Labor Migration in Asia 1991

8/11/2019 Labor Migration in Asia 1991

1/19

Labor Migration in AsiaAuthor(s): Philip L. MartinSource: International Migration Review, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Spring, 1991), pp. 176-193Published by: The Center for Migration Studies of New York, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2546239

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2/19

CONFERENCE

REPORT

Labor

Migration

in Asia

Philip

L. Martin1

University of California,

Davis

International

migration

for

employment

is

usually

studied

by examining

countries

that

export

labor to or

that receive

foreign

workers in Western

Europe, North America, and in the Middle East. Other labor migrations are

usually

considered

special

cases

(migration

into South

Africa),

a

continua?

tion of historical

patterns

(migration

across

African

borders),

or

relatively

small

labor

migrations

(migration

into

Singapore). Among

the three

major

economic

regions

that dominate

world economic

output

and trade?the

U.S.-led

North

American

region,

the German-led

European

region,

and the

Japanese-led

Asian

region?international

migration

for

employment

within

Asia has

been

conspicuous by

its absence

from

literature.2

A recent

conference

sponsored

by

the

United Nations Center for Re?

gional Development (UNCRD)

in

Nagoya, Japan

examined the

growing

importance

of labor

migration

for four

major

Asian

labor

importers (Japan,

Hong Kong,

Malaysia,

and

Singapore)

and five

major

labor

exporters

(Bangladesh,

Korea,

Pakistan,

Philippines,

and

Thailand).3

Although

reli?

able

data

are

unavailable,

the four

major importing

countries include over

one million

foreign

workers

and

persisting

differences

in

wages, unemploy?

ment,

and economic

growth

rates,

as well as

events in

the

Middle East

which

have reduced the demand for

foreign

workers

there,

are

expected

to make

international labor

migration

within Asia an

increasingly

important phe?

nomenon.4

1

Professor

f

Agricultural

conomics

at the

University

f

California,

avis.

2

There have been

articles n labor

migration

nto

Singapore,

nd

the

effects

f

emigration

on abor

exporters

uch as

the

Philippines,

utAsian abor

migration

s

coveredmost

extensively

in

the

clipping

ervice

provided

by

Abella since

1986.

3

Taiwan

s also

debating

whether o

import

oreign

workers,

ut

was

not

represented

t the

conference.

Neither

wereAustralia nd

New

Zealand,

which re not

consideredAsian countries.

China

has almost100

companies

that

export

workers,

sually

s

project-tied

orkers

o build a

steel mill n

Africa;

or

example,

t

too was not

represented

t the

conference.

Half of these

foreign

workers re

llegal

liens n

Malaysia.

Japan

has

81,000

egal

foreign

workers, 5,000foreigntudentsnd trainees,nd an estimated 00,000to200,000 llegal liens.

176 IMR Volume

xxv,

No.

1


3/19

CONFERENCE

REPORT 177

The conference concluded that international

labor

migration

would

increase within

Asia

because

the

tight

labor

markets and

rising wages

which

have stimulated

Japanese

investment in other Asian

nations,

for

example,

have

not

been sufficient to

eliminate

migration

push

and

pull

forces

(Abella,

1990).

Japan

has

aggressively

invested

throughout

Asia,

taking

capital

and

jobs

to workers instead

of

improving

workers,

but

Japan

has not

eliminated

labor

shortages

within

the

country.5 Hong Kong

was

not as

successful

as

Japan

at

restricting

labor

immigration,

so

its

manufacturing

industries

have

been

slower to restructure.

Singapore

very

effectively

controls

foreign

workers,

but

has

not

yet

decided

exactly

how

quickly

to

force

lower-wage

industries

to

go

abroad.

Finally,

booming

Malaysia

has

very

little control

over immigration and a segmented labor market which complicates the job

restructuring process.

Labor

shortages

are

occurring

in

Singapore,

Hong

Kong, Japan, Malaysia,

and Korea

as

foreign

worker

employment

in the

Middle

East is

shrinking,

so the

Philippines,

Thailand,

Bangladesh,

and

Pakistan

are

looking

with renewed

interest

to

send workers to Asian labor

markets such as

Japan.

There is

an

important

background

factor

in all

discussions of future

labor

migration

within

Asia: China

has

1.2

billion

people

and

several

corporations

which send Chinese workers

abroad.

If

labor-short

countries

decide

to recruit unskilled

Asian

workers,

and Chinese

workers are made

available,

China

is

expected

to

be able to

supply

all

of the

foreign

workers

required by

Asian labor

importers.

LABOR

IMPORTERS

Japan

Japan

is Asia's economic locomotive.

During

the

early

1970s,

labor

short?

ages

in

manufacturing prompted

a debate

over the need for

guestworkers,

but cultural

insularity prevented

employers

from

winning approval

for

foreign workers before the 1973 oil price hikes brought about a recession

and industrial

restructuring

to make

foreign

workers

unnecessary.

In the

Hong Kong

has about

75,000

legal foreign

workers nd

perhaps

20,000

illegal

aliens.

Malaysia

has

400,000

to

800,000

mostly

llegal

lien

workers.

Singapore

has

150,000

egal

foreign

workers.

There

are about 15 million

foreigners

n

Western

European

countries

nd

about

15 million

foreigners

n

North

America.

Between

1986 and

1989

Japan

nvested

11

billion

n three

fast-growing

sian economies

with combined

population

of

250

million?Malaysia,

Thailand,

and

Indonesia.

Korea, Taiwan,

Hong

Kong,

and

Singapore

the

4

Tigers)

nvested

nother

11

billion n

these

ountries,

ersus

a U.S. investment f

$3

billion.A

recent rticle

predicted

he

600 million

people

in

Western

Pacific?Japan,

he4

Tigers,

ASEAN,

and coastal Chinese

provinces

Guangdong

and

Fujian?

would

surpass

the EC and

North

America

n economic

activity

within

generation

Tanzer,

1990).


4/19

178

INTERNATIONAL

MIGRATION

REVIEW

early

1980s,

Japan

was

considered the

best

example

of an

industrial

country

that

enjoyed rapid

economic

growth

without

foreign

workers

(Reubens,

1982).6

However,

since

the

mid-1980s,

there have once

again

been com?

plaints

from

employers

of

labor

shortages;

for

example,

in

May

1990,

the

Japan

Food Service Association

urged

the

government

to

admit

up

to

600,000

unskilled

workers on two to

three-year

contracts.

Illegal

immi?

grants

have

begun

to arrive

while the

government

debates how

to

respond

to labor

shortage

complaints.

There

were

2,000

illegal

aliens

apprehended

in

1983,

14,000

in

1988,

and

23,000

in

1989,

and in 1990 there are an

estimated

100,000

to

200,000

illegal

alien workers in

Japan.7

The men?

from the

Philippines, Bangladesh, Pakistan,

and China?find unskilled

jobs

in

construction

and small factories

while the women?from

Thailand,

Taiwan,

and the

Philippines?work

as

entertainers

in bars and restaurants

and as maids.

Japan

has an

alien

worker

admissions

system

which

requires employers

to

request

the

Immigration

Bureau of

the

Ministry

of

Justice

to

certify

that

a

particular

alien worker is

needed.

The

employer supplies supporting

documentation,

and

the

Immigration

Bureau

makes

a

decision

on

the

employer's

application

without

any

formal consultation

with the

Ministry

of Labor. If the Immigration Bureau approves the employer's request, it

issues

a

certificate

which

permits

the

alien worker to secure the

appropriate

visa

from

a

Japanese

consulate before

departing

for

Japan.

Most

temporary

employment

visas

are for three

years

or

less.

This admissions

system

applies

to all

foreign

workers,

but

requests

to

import

unskilled alien

workers

are

routinely

denied.8

Instead of

approving

the

admission

of

unskilled

alien

workers,

labor-short

Japanese employers

have been advised

by

the

government

to recruit older

and

disadvantaged

Reubens

1982:750)

reviewed

wo

explanations

or

Japan's exceptional nondependence

on unskilled oreignworkers: ight ontrols okeepthem utdespitepushand pullfactors,nd

factors

within

Japan

which

1)

nunimize

he

mount

of

ow-level

work;

nd

2)

integrate

ow-level

jobs

into the

abor

market

o

that

domesticworkerswould

take them.

The

Ministry

f

Justice

estimated

hat

100,000

aliens

were in

Japan

longer

than

they

should have

been

in mid-1989.

Shimada

(1990:3)

estimates

hat,

with the additionof

persons

legally

n

Japan

as

students,

or

example,

but

who violate

the

terms

f their

stayby

working,

there

re severalhundred

thousand

llegal

lien

workers.

8

There

are

limited

xceptions.

The

foreign

hildren r

spouses

of

Japanese

citizens

can

enter

Japan

fairly

asily

to

work

there,

nd there are an estimated

0,000

to

50,000

South

Americans

of

Japanese

descent

employed

n

the

Japanese

auto

parts

and

apparel

industries.

Another imited

exception

re

foreign?usuallyFilipino?brides

mported yJapanese

farmers

to be both wives

and

farmworkers.

everal hundred

have been

imported,

ut success has been

mixed,

n

part

because husband and wife

ften

have

no

common

anguage.


5/19

CONFERENCE

REPORT

179

workers or to restructure

jobs

so

that

unskilled

foreign

workers are not

needed.

Japanese

employers

who cannot find unskilled

Japanese

workers have

been

turning

to

illegal foreign

workers

instead

of

restructuring. Filipino

women

have been

imported

legally

as

singers

and entertainers for

a

decade,

and the

networks

established

by

this

immigration

have been

expanded

to

import

illegal

alien men

for construction

and

manufacturing jobs,

especially

to

small

and

medium-sized

manufacturing

firms such

as

foundries.9 In

1987,

about 70

percent

of the

11,300

illegal

aliens who

were

apprehended

while

working

in

Japan

were from the

Philippines.

Most

illegal

alien workers

arrive

on

90-day

tourist visas and then

go

to work as unskilled and semi?

skilled workers in small

manufacturing plants.

Most earn about 60

percent

of what

Japanese

workers in

comparable jobs

earn,

although

one

study

reported

that the

illegal

aliens earned more than

comparable

Japanese

workers

($7.30

versus

$5.40

hourly)

because

they

had no

job

security (Koga,

1990).

This

case

study

of

subcontractors with

less than 30

employees

who

made

parts

for auto manufacturer

Fuji

found

that

4,000

to

5,000

illegal

Bangladeshi

workers

were

up

to

half of

these small

firms' work

forces,

and

their

illegal

presence

was

known

and tolerated

because,

without

them,

these

small

firms could

not survive

(Koga,

1990).

After

the

June

1990

employer

sanctions

law,

these

employers

switched to Brazilian workers of

Japanese

ancestry,

who are

permitted

to live and work in

Japan

without

restriction.

Most

illegal

aliens

arrive

in

Japan

as tourists and then

work,

but there

are

also

65,000

foreign

students and trainees in

Japan.

In some

cases,

labor

recruiters

sign up

Chinese or Korean

20

to 30

year-olds

for

Japanese

language training

and

then

put

the students to work

as soon as

they

arrive

in

Japan.

These students want to

work in

Japan,

and

usually

see the

tuition

payment

as the

price

of

getting

into

Japan

to work.

Immigration

to

Japan

is

regulated

by

the

Immigration

Control

and

Refugee

Recognition

Act

(ICRRA)

of

1952.10ICRRA,

which

went into

effect

on

June

1, 1990,

included sanctions

of

2

million

yen

(about $15,000)

for

every

illegal

alien hired

by

an

employer. Despite

the

labor

shortage

debate,

9

Most of the

81,407

legal

foreign

workers

granted

visas to work n

Japan

in 1988 were

entertainers

71,000).

The next

argest

groups

were

business executives

6,100)

and

language

teachers

2,000).

There

were

only

30,000

legal foreign

workers

n

1980,

including

20,000

entertainers.

10

Japan

requires

refugees

to have

documentaryproof

of

political persecution

and

a

Japanese

guarantor. mmigration

tatistics how

that

Japan

accepted

an

average

30

refugees

yearly ince 1982. Kono (1990) reports hat130,000refugees rrived nJapanbetween 1975

and

1989,

and that

63,000

have

been resetded

n third

ountries; 5,000

are

awaiting

esetde-

ment n

refugee

amps;

and

25,000

are setded n

Japan.


6/19

180

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

REVIEW

the

June

1990

amendments

do

not deal

with

unskilled

guestworker migra?

tion

because

the issues

needed

to be discussed further

(Suwa, 1990:6).

However,

the

June

1990 amendments are

expected

to

make it

easier

for

professional

and

skilled workers

to

work in

Japan

because

they

force

the

Immigration

Bureau

of

the

Ministry

of

Justice

to

publish

its heretofore

unpublished

entry

requirements

and to

act

quickly

on

employer requests

to

admit and

employ foreigners?administratively,

the Bureau now has

less

discretionary

authority

to

deny

entry

to

lawyers

and

accountants

who

wish

to

work

in

Japan.

Ten

additional

occupations

are

permitted

to

employ

foreign

workers,

including

lawyers

and

accountants,

doctors and

nurses,

and

research

and

education,

bringing

the total to

28.

While

making

it easier for

professionals

to

work in

Japan,

the

June

1990

amendments

toughened

sanctions

against employers

and

brokers of

illegal

aliens. Most

unskilled

illegal

aliens are

recruited

by

labor

brokers,

enter

Japan

as

tourists and

they

are then

taken

to

a

Japanese employer

who

has

arranged

with the

labor

broker

for their

employment.11

The

new

2

million

yen

fine and

prison

terms of

up

to three

years

apply

to

foreign

and

Japanese

labor

brokers

and

Japanese employers

who

knowingly

hire

illegal

aliens.

Illegal

aliens

working

in

Japan

remain

subject

to fines

of

up

to

300,000

yen

(about $2,500)

and

up

to

three-year prison

terms.

The

June

1990 amendments caused confusion and concern

among

work?

ers and

employers

in the

construction,

shipping,

and restaurant

industries.

Several

newspapers

reported falsely

that

all

illegal

alien

workers

would

be

imprisoned,

although only illegal

aliens

entering

after

June

1,

1990 were

threatened with

imprisonment,

and

an

estimated

20,000

left

Japan

after

March 1990

(Suwa, 1990:7).

The

resulting

labor

shortage

complaints

from

small and medium-sized

businesses

prompted

a

flurry

of

government

activ?

ities.

A

May

1990

government

survey

of

10,000

employers

reported

that

15

percent

hired

foreign

workers

within the

past

two

years

and that

one-third

would like

to hire more

foreign

workers.

About half

of

the

foreign

workers

employed

by

these businesses were students.

Foreign

students

are

allowed

to

work

twenty

hours

per

week in

Japan,

but

70

percent

in

this

survey

were

illegal

aliens because

they

exceeded

this

limit. The number

of

foreign

students

and

trainees

jumped during

the

1980s from

less

than

20,000

in

1983

to

65,000

in 1988.12

11

Japan

had

2.4

millionbusiness and tourist rrivals n

1988,

a

doubling

from

1.2

million

in 1980. Over one third

of these

arrivals

were from

Korea

and Taiwan. About 8.4 million

Japanese

traveled

broad n 1988. Of the

1.9 million

new

or first ime rrivals n

Japan

n

1988,

about halfweretouristsnd one-thirdwerebusinessvisitors.

12

Trainees n

Japan

are not

permitted

o

be

paid

wages

even

if

they

receive

on-the-job

training.

he number

of trainees

oubled

to

23,000

between 1983

and 1988.


7/19

CONFERENCE

REPORT

181

Japan

is

in the

midst

of

a

vigorous

debate over

foreign

workers. On the

one side are

mosdy

small

employers

who face increased international

competition,

a

reduced

number of

entry-level Japanese

workers for

un?

skilled

jobs,

and the

knowledge

that there are millions of

Filipino,

Bangladeshi,

and

Chinese

workers

who are

eager

to fill unskilled

jobs

in

Japan.

On the

other side are the

Japanese

who

note

that

Japan

has done

a

poor

job

of

integrating

the

700,000

second and third

generation

descen?

dants of

Koreans

imported

before

and

during

World War

II,

and

they

note

the failure of

European

countries to

get

their

guestworkers

to

leave and

doubt

that

Japan

can

prevent

unskilled

workers from

setding.13*

14

The

government

has

established a

ten-member Commission

to

study

a

consensus

solution to labor

shortage

complaints.

The

Japanese

Labor

Min?

istry opposes

guestworkers?it

projects

a

shortage

of

500,000

workers

during

the

1990s,

but then

notes that economic reforms

could

help

to

eliminate

labor

shortages

without

immigration.

For

example,

reducing

agricultural

protections

for

Japan's

4

million farmers

could

provide

addi?

tional workers

for

labor-short

industry

and services.15

Similarly,

restructur?

ing

the distribution

and

retail

sector

from small

family-operated

businesses

into

U.S.-style

superstores

would

free

up many

of the

family

workers.

Japan's ruling

Liberal-Democratic

Party

is reluctant to

encourage

labor-dis?

placing

structural

changes

in

agriculture

and

retailing,

two of

its

pillars

of

support.

The

Japanese

government

has so

far resisted

pleas

for

easy employer

access to unskilled

foreign

workers.

Instead,

a

government

booklet for small

13

Japan occupied

Korea from

910 to theend

ofWorldWar I. Mostofthe

700,000

Koreans

in

Japan

have

refused o

give

up

theirKorean

nationality,

nd

they

etain heirKorean names.

As

foreigners

n

Japan, they

must

be

fingerprinted

nd

carry

lien

registration

ards. Third-

generation

Koreans?there

were four n

May

1990?will no

longer

have to

be

fingerprinted

{New

York

imes,

May

2,

1990,

p.

A5).

Some

internationaUy-minded

apanese

believe that

guestworkersmight

egin

to

change

Japanese

prejudices

gainst

utsiders.

However,

ther

Japanese

believe thatracial

homogeneity

is a

key

o

Japan's

economic

uccess,

and thatracial and ethnic

diversity

urtAmerica's

ability

to

compete.

Former

Prime MinisterNakasone in 1986 said that

Blacks,

Puerto

Ricans,

and

Mexicans

keep

average

U.S. educational evels

low,

and

Justice

Minister

Kajiyama

n

1990

justified

ounding-up

llegal

lien Thai

prostitutes

y

drawing

parallel

to

Blacks,

rguing

hat

when Blacks move

n,

whites

re

forced ut.

The United

States

imposed

a land reform n

Japan

afterWorld

War II which

has

given

Japan

about 4.5

million

arms wned

by

their

operators.

These farms

verage

about 1 hectare

or

2.5

acres each. Almost

90

percent

of

these

farmers re

part-time perators

whose nonfarm

income xceeds their armncome; n densely-populated apan,farmers an commute o urban

jobs

and farm n weekends.

Many

full-timearmers re

workers

who retired rom

rban

obs

in

their

0s;

their

verage

age

is 56.

However,

halfof

the

farm

work

force

s women

n their 0s.


8/19

182

INTERNATIONAL

MIGRATION

REVIEW

and medium-sized

employers offering

3k

jobs?dangerous

(Kiken),

dirty

(Kitani),

and

demanding

or hard

(Kitsui)?told

the

employers

that

they

should

correct labor market mismatches

with new

technology

and

by

making

better use

of

women and older

Japanese

workers

and not

depend

on

foreign

workers.

However,

many

academicians

and

journalists

discuss

the

inevitability

of

foreign

labor

and

foreign

workers:

neighbors

of

tomorrow

(Shimada,

1990:17-18).

Academic

working

papers

assert that

as

long

as

Japan

has a

demand for

labor,

a

large

scale

inflow

of

migrant

workers from Asia is inevitable

(Morita, 1990:11)

and

then

they

outline

work-and-learn

or

other

guestworker programs

that admit

foreign

workers

but minimize

their

negative

effects,

including

their

settlement in

Japan.

The

sense that

foreign

workers are inevitable is

widespread:

there seems to be a

belief that

an

international and

open economy

should

include

foreign

workers. The

government,

unions,

and

the

population

at

large

seem to be

opposed

to the call for

guestworkers

made

by

business and

some

academi?

cians,

but

a research

institute

funded

by

the

Japanese

Labor Union Confed?

eration,

which

opposes

the admission

of unskilled

foreign

workers,

recommended in October 1990 the admission

of

unskilled

foreign

work?

ers.16

Japan

has the

world's lowest

fertility

rate and

longest

life

expectancy,

guaranteeing labor shortage complaints for the foreseeable future if eco?

nomic

growth

remains

high

(Martin,

1989).

Unemployment

has been

at

2

to 3

percent

during

the

1980s,

and is not

threatening

to

rise

despite

the

energy

price

hikes

occurring

in the fall of 1990. If

Japan

were to

import

guestworkers,

and

if it added 10

percent

of

foreign

workers

to its

work force

(as

many

European

countries did in the

early

1970s)

Japan

would

have 6

million

foreign

workers.

Singapore

The

city-state

of

Singapore

has

doubled

its

foreign

work force from

72,000

in 1970 to

150,000

in

1990,

and reduced its

dependence

on

Malays,

who

are

now

half

of

Singapore's foreign

workers

(Fong,

1990).

Most of

Singapore's

foreign

workers

are

unskilled;

perhaps

25,000

are

skilled and

professional

workers.

Singapore

has

one of

the most interventionist

guestworker

policies

in the world:

it has

separate

systems

for

professional

and

unskilled

foreign

workers,

and its

micro

management

of unskilled

foreign

workers includes

sectoral limitations

(they

can work

only

in

hotels,

manufacturing,

construc?

tion, and as domestic maids), per worker levies or taxes to equalize the cost

of

foreign

and

domestic workers

(S$300

in

August

1990),

and a

ceiling

of

16

WallStreet

Journal,

October

16, 1990,

p.

A27.


9/19

CONFERENCE

REPORT 183

70

percent foreign

workers

in

any

firm

(but

no

quota

on

the

total

number

of

foreign

workers in the

country).17 Singapore

enforces

foreign

worker

rotation,

increasing

the

training,

transportation,

and tax costs

of

employers,

but rotation maintains

foreign

workers

as a

flexible

buffer

work force that

can be

sent

home

when

they

are no

longer

needed. Unskilled

foreign

workers

are

not

permitted

to settle or to

bring

their families

to

Singapore,

and

even

marriage

to

a

Singaporean

does not confer an automatic

right

of

residence in

Singapore.

As the number of unskilled

foreign

workers rose

during

the

1970s,

Singapore

in

1981

announced

a

plan

to

stop recruiting

unskilled

foreign

workers

by

1991.

Employers protested

and,

instead of

shrinking,

the

num?

ber of

foreign

workers

jumped

to

160,000

or 11

percent

of the work force

in

1984.

The 1986 recession

sent

50,000

foreign

workers

home,

but

by

1989

their number

was back

up

to

161,000.

Illegal

immigration

became

a

problem

in the

1980s.

In

March

1989,

Singapore

announced that

illegal

aliens

would receive

a

mandatory

three-

month

jail

term and

three

strokes

of

the cane.18 An

amnesty

before the

law

came into

effect

produced

11,800

illegal

aliens,

about half

Thais,

more

than

expected.

However,

when a Thai

illegal

alien worker was sentenced

in

June

1989 to three months in

jail

and three-cane

strokes,

the

Thai

government

protested the

corporal punishment

and pointed out that Singaporean em?

ployers

were not

subject

to cane strokes for

knowingly

hiring

illegal

aliens.

In

July-August

1989,

Singapore

had a

second

amnesty,

which

produced

another 500

illegal

aliens,

and

Singapore

announced that henceforth

em?

ployers

who

knowingly

hire five or more

illegal

alien workers

would be

caned.

In

contrast

to

its

tightly

regulated

unskilled

foreign

worker

program,

Singapore

has

a liberal

policy

toward

skilled and

professional foreign

workers. In

August

1989,

Singapore

announced

that

college-educated

per?

sons earning at least S$ 1,500 per month could apply for permanent resi?

dence.

This

policy

was

designed

to attract

educated

Hong Kong

residents,

where it has been received

enthusiastically,

and

may

send

25,000

immigrant

families or

100,000

people

to

Singapore

in the 1990s.

Skilled

Hong

Kong

residents

may

receive the

right

to

immigrate

immediately,

but

they

do not

17

$1.00

U.S.

equaled

S$1.70

in

November

1990.

18

Cane strokes re

applied

with

wood

stick

oaked

n

water,

o

that

he flesh s

removed,

leaving

a

permanent

scar.

Caning

often eads to

hospitalization.

It

is

believed that

the

Singaporean

government

as

located and

caned

several

llegal

alien

workers ince the

summer

1989

dispute

with

Thailand,

but

canings

are no

longer publicized

because

they

are

not a

deterrent o someIndian and Thai

workers,

or

example.

No

employer

has

yet

been

caned,

so

it s

not

yet

resolved

exactly

who an

employer

s;

for

example,

who in a

corporation

s to be

caned

if five

r

more

llegal

aliens are

found

employed?


10/19

184

INTERNATIONAL

MIGRATION

REVIEW

have to move to

Singapore

for five

years.

There

is

some concern that such

an influx of Chinese

immigrants may upset Singapore's

ethnic

balance,

which is

currendy

three-quarters

Chinese.

Singapore

has

a two-tiered

foreign

worker

policy,

encouraging

the

entry

and setdement of skilled

immigrants

and

permitting

the

entry

of unskilled workers but

discouraging

their settlement. Few

other

governments

have

Singapore's

confidence that

foreign

workers

can

be

regulated exacdy

as

anticipated.

However,

in an

apparent

concession to setdement

pressures,

Singapore

is

encouraging

unskilled

foreign

workers

to

upgrade

their

skills

and then

settle

in

Singa?

pore.

The

major problems

in

Singapore

are the

foreign

worker

levy

and the

foreign policy consequences of Singapore's illegal alien policies. Singapore

has no minimum

wage,

so when the

government

raised the

foreign

worker

levy

to

discourage

the recruitment

of

unskilled

workers,

employers

simply

cut

wages

to

recoup

the

levy

from

the

foreign

workers

they

continued

to

import;

in

construction,

for

example,

wages

fell from

S$23

daily

to

S$16

daily.

A tax

levy designed

to

change

employer

behavior

away

from reliance

on unskilled

foreign

workers fails

if

employers

simply

take

the

levy

from

the

workers,

so the

Singapore

levy

has

become,

in most

cases,

simply

a

way

to reduce the

wages

earned

by foreign

workers without

discouraging

em?

ployers from hiring them. Second, Singapore did not anticipate the vigorous

1989 Thai

protests

to

caning illegal

aliens.

Singapore

learned

that its

domestic

management

of

foreign

workers had

foreign policy consequences.

Hong Kong

Like

Singapore,

Hong

Kong

has had a

tight

labor market since

the

1970s?a

two-tiered

foreign

worker

policy

with

easy entry

of skilled and

professional

workers,

and the

emigration

to the

United

States,

Canada,

and Australia of

some

of

its

professionals

(Yeh, 1990).

However,

most of

Hong Kong's

immigrants come from China, and Hong Kong will become a Special

Administrative

Region

of China on

July

1,

1997.

Until October

1980,

Hong

Kong

had a

touch base

policy

toward

Chinese

nationals?illegal

aliens

that

got

into

Hong Kong

could remain as

legal immigrants.

However,

when

170,000

Chinese arrived

in

1979,

the

squatter population

jumped

from

300,000

in

1978 to

750,000

in 1980 and

Hong Kong toughened

its

policies

toward

Chinese nationals.

Hong

Kong employers wishing

to

hire

skilled

and

professional

workers

can

get

an

approval

or

certification from

the Director of

Immigration

for

the alien they wish to hire, and the alien then gets an employment visa.19

Until

1990,

the

only

unskilled workers admitted

to

Hong Kong

were

39

United

Kingdom

passport

holders an enter nd

work n

Hong Kong

without estriction.


11/19

CONFERENCE

REPORT

185

domestic

helpers

or maids.

Originally begun

as a

program

to

get English-

speaking

maids

for

English-speaking

families,

the

number

of

newly

admit?

ted

legal

maids

jumped

from

2,000

in 1976

to

44,000

in

1989,

bringing

the

total to

58,000,

mostly Filipinos. Employers

must

provide

housing

and

pay

a

minimum

wage

of

HK$3,000

per

month,

and

the

government

has a

dispute

resolution

service

to

deal

with

complaints

from

maids.20

Filipino

maids in

Singapore

and

Hong Kong

also

have a union

to

represent

them.

In

May

1989,

the

Hong Kong government

announced

a

program

to

import up

to

3,000

skilled workers in

a

transitional

program

while

compa?

nies

complaining

of

labor

shortages developed

labor-saving

or

training

alternatives.

However,

employers

immediately

applied

for

8,500 workers,

and in

May

1990 the

government

responded

with an

enlarged program

to

admit

up

to

14,700

skilled and semiskilled

workers?2,700

skilled

workers,

10,000

semiskilled

(machine

operators

with

at least one

year's

experience),

and

2,000

airport

construction workers.

These

foreign

workers must be

housed

by

the

employer

for free or at

a

cost

regulated by

the

government

and be

paid wages

at least

equal

to the median

wage published

by

the

government

for

that

occupation.

After

six

months,

Hong

Kong employers

applied

for

57,000

foreign

workers,

or four times the

annual

quota,

launch?

ing

a

debate

over

whether more

foreign

workers should be admitted.

Hong Kong and Singapore are small economies (Hong Kong has a labor

force

of almost

3

million,

Singapore

has 1.5

million)

that are successful

manufacturing export

platforms;

that

is,

materials and

components

are

brought

to both

countries, assembled,

and then

exported.

In

both

areas,

there

have been

persisting

labor

shortages

that were

usually

satisfied

by

importing

workers from a

neighboring

country?China

to

Hong Kong,

and

Malaysia

to

Singapore.

Both countries

adopted

new

policies

in

1989-90;

Singapore

enacted the

foreign

worker tax or

levy

and

introduced

new

measures

against illegal

aliens,

while

Hong Kong cautiously expanded

its

foreign worker program from maids to skilled and semiskilled workers.

Filipinos

loom

large

in the ever

more diversified

foreign

work force of both

areas.

Conference

participants

felt that

Hong

Kong's

minimum

wage system

better

protected foreign

workers than

Singapore's

foreign

worker

levy.

Indeed,

the difference

between

these areas' control mechanisms illustrates

the different

goals

of

foreign

worker

policies:

Singapore

is

primarily

inter?

ested in

its own

economy

and believes

that it can

regulate foreign

worker

entry

and

settlement with

precision,

while

Hong

Kong's

policy

was

subject

to more debate before being implemented and includes quotas and wage

protections

sought

by

Hong

Kong

unions.

20

$1.00

U.S.

is

equal

to

HK$7.8,

so

HK$3,000

is

equal

to

$385.


12/19

186

INTERNATIONAL

MIGRATION

REVIEW

Malaysia

Malaysia

has about half of Asia's

foreign

workers, but their status and effects

are

not

well documented.

Malaysia

is a

resource-rich

country

of

17

million.

About 80

percent

of

the

population

lives on the

Malay

peninsula

or

West

Malaysia,

which

is

separated

from East

Malaysia

in

North Borneo

by

900

miles of the South

China

Sea. The

Malaysian population

is 56

percent

Malay,

33

percent

Chinese,

and

10

percent

Indian and other. The

Malays

tend

to

engage

in

peasant

agriculture,

the

Chinese have urban

businesses,

and

the

Indians often do

farm

work on estates.

Before

independence

in

1957,

the British

imported

Chinese,

Indian,

and

Japanese workers to work on rubber plantations and estates. Malaysia

adopted

a

New

Economic

Policy

in

1971,

and rural

Malays began

migrating

to urban areas for

factory jobs.

The

semigovernmental agencies

which

operate

the

rubber

plantations

now face

labor

shortages,

since

the children

of

peasants

and estate farmworkers

prefer steady monthly jobs

and salaries

in

urban factories

to

uncertain and

daily

farm

wages.

The

plantations

have

once

again begun

to

import Filipino

and Indonesian

workers,

so

that

today

three

quarters

of

Malaysia's

farmworkers

are

foreign

workers.

The number of

foreign-born persons

in

Malaysia

declined between 1970

and 1980 according to the Census of Population, but this apparent decline

simply

reflects the undercount of

illegal

foreign

workers

(Abella, 1990:12).

A

1968

Employment

Restriction Act

requires

resident

foreigners

who

are

salaried workers

to have work

permits,

and there

were

18,000

such workers

in

1987. But resident workers with

manual

jobs

in

agriculture

and

construc?

tion

do not need

such

permits.

Temporary

workers need to

have

only

passes,

and

about

70,000

foreigners

have

such

passes.

These

data

suggest

that there

are fewer than

100,000

legal foreign

workers in

Malaysia,

but the estimated number

of

illegal migrants

in

Malaysia ranges from 200,000 to 1 million (Abella, 1990:12, calls 400,000

conservative).

By

one

estimate,

there

are

perhaps

350,000

illegal

In?

donesians,

100,000

Filipinos,

and several hundred thousand Thais.

Malaysia's

ethnic

politics

have

made these estimates a

political

issue.

Chinese

politicians generally

overestimate the

number

because most

of

the

immigrants

are

Indonesian

and

Filipino

Muslims,

and the Chinese

argue

that because

the

immigrants

are fellow Muslims

the

Malay-dominated

government

does not

take

vigorous

action to reduce the

illegal immigration

which

may

add 1

percent

to

the

Malaysian

population

each

year. Malaysia

had amnesties for illegal aliens in 1986 and 1990, but the high cost of

legalization

under these

programs

meant

that

most

aliens remained

in an

illegal

status.

Malaysia

has an

employer

sanctions

law,

but it is

apparently


13/19

CONFERENCE

REPORT

187

not

enforced.

Malaysia's long

coastline and

the

historical

affinity

between

Malays

and

Indonesians,

make it

hard

to

promote

a

vigorous anti-illegal

immigration policy.

Malaysia

also

exports

workers. Over

80,000

Malaysians

are

employed

in

Singapore

at

wages

that

are

about twice

Malaysian

levels.

Another several

thousand

Malays

are

employed

in Middle Eastern

countries,

and

there

may

be

1,000

illegal

alien

Malaysians

in

Japan.

Malaysians

of Chinese

origin

appear

most

likely

to

emigrate.

LABOR EXPORTERS

There are three types of Asian labor exporters: countries which both export

and

import

labor,

but are net

importers (Malaysia);

countries

which

both

export

and

import

labor,

but

are

on balance

exporters

(Thailand,

and

soon

Korea);

and

classic

labor

exporters

such as the

Philippines, Bangladesh,

and

Pakistan.

Malaysia

exports professional

workers to the United States and

other industrial countries

as

well as skilled

and

semiskilled labor to

Singa?

pore,

but

imports

more

unskilled

Indonesian,

Thai,

and

Filipino

workers

than

it

exports.

Thailand

is a

net labor

exporter,

but

rapid

economic

growth

has

led to labor

shortages

and

an influx of workers from

Burma

and

Cambodia. These immigrant workers, as well as landless Thais, work on the

northeastern farms that are owned

by land-owning migrants

who are

in the

Middle East.

Thailand,

with a

population

of

56

million and

a work

force

of

29

million

(83

percent

in

rural

areas),

sent

125,000

migrant

workers

abroad

in 1989.

Half went to

Saudi

Arabia;

only

20

percent

went to Asian

destina?

tions

such as

Singapore,

Brunei and

Hong Kong (Tingsabath,

1990.A7).

Korea first sent

240

migrant

workers to

West

Germany

in 1963

and,

since

then,

about 1.7 million

Korean

migrants

have remitted

$16

billion to

Korea

(Park, 1990).

Korea

sends

primarily

project-tied migrants,

especially

to

the

Middle Eastern countries which took two thirds of the Korean emigrants.

Most of these

men

had

two

or

three-year

contracts to build a

factory,

hotel

or

road,

for

example.

The Korean

government required

all

migrants

to have

contracts that established

minimum

wages

and

maximum

hours

(eleven

hours

daily),

but

these

standards were violated

routinely,

especially

in the

Middle

East.

However,

when

Korean

workers

protested

these

contract

violations,

as

in

Jubeil

in

1978,

labor

importers

threatened

to

bar the

importation

of Korean

workers

unless these labor

disputes stopped,

which

they

did

after the

Korean

government

intervened,

usually

against

the

protesting migrants.

In

1989,

Korean

employment

reached

17.5

million,

the

unemployment

rate fell

to

2.6

percent,

and

there

were

fears

of

labor

shortages

in the

1990s


14/19

188 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

REVIEW

if economic

growth

continues

at

10

percent annually

(Park, 1990:47).

Korean

manufacturing

and construction

employers complained

that

they

needed

about 5

percent

more workers

in

1989,

and these labor

shortages

are

expected

to

become

more

acute

as

Korea tries

in the 1990s to build

2

million

more houses

and

improve

its

infrastructure.21

The

demand for

construction workers

in Korea

is

reflected in their

declining

number

abroad:

in

1983,

about

42

percent

of

the

225,000

Korean workers abroad were

construction

workers;

by

1989,

only

10

percent

of

76,000

were

construction

workers

(Park, 1990:9).

Korea

is

debating

whether

to

import

unskilled

workers

in the 1990s from

China,

for

example,

but

uncertainty

about

possible

reunification

with

North

Korea

will

probably preclude importing

workers

for at least

a

few

more

years

despite

labor

shortage complaints.

The

Philippines, Bangladesh,

and Pakistan are classic

labor

exporters

in

that

each sends 10 to 30

percent

of their annual labor force

entrants abroad.

The

Philippines

processed

3 million workers for overseas

employment

between

1975 and

1987,

and

85

percent

went to the Middle East

(Go,

1990:3).

In

1987,

about

425,000

workers were

processed

for overseas

employment.

Filipinos

who

work

abroad are

mosdy

young

(56

percent

are

20

to

29)

men and

women

whose skills are bimodal:

they

include fourth

grade only

unskilled workers

and

maids as well as

college graduate

nurses.

A

frequent complaint

of

migrant

workers

in

the

Philippines

and

other

labor-exporting

countries

is the

high

cost of

getting

a contract

for

an

overseas

job.

The

Philippines

sets

a

maximum recruitment

fee of

P5,000

(about

$250),

but workers

report

paying

two

or

three times more to

get jobs

which

pay

about

$250

monthly;

that

is,

workers

pay

up

to

25

percent

of

their

first

year's earnings

just

to

get

a

contract to

go

overseas.

Reports

of

workers

who

paid

fees to

go

abroad but

never

got

a contract are common.

Filipino

women

reportedly

prefer

to be maids in

Singapore

or

Hong Kong

instead

of the Middle

East,

but

recruitment

fees are almost three times

higher

to

get

Asian

versus

Middle

Eastern

jobs.

Bangladesh

is

a

relatively

new labor

exporter,

but

it has

emerged

as one

of the lowest-cost

sources of

unskilled

workers

and in 1989 sent

106,000

workers

abroad,

40

percent

to

Saudi

Arabia

(Mahbub,

1990:14).

Remit?

tances are

about

$800

million

annually,

or

equal

to 50 to 60

percent

of the

value of

Bangladesh exports. Bangladesh

runs

a

significant

trade deficit

21

In

November

1990,

Korea

announced

plans

to scrutinizenew arrivals

from outheast

Asia

to

reduce

llegal

lien

workers;

lmost

1,000

llegal

lien manual

workerswere

apprehended

in

1990,

and one-thirdwere

Filipinos.

Korea

plans

to raise fines n

illegal

alien workers

rom

$4,200

to

$7,000

and

up

tothree

years

n

ail.

Korean

employers

who hire

llegal

alienscan be

fined

4,200

and

imprisoned

for

up

to

three

years.

WallStreet

Journal,

November

27, 1990,

p.

All.


15/19

CONFERENCE

REPORT 189

each

year,

and this

deficit

is

only partially

covered

by

remittances and

foreign

aid.

Some

Bangladeshis argue

that countries which

export

to

Bangladesh

should

accept migrant

workers

so

their

remittances can

pay

for the

exports.

Japan,

for

example,

exports

five times

more to

Bangladesh

than

it

imports,

and

current

Bangladesh

remittances from

Japan pay

for

just

5

percent

of

these

Japanese

imports.

Bangladesh migrants

are

eager

to work in

Japan:

the

per

capita

wage gap

is

about

80 to one?one

of

the

highest

in the

world?and

Bangladesh

would like

to

export

more of its

workers to

Japan

and elsewhere.22

Both

Bangladesh

and Pakistan have been

exporting

about

one

quarter

of

their

annual

labor

force

growth.

Pakistan's annual exit was over

150,000

in the

early

1980s,

dipped

to

58,000

in

1986,

and was

96,000

in 1989

(Azam,

1990:14).

The

percentage

of

migrants

who are laborers has

fallen from

one-half in the

early

1980s

to

one-third

in

the

late

1980s,

and the

percentage

of

migrants

who

are

drivers,

clerks,

and tailors

has

increased.

Because of

their

patriarchal

kinship systems,

neither

Bangladesh

nor

Pakistan send

female

migrants

abroad,

explaining why

female

migrants

in

the Gulf States

tend to be

Filipino,

Thai,

or Sri Lankan.

Like

Korea,

Pakistan

requires migrants

to

have

a

contract which

guaran?

tees

minimum

wages

and

working

conditions

before

going

abroad;

in

Pakistan,

migrants

with

approved

contracts

get

a Protector of

Immigrants

stamp

in their

passports.

However,

a

significant

fraction of Pakistani mi?

grants apparendy

leave without

approved

contracts;

a

survey

of returned

migrants

in

the

mid-1980s

found

that

only

half had

approved

contracts when

they

left Pakistan. As in the

Philippines,

Pakistani

workers

often exit without

contracts because

the cost

of

getting

a

contract

to

work

abroad

may

be 10

to

30

percent

of

the

first

year's

earnings.

There

were

90,000

Pakistanis

in Kuwait when

Iraq

invaded

in

August

1990,

and about

70,000

have

returned

to Pakistan.

The

initial

attempt

to

fly

migrants

from

Jordan

proved

too

expensive,

so most Pakistani

migrants

returned

by taking

their autos

and

what

household

goods they

could over?

land

through

Iraq,

Turkey,

and Iran. Pakistan

permitted

returning

migrants

to avoid normal tariffs and customs duties on

goods brought

back

by

this

land

route.23 Pakistan

is

currendy

estimating

the losses

experienced

by

its

returning

migrants,

and

it

reckons

that

its

remittances

will

decrease

by

$1.6

billion in 1990.

22

Koga

(1990)

reported

hat

Bangladesh

workers arned

about

$7

per

hour

n

1989

n

small

manufacturing

lants

near

Tokyo.

23 In addition o

losing

their

ontracts,

akistani nd other

migrants

nKuwait awthevalue

of their

avings

n Kuwaiti inars

devalued

by

90

percent

when

Iraq

replaced

the

Kuwaiti

dinar

with ts own

currency

t a 1 to 1 rateversus

the

preinvasion

1 to 10 rate.


16/19

190

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

REVIEW

There

were

between

3 and 3.5 million Asian

migrants

in the Middle East

when

Iraq

invaded Kuwait

in

August

1990.

Amjad

(1990:5)

reports

that

India

had

800,000

to

1 million

migrants

in

the

Gulf

States,

Pakistan

850,000

to

1.1

million,

the

Philippines

700,000

to

800,000,

Bangladesh

250,000

to

300,000,

Sri

Lanka

200,000

to

300,000

and

Indonesia, Korea,

and

China

less

than

100,000

each. Remittances

to the

Asian countries

of

origin

of these

migrants

were

as much

as

$10

billion

annually

during

the 1980s.

Unlike

Arab labor

migration

to the

Gulf

States,

Asian

labor

migration

was much

more

organized,

with

Korea

being

the most

organized exporter

of labor

and

Thailand

having

the

least

governmental

involvement

in

labor

emigration.

Few Asian

countries

have

programs

and

policies

which can translate

remittances and returned migrants into sparkplugs for job-creating devel?

opment.

Government

programs

which

assist

returned

migrants

are some?

times

resented

by

other

nationals because

the

returned

migrants

are in most

cases

better off

than

nonmigrants.

However,

without effective

development

strategies

for

both

migrants

and

nonmigrants,

remittances wind

up

being

spent

without

launching stay-at-home

development.

There

appears

to be

little research and

few

policy suggestions

for

using

the

window

of

opportu?

nity

provided

by

remittances

and

returned

migrants

to

accelerate

Asian

development.

CONCLUSIONS

AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

Conference

participants agreed

that Asia

is

joining

the Middle East

as a

major

destination for

Asian

migrants

in the

1990s.

There are

now

about 1

million

migrant

workers

in the four

major

Asian

labor-importing

countries,

but

half are

illegal

aliens in

Malaysia.

The

major

new

destination

may

be

Japan:

it

will

continue

to have

labor

shortages

in the

1990s,

and if

it decides

to

cope

with

these labor

shortages

by

importing

migrant

workers,

Japan

could

import

in

the

1990s more than

the

2

million

migrants

in

Saudi Arabia.

Japan

seems to be divided on whether to become a

labor-importing

country

in

the 1990s. Like

Singapore

and

Hong

Kong, Japan

now

provides

relatively easy

entry

for

professional

migrants.

However,

most of the

80,000

legal

foreign

workers

in

Japan,

as well

as most

of the

65,000

foreign

students

and

trainees

and most of the

200,000

illegal

aliens,

are unskilled

workers.

Japan

has

indicated

that

it

is

willing

to

import

unskilled

workers

by

granting

automatic work

and settlement

rights

to

South

American residents

of

Japanese

descent,

for

example,

but

Japan

has

not

yet

decided

whether to

import

unskilled workers from other

countries who

may

settle in

Japan.

Japan seems to be less confident than Singapore that it can rotate migrants

and

prevent

settlement,

and less

interested

than

Hong Kong

in

migrant

maids,

but

very

worried

about the settlement of

migrant

workers?the

most


17/19

CONFERENCE

REPORT

191

often

repeated example

of

what

Japan

does

not

want

is

the Turkish workers

who settled in

Germany.

While

Japan

debates

whether

to

import

unskilled

migrant

workers in the

1990s,

the

Asian labor

exporters

that became accustomed to

exporting

10

to 30

percent

of their annual

labor force

growth

to

Middle Eastern countries

in the 1980s are

looking

for

new

destinations

as

the

demand

shrinks

in

the

Middle East. These countries

would

like

to

go

on

exporting

workers

to

earn

remittances and to reduce their

unemployment

despite

the

widely

acknowl?

edged

human and social costs

of

emigration

due

to

family

separation

at

home and

mistreatment abroad.

Emigration

and remittances seem to have

become institutionalized in

some

of

the

Asian

labor-exporting

countries,

but

there have been few studies of the local and regional effects of emigration

and litde

thought given

to

what

development

efforts

should

be

undertaken

if

opportunities

for

emigration

diminish.

Conference

participants

thought

that the current

uncertainty

about

whether the destination of Asian

migrants

will shift from the Middle East

offers

a

unique opportunity

to

reassess

international

migration

for

employ?

ment.

Potential labor

importers

such

as

Japan

can

determine the

pros

and

cons of

importing

workers

under

the

higher

standards

expected

by

labor

exporters.

In

Japan's

case,

Asian

labor

exporters

promise

to

be

especially

sensitive about the treatment of their nationals in Japan because ofJapan's

often

harsh

occupation

of

their

countries in

World War

II. If

Japan

and

other

Asian countries

emerge

as 1990s destinations for

migrant

workers,

labor

exporters

hope

that bilateral

and

multilateral

agreements

can deal

with

both

the

specific problems

that

have

arisen with

migration

to

the Middle

East,

such

as

recruitment costs and

mistreatment

abroad,

and

the more

general

issue of

how

to

organize

emigration

so that

exporting

workers becomes

a

road

to

economic

development

rather than

a

path

to

continued

dependence

on

foreign

labor markets.

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Labor Migration in Asia 1991

Documents

Transcript of Labor Migration in Asia 1991