Labor StandardsCASESMadeline S. Toledo

2013 0293

[G.R. No. 125303. June 16, 2000]DANILO LEONARDO, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and REYNALDOS MARKETING CORPORATION, ET. AL., respondents.[G.R. No. 126937. June 16, 2000]AURELIO FUERTE and DANILO LEONARDO, petitioners, vs. RAUL T. AQUINO, VICTORIANO R. CALAYCAY and ROGELIO I. RALAYA, as Chairman and Members of the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, SECOND DIVISION and REYNALDOS MARKETING and/or REYNALDO PADUA, respondents.FACTS:Petitioner Aurelio Fuerte was originally employed by private respondent REYNALDO'S MARKETING CORPORATION on August 11, 1981 as a muffler specialist, receiving P45.00 per day.

When he was appointed supervisor in 1988, his compensation was increased to P122.00 a day, augmented by a weekly supervisor's allowance of P600.00. On the other hand, DANILO LEONARDO was hired by private respondent on March 4, 1988 as an auto-aircon mechanic at a salary rate of P35.00 per day. His pay was increased to P90.00 a day when he attained regular status six months later. From such time until he was allegedly terminated, he claims to have also received a monthly allowance equal to P2, 500.00 as his share in the profits of the auto-aircon division. FUERTE alleges that on January 3, 1992, he was instructed to report at private respondent's main office where he was informed by the company's personnel manager that he would be transferred to its Sucat plant due to his failure to meet his sales quota, and for that reason, his supervisor's allowance would be withdrawn. For a short time, Fuerte reported for work at the Sucat plant; however, he protested his transfer, subsequently filing a complaint for illegal termination. On his part, Leonardo alleges that on April 22, 1991, private respondent was approached by the same personnel manager who informed him that his services were no longer needed. He, too, filed a complaint for illegal termination. The case was heard by Labor Arbiter Jesus N. Rodriguez, Jr. On December 15, 1994, Labor Arbiter Emerson C. Tumanon, to whom the case was subsequently assigned, rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. To reinstate complainant Aurelio Fuerte, to the position he was holding before the demotion, and to reinstate likewise complainant Danilo Leonardo to his former position or in lieu thereof, they be reinstated through payroll reinstatement without any of them losing their seniority rights and other privileges, inclusive of allowance and to their other benefits. On appeal, the respondent Commission modified the decision ordering the reinstatement of Fuerte but without any monetary claims and finding the complaint of Danilo Leonardo lack or merit, hence, dismissed.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioners were illegally dismissed.HELD:

In Fuerte's case, private respondent claims that the latter was demoted pursuant to a company policy intended to foster competition among its employees. Under this scheme, private respondent's employees are required to comply with a monthly sales quota. Should a supervisor such as Fuerte fail to meet his quota for a certain number of consecutive months, he will be demoted, whereupon his

supervisors allowance will be withdrawn and be given to the individual who takes his place. When the

employee concerned succeeds in meeting the quota again, he is re-appointed supervisor and his allowance is restored.

Insofar as the action taken against Fuerte is concerned, private respondent's justification is well illustrated in the record. He was unable to meet his quota for five months in 1991, from July to November of that year. Yet he insists that it could not possibly be so. He argues that he must have met his quota considering that he received his supervisor's allowance for the period aforesaid.

Fuerte nonetheless decries his transfer as being violative of his security of tenure, the clear implication being that he was constructively dismissed. We have held that an employer acts well within its rights in transferring an employee as it sees fit provided that there is no demotion in rank or diminution in pay. The two circumstances are deemed badges of bad faith, and thus constitutive of constructive dismissal.

Yet here, the transfer was undertaken beyond the parameters as aforesaid. The instinctive conclusion would be that his transfer is actually a constructive dismissal, but oddly, private respondent never denies that it was really demoting Fuerte for cause. It should be borne in mind, however, that the right to demote an employee also falls within the category of management prerogatives.

This arrangement appears to us to be an allowable exercise of company rights. An employer is entitled to impose productivity standards for its workers, and in fact, non-compliance may be visited with a penalty even more severe than demotion. In the case at bar, the petitioners' failure to meet the sales quota assigned to each of them constitute a just cause of their dismissal, regardless of the permanent or probationary status of their employment. This management prerogative of requiring standards may be availed of so long as they are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest.

Neither can we say that Fuerte's actions are indicative of abandonment. To constitute such a ground for dismissal, there must be (1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention, as manifested by some overt acts, to sever the employer-employee relationship. We have accordingly held that the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, as in this case, is inconsistent with a charge of abandonment.

Hence, given that Fuerte may not be deemed to have abandoned his job, and neither was he constructively dismissed by private respondent, the Commission did not err in ordering his reinstatement but without backwages. In a case where the employee's failure to work was occasioned neither by his abandonment nor by a termination, the burden of economic loss is not rightfully shifted to the employer; each party must bear his own loss.

With regard to Leonardo, private respondent likewise insists that it never severed the former's employment. On the contrary, the company claims that it was Leonardo who abandoned his post following an investigation wherein he was asked to explain an incident of alleged "sideline" work which occurred on April 22, 1991. It would appear that late in the evening of the day in question, the driver of a red Corolla arrived at the shop looking for Leonardo. The driver said that, as prearranged, he was to pick up Leonardo who would perform a private service on the vehicle. When reports of the "sideline" work reached management, it confronted Leonardo and asked for an explanation. According to private respondent, Leonardo gave contradictory excuses, eventually claiming that the unauthorized service was for an aunt. When pressed to present his aunt, it was then that Leonardo stopped reporting for work, filing his complaint for illegal dismissal some ten months after his alleged termination.

It must be stressed that while Leonardo alleges that he was illegally dismissed from his employment by the respondents, surprisingly, he never stated any reason why the respondents would want to ease him out from his job. Moreover, why did it take him ten (10) long months to file his case if indeed he was aggrieved by respondents. All the above facts clearly point that the filing of his case is a mere afterthought on the part of complainant Leonardo.

Leonardo protests that he was never accorded due process. As testified to by Merlin P. Orallo, the personnel manager, he was given a memorandum asking him to explain the incident in question, but he refused to receive it. In an analogous instance, we held that an employee's refusal to sign the minutes of an investigation cannot negate the fact that he was accorded due process. We find no reason to disturb the Commission's ruling that Leonardo had abandoned his position.

[G.R. No. 120556. January 26, 1998]

HDA. DAPDAP I and/or LUMBIA AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR WORKERS FOOD AND GENERAL TRADES (NFSW-FGT)/PEDRO BARRIENTOS JR., respondents.FACTS:

Sometime on March 1992 nine (9) workers of Hda. Dapdap I, a sugar farm in Victorias, Negros

Occidental, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against its owner Magdalena Fermin with the NLRC

Regional Arbitration Branch in Bacolod City alleging that they had been working in the farm since 1977 but were unjustly terminated, without notice and without any valid ground, on 27 January 1992. The only reason for their dismissal was their refusal to return the 6-hectare lot given to them for cultivation under an "Amicable Settlement" dated 30 September 1986 in connection with an illegal dismissal case previously filed against the management of Hda. Dapdap I by its workers. In addition, complainants charged Magdalena Fermin with unfair labor practice for trying to bust the National Federation of Sugar Workers Food and General Trades (NFSW-FGT) Union which forged the 1986 "Amicable Settlement."

On 7 September 1992 eight (8) of the original complainants withdrew from the complaint and returned to work on the ground that their misunderstanding with management was already settled. Pedro Barrientos Jr. was left as the sole complainant who amended the complaint on 30 March 1993 by

impleading Lumbia Agricultural and Development Corporation (LADCOR), the real owner of Hda. Dapdap I, as co-respondent with its President Magdalena Fermin.

LADCOR denied that complainant was terminated on 27 January 1992; on the contrary, it alleged that complainant voluntarily abandoned his work after 1 March 1992 to transfer to the adjacent farm of a certain Mr. Ramos. In addition, LADCOR alleged that it had a personality separate and distinct from its president, Magdalena Fermin, hence the latter could not be held personally liable for the alleged illegal dismissal.

Labor Arbiter Merlin D. Deloria ruled in favor of complainant. LADCOR appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision in toto.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondent abandoned his job and he was not illegally dismissed.HELD:

No, the respondent did not abandoned his job, thus, he was illegally dismissed. The NLRC correctly applied the consistent ruling in labor cases that a charge of abandonment is totally inconsistent with the immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal. It is indeed inconceivable that an employee like herein respondent who has been working at Hda. Dapdap I since 1977 and cultivating a substantial portion of a 6-hectare lot therein for himself would just abandon his work in 1992 for no apparent reason. As quoted by the Court in Judric Canning Corporation v. Inciong, "To get a job is difficult; to run from it is foolhardy.

[G.R. No. 114695. July 23, 1998]PREMIERE DEVELOPMENT BANK, PROCOPIO C. REYES, PACITA M. ARAOS and RENATO DIONISIO, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and TEODORA LABANDA, respondents.

FACTS:On August 8, 1985, Ramon T. Ocampo, a depositor of petitioner bank, issued a check in the amount of P6,792.66 in favor of and for deposit to the account of Country Banker's Insurance Corporation (CBISCO), also a depositor of petitioner bank. On the same day, after the check and the deposit slip were presented to respondent Teodora Labanda, who was employed as teller at petitioner's Taytay Branch, they were turned over to the Branch cashier for verification of the fund balance and signature of the drawer. There was a confirmation of the check and the same was accepted by Labanda for deposit to the current account of CBISCO.

The check was posted by Manuel S. Torio, the Taytay Branch bookkeeper. But instead of posting it to CSISCO's account, the same was posted to the account of Ocampo treating it as "On-Us Check," that is, drawn against the Taytay Branch where the check was deposited.

On January 13, 1986, the wife of Ocampo, together with the auditor from CBISCO, went to petitioner bank and complained to petitioner Dr. Procopio C. Reyes that her husband was being held accountable for the amount. It was only then that petitioner bank discovered the misposting of the check issued by Ocampo, resulting in the overstatement of his outstanding daily balance by P6,792.66. The overstatement remained undetected until Ocampo withdrew the money from the bank.

Due to this incident, petitioner Pacita M. Araos sent a demand letter to private respondent requesting her to explain in writing the misposting and erroneous crediting of the subject check in issue as well as the circumstances surrounding the incident within three (3) days from receipt thereof, and in case she fails to do so, necessary action shall be taken against her.

Petitioner Renato G. Dionisio, upon instructions of petitioner Reyes, sent the internal auditors of the bank to investigate and make a detailed report about the incident. On January 22, 1986, the auditors

came out with a report finding private respondent Labanda and bookkeeper Torio primarily liable for the incident, for the following reasons: a) Firstly, there was no end-of-the-day independent balancing of cash and checks between Labanda and Torio, thus the former failed to notice the over-stated cash and understated check reflected in the latter's blotter posting tape ;b) Manuel Torio did not affix his initial on Labanda's blotter to indicate the balancing between them.

These findings prompted petitioner Dionisio to send a letter to private respondent Labanda requiring her to shoulder 20% of the amount lost via salary deduction. Private respondent replied, objecting to such move, reasoning out that she is the breadwinner in the family. She further asked the bank to furnish her a copy of the audit report and requested for a full-dress investigation. For this reason, petitioners held in abeyance the salary deductions.

On March 13, 1986, respondent Labanda was placed under preventive suspension pending investigation of the incident. She was requested to report on April 4, 1986 so that she can present her side of the story. Labanda then wrote a letter to petitioner Reyes requesting information on the duration of her suspension and at the same time asking for an expeditious investigation. In response thereto, she was informed that the period of her suspension shall last until the investigation is completed and a decision is made thereon.

On the date of said inquiry, Labanda executed a statement.However, she manifested before Atty.

Revelo during the inquiry that she will not sign any of the preliminary statements she made unless the same is with the consent and advice of her husband. She also told the inquiring officer that she could not inform petitioners of the dates when she would be available for investigation.

On April 8, 1986, another letter was sent to respondent Labanda by petitioner Reyes informing the former that her refusal to sign or authenticate preliminary statements given on April 4, 1986 was a clear indication of her unwillingness to cooperate or an effort to hide something or suppress the truth.

The dates of the hearing were rescheduled by petitioners several times. The first rescheduled hearing was on April 14, 1986 where private respondent sent her lawyer bringing with him a letter asking that she be given time to confer with her counsel for which she was given until April 23. Notices were sent to inform her of the rescheduled dates with warning that failure to attend the same shall be taken as a tacit admission of her liability and the case shall be resolved based on the evidence available. In the meantime, Bookkeeper Torio admitted liability and was allowed to resign.

On April 7, 1986, petitioners received a letter from private respondent through her counsel demanding payment of actual damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for their alleged arbitrary, illegal and oppressive acts. 12Petitioners did not heed the demand.

On May 23, 1986, private respondent filed a complaint for damages before the court. Petitioners' subsequent motion to dismiss was denied. When their motion for reconsideration was likewise denied, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which however dismissed the case without prejudice to the refiling of the complaint with the labor arbiter. The decision became final and executory on July 30, 1987.

On April 4, 1988, respondent Labanda filed an illegal dismissal case. After trial, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the labor case ruling that by filing of the complaint with the Regional Trial Court, the respondent on her own, terminated her employment with the Bank. She was not dismissed by her employer. However, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter ruling that private respondent's indefinite preventive suspension amounted to constructive dismissal, thus, illegal and unjust.ISSUE:

Whether or not the filing of a complaint for damages by respondent Labanda against the petitioners amounts to abandonment.

HELD:Private respondent's preventive suspension is without valid cause since she was outrightly suspended by petitioner. As of the date of her preventive suspension on March 13, 1986 until the date when the last investigation was rescheduled on April 23, 1986, more than 30 days had expired. The

NLRC correctly observed that the preventive suspension beyond the maximum period amounted to constructive dismissal.

The High Court agrees with the NLRC and the Solicitor General that respondent Labanda did not abandon her job. To constitute abandonment, two elements must concur: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts. An employee who merely took steps to protest her indefinite suspension and to subsequently file an action for damages, cannot be said to have abandoned her work nor is it indicative of an intention to sever the employer-employee relationship. Her failure to report for work was due to her indefinite suspension. Petitioner's allegation of abandonment is further belied by the fact that private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Abandonment of work is inconsistent with the filing of said complaint.

On procedural considerations, respondent NLRC held that there was a violation by petitioner bank of the due process requirements under the Labor Code when it held that we also have not seen any effort of notifying complainant about her interest in her job by sending letters at her home address. The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process which are set out in Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this case, it nonetheless cannot be denied that notice still has to be served upon the employee sought to be dismissed.

Moreover, the observation of the Solicitor General must be noted that to the records of this case will show that private respondent Labanda never intended to abandon her job. First, after her indefinite suspension, she requested that the "full-dressed" investigation be done at the quickest time possible, and appealed to petitioner Reyes to consider that she was the breadwinner in the family. Second, she actively fought for her right to security of tenure by filing first with the Regional Trial Court an action for damages, and later with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal. Also, private respondent Labanda's inability to report for work was not voluntary but was rather the result of her indefinite suspension, which in reality was a constructive dismissal.

The foregoing considerations indubitably show that private respondent Labanda did not abandon her job but was illegally dismissed from employment without due process of law.

[G.R. No. 132805. February 2, 1999]PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER ROMULUS PROTACIO and DR. HERMINIO A. FABROS, respondents.FACTS:Private respondent Dr. Fabros was employed as flight surgeon at Petitioner Company. He was assigned at the PAL Medical Clinic and was on duty from 4:00 in the afternoon until 12:00 midnight.

On Feb.17, 1994, at around 7:00 in the evening, Dr. FAbros left the clinic to have his dinner at his residence, which was abou t5-minute drive away. A few minutes later, the clinic received an emergency call from the PAL Cargo Services. One of its employees had suffered a heart attack. The nurse on duty, Mr. Eusebio, called private respondent at home to inform him of the emergency. The patient arrived at the clinic at 7:50 in the evening and Mr. Eusebio immediately rushed him to the hospital. When Dr. Fabros reached the clinic at around 7:51 in the evening, Mr. Eusebio had already left with the patient to the hospital. The patient died the following day.

Upon learning about the incident, PAL Medical Director ordered the Chief Flight Surgeon to conduct an investigation. In his explanation, Dr. Fabros asserted that he was entitled to a thirty-minute meal break; that he immediately left his residence upon being informed by Mr. Eusebio about the emergency and he arrived at the clinic a few minutes later; that Mr. Eusebio panicked and brought the patient to the hospital without waiting for him.

Finding private respondents explanation unacceptable, the management charged private respondent with abandonment of post while on duty. He denied that he abandoned his post on February 17, 1994. He said that he only left the clinic to have his dinner at home. In fact, he returned to the clinic at 7:51 in the evening upon being informed of the emergency.

After evaluating the charge as well as the answer of private respondent, he was given a suspension for three months effective December 16, 1994.

Private respondent filed a complaint for illegal suspension against petitioner.

On July 16, 1996, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the suspension of private respondent illegal. It also ordered petitioner to pay private respondent the amount equivalent to all the benefits he should have received during his period of suspension plus P500,000.00 moral damages.

Petitioner appealed to the NLRC.

The NLRC, however, dismissed the appeal after finding that the decision of the Labor Arbiter is supported by the facts on record and the law on the matter. The NLRC likewise denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition.ISSUE:

1. WON the nullifying of the 3-month suspension by the NLRC erroneous.

2. WON the awarding of moral damages is proper.HELD:

The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The portion of the assailed decision awarding moral damages to private respondent is DELETED. All other aspects of the decision are AFFIRMED

1. The legality of private respondents suspension: Dr. Fabros left the clinic that night only to have his dinner at his house, which was only a few minutes drive away from the clinic. His whereabouts were known to the nurse on duty so that he could be easily reached in case of emergency. Upon being informed of Mr. Acostas condition, private respondent immediately left his home and returned to the clinic. These facts belie petitioners claim of abandonment. Petitioner argues that being a full-time employee, private respondent is obliged to stay in the company premises for not less than eight (8) hours. Hence, he may not leave the company premises during such time, even to take his meals. We are not impressed. Art. 83 and 85 of the Labor Code read: Art. 83. Normal hours of work. The normal hours of work of any employee shall not exceed eight (8) hours a day. Health personnel in cities and municipalities with a population of at least one million (1,000,000) or in hospitals and clinics with a bed capacity of at least one hundred (100) shall hold regular office hours for eight (8) hours a day, for five (5) days a week, exclusive of time for meals, except where the exigencies of the service require that such personnel work for six (6) days or forty-eight (48) hours, in which case they shall be entitled to an additional compensation of at least thirty per cent (30%) of their regular wage for work on the sixth day. For purposes of this Article, health personnel shall include: resident physicians, nurses, nutritionists, dieticians, pharmacists, social workers, laboratory technicians, paramedical technicians, psychologists, midwives, attendants and all other hospital or clinic personnel Art. 85. Meal periods. Subject to such regulations as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe, it shall be the duty of every employer to give his employees not less than sixty (60) minutes time-off for their regular meals. Sec. 7, Rule I, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code further states: Sec. 7. Meal and Rest Periods. Every employer shall give his employees, regardless of sex, not less than one (1) hour time-off for regular meals, except in the following cases when a meal period of not less than twenty (20) minutes may be given by the employer provided that such shorter meal period is credited as compensable hours worked of the employee; (a) Where the work is non-manual work in nature or does not involve strenuous physical exertion; (b) Where the establishment regularly operates not less than sixteen hours a day; (c) In cases of actual or impending emergencies or there is urgent work to be performed on machineries, equipment or installations to avoid serious loss which the employer would otherwise suffer; and (d) Where the work is necessary to prevent serious loss of perishable goods. Rest periods or coffee breaks running from five (5) to twenty (20) minutes shall be considered as compensable working time. Thus, the eight-hour work period does not include the meal break. Nowhere in the law may it be inferred that employees must take their meals within the company premises. Employees are not prohibited from going out of the premises as long as they return to their posts on time. Private respondents act, therefore, of going home to take his dinner does not constitute abandonment. 2. The award of moral damages: Not every employee who is illegally dismissed or suspended is entitled to damages. As a rule, moral damages are recoverable only where the dismissal or suspension of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy In the case at bar, there is no showing that the management of petitioner company was moved by some evil motive in suspending private respondent. It suspended private respondent on an honest, albeit erroneous, belief that private respondents act of leaving the company premises to take his meal at home constituted abandonment of post which warrants the penalty of suspension. Under the circumstances, we hold that private respondent is not entitled to moral damages.

[G.R. No. 125298. February 11, 1999]1. CMP FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER CRESENCIANO R. INIEGO, and FERNANDO CARANTO, RESTY REMITTERE, REYNALDO ROSALES, ANTONIO TAPAR, NARCISO CLARO, SIONY MANOS, BALDO VIODOR and DAWAY WAHAB, respondents.FACTS:

CMP Federal Security Agency Inc. (CMP hereon) is in the business of providing detective and security services. Among its employees were herein private respondent security guards Fernando Caranto, Resty Remittere, Reynaldo Rosales, Antonio Tapar, Narciso Claro, Siony Manos, Baldo Viodor and Daway Wahab, all assigned at the Maalikaya Health Complex in Quezon City.

On 10 March 1994 private respondents filed complaints for illegal deduction, underpayment and/or non-payment of wages, premium pay for holiday, rest day and night shift differential pay, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, separation pay, allowance and unfair labor practice against CMP, Carolina Mabanta Piao and Ponciano Mabanta Sr. Private respondent Fernando Caranto later amended his complaint to include illegal dismissal after he was relieved from his post at the Maalikaya Health Complex by CMP, allegedly upon request of the client.

The case was initially set for mandatory conference or conciliation on 29 March 1994.

When the case was finally called for hearing on 23 May 1994 private respondents filed their position paper and other documentary evidence in compliance with the Labor Arbiters orders. Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted for decision. It was only on 13 June 1994 that CMP presented its position paper.

On 22 July 1994 the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of private respondents ordering CMP to reinstate Fernando Caranto with full back wages, pay salary differentials to all private respondents, plus attorneys fees. Subsequently, Both parties appealed to the NLRC.

ISSUE:1. whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that private respondent Fernando Caranto was illegally dismissed by CMP

2. whether in granting all the money claims of private respondents CMP was denied due process.HELD:

In termination cases like the one before us, the burden of proving that the dismissal of the employee was for a valid or authorized cause rests on the employer and failure to discharge that duty would mean that the dismissal is not justified and therefore illegal. The same principle was reiterated by this Court in Golden Donuts Inc. v. NLRC when it ruled that the employer carries the burden of proof in showing just cause for terminating the services of an employee.

Finally, while it may be true that in labor cases stringent rules of procedure may be dispensed with in the interest of justice, it does not mean that a party litigant is at liberty to completely disregard or ignore the rules, particularly those relating to the periods for filing of pleadings. In this connection, if we are to sustain petitioners argument that it was denied due process when its position paper and documentary evidence were not considered by the Labor Arbiter in deciding the case, we will in effect put a premium on the undesirable practice of filing position papers late and only after the case has already been submitted for decision

The petition is dismissed. The Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 26 October 1995 affirming with modifications the Decision of the Labor Arbiter and ordering petitioner CMP FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, INC., to pay private respondents FERNANDO CARANTO, RESTY REMITTERE, REYNALDO ROSALES, ANTONIO TAPAR, NARCISO CLARO, SIONY MANOS, BALDO VIODOR and DAWAY WAHAB wage differentials, 13th month pay, holiday pay and service incentive leave pay as earlier quoted in this Decision, and its Resolution of 29 November 1995 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, are affirmed. Costs against petitioner.[G.R. No. 131405. July 20, 1999]LEILANI MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ASIAN LAND STRATEGIES CORPORATION, respondents.FACTS:

On April 25, 1999, the Board of Directors of the Rural Bank of Lucban, Inc., issued Board Resolution Nos. 99-52 and 99-53, that in line with the policy of the bank to familiarize bank employees with the various phases of bank operations and further strengthen the existing internal control system[,] all officers and employees are subject to reshuffle of assignments. Moreover, this resolution does not preclude the transfer of assignment of bank officers and employees from the branch office to the head office and vice-versa."

Petitioner filed a Complaint before Arbitration Branch No. IV of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The Complaint -- for illegal dismissal, underpayment, separation pay and damages. Petitioner argues that he was compelled to file an action for constructive dismissal, because he had been demoted from appraiser to clerk and not given any work to do, while his table had been placed near the toilet and eventually removed.

He adds that the reshuffling of employees was done in bad faith, because it was designed primarily to force him to resign.

After the NLRC denied his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner brought before the CA a Petition for Certiorari assailing the foregoing Resolution. The Court of appeals Find that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the NLRC. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner was constructively dismissed from his employment?

HELD:

The Petition has no merit.

Constructive dismissal is defined as an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or a diminution of pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee. Jurisprudence recognizes the exercise of management prerogatives. For this reason, courts often decline to interfere in legitimate business decisions of employers. Indeed, labor laws discourage interference in employers' judgments concerning the conduct of their business. The law must protect not only the welfare of employees, but also the right of employers.

In the pursuit of its legitimate business interest, management has the prerogative to transfer or assign employees from one office or area of operation to another -- provided there is no demotion in rank or diminution of salary, benefits, and other privileges; and the action is not motivated by discrimination,

made in bad faith, or effected as a form of punishment or demotion without sufficient cause. This privilege is inherent in the right of employers to control and manage their enterprise effectively. The right of employees to security of tenure does not give them vested rights to their positions to the extent of depriving management of its prerogative to change their assignments or to transfer them.

The law protects both the welfare of employees and the prerogatives of management. Courts will not interfere with business judgments of employers, provided they do not violate the law, collective bargaining agreements, and general principles of fair play and justice. The transfer of personnel from one area of operation to another is inherently a managerial prerogative that shall be upheld if exercised in good faith -- for the purpose of advancing business interests, not of defeating or circumventing the rights of employees.

"The reshuffling of its employees was done in good faith and cannot be made the basis of a finding of constructive dismissal.

WHEREFORE, this Petition is DENIED, and the June 14, 2002 Decision and the September 25, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

G.R. No. 72977 December 21, 1988BIENVENIDO R. BATONGBACAL, petitioner, vs.ASSOCIATED BANK and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,respondents.

FACTS:Petitioner Bienvenido Batongbacal started his banking career as a manager of the Second Rizal

Development Bank. He then transferred to Citizens Bank and Trust Company and was appointed as assistant vice-president and concurrently, as acting manager of the personnel department. Subsequently,

Citizens Bank merged with Association Banking Corporation and later became known as Associated

Bank. In the new bank, petitioner resumed his position as assistant vice president. Years later, he found out that his salary was very much below the standard remuneration of the banks other assistant vice presidents. He asked for the board to give him the accrued salary withheld from him but to no avail.

Thereafter, as part of its streamlining measures, the management required all bank officers to submit their courtesy resignations. Petitioner did not submit his courtesy resignation. As a result, he received a letter from the Bank informing him that his resignation was accepted. Petitioner made repeated demands for the reconsideration of the banks decision to terminate his employment. He then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages in the arbitration branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. The NLRC ordered petitioners reinstatement with full back wages. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, the bank appealed to the NLRC which ruled in favour of the legality of petitioners dismissal.

ISSUE:

WON respondent bank legally dismissed petitioner for refusing to tender his courtesy resignation.

HELD:

No. Petitioners dismissal was effected through a letter accepting his resignation, even if petitioner did not actually submit such letter. It is clear from private respondents pleadings that it terminated petitioner for insubordination in view of his failure to comply with the order to submit his letter of courtesy resignation. However, the Court held that insubordination may not be imputed to one who refused to allow an unlawful order. Moreover, the Court held that the record fails to show any valid reasons for terminating the employment of petitioner.

[G.R. No. 114129. ]

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSIONS and JEREMIAS G. CORTEZ, respondents.

FACTS:

Signowas employed in Meralco as supervisor-leadman since Jan 1963.In 1981, hesupervised the installation of electricity in de Laras house in Antipolo. DeLaras house was not yet within the required 30-meter distance from the Meralco facility hence he is not yet within the service scope of Meralco. As a work around, Signo had it be declared that a certain sarisari store nearer the facility be declared as de

Laras so as to facilitate the installation. Evertything would have been smooth thereafter but due to fault of the PowerSales Division of Meralco, de Lara was not billed for a year. Investigation was conducted and Meralco found out the irregularity in Signos work on de Laraselectricity installation. Signo was dismissed on May 18, 1983. Signo filed a case for illegal dismissal and for backwages. The Lanor Arbiter ruled that though there is a breach of trust in the actuations of Signo dismissal is aharsh penalty as Signo has been employed for more than 20 years by Meralco andhas been commended twice before for honesty. The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter. Meralco appealed.

ISSUE:

WON there has beendue process in the dismissal of Signo.

HELD:

The SC sustained the decision of the NLRC. Well-established is the principle that findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but even finality. Judicial review by this Court on labor cases does not go so far as to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor officer or office based his or its determination but is limited to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.

Notwithstanding the existence of a valid cause for dismissal, such as breach of trust by an employee, nevertheless, dismissal should not be imposed, as it is too severe a penalty if the latter has been employed for a considerable length of time in the service of his employer. Reinstatement of respondent Signo is proper in the instant case, but without the award of back wages, considering the good faith of the employer in dismissing the respondent.

G.R. No. L-48494 February 5, 1990BRENT SCHOOL, INC., and REV. GABRIEL DIMACHE, petitioners, vs.RONALDO ZAMORA, the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, Office of the

President, and DOROTEO R. ALEGRE, respondents.

FACTS:

Doroteo R. Alegre was engaged as athletic director by Brent School, Inc. The contract was fixed for five (5) years, i.e., from July 18, 1971, the date of execution of the agreement, to July 17, 1976. Three months before the expiration of the stipulated period, or more precisely on April 20,1976, Alegre was given a copy of the report filed by Brent School advising of the termination of his services effective on July 16, 1976. The stated ground for the termination was "completion of contract, expiration of the definite period of employment." Alegre protested and argued that although his contract did stipulate that the same would terminate on July 17, 1976, since his services were necessary and desirable in the usual business of his employer, and his employment had lasted for five years, he had acquired the status of a regular employee and could not be removed except for valid cause. 6

The Regional Director considered Brent School's report as anapplication for clearance to terminate employment (not a report of termination), and accepting the recommendation of the Labor Conciliator, refused to give such clearance and instead required the reinstatement of Alegre, as a "permanent employee," to his former position without loss of seniority rights and with full back wages. Brent School filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. The School is now before this Court in a last attempt at vindication. That it will get here.

ISSUE:

WON the provisions of the Labor Code, as amended, have anathematized "fixed period employment" or employment for a term.

HELD:

On one hand, there is a gradual and progressive elimination of references to term or fixed period employment in the Labor Code, and the specific statement of the rule that regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be employed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: provided, that, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such actually exists. On the other hand, the Civil Code, which has always recognized, and continues to recognize, the validity and propriety of contracts and obligations with a fixed or definite period, and imposes no restraints on the freedom of the parties to fix the duration of a contract, whatever its object, be it specie, goods or services, except the general admonition against stipulations contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Under the Civil Code, therefore, and as a general proposition, fixed-term employment contracts are not limited, as they are under the present Labor Code, to those by nature seasonal or for specific projects with pre-determined dates of completion; they also include those to which the parties by free choice have assigned a specific date of termination. The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its application. Outlawing the whole concept of term employment and subverting to boot the principle of freedom of contract to remedy the evil of employer's using it as a means to prevent their employees from obtaining security of tenure is like cutting off the nose to spite the face or, more relevantly, curing a headache by lopping off the head. Alegre's employment was terminated upon the expiration of his last contract with Brent School on July 16, 1976 without the necessity of any notice. The advance written advice given the Department of Labor with copy to said petitioner was a mere reminder of the impending expiration of his contract, not a letter of termination, nor an application for clearance to terminate which needed the approval of the Department of Labor to make the termination of his services effective.