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A MODEL INTERVENTION?

Many commentators have praised NAOs 2011intervention in Libya as a humanitarian success oraverting a bloodbath in that countrys second largestcity, Benghazi, and helping eliminate the dictatorialregime o Muammar al-Qaddafi. Tese proponentsaccordingly claim that the intervention demonstrateshow to successully implement a humanitarian prin-ciple known as the responsibility to protect (R2P). In-deed, the top U.S. representatives to the transatlanticalliance declared that NAOs operation in Libya hasrightly been hailed as a model intervention. A morerigorous assessment, however, reveals that NAOsintervention backfired: it increased the durationo Libyas civil war by about six times and its deathtoll by at least seven times, while also exacerbating

BOTTOM LINES The Conventional Wisdom Is Wrong. Libyas 2011 uprising was never peaceul, but instead

was armed and violent rom the start. Muammar al-Qaddai did not target civilians or resort toindiscriminate orce. Although inspired by humanitarian impulse, NAOs intervention did not aimmainly to protect civilians, but rather to overthrow Qaddais regime, even at the expense o increasingthe harm to Libyans.

The Intervention Backfired. NAOs action magniied the conlicts duration about sixold, and its

death toll at least sevenold, while also exacerbating human rights abuses, humanitarian suering,Islamic radicalism, and weapons prolieration in Libya and its neighbors. I Libya was a modelintervention, then it was a model o ailure.

Three Lessons. First, beware rebel propaganda that seeks intervention by alsely crying genocide.Second, avoid intervening on humanitarian grounds in ways that reward rebels and thus endangercivilians, unless the state is already targeting noncombatants. hird, resist the tendency o humanitarianintervention to morph into regime change, which ampliies the risk to civilians.

Lessons from Libya: How Not to Intervene

Q J: I S

human rights abuses, humanitarian suffering, Islamicradicalism, and weapons prolieration in Libya and itsneighbors. I this is a model intervention, then it isa model o ailure.

FLAWED NARRATIVE

Te conventional account o Libyas conflict andNAOs intervention is misleading in several keyaspects. First, contrary to Western media reportsQaddafi did not initiate Libyas violence by targetingpeaceul protesters. Te United Nations and AmnestyInternational have documented that in all ourLibyan cities initially consumed by civil conflict inmid-February 2011Benghazi, Al Bayda, ripoliand Misurataviolence was actually initiated by theprotesters. Te government responded to the rebelsmilitarily but never intentionally targeted civiliansor resorted to indiscriminate orce, as Westernmedia claimed. Early press accounts exaggerated thedeath toll by a actor o ten, citing more than 2,000deaths in Benghazi during the initial days o the

Policy Brief September 2013

By Alan J. Kuperman

Tis policy brief is based on A Model HumanitarianIntervention? Reassessing NAOs Libya Campaign,which appears in the Summer 2013 issue of Interna-tional Security.

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uprising, whereas Human Rights Watch (HRW) laterdocumented only 233 deaths across all o Libya in thatperiod.

Further evidence that Qaddafi avoided targeting

civilians comes rom the Libyan city that was mostconsumed by the early fighting, Misurata. HRWreports that o the 949 people wounded there in therebellions initial seven weeks, only 30 were women orchildren, meaning that Qaddafis orces ocused nar-rowly on combatants. During that same period, only257 people were killed among the citys populationo 400,000a raction less than 0.0006providingadditional proo that the government avoided usingorce indiscriminately. Moreover, Qaddafi did notperpetrate a bloodbath in any o the cities that his

orces recaptured rom rebels prior to NAO inter-ventionincluding Ajdabiya, Bani Walid, Brega, RasLanu, Zawiya, and much o Misurataso there wasvirtually no risk o such an outcome i he had beenpermitted to recapture the last rebel stronghold oBenghazi.

Te conventional wisdom is also wrong in assertingthat NAOs main goal in Libya was to protectcivilians. Evidence reveals that NAOs primary

aim was to overthrow Qaddafis regime, even at theexpense o increasing the harm to Libyans. NAOattacked Libyan orces indiscriminately, includingsome in retreat and others in Qaddafis hometowno Sirte, where they posed no threat to civilians.Moreover, NAO continued to aid the rebels evenwhen they repeatedly rejected government cease-fireoffers that could have ended the violence and sparedcivilians. Such military assistance included weapons,training, and covert deployment o hundreds o troopsrom Qatar, eventually enabling the rebels to capture

and summarily execute Qaddafi and seize power inOctober 2011.

THE INTERVENTION BACKFIRED

Te biggest misconception about NAOs interven-tion is that it saved lives and benefited Libya and itsneighbors. In reality, when NAO intervened in mid-March 2011, Qaddafi already had regained control o

September 2013

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most o Libya, while the rebels were retreating rapidlytoward Egypt. Tus, the conflict was about to endbarely six weeks afer it started, at a toll o about 1,000dead, including soldiers, rebels, and civilians caughtin the crossfire. By intervening, NAO enabled the

rebels to resume their attack, which prolonged thewar or another seven months and caused at least7,000 more deaths.

Te best development in postwar Libya was thedemocratic election o July 2012, which brought tooffice a moderate, secular coalition governmentastark change rom Qaddafis our-decade dictator-ship. Other developments, however, have been lessencouraging. Te victorious rebels perpetrated scoreso reprisal killings and expelled 30,000 mostly black

residents o awerga on grounds that some had beenmercenaries or Qaddafi. HRW reported in 2012that such abuses appear to be so widespread andsystematic that they may amount to crimes againsthumanity. Ironically, such racial or ethnic violencehad never occurred in Qaddafis Libya.

Radical Islamist groups, suppressed under Qaddafiemerged as the fiercest rebels during the war andreused to disarm or submit to government authority

aferward. Teir persistent threat was highlighted bythe September 2012 attack on U.S. acilities in Beng-hazi that killed Ambassador Christopher Stevens andthree o his colleagues. Even more recently, in April2013, a vehicle bomb destroyed hal o the French em-bassy in the capital, ripoli. In light o such insecurityit is understandable that most Libyans responding toa postwar poll expressed nostalgia or a strong leadersuch as Qaddafi.

Among neighboring countries, Mali, which previ-

ously had been the regions exceptional example opeace and democracy, has suffered the worst con-sequences rom the intervention. Afer Qaddafisdeeat, his ethnic uareg soldiers o Malian descentfled home and launched a rebellion in their countrysnorth, prompting the Malian army to overthrow thepresident. Te rebellion soon was hijacked by localIslamist orces and al-Qaida, which together imposed

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sharia and declared the vast north an independentcountry. By December 2012, the northern hal o Malihad become the largest territory controlled by Islamicextremists in the world, according to the chairman othe U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Arica. Tis chaos

also spurred massive displacement o hundreds othousands o Malian civilians, which Amnesty Inter-national characterized as Malis worst human rightssituation in 50 years.

Sophisticated weapons rom Qaddafis arsenalin-cluding up to 15,000 man-portable, surace-to-airmissiles unaccounted or as o 2012leaked to radi-cal Islamists throughout the region. NAOs interven-tion on behal o Libyas rebels also encouraged Syriasormerly peaceul protesters to switch to violence in

mid-2011, in hopes o attracting a similar interven-tion. Te resulting escalation in Syria magnified thatcountrys killing rate by tenold.

LESSONS

NAOs intervention in Libya offers at least three im-portant lessons or implementing the responsibilityto protect. First, potential interveners should bewareboth misinormation and rebel propaganda. I West-ern countries had accurately perceived Libyas initial

civil conflictas Qaddafi using discriminate orceagainst violent tribal, regional, and radical IslamistrebelsNAO would have been much less likely tolaunch its counterproductive intervention.

Te second lesson is that humanitarian interventioncan backfire by escalating rebellion. Tis is becausesome substate groups believe that by violently provok-ing state retaliation, they can attract such intervention

to help achieve their political objectives, includingregime change. Te resulting escalation, howevermagnifies the threat to noncombatants beore any po-tential intervention can protect them. Tus, the pros-pect o humanitarian intervention, which is intended

to protect civilians, may instead imperil them via amoral hazard dynamic. o mitigate this pathologyit is essential to avoid intervening on humanitariangrounds in ways that reward rebels, unless the state istargeting noncombatants.

A final lesson is that intervention initially motivatedby the desire to protect civilians is prone to expandingits objective to include regime change, even i doingso magnifies the danger to civilians, contrary to theinterveners original intent. Tat is partly because

intervening states, when justiying their use o orce todomestic and international audiences, demonize theregime o the country they are targeting. Tisdemonization later inhibits the interveners romconsidering a negotiated settlement that wouldpermit the regime or its leaders to retain somepower, which typically would be the quickest way toend the violence and protect noncombatants. Suchlessons rom NAOs use o orce in Libya suggest theneed or considerable caution and a comprehensive

exploration o alternatives when contemplating i andhow to conduct humanitarian military intervention.

Statements and views expressed in this policy brief aresolely those of the author and do not imply endorsemenby Harvard University, the Harvard Kennedy School, orthe Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

RELATED RESOURCES

Craword, imothy W., and Alan J. Kuperman, eds. Gambling on Humanitarian Intervention: Moral Hazard, Rebellion, and Civil War(New York: Routledge, 2006).

Kuperman, Alan J. Te Moral Hazard o Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons rom the Balkans, International Studies Quarterly, Vol52, No. 1 (March 2008), pp. 4980.

Roberts, Hugh. Who Said Gaddafi Had to Go? London Review of Books, Vol. 33, No. 22 (November 2011), pp. 818.

UN Human Rights Council, nineteenth session, Report o the International Commission o Inquiry on Libya, A/HRC/19/68, ad-vance unedited version, March 2, 2012.

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ABOUT THE BELFER CENTER

Te Beler Center is the hub o the HarvardKennedy Schools research, teaching, and trainingin international security affairs, environmental and

resource issues, and science and technology policy.Te Center has a dual mission: (1) to provideleadership in advancing policy-relevant knowledgeabout the most important challenges o internationalsecurity and other critical issues where science,technology, environmental policy, and internationalaffairs intersect; and (2) to prepare uture generationso leaders or these arenas. Center researchers notonly conduct scholarly research, but also developprescriptions or policy reorm. Faculty and ellows

analyze global challenges rom nuclear prolierationand terrorism to climate change and energy policy.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Alan J. Kuperman is Associate Proessor o PublicAffairs in the Lyndon B. Johnson School o PublicAffairs at the University o exas, Austin. During

201314, he will be a Jennings Randolph Senior Fel-low at the U.S. Institute o Peace, in Washington, D.C

ABOUT INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

International Security is Americas leading peer-reviewed journal o security affairs. It providessophisticated analyses o contemporary, theoreticaland historical security issues. International Securityisedited at Harvard Kennedy Schools Beler Center orScience and International Affairs and is published by

Te MI Press.

For more inormation about this publication, pleasecontact the International Security editorial assistant at617-495-1914.

FOR ACADEMIC CITATION:Kuperman, Alan J. Lessons rom Libya: How Not to Intervene. Policy Brie, Beler Center or Science andInternational Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, September 2013.