Korean Advisers Handbook1951

7/29/2019 Korean Advisers Handbook1951

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UIWt.hSTATW MiIzttmT ~~vrfk~Ry GI+OUP TO .~rn stwt@~IC OP !fto~u82OM Au. \ +.Office of the chief , .IAI'0 01 \ /* 5c/o%MrlasterSan F2+ancisco)cdif

1 Mar& 1961 I

AIWT$Xt?J HAVB Ok1. This handbook ie prbliahed for your gu2&en& and reference with the purpose:

a. TO g!.ve he functions, objectiv.98, ias%on and standards of the United states MiS.itary daisory Group to thy Xeuublic of 'Porea (SWAG).b. To provide a complete picture of the organizational strut- * ture of the Ilorqan rmy and of KKAG, c. TO shcw certain internal functions of +G, par)icularly adminfstrative procedures,. nternal cupply system, and the interpreter_ eervice, d, To furnfzh certa5n functioning and procedures of thm staffas&Son8 ae explaSned in f&u staff annsxls.

2. Thorough familiarization with this handbook and strict compliance with the pres.or?b?d ~ocedur?e shourid xpedite the efficient accomplish- ment of the KMAG miseion and the successful termination of this campaign.

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Adviror*s HandboskPart I -GF Z-6Skction I - ORIEYTATIOP x-3qriginal ObJectivea 1 1P'unction nd. ission 2 %

rc\\.Comnnd RelationshipWssfon, XMAG Off&era

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Sfxmti8rf-bor Advisor6 5 2I Section If - ORGAFIZATIOF OF PHn: 3-OR~ATfAWY AM) OF KMAG

Organieetion of the Worenn ArmyOr@nleation of KMAG

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Section III - In=& ?J'LWC!TIGBS,XAG~Al?JWWERS 46 :Imporhnt A*mblatrative Frocehree %

J.Internal L3u$ply %A!?Iaterpret9r Qvvhe KMAG

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Part II - srAp'plSWEXWElG-2G3G-4

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Advieorls Handbook Part I -GEVEiUI,Section I - ORIE?~'l%TIO~ Original Objectives Function Pnd. lsalon Command Relationship Niasion, KMAG Officers Stand8tb for Advisors

PARAGRAPH

-1 2 3 4 5

PAGX I

I-6 1-3 1 8 I2 2

Section II'- ORGA~?IZATfOF F '?Ha:ORTANARMYAEDO1pKMAG 3-4Organlaetibn of the Xore~a rirmy 6. Organization of KMAG 7 3

Section III - IN~AL ??UWTIGPS, RMAff!-naIQYARms - .46Import~titAfiminfatrative rocecbres a 4

Part

Part

Internal Supply ?!l.!AG . 9 .5Interpretsr~Service KMAG SO 5II -STAFFAN??EX?BElG-2G-3G-4SQ!nal-~-


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UNITEDfJTA!t'%SMZLfTAW AIYVISORP GROUPTO !lTR R?PU%IC OF KOR?3 82026 AU Office of the Chief APO 301 c/o Postmaster . San Y'xinciaco, alif 1 ?4qkch 951

SUBJ9CT: Advieor's Handbook

TO: All KMAG Adviaore PARTI_- GEQ?R.AL_--

SEcTIOlV . 03'Z%TTATIO"r_._._ ."~_* 1. Origiaal Ob:isctiv6_i

Prior t.o 5 June 1950 when the "orth'Forean agqessor crossed the 380 North I'a%ilal.nto Sks PqFrb'iic f F:brga, he United States Elilitav Advis,oi*.v of Y~rea (IWAG) waa ac;sisi;ing ~up to the Xsp~.b;.iuth2 infant rq,dbS c in t'he x.pil:>zation p atiixistratiun, cquiaaina, andtraining of the Toreen Arci:?ad. 'a%;ion~l An initini major ob-i i c e _jective of lW.G xas the trpxning Jf the vo-;eGn rmy to perform canably the mission: ?kfctgea f th+ V3Q Woxth Ptirallal gainst aggression.

Prssentf.y, MAfi s an intsqral, ert in the combat effort of tha Wzhth U.S. ATW;V orea (Y'USAF), It is thq advisory amncy (with opera- - tional, liaison, and eur,ervborv functions) of t& Comm6nding Mnaral,VJSAK with the Department of "atione! IMeaae of the %nu'bSic of Porea.The primary mission of FLAG is to ~fi_vis+,n accordencc! ith ?US.N? rdsreand directivea, the Torean commanj.ere d ei,affe in ths combat operation8wagad,by Rt?public f For


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4, &Iission;MAG Off&era: The mission f all WC Officers s:_ aa To advise he Korean ounterparts o as to-providethem withthe benefits of the military xpesiense f the KMAG officers n order toaccomplish uccessfully he overall ombat ission.

b. To function s an informationgathering nd reporting gencyso that accurate nd timely eports n all phases of the military peratiocan be forwarded hrough United tates hannels o Chief, K&G. 13. Standards,fordvisory,

8. In the execution f his advisory ission, he advisor eginswith considerable restige hich e must continually ndeavor o maintain*?iithfinesse nd intelligenceany advisors ave made recommendationsotheir counterparts o and effectively hat United tates ili-ogic;olLy tary doctrine tands out clearly n the issuance nd execution f orders by Korean countc:parts. dviscrs hould statkish ordial elationships.with their counter-perts; nd are cautioned o avoid issues ver autharity.They will insure tile aamwark a of plans, n checks n exe-: epmatdoklcution of orders, nd in cocrdinstion f logistical upport ssential othe accomplishmentf the opcretional ission. Wenever hot spots occur,they will go there with their coizn+erpartsnd assist n the coordinationof attacks, efense, nd counterattacks; andspecially he air, artillery, naval gun fire support. b. In the performance f his information athering nd rePorti%mission,,he unit field advisor s charged ith rendering eriodic ndflash eports s prescribed nd with pa ?.icularttentiono their accu-racyland imelirEss.Senior ieid Advisors re directly esponsible stheir kited States uperior ffLcers crr he accomplishmentf the abovemission. They alone are responsible hat communicationsre &,%qy~_oZ~,Ever closed _oz~~They must know the normal procedties nder which adiotraffic s hondisd nd rn-~~ ive important utgoing escege ufficientlyhigh precedeno?: ,to nsure imeL!yiassificetion encoding nd transmission,Accordingly,the signai erscnnel nd the communicationset must be at-tuned to meet the exigent-itsf the tactical ituation, 'nemovement ofcommand asts, nd the changes n the compositi@l f forces, A backlogof inconningessages ust be anticipated nd,, :hen.-..*_-__ necessary, ormal ro-cedures uat be modified nd the signal erscnnel lsced on en overtimehasiso Senior dvisze must insist hat 31.1 embers f their staffs nowthe capabiLities,ifii-t.sLionsnd working *&es of the communications teams necessary or cif:e and41ent xecution f the timely ransmission receipt Of Official essages. ce Senior dvisors ill maintain n their crganizationshe same high standards f discipline equired n -any nited tates hrmy ccmaand, In an isoiated nit such as an advisory roqp high standards in performance f duty and in individual onduct re of the utmost importance,Senior dvisors ill devote particular ttention o the welfare f the individucll nalntaln he high morale isting$&ing r13 all United tates &my units.

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SSCTION II. ORG~IZATIO)iTOP Tp? POEA?? ARMY AXD OF KMAG. 6. Organization of the Korean Army._

The organization of the Forean Army is shown in &arts #l, 2,and 3, fnclosurnsl With a Department of Vational Defense organizedalong KS; lines, but also exercising the functions of our Departmentof the Army, the ZCo1'eanhannal of reauonsibility goes directly to theChief of Staff, voroan Army. Prom the Chisf of Staff the chain of re-sponsibility proceeds directly to Forean Corps Commanders. (There is nointorvcning field Army Commander or headquarters and., ence, EeadquartarsPorean Army exercises the usual operational functions of the U.S. FieldArmy Headquartersj. In th? vorean Corns and Divisions Haadauaters, theorcenizationel structure is based unon and closely parallels thr! truc-turn Of UC& W.&a!%~ayt%on~.The organization of the Division is bpseduuon U.S. organization but lpcks thn fire newer of the U.S. unit. Theprincipal shortegs n fire power is apparent upon analyzing the Division .Artillery structure:,. nsterad f P Division Artillery of three 105.mmgun batterifis nd cnn l%mm Xowitzer battery, the Korean Division hasOnly one batta'lfon f l!Xmm Artiliery. Also tha Division doss not havewithin the Infantry rflpiaouts, qnks, heavy mortars, or r+coilloss wna- pans. hesent plans, how'Vnr, call for an augp:mntPtion n each Divisionof onn heavy tank company, ons battery of 155mm artillery, and r~coillessweapons at the company'lovsls where arsscribnd in th? U.S, organizational structure.

7. Ths organization of KMAG is shown in Charts #4, 5, and 6, Inclo- sure6 #4, 5, and 8, to G-3 Annex #3. a- Chart #4, mted Stptss M$lfterv A_dv~soryJroup. rz._t_ha_Re=_ ._c.__-Public of Korea shows the IWiG tIeedauert_rs rgenizetional structura; par- ticularly the corrallnting advisory agnncy to Bach vorsan Staff Division. I-8. Chart #5, J!MAG orps Rnadq_uart;lrs_ _. .__L__J portrays thq JWG organi-zation functioning wtth ROIL orps Headq.uerters. c. Chart #S, RMAG Division ??eadouartsrs_.,llustratns the KVAG _.__.__-. organization prescribed to function with the Eeadquartirs of ROT Divi- sions. d. thorn he Ordn.ance nd 'Quartarmaster taff S-?ctions f J%AG Headquarters, advisors are assigned to Ordnance and Quartermaster Army Service Troops supportiv combat operations. 8. Ir summary, lVL$G advisors function from the HsaclquMersKorean Army level down to includ? th.? attalion leas1 in combat units,and down to &&I Q&$ 2fiTg&e :*~fBhrt ,X&mm -Am.y. y%i&v%~ fEBk&+b.ROm: Also see Section Ii, Crganization, G,3 Annex $3. SXXTIOD III. IJVm23, 'JV'CTIONS GAG-..-I-_ -.LW*-_-_L..__-T_'_..__ _- HMDC'UART~S

a. OFFICIAL OFFJC~S R~GIST%X: The official officers rclgistar is maintained in the Adjutant Wnnral1s Seotion, Offfcers will sign in and/or out when ramainingat, or being absent from, this hendo.unrters for periods in excess of twenty-four (24) hours.


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b. PA=: Personml of all sections within RMAG me paidby a Class A Agent, %i,i use ehould bo made of Rllotments of pay, sinc,e fRcilitie6 for obtaining monpy orders or US Treasury Check& are not rea- dily aPRilable to most un?ts ii1 he field.

d. POSTAL PlZ'8U$2?IOJ: (1) Th. mailing Address for perc;oxncl

(b) Be deposited for mailing in a U,S. Al?0 in Korea, (c) Have in the uuper left corner of the address sidethe bend wr%tt:n na:? of the sender, s?rv!.csnom- *

her :( gmds, unit designation and complete militarjaddress.(d) Hz?ve n the! pper right corner of the aildre33 side,

(e) Be normal size letters weighing one (1) ounce or lese.

(4) At present w2r souvenirs such as @IX. srr;ords,nivesetc,9 ltiiii not 'bs uzr:~ted or mailing by any APO inthti ilr -SC Conmaud.e, PXf?SONAL YZYECTS: Under no circwnstencras ill the effectsof personnel K3'A r MIA tr; forvnr30a to i;h* nsxt-of-kXl dixct, 811such effects will be forwardpi! o this heatdquartara or dispoaition throughproper channels,

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f, SETTER OF IFJJJIRfi Letters of inquiry from the relative or a friend af an individual casualty addressed to a commander of Chaplain by name or official designation will be referred to this office for re- PlY. If the addreseee is-a personal friend of the writer the letter of inquiry may be answered direct. Any statement relative to a casualty however, Will be cleared with this office to ensure that any information given in reply is in accord with the official report of casualty. 9. Internal Supply,. UG-.--

The supply of KMAG field personnel is R matter of particularconcern to Chief, SNAG, Dispersion of detacments, poor roads, limitedtransportation facilities, end prolorged periods of bad. eather compli-cate the problem of logistical support,, To overcome'these obstacles,the internal supply of IlMAG s placed under the Eeadquarters Commandant,with an operating agency, tha Dirnc.;;orf %pply, acting as the exscri;crrfor all logistical matters, To facilitate and expedite lo&tic& x@-port of field insta!.l.a?icns, attached Advisoryhsre Is to each CorpsBetachment, a Corps i._ D~~tschmPnt onsisting of one (1) officer andn-Ji.7one (1) enlisted ma3, 3.t s the f a,ction of this section to insure thatrequisitions are properly and promptly submitted to this headqusr%ers:that supplies are promptly drawn acd dalivt;rnd o using units, and thateffective liaison is maintainad with t'he irnctor of Supply to insure con-tinuing prompt and adequate logistical support of field personnel, De-tails of this internal supply are prescribed in letter this headquarters,subject: SOP for Internal Supply, KMAG, dated 26 December 1950.

10. Interureter Service WAG _. ___-_,..~.z Of the utmost importance to an Advisor is the interpreter. In-terpreters will be provided by this IIeadcuarters AC of S, Gl) 'to newlyarrived field advisors prior tc their departure from this Headouarters.Recruited from civilian life, with little military experience, interpre-ters are entitled to the pay, allowances, and privileges of first lie-

tenants but have no command status, They must meet prescribed physical, educational, and lo,yalty learance stand_ards, Interpretarsarc entitledto the same consideration given other officers and mania1 jobs will notbe imposed upon them. The supuort of the interpreter is a resnonsibilityof the ROY unit whers he is ettached. Advisors are morally resnonsiblethat their interpreters have the necessary items of clothing and individualeauipment. Reassignments of interureters will be promptly reported tothis headquarters (AC of S, Gl) giving name, rank, and serial number ofthe interpreter, the circumstances of tha reassignment, ana the name andassignment of the losing, or gaining, advisors.11. Referents.

R. For your reference, five (5) staff annexes are uublishadas Part II, and two (2) KMG Standing Operating Procedures, and. ne (1)letter are Published as Part III of this handbook.b, The Advisor's Handhook is supplemnnted by other nublica-tions of this Headquarters,' nd it .$s nresant'Fbd%bokslanned to keQi3 )lPJ up tc date by issuance of appropriate KM?G letters, memorandums, and SOP'S.

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CAPITOL DlVl51CI&$ - I , FIRST D~viS~or\lI- ,. -CAY KWIMENT 1st RE$I MENT

26th RE$I MENT 10the~ y DAZ~Liti ,

THI RD PlVlS&d_

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(2) Assist -l in planning, oordinating,nd expediting *overall Gil functions in suppcert of the Army mLssi~~~-(3) Effect necessary oordination f approkiate personnelmatters etween G*l Kk and EUSAK.

b. At Corps and Division evel the mission of the G-l Advisors s to advise and assist ounterparts n planning nd coordinating ctivities pertaining o the G-l functions See ar 15, FM 1Ol-5, Staff Organization nd Procedure,dated July 1950).

4. Hints to Corps and Ltivision-1 Advisors. a* Check daily the personnsl aily summary eport. Keep the Senior Advisors nformed f strengths, asualties, tc. b. Assist in th0 allocating nd assignment f replacements o, and within, ivisions; oordinate he necessary ransportation.

with the coun';erparts,Marshals, nd field team frm the office f Advisor o the FMG on matters f .discipline,law and order. F!?.acaparticular mphasis n the collecting nddisposition f stragglers.

0. Coordinate Corps and Division rovost

d. Infarm he counterparts nd Provost arshaIs f the policies f United ations eadquarters ertaining o the care and treatment f prisoners Of war. er Assist Senior dvisors n the preparation forf recommendations U.S.Army decorations ar Korean rmy personnel. f. Assist,when directed, n the distribution f U.N. relief suppliesand coordinate he necessary ransportation.g- Cccr$_nii%::ithca~nterpartsin t,he ite loc&?lOLl and internalarrangementof command osts, Secure 0 accommodationso meet the needsdsquat,

of the KMAG Group at the location f the Corps and Division ommand osts. 5: Biscellaneous.a* Arrangementsor the administrationrecords, ay, etc) of KoreanArmy personnel integrated into the T3 Forces n Korea are coordinatedby theArmy G-l Advisor.b. The Army G-l Advisor s responsible or the final preparation and processing f recommendationsor awards nd decorations or personnel f KMAG. (This is the only KIVIAG l function erformed y the G-l Advisor. All other KwrAGpersonnel atters re handled y the KMAG Adjutant eneral nd Deputy Chief of Staff).

4 Inclosures:Incl #l, marked #!+, hart Organization f G-1 Incl #2, marked 5, Chart Organization,dvisor -l, IQ Incl#3, marked 6, Chart Proouremnt of Enlisted ersonnel Incl #4, marked $7, Chart Procurement f Officers


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ORCN: Unit Organization., Jnit eorganization, Unit InsctiYation, Organization Control, Organization StGltlsc.cs *R3.E; Procurement, Allocation, Ijriorities, rans-.pl-'thtlOrI, %pply, Replacement Battalion, ProcessingRate Table fiSC".l?"$I. Ap~intment;Assignment, Classification,Transfers, Promotion, Demotion, Reclassification,Discharge, Retirement.CCXSCRIFTION: Conscription, Military Services, RTCControl, NDA Matters.CIV: Frocurement, ppointment, Assignment, Wages, Norking Conditions, Population.


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_ A.___._OFFIC2 OF AEBISOR Gl

_.__.____.~___-^-..I

ASSIST.QB AnVISOR

.__l___._ -- I A--.--L -@_..__A-.- - ! Statistics Specie.1 Service Reports ma

/ Reports ?E!?E!ui--i- Graves Registration Coordination

---__.A____,Military Police Reports Prisoner of ?"lar ata Stragglers Military Justicesirmy risonA ?. 0. L.Civil Assistance

Inclosure Ko 5


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1, Functions of E.XG GJ-2 ection_w The functions of the XXG G-2 Section are: 3. To keep C5iof I(I%G nd all intcrosted agencies and sections fully inforked of the enemy situntion and capzbilties, ,and f wcnthor .and terrain,;, b. To advise the Korean counferparts so as to provide themwith the Ijcnefit f the milikry eqerimce of the EXG officers in orderto accomplish succcrnf -rgu l l y t iw o-w5~11 ac0mbat issiony

fl To assir;t ;hc hief of Gt?ff in the coordiwtion of functions intclliecnce and ~onntcri~telli~~ence. d. To plan and supervise inte?_li~cnoc r,%.ning f tile 2 Sec-tion and) in caordiwtion with G-3, such trairL:lp;ithin IG;1G,

21 Organi$trtion f corps gnd Ditieiofis -2 Sections-_PwI_-_-__- --_-The G2 functions are ?erfor?od t KEG Corps levels by one offi-ccx" nsiened as Ea2., At divieign ltirels, he G-2 fwctions are executedby L?n fficer asslgod as G2/'G-3, %erc is no officer provided irl heICIIIc2 C-/O as S-2/S-3 nt r@_mental and bzttzlion le~zels., w:ever, the -5.3 tical advisors assQncd to the regimcct? and battalions hzve an nddition~z.1 duty of advising in S-2 functiow (zt he regimtintnl c-,-clLc 3aGtt::Lion lcvcls, respectively,

*3. ;Yssion.- At Corps 2nd Division lcvcls, the G2 mission rks:a. To advise the Korean G-2 coktcrparts so as to cn;?Xo them to accomplish their mission, and b. To act as an irform,?tion z.thering nd roportin.5 czcy so that accurate, tincly, and prescribed G-2'rcports on the enemy situationand capabilities may be fonr-rdcd through American channels to Chief E-ACand all intcrestcd qcncies and sectionsi .

4, Dctailcd Instructions Tho G-2 field advisor should supervise or pcrfon the follo?tingactivities,


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b, flen @pe Captured Am~~r Zquipmnt: Rm ty-pe cngturcd cne-q~ erluipnont hould be immdirtcly rcportcd and held in spccinl custodypendin instructions for its disposition by this Headqumtors.C. Captured Documents: All docur;lcnts collected from enemydead and from POYs should be cxmir,ed for tirlely ild qyortnnt inform-tion. Such information should be classifidd secret and, if affectin:;adjment units 2nd higher headqucrters, reported ?iith he utmost practi-cable speed.d. lkil:; ntclli~cnco Plan: A daily Intelligence Plan till be prepared at division, evel. Thjx plan should.contnin detailed instructions to the Xorean collection qencies, mong the most important of which are ground pztrols,, Zffective ground patrolling, difZ_cult to achieve in any 2.q~~ is psrticul?rly so ir, he Korean I'imq emuse of its lack of training aild he l~k of sypreci4ion by KorOzn comandeys of the vital nature of ground ~trcll~_n~;, Iknce, the advisor must constant- __ ly stress to the Sorcan co~-mFier the importance aY;d ecessit;? f ground patrolling, must activcY7 aesiat . I) n t!:e rnpnrctior, f patrol plars and of det,?iled nstructions for pytrols,, nd do everything in his power to

assure the actuc?l xecut.lor_ missions.f pc,";rol Advisors nust assure that information fron all sources nust be reported to hi$wr he::_dquartcrs and affected adjacent head?unrtcru with the utmost practicable speed. e. Intelligence Xstimkc: (372 d\&ors till keep cor,tirmous- ly abreast of the ta,~~~~-7---'" and will be prcprred to present eltua-tz.on an intelligence estimtO~-of-the-situation t any time

a8 Prescribed T~xT%s: IC.ly Unit intelligence Reports,-_--Special SituAion Eeports, 2nd Spot Reports should 3c submitted by the nest expeditious means, b. Report Schedule: (ITOT",:Code rrhere ecessitated),

TYF'Z IZGRT IIIVS O CORPS COW3 TO I:',lG Unit Report 2030 2100 24 hour period ending 1800, Report h=l.s approyi%tc pm?,r;raphs rcl- F-~0 o intclli-

~OncOSpeck.1 Report 0800 0900 Brief general pictureof situqtion with nc~a-tivo information beingreported in absence ofpositisc i:IPomation.Spot Report At once At once Includes 17h0, ilat,t-rhen,,%cre, Ti:drhy,tith an eT.-zlw.ti.onm-301 (see pamzraph 8bclos-r).


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portine: a. The numhsr of POWs carryine s&render leaflets, . 3. Defueef3 ovem3nt trenf3.s. c. Siv5.lan nttT_tu~es n areas of proba?le revolt.

8. Tva1up.tion et em --~.-I_ -.- - i-a

WCCL?ACY-.---

A

Annex # 2 3


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%ction I__.._-_-

1. Functions of YIQG_ _3__S~.cJioz1:.____- -- - _ --_ ...._.~The furztions of the IDfAG G-3 Cection are: '. *

c. To r an? stmsroise tile unctiom n.qrixinir.6zlan, cocrcI.m;~t;~ to combat oDerPticns, .to nciu?? pre?,mrtion of opsrptiona nlans, orfiers, directives, renorts, and bx it3finm.

e. In eqori'inptiJ)n the tr?ini>pith the KA CL-3Sactim, Dream nroEcram or the For?,-n rzr,

CT. To Ftmlyze VPF~ ??-I+risnQ tr\ctics ith P visw of rlsvp.lom-ix Qff"ctive tactical floctrina lnfir?ininp m4hoA.s.h. TO net PS C-,7 c?ir for tha vorp,nn my.i. To enrcisp pensral staff su?ervision of mvchql~g-fcal warfmsnctivitil>s n the Porem, kmy.. . To tZle ffQrts of ths T'orem nmyoQr?inps_ts nnfl he %tiond

Police. -k. To cor?r?inpte il renr officer ?USAF. 1. 5-1 ssist thl Chief of n0rtPining to G-3 nctivities.


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.n. To emrcise o?eratiand control of the FLAG Lipht Aircraft Seu_$fo:~.

1. 'The troon b~eis for the 'ICoraqnrmy hns Yepn estR?liahei! t 250,000, Gen%relly, the >rs~&down of this figure is 135,000 trr)oTs om- prising 10 Infantry Divisions, 64,000 troons con73risine rmy suqorting troop units, Arms an? Corps YsPdquarters, ;Inilhe trsininr Cndr=s of the ,vr.rious ervice schools en8 rqlec?mant trpinina crjntsrs. Ths remainder are trainees in ths RTcrs, students in ths sqrvica schools an? Dptisnts in the hos7oitals. I. The ROR Inf Division is similar in structup to thq A?ericPn Xvi-sion, al hough certnin suny,X>rtiny nits, armor, AAA, Artfl1er.y nd Y~vy MOrt;lr nits, or&%nic to the AmOricRn Division prr? ot indud!?& (SW Tnsl 79#lJ.

4. A coaDl?te orppnization of Army sunr,ortin+? nits to sun?ort P 13 division Army has been &~~elor)~~ nc7 s onPr?,tinE. This Qrpnnizztign in- cluclss gr, (29, ign21, ?idfi tirtillerv, rfinRficCR, ilitary Polics$ Nedical,CIC and IIID nits. (SN Incle $3 and #3 to Pprt I). 5. Ths MilitRrg Advisory Group to the Q.prublic f Porea @MAa) has a total strength of RnBrqximetdy 1,000 officers and men. Both dvisors and administrative personnel pre inclu?ad in this figure. WAG ngrallels the orKpnizetion of the Horeen Rrmv with Ac%isors Rssipnsfi at ~11 1~3~~1s) ifWJ?2o Bzttdion in tactical units an8 trr nmpnrny n 6nme of ths sF?rvicf?

slenQnts, The structure of Fb??G rganization is shown in Incls 4, 5, and 6. S4CTIO" III _~._______.___ TRAI?YI1%.--__-

Prior to the! ar thp Porepn Army asta%lishsP a r?nlRcamF?nt ni! school systApl inilzr to that utilize+ in tha U.S. Armv. This system oDerRt- ed at maximum efficiency en+ was r'clsi.gnPrJ o trfiin fficers an< enlisted nersonnel in thP j&s en8 toch?iorl snccielities necsssPr,v o s?J?aort iOO,OOO men hrmy. The schnt?l yRtsm coniluctec? esic an? advencoir fficers tr;rining n ppch brsnch of th? service an6 incluPed n Command ana General 'Staff Co!_lege hich was or+ratine rt full cpaacity. Vital he outhrrek of hostilities ani! ra3ii! ithr'rcwel o the souk;ti; ha schnol and rpdncement system va6 disruntec?. Adfiitionelly, he school 3rd rqbcennnt system utilized nrior to the war hecane imnrecticd as r7 esult of the Army's increase from 100,800 to 25C,OOO anC the necessity for m?intainine increase8. sylaae- ments. In Septem?3er 950, 69ven (7) renlPcensnt traininr centers were or-


24/66

ganiser-7 for the pur-noae of trnininp hc?sic nlister! onlacem~nts, Rnc? heoaricus branch school3 ware 4~eacl under central control Rt th? KoraEnArmy Ground. enFtral chool. ?+re officer r,RndiBates ere trains8 for Rllarms ana services.

7 To C7?vel0n higher stanFar of non-cqmmissir,ned ific*r a LmadersSchoo;'wns orpaniz.?i!n8 began ocq-atir)ne ?brch 1951 with a ca-oacity f /- 7200. (See Incl +7),


25/66

G-3 me listed ~8 f01lows: :a. To pepere Omratiqns nlans, orders end instructions. 3. To mdntain en 0nerPtiona oa~roflectinp the lomtion of ~11 corn3pt nits V?? n8 ROPA em~loger? n Farm, c. To receWe, evaluate, ~3.~33rm70rt to 7USAK thn tpcticfd situation of ROU units, and to rmna$n cQntinudly ??riefed n the comlete tactical situation with partimlnr enyMsis on ROXA units. cl.. To 3e nrsmrc?r tn n&e mung and- iooly recmmsrd8ti9ns on the followine: _

(11 Cmmitment of reserv*s: rin? hmps in bmnrJar,y nA.task orflanizatinns o facilitate ~ccomlishmnt of theassimec'. issim.(2) 30m3lintt hanges (To JOC), in relztim tr, r0nt 'line uriitg. (3) Issuance of efi?itional rnbzmentary raars ani! nstructifm@ moiilifyinghe etssictred effective F~cCCCW issions for mm plishrmnt.

e. To maintain R cemnlete kn~rx?n2,journd.f. To mapest, RM establish where necessdtiy, rior1t.v or air supTort for RgWmft s - t l?r?V,-h ,07. c. To naintnin clqse coqrfiination ith PA G-3 onerations officer,and-mbise him?\dn he nsrformance of his i'utiss,

a. kneral:All o?erPtiqnal directives, normd.y vrr?nPrd! in the formof en oprations dan, orfisr r instructlm, are '?asef?n ?tEAF onerationelfiirectvas an8 instructions. Owr~tiona officw, KA CWT, is Fri.efe!C?n all pr0:asd operationid directivss, his conmsnts an?. mcurrmce, o7?tainclc'Rnd tmrallel publisatione in K,rs?an nd. nzlish arP r'istributsc? bultan-SOUsly to all units concerneii_. Cl.visoraith sdbor9inate units e.re njoined to follow this sane arocedure in issuinz instzmctims within units to which thev tire ssi+zned. This drmztice insuree nmimm cmr3imtion an? mutual un?erstandine between Advisore e.nd he+Forean chuntnrdts.

h, memtion Plans!Plms am a7mdinns toresord? on mr)r)lns~P ,PI~ Jistri+uted Yield Commn~ers Fin? idviwrs as Etiarlys nossi%le TV Demit r?axim27 ipe in preparations for new operations. To nrPsr the nlcln nto execution, an "Opernti7ns Instructi0n11 s m~118kert ks8_esiemting the TlRn as m order an6 d.irectinp he order 3e oxecuteP,

4


26/66

Ord.ers ro bu'?lishea ? asnicn onerationpl tTme missbns to fill ornhat nits under ooerptional cqntrol of Chief of Staff ROKA. P~rmnll.y, r&x-s ~rs issued 01%I.y mission 0f the najoriey hen the 9Qer-p,11of units unfler psrntionel control of the Chief of StRff ?OKA is affected.a.. berations Instructions:-_II--- ._

OTer::tions nstructions are 'nuMishe3 PS P vehicle to amend the operations.order in effect fin+ ormnlly effects minor chances in the 'aenerrl operatioml miss%zn Qf the majority of units udsr onerntiqnal cqn- tr01 of Chief 0f Staff RCRA. OP%?ATIfV3 PTPORTS7 --__-.__._


27/66

Ten (13) Inclosuree: Crgmizationd Chmt The Infantry Division Orgmiwtion ?hart JCorem Corps Seadouprt+rs Organization Chart Porem Urmy Organiz9tiond Chart W4Ar,Ltr, K?JIAG,ssigment of Pie18 Afivisors, tc! ?? %?F, 51Ltr, XXQG, Assipnmnt of Divisions, 8t? 1 Mar 51ield Aciviflors,Chmt Replace:Jent chool System, (ALtr, FMAG, Tactiwl Stan$.i~~ nemtinlz Pmcer'ure, ritil6 Dee 80Ttr, KMAG, Omrations SO3 fQr Tmticpl Air Sunnort, Jtd 15 Jnn 51

+lO Ltr, RMAG, Tecticel Air Coordimtor (Air%orne), ?t? 1 lar 51.

GAnnex #3 -_ _~1


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The.Infaritrv ivisionOrEanizational Chart

. _, *.:,,. ..: -,.I. ,-.x.__ 8

-.^.-.___-_____._._,Infantry Division

L

Engr TD EnCcmbat Eln L I . ,,

i


29/66

ORGANIZATIONAL C'H~T KOREAN ORPS -IEADn~J~~RT~$

-HP1 . ,,..:.3 I -2

AIDES.J I 6 CG .Ipq--STAFT 6 J.

c1

G3

STVF ..__ ,_.. 1- T-------

4 I,-8 3 :I_ 1 II t 3 4 8 2 -11 10 1 1 ,a1 Ir

ORD SEC PM SEC QMC SEC SIG SEC SPS szc 1 c . 1 4

Inclclgure2 . *:


30/66

_ ____.. y-- -*9

ORG4NIZBTIONAL CH;RT ~- I* - KORINN AREY

26DND t 1

L C&i?

,

* - Includes 21,000 Detachm.ent Jnclnsure #7


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ORG-:NIZATION,u,HLfi'f UNITED TATES ILIT:&Y ",DyISGRY GROUP TO THE RX'UBLIC F ~&a:,

.

LEGmD: Denotes ual functions Inclosure#f!+


32/66

-

WIT'ZD STATbS MILITARY ADVISOT;Y 9CTP TO mu RqtBftr': " ~'ORQ 820?8 AU Office of th+ "Ihief APO 301 c/a ??etnpstsrSRn PrRnciSc0, Cdif.32 Pe3rmry 1951

SuBJSC?'* Assignment of ?'ielfirWisars TO: Senior Advimr 3ach Cor'm

1. The policy governing the msiamnt of narsmnel within the d- visory structure of erch 2or:)s s 88 folio-0: A.5.c.a. :: CT.h. .1.3. Ir. 1.m.n.0.n.9.r.8.

In dfiition to the L)~OW, conmunic~tim teRDs including mr'l9-crypt9 personnel an8 equi_omnt will he F?ttAc'her'o Corns Feadouarters fro? KMAb Sip- nal Detachment. 2, %rxdly the Detachment Suplg OffS.cer ill ~180 aerfor- the func-. tions of PPadquartw8 Commanr'cntan3 "lnl!si;ai'et~chnent ?xmm~_er. 7 The Si,anL ArLvisnr'e rimrry miSsion is to nPviSs the SimsI. Offi-

cer oh-the Corn3 on d-I_ ni-.ters Twr,ertPininr to Sip301 corvnuni.c-~ti0n. Yiel3 Communication ITI!Oio.re ssiznai! o pssiSt the Cnr~s 3ig:nal iivieor, 4. The rac?iq eens ;ra c"ttachaJ r, rovirIe ommunicative fw Ihs ad- vimry ,:nrs~.rm@lnP will nqrm-ol1.v~r&te under thm Pimct mntml of the Signal Arlvism.

7


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5. The orzmization end n~licy outliner? n nrecedinfr r"rngrsvhswill be considered stanflare xtent under exce-tionei circtistances. Itm%y '5e nodifiefin certain cases At the r?iscratio,nf the Senior Corns Ail- visor. These exceptional circumstnnces inc1uir.e: a. The necessity for close liRi,son ith djncent units or su\orMnRte units. h,. The necasdity for close cov+imtinn with suvnortinc tr90ns.C. Difficulties with normal communicdion chnnnds. 6. An inexverience? l?q,reRn bff reidring more daice thenwould normally be expectefl.

However such adjustments ehouli! e cansirtrred nmnorRrg measures tq meetthe requirements qf the tacticnl situntion. The orgRnizati5n p.8 utlined.is considereir dequEte t? flccomvlish he Came Mvisory mssi on.

-UiiL MA_TTIC'T.- 61 . 1-f ., . :;_.1.;Chigf-of Staff

,,


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_

ORQANIZATIONCHART KMAG CORPS Et4~UART"rJzs

KMAG HQ COTYDT f--lc-L--l1-I , TACP:Mr*r-ADVISOR

II 't ?+?EDICAL TRANS SUPPLY. . , t -F-L-7 -c--h I I-c---e a-e-w-* I I: RAD.TEXM 1 l RADTFm 1 I I I In--e--c- -- r-iL_.'

.J .;_ . . . .


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c/o Postmeeter9a.n '3x0~i.a~1 E'arch 351 Calif

SUBJ3CT: Assignment of Field Advisors I)ivisions!I?@: Senior Advisor each Xvision

.i:C.a,e.f.E*h..1.

3. The necessity for coordirption with sunnortine troops.


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-

~ISTTZWTION_____--1 -- Chief of Staff 1 -- e9 Staff Section 3 -- ea C0rtx1 110 - ea Di&l.sion 20 - Tncr 20 -- Signal 12 -- FA 3 -- O-3 Pile 2 -- AG File Incl: Orpnimtior Chart I!XAG ivision lieadmarters

I2

_


37/66

ORGANIZ~'ffONCHART KMAG DIVISfON HEXQUX3TERS

#--4dvi3rI Gl -G4 * Advisor I


38/66

.REF'LACEMENT SCHOOL YSTEJ4 KORE:W ARMY

C/FIN i

I

IInclosure #7


39/66

--

--

WIT% STATES MILITARY AIJVISORY ROUP TO TN? RRR'UBLIC F K0R.Q 8202d AU Office of the Chief. APO ?XJl c/o Postmaster San Francisco, Calif. 1& lkcem'C,sr 950

RMAG -ical Standing Onerating Procedure

1. General.a. This Standine OWrating Frocefkr ia agnlica3le to Senior Advisors of all units aseignei! r attached to Readquartars, PA for onera- tional control. 35. This StnnP%ng Cpratina Procedure hctcomes ffective on recebtnreviousiy 33liaher' directioeo concerning operating uro-

2. Iiaison. a. Senior Advisors of Sor?s, Divisions PEA separate com*at units of regim@ntal size oberatine C'irnetly ndbr this headquertars-will rerpest counternarts to furnish at least one liaison officer @oraan) to 3% Head- quarters. h.. RA Readauartnrs will furnish liaison officers to sukordinate

units as requir-d,7 Command Fasts..

Prior to movement of cam~and Posts, Senior Advisors with ma.jx su3- ordinate com?7at nits will rsuort a general araa to %a occu7ied. Vnon eeta- ?lishment of ths new CF the exact location will ke rslsor,i;ed ,g he mostexpeditious means, Tha Ow c?, @MA&-A) Will nO+ hr! C134d. UYItil COI?Imni.--__ _-- ____._.___~~~.--~ tione from this %adouartnre to the&w C? heve Wan esta?liaheP. 4. Orcters.

cjoniea (Porean and %irlish) of all a-oerational ype orders issued>y na.jor ukdinate units will3e forwarder' o this Peakuarters (Attn G3).5. Ouerations Se~orts _I-.,-_--__._*

a. Period& Onerations RaTorts will 3e su%itteS thre- times daily3y Senior Advisors of Corns, Divisions, snnaratn Task t'oroes n*. etx?.rateSeeiments oseratine under r'ircct ontrol of this headauarters. mese renortswill 30 ns of 0~0, 1600 and WOO so ae to &ch this %w%maM~reu%itt.r!tinot later then 0500, MOO and 2400. will ha forwar&M ?y l%fliOee33ert.e

3nolokire #8 1


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.. .*r- ..a:. ;NCL~SSIFIED teletype, telephone (using tsleohone cotie) r messenger. ?legatiVeremrtswill 3e au3mittefl.For format anP coatents see inclo%r+- %, 1. An overlyto cover locatiorb f su3or*i~ste 3n4ta frown o an5 incluflina Rttalions nnflseparate compa&"les ?il he ~rfqa7xi. e of 2200 ilpiiy, This overly will 3eforwarded by first i3Vail&ls cou-rier.

3. Period9.copqationb ?X?pOitB will. 1f? su~alemnnt4 ?g khf, Sp+cial raporte s r&csssarg tc~keep this he&+artfrs ahred, of the currantsituation.

XntPlliebnc~__~_e~orts. __.~~_*fntnlliesn~e Ibx,rts of mp.jor u~orr?inats tactical units will beeuhmittefihy Ssn-ior &ieox AS t'ollowa:

Timeeport uow f3.l%?litt??c? -II- -__-_-_-_-.__.____ %TOT -.. spo t tE l!OBT RmeC?f tiOUk 3 g-iep,na At once

h. Intelligence Summary Pairs;, eietpP, Tela~hone Daily a.8 f1800, BY CCMFAKD OF BRIG~IDI73

":I. W. MAR? j Mrjor, GC Adjutant enerid


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Inclosure #Tl, actic31 CveratinF Procedure. Fcrnat and Con!-ek, Per%o(qic perations %port

Periodic Operations Report Vo, .For Pkrior?.

1. Compos?t.icncf Pr:.:!nailylorces: a. Eirt ncy c?lc:hr~- 3 i.3 som>::s;tionof units (attachments, r'.etach-.mente, etc.),

2. Operatio;l:;la*;te~::..--___..-Outline FQ:! parations which are in the planning stam only.

3. 0Perati.os7.ss&xcif: List ali operations ori'ercd urinfr hq. eriod? emrdless of the degree of conp~et:ion,,

4. Results of Cperatbns:

Vnit strnn&h exeressad in percc3ntaEe f author'iz& streneth (2200 repkt o&j), c. Morale Pxpresssd. s 2xceXlent, Good,.F&fr or Poor II2200 eport only).

Ccn?at efficiency c~atessed as Txcellent, Good, Fair or Poor (2200 repod;t nlyj.

Inclustire #8


42/66

!,tNCUlSSlFlED-------_..__UnTI'I'ED OF KO???SA TATW FILITA?P ADTTISORv ?OUP TO TUY RFUDLIC 8202 AU Office of the Chief BP0 301

c/oPostmasterSan Zbncisco, Celif150806 Jan 195103?Fw IOV_c A1sopT'or flcticel ir Su3Tort -----____-...-__--L-~__-

1. IYirdose,- TO provi.de AG Personnel with ROK tactice units the standard procEFi!ure 1;iceieir support end to 7xovid.e ssist- or reaues~


43/66

5, attache&

(.'lSt;Jt

(3) To whom aircreft ia ta rebort (TAW - Moequito). (4) Whether or not !?ACP d/or Mosquito will control.

C. Mosquito Rircrtift rln ften 0btRin tRcticR1 abcreft by request- fiirectly rom Vosquito contra; Fq. Tactiml Proceflurea v._ -_ _.-_.._!_.___.PR. ThPs will be kent 8s close RS noseihl to cu$2-ent ront linss

Txtrsct if 5th .hir orce SOD for Tecticd Air Control "firtie is for infomE$ion Rnir rlrt~ncs.

Ehm MATTIE 07 'inf Cil1ef f %aff

h%

Inclosure #9 2


44/66

- UNCLASSI FI EDUKJTED!%'ATES i!ti.ITARYADW%RY GROUPTO IRE REPUBLIC F KC!FGA8202d AtrOffice of the ChiefAPO 301

c/O Postmaster San Francisco, alif 1March 1951

SUBJECT: Tactical .r Caordinatw (Airborng)

TO: See Mstribution

1. Reference s mada to *sanding perating rocedure unber 5-26, Headquarters5th bir Force, dated 26 Jacuary 551, attached s inclosure nunberl. 2. Reference OP is forwarded or your informatigl nd guidance n conduct f future operations.

BY CCMMAXD F BRIGADIER ENZRAL ARRELkt

1 Incl: _*Lxi~k&vc5th AF SOP, No. 55-26 1st Lt. -+iGCtd 26 Jan 51 Actg d*djutant eneral (True cy)

Inclosure !LO CLASSI FI ED '


45/66

HQFIFTRUIR FCRCZ 5A.F tanding @erating) APO 970 Procedure OPRRATIOKS 26 January 951 NO. 55-26:) Standing paating Procedure or Tactical ir Coordinator Airborne)

1; loss - To prescribe he functions, uties and procedures f Tat-tical dir Cmznators (Airbarns).2. @nsr&_ - To obtain aximum ffectimness rom tactical ir power and eliminate he possibj.lity troops, at- f inflicting amage on friendly tical &r Coordinatcrs +ijrScrne) prmided to control nd coordi-na+& reattacks f tactical irczeft n the vicinity f the frorlt ines, Rd to main-tain other tact&i air ocmtrol. as directed y the Joint OpersMons Center.These instructions pplyto those Fifth &r Force units actively ngsged inairborne ontrol f ta::ticaifrcraft. 3. ReouSremg&g- Each Tactical oordinator Airborne) eam will con- sist of:

a. Personnel- One pilot and one observer @my Officer f available.)b. Equipent - An aircraft aving eciprocatingngine, ull visi- bility, andem eats, apable f' ong end~rrnnce, reduced pead and equippedndwith VHF ccmmunications, rockets, nd an external uel tank, dentification

4. Resnonsibili$y- the Tactical ir Coordinata (Air- hile airbclrns, bmne) willbe responsible the i'ivision o Air Liaison fficer ALO) hrough the Division actic;@1r Control arty {TACT) n whose area operationsare being conducted, Targets ill not be attacked nside he 'on53 ine uniess both the T&P end the Taztictil& Coordiaatul*dSrbarne) TAG) gree on the identity, "Rere oubt exists on the part of either he TsCP or the TAC, the target ill not be attacked, 5: &nctions_- The functions f a Tactics1 FT Coordinator Airborne)controllingand coordinating lose support trikes enerally nclude:

a0 Receiving nd evaluatingarget locations or air strikes runthe ground ontrollers.b, Searching or targets f opportunity, o include pecified oute and area reconnaissance,nd directing sctica1 frcraf% n such targets. co Advising the TXP and/or ivision LO of all observed osations,activity,. positions,inrrtsllat?.ons, and move-oncentraY_ons, disposltfons, ments of the enemy io his area of responsibility.

Reportingthe results f controlled trikes o the TACP end/or heDivision ,io.e. Performing pecial issions S directed y the Joint Operations Center (JOG); uch as, cclumn mer, identifyingand locating riendly lements,monitoring nd relaying essages o the Tactical ir Cartroi enter (T&C), assisting nd guiding owned crews end escaped risoners f War (P!Vs).

UNCLASSI FI ED- ~ ~


46/66

. j UNCLASSI FI ED6. Procedure- a* Tactical ir Coordinators Airborne)will be assigned all si;nFas follows: the name of the T&P preceded y the word Wosqulto;"a .secondircraft o the same TBCP will use the same call sign with word "Special" dded. &ample: l'Mosquitoobalt", nd Mosquito Colbalt pecial.)

b. TX% are assigned aily y the Fifth Air Force Operations Order to operate n designa%d area ar in the vM.ntLty f the front line with a TACP. These stations ill be nai.ntafned esignated continuously between he hours indicated n the Operations rder y relieving n station unlessotherwise specified. c* ,J%on epar%irg rom their cme base, all Ti,C's ill report to the TACC giving irl;3~neimes and ~~sigaad TI:GP's. n the vicitity f their assigned !ivi.Eionrtiepach TAC will reportin to the Evislon TACP for tar-get icfarmation & Iratr:l.c:i;i.obs~ 5is KtlLston Rf2 will normally esignatea Forward AC;P JT' ar3a to raconnciter, fter reporting n to the Forward n TSZ, the T&2 d.17, rhnt h'a33l.fn re:istlsno friandly nd enemy posittonsand ccumxence imr:leS sear;+ ar tare 5s. ShouLd tarGt.s e unuvsilable n atein the vicinity f Y_S frofl t: i i~c 8e3~0~, t he TAC wi:!l ecoanoiterplannedroutes and areas epo?ting ack pric&osrlYg to the Forward ACP ar continued

control f strikes &net close sumort ta2:getsod. An altitude ill be flown conducive o sesrching nd making e- tailed observations. peoip.1.ffi>rtei_ilb3 mad3 to detect amoufleg3d objects. The resulting ar+ infcrmeticnwiil 1~e aszed o the Forward T&P or, if eppli_zahi3F T4FDo %be Div:',.sion The 'MC till corxxlt ith these control13rs oncsrningthe .M.tebil.i~y rd 9&93~5_on f targets orpossible ir action. ?'!~axafi cm d app Cp4.c te targef;s fcr air attack illbe designated y reference o the Universal ransverse ercator rid used bytactical ircraft nd TAC;Fs,e. Tacticsi lights eport in to the Mvi&.on TACP and/or he For-ward TACP who may a zign hem o the contrcl f a TAG. After visual ontaot

has been established i$h the tactical ircrst't,he TAG wiil pass to them the following nformation:an accurate escription nd iden%iffcetion f the target, ts.locatLon nd/or osition el,aS_veo.pominen+ andmerkc, ny potential arget azards nd any other srtimnt irfcrmation. ?ne=ver riend-ly troops are in tie immed!,ate roxirity f the tergat area, the TAG will al-ways infzm the tactiaal ircraft ccor.?ingly, n required, or targetidentificaticn,&e TAG wiii l3ad the tactical ircraft o the target singrockets hen available o pinpoint ts location.

f. A TAG will not cell tactical lLghts o its area which havebeenassigned o other reas. However,should fl.i&t e unable o contactwedesignated orward ir controLler, TAC operating n anothar rea awareof this fact may assume ontrol f the flight to attack mmediate argets favailable.g, Each TAG will check ut with his IXvision ACP giving the ol-lowing information: esliitsf the controlled trikes, nemy disposition ndmovements, nd condition f T&P radio.


47/66

wmmunicetione.

QFFICIAL: /s/James L. O'Corlnor/t/JAMES . O'slx~ Major, USAF Adjutant e~el~~12

15 - ea Ftr ?g 1;; -$&L TAC Eq 20 - 5AF (Operations) 10 - 6160th M xg10 - 3l4th Air Div12 - CCMNAVFE1: - 1 MAw FEAF?O - 6347th TAC Sq15 - ea Bmr Yg10 - 5Cad TAG GP5 - 6146th u;

..-._


48/66

Inclto Operation33P fm TacticalAir Support.Following s extracted rcm 5th AF Regulations unber 5-5 for information and guidance f KMAG Advisors.

sop for TACTIC& CONTROL ARTIES (TACP~ SECTICH

Introduction 1. PWDO8e - To provide consolidated anual of instructions efining the responsibilitiesnd duties of Tactical ir Control arties, o prescribeoperational rocedures or close suppmt missions and to clarify CUB of the problems ncountered hen embarking pon field duty with army unitso 2. General- The Tactical ir Control arty is an operations cmbat eamthat by use of voice radio aontrols ircraft ngaged in close supFt of groundforces who are in contact ith the enemy. Each team is attached irectly o aCorps, ivision, r regiment nd acccmpanies hat unit ciherevert goes. Thisassignmentmay be changed y the nir Liaison fficer ho has oprational con+ fro1 of the TACP, when tactical equirements o dictate. 3. Graanization- The commander ; the TACP is the Forward ir Controlle(FAC)td10 td i i be a pilot who has had ccmbat xperience n close support nthis theater, Each team will e organizedas follows:

PERSONAL EGDIPMENT One (1) Forward ir Controller FAC) Two (2) VRC-1 Radio Jeeps ith Om (1)SCR-522and 0~ (1) SCR-191 ach.Ons (1) Radio echanic (648) or(V54) One (1) spare 93-522. One (1) Radio Operator 766) ~4: 776) One (1)Remote system or SCR-522.

one (1)personnel arrier eep. One (1)AN/TRC-7, ortable HF radio.

4. Tour of Duty - The Forward ir Controller s furnished n a rotationalbasis by an active ombat ing nd dusing is period of duty in the field e ..will be on TDY cr DS to the TAC Squadron.MormaXQ, but not alnays, e willbe relieved y a pilot from his ol*vnroup and squadron o his parent organiza-tion. Airmen orew members re selected rom a TACP pool of men who are perma-nently ssigned o the detachment, nd axe rotated ith the FAC, SCTION II

SOP for Tactical ir Control arties 5. Dutieq 'IbeTACP in the field ill be under the operational ontrol of the Army Air Liaison E'ficer. n his area of responsibilityhe FAC will maintain ognizance f tarpts and their riority s dets.rminedy the Mvi- sion or Corps Advise or his representative. I


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6. &3snonsibilitv.The AC will determina he extent of damage onaby our aircraft nd maintain retard n the daily log. This inform&bwill also be reported o the Air Lhaison fficer y High Frequency adio QPtelephone.He will maintain journal f daily events to include: callsigns of flights orki& end times in the area; results f attacks; ailureof ccmununicetions;mements of the T&P; pertinent emarks. The journalwill be forwarded y him to the Director f Liaison, eadquarters, ifth irForce on Wednesdays.7. Tactic& Procedure a, In selecting site to operate he [email protected] given to the limitations f the equipment. The VHFradios operate n the %.na of sightn rinciple herefore, n so far as prac-tical they should e iocated here there is least obstruction ran terrainfeatures n crder hat transmissionsetxeen ircraft nd controller ay ob-tain maximum oss.2'itlcmg3. The SC-191 opertites. the high frequency andn and is not serfons3.yaRpred by terrain eatures, owver it has very low- out and awhip an+&nna s mer!.y laays scessary o obtain ange. One furtherprecaution;Do not operaba he transmitter nless he engine generator s

,,a.nltterperating,as the tram'- draws igh wattage and will discharge fullycharged attery n a few seconds. b. When be ia F;"oparedo oprate the controller ust keep a current

list of targets arked on his map and continually valuate hem in order oadvise s to their suitabiiity ith reference o the weapons hat he will haveavailable.He must constantly lan in his mind just how he will describe achtarget nd how he will direct is aircraft ga3.nstt so that when his planesreport n stating heir armament oad,and the final target election s made,his dirkctions ill be prompt and as brief as clarity ill permit. He shouldanticipatethe arrival f his scheduled lights nd be monitoring he "'reparting" frequency. Monitorjng he reporting reqlancy s very important n arderthat the flight eader ay obtair rompt nattuctions. hen the controller sWorking a flight, e sh0Ql.dove his radio operator isteningn on the spareequipment, f available, r on the AE/TRC-7, n order that he can inform thecontroller ien a flight alls in far instzucti0as. The, ontroller an switahfrequencies unentarily o give a "stand y:' r direct he flight ack to thenext higher controller. ven when there re no targets t is impcrtant oA m@nitor the "reporting" et in order o be able to redirect ircraft rcanptly

c* After the target as been described t will be initially ocatedby reference o UIM Grid Coordinates. s the aircraft egin their attack, e must carefully crutinize he final approach, iving continuous irections with reference o prominent andmarks nd if it ap.pzarshat the wrong target will be structk, e must call off the attack? It may be n3cessar-y n somecases to require dry run, and in many cases the mosquito ircraft ust becalled pon to assist n finding he target or to point the way, Army Liaisontype aircraft L-5) (L-17) ill not be used for controlling ur planes xceptunder ery exceptional onditicns nd when such cases o occur,he circun-stances ill be reported o the ALO who will make a report to this headquarterThe Forward ir Controller ust be an AI? ilot thoroughly amilicr ith ouraircraft. The liaison iiots are not adapt in ovr procedures, re not fami-liar with cunacnicationsroblems,and in their enthusiasm ave been known to s.call aircraft ww from a vital targef o attack a less lucrative ne selectedby the liaison bserver.Homver, their rcdiced dvice s valuable o thearmy and is used extensively y them in target election. The army when re-quested, ill assist n marking argets y smoke, nd friendly roops y panela


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,

d. The reasons for being prctnpt nd con&iSe are apparent when it isrealized that the f3.ghter, articularly a jet is, imited in ehdurence. He hasonly a short time to stay in the area before it becomes necessary to return tohis base. If he begins to run lov on fuel his w@k becomes hasty and hapha-zard with resulting inaccuracy against the emmy. Then, to, wasting time overthe target is inefficient use of the aircraft, adds extra, tiring time to thePilots flying, and keeps him unnecessarily long circling at low altitude wherehe is a cripple for light flfik nd hostile fighters. Xhen it is necessary tohave aircraft circle to keep the enemy pinned, that type of mission will hevebeen requested instead of close support. Our present VW-l's are equippedwith the SCR-522 radio which permits 4 radio channels only for voice canmuni-cations. This is an additional reason fcr stressing brevity and clear instruc-tions. No unnecessary chatter should take place, such as long congratulstory or abusive messages or inquiries about the boys back in the group.

8. Ccmmunice&ions - Communications frequencies will be established by--.-FAF COI, ---Fr he CdL will also establish call signs, voice and 071, or each army unit, these tail signs to be assumed by the TACP assigned. 9. Mainten.a_nc? The condition of automotive and radioequipment de-ab termines whether a TACP can operate. The automotive equinment must be well

maintained (the jeep engine provides power for the radio) and ready to move immediately when the Command Post moves. Field maintenance ~5.11 e difficult and many hours must be spent on it. Ercrusted mud must be removed and vehicleswashed to allow lubrication and inspection for defects. The army regiments or divisions, although not required to do so, will assist on maintenance and repair and will supply such parts as tires, spark plugs, and batteries, but for the most part, needed supplies must be procured thru the Air Liaison Offi- cer. b. Operative radio equipment is vital. Mechanics must be thoroughly qualified to install the radios, align frequencies, change tubes, trace cir-cuits, and ma& other minor repairs. He must have a frequency meter and othertools for performing these functions as the frequencies will nearly always go

out of alignment after driving the AN/VRC-1 even for a short distance* Drivingthe jeep over roqh terrain may also cause internal damage. It is thereforeexceedingly important that the equiument be moved only when it is mandatory tomove it and never purely for personal. onveniences. A small stock of sparesshould be kept on hand and when new sets are required, the sir Liaison Officerwill arrange to have this equipment brought by an L-5.10. Summary - The responsibilities of the TAG3 cannot be over-stressed,The success of one mission may result in the winning of important objectives;its failure mayresult in the loss of important positions and in the unnecessaryloss of many lives. Constant vigilance, patience, endurance, initiative andcourage are necessary to insure the successof our mission in close support.


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1. Functions of YFAG G-4 Section,The functions of tha KMAG G-4 Section are: a. To keep Chief KMAG


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4. nptpilei!Instrvcti(~~ls-.A- ---_' The P-4 field rdvisor is charse? with the following major funotione:

e,, To pre!pc?rp logistic resorts for submission to ~qkly ywio?.icKMAG hsadouarters.f. To afivise, oori?ir*te, nd su9srvise measures for enforcement of supply discinilzle. G* To advise, coor?ir*ix, RIX? uT)ervise, n coord$wtion withTechnical Services pnc! -.7 $?7iF3rs, -3 ~~i~i_q~nsntf loeistlcal suwort units, inclufiingShe fir~ftin:: f ~!~i2iitr~ptiw r,rZsrs, h. To R8visa, ir, oorfiiwti9n 1631 othw- w3visow sections, lopis- ticnl noZicfns pnd t)rocofiums; II? q z?u~~~rvis~ heir imnlemsntation,

5. Fints to C-4 AClpisors.I-_ ..... _. _a. GenQral:-_-


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(6)

(7)03)

3. CoorrJinfit,ion:(1)-- --

qf the snnmy can+R rI_irectearingtha aaunt of vour.

(?I Bossible chznges

(3)

(41

(5)

3


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(6) Coordinate with the m Advisor of the suunortirq ser-vice unit. Freauently he has trucks under his control which he may use to eliminate bottlenecks in ammunition resupply. Keen informed of the POL levels and keeo the C-3 informed of this matter. (7) Maintain close liaison with G-3 and insura proper

security for sqqorting installations. (8) On attachment of ROT units to u. s. units,s$tablis?V_i~h_contact with thn, -4 of the U.S. unit without delay,(9) In airdrouarequests, comalg'with normal airdrop procedure nrescribed in K%G Administrative SOP.

C. %~x~ly Disciuline. The pro>er a&ministration, safezuarding, accounting, renort-inp, and maintenance of sup3iies rests in ir.rge easures uuon the impetus of the. XAG G4. Property arod'i, cared for, Tronerly used and e o.?OT)ATl:Vpriodically maintainad. Advisors must encourap? Korean counteruarts tocause frequent insnections of clothing, eauinment, an3 suu~liss. Repairand reissue, in lieu of renlacemant, must 3e the rule.

6. Sunply References.?( Lstter, WAG, Subject: Administrative ?tanding_ noratincrProcedure, currently being revised,b. Ordnance Section, PA Adm___ n 1 s t r a. lve._. -.- -._I s~~n_r?ln~__~~_r_~~~~_~_~~~-ceil.ure dtd. 6 Aug 1950.c. Lsttsr, PEAG, Subject: Mnintsnanoe and. vacuat_ion f Or+ nance Materiel, dtd 17 Se? 1950, d. Current Latter, YVAG, Subject: Ammunition Surly, QOFA,dtd 7 Fab 19s.e, Letter, TNQLG,Subject: b%inted~nce and Sunply DisciqlineWith Relation to Ordnance Materiel-.._L__ _ -_-A __.___9 dtd 27 Feb 1951. --f; Letter, YMAG, Subject: Ammunition Used for Stina.1 urnosos _ --._____-_----.__-'-With Launching Dtlvices, td 20 ?eb 1951. B. Memo, KMAG, To All AA.visors n~ch$lo__ns o!sfntenancz, dtd. 29 Nov 1350.

4


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PDVISORrS FTAFD3OOK~_1..._..-....______.-_.__

1. The functions of the K?JAG i al S.?ction re:a. To .dvis? Chief KYAG find taff on sizzirl atters.3. To plan an5 suprvise si+znal raptions, includ.tiP;

(1) InstellRtion, operation, Rnd. RintenRnce of the signal systex (2) Photoxrwhlc S?rvic*S, (3) *sw.tion of sLgnd maintnnanc9 and rTair facilities. (4) Tecbicai inmection of signd eauimsnt an8 orcaniza- tiona'l aintsnanw of such equipment,

c. To exercise operational control of the signal section. d. To OperRte a Sigm31 6Umlp agency.9. To make reconmsnddi~ns for procurement 2nd employment of

siFtT_al troops pn.8 heir allotmant to su?or?inate units. 2. KYAG (US) C?rpPnizEtion__._-_ _.a*_~__~_.

a. The Gpnior Advisor, Signel is Sknal Officer of PI'IAGnd a6 a mem??er f the 6TlQCiP1 str?ff f the fiiaf, WAG, is fesTonsi.ble or +he RCCOE!771iSh?9nt of $hs KMAG 6iz&d mission,

%. The Siznel Officer util_izps he oreanizwtion shown in thePMAG Sign=11 ommuniantions &qctionpl Chart (Incl, -#l) nd %he ?XXS FZaaioNets Chart (Incl 92) to flischar~e is r~sr)onsibilities~t? . CORPS A?rD IVIS'iOF Ef11304.S. t dvi~ory heaflqu~rtsra f Cor'96I_ _-___-_-.._-_ _-. ____.._1-_' Rnd Divisiona the Si?nal &+vi~or; in nfiiiition o his Puties as Signal Ad-visor, his the ac?Pitiond ijuty f Simal Officer on thq stnff of the SeniorA&isor. These &tins aret

a. To kee? the Senior &visor currently inform4 of ths status of the KMAG comrzxnlcations t his unit h%-d.quarters.

h. To ndvise the Senior Advinor and his Rdvisory stnff on sigw!lmatters.c. To recomm?nP ~2~6 of sisal com?unicotion ?u-d.ocation of oommand pO6t6 to th_, enior Afivisor. h. To supc?rYisf? h- inatPll?tion, naintsnxxs end. nsration of the RNAG sipd system Rt ths unit heRdaunrtnrs.


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--

P.. Every effort will be exerted to mainbin communice.tionetwenty-four hours a dey. DurinP the movemant qf d.ivisirjnommand no&$continuous onerstion mry 5~ im9rncticehle Secr?use0nl.y9ne redio set (SC?-1%) iS iSSUei! to thm Pivfsbn siirnpldetachment. The radio set shquld 1emoved to predesignet?d_nointa on 19nc moves in order to 0Den u? tsnnor~rflg.b. When the commnd nest moves, ind.icptethe general desired-lo-cation of the future comaand post pnd request the Sienel Advisor's recom-mendctions on conmunicrticns. Adeoueto edvence notice to the Signal AdvisorPrior tc the move will im>rovF!signal communications during movements.. TheSenior Advisor will notify the Chief 73jA.Gf the neriod af time the stationwill ?IPoff the Rir.c. ?k+?nnrncticable com!unicetions should ha in operation in the new commend post ?fore the commend pour, fiisrlaces. This will ?e accom-plished by the ltjumnnethod'fwhere two rbdib sets sre assigned to the unib. n. All Messiahs should F,ccleared, or relnyed to the new com-

mend post, before P station is closer! dmwn for P move to a new looetion. 5. WZSSAG?!DXI,i+P:If pn out.33ingmesseee is not cleared ?romntly (maximum delay four hours) the writer will >e notifie* %y the communicn-tions center. When traffic cqnfrsstiQnoccurs the senior advisor will con-sult with his signal officer tr,nscsrtein thl status of nrecedence of mess-eges. Failure tq do this mny result in traffic, which the senior edvisor ureently desires ta be trensmitted, Seine held u? by nssn~~es of higher, prec(?dence,incoming and outgolag. S;. XTSSAGE WLAYS - %smnle.&gsF_sJ?..nd

to 3ne or several of the following CPUSPS.

P%. Cous9s: Messege ae1FLysmsy b9 e.ttri%utei!

(1) -0vercl~ssific~tionin the category of qrscedence,. (2) The limitation qf the &20? cinher device,

POT"j: A hunilre?groun (word) messp~r3rnauires e3out two hours from the tins it is received in plain text ?~ythe 10~1 crpto sectbn until it is re-ceived 7ni'svniln519 for Aelivery in plsin text et the distant crynto section. (3) At Division (with rnsnect tr,FIhigher hesdausrters):

4R.) The limitntbn innessd.)?yminimti onoretion ner-sonnql, tacet)lerwith the iknl ,jcbassignments(rzAi(3onerrtor snd cry-W3 clerk).(3) The necessrrily prescrl\ed signnl standing onerat-ing l3rscedure: Tmt, in resyect to messe,?esof qua.1precedence clessificetion, the station zt the higherheadausrtsrs trnnsmits its messace 3efore the lowerhePdauRrt_rs transmits.Annex 95' 2


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x

b. ~xa.ml: Recently m imnortmt nessaEe sipped at a divi-sion a'Sout 300 hm& WPS not trmemitted by 0830 hmrw ths follo%ina day.Check disclosed. thRt seven incminc ~OSSRBW., of between 700 an+ 800code eroum , were received from t'hn iphmr hsad.c+prtcrF uring the period;that only'onp of the two o~e:r-ziorscrgato men) was en ilutg; hat the mmon duty imnedfately be,gn decinherbg the inconing mess~ge5 after theirreceint (such nction was nropr 'b+c;nasef their cfnssificetion); Chatthese messages Secausi: f their length were not~dscinhm~?? >y 0830 hoursof "the following d~v" nca~;io:leci. awve; - That tkle riter was not notified. in accardznce with the ru';~? in m~agrznki 5, above - of this de- ention& lay; ani! hat the irr,portant en-ubgoing .m?ssag~ ad not besn comletaly ciphered F)t 830 hours of "the folllowing q"_~enfionnd r?ovs.

C. Conclusion: correc.tivP-._-_.___-_.It is believed. hat the seveml : mensures necessary in the above exmmle are mmrent. The sxmmle is cited in the hoTe of ninimSzing such occurrences.

2 Incls:

Annex #53

-


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KMAG SIGNAL COMPUNICATIONS

FUidCTIObJALHKRT

f-_..-- - ..--.-.-- . - _. _

-1I Senior Advisor Sipal fSignal Officer KlJQG iIh Fh0tL.o jI ,-.-__.,.Jw.... _, -_.-..L KXAG Corimunications O.ffi32r --l'fL--m. .4

ra.de..e_ _WI_-_._L _ -- r------YI1 AdminTstration 1 Operst.dmL ----_...-.- _-_I
http:///reader/full/r%E4%A1%AEde.http:///reader/full/r%E4%A1%AEde.


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KNA_G RADIO PPS.~__._~--_

Note a.

BrlTTAT:IO,dbVI=RS AIR-GXWND LIAISON Note a, - Radio te,ams rom the KMflG ignal section are assi.g;iedt KMAG Head-quarters and lower echelons to FncLlde division headquarters, Teamsat Corps include red-Lo perators, crypt0 perscL.;lel.and,hei: he a radio repairrrtll vailability of personnel _oermi.ts, and powerman. Teams at division level are usually limited to one radio operator who also performs crypt0 functions. Incl #2
http:///reader/full/_oermi.tshttp:///reader/full/_oermi.ts


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UNITTD STAT% MSLIT_G?Y DVISOW GSOIP TO TW RTWIC OF PCR7A 8;?02? U Office of the Chief APO 701 c/o?cslx?!.ssterSan Franciscor Salif 20 Decsm7?fi? 950

1. ,me conilitionp nbar which fielii r%isc!ry ~sonn~l of this croupserve are varid, In ~orna itu3tionsl rist;,ncqs anr! Rctica1 conditions makeit relatively sir2nlr cr ths Director of ';CLn,niJro satisfy r?ll nauirEm?nts of th? fiel? a$_visory ~~~~:c~i~~?ts, n otl;+r ituati~7ns, tistances, ack of communications, anfi '?? ~,rctS. it f92sih19 %t togi situation rn~\kn 8ifficul.tsupply fioIF installa ;l~ns, Ddc?r stdi oth.lr ircumstances, pistances orthe tactical sitwtiqn mkt-! it innrssihle f(\r he Dirnc$bQr f Surj-dy q fur-nish logistical sunport, In this ca.sn, npcial firranp::nnts ust % l&e forthe sup?ly of fielr! fivisory tacbe~ts,, Genlr&ly thpss ~etac~lnontswill?e attache? to US units for lod.s*.ical U~GT~, 7!';:lnn areuch arrsngeaents necessary, separate instructions trill i: issud '?y his headquarters.

3 : the Birnctor of Sun?;-' ill requisition,,. G3RRAL I? generpLl,l, m-ceive, star- 7,) ins to all. nmm%rs or units of thqn+ issue 011 classps qf su-031 group. It is the resnonsi?ility off he seniQr advisor of each field a?visorg detachment to insure th.? ollowing: P,. That all TJS ercome assicmed or attached to his fletachment re properly sup~lisfl. 3. That there is no misuse, waste, or 8ccumulPtion of axcess su~01ipsin his detachment.c. That informal rocors?s f ~11 non-exoFnflnFle roperty in his de- tackTent nre m&ibtained.

7 COPPS STCTIOV:. SUPPLYa. ORPA%TI?ATI@P. '3mnly sections RS list?fi elow are hpre'l?yutho-rizecl or eech Corps zs an ad.+ition c, he stnff of the senior pbisor. These units w-ill eal ilirsctly ith the 3irector of Sundy on surely technical matters. It must ?-JOlearly understood, however, th_e.thq RFL! ot an inteaal part of the Director of Sunnly organization hut are a psrt of tkle taff of the

senior aevisor, 1 1, eut ernnt -- Su-~nlv fficer1 set l/cl -- Sur3ly %TCO

(1) gJF)TLY ?IC73: The COFX Su~nly Officer is resnqnsi?lefor the proper oneratiQn of the Car-Js upqly section. Yewill assist the senior,advisor on all m&tars prtaining&pen? ix #1 1
mailto:ORPA%TI?ATI@Pmailto:ORPA%TI?ATI@P


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t0 SUpply of US nersonnel, Ve is resnonsFle that infor-mal recorf is qf all non-emendable property in the Cerpsare maintainer'. UP will con?ly with procetires an? sche-duals as outline? 5y his sunplying apency.(2) SUPPLY VCO: The S?~ply 'JCO'will fiit n? consolidate re-quests from Soms units and nersonnel, HP will receive,store, ancl ssue su3131ips, aintain recor?s, and uerform

additional duties as mRy ?a required,

a. OS", k~TI~~I OP* Th. ? Senior APvisor is resoonsi>le for compliance-.--&d with procedures an? schefltiae rescri%c! herein. Ye may aanoint a Suunly Officer or a Supnlg ?TCO c assist him in mentin? this rssnqnsi7-ilitv. ue will us o assigned personnel for this uurTr)se nd such duties will constitute an additional duty for personnr?l o apuointed.

a. T",o ?rsic nit for su~Jy numosss is tha division advisoryPetachment. PPers3nnql ssiznsr! r attache3 tn divisions will requisitionweekly on the r?ivision dvisory ilrtadhmsnt usUlv O"ficnr or "X0, T:?s ivi-.Officer or XC0 will su%~it &.e co>y of his requisition to the Cor?s Sunnly Officer (or appropriate sunply azency, in the case qf divisions not attached to a ROR Corps), retaining one copy for his own use in issuinir tems when received..

-b The Crrns %Dply ; fficer will nranare his requisition for thepersonnelLLssigned_or attached to the Corbs Advisory Detechment in the mannerd.escri?ed 3ove. Iip ill then consolidate that requisition with those sut-mjtted hy the Suuply Officers of the attached Division Advisory Detachments.The final consolidation will he submitted to the aeency sunnlyinz ths Corpsas a formal requisition. Ore copy of the requisition will \e retained hythe Corps Supply Officer for his use in making issue of sunulies received,

a, Units based on an agency other than IWAG for supply will comply with schedules and nrocec'ures s diractnd hy the sunuortinc agency. 3. Tha followinP nroceciure s urcscri?ed. or units C~~efl YMAGnfor supply:

(1) Requests will 30 consolidated weQkly ky Corps, Se-aarate Division, Senarate ?eEimnnts, Pnd other senarata units anfi forwardad, ATT??: Director of Supuly, so as to reach this headquarters on or Yefore Tussr?ay. Sunnlies will Ye ready for issUe at the Director of Supnly warehouse on Friday of the same week.

Appendix #l' 2


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._.

(4) Bonafide enercencles will Ye processed at any time. 7. AUT'VORI%_ L~3",T..~_:~ fol.lowiw ere the e.Ilthor!ed levels of sup-ply and will not ,e ezx&ed vifhO'c?t annrou'a'irjscif3.c from this headauartera:

a. Class I (P.a';ionsj cr 'rBtr. ,ne ay .- '!A(' ratbns, fiftoerr (i5T gagscondiments, one "OFaraki3ne'l or rC~~racionsj for 75s ofy 'Irations,- (5 in 1A--- troops served. b. Class II (Cicthke and. aui?xej - seven (7) days. c_ Class oil nnir icihr:cztts for motor vehicles) II (Tst;roieu?m, -one (1) day.

OT?ICIAL:


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UNITED STATES MTLITARY .aDVISQKY ROUP TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 8202d AU Offioe of the Chief APO 301 o/o Postmaster San Franoisoo, Calif KIGGCG 350.05 2 February 1951

SUBJECT: Suggestions for Unit Advisors

TO: Field Advisors .

1. The attaohed memorandum is fcfivarded or the infcrmati_on nd guidanoe of personnel concerned. 2. The oontents shouid be oarefully read and osnsidered by all field

advisors. They are the ocmments of a veteran advisor with both prewar and war experienoa. These suggestions should not be oonsidered as solutions to all the problems ,Jonfronting dvisors. flowever hey illustrate prinaiples that have been applied with exoellent results. 3. Partioular attention should be direoted ta the oomments regarding leadership, Though field advisors do not exeroise oommand in any sense, an example of leadership may influen;e the Korean cffioers to the extent that an over-all improvement may be effected. 4. The prinoiples outlined in this memorandum should be studied oare-fully and applied whenever and wherever praotioable.

Chief

Appendix #2


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Your function BE an American Advisor with units of the Korean Armyis twofold. First, your mission is to provide your Forean officers withthe Benefits of your Fast military experience. This requiremnnt ?ooe notapply to tact ical operations clone. It anFlies to all phases of militaryoperations such as loeistics, n~rsonnel, trainin?, medical sunnort, &Tend.,your mission is to act as an information Eath=rine acrenrg o that accurate,timely reports on all phases of the military oDeration can 3e forwarder'.through Anerican channels to the Chief ;TtAG. From this informption accuratereports can be prepared and submitted to the Army Commander.h order to perform these twq functions, you must have an und-erstandincof the type of people wtth whom you are wTrkinc. YOU must realize fhat theKorean Army is a new army, +;hs';here is ngt an old esta?lishsc? ystem.

YOU must also rmalize t,kLqthe P;:rnans re very much aware of their in-experience and are 19oki;lg or eood advice. Remamher thqt yc;u re not deal-ing with a group of unin:elligsnt pecpls, On the contrary thny are ex?,remelyintell igent and easily 2~c3-1l*ze 33 difference hetweox ~0~3. ; ,4vice, iq?i:-ferent advice, .and ?a(! ad7,i,ce, ha manner in which you prov+de advice 5r,ycur unit officers is er::r6SI_y mportant. If you give ad-vice in an inc?iffer-ent , lackadaisical macn:+T:, thy wili z.ccept it ad such and react to it inthe same manner. Therefcrt it can he sair? :lat our first .joh, is to stuayYOUr officers, learn to l;nderstand hem, and iend every effort to ecta?lisha spirit of mutual trust, res;)pct, and cooneration. You should consider thelack of experience and training of your >ersonnel a challange rather thanan 03stacle.

YOU must approach the securing of accurate information in much the samemanner as giving advice. You must attempt to develop, a willingness on thepart of your officers to Sring Mxmation to vou. The alternative - todig it out yourself - is uncertain and far too s?_ow. You wil l find it eoodpractice to require cerbin resorts each; ornin< or each week denendinc onthe su?jact and the sitwtion. An S-1 revert each morxing shcwing thestrengths of each unit, and. the number of casualties is invalu&le. In-formation on ?attle casualties can ??e utilized in various wa.ys. First ofall it provides a check on the efficiency of your unit in com3a.t. From thisreport you may note that B Comrany h.as uffered serious casualties in anaction the previous day. Take thisinformption to tha S-3 an8 determinejust what took place. Check with the commadrler oncerned tr, ind out thecircumstances. Often in this way you spcure information that you miahtotherwise have overlooked, Corrective action can then ?e taken immediatelythat may prevent future difficulties, A second use of the S-1 report is todetermine the number of non-?attlc cr.sualti?s.When these are excess?ve,yuu can often make apnroprinte recommendations to the medical officer orunit officers to eliminate the CPUS~ of these losses, $xamQle: l?if teenmen are listed as non-battle casualties. Check with the r+Wmental aifl.station and determine the reason. It may 36 dysentery, frost%ite, or anyof a number of other reasons, in th$s OEG~, let us say frostF\itewas thecause. Immediately Sring this to the attention of the ri letocn lead.ers.Have them conduct foot inspection twice daily, have them suqerviae thechanging of socks, have them nrovide means of drying the mens socks andshoes. Recommend qeriodic massaging of the feet using the hudiry system.Finally go forward yourseif and check the front line nlatcons to 8.etarminewhat is being done. YQU may find thet the casualties are not due to faultyequipment 5ut due to lack of it. This conili t ion can %cF?roucrht o the at-tention of S-4. Necessary action can at least he started to eliminate theshortage. The most im%rtant thing is to show interest and to 8.0 omething constructive. Appendix # 2 1


65/66

There ?re other types of reports thnt you should receive periodically; They will assist you in pilvisinm nit officers properly. They will eid you in rendorine eccurete r"?crts to hich@r heedauertsrs. They include the following: Ammunitix Status Be3oyt_: This is P necessitv! In order to pre- Qent the stockpiling of rmmuniti3n fPr beyond co&at renuirsments you must al~~ev~ e up to fiTto on whzt is on hand. You must nlweys rnmem?er thncapacity of your tr9,nsnortPtionnd keep ycur supnly of emmunition at p. level that cm 11e hnndled.. %cess ive 0uTJl es usunllv must ?e f?estroyed rR?andoned. _%~_g~s_of eapons Re;iort: Ym must r~lweys how much concern Rhout tb_f? some svstem oss of weP?Dons. ?ecq>;meilr! whereby the weapons of cc7suel- ties ;Ire nlv~grer' ~nd emover? r, , afe star,?EG lace for reissue ct :! ater dnte. Constrntly work on mezne of controlling the loss of wee7)ons. You will find this one of ycur CreRtest prohlsms. S-4 Qport: -_I_- This ra?ort ,qt crst once n we+ should shr)~ hr?rtrees of clothing and equi-i:ren.t.. t9?,lish T. str9 of checking all reauisitions for resupply of food, clothin:, PCL, equ_Lzent, etc. In t%is wpy YT.I eep aSreast of the supply situation pnc' liminate wcste pnP ~ov9rClrPwing.

5: V-U cpn best secure this typeof informatinn thraueh "~son;l o?serv~tirn .onP y persone.1 nntsct JudithheS-2 and S-X. Q'tlowhet information vvou ent! T~'rc"n interpreter n? mes-t ion the approprintp staff officer until v7u -?p.thnt information. This in-formetion, coupled brith our p=rsoc~l ohservgtian, will eive vou r? orkingkn7wled;e of the situation pt $3 times. Fers?ne11Q_ conduct - t

Oper::tions_~_~~__I_n_t~~l_l_~~ence__~sn?rt

PI" interroerti9nsinterview civilinns c?,rr.ing hrqurh friendly lines, talk to our personnel who asca.ped. This P,oes ot tnk,? one and the results mqre then justify the effort 2nd time ex-oanded. YOU will note the term "pers?nel ol?servetion" as ?een use?. Assume

th,ot ou are the commsndar of any size unit of the America Army engaged in com%,-lt. W $0 you keep yourself informed? You do so thrauch :: eries of reports from your staff officers, followed hy freauent personel inspections. In your position es Fn rdvisor to P unit-of the Hqrefin rmy the same system applies. These inspections must include both the edainistrstive end tPcticP1 sitmtisn. Dose inspecti,9ns ;rre ssential if you are to PC- comnlish your missinn succ~ssfullv. The folIowinE sucpstions pre offered 3s 13ossi?le nePns f m&ing vnurjoF) n easier r)ne o perform. They may result in greatly imnr?vinp yourstrtus in your unit. over!.th?uzh you are not in a nosition of canmnnd, tr.yto be a leader - set fin xemale for your Qfficers. Yau must \e. neat, cleen,sn~~eoldierly in a3Denrance 8t 2l.I imes no mRtter how irifficult t nily e

to maintain yourself so. R-rneEY9r hat no one respects a sloven. If youfind 8. oundefi olcf.ier him to the rid station in yourrom your unit, t&e jeep. Check the ~?id. tetiqn periodicrllv cqncernina care of the l+lounded. Show an interest in the soldiers ~nil fficers, A-k auestigns c?%ut their clothing. Are they werm enouch? ?o they hF.ve loves or socks? If dis- crepancies are found - do something alout it.

Appendix # 2 2


66/66

Skm c9,nfiirence in your unit. hlva:m trr tQ build Ysprit 3e Corps. DO not evidence fiefeatism r fear in front, of your officers or your interpreters no matter how strQn.:l:iyou EP~ 39 tempteil to do SO. Yx-plain ezticel failurps to :WI~ officers in such a WY that they feel you arc? incerely tr;vine to help them, Do nqt con?.emn them for their failure. Instruct ther so such fr,ilwes c70 ot recur. D9 vat karc:ss hen constantly. %zn Lyou feel forceful cgrrectil-eaction is necessary, stop ani! hink then ;ict i2 such F! ay that you aresure to o?tain results.Be sufficiently awc?re f the situation so that you l7TY vhen ailVj_Oe

is ne9C?eA..Then z3.ve t frcdp. VOX must know enor4Th if he situation?t all times to be capa+le flf iving pt)Vic't. If you I% nqt know, 30 notFive i3r'Yice.The Americ,nnaC1,Vis;r in the fiel?, Or in P hegdOua.rters, Or wh,erPVer

he may !:e is fPcC$ -liln ngq d.if?ia~lti.Ps. Fe solution to some qf these*ifficulties my p??epr imhC:ssitj1R. Rs a rnsult of this feeline, advkorsoften take the 11~~: Of IeAst reeistpnce. T!?is nttitde $oes not fyet thejo? done, To ad: is tn l=t drwn t;:?e ther AC?Visors iz RlAS, ?e?e+erthgt there pre A'sricPn nf:Picsrs nd Tpan s~rrir;;r in 911 levds of theForear, rmy. The77 ?re f;lcec' -,rnl-l~~s Theith the SZITIP thzt ?V_I re.amount of effort exnen(7~?iihy ;TJU C?S ,on id j.x-xfW91to secilre itccurr2tP,timely information will i.nci g;lse the effect.k2zf,ers Of the 2fivis9rs owrat-i3g nc?jacent to you. liack cf effort aa.;y rsuii, -in anecessary Loss of Americnn lives. Th? co&at effscti;ren~Ss of 2 Toreen unit is rlirectly pm-lsorti0n.d tc the efficiency nr,d. nthusiasm of the &iericm aclvisor.

Korean Advisers Handbook1951

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Transcript of Korean Advisers Handbook1951