Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 126383 November 28, 1997SAN JUAN DE DIOS HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-AFW/MA. CONSUELO MACQUILING LEONARDO MARTINEZ, DOMINGO ELA, JR., RODOLFO CALUCIN, JR., PERLA MENDOZA, REX RAPHAEL REYES, ROGELIO BELMONTE, and 375 other EMPLOYEE-UNION MEMBERS,petitioners,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, and SAN JUAN DE DIOS HOSPITAL,respondents.FRANCISCO,J.:Petitioners, the rank-and-file employee-union officers and members of San Juan De Dios Hospital Employees Association, sent on July 08, 1991, a "four (4)-page letter with attached support signatures . . . requesting and pleading for the expeditious implementation and payment by respondent" Juan De Dios Hospital "of the '40-HOURS/5-DAY WORKWEEK' with compensable weekly two (2) days off provided for by Republic Act 5901 as clarified for enforcement by the Secretary of Labor's Policy Instructions No. 54 dated April 12, 1988."1Respondent hospital failed to give a favorable response; thus, petitioners filed a complaint regarding their "claims for statutory benefits under the above-cited law and policy issuance"2, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-08-04815-19. On February 26, 1992, the Labor Arbiter3dismissed the complaint. Petitioners appealed before public respondent National Labor Relations Commission4(NLRC), docketed as NLRC NCR CA 003028-92, which affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision. Petitioners' subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of NLRC in concluding that Policy Instructions No. 54 "proceeds from a wrong interpretation of RA 5901"5and Article 83 of the Labor Code.As the Court sees it, the core issue is whether Policy Instructions No. 54 issued by then Labor Secretary (now Senator) Franklin M. Drilon is valid or not.The policy instruction in question provides in full as follows:Policy Instruction No. 54To: All ConcernedSubject: Working Hours and Compensation of Hospital/Clinic PersonnelThis issuance clarifies the enforcement policy of this Department on the working hours and compensation of personnel employed by hospitals/clinics with a bed capacity of 100 or more and those located in cities and municipalities with a population of one million or more.Republic Act 5901 took effect on 21 June 1969 prescribes a 40-hour/5 day work week for hospital/clinic personnel. At the same time, the Act prohibits the diminution of the compensation of these workers who would suffer a reduction in their weekly wage by reason of the shortened workweek prescribed by the Act. In effect, RA 5901 requires that the covered hospital workers who used to work seven (7) days a week should be paid for such number of days for working only 5 days or 40 hours a week.The evident intention of RA 5901 is to reduce the number of hospital personnel, considering the nature of their work, and at the same time guarantee the payment to them of a full weekly wage for seven (7) days. This is quite clear in the Exemplary Note of RA 5901 which states:As compared with the other employees and laborers, these hospital and health clinic personnel are over-worked despite the fact that their duties are more delicate in nature. If we offer them better working conditions, it is believed that the "brain drain", that our country suffers nowadays as far as these personnel are concerned will be considerably lessened. The fact that these hospitals and health clinics personnel perform duties which are directly concerned with the health and lives of our people does not mean that they should work for a longer period than most employees and laborers. They are also entitled to as much rest as other workers. Making them work longer than is necessary may endanger, rather than protect the health of their patients. Besides, they are not receiving better pay than the other workers. Therefore, it is just and fair that they may be made to enjoy the privileges of equal working hours with other workers except those excepted by law. (Sixth Congress of the Republic of the Philippines, Third Session, House of Representatives, H. No. 16630)The Labor Code in its Article 83 adopts and incorporates the basic provisions of RA 5901 andretains its spirit and intentwhich is to shorten the workweek of covered hospital personnel and at the same time assure them of a full weekly wage.Consistent with such spirit and intent, it is the position of the Department that personnel in subject hospital and clinics are entitled to a full weekly wage for seven (7) days if they have completed the 40-hour/5-day workweek in any given workweek.All enforcement and adjudicatory agencies of this Department shall be guided by this issuance in the disposition of cases involving the personnel of covered hospitals and clinics.Done in the City of Manila, this 12th day of April, 1988.(Sgd.) FRANKLIN M. DRILONSecretary(Emphasis Added)We note that Policy Instruction No. 54 relies and purports to implement Republic Act No. 5901, otherwise known as "An Act Prescribing Forty Hours A Week Of Labor For Government and Private Hospitals Or Clinic Personnel", enacted on June 21, 1969. Reliance on Republic Act No. 5901, however, is misplaced for the said statute, as correctly ruled by respondent NLRC, has long been repealed with the passage of the Labor Code on May 1, 1974, Article 302 of which explicitly provides: "All labor laws not adopted as part of this Code either directly or by reference are hereby repealed. All provisions of existing laws, orders, decree, rules and regulations inconsistent herewith are likewise repealed." Accordingly, only Article 83 of the Labor Code which appears to have substantially incorporated or reproduced the basic provisions of Republic Act No. 5901 may support Policy Instructions No. 54 on which the latter's validity may be gauged. Article 83 of the Labor Code states:Art. 83. Normal Hours of Work. The normal hours of work of any employee shall not exceed eight (8) hours a day.Health personnel in cities and municipalities with a population of at least one million (1,000,000) or in hospitals and clinics with a bed capacity of at least one hundred (100)shall hold regular office hours for eight (8) hours a day, for five (5) days a week, exclusive of time for meals, exceptwhere the exigencies of the service require that such personnel work for six (6) days or forty-eight (48) hours, in which case they shall be entitled to an additional compensation of at least thirty per cent (30%) of their regular wage for work on the sixth day. For purposes of this Article, "health personnel" shall include: resident physicians, nurses, nutritionists, dietitians, pharmacists, social workers, laboratory technicians, paramedical technicians, psychologists, midwives, attendants and all other hospital or clinic personnel. (Emphasis supplied)A cursory reading of Article 83 of the Labor Code betrays petitioners' position that "hospital employees" are entitled to "a full weekly salary with paid two (2) days' off if they have completed the 40-hour/5-day workweek".6What Article 83 merely provides are: (1) the regular office hour of eight hours a day, five days per week for health personnel, and (2) where the exigencies of service require that health personnel work for six days or forty-eight hours then such health personnel shall be entitled to an additional compensation of at least thirty percent of their regular wage for work on the sixth day. There is nothing in the law that supports then Secretary of Labor's assertion that "personnel in subject hospitals and clinics are entitled to a full weekly wage for seven (7) days if they have completed the 40-hour/5-day workweek in any given workweek". Needless to say, the Secretary of Labor exceeded his authority by including a two days off with pay in contravention of the clear mandate of the statute. Such act the Court shall not countenance. Administrative interpretation of the law, we reiterate, is at best merely advisory,7and the Court will not hesitate to strike down an administrative interpretation that deviates from the provision of the statute.Indeed, even if we were to subscribe with petitioners' erroneous assertion that Republic Act No. 5901 has neither been amended nor repealed by the Labor Code, we nevertheless find Policy Instructions No. 54 invalid. A perusal of Republic Act No. 59018reveals nothing therein that gives two days off with pay for health personnel who complete a 40-hour work or 5-day workweek. In fact, the Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 16630 (later passed into law as Republic Act No. 5901) explicitly states that the bill's sole purpose is to shorten the working hours of health personnel and not to dole out a two days off with pay.Hence:The accompanying bill seeks to grant resident physicians, staff nurses, nutritionist, midwives, attendants and other hospital and health clinic personnel of public and private hospitals and clinics,the privilege of enjoying the eight hours a week exclusive of time for lunch granted by law to all government employees and workers except those employed in schools and in courts.At present those hospitals and clinics, work six days a week, 8 hours a day or 48 hours a week.As compared with the other employees and laborers, these hospital and health clinic personnel are over-worked despite the fact that their duties are more delicate in nature. If we offer them better working conditions, it is believed that the "brain drain", that our country suffers nowadays as far as these personnel are concerned will be considerably lessened.The fact that these hospitals and health clinic personnel perform duties which are directly concerned with the health and lives of our people does not mean that they should work for a longer period than most employees and laborers.They are also entitled to as much rest as other workers.Making them work longer than is necessary may endanger, rather than protect, the health of their patients. Besides, they are not receiving better pay than the other workers. Therefore, it is just and fair thatthey be made to enjoy the privileges of equal working hours with other workers except those excepted by law.In the light of the foregoing, approval of this bill is strongly recommended.(SGD.) SERGIO H. LOYOLA"Congressman, 3rd DistrictManila" (Annex "F" of petition, emphasis supplied)Further, petitioners' position is also negated by the very rules and regulations promulgated by the Bureau of Labor Standards which implement Republic Act No. 5901. Pertinent portions of the implementing rules provide:RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTINGREPUBLIC ACT NO. 5901By virtue of Section 79 of the Revised Administrative Code, as modified by section 18 of Implementation Report for Reorganization Plan No. 20-A on Labor, vesting in the Bureau of Labor Standards the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement wage and hour laws, the following rules and regulations to are hereby issued for the implementation of Republic Act No. 5901.CHAPTER I CoverageSec.1. General Statement on Coverage. Republic Act No. 5901, hereinafter referred to as the Act, shall apply to:(a) All hospitals and clinics, including those with a bed capacity of less than one hundred, which are situated in cities or municipalities with a population of one million or more; and to(b) All hospitals and clinics with a bed capacity of at least one hundred, irrespective of the size of population of the city or municipality where they may be situated.xxx xxx xxxSec. 7. Regular Working Day. The regular working days of covered employees shall be not more than five days in a workweek. The workweek may begin at any hour and on any day, including Saturday or Sunday, designated by the employer.Employers are not precluded from changing the time at which the workday or workweek begins, provided that the change is not intended to evade the requirements of these regulations on the payment of additional compensation.xxx xxx xxxSec. 15. Additional Pay Under the Act and C.A.No.444. (a) Employees of covered hospitals and clinics who are entitled to the benefits provided under the Eight-Hour Labor Law, as amended, shall be paid an additional compensation equivalent to their regular rate plus at least twenty-five percent thereof for work performed on Sunday and Holidays, not exceeding eight hours, such employees shall be entitled to an additional compensation of at least 25% of their regular rate.(b) For work performed in excess of forty hours a week, excluding those rendered in excess of eight hours a day during the week, employees covered by the Eight-Hour Labor Law shall be entitled to an additional straight-time pay which must be equivalent at least to their regular rate.If petitioners are entitled to two days off with pay, then there appears to be no sense at all why Section 15 of the implementing rules grants additional compensation equivalent to the regular rate plus at least twenty-five percent thereof for work performed on Sunday to health personnel, or an "additional straight-time pay which must be equivalent at least to the regular rate" "[f]or work performed in excess of forty hours a week. . . . Policy Instructions No. 54 to our mind unduly extended the statute. The Secretary of Labor moreover erred in invoking the "spirit and intent" of Republic Act No. 5901 and Article 83 of the Labor Code for it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal, the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says.9No additions or revisions may be permitted. Policy Instructions No. 54 being inconsistent with and repugnant to the provision of Article 83 of the Labor Code, as well as to Republic Act No. 5901, should be, as it is hereby, declared void.WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. No costs.SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 80737 September 29, 1988PHILIPPINE GRAPHIC ARTS INC., IGMIDIO R. SILVERIO AND CARLOS CABAL,petitioners,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ROSALINA M. PULPULAAN AND EMELITA SALONGA,respondents.George L. Howard for petitioners.The Office of the Solicitor General for public respondent.Raul E. Espinosa for private respondents.GUTIERREZ, JR.,J.:In October, 1984, the petitioner corporation was forced by economic circumstances to require its workers to go on mandatory vacation leave in batches of seven or nine for periods ranging from 15, 30, to 45 days. The workers were paid while on leave but the pay was charged against their respective earned leaves.As a result, the private respondents filed complaints for unfair labor practice and discrimination.On April 9, 1986, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which reads:Wherefore, for lack of merit, the complaint for unfair labor practice on grounds of discrimination, forced leave and reduction of working days is hereby, DISMISSED. Respondent is hereby ordered to restore and grant to all its employees the company policy regarding groceries previously enjoyed by them. (p. 27, Rollo)The private respondents filed a "partial appeal" with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) questioning the Labor Arbiter's dismissal of their complaint for unfair labor practice and the resultant forced vacation leaves which were actually without pay.On June 19,1986, the NLRC affirmed the arbiter's decision with modification as follows:Be that as it may, since as intimated at the outset, the vacation leave forced upon the complainants was visited with arbitrariness not amounting to unfair labor practice, a refund of the amount equivalent to the earned leave of each of the complainants treated as their pay during their vacation is believed in order.WHEREFORE, modified as above indicated, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. (PARTIAL APPEAL TO THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, p. 1) (p. 60, Rollo)The petitioners raise two issues in their petition, namely:A. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RENDERING A RESOLUTION ON AN ISSUE INVOLVING A MONEY CLAIM, WHICH WAS NOT A SUBJECT OF AN APPEAL NOR ASSIGNED AS AN ERROR.B. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RENDERING A RESOLUTION IN FAVOR OF THE UNION AND/OR 23 OTHER EMPLOYEES WHO ARE NOT REAL PARTIES IN THE CASE, NOR IN THE PARTIAL APPEAL. (pp. 17 & 22, Rollo)After considering the petition and treating the comments of the private respondents and the Solicitor General as Answers, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and decide it on the basic merits.The principal issue now before the Court is the forced vacation leave without pay whether or not it is unfair labor practice and if not an unfair labor practice, whether or not it was tainted with arbitrariness.The Court is convinced from the records now before it, that there was no unfair labor practice. As found by the NLRC, the private respondents themselves never questioned the existence of an economic crisis but, in fact, admitted its existence. There is basis for the petitioner's contentions that the reduction of work schedule was temporary, that it was taken only after notice and consultations with the workers and supervisors, that a consensus was reached on how to deal with deteriorating economic conditions and reduced sales and that the temporary reduction of working days was a more humane solution instead of a retrenchment and reduction of personnel. The petitioner further points out that this is in consonance with the collective bargaining agreement between the employer and its employees. The Court, therefore, agrees with the Solicitor General in his submission that:There is also no showing that the imposition of forced leave was exercised for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of employees under special laws or under valid agreements. As the records show, petitioners instituted the forced leave due to economic crisis, which private respondents do not even question. (Position Paper [Private Respondents'], dated July 1985, p. 2)Likewise the forced leave was enforced neither in a malicious, harsh, oppressive, vindictive nor wanton manner, or out of malice or spite. Apart from private respondents concurrence that the forced leave was implemented due to economic crisis, what only "hurts" (ibid.) them "is that said management's plan was not even discussed in the grievance procedure so that the Union members thereof may well be apprised of the reason therefor." (Ibid.)However, to rule that petitioners' failure to bring the question of necessity in the imposition of forced leave and the distribution of work availability before the grievance machinery, as a prior requisite for the implementation of the forced leave scheme, constitutes arbitrariness is erroneous. (Rollo, pp. 63-64)The decision to resort to forced leaves was, under the circumstances, a management prerogative. The workers' claim of non-resort. to the grievance machinery is negated by their failure to initiate steps for its employment.As stressed by the Solicitor General:The statutory law on grievance procedure provides that:ART. 261. Grievance machinery. Whenever a grievance arises from the interpretation or implementation of a collective agreement, including disciplinary actions imposed on members of the bargaining unit, the employer and the bargaining representative shall meet to adjust the grievance. Where the grievance procedure as provided herein does not apply, grievances shall be subject to negotiation, conciliation or arbitration as provided elsewhere in this Code (Labor Code (Emphasis supplied)As the law stands, both employers and bargaining representative of the employees are required to go through the grievance machinery in case a grievance arises. And though the law does not provide who, as between labor and capital, should initiate that said grievance be brought first to the, grievance machinery, it is only logical, just and equitable that whoever is aggrieved should initiate settlement of the grievance through the grievance machinery. To impose the compulsory procedure on employers alone would be oppressive of capital, notwithstanding the fact that in most cases the grievance is of the employees.In the case at bar, when petitioners sent notice to complainants, no grievance between petitioners and private respondents that need be threshed out before the grievance machinery has yet materialized. But then, private respondents, who received such notice and being aggrieved thereof, instituted a case before the Labor Arbiter for unfair labor practices and discrimination, prior to any referral to the grievance machinery, which they are equally mandated to go through and under the circumstances they were better situated to initiate; likewise, petitioners even prayed before the Labor Arbiter that the complaint be dismissed and/or referred to the grievance machinery. (Position Paper (Petitioners'), dated 24 July 1985, p. 7) Thus, petitioner should not be faulted if the grievance machinery was in any way by-passed. (Rollo, pp. 64-66)WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The June 19, 1987 resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission is set aside and the April 9, 1986 decision of the Labor Arbiter is REINSTATED.SO ORDERED.Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 163147 October 10, 2007LINTON COMMERCIAL CO., INC. and DESIREE ONG,Petitioners,vs.ALEX A. HELLERA, FRANCISCO RACASA, DANTE ESCARLAN, DONATO SASA, RODOLFO OLINAR, DANIEL CUSTODIO, ARTURO POLLO, ROBERT OPELIA, B. PILAPIL, WINIFREG BLANDO, JUANITO GUILLERMO, DONATO BONETE, ISAGANI YAP, CESAR RAGONON, BENEDICTO ILAGAN, REXTE SOLANOY, RODOLFO LIM, ERNESTO ALCANTARA, DANTE DUMAPE, FELIPE CAGOCO, JR., JOSE NARCE, NELIO CANTIGA, QUIRINO C. ADA, MANUEL BANZON, JOEL F. ADA, SATPARAM ELMER, ROMEO BALAIS, CLAUDIO S. MORALES, DANILO NORLE, LEONCIO RACASA, NOEL LEONCIO RACASA, NOEL ACEDILLA, ELPIDIO E. VERGABINIA, JR., CONRADO CAGOCO, ROY BORAGOY, EDUARDO GULTIA, REYNALDO SANTOS, LINO VALENCIA, ROY DURANO, LEO VALENCIA, ROBERTO BLANDO, JAYOMA A., NOMER ALTAREJOS, RAMON OLINAR III, SATURNINO C. EBAYA, FERNANDO R. REBUCAS, NICANOR L. DE CASTRO, EDUARDO GONZALES, ISAGANI GONZALES, THOMAS ANDRAB, JR., MINIETO DURANO, ERNESTO VALLENTE, NONITO I. DULA, NESTOR M. BONETE, JOSE SALONOY, ALBERTO LAGMAN, ROLANDO TORRES, ROLANDO TOLDO, ROLINDO CUALQUIERA, ARMANDO LIMA, FELIX D. DUMARE, ALFREDO SELAPIO, MARTIN V. VILLACAMPA, JR., CARLITO PABLE, DANTE ESCARLAN, M. DURANO, RAMON ROSO, LORETA RAFAEL, and ELEZAR MELLEJOR,Respondents.D E C I S I O NTINGA,J.:This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the Decision1of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 12 December 2003 as well as its Resolution2promulgated on 2 April 2004 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.This case originated from a labor complaint filed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in which herein respondents contended that petitioner Linton Commercial Company, Inc. (Linton) had committed illegal reduction of work when it imposed a reduction of work hours thereby affecting its employees.Linton is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of importation, wholesale, retail and fabrication of steel and its by-products.3Petitioner Desiree Ong is Lintons vice president.4On 17 December 1997, Linton issued a memorandum5addressed to its employees informing them of the companys decision to suspend its operations from 18 December 1997 to 5 January 1998 due to the currency crisis that affected its business operations. Linton submitted an establishment termination report6to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) regarding the temporary closure of the establishment covering the said period. The companys operation was to resume on 6 January 1998.On 7 January 1997,7Linton issued another memorandum8informing them that effective 12 January 1998, it would implement a new compressed workweek of three (3) days on a rotation basis. In other words, each worker would be working on a rotation basis for three working days only instead for six days a week. On the same day, Linton submitted an establishment termination report9concerning the rotation of its workers. Linton proceeded with the implementation of the new policy without waiting for its approval by DOLE.Aggrieved, sixty-eight (68) workers (workers) filed a Complaint for illegal reduction of workdays with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC on 17 July 1998.On the other hand, the workers pointed out that Linton implemented the reduction of work hours without observing Article 283 of the Labor Code, which required submission of notice thereof to DOLE one month prior to the implementation of reduction of personnel, since Linton filed only the establishment termination report enacting the compressed workweek on the very date of its implementation.10Petitioners, on the other hand, contended that the devaluation of the peso created a negative impact in international trade and affected their business because a majority of their raw materials were imported. They claimed that their business suffered a net loss ofP3,569,706.57 primarily due to currency devaluation and the slump in the market. Consequently, Linton decided to reduce the working days of its employees to three (3) days on a rotation basis as a cost-cutting measure. Further, petitioners alleged that the compressed workweek was actually implemented on 12 January 1998 and not on 7 January 1998, and that Article 283 was not applicable to the instant case.11Pending decision of the Labor Arbiter, twenty-one (21) of the workers signed individual release and quitclaim documents stating that they had voluntarily tendered their resignation as employees of Linton and that they had been fully paid of all monetary compensation due them.12On 28 January 2000, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision13finding petitioners guilty of illegal reduction of work hours and directing them to pay each of the workers their three (3) days/weeks worth of work compensation from 12 January 1998 to 13 July 1998.Petitioners appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). In a Resolution14promulgated on 29 June 2001, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC held that an employer has the prerogative to control all aspects of employment in its business organization, including the supervision of workers, work regulation, lay-off of workers, dismissal and recall of workers. The NLRC took judicial notice of the Asian currency crisis in 1997 and 1998 thus finding Lintons decision to implement a compressed workweek as a valid exercise of management prerogative. Moreover, the NLRC ruled that Article 283 of the Labor Code, which requires an employer to submit a written notice to DOLE one (1) month prior to the closure or reduction of personnel, is not applicable to the instant case because no closure was undertaken and no reduction of employees was implemented by Linton. Lastly, the NLRC took note that there were twenty-one (21) complainants-workers15who had already resigned and executed individual waivers and quitclaims. Consequently, the NRLC considered them as dropped from the list of complainants. The workers motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution16dated 24 September 2001.The workers then filed before the Court of Appeals17a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the decision18of the NLRC and its resolution19that denied their Motion for Reconsideration. In the petition, the workers claimed that the NLRC erred in finding that the one (1) month notice requirement under Article 283 of the Labor Code did not apply to the instant case; that Linton did not exceed the limits of its business prerogatives; and that Linton was able to establish a factual basis on record to justify the reduction of work days.In its Comment,20Linton highlighted the fact that the caption, the body as well as the verification of the petition submitted by complainants-workers indicated solely "Alex Hellera, et al." as petitioners. Linton argued that the petition was defective and did not necessarily include the other workers in the proceedings before the NLRC. Linton also mentioned that 21 out of the 68 complainants-workers executed individual resignation letters and individual waivers and quitclaims.21With these waivers and quitclaims, Linton raised in issue whether the petition still included the signatories of said documents. Moreover, Linton pointed out that the caption of the petition did not include the NLRC as party respondent, which made for another jurisdictional defect. The rest of its arguments were merely a reiteration of its arguments before the NLRC.In reversing the NLRC, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision22dated 12 December 2003 ruled that the failure to indicate all the names of petitioners in the caption of the petition was not violative of the Rules of Court because the records of the case showed that there were sixty-eight (68) original complainants who filed the complaint before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. The appellate court likewise considered the quitclaims and release documents as "ready documents" which did not change the fact that the 21 workers were impelled to sign the same. The appellate court gave no credence to the said quitclaims, considering the economic disadvantage that would be suffered by the employees. The appellate court also noted that the records did not show that the 21 workers desisted from pursuing the petition and that the waivers and quitclaims would not bar the 21 complainants from continuing the action.23On the failure to include the NLRC as party respondent, the appellate court treated the NLRC as a nominal party which ought to be joined as party to the petition simply because the technical rules require its presence on record. The inclusion of the NLRC in the body of the petition was deemed by the appellate court as substantial compliance with the rules.On the main issues, the Court of Appeals ruled that the employees were constructively dismissed because the short period of time between the submission of the establishment termination report informing DOLE of its intention to observe a compressed workweek and the actual implementation thereat was a manifestation of Lintons intention to eventually retrench the employees. It found that Linton had failed to observe the substantive and procedural requirements of a valid dismissal or retrenchment to avoid or minimize business losses since it had failed to present adequate, credible and persuasive evidence that it was indeed suffering, or would imminently suffer, from drastic business losses. Lintons financial statements for 1997-1998 showed no indication of financial losses, and the alleged loss ofP3,645,422.00 in 1997 was considered insubstantial considering its total asset ofP1,065,948,601.00.Hence, the appellate court considered Lintons losses asde minimis.24Lastly, the appellate court found Linton to have failed to adopt a more sensible means of cutting the costs of its operations in less drastic measures not grossly unfavorable to labor. Hence, Linton failed to establish enough factual basis to justify the necessity of a reduced workweek.25Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration26which the appellate court denied through a Resolution27dated 2 April 2004.In filing the instant petition for review, petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals erred when it considered the petition as having been filed by all sixty (68) workers, in disregard of the fact that only "Alex Hellera, et al." was indicated as petitioner in the caption, body and verification of the petition and twenty-one (21) of the workers executed waivers and quitclaims. Petitioners further argue that the Court of Appeals erred in annulling the release and quitclaim documents signed by 21 employees because no such relief was prayed for in the petition. The validity of the release and quitclaim was also not raised as an issue before the labor arbiter nor the NLRC. Neither was it raised in the very petition filed before the Court of Appeals. Petitioners conclude that the Court of Appeals, therefore, had invalidated the waivers and quitclaimsmotu proprio.Petitioners also allege that the Court of Appeals erred when it held that the reduction of workdays is equivalent to constructive dismissal. They posit that there was no reduction of salary but instead only a reduction of working days from six to three days per week. Petitioners add that the reduction of workdays, while not expressly covered by any of the provisions of the Labor Code, is analogous to the situation contemplated in Article 28628of the Labor Code because the company implemented the reduction of workdays to address its financial losses. Lastly, they note that since there was no retrenchment, the one-month notice requirement under Article 283 of the Labor Code is not applicable.First, we resolve the procedural issues of the case. Rule 7, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states that the names of the parties shall be indicated in the title of the original complaint or petition. However, the rules itself endorses its liberal construction if it promotes the objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the action or proceeding.29Pleadings shall be construed liberally so as to render substantial justice to the parties and to determine speedily and inexpensively the actual merits of the controversy with the least regard to technicalities.30InVlason Enterprises Corporation v. Court of Appeals31the Court pronounced that, while the general rule requires the inclusion of the names of all the parties in the title of a complaint, the non-inclusion of one or some of them is not fatal to the cause of action of a plaintiff, provided there is a statement in the body of the petition indicating that a defendant was made a party to such action. If inVlasonthe Court found that the absence of defendants name in the caption would not cause the dismissal of the action, more so in this case where only the names of some of petitioners were not reflected. This is consistent with the general rule that mere failure to include the name of a party in the title of a complaint is not fatal by itself.32Petitioners likewise challenge the absence of the names of the other workers in the body and verification of the petition. The workers petition shows that the petition stipulated as parties-petitioners "Alex A. Hellera, et al." as employees of Linton, meaning that there were more than one petitioner who were all workers of Linton. The petition also attached the resolution33of the NLRC where the names of the workers clearly appear. As documents attached to a complaint form part thereof,34the petition, therefore has sufficiently indicated that the rest of the workers were parties to the petition.With respect to the absence of the workers signatures in the verification, the verification requirement is deemed substantially complied with when some of the parties who undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition had signed the same. Such verification is deemed a sufficient assurance that the matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct, and not merely speculative.35The verification in the instant petition states that Hellera, the affiant, is the president of the union of "which complainants are all members and officers."36As the matter at hand is a labor dispute between Linton and its employees, the union president undoubtedly has sufficient knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition. Helleras verification sufficiently meets the purpose of the requirements set by the rules.Moreover, the Court has ruled that the absence of a verification is not jurisdictional, but only a formal defect.37Indeed, the Court has ruled in the past that a pleading required by the Rules of Court to be verified may be given due course even without a verification if the circumstances warrant the suspension of the rules in the interest of justice.38We turn to the propriety of the Court of Appeals ruling on the invalidity of the waivers and quitclaims executed by the 21 workers. It must be remembered that the petition filed before the Court of Appeals was a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in which, as a rule, only jurisdictional questions may be raised, including matters of grave abuse of discretion which are equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.39The issue on the validity or invalidity of the waivers and quitclaims was not raised as an issue in the petition. Neither was it raised in the NLRC. There is no point of reference from which one can determine whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in its finding on the validity and binding effect of the waivers and quitclaims since this matter was never raised in issue in the first place.In addition, petitioners never had the opportunity to support or reinforce the validity of the waivers and quitclaims because the authenticity and binding effect thereof were never challenged. In the interest of fair play, justice and due process, the documents should not have been unilaterally evaluated by the Court of Appeals. Thus, the corresponding modification of its Decision should be ordained.After resolving the technical aspects of this case, we now proceed to the merits thereof. The main issue in this labor dispute is whether or not there was an illegal reduction of work when Linton implemented a compressed workweek by reducing from six to three the number of working days with the employees working on a rotation basis.InPhilippine Graphic Arts, Inc. v. NLRC,40the Court upheld for the validity of the reduction of working hours, taking into consideration the following: the arrangement was temporary, it was a more humane solution instead of a retrenchment of personnel, there was notice and consultations with the workers and supervisors, a consensus were reached on how to deal with deteriorating economic conditions and it was sufficiently proven that the company was suffering from losses.The Bureau of Working Conditions of the DOLE, moreover, released a bulletin41providing for in determining when an employer can validly reduce the regular number of working days. The said bulletin states that a reduction of the number of regular working days is valid where the arrangement is resorted to by the employer to prevent serious losses due to causes beyond his control, such as when there is a substantial slump in the demand for his goods or services or when there is lack of raw materials.Although the bulletin stands more as a set of directory guidelines than a binding set of implementing rules, it has one main consideration, consistent with the ruling inPhilippine Graphic Arts Inc., in determining the validity of reduction of working hoursthat the company was suffering from losses.Petitioners attempt to justify their action by alleging that the company was suffering from financial losses owing to the Asian currency crisis. Was petitioners claim of financial losses supported by evidence?The lower courts did not give credence to the income statement submitted by Linton because the same was not audited by an independent auditor.42The NLRC, on the other hand, took judicial notice of the Asian currency crisis which resulted in the devaluation of the peso and a slump in market demand.43The Court of Appeals for its part held that Linton failed to present adequate, credible and persuasive evidence to show that it was in dire straits and indeed suffering, or would imminently suffer, from drastic business losses. It did not find the reduction of work hours justifiable, considering that the alleged loss ofP3,645,422.00 in 1997 is insubstantial compared to Lintons total asset ofP1,065,948,601.76.44A close examination of petitioners financial reports for 1997-1998 shows that, while the company suffered a loss ofP3,645,422.00 in 1997, it retained a considerable amount of earnings45and operating income.46Clearly then, while Linton suffered from losses for that year, there remained enough earnings to sufficiently sustain its operations. In business, sustained operations in the black is the ideal but being in the red is a cruel reality. However, a year of financial losses would not warrant the immolation of the welfare of the employees, which in this case was done through a reduced workweek that resulted in an unsettling diminution of the periodic pay for a protracted period. Permitting reduction of work and pay at the slightest indication of losses would be contrary to the States policy to afford protection to labor and provide full employment.47Certainly, management has the prerogative to come up with measures to ensure profitability or loss minimization. However, such privilege is not absolute. Management prerogative must be exercised in good faith and with due regard to the rights of labor.48As previously stated, financial losses must be shown before a company can validly opt to reduce the work hours of its employees. However, to date, no definite guidelines have yet been set to determine whether the alleged losses are sufficient to justify the reduction of work hours. If the standards set in determining the justifiability of financial losses under Article 283 (i.e., retrenchment) or Article 286 (i.e., suspension of work) of the Labor Code were to be considered, petitioners would end up failing to meet the standards. On the one hand, Article 286 applies only when there is a bona fide suspension of the employers operation of a business or undertaking for a period not exceeding six (6) months.49Records show that Linton continued its business operations during the effectivity of the compressed workweek, which spanned more than the maximum period. On the other hand, for retrenchment to be justified, any claim of actual or potential business losses must satisfy the following standards: (1) the losses incurred are substantial and notde minimis; (2) the losses are actual or reasonably imminent; (3) the retrenchment is reasonably necessary and is likely to be effective in preventing the expected losses; and (4) the alleged losses, if already incurred, or the expected imminent losses sought to be forestalled, are proven by sufficient and convincing evidence.50Linton failed to comply with these standards.All taken into account, the compressed workweek arrangement was unjustified and illegal.1wphi1Thus, petitioners committed illegal reduction of work hours.In assessing the monetary award in favor of respondents, the Court has taken the following factors into account:(1) The compressed workweek arrangement was lifted after six (6) months, or on 13 July 1998.51Thus, Linton resumed its regular operations and discontinued the emergency measure;(2) The claims of the workers, as reflected in their pleadings, were narrowed to petitioners illegal reduction of their work hours and the non-payment of their compensation for three (3) days a week from 12 January 1998 to 13 July 1998. They did not assert any other claims;(3) As found by the NLRC, 21 of the workers are no longer entitled to any monetary award since they had already executed their respective waivers and quitclaims. We give weight to the finding and exclude the 21 workers as recipients of the award to be granted in this case. Consequently, only the following workers are entitled to the award, with the amounts respectively due them stated opposite their names:1wphi11. Alex A. Hellera -P16,368.30

2. Francisco Racasa -16,458.00

3. Dante Escarlan -15,912.00

4. Donato Sasa -15,580.50

5. Rodolfo Olinar -15,912.00

6. Daniel Custodio -15,912.00

7. Arturo Pollo -16,660.80

8. B. Pilapil -16,075.80

9. Donato Bonete -15,600.00

10. Isagani Yap -15,678.00

11. Cesar Ragonon -16,068.00

12. Benedicto Bagan -15,775.50

13. Rexte Solanoy -15,678.00

14. Felipe Cagoco, Jr. -15,990.00

15. Jose Narce -16,348.80

16. Quirino C. Ada -15,990.00

17. Salfaram Elmer -16,302.00

18. Romeo Balais -16,302.00

19. Claudio S. Morales -15,947.10

20. Elpidio E. Vergabinia -15,561.00

21. Conrado Cagoco -15,990.00

22. Roy Boragoy -15,892.50

23. Reynaldo Santos -16,200.60

24. Lino Valencia -15,678.00

25. Roy Durano -15,678.00

26. Leo Valencia -15,678.00

27. Jayoma A. -15,561.00

28. Ramon Olinar III -15,678.00

29. Saturnino C. Ebaya -15,919.80

30. Nicanor L. de Castro -16,614.00

31. Eduardo Gonzales -15,678.00

32. Isagani Gonzales -16,469.70

33. Thomas Andrab, Jr. -15,912.00

34. Minieto Durano -16,660.80

35. Ernesto Vallente -15,997.80

36. Nestor M. Bonete -15,705.30

37. Jose Salonoy -16,458.00

38. Alberto Lagman -16,660.80

39. Rolando Torres -15,678.00

40. Rolindo Cualquiera -16,068.00

41. Armando Lima -16,426.80

42. Alfredo Selapio -16,060.20

43. Martin V. Villacampa -15,939.30

44. Carlito Pable -16,263.00

45. Dante Escarlan -15,912.00

46. M. Durano -16,614.00

47. Ramon Roso -16,302.0052

(4) The Labor Arbiters decision in favor of respondents was reversed by the NLRC. Considering that there is no provision for appeal from the decision of the NLRC,53petitioners should not be deemed at fault in not paying the award as ordered by the Labor Arbiter. Petitioners liability only gained a measure of certainty only when the Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC decision. In the interest of justice, the 6% legal interest on the award should commence only from the date of promulgation of the Court of Appeals Decision on 12 December 2003.WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED IN PART. The decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating the decision of the Labor Arbiter is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to the effect that the 21 workers who executed waivers and quitclaims are no longer entitled to back payments. Petitioners are ORDERED TO PAY respondents, except the aforementioned 21 workers, the monetary award as computed,54pursuant to the decision of the Labor Arbiter55with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from 12 December 2003, the date of promulgation of the Court of Appeals decision, until the finality of this decision, and thereafter at the rate of 12% per annum until full payment.SO ORDERED.DANTE O. TINGA

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 151309 October 15, 2008BISIG MANGGAGAWA SA TRYCO and/or FRANCISCO SIQUIG, as Union President, JOSELITO LARIO, VIVENCIO B. BARTE, SATURNINO EGERA and SIMPLICIO AYA-AY,petitioners,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, TRYCO PHARMA CORPORATION, and/or WILFREDO C. RIVERA,respondents.D E C I S I O NNACHURA,J.:This petition seeks a review of the Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 24, 2001 and Resolution dated December 20, 2001, which affirmed the finding of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) that the petitioners' transfer to another workplace did not amount to a constructive dismissal and an unfair labor practice.The pertinent factual antecedents are as follows:Tryco Pharma Corporation (Tryco) is a manufacturer of veterinary medicines and its principal office is located in Caloocan City. Petitioners Joselito Lario, Vivencio Barte, Saturnino Egera and Simplicio Aya-ay are its regular employees, occupying the positions of helper, shipment helper and factory workers, respectively, assigned to the Production Department. They are members of Bisig Manggagawa sa Tryco (BMT), the exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees.Tryco and the petitioners signed separate Memorand[a] of Agreement2(MOA), providing for a compressed workweek schedule to be implemented in the company effective May 20, 1996. The MOA was entered into pursuant to Department of Labor and Employment Department Order (D.O.) No. 21, Series of 1990,Guidelines on the Implementation of Compressed Workweek. As provided in the MOA, 8:00 a.m. to 6:12 p.m., from Monday to Friday, shall be considered as the regular working hours, and no overtime pay shall be due and payable to the employee for work rendered during those hours. The MOA specifically stated that the employee waives the right to claim overtime pay for work rendered after 5:00 p.m. until 6:12 p.m. from Monday to Friday considering that the compressed workweek schedule is adopted in lieu of the regular workweek schedule which also consists of 46 hours. However, should an employee be permitted or required to work beyond 6:12 p.m., such employee shall be entitled to overtime pay.Tryco informed the Bureau of Working Conditions of the Department of Labor and Employment of the implementation of a compressed workweek in the company.3In January 1997, BMT and Tryco negotiated for the renewal of their collective bargaining agreement (CBA) but failed to arrive at a new agreement.Meantime, Tryco received the Letter dated March 26, 1997 from the Bureau of Animal Industry of the Department of Agriculture reminding it that its production should be conducted in San Rafael, Bulacan, not in Caloocan City:MR. WILFREDO C. RIVERAPresident, Tryco Pharma CorporationSan Rafael, BulacanSubject: LTO as VDAP Manufacturer at San Rafael, BulacanDear Mr. Rivera:This is to remind you that your License to Operate as Veterinary Drug and Product Manufacturer is addressed at San Rafael, Bulacan, and so, therefore, your production should be done at the above mentioned address only. Further, production of a drug includes propagation, processing, compounding, finishing, filling, repacking, labeling, advertising, storage, distribution or sale of the veterinary drug product. In no instance, therefore, should any of the above be done at your business office at 117 M. Ponce St., EDSA, Caloocan City.Please be guided accordingly.Thank you.Very truly yours,(sgd.)EDNA ZENAIDA V. VILLACORTE, D.V.M.Chief, Animal Feeds Standard Division4Accordingly, Tryco issued a Memorandum5dated April 7, 1997 which directed petitioner Aya-ay to report to the company's plant site in Bulacan. When petitioner Aya-ay refused to obey, Tryco reiterated the order on April 18, 1997.6Subsequently, through a Memorandum7dated May 9, 1997, Tryco also directed petitioners Egera, Lario and Barte to report to the company's plant site in Bulacan.BMT opposed the transfer of its members to San Rafael, Bulacan, contending that it constitutes unfair labor practice. In protest, BMT declared a strike on May 26, 1997.In August 1997, petitioners filed their separate complaints8for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, nonpayment of overtime pay and service incentive leave, and refusal to bargain against Tryco and its President, Wilfredo C. Rivera. In their Position Paper,9petitioners alleged that the company acted in bad faith during the CBA negotiations because it sent representatives without authority to bind the company, and this was the reason why the negotiations failed. They added that the management transferred petitioners Lario, Barte, Egera and Aya-ay from Caloocan to San Rafael, Bulacan to paralyze the union. They prayed for the company to pay them their salaries from May 26 to 31, 1997, service incentive leave, and overtime pay, and to implement Wage Order No. 4.In their defense, respondents averred that the petitioners were not dismissed but they refused to comply with the management's directive for them to report to the company's plant in San Rafael, Bulacan. They denied the allegation that they negotiated in bad faith, stating that, in fact, they sent the Executive Vice-President and Legal Counsel as the company's representatives to the CBA negotiations. They claim that the failure to arrive at an agreement was due to the stubbornness of the union panel.Respondents further averred that, long before the start of the negotiations, the company had already been planning to decongest the Caloocan office to comply with the government policy to shift the concentration of manufacturing activities from the metropolis to the countryside. The decision to transfer the company's production activities to San Rafael, Bulacan was precipitated by the letter-reminder of the Bureau of Animal Industry.On February 27, 1998, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the case for lack of merit.10The Labor Arbiter held that the transfer of the petitioners would not paralyze or render the union ineffective for the following reasons: (1) complainants are not members of the negotiating panel; and (2) the transfer was made pursuant to the directive of the Department of Agriculture.The Labor Arbiter also denied the money claims, ratiocinating that the nonpayment of wages was justified because the petitioners did not render work from May 26 to 31, 1997; overtime pay is not due because of the compressed workweek agreement between the union and management; and service incentive leave pay cannot be claimed by the complainants because they are already enjoying vacation leave with pay for at least five days. As for the claim of noncompliance with Wage Order No. 4, the Labor Arbiter held that the issue should be left to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrator.On October 29, 1999, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's Decision, dismissing the case, thus:PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Decision of February 27, 1998 is hereby AFFIRMED and complainants' appeal therefrom DISMISSED for lack of merit. Complainants Joselito Lario, Vivencio Barte, Saturnino Egera and Simplicio Aya-ay are directed to report to work at respondents' San Rafael Plant, Bulacan but without backwages. Respondents are directed to accept the complainants back to work.SO ORDERED.11On December 22, 1999, the NLRC denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.12Left with no recourse, petitioners filed a petition forcertiorariwith the CA.On July 24, 2001, the CA dismissed the petition forcertiorariand ruled that the transfer order was a management prerogative not amounting to a constructive dismissal or an unfair labor practice. The CA further sustained the enforceability of the MOA, particularly the waiver of overtime pay in light of this Court's rulings upholding a waiver of benefits in exchange of other valuable privileges. The dispositive portion of the said CA decision reads:WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated February 27, 1998 and the Decision and Resolution of the NLRC promulgated on October 29, 1999 and December 22, 1999, respectively, in NLRC-NCR Case Nos. 08-05715-97, 08-06115-97 and 08-05920-97, are AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.13The CA denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration on December 20, 2001.14Dissatisfied, petitioners filed this petition for review raising the following issues:-A-THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE PATENTLY ERRONEOUS RULING OF THE LABOR ARBITER AND THE COMMISSION THAT THERE WAS NO DISMISSAL, MUCH LESS ILLEGAL DISMISSAL, OF THE INDIVIDUAL PETITIONERS.-B-THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS COMMITTED ACTS OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE.-C-THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR MONEY CLAIMS AND TO DAMAGES, AS WELL AS LITIGATION COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.15The petition has no merit.We have no reason to deviate from the well-entrenched rule that findings of fact of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality, and bind us when supported by substantial evidence.16This is particularly true when the findings of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA are in absolute agreement.17In this case, the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the CA uniformly agreed that the petitioners were not constructively dismissed and that the transfer orders did not amount to an unfair labor practice. But if only to disabuse the minds of the petitioners who have persistently pursued this case on the mistaken belief that the labor tribunals and the appellate court committed grievous errors, this Court will go over the issues raised in this petition.Petitioners mainly contend that the transfer orders amount to a constructive dismissal. They maintain that the letter of the Bureau of Animal Industry is not credible because it is not authenticated; it is only a ploy, solicited by respondents to give them an excuse to effect a massive transfer of employees. They point out that the Caloocan City office is still engaged in production activities until now and respondents even hired new employees to replace them.We do not agree.We refuse to accept the petitioners' wild and reckless imputation that the Bureau of Animal Industry conspired with the respondents just to effect the transfer of the petitioners. There is not an iota of proof to support this outlandish claim. Absent any evidence, the allegation is not only highly irresponsible but is grossly unfair to the government agency concerned. Even as this Court has given litigants and counsel a relatively wide latitude to present arguments in support of their cause, we will not tolerate outright misrepresentation or baseless accusation. Let this be fair warning to counsel for the petitioners.Furthermore, Tryco's decision to transfer its production activities to San Rafael, Bulacan, regardless of whether it was made pursuant to the letter of the Bureau of Animal Industry, was within the scope of its inherent right to control and manage its enterprise effectively. While the law is solicitous of the welfare of employees, it must also protect the right of an employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives. The free will of management to conduct its own business affairs to achieve its purpose cannot be denied.18This prerogative extends to the management's right to regulate, according to its own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including the freedom to transfer and reassign employees according to the requirements of its business.19Management's prerogative of transferring and reassigning employees from one area of operation to another in order to meet the requirements of the business is, therefore, generally not constitutive of constructive dismissal.20Thus, the consequent transfer of Tryco's personnel, assigned to the Production Department was well within the scope of its management prerogative.When the transfer is not unreasonable, or inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee, and it does not involve a demotion in rank or diminution of salaries, benefits, and other privileges, the employee may not complain that it amounts to a constructive dismissal.21However, the employer has the burden of proving that the transfer of an employee is for valid and legitimate grounds. The employer must show that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee; nor does it involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, privileges and other benefits.22Indisputably, in the instant case, the transfer orders do not entail a demotion in rank or diminution of salaries, benefits and other privileges of the petitioners. Petitioners, therefore, anchor their objection solely on the ground that it would cause them great inconvenience since they are all residents of Metro Manila and they would incur additional expenses to travel daily from Manila to Bulacan.The Court has previously declared that mere incidental inconvenience is not sufficient to warrant a claim of constructive dismissal.23Objection to a transfer that is grounded solely upon the personal inconvenience or hardship that will be caused to the employee by reason of the transfer is not a valid reason to disobey an order of transfer.24Incidentally, petitioners citeEscobin v. NLRC25where the Court held that the transfer of the employees therein was unreasonable. However, the distance of the workplace to which the employees were being transferred can hardly compare to that of the present case. In that case, the employees were being transferred from Basilan to Manila; hence, the Court noted that the transfer would have entailed the separation of the employees from their families who were residing in Basilan and accrual of additional expenses for living accommodations in Manila. In contrast, the distance from Caloocan to San Rafael, Bulacan is not considerably great so as to compel petitioners to seek living accommodations in the area and prevent them from commuting to Metro Manila daily to be with their families.Petitioners, however, went further and argued that the transfer orders amounted to unfair labor practice because it would paralyze and render the union ineffective.To begin with, we cannot see how the mere transfer of its members can paralyze the union. The union was not deprived of the membership of the petitioners whose work assignments were only transferred to another location.More importantly, there was no showing or any indication that the transfer orders were motivated by an intention to interfere with the petitioners' right to organize. Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the workers' right to organize. With the exception of Article 248(f) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, the prohibited acts are related to the workers' right to self-organization and to the observance of a CBA. Without that element, the acts, no matter how unfair, are not unfair labor practices.26Finally, we do not agree with the petitioners' assertion that the MOA is not enforceable as it is contrary to law. The MOA is enforceable and binding against the petitioners. Where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking.27D.O. No. 21 sanctions the waiver of overtime pay in consideration of the benefits that the employees will derive from the adoption of a compressed workweek scheme, thus:The compressed workweek scheme was originally conceived for establishments wishing to save on energy costs, promote greater work efficiency and lower the rate of employee absenteeism, among others. Workers favor the scheme considering that it would mean savings on the increasing cost of transportation fares for at least one (1) day a week; savings on meal and snack expenses; longer weekends, or an additional 52 off-days a year, that can be devoted to rest, leisure, family responsibilities, studies and other personal matters, and that it will spare them for at least another day in a week from certain inconveniences that are the normal incidents of employment, such as commuting to and from the workplace, travel time spent, exposure to dust and motor vehicle fumes, dressing up for work, etc. Thus, under this scheme, the generally observed workweek of six (6) days is shortened to five (5) days but prolonging the working hours from Monday to Friday without the employer being obliged for pay overtime premium compensation for work performed in excess of eight (8) hours on weekdays, in exchange for the benefits abovecited that will accrue to the employees.Moreover, the adoption of a compressed workweek scheme in the company will help temper any inconvenience that will be caused the petitioners by their transfer to a farther workplace.Notably, the MOA complied with the following conditions set by the DOLE, under D.O. No. 21, to protect the interest of the employees in the implementation of a compressed workweek scheme:1. The employees voluntarily agree to work more than eight (8) hours a day the total in a week of which shall not exceed their normal weekly hours of work prior to adoption of the compressed workweek arrangement;2. There will not be any diminution whatsoever in the weekly or monthly take-home pay and fringe benefits of the employees;3. If an employee is permitted or required to work in excess of his normal weekly hours of work prior to the adoption of the compressed workweek scheme, all such excess hours shall be considered overtime work and shall be compensated in accordance with the provisions of the Labor Code or applicable Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA);4. Appropriate waivers with respect to overtime premium pay for work performed in excess of eight (8) hours a day may be devised by the parties to the agreement.5. The effectivity and implementation of the new working time arrangement shall be by agreement of the parties.PESALA v. NLRC,28cited by the petitioners, is not applicable to the present case. In that case, an employment contract provided that the workday consists of 12 hours and the employee will be paid a fixed monthly salary rate that was above the legal minimum wage. However, unlike the present MOA which specifically states that the employee waives his right to claim overtime pay for work rendered beyond eight hours, the employment contract in that case was silent on whether overtime pay was included in the payment of the fixed monthly salary. This necessitated the interpretation by the Court as to whether the fixed monthly rate provided under the employment contract included overtime pay. The Court noted that if the employee is paid only the minimum wage but with overtime pay, the amount is still greater than the fixed monthly rate as provided in the employment contract. It, therefore, held that overtime pay was not included in the agreed fixed monthly rate.Considering that the MOA clearly states that the employee waives the payment of overtime pay in exchange of a five-day workweek, there is no room for interpretation and its terms should be implemented as they are written.WHEREFORE, the petition isDENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated July 24, 2001 and Resolution dated December 20, 2001 areAFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTBaguio CityFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 119205 April 15, 1998SIME DARBY PILIPINAS, INC.petitioner,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (2ND DIVISION) and SIME DARBY SALARIED EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (ALU-TUCP),respondents.BELLOSILLO,J.:Is the act of management in revising the work schedule of its employees and discarding their paid lunch break constitutive of unfair labor practice?Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc., petitioner, is engaged in the manufacture of automotive tires, tubes and other rubber products. Sime Darby Salaried Employees Association (ALU-TUCP), private respondent, is an association of monthly salaried employees of petitioner at its Marikina factory. Prior to the present controversy, all company factory workers in Marikina including members of private respondent union worked from7:45 a.m.to 3:45 p.m. with a 30-minute paid "on call" lunch break.On 14 August 1992 petitioner issued a memorandum to all factory-based employees advising all its monthly salaried employees in its Marikina Tire Plant, except those in the Warehouse and Quality Assurance Department working on shifts, a change in work schedule effective 14 September 1992 thus TO: ALL FACTORY-BASED EMPLOYEESRE: NEW WORK SCHEDULEEffective Monday, September 14, 1992, the new work schedule of the factory office will be as follows:7:45 A.M. 4:45 P.M. (Monday to Friday)7:45 A.M. 11:45 A.M. (Saturday).Coffee break time will be ten minutes only anytime between:9:30 A.M. 10:30 A.M. and2:30 P.M. 3:30 P.M.Lunch break will be between:12:00 NN 1:00 P.M. (Monday to Friday).Excluded from the above schedule are the Warehouse and QA employees who are on shifting. Their work and break time schedules will be maintained as it is now.1Since private respondent felt affected adversely by the change in the work schedule and discontinuance of the 30-minute paid "on call" lunch break, it filed on behalf of its members a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for unfair labor practice, discrimination and evasion of liability pursuant to the resolution of this Court inSime Darby International Tire Co.,Inc.v.NLRC.2However, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint on the ground that the change in the work schedule and the elimination of the 30-minute paid lunch break of the factory workers constituted a valid exercise of management prerogative and that the new work schedule, break time and one-hour lunch break did not have the effect of diminishing the benefits granted to factory workers as the working time did not exceed eight (8) hours.The Labor Arbiter further held that the factory workers would be unjustly enriched if they continued to be paid during their lunch break even if they were no longer "on call" or required to work during the break. He also ruled that the decision in the earlier Sime Darby case3was not applicable to the instant case because the former involved discrimination of certain employees who were not paid for their 30-minute lunch break while the rest of the factory workers were paid; hence, this Court ordered that the discriminated employees be similarly paid the additional compensation for their lunch break.Private respondent appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which sustained the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the appeal.4However, upon motion for reconsideration by private respondent, the NLRC, this time with two (2) new commissioners replacing those who earlier retired, reversed its earlier decision of 20 April 1994 as well as the decision of the Labor Arbiter.5The NLRC considered the decision of this Court in the Sime Darby case of 1990 as the law of the case wherein petitioner was ordered to pay "the money value of these covered employees deprived of lunch and/or working time breaks." The public respondent declared that the new work schedule deprived the employees of the benefits of a time-honored company practice of providing its employees a 30-minute paid lunch break resulting in an unjust diminution of company privileges prohibited by Art. 100 of the Labor Code, as amended. Hence, this petition alleging that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction: (a) in ruling that petitioner committed unfair labor practice in the implementation of the change in the work schedule of its employees from 7:45 a.m. 3:45 p.m. to 7:45 a.m. 4:45 p.m. with one-hour lunch break from 12:00 nn to 1:00 p.m.; (b) in holding that there was diminution of benefits when the 30-minute paid lunch break was eliminated; (c) in failing to consider that in the earlier Sime Darby case affirming the decision of the NLRC, petitioner was authorized to discontinue the practice of having a 30-minute paid lunch break should it decide to do so; and, (d) in ignoring petitioner's inherent management prerogative of determining and fixing the work schedule of its employees which is expressly recognized in the collective bargaining agreement between petitioner and private respondent.The Office of the Solicitor General filed in a lieu of comment a manifestation and motion recommending that the petitioner be granted, alleging that the 14 August 1992 memorandum which contained the new work schedule was not discriminatory of the union members nor did it constitute unfair labor practice on the part of petitioner.We agree, hence, we sustain petitioner. The right to fix the work schedules of the employees rests principally on their employer. In the instant case petitioner, as the employer, cites as reason for the adjustment the efficient conduct of its business operations and its improved production.6It rationalizes that while the old work schedule included a 30-minute paid lunch break, the employees could be called upon to do jobs during that period as they were "on call." Even if denominated as lunch break, this period could very well be considered as working time because the factory employees were required to work if necessary and were paid accordingly for working. With the new work schedule, the employees are now given a one-hour lunch break without any interruption from their employer. For a full one-hour undisturbed lunch break, the employees can freely and effectively use this hour not only for eating but also for their rest and comfort which are conducive to more efficiency and better performance in their work. Since the employees are no longer required to work during this one-hour lunch break, there is no more need for them to be compensated for this period. We agree with the Labor Arbiter that the new work schedule fully complies with the daily work period of eight (8) hours without violating the Labor Code.7Besides, the new schedule applies to all employees in the factory similarly situated whether they are union members or not.8Consequently, it was grave abuse of discretion for public respondent to equate the earlier Sime Darby case9with the facts obtaining in this case. That ruling in the former case is not applicable here. The issue in that case involved the matter of granting lunch breaks to certain employees while depriving the other employees of such breaks. This Court affirmed in that case the NLRC's finding that such act of management was discriminatory and constituted unfair labor practice.The case before us does not pertain to any controversy involving discrimination of employees but only the issue of whether the change of work schedule, which management deems necessary to increase production, constitutes unfair labor practice. As shown by the records, the change effected by management with regard to working time is made to apply to all factory employees engaged in the same line of work whether or not they are members of private respondent union. Hence, it cannot be said that the new scheme adopted by management prejudices the right of private respondent to self-organization.Every business enterprise endeavors to increase its profits. In the process, it may devise means to attain that goal. Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of the employees, it must also protect the right of an employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives.10Thus, management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods, time, place and manner of work, processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay off of workers and discipline, dismissal and recall of workers.11Further, management retains the prerogative, whenever exigencies of the service so require, to change the working hours of its employees. So long as such prerogative is exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements, this Court will uphold such exercise.12While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be supposed that every dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. Management also has rights which, as such, are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Although this Court has inclined more often than not toward the worker and has upheld his cause in his conflicts with the employer, such favoritism has not blinded the Court to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and the applicable law and doctrine.13WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 29 November 1994 is SET ASIDE and the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 26 November 1993 dismissing the complaint against petitioner for unfair labor practice is AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 105963 August 22, 1996PAL EMPLOYEES SAVING AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC. (PESALA),petitioner,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND ANGEL V. ESQUEJO,respondents.PANGANIBAN,J.:pIs an employee entitled to overtime pay for work rendered in excess of eight hours a day, given the fact that his employment contract specifies a twelve-hour workday at a fixed monthly salary rate that is above the legal minimum wage? This is the principal question answered by this Court in resolving this petition which challenges the validity and legality of theDecision1of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission2promulgated on April 23, 1992 in NLRC NCR CA No. 002522-91 entitled "Angel V. Esquejo vs. PAL Employees Savings and Loan Association" which Decision modified (slightly as to amount) the earlier decision3dated November 11, 1991 of the labor arbiter granting private respondent's claim of overtime pay.The Facts and the Case BelowOn October 10, 1990, private respondent filed with public respondent a complaint docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 10-05457-90 for non-payment of overtime pay and non-payment of the P25.00 statutory minimum wage increase mandated by Republic Act No. 6727.Subsequently, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint for illegal suspension with payer for reinstatement and payment of backwages. However, before the case was submitted for resolution, private respondent filed a "Motion to Withdraw Supplemental Complaint" on the ground that a separate action for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, etc. had been filed and was pending before another labor arbiter. Hence, the issue decide by public respondent and which is under review by this Court in this petition involves only his claim for overtime pay.On November 26, 1990, private respondent filed his position paper4with the labor arbiter alleging the following facts constituting his cause of action:Complaint (herein private respondent) started working with respondent (PESALA) sometime last March 1, 1986 as a company guard and was receiving a monthly basic salary of P1,990.00 plus an emergency allowance in the amount of P510.00. He was required to work a (sic) twelve (12) hours a day, a (sic) xerox copies of his appointment are hereto attached and marked as Annexes "C" and "D" of this position paper;That on December 10, 1986, respondent Board of Directors in its board meeting held on November 21, 1986 approved a salary adjustment for the complainant increasing his monthly basic salary to P2,310.00 and an emergency allowance of P510.00, a xerox copy of the salary adjustment is hereto attached and marked as Annex "E" hereof;That on August 25, 1987, because of his impressive performance on his assigned job, another adjustment was approved by the President of the association increasing his monthly basic salary to P2,880.00, a xerox copy of the salary adjustment is hereto attached and marked as Annex "F" hereof;That from January 4, 1988 up to June 1990, several salary adjustments were made by the respondent on the monthly basic salary of the complainant including a letter of appreciation for being as (sic) one of the outstanding performers during the first half of 1988, the latest salary prior to the filing of the complaint was P3,720.00, a (sic) xerox copies of all documents relative to the salary adjustments are hereto attached and marked as annexes "G", "H", and "K" of this position paper;That during his entire period of employment with respondent, the former was required to perform overtime work without any additional compensation from the latter. It was also at this point wherein the respondent refused to give the 25.00 increase on the minimum wage rates as provided for by law. On October 12, 1990, complainant was suspended for the period of thirty seven (37) days for an offense allegedly committed by the respondent sometime last August 1989.On December 13, 1990, petitioner PESALA filed its position paper5alleging among other things:On 01 March, 1986, complainant was appointed in a permanent status as the company guard of respondent. In the Appointment Memorandum dated February 24, 1986 which has the conformity of complaint, it is expressly stipulated therein that complainant is to receive a monthly salary of P1,900.00 plus P510.00 emergency allowance for a twelve (12) hours work per day with one (1) day off. A copy of said appointment memorandum is hereto attached as Annex "A" and made an integral part hereof.On 01 December, 1986, the monthly salary of complainant was increased to P2,310,00 plus P510.00 emergency allowance. Latter, or on 01 January, 1988, the monthly salary of complainant was again increased to P3,420.00. And still later, or on 01 February, 1989, complainant's monthly salary was increased are hereto attached as Annexes "B", "B-1" and "B-2" and are made integral parts hereof.On 29, November, 1989, the manager of respondent in the person of Sulpicio Jornales wrote to complainant informing the latter that the position of a guard will be abolished effective November 30, 1989, and that complainant will be re-assigned to the position of a ledger custodian effective December 1, 1989.Pursuant to the above-mentioned letter-agreement of Mr. Jornales, complaint was formally appointed by respondent as its ledger custodian on December 1, 1989. The monthly salary of complainant as ledger custodian starting on December 1, 1989 was P3,720,00 for forty (40) working hours a week or eight (8) working hours a day. a copy of said Appointment memorandum is hereto attached as Annex "C" and made an integral part hereof.On 29 August, 1990, complainant was administratively charged with a serious misconduct or disobedience of the lawful orders of respondent or its officers, and gross and habitual neglect of his duties, committed as follows:1. Sometime in August, 1989, you (referring to complainant Esquejo) forwarded the checks corresponding to the withdrawals of Mr. Jose Jimenez and Mr. Anselmo dela Banda of Davao and Iloilo Station, respectively, without the signature of the Treasurer and the President of PESALA, in violation of your duty and function that you should see to it that the said checks should be properly signed by the two PESALA officials before you send out said checks to their addresses. As a result of which, there was a substantial delay in the transmission of the checks to its owners resulting to an embarrassment on the part of the PESALA officers and damage and injury to the recipients (sic) of the checks since they needed the money badly.2. Sometime in August, 1989, before you (complainant) went on your vacation, you failed to leave or surrender the keys of the office, especially the keys of the keys to the main and back doors which resulted to damage, injury and embarrassment to PESALA. This is a gross violation of your assigned duties and you disobeyed the instruction of your Superior.xxx xxx xxxHerein complainant was informed of the aforequoted charges against him and was given the opportunity to be heard and present evidence in his behalf as shown by the Notice of Hearing (Annex "D" hereof) sent to him. Complainant did in fact appeared (sic) at the hearing, assisted by his counsel, Atty. Mahinardo G. Mailig, and presented his evidence in the form of a Counter-Affidavit. A copy of said Counter-Affidavit is hereto attached as Annex "E" and made an integral part hereof.On 12 October, 1990, after due deliberation on the merits of the administrative charges filed against herein complainant, the Investigating Officer in the person of Capt. Rogelio Enverga resolved the same imposing a penalty of suspension of herein complainant, thus:"PENALTY: 1. For the first offense, you (referring to complaint Esquejo) are suspended for a period of thirty (30) working days without pay effective October 15, 1990.2. For the second offense, your (sic) are suspended for a period of seven (7) working days whiteout pay effective from the date first suspension will expire".On March 7, 1991, private respondent filed a detailed and itemized computation of his money claims totaling P107,495.90, to which petitioner filed its comment on April 28, 1991. The computation filed on March 7, 1991 was later reduced to P65,302.80. To such revised computation, the petitioner submitted its comment on April 28, 1991.WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:1. Granting the claim for overtime pay covering the period October 10, 1987 to November 30, 1989 in the amount of P28,344.55.2. The claim for non-payment of P25.00 salary increase pursuant to Republic Act No. 6727 is dismissed for lack of merit.Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, petitioner appealed to public respondent NLRC only to be rejected on April 23, 1992 via the herein assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the award is reduced to an amount of TWENTY EIGHT THOUSAND SIXTY-SIX PESOS AND 45/100 (P28,066.45). In all other respects, the Decision under review is hereby AFFIRMED and the appeal DISMISSED for lack of merit.No motion for reconsideration of the Decision was filed by the petitioner.6What transpired afterwards is narrated by the Solicitor General in his memorandum,7which we presume to be correct since petitioner did not contradict the same in its memorandum:. . . Petitioner did not appeal the Decision of respondent NLRC. When it became final, the parties were called to a conference on June 29, 1992 to determine the possibility of the parties' voluntary compliance with the Decision (Order of Labor Arbiter Linsangan. dated July 23, 1992).. . . In their second conference, held on July 15, 1992, petitioner proposed to private respondent a package compromise agreement in settlement of all pending claims. Private respondent for his part demanded (P150,000.00 as settlement of his complaint which was turned down by petitioner as too excessive. Unfortunately, no positive results were achieved.As a result, pleading was filed by petitioner captioned: Motion to Defer Execution and Motion to Re-Compute alleged overtime pay. Petitioner states that "quite recently, the Employee Payroll Sheets pertaining to the salaries, overtime pay, vacation and sick leave of Angel Esquejo were located".. . . Petitioner's Motion to Defer Execution and Motion to Re-Compute respondent's overtime pay was denied in an Order dated July 23, 1992.. . . Petitioner moved to reconsider the Denial Order on July 27, 1992. Private respondent opposed.In the meantime, petitioner filed the instant special civil action forcertioraribefore this Court on July 10, 1992. Later, on July 17, 1992, citing as reason that ". . . quite recently, the Employee Payroll Sheets which contained the salaries and overtime pay received by respondent Esquejo were located in the bodega of the petitioner and based on said Payroll Sheets, it appears that substantial overtime pay have been paid to respondent Esquejo in the amount of P24,238.22 for the period starting January 1987 up to November 1989". petitioner asked this Court for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction. On the same date of July 17, 1992, a "Supplemental Petition Based On Newly Discovered Evidence" was filed by petitioner to which was attached photocopies of payroll sheets of the aforestated period.On July 29, 1992, this court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing the Decision dated April 23, 1992 issued in NLRC NCR No. 002522-91, the case below subject of the instant petition.The IssuesFour issues have been raised by the petitioner in its effort to obtain a reversal of the assailed Decision, to wit:ITHE RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO OVERTIME PAY WHEN THE SAME IS A GROSS CONTRAVENTION OF THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT BETWEEN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT ESQUEJO AND A PATENT VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 1305, 1306 AND 1159 OF THE CIVIL CODE.IITHE RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IF AWARDING OVERTIME PAY OF P28,066.45 TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT WHEN THE SAME IS A CLEAR VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 22 OF THE CIVIL CODE ON UNJUST ENRICHMENT.IIITHE RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSED OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT PAID THE OVERTIME PAY BASED ON THE COMPUTATION OF LABOR ARBITER CORNELIO LINSANGAN WHICH WAS AFFIRMED BY SAID RESPONDENT NLRC WHEN THE SAME IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND IT, THEREFORE, VIOLATED THE CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS OF PETITIONER AS PRESCRIBED IN "AND TIBAY VS. CIR." 69 PHIL. 635.IVWHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION BASED ON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE MAY BE ADMITTED AS PART OF ITS EVIDENCE IT BEING VERY VITAL TO THE JUDICIOUS DETERMINATION OF THE CASE. (Rollo, p. 367)In essence the above issued boil down to this query: Is an employee entitled to overtime pay for work rendered in excess of the regular eight hour day given the fact that he entered into a contract of labor specifying a work-day of twelve hours at a fixed monthly rate above the legislated minimum wage?The Court's RulingAt the outset, we would like to rectify the statement made by the Solicitor General that the "petitioner did not appeal from the Decision of (public) respondent NLRC". The elevation of the said case by appeal is not possible. The only remedy available from an order or decision of the NLRC is a petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleging lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.8The general rule now is that the special civil action ofcertiorarishould be instituted within a period of three months.9Hence, when the petition was filed on July 10, 1992, three months had not yet elapsed from petitioner's receipt of the assail