LABOR RELATIONS

Digested CasesSET II Arts.213-222

- NLRC, jurisdiction, due process, injunction

14. PNB vs FLORENCE CABANSAG

G.R. No. 157010 - 21 June 2005FACTS:After being recommended by Tobias, the banks GM and VP in Singapore to the President of PNB in the Phils., Florence Cabansag consequently was offered a temporary position in 1998 which she accepted while her employment contract was processed by the Philippine Embassy in the same country. In 1999 she was issued by POEA an Overseas Employment Certificate, certifying that she was a bona fide contract worker for Singapore.Barely 3mos after submitting her initial performance report which was commended by Tobias, she was informed by her colleagues that they were asked by Tobias to inform her that she needs to resign. Perplexed at the sudden turn of events, she talked to Tobias to ask if what she was told was true. He confirmed the veracity of the information, with the explanation that her resignation was imperative as a cost-cutting measure as the PNB Singapore Branch will be sold or transformed into a remittance office. Cabansag requesded that she be furnished with a Formal Advice from the PNB Head Office in Manila, which Tobias flatly refused. She was even threatened that unless she submitted said letter, her employment record will be blemished with the notation DISMISSED. After the third time of being asked of the letter which she did not submit, she received a letter terminating her employment with PNB.LA Lustria in 2000 ruled against the Respondents, ordering the reinstate of Cabansag along with the payment of her backwages and other monetary benefits from the time of her termination up to the time of the promulgation of the Resolution.

PNB appealed to NLRC which affirmed such Resolution, with a reduction on the amount of damages rewarded. PNB filed an MR but was denied. It thereafter appealed to CA, which held that albeit the procurement of employment pass from the Singapore Ministry of Employment, Cabansag did not waive Philippine labor laws, and that PNB failed to establish a just cause for her dismissal and failed to give her sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard and to defend herself.ISSUES:

1. WON NLRC has jurisdiction and is the most convenient venue or forum to hear and decide over the controversy; and

2. WON the respondent was illegally dismissed, and therefore, entitled to recover backwages and other monetary benefits

HELD:

1. Jurisdiction: As the petitioner admitted that it is it is a Philippine corporation doing business through a branch office in Singapore, Cabansags employment by the Singapore branch office had to be approved by the PNB President whose principal offices were in Manila. This goes up against its contention that Cabansag was locally hired; and was totally governed by and subject to the laws, common practices and customs of Singapore, not of the Philippines. Instead, with more reason does this fact reinforce the presumption that respondent falls under the legal definition of migrant worker, in this case one deployed in Singapore. Hence, petitioner cannot escape the application of Philippine laws or the jurisdiction of the NLRC and the LA. (Art. 217, LC)

Proper Venue: Following Section 1(a) of Rule IV of the NLRC Rules of Procedure and under the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 (RA 8042), Cabansag is given two choices for the venue of her Complaint against PNB for illegal dismissal: (a) at the Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) where she resides or (b) at the RAB where the principal office of her employer is situated.Since her dismissal by petitioner, respondent has returned to the Philippines -- specifically to her residence at Filinvest II, Quezon City. Thus, in filing her Complaint before the RAB office in Quezon City, she has made a valid choice of proper venue.2. Illegal Dismissal: CA was correct in holding that respondent was already a regular employee at the time of her dismissal, because her three-month probationary period of employment had already ended. PNB even recognized her as such at the time it dismissed her, by giving her one months salary in lieu of a one-month notice, consistent with provision No. 6 of her employment Contract.Recovery of Benefits: As a regular employee, Cabansag was entitled to all rights, benefits and privileges provided under our labor laws. And as the petitioner acted in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner in terminating her employment, it is therefore liable for exemplary damages. Such serves as protection to other employees of the bank and by way of example or correction for the public good so that persons similarly minded would be deterred from committing the same acts.

RATIO:

It is a basic policy that all Filipino workers, whether employed locally or overseas, enjoy the protective mantle of Philippine labor and social legislations. Our labor statutes may not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or stipulations agreed upon, in a foreign country.15. WILLIAM DAYAG, ET AL vs HON. POTENCIANO CANIZARES, NLRC

G.R. No. 124193 - 6 March 1998

FACTS:Dayag, along with his peers were employed as tower crane operators by contractor Alfredo Young. When they were from Manila to Cebu, they started having issues with their employer like being purportedly harassed by the latter and for not being paid for certain tools and equipment. For such reasons, herein petitioners filed a case for damages against Youngs Construction with the NCRA branch of NLRC, which was assigned to LA Canizares.

Instead of attending their initial hearings, however, Young filed a motion to transfer the case to the RAB, Region 7 of NLRC, claiming that the workplace where petitioners were regularly assigned was in Cebu City, where the case should have been filed.

Petitioners opposed the same, arguing that they were, by that time, residents of Metro Manila and that they could not afford trips to Cebu City and stated that respondent had its main office at Corinthian Gardens in Quezon City. Young, in reply, declared that such address was not his principal place of business, but actually his residence, which he also used as a correspondent office for his construction firm.

Agreeing that petitioners workplace when the cause of action accrued was Cebu City, Canizares granted Youngs motion and ordered the transmittal of the case to the RAB. Petitioners promptly appealed to NLRC, which dismissed the same for lack of merit.

ISSUES:

1. WON LA Canizares erred in approving the motion to transfer venue of the controversy; and

2. WON LA Canizares and NLRC erred in issuing the disputed judgment and erred in concluding that the workplace of the complainants is in Cebu City.

HELD:

1. No. The Court held that the resolution to move the venue to Cebu City was valid as Young seasonably made representations to transfer the venue of the action in the proper motion. Such acts are in consonance with Section 1(d) of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC which provides that:

The venue of an action may be changed or transferred to a different Regional Arbitration Branch other than where the complaint was filed by written agreement of the parties or when the Commission or Labor Arbiter before whom the case is pending so orders, upon motion by the proper party in meritorious cases.

2. Yes. The Court ordered the case remanded to the AB of origin, ruling that the resolution specifying the NCRAB as the venue of the present action cannot be considered oppressive to Young. His residence in Corinthian Gardens also serves as his correspondent office. Certainly, the filing of the suit in the National Capital Region Arbitration Branch in Manila will not cause him as much inconvenience as it would the petitioners, who are now residents of Metro Manila, if the same was heard in Cebu. Hearing the case in Manila would clearly expedite proceedings and bring about the speedy resolution of case.RATIO:

The worker, being the economically-disadvantaged partywhether as complainant/petitioner or as respondent, as the case may be, the nearest governmental machinery to settle the dispute must be placed at his immediate disposal, and the other party is not to be given the choice of another competent agency sitting in another place as this will unduly burden the former. In fact, even in cases where venue has been stipulated by the parties, the Court has not hesitated to set aside the same if it would lead to a situation so grossly inconvenient to one party as to virtually negate his claim.16. LORENZO DY, ET AL. vs. NLRC AND LA ALBERTO DALMACION

G.R. No. L-68544 27 October 1986FACTS:Herein PR Vailoces, was a stockholder and the manager of the Rural Bank of Ayungon, Negros Oriental. Following his relief as BM, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages with the Ministry of Labor and Employment against the petitioners. The complaint was later on amended, including additional respondents and additional causes of action for underpayment of salary and non-payment of living allowance.In his complaint and position paper, Vailoces asserted that the illegal stockholders' meeting on July 2, 1983 resulting to his dismissal was motivated by Lorenzo Dy's desire to take over the management and control of the bank, along with his ill feelings against Vailoces on account of the latter's filing of a complaint for violation of the corporation code against him and another complaint for compulsory recognition of natural child with damages against Zosimo Dy, Sr.In their answer, the petitioners denied the charge and pointed out that Vailoces' position was an elective one, and he was not re-elected as bank manager because of the Board's loss of confidence in him brought about by his absenteeism and negligence in the performance of his duties; and that the Board's action was taken to protect the interest of the bank and was "designed as an internal control measure to secure the check and balance of authority within the organization."LA Dalmacion ruled in favor of Vailoces, declaring that he was illegally dismissed and ordered his reinstatement as well as the payment of his backwages and other benefits. The Petitioners appealed to NLRC, assigning error to the decision of the LA, and that the matter of his relief was within the adjudicatory powers of SEC. NLRC, however, bypassed the issues raised and simply dismissed the appeal for having been filed late hence, this petition.ISSUES:

1. WON the judgment of the LA is void for lack of jurisdiction;

2. WON the decision of NLRC is void; and

3. WON the Court can act on an appeal over such decision of NLRC.

HELD:

1. Yes. The Court held that the controversy is intra-corporate in nature as it revolves around the election of directors, officers or managers, the relation between and among its stockholders, and between them and the corporation. Those, along with the contention of Vailoces that his "ouster" was a scheme to intimidate him into selling his shares and to deprive him of his just and fair return on his investment as a stockholder received through his salary and allowances as EVP are matters that fall within the jurisdiction of the SEC, as vested by PD No. 902-A. It is well settled that the decision of a tribunal not vested with appropriate jurisdiction is null and void.2. Yes. The decision of NLRC is void not because of its unreasonable adherence to procedural technicality but because it was based from a decision which was originally void, that of the LA. But that is not a hindrance to the Court's consideration of the appeal, which leads to the third issue.3. Yes. The invocation of Vailoces of estoppel as against petitioners with respect to their appeal on issue of jurisdiction is unavailing. For one, the petitioners, in their appeal to NLRC, called attention to the LAs lack of jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the meeting of July 2, 1983. Albeit being a matter that should have been raised with SEC, the Court is not hindered from taking cognizance over an appeal over a void decision of NLRC. Estoppel cannot be invoked to prevent the Court from taking up the question of jurisdiction, which has been apparent on the face of the pleadings since the start of litigation before the Labor Arbiter.Taking into consideration the issue of lack of jurisdiction and in the exercise of its judicial power, the Court dismissed and set aside the judgment of the Labor Arbiter and the resolution of the NLRC, without prejudice to private respondent's seeking recourse in the appropriate forum.

17. MAINLAND CONSTRUCTION vs. MILA MOVILLA G.R. No. 118088 23 November 1995

FACTS:In 1991, the DOLE conducted a routine inspection on Mainland Construction and found that it committed some irregularities in the conduct of its business. On the basis of such findings, it ordered Mainland to pay 13 of its employees an amount representing their salaries, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay differentials, unpaid wages and 13th month pay. All employees listed by DOLE were paid except Ernest Movilla, who was an Administrative Officer and a stockholder. He thereafter filed a case against petitioner with the DOLE based in Davao City. Upon his death in 1992, he was substituted by his heirs, the herein PRs.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint on the ground that the controversy is intra-corporate in nature, over which the SEC has proper jurisdiction and not the Labor Arbiter. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the judgment of the Labor Arbiter and ruled that the case was one which involved a labor dispute, thus NLRC has jurisdiction to resolve the same.

ISSUES:

WON the NLRC is has jurisdiction over the controversy.HELD:

Yes, NLRC has jurisdiction over the case. The fact that the parties involved in the controversy are a corporation and its stockholders does not necessarily place the dispute within the jurisdiction of SEC. In order that the SEC can take cognizance of a case, the controversy must pertain to factors such as the status or relationship of the parties or the nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy.

RATIO:

Claims for unpaid wages and separation pay involve a labor dispute. It does not involve an intra-corporate matter, even when it is between a stockholder and a corporation. It relates to an ER-EE relationship which is distinct from the corporate relationship of one with the other.

18. PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY, ET AL. vs. JUDGE MARTINEZ AND TUMALA, JR. G.R. No. L-58877 15 March 1982

FACTS:Tumala was a salesman of the company in Davao City from 1977 to 1980. In 1979, after winning an award for his performance as top salesman of the year in an annual contest held by the company, he wsa entitled to a prize of house and lot. Following the unjust refusal to deliver the said prize and the its oppressive, unlawful and arbitrary termination of his employment, he filed a case against the company and its officers in 1980. He prayed that petitioners be ordered, jointly and severally, to deliver his prize of house and lot or its cash equivalent, and to pay his back salaries and separation benefits, plus moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses but did not ask for reinstatement.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and cause of action, alleging that Tumala was not entitled to the for having misled the company into declaring him top salesman for 1979 through various deceitful and fraudulent manipulations and machinations in the performance of his duties as salesman and depot in-charge of the bottling company in Davao City, which consisted of "unremitted cash collections, fictitious collections of trade accounts, fictitious loaned empties, fictitious product deals, uncollected loaned empties, advance sales confirmed as fictitious, and route shortages which resulted to the damage and prejudice of the bottling company in the amount of P381,851.76." The alleged commission of these fraudulent acts was also advanced by petitioners to justify Tumala's dismissal. The court, however, denied the MR.

ISSUE:

Which tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over an action filed by an employee against his employer for recovery of unpaid salaries, separation benefits and damages the court of general jurisdiction or the Labor Arbiter of NLRC?

HELD:

The Court ruled that the Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction over the case and respondent judge is hereby directed to dismiss the civil case filed by Tumala without prejudice to his right to refile the same with the Labor Arbiter.

RATIO:

Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; and it is given only by law. It is never presumed and must be conferred by law in words that do not admit of doubt.Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from statutes, issues regarding jurisdiction should be resolved on the basis of Sec1 Par(a) of Article 217 of the LC, as amended by P.D. 1367, which was amended anew by P.D. 1691 restoring to the Labor Arbiters their exclusive jurisdiction over money claims, including those based on non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees' compensation, social security, Medicare and maternity benefits.

Tumalas action for the action for delivery of the house and lot unquestionably arose from an employer-employee relation therefore his claim that it is a civil controversy triable exclusively by the court of the general jurisdiction is incorrect. To hold that Tumala's claim for the prize should be passed upon by the regular court of justice, independently and separately from his claim for back salaries, retirement benefits and damages, would be to sanction split juridiction and multiplicity of suits which are prejudicial to the orderly administration of justice.

19. SMC vs. NLRC AND RUSTICO VEGA

G.R. No. 80774 31 May 1988FACTS:In line with an Innovation Program sponsored by petitioner SMC, and under which management undertook to grant cash awards to employees who submit to the Corporation Ideas and suggestions found to be beneficial to the Corporation, PR Rustico Vega submitted on 23 September 1980 an innovation proposal. SMC, however, did not find his proposal acceptable and consequently refused Vega's subsequent demands for cash award under the program.Alleging that that his proposal been accepted by the methods analyst and implemented by the corporation a month after his submission and that the same solved the problem of SMC in production, he claimed entitlement to a cash prize of P60,000.00 (the maximum award per proposal offered under the Innovation Program) and attorney's fees.

SMC countered that Vega had no cause of action. It denied ever having approved or adopted Vega's proposal as part of the brewing procedure in the production of San Miguel Beer Grande and stated that his proposal was turned down for lack of originality and that even if implemented; the same could not achieve the desired result. It further alleged that the LA had no jurisdiction as Vega have improperly bypassed the grievance machinery procedure prescribed under a then existing CBA between management and employees, and available administrative remedies provided under the rules of the Innovation Program. A counterclaim for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses closed out petitioner's pleading.In 1986, LA noted that the money claim of complainant Vega in this case is "not a necessary incident of his employment" and that said claim is not among those mentioned in Article 217 of the LC, dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and directed SMC to pay Vega the sum of P2,000.00 as financial assistance to which both parties filed appeals with Vega assailing the dismissal of his complaint for lack of jurisdiction and SMC questioning the propriety of the award of "financial assistance" to him. Acting on the appeals, NLRC ruled to set aside the resolution of the LA and order the respondent to pay the complainant the amount of P60,000.00.

ISSUE:

WON the money claim of Vega falls within the jurisdiction of LA and NLRC

HELD:

No. The Court held that the claim of Vega is not under the jurisdiction of NLRC as it stemmed out of an enforceable contractual obligation on the part of SMC. And whether or not it was breached is a pre-eminently legal question, which is not to be resolved by referring to labor legislation for having nothing to do with wages or other terms and conditions of employment. Having recourse to our law on contracts, the protection Vega seeks is dealt with under the civil laws and claims no benefits under the Labor Code. The decision of NLRC was set aside, without prejudice to the right of Vega to file a suit before the proper court.RATIO:

The Innovation Program of SMC is an employee incentive scheme offered and open only to employees of petitioner Corporation, more specifically to employees below the rank of manager. Without the existing Er-Ee relationship between the parties here, there would have been no occasion to consider the petitioner's Innovation Program or the submission by Mr. Vega of his proposal concerning beer grande; without that relationship, private respondent Vega's suit against petitioner Corporation would never have arisen. The money claim of private respondent Vega in this case, therefore, arose out of or in connection with his employment relationship with petitioner.Although a controversy is between an employer and an employee, the Labor Arbiters have no jurisdiction if the Labor Code is not involved. The money claims of workers" referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 217 as last amended by B.P. Blg. 227 embraces money claims which arise out of or in connection with the employer-employee relationship, or some aspect or incident of such relationship. Such money claims of workers which now fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of LAs are those money claims which have some reasonable causal connection with the employer-employee relationship. While paragraph 3 refers to "all money claims of workers," it is not necessary to suppose that the entire universe of money claims that might be asserted by workers against their employers has been absorbed into the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters.

20. LEONARDO SUARIO vs BPI G.R. No. L-50459 25 August 1989

FACTS:Leonardo D. Suario was the head of the loan section of BPI in 1976. During his employment, he pursued his studies of law with the consent of the BPI. Sometime in March 1976, Suario verbally requested the then VP and BM Mr. Guilatico of the bank for a 6-month LOA without pay in order for him to take the pre-bar review in Manila, for which he was told that there would be no problem. Following instructions from Mr. Guilatico who was then assigned in Head Office as VP, new BM Mr. Casino, sent verbal notice to Suario that the latter was approved only a 30-day LOA, to which he would need to go to Manila to avail of. Suario did so but after 3 months, received a letter ordering him to report back for work and that failure to do so would be a conclusive proof that he is no longer interested in working for the bank and would therefore be considered resigned. Believing that his request would soon be granted, he did not for work and thereafter received another letter with a Clearance to terminate on the ground of resignation/or abandonment.

After failing to file his opposition, Suario, in December 1976, went to BPI where he was informed that he was already dismissed. He then wrote a letter to the bank requesting for a written and formal advice as to his real status and was replied that the matter was still referred to the Personnel Department. In response to his second letter, he was finally informed that his services were considered terminated. He then filed a complaint for separation pay, damages and attorneys fees against the BPI on the ground of illegally dismissal.

The LA rendered a decision ordering payment of Suario's claim for separation pay. His claim for damages and attorneys fee were, however, dismissed for lack of merit. On appeal, NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA.

ISSUES:

1. WON NLRC has authority to entertain claims for moral and other forms of damages; and

2. WON Suario was entitled to his claim for moral damagesHELD:

1. Yes. Re-enacting Article 217 of the LC, P.D. 1691 nullified P.D. 1367 and restored to the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC their jurisdiction to award all kinds of damages in cases arising from ER-EE relationship.

2. No. Although it is settled that LAs are allowed to award moral and other forms of damages arising from ER-EE relations, it is consistently ruled that in the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded.

RATIO:

It is incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that there was malice or bad faith. The Court did not, however, find any bad faith or fraud on the part of the bank officials. He was merely given personal assurances which could be reconsidered in later developments. There is no evidence that they meant to deceive him. On the contrary, BPI acted in accordance with law before effecting the dismissal. He was informed of BPIs application with the Ministry of Labor to terminate his employment, of which he was furnished a copy of and to which he did not oppose nor did anything to preserve his right. Therefore, the fact that petitioners request was denied, does not entitle him to damages.

21. ALFREDO PRIMERO vs. IAC AND DM TRANSIT

G.R. No. 72644 - 14 December 1987FACTS:Alfredo Primero was discharged from his employment as bus driver of DM in August 1974 after being employed therein for over 6years. Primero in his complaint stated that prior to his dismissal; he has not been assigned any bus to drive for 23 days by DMs bus dispatcher without any reason or cause. He pleaded that he be allowed to work as his family was in dire need of money and at the same time inquired as to why he was not allowed to work. Apart from being humiliated and ridiculed, he was given a run-around by some management personnel and worse, on the 23rd day, he was finally told by GM Briones to seek employment with other bus companies because he was already dismissed from his job.

He pleaded with the company President for reinstatement and asked for financial assistance but apart from being mocked of not getting any single centavo unless he goes to court and win, DM in bad faith and with malice persuaded other firms (California Transit, Pascual Lines, De Dios Transit, Negrita Corporation, and MD Transit) not to employ Primero in any capacity.

Primero thereafter filed a complaint against DM with the LA for illegal dismissal, who rendered judgment ordering DM to pay complainant Primero P2,000.00 as separation pay in accordance with the Termination Pay Law; which was affirmed by NLRC.

3 months after the conclusion of the case, Primero instituted proceedings for damages in the CFI of Rizal seeking recovery of damages caused not only by the breach of his employment contract, but also by the oppressive and inhuman, and consequently tortious, acts of his employer and its officers antecedent and subsequent to his dismissal from employment without just cause.

The lower court dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, for the reason that at the time that the complaint was filed, the Labor Code as amended by PD 1367, conferred exclusive, original jurisdiction over claims for moral or other damages, not on ordinary courts, but on Labor Arbiters. The judgment was affirmed by IAC thus the present appeal.

ISSUES:

WON the petitioner is entitled to a subsequent recovery of moral damages by action in a regular court after having recovered separation pay by judgment of the LA.

HELD:

No. The Court dismissed the petition and held that the jurisdiction vested in LAs by Article 217 of the Labor Code is sufficiently comprehensive to include claims for moral and exemplary damages sought to be recovered from DM by Primero upon the theory of his illegal dismissal.

RATIO:

The legislative intent appears clear to allow recovery in proceedings before Labor Arbiters of moral and other forms of damages, in all cases or matters arising from employer-employee relations. This would include, particularly, instances where an employee has been unlawfully dismissed. In such a case the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to award to the dismissed employee not only the reliefs specifically provided by labor laws, but also moral and other forms of damages governed by the Civil Code. When he institutes proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, he should make a claim for all said reliefs. He cannot institute proceedings separately two forums: one, before the Labor Arbiter for reinstatement and recovery of back wages, or for separation pay, upon the theory that his dismissal was illegal; and two, before a court of justice for recovery of moral and other damages, upon the theory that the manner of his dismissal was unduly injurious, or tortuous. Such constitutes splitting causes of action, engendering multiplicity of actions. It is against such mischief that the Labor Code amendments are evidently directed, and it is such duplicity which the Rules of Court regard as ground for abatement or dismissal of actions, constituting either litis pendentia (auter action pendant) or res adjudicata, as the case may be.22. DOMICIANO SOCO vs. MERCANTILE CORP G.R. No. s. L-53364-65 16 March 1987FACTS:Domiciano Soco was a driver of MERCO's delivery van and was at the same time the President of the MERCO Employees Labor Union (MELU), an affiliate of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW). Following various insSocos deviation on at one time from his usual route and going to a different place to speak with a co-employee who was then off-duty and due to reports that he was carrying on his unions activities during his working hours for the purpose of transferring his its affiliation from FFW to the Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL) for which purpose he utilizes the company vehicle, the personnel officer of MERCO in 1979 conducted an investigation. He was asked to explain the said incident but SOCO did not comply.

The same incident happened for the second time, for which he was asked again to explain but did not do so. MERCO thereafter wrote FFW for a grievance conference which was reset as the latter needed time to notify Soco. For his part, on the same day that MERCO wrote FFW, Soco filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the former, alleging that the five (5) days suspension imposed on him, was on account of his union activities.

A day before the meeting, FFW informed MERCO that the requested grievance conference would not be held because Soco finds it unnecessary to do so. Thus, he was placed on preventive suspension pending the approval of MERCO's application for clearance to terminate the services with the Ministry of Labor. MERCO's application for clearance to terminate was opposed by Soco even as MERCO filed its Answer to the complaint against it for unfair labor practice. The two cases were consolidated and tried jointly as agreed to by the contending parties and in an order, the Regional Director granted MERCO's application to terminate the employment of Soco. On appeal, the Ministry of Labor affirmed the order of the Regional Director.

ISSUES:

1. WON the RD has jurisdiction to hear and decide the controversy; and

2. WON respondent Deputy Minister of Labor erred in affirming the findings of the RD and that such was violative of the Constitution.

HELD:

1. Yes, the Ministry of Labor has jurisdiction over the case. The contention of Soco that the case should first be resolved by the LA and not the RD was found to be undeserving of the Court's favour. It ruled that as it was agreed upon by the parties to consolidate the two cases being litigated considering that both concern the same parties and the issues involved are interrelated, Soco obviously accepted the jurisdiction of the RD by presenting his evidence. By having asked for affirmative relief and without challenging the RDs power to hear and try his complaint for unfair labor practice, he cannot rightfully challenge the resolution made in said cases by the same Director, based on the latter's alleged lack of jurisdiction.2. No. The affirmation of the Deputy Minister of Labor of the RDs Order did not defy the constitutional provision on the security of tenure of employees as it is the prerogative of an employer company to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations necessary for the conduct of its business and to provide certain disciplinary measures in order to implement said rules and to assure that the same would be complied with. The Court dismissed the petition but taking into consideration the length of time that Soco worked for MERCO, the latter was ordered to grant the former separation pay.RATIO:A rule prohibiting employees from using company vehicles for private purpose without authority from management is reasonable. This regulation cannot be faulted by Soco because this is proper and necessary even if only for an orderly conduct of MERCO's business. To cap off his infractions, petitioners stubbornly declined even to satisfy MERCO's request for an explanation or to attend a grievance conference to discuss violations. Certainly, to condone petitioner's own conduct will erode the discipline that an employer should uniformly apply so that it can expect compliance to the same rules and regulations by its other employees. Otherwise, the rules necessary and proper for the operation of its business, would be gradually rendered ineffectual, ignored, and eventually become meaningless.

23. RONALD CABE vs. SOTERO TUMANG

G.R. No. L-57682 18 March 1985

FACTS:

Herein private respondent Samuel Tamayo agreed to construct a residential house for the petitioners in accordance with a plan prepared by an architect and its specifications. Tamayo started to work but was dispensed of his services when he allegedly made deviations from the said plan and the construction was finished by another.

Tamayo instituted a case against the Cabes in the Regional office of DOLE which ruled in his favour. The spouses assailed the decision by contending that the Assistant Director has no jurisdiction over the case.ISSUE:

WON the Labor Regional Office has jurisdiction over breach of construction contracts?

HELD:

No. The Labor Regional Office and the NLRC has no jurisdiction over Tamayos claim as their jurisdiction is confined to claims arising from Er-Ee relationship which does not exist in this case. Tamayo is an independent contractor, not an employee of the petitioners. The case is instead cognizable by the regular courts of justice.24. MOLAVE MOTOR SALES, INC. vs. JUDGE

CRISPIN LARON and PERDRO GEMINIANO G.R. No. L-65377 25 March 1984

FACTS:

MMS, a corporation engaged in the sale and repair of motor vehicles in Dagupan City, filed a claim for Sum of Money and Damages against its former Sales Manager, Pedro Geminiano for outstanding accounts he incurred for purchases and repair jobs for his personal cars and cash advances. The case was dismissed by the judge of the lower court in favour of Geminianos claim that as he was still an employee when he incurred such accounts, the regular court is not the proper venue for the issue. ISSUE:

WON the Labor Code has any relevance to the reliefs sought by the petitioners.

HELD:

No. The court held that the accounts incurred by Geminiano have no relevance to the Labor Code as the cause of action was one which is addressed by the civil laws and does not breach any provision of the Labor Code or the contract of employment of the respondent. Hence, it is the civil courts, not the LAs or NLRC who has jurisdiction.

RATIO:

The complaint filed by the plaintiff has not alleged any unfair labor practice. Theirs was a simple action for damages for tortuous acts allegedly committed by the defendant. Such being the case, the governing statute is the Civil Code and not the Labor Code.25. ANG TIBAY, ET Al. vs. CIR, ET AL G.R. No L-46496 27 February 1940FACTS:Toribio Teodoro owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Teodoro caused the layoff of a number of its employees. Such employees who are laid-off are members of the National Labor Union Inc., which averred that Teodoros act was not valid as it was not within the CBA and was seemingly in favour of the members of the other union, the National Workers Brotherhood (NWB); which was dominated by Teodoro himself. NLU filed a case before the CIR which elevated the case to SC.

Alleging that the supposed lack of material claimed by Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the NLU from work, NLU filed an motion with the desire to prove its claim in a new trial after having been able to come up with new evidence that were previously inaccessible, composed of records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.

ISSUES:1. WON the CIR observed due process of law in its proceedings; and

2. WON the application for new trial filed by NLU is meritorious.

HELD:1. No. The Court held that the whole transcript taken contains what transpired during the hearing which is more of a record of contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing counsels, with sporadic conclusion drawn to suit their own views. Such statements and expressions of views of the counsels having no evidentiary value solidify the Courts majoritys opinion that the lower court did not properly observe due process of law with its elevation of the case to SC.

2. Yes. Finding that the failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties, the Court held that interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. It ordered the case to be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise.

RATIO:

The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide and settle any question, matter, controversy or dispute arising between and/or affecting employers and employees or labourers and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA No. 103. In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies between labor and capital industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.The CIR, although not restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to industrial or agricultural disputes, may include in the award, order or decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. However, the fact that the CIR is said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of such character: (1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence in support thereof; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have something to support itself; (4) the evidence must be substantial; (5) the decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) the tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the

views of a subordinate; and (7) the Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.8 | Labor Relations | Mondays, 5:30-8:30pm | Judge Fernandez | UPang Venessa Lynn S. Barbiran, Year 3