ON THE ISSUE OF CONCEALMENT

Section 20(E) of the POEA-SEC is clearly states that a seafarer who knowingly conceals and does not disclose past medical condition, disability and history in the pre-employment medical examination constitutes fraudulent misrepresentation and shall disqualify him from any compensation and benefits. This may also be a valid ground for termination of employment and imposition of the appropriate administrative and legal sanctions. Thus, for knowingly concealing his diabetes during the PEME, petitioner committed fraudulent misrepresentation which under the POEA-SEC unconditionally barred his right to receive any disability compensation or illness benefit. STATUS MARITIME CORPORATION, MS. LOMA B. AGUIMAN, FAIRDEAL GROUP MANAGEMENT S.A., and MT FAIR JOLLY vs. SPOUSES MARGARITO B. DELALAMON and PRISCILA A. DELALAMO., G.R. No. 198097, July 30, 2014, J. Reyes

As in Dumadag, Gepanaga failed to observe the prescribed procedure of having the conflicting assessments on his disability referred to a third doctor for a binding opinion. Consequently, the Court applies the following pronouncements laid down in Vergara: The POEA Standard Employment Contract and the CBA clearly provide that when a seafarer sustains a work-related illness or injury while on board the vessel, his fitness or unfitness for work shall be determined by the company-designated physician. If the physician appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the company-designated physician’s assessment, the opinion of a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer to be the decision final and binding on them. Thus, while petitioner had the right to seek a second and even a third opinion, the final determination of whose decision must prevail must be done in accordance with an agreed procedure. Unfortunately, the petitioner did not avail of this procedure; hence, we have no option but to declare that the company-designated doctor’s certification is the final determination that must prevail. VERITAS MARITIME CORPORATION AND/OR ERICKSON MARQUEZ vs. RAMON A. GEPANAGA JR., G.R. No. 206285, February 04, 2015, J. Mendoza

A seafarer may have basis to pursue an action for total and permanent disability benefits only if any of the following conditions are present: (a) The company-designated physician failed to issue a declaration as to his fitness to engage in sea duty or disability even after the lapse of the 120-day period and there is no indication that further medical treatment would address his temporary total disability, hence, justify an extension of the period to 240 days; (b) 240 days had lapsed without any certification issued by the company designated physician; (c) The company-designated physician declared that he is fit for sea duty within the 120-day or 240-day period, as the case may be, but his physician of choice and the doctor chosen under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC are of a contrary opinion; (d) The company-designated physician acknowledged that he is partially permanently disabled but other doctors who he consulted, on his own and jointly with his employer, believed that his disability is not only permanent but total as well; (e) The company-designated physician recognized that he is totally and permanently disabled but there is a dispute on the disability grading; (f) The company-designated physician determined that his medical condition is not compensable or work-related under the POEA-SEC but his doctor-of-choice and the third doctor selected under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC found otherwise

and declared him unfit to work; (g) The company-designated physician declared him totally and permanently disabled but the employer refuses to pay him the corresponding benefits; and (h) The company-designated physician declared him partially and permanently disabled within the 120-day or 240-day period but he remains incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties after the lapse of said periods. Furthermore, the onus probandi falls on the seafarer to establish or substantiate his claim that he is entitled to disability benefits by the requisite quantum of evidence. He has to prove causation between the nature of his employment and his illness, or that the risk of contracting the illness was increased by his working condition. Otherwise, for lack of factual and legal basis, he will not be entitled to any claim. ALONE AMAR P. TAGLE vs. ANGLO-EASTERN CREW MANAGEMENT, PHILS., INC., ANGLO-EASTERN CREW MANAGEMENT (ASIA) and CAPT. GREGORIO B. SIALSA, G.R. No. 209302, July 9, 2014, J. Mendoza

Under the POEA-SEC, it is the company-designated physician who declares the fitness to work of a seafarer who sustains a work-related injury/illness or the degree of the seafarer’s disability. While a seafarer is not precluded from seeking a second opinion on his medical condition or disability, a finding by his doctor of choice in contrast with that made of the company-designated physician, necessitates the appointment of a third doctor whose decision shall be final and binding. Such disagreement should have been referred to a third doctor jointly by the employer and the seafarer. In the case at bar, the non-referral cannot be blamed on the employer. Since it was the seafarer who consulted another doctor without informing his employer, he should have actively requested that the disagreement be referred to a final and binding third opinion. In the absence of any request from him, the employer-company cannot be expected to respond. As such, in the absence of a third doctor resolution of the conflicting assessments between the doctors, the assessment of the company-designated physician as to the seafarer’s health should stand. BAHIA SHIPPING SERVICES, INC. and FRED OLSEN CRUISE LINES LIMITED vs. CRISANTE C. CONSTANTINO, G.R. No. 180343, July 9, 2014, J. Brion

In Quizora v. Denholm Crew Management (Phils.), Inc., this Court categorically declared that the petitioner cannot simply rely on the disputable presumption provision mentioned in Section 20(B)(4) of the 2000 POEA-SEC. As he did so without solid proof of work-relation and work-causation or work-aggravation of his illness, the Court cannot provide him relief. The disputable presumption provision in Section 20(B) does not allow him to just sit down and wait for respondent company to present evidence to overcome the disputable presumption of work-relatedness of the illness. Contrary to his position, he still has to substantiate his claim in order to be entitled to disability compensation. He has to prove that the illness he suffered was work-related and that it must have existed during the term of his employment contract. He cannot simply argue that the burden of proof belongs to respondent company. On that note, we emphasize that making factual findings based only on presumptions and absent the quantum of evidence required in labor cases is an erroneous application of the law on compensation proceedings. This Court has ruled in Gabunas, Sr. v. Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., citing Government Service Insurance System v. Cuntapay, that

claimants in compensation proceedings must show credible information that there is probably a relation between the illness and the work. Probability, and not mere possibility, is required; otherwise, the resulting conclusion would proceed from deficient proof. JORAINA DRAGON TALOSIG vs. UNITED PHILIPPINES LINES, INC, ET AL, G.R. No. 198388, July 28, 2014, CJ. Sereno