LABOR RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS

Matling Industrial vs CorosFacts: VP for finance filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal against Matling. Petitioners averred that the SEC has jurisidiction over the complaint due to the controversy being intra-corporate as the respondent was a member of Matling’s Board of Directors aside from being its VP for Fin and Admin prior to his termination. Respondent opposed such, insisting that his status as a member of Matling’s BOD was doubtful considering that he had not been formally elected as such; that he did not own a single share of stock in Matling, considering that he had been made to sign in blank and undated indorsement of the Cert of stock; that Matling had taken back and retained the COS in its custodu; and that even assuming that he had been a Dir of Matling, he had been removed as the VP for fin and admin, not as Dir, a fact that the notice of his termination showed.

Issue: WON the complaint for illegal dismissal is cognizable by LA or RTC

Held:The illegal dismissal of an officer or other employee of a private

employer is properly cognizable by the LA pursuant to Art. 223 of the LC.

Where the complaint for illegal dismissal concerns a corporate officer the controversy falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC because the controversy arises out of intra-corporate or partnership relations.

The corporate officers are the President, Secretary, Treasurer and such other officers as may be provided for in the By-Laws. The corporate officers enumerated in the by-laws are the exclusive officers of the corporation and the Board has no power to create other offices without amending first the corporate by-laws. However, the Board may create appointive positions other than the positions of Corporate officers but the persons occupying such positions are not considered as corporate officers within the meaning of Sec 25 of the Corporation Code and are not empowered to exercise the functions of the corporate officers, except those functions lawfully delegated to them. Their functions and duties are to be determined by the BOD/Trustees.

In order to determine whether a dispute constitutes an intra-corporate controversy or not, the Court considers two elements instead, namely: (a) the status or relationship of the parties; and (b) the nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy.

Gen. milling corp vs caFACTS:

In its two plants located at Cebu City and Lapu-Lapu City, petitioner General Milling Corporation (GMC) employed 190 workers. They were all members of private respondent General Milling Corporation Independent Labor Union. On April 28, 1989, GMC and the union concluded a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which included the issue of representation effective for a term of three years. The day before the expiration of the CBA, the union sent GMC a proposed CBA, with a request that a counter-proposal be submitted within ten (10) days. However, GMC had received collective and individual letters from workers who stated that they had withdrawn from their union membership, on grounds of religious affiliation and personal differences. Believing that the union no longer had standing to negotiate a CBA, GMC did not send any counter-proposal.On December 16, 1991, GMC wrote a letter to the union’s officers, Rito Mangubat and Victor Lastimoso. The letter stated that it felt there was no basis to negotiate with a union which no longer existed, but that management was nonetheless always willing to dialogue with them on matters of common concern and was open to suggestions on how the company may improve its operations. In answer, the union officers wrote a letter dated December 19, 1991 disclaiming any massive

disaffiliation or resignation from the union and submitted a manifesto, signed by its members, stating that they had not withdrawn from the union.NLRC held that the action of GMC in not negotiating was ULP.

ISSUE: WON the company (GMC) should have entered into collective bargaining with the union

HELD: The law mandates that the representation provision of a CBA

should last for five years. The relation between labor and management should be undisturbed until the last 60 days of the fifth year. Hence, it is indisputable that when the union requested for a renegotiation of the economic terms of the CBA on November 29, 1991, it was still the certified collective bargaining agent of the workers, because it was seeking said renegotiation within five (5) years from the date of effectivity of the CBA on December 1, 1988. The union’s proposal was also submitted within the prescribed 3-year period from the date of effectivity of the CBA, albeit just before the last day of said period. It was obvious that GMC had no valid reason to refuse to negotiate in good faith with the union. For refusing to send a counter-proposal to the union and to bargain anew on the economic terms of the CBA, the company committed an unfair labor practice under Article 248 of the Labor Code.

ART. 253-A. Terms of a collective bargaining agreement. – Any Collective Bargaining Agreement that the parties may enter into shall, insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, be for a term of five (5) years. No petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent shall be entertained and no certification election shall be conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment outside of the sixty-day period immediately before the date of expiry of such five year term of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. All other provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement shall be renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its execution….

ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. – It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice:(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code;

Under Article 252 abovecited, both parties are required to perform their mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement. The union lived up to this obligation when it presented proposals for a new CBA to GMC within three (3) years from the effectivity of the original CBA. But GMC failed in its duty under Article 252. What it did was to devise a flimsy excuse, by questioning the existence of the union and the status of its membership to prevent any negotiation.

ART. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. – The following procedures shall be observed in collective bargaining:(a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written notice upon the other party with a statement of its proposals. The other party shall make a reply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such notice.

GMC’s failure to make a timely reply to the proposals presented by the union is indicative of its utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union. Its excuse that it felt the union no longer represented the workers, was mainly dilatory as it turned out to be utterly baseless.

Failing to comply with the mandatory obligation to submit a reply to the union’s proposals, GMC violated its duty to bargain collectively, making it liable for unfair labor practice.

COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN vs. ASSOCIATION OF EMPLOYEES AND FACULTIES OF LETRANFacts:

During the renegotiation of the respondent unions Collective Bargaining Agreement with the petitioner, Eleonor Ambas emerged as the newly elected President of the union. Ambas wanted to continue the renegotiation of the CBA but petitioner, through Fr. Edwin Lao, claimed that the CBA was already prepared for signing by the parties. However, the union members rejected the said CBA. Thereafter, petitioner accused the union officers of bargaining in bad faith before the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of the petitioner. This decision was reversed on appeal with the NLRC.

The parties later agreed to disregard the unsigned CBA and to start negotiation on new five-year CBA. During the pendency of approval of proposals, Ambas was informed that her work schedule was being changed. Ambas protested and requested management to submit the issue to a grievance machinery under the old CBA.

After the petitioner’s inaction on the CBA, the union filed a notice to strike. After meeting with the NCMB to discuss the ground rules for renegotiation, Ambas received a letter dismissing her for alleged insubordination. The petitioner then ceased negotiations when it received news that another labor organization had filed a petition for certification.

The union finally struck, but the Secretary of Labor and Employment ordered them to return to work and for petitioner to accept them back. The Secretary of Labor and Employment later rendered judgement that the petitioner had been guilty of unfair labor practice. The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the former.

Issue(s):1. Whether petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by

refusing to bargain with the union when it unilaterally suspended the ongoing negotiations for a new CBA; and

2. Whether the termination of the union president amounts to an interference of the employees’ right to self-organization.

Held:The Supreme Court found the petition unmeritorious.

1. The petitioner’s failure to act upon the submitted CBA proposal within the ten-day period exemplified in Article 250 of the Labor Code is a clear violation of the governing procedure of collective bargaining. As the Court has held in Kiok Loy vs. NLRC, the company’s refusal to make counter-proposal to the union’s proposed CBA is an indication of bad faith. Moreover, the succeeding events are obvious signs that the petitioner had merely been employing delaying tactics to the passage of the proposed CBA. Moreover, in order to allow the employer to validly suspend the bargaining process, there must be a valid petition for certification election raising a legitimate representation issue. Hence, the mere filing of a petition for certification election does not ipso facto justify the suspension of negotiation by the employer.

2. The factual backdrop of the termination of Ambas led the Court to no other conclusion that she was dismissed in order to strip the union of a leader who would fight for the right of her co-workers in the bargaining table. While the Court recognizes the right of the employer to terminate the services of an employee for a just or authorized cause, nevertheless, the dismissal of employees must be made within the parameters of aw and pursuant to the tenets of equity and fair play. Even assuming arguendo that Ambas was guilty of insubordination, such disobedience was not a valid ground to terminate her employment. When the exercise of the management to discipline its employees tends to interfere with the employees’ right to self-

organization, it amounts to union-busting and is therefore a prohibited act.

St. Luke’s Medical vs TorresHELD:

A deadlock developed during CBA negotiations between management unions. The Secretary assumed jurisdiction and ordered the retroaction of the CBA to the date of expiration of the previous CBS. The Court ratiocinated thus: In the absence of a specific provision of law prohibiting retroactive of the effectivity of arbitral awards issued by the Secretary pursuant to article 263(g) of the Labor Code, public respondent is deemed vested with the plenary and discretionary powers to determine the effectivity thereof.

In general, a CBA negotiated within six months after the expiration of the existing CBA retroacts to the day immediately following such date and if agreed thereafter, the effectivity depends on the agreement of the parties. On the other hand, the law is silent as to the retroactivity of a CBA arbitral award or that granted not by virtue of the mutual agreement of the parties but by intervention of the government. In the absence of a CBA, the Secretary’s determination of the date of retroactivity as part of his discretionary powers over arbitral awards shall control.

Pier 8 Arrastre vs ConfessorHeld:

Effectivity of the CBA. The Union demands that the CBA should be fully retroactive to 28 November 1991. The Company is opposed on the ground that under Article 253-A of the labor code, the six-month period within which the parties must come to an agreement so that the same will be automatically retroactive is long past.The Union's demand for full retroactivity, we note, will result in undue financial burden to the Company. On the other hand, the Company's reliance on Article 253-A is misplaced as this applies only to the renegotiated terms of an existing CBA. Here, the deadlock arose from negotiations for a new CBA.

These considered, the CBA shall be effective from the time we assumed jurisdiction over the dispute, that is, on 22 September 1992, and shall remain e effective for five (5) years thereafter. It shall be understood that except for the representation aspect all other provisions thereof shall be renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its effectivity, consistently with Article 253-A of the Labor Code.

MERALCO vs QUISUMBINGIn general, a CBA negotiated within six months after the expiration of

the existing CBA retroacts to the day immediately following such date and if agreed thereafter, the effectivity depends on the agreement of the parties.18 On the other hand, the law is silent as to the retroactivity of a CBA arbitral award or that granted not by virtue of the mutual agreement of the parties but by intervention of the government. Despite the silence of the law, the Court rules herein that CBA arbitral awards granted after six months from the expiration of the last CBA shall retroact to such time agreed upon by both employer and the employees or their union. Absent such an agreement as to retroactivity, the award shall retroact to the first day after the six-month period following the expiration of the last day of the CBA should there be one. In the absence of a CBA, the Secretary's determination of the date of retroactivity as part of his discretionary powers over arbitral awards shall control.