The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 13 | Issue 41 | Number 1 | Oct 12, 2015

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Komeito’s Soka Gakkai Protesters and Supporters: ReligiousMotivations for Political Activism in Contemporary Japan

Levi McLaughlin

Recently, adherents of the lay religiousorganization Soka Gakkai have taken to thestreets and the Internet to rebuke Komeito, thejunior member of the ruling governmentcoalition and the party founded by SokaGakkai, for abandoning peace advocacy. Thisarticle places the recent protests in historicaland doctrinal context as it introducesperspectives from within Soka Gakkai tocomplicate easy assumptions about adherents’ideology, and it suggests ways to determinehow Soka Gakkai political activism may takeshape in the near future.

Keywords: Komeito, Soka Gakkai, politics,religion, security legislation, Buddhism,SEALDs.

Following a rugby-like scrum in the early hoursof Friday, September 19, Japan opened a newchapter in i ts domest ic pol i t ics andinternational relations.

Opposition Diet members battle in an attempt toprevent Konoide Yoshitada, chair of the Upper Housecommittee on the security legislation, from allowing

a vote to proceed . Photo ava i lab le here(http://ichef.bbci.co.uk/news/624/cpsprodpb/4FF5/production/_85596402_ce87490f-ca6d-47e6-bf0d-abc72fb35559.jpg).

Opposition members in the National Diet’sHouse of Councilors failed to block thecommittee chairman from allowing the vote,which saw the ruling Liberal Democratic Party(LDP) and its coalition partner Komeito gainpassage of eleven new bills. These are referredto collectively as the anzen hogai kanren hōan,or “security-related legislation,” mostcommonly as the anpō hōan, “national securitylegislation,” and by angry opponents as thesensō hōan, or “war legislation.”1 The newsecurity bills put into effect a decision of July 1,2014 by the Cabinet of Prime Minister AbeShinzō that reinterpreted Japan’s 1947Constitution to allow for shūdanteki jieiken, orthe “right of collective self-defense.” Thisreinterpretation allows Japan’s military, theSelf-Defense Forces (SDF), to come to the aidof the United States and other allies underarmed attack, even if Japan itself is notattacked directly.

Proponents of the bills claim that the newlegislation will improve Japan’s security in theface of rising regional frictions. They point outthat Japan, which is now able to integrate itsmilitary intelligence with America, Australia,and other allies thanks to the December 2013Special Secrecy Law – another piece oflegislation that sparked public outcry – is betterequipped through these new laws to cooperatewith military partners by means of seamlesscoordination of SDF operations with alliedforces. Critics regard the new laws as

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unnecessary over-reach by a Prime Ministerwho is eager to push forward revision of ArticleNine of the 1947 Japanese Constitution, the“peace clause” that outlaws war as a means forJapan to resolve international disputes.Opposition to the new legislation inspiredcritics to take to Japan’s streets. The monthsleading up to the September 19 Upper Housevote witnessed some of the largest publicprotests Japan has seen in decades. The largestdemonstration took place on August 30, 2015,when at least 120,000 protestors gathered infront of the National Diet while tens ofthousands o f o thers demons t ra tedsimultaneously at more than 300 otherlocations.2 Street protests have accompaniedoutspoken criticism by public intellectuals andopposition politicians, who argue that theSeptember 2015 bills give the Abe Cabinetexcessive leeway in dispatching Japan’smilitary and fear that Japan will enter a “newnormal” in which Japanese troops serveroutinely in combat overseas – actionprohibited since the end of the Pacific Warseventy years ago. A telephone poll by thenewspaper Asahi shinbun carried outSeptember 12 and 13 revealed that 68% ofrespondents thought the bills were notnecessary for the SDF to defend Japan. Only29% of respondents agreed with the legislation,and 54% were opposed to it.3

Protest organizers and Japan’s mass mediahave taken note of a new group among thedemonstrators: members of Soka Gakkai, thereligion that founded Komeito, the juniorpartner in the governing coalition.4 Over thesummer, Twitter feeds lit up with strikingimages of Soka Gakkai protestors expressingdissent against the political party their ownreligion created. Photos showed theseadherents holding signs emblazoned with SokaGakkai’s distinctive sanshokki, or tri-color flag,and p lacards bear ing s l ogans tha tremonstrated Komeito Diet members forabandoning the party’s, and their religion’s,long-held principles of peace.5 These protestors

are striking to many, for Soka Gakkai membershave earned a reputation for their absoluteloyalty to Komeito and their practice duringevery election to eagerly solicit votes from non-member friends, family, and acquaintances.

Protesters waving Soka Gakkai’s flag outside theNational Diet, August 30, 2015. Video footagea p p e a r s h e r e(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MxfWG5V7VU0&feature=youtu.be).

Soka Gakkai and Komeito are two separateentities, yet in popular understanding they aretypically regarded as one and the same, a wayof thinking that is reinforced by Gakkaielectioneering. Literally the “Value CreationStudy Association,” Soka Gakkai grew from afew thousand members at the beginning of the1950s to claim millions of adherent families inJapan today. This massive surge was driven inpart by the religion’s engagement in electoralpolitics, an activity that intensified when thereligion founded Komeito in 1964. Soka Gakkaivoters now comprise Japan’s most reliablevoting bloc. No other interest group – theconstruction industry, agricultural collectives,teachers’ unions, the Japan Communist Party,or any other constituency – out-mobilizes SokaGakkai when it comes to electoral politics. TheGakkai’s power to elect candidates is feared byits opponents and valued by its allies, and it

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unfailingly makes itself an influential presencein every election at every level, from localmunicipalities up to the Diet. Rock-solid voterdependability has allowed Komeito partyofficials to determine with unmatched accuracyjust when and where to put candidates forwardfor election in the National Diet and at everyother governmental level.6

Since it began operating in coalition with theLiberal Democratic Party in 1999, Komeito hasbeen able to exercise a level of influence that itdid not enjoy in its decades in opposition. Atpresent , i ts 35 seats in the House ofRepresentatives (Lower House) comprise theswing vote for the governing coalition’s super-majority in the National Diet. And while, withonly 55 of the Diet’s total of 722 seats, Komeitomay only rank as the fourth-largest party at thenational level, it wields power beyond itsnumbers. Most significantly, Komeito and LDPpoliticians alike rely on Gakkai voters to retaintheir seats. Komeito has also shaped key piecesof legislation from its position withingovernment. For example, in October 2008,Komeito convinced the cabinet of PrimeMinister Asō Tarō to support a bill providingteigaku kyūfukin (supplementary incomepayment), a fixed disbursement (12,000 yenguaranteed for all, and 18,000 yen for childrenand seniors) for every Japanese citizen; thisbecame law in the spring of 2009.7 In keepingwith this social welfare orientation, Komeitowas also instrumental in securing concessionslimiting the implementation of a consumptiontax hike and the disbursement of another one-time cash infusion to Japanese citizens in 2014,the Abe Cabinet has recently indicated that itwill follow Komeito’s plan when it increases theconsumption tax in 2017.8 And, as discussedbelow, Komeito takes credit for placing limitson the exercise of collective self-defense madepossible by the new security legislation.

Japanese- and English-language media has paidconsiderable attention to Soka Gakkaip ro te s to r s who have j o i ned s t r ee t

demonstrations, circulated petitions, andvoiced their outrage at Komeito’s departurefrom its founding principle of world peace.Images of Soka Gakkai members decryingKomeito appear to confirm a trend in coveragethat traces a near half-century arc from SokaGakkai = Komeito – a carefully researched1967 book by the renowned scholar MurakamiShigeyoshi – to the 2007 declaration of Komeitovs. Soka Gakkai by popular writer and formerprofessor of religion Shimada Hiromi.9

Coverage of the Gakkai protestors combinedwith analyses from outside observers createsthe overall impression of a burgeoningopposition between Soka Gakkai and Komeito.

Here, I provide information that complicatesand even contradicts this impression. Glaringlyabsent in discussions to date of Soka Gakkaireactions to the new legislation are the voicesof ordinary Soka Gakkai members who continueto carry out electioneering on behalf ofKomeito and did not participate in protestsagainst the security bills. Missing also areexplanations for why Soka Gakkai members areso invested in electoral politics in the firstplace, or examinations of how Komeito’sshifting policies reflect complementary changesin the opinions and actions of its grassroots-level Soka Gakkai supporters.

This art icle covers a range of Gakkaiperspectives on the new law as it cautionsagainst concluding that that there may be agroundswell movement of Soka Gakkaiopposition to Komeito. To fill lacunae in theaccount to date, I contrast positions taken bythe Gakkai protestors with opinions voiced bySoka Gakkai adherents I have known over adecade and a half of participant observation asa non-member researcher. The memberaccounts I provide, presented here as examplesfrom what are, in many ways, representativeGakkai participants, differ starkly from thoseexpressed by the Soka Gakkai protestors whohave gained mass media attention and theapprobation of left-leaning commentators.

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While the members I introduce can besummarized as supporters of the new laws,they express a range of sentiments, fromanguish over lost community solidarity tohawkish rejection of the protestors, and thoughthey continue to support the party as itadvances into new policy territory, they are notblind advocates, and instead hold Komeito, andone another, accountable to guiding principles.

In order to understand their principles, as wellas those of Gakkai members who opposeKomeito, one must understand their religiousunderpinnings. To introduce these guidingreligious ideas, I identify ways defenders andcritics of Komeito draw on Soka Gakkai’sdistinctive conflation of modern humanism withthe Buddhism of the medieval JapaneseBuddhist reformer Nichiren (1222-1282) –legacies that merge within the teachings of theGakkai’s undisputed leader, HonoraryPresident Ikeda Daisaku (1928- ). I analyze howthe current conflict over the security legislationfits within the longer history of Soka Gakkai’srise as a lay movement in the immediatepostwar years, and I conclude this article byconsidering what we might expect from Gakkaiactivists in the wake of the protests as I discussthe possibility for changes in Gakkai support ofKomeito in the future.

A Buddhist Language of Rebuke

In mid-July 2015, SEALDs, Student EmergencyAction for Liberal Democracy, a collective ledby young activists who have organized some ofthe largest anti-security legislation protests,10

began retweeting messages from a newinitiative called “SGI Against Fascism,” whichput out an appeal through Twitter for like-minded Gakkai members to take part indemonstrations.11

Ōbai Tōri’s “SGI Against Fascism” Twitter feed,September 13, 2015

These retweets amplified attention to SGIAgainst Fascism, whose organizer goes by thehandle Ōbai Tōri, or “cherry, plum, peach,damson.” This will most likely appear as aquaintly bucolic alias to the average JapaneseTwitter user, yet Gakkai members willrecognize ōbai tōri as a phrase from thewritings of Nichiren, the medieval Buddhistreformer they regard as the source of theirreligious orthodoxy. Soka Gakkai regards itselfas the only true inheritor of Nichiren’s dharma,a claim that has pitched it against rivalNichiren-based sects and placed it in diametricopposition to Nichiren Shōshū, the temple-based Buddhist sect of which Soka Gakkaiformed a lay association until a schism in1991.12 The four-character phrase ōbai tōri isfound in Nichiren’s Ongi kuden [Record of theOrally Transmitted Teachings] as part of hisaffirmation that the eternal Buddha manifestswithin all things in their diversity.13 It is aconcept promoted by Soka Gakkai’s HonoraryPresident Ikeda as a means of accommodatingadherents’ differences and encouraging themto respect one another as they cooperate torea l i ze ningen kakumei , or “humanrevolution.” 1 4

In the days following the appearance of SGIAgainst Fascism, journalists began uploadingblog posts that included photos of Gakkaip r o t e s t o r s w h o w e r e a p p e a r i n g a tdemonstrations with distinctive placards that

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included displays of the sanshokki, the tri-colorflag of Soka Gakkai.15 Gakkai members broughttogether through a Facebook group called SokaGakkaiin dakedo Jimintō ga daikirai na hito,danketsu shimashō – “People who are SokaGakkai members but really hate the LDP, let’sunite!” – appeared at a SEALDs-organizedprotest in the Kansai region of western Japanon July 19 holding signs rebuking Komeitoelected officials for their failings as fellowGakkai adherents.16 One sign demanded Ningenkakumei o yominaose, a call for Komeito Dietmembers to “Re-read The Human Revolution!”,the novelized history of Soka Gakkai thatrecounts the rebuilding of the organizationafter the wartime imprisonment of its secondpresident Toda Jōsei (1900-1958) and the deathin prison of his mentor, first Gakkai presidentMakiguchi Tsunesaburō (1871-1944).

“Komeito Diet members – reread The HumanRevolution!” These photos taken by HashimotoMasato at Kansai-area anti-security legislationdemonstration, July 19, 2015, accessible here(http://ideanews.jp/archives/6324).

Here we can see intra-Gakkai appeals playingout within the public protests, a dramaticrebuke legible only to those steeped in SokaGakkai’s literary oeuvre. Ningen kakumei (TheHuman Revolution) is a twelve-volume roman àclef Gakkai members regard as de factoscripture and an indisputable account of theirfounding presidents’ martyrdom by Japan’smilitary dictators that justifies their belief inSoka Gakkai’s leaders as Nichiren’s soledharma heirs.

Calling on Komeito Diet members to re-readthis text also bears another specific NichirenBuddhist meaning, as it evokes kokka kangyō,or “remonstrating the government,” a practiceenacted when Nichiren rebuked the Kamakura-era military leadership and emulated over thecenturies since then by Nichiren Buddhists.17

Remonstrating the Komeito Diet members wasclearly the order of the day: another sign at thisdemonstration pictured Toda Jōsei’s face nextto the words “No! War!” in English, over aJapanese-language condemnation of Komeitofor destroying its origins as a foundation forpeace. Yet another protestor’s placard was arepurposed campaign poster for Komeito partyleader Yamaguchi Natsuo: The protestor hasadded the condemnation butsubachi, “Buddhist

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penalty,” a severe term for retributivepunishment suffered by one who violatesBuddhist principles, with an arrow pointed atYamaguchi’s face. These Gakkai members thussituated their rebuke of Komeito and itssupport of the new security legislation withinthe grand narrative of Soka Gakkai’s religiousstruggle against corrupt tyranny, and it is clearfrom their protest that they regarded the partytheir religion founded as turning away fromtheir transcendent mission by transforming intothe very worldly corruption they oppose.

Critics become Supporters

The messages broadcast by these protestorsmay have been expressed in the language ofSoka Gakkai insiders, yet their opposition tothe security bills earned them support fromoutsiders. In late July, former Prime MinisterMurayama Tomiichi, now 91 years of age,broke a twenty-year hiatus on speaking atrallies to address protestors outside the Diet.On July 25, during an appearance on a TVTokyo program, he noted with approval that“there are many Soka Gakkai members who area l so worked up [about the secur i tylegislation].”18 The Japan Communist PartySecretary General and Upper House memberYamashita Yoshiki, in an August 3 pressconference, praised “Komeito supporters,” athinly-veiled allusion to Soka Gakkai members,for their opposition and credited them withpossessing the greatest potential to prevent theAbe government from forcing through securitylegislation. He expressed his desire to fostertheir efforts to “pour out their feelings in theprotest movement” (kimochi o shikkari kundaundō o hatten sasetai).19 This entreaty earned asharp riposte from Komeito head Yamaguchi,who used a press conference the following dayto question the Communist leader’s intentionsin co-opting supporters of other parties.20

Calls by Gakkai protestors to revisit SokaGakkai’s foundations resonated with critiqueslaunched by Shimazono Susumu, Professor

Emeritus of religious studies at the Universityof Tokyo and now Professor at SophiaUniversity, where he heads Sophia’s Instituteof Grief Care. After the March 2011 compoundearthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disasters thatdevastated northeast Japan, Shimazono,already well known in academic circles,emerged as a public advocate for religiousengagement in social activism and communityreconstruction, championing such initiatives asthe Japan Religion Coordinating Project forDisaster Relief (Shūkyōsha Saigai ShienRenrakukai) and its related programs. He grewactive on Twitter and through his blogpromoting anti-nuclear mobilization by urgingcoalition with like-minded scientists, scholars inthe humanities, and social welfare activists. Todate, he has attracted more than 13,000Twitter followers, a massive number for aJapanese public intellectual, and in recentmonths his followers have seen him transforminto a strident critic of the new securitylegislation.21

Not a small number of his many recent tweetsand blog posts have pointed out specific waysKomeito has departed from the world peaceplatform promoted by its founder, Soka GakkaiHonorary President Ikeda. As Japan’s mostinfluential scholar of so-called shinshūkyō, or“new religions,” Shimazono is tremendouslyknowledgeable about Soka Gakkai’s doctrineand historical development. In an exercise ofwhat might best be termed “scholarship asadvocacy” – a stance he has also taken in hiswork on religious responses to disaster –Shimazono has been putting this knowledge towork over recent months in exhaustive analysesof Ikeda’s writings on peace, a subject that theGakkai’s Honorary President expounded uponfor decades. Shimazono has pored over Ikeda’sCollected Writings and many of his otherpublications to itemize principles that Komeitoand, by extension, Soka Gakkai, have violatedin their support for the new security bills. Hehas focused in particular on Ikeda’s dialogueswith intellectual luminaries, conversations in

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which the Gakkai’s Honorary Presidentdiscussed the proper role of a Self-DefenseForce and otherwise stressed the importance ofpreserving Article Nine of the Constitution inorder to cultivate an attitude of peace. In ananalysis of Ikeda’s discussions in 1972 and1973 with the famed British historian Arnold J.Toynbee, for instance, Shimazono quotes atlength from Ikeda to note ways the Gakkaileader draws on Jean-Jacques Rousseau andJohn Ruskin to emphasize the need to foster ahumanism-focused political system that rejectswar, a system that encourages citizens toprevent the rise of polities that turn to the useof weapons to resolve disputes or claimterritory.22

Critiques and Rebuttals from Within SokaGakkai and Komeito

A loosely connected network of disgruntledGakkai adherents has continued online and inthe streets to voice their opposition to thesecurity legislation and to change the minds ofKomeito politicians, all of whom also come fromSoka Gakkai. Perhaps the most widelypublicized of the protestors is Amano Tatsushi,a 51-year-old second-generation Gakkaimember in Aichi Prefecture who goes by thehandle Hitori no Gakkaiin (One GakkaiMember) on Twitter and Facebook.23 Amanogarnered national attention after he posted apetition from July 30, sent out via Twitter andother platforms, calling for the withdrawal ofthe bills. He submitted 9,177 signatures inperson to Komeito headquarters in Tokyo onSeptember 11, where his supporter filmed himpolitely handing over the entire printout topersonnel at the facility.24

F r o m t h e H i t o r i n o G a k k a i i n w e b s i t e(https: / /hakushi.amebaownd.com/)

Around the same time, a Yūshi no Kai(Volunteers’ Association) made up ofinstructors and alumni from Soka Universityand Soka Women’s College in Hachiōji, westernTokyo, posted a manifesto that invokes thewords o f Gakkai founder MakiguchiTsunesaburō and Soka University founderIkeda Daisaku as it denounced the newlegislation as counter to Soka Gakkai’shumanistic educational mission.2 5 Theuniversities’ Volunteer Association hascirculated a petition that has gathered close totwo thousand signatures from Gakkai schoolalumni and earned letters of support fromacademics and peace activists overseas,including Johan Galtung, a famed Norwegianpeace studies founder who co-authored a bookwith Ikeda Daisaku titled Choose Peace.26

Both Komeito and Soka Gakkai have respondedto the Gakkai protestors. The party hasproactively engaged its critics, while thereligion’s administrators seek to distance SokaGakkai from the conflict. Komeito officials,most notably Komeito Deputy Chief KitagawaKazuo, defend their support of the securitylegislation on the grounds that the new lawssatisfy what they terms Komeito’s “Three

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Principles” for not violating Article Nine: 1) thelegitimacy under international law ofdispatching Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF),2) the understanding of the Japanese people,and 3) safety of SDF members.27 Because thenew laws require that SDF forces must onlytake part in United Nations-mandated missions,because the laws are passed by elected officialsin the National Diet after debate, and becausethe Prime Minister has issued assurances thatJapanese troops will not be sent into areaswhere their safety is threatened, Komeitoleaders regard the bills as satisfying theirThree Principles, and therefore promote themas responsible as well as realistic measures fordealing with Japan’s security.

Komeito’s security position has shifteddramatically in recent years. In 2012, whenasked whether they favored reinterpreting theconstitution to allow for shūdanteki jieikan, the“right of collective self defense,” 74 percent ofKomeito candidates were opposed, a stance theparty had taken since its founding. By theDecember 2014 House of Representativeselection, after the Abe administration hadproposed reinterpreting the constitution toallow limited participation in collective defense,89 percent of Komeito candidates answeredeither that they approved or generallyapproved of this policy.28 In the spring of 2015,Komeito produced a DVD that explains theparty’s security policy, and since then itspoliticians have made frequent visits to localdistricts to screen it and address constituents’concerns. Individual Komeito Diet membershave made justifications for their support of thelegislation clear in their media releases. Houseof Councilors member Tōyama Kiyohiko, whoreceived a Ph.D. in peace studies from theUniversity of Bradford in the United Kingdom,itemizes reasons why military defense ofJ apan ’ s a l l i e s does no t compr i se areinterpretation of the country’s peaceconstitution, and instead serves to preserve it.29

His senior colleague in the Upper House, UedaIsamu, situates the new laws as a logical

outcome of the sequence of legislation andsecurity guidelines agreed upon by both theLDP-Komeito coalition and the DemocraticParty of Japan that was in power between 2009and 2012. Ueda also states that constituentswith whom he meets tell him that they want tosee a more, not less, proactive role taken byJapan’s Self-Defense Forces, and that thelegislation passed by the Diet was a balancestruck within the coalition.30

The “Soka Academic Community AgainstUnconstitutional Security Bills” site, accessible here(http://sokauniv-nowar-en.strikingly.com/).

It is worth noting that no Komeito politicianlingers on the security laws in promotionalmaterial. Discussion of the legislation is usuallyhidden in their homepages, buried beneathrepeated appeals to other Komeito priorities,such as proposed limits to the consumption taxand related matters of domestic concern. Whenthey do discuss the security laws, Komeito Dietmembers repeatedly stress the importance oftheir party’s mitigating function. In recentelections, Komeito has campaigned on thebyline yotō no naka no yatō, or “the oppositionwithin the government,” emphasizing that,even though they are part of the rulingcoalition, they guide the government toward amoderate course. In elections to come, Komeito

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will potentially calculate passage of the newsecurity laws with the Three Principles in placeinto its “power to actualize” (jitsugenryoku)percentage – that is, the percentage ofobjectives set out in the party manifestos thatKomeito politicians frequently tout on thecampaign trail.31

In the meantime, administrators from SokaGakkai’s Kōhoshitsu (Office of Public Affairs),in press releases and in private correspondenceto me, assert that the protestors are freelyexercising their right to express individualopinions, but that the organization itselfremains mattaku kanchi ga nai, or “absolutelyunconcerned / unconnected.”32 They assert thatthe organization values Diet deliberations andexpress regret that protestors oppose thisestablished democratic process. “It isdeplorable that the three-color flag of ourGakkai is being used in a political manner,” onepublished statement adds.33

Electioneering as Religious Practice

What accounts for Soka Gakkai’s distinctiveconflation of lay Buddhism, modern humanism,and electioneering? In order to understand howSoka Gakkai political activism plays out at thegrassroots level, let us consider this snapshotfrom my ethnographic encounter of a couple ofyears ago. It provides a representative exampleof Soka Gakkai’s electioneering as religiousengagement:34

Tuesday, June 11, 2013, 7:30 p.m., in the homeof a Gakkai adherent in Setagaya Ward, Tokyo.I’m with Iizuka Keitarō, a local Young Men’sDivision leader I’ve known for more than adecade, and we’re with his wife Seika and Mr.Horiuchi, another young man Keitarō isencouraging to join Soka Gakkai. Tonight’sevent is called a daishōri taikai, a “GreatVictory Meeting,” and Keitarō tells me that it isa special meeting of the Young Men’s, YoungWomen’s, Married Women’s, and Men’sDivisions for the local Gakkai Chapter (shibu).

This full range is not represented: other than usthree, there are thirteen Married Women’sDivision members and seven men, four of whomare visiting Gakkai administrators, crowdedinto the downstairs living room of this modesthome, which is dominated by a large woodenBuddhist altar.

A portion of the meeting is devoted to readingHonorary President Ikeda’s interpretation of a1279 letter by Nichiren to his disciple ShijōKingo.35 The letter is titled “The Strategy of theLotus Sutra,” and in it Nichiren quotes ChapterNineteen of the Lotus, writing “all others whobear you enmity or malice will likewise bewiped out,” and concludes by encouraging hisdisciple to persevere in the face of persecution:“a coward cannot have any of his prayersanswered.” The selection of this letter and theother religious practices we engage in at themeeting – chanting portions of the Lotus andrepeating invocations of the daimoku, the Lotustitle iterated as the sacred syllables namu-myōhō-renge-kyō – do indeed take upNichiren’s call to employ the “Strategy of theLotus Sutra,” as they are in service of the GreatV ic tory a t hand : the June 23 TokyoMetropolitan Assembly election.

Official Tokyo Assembly candidate registrationis not to begin until June 14, but Gakkaimembers across Tokyo began mobilizing longbefore this to get out the vote. Tonight is thesecond Great Victory Meeting at this localGakkai leader’s home in two days. All otherlocal Gakkai activities – doctrinal study,soliciting subscriptions for the daily newspaperSeikyō shinbun, and many others – have beenput on hold as every member in Tokyo has beenenjoined to compile a tally of f-tori, “friendgetting,” a vote-gathering tactic thatcircumvents Japan’s prohibition on house-to-house campaigning.36 My friend Keitarō standsand announces that members in his district(chiku) have claimed 140 “friend gets,” or non-members who have asked to vote for Komeito.He has set a goal of 150 for his district, and he

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announces a personal goal to convert his friendHoriuchi to Soka Gakkai. Horiuchi stands andbows, a little self-consciously, to enthusiasticcheers from the Gakkai members who surroundhim.

As is typical in almost every Gakkai meeting,o n c e t h e m a l e l e a d e r s m a k e t h e i rannouncements, the Married Women’s Divisiontakes over. This living room makes it clear thatMrs. Origuchi, the Married Women’s Divisiondistrict leader in whose home we are nowgathered, has been working assiduously withher fellow Division members on electionstrategy. A large card propped on the Buddhistal tar before the object of worship isemblazoned with an appeal: shitei shōri norokugatsu nijūsannichi e, “toward mentor /disciple victory on June 23rd.” A colorfulhandmade poster on the wall beside the altardisplays a map of Setagaya Ward broken downby voting district; districts in which Komeitoprevailed in the last Tokyo election areidentified by a red circular seal, and the othersremain blank. Next to this is a pyramidal graphwith blocks colored in, recording Gakkaidistrict names and their record of shōdaikai –thousands upon thousands of repeatedinvocations of the daimoku over hundreds ofhours by local members, all aimed at this singleelectoral success. One million total repetitionsis the goal, and the chart is mostly filled in.

Mrs. Origuchi urges all assembled to gathertomorrow morning at 11:15 to hear an addressfrom the Komeito candidate KuribayashiNoriko, who has served in the Tokyo Assemblysince 2009.

Kuribayashi Noriko’s homepage (http://kurinori.net/)

Kuribayashi’s campaign color is orange, Mrs.Origuchi tells everyone: please wear orangetomorrow, bring orange-colored gudzu (goods),and encourage your friends to do the same.After a number of women give testimonials onhow they have sought to convince friends andneighbors to vote for Kuribayashi, the meetingconcludes with Seika, Keitarō’s wife, handingout two photocopied pages. One is a finelydetailed shop-by-shop map of the localshopping street, which she gives to memberscharged with asking businesses to displaycampaign posters and to convince theiremployees to vote Komeito. The other is aprinted invitation asking everyone to attend theofficial opening of Kuribayashi’s campaignoffice on Wednesday, June 19. Members areurged to attend the entire event, which isscheduled to last from 9:00 a.m. until 9:00 p.m.

Multiply the meeting at Mrs. Origuchi’s on thisTuesday night hundreds of times to get a senseof how Soka Gakkai mobilized for the June2013 Tokyo election. As intense as this effortmay seem, it was treated by the participants aspreparatory, as a dress rehearsal for the muchbigger challenge of the July 23, 2013 UpperHouse election. And it was only the latest in arelentless stream of electoral campaigns thatdominate Gakkai activities in Japan.

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Komeito’s Origins in a Nichiren BuddhistObjective

Why are members of Soka Gakkai so intenselyengaged in electoral politics? Answering thisquestion means paying attention to somedoctrinal specifics. Soka Gakkai began as aneducational reform movement called SokaKyōiku Gakkai (Value Creation Education StudyAssociation) founded in 1930 by schoolteacherMakiguchi Tsunesaburō and his disciple TodaJōsei.

They became adherents of a temple-basedBuddhist sect called Nichiren Shōshū, orNichiren True Sect, and Soka Kyōiku Gakkaibecame a Shōshū lay association. NichirenShōshū is a minority lineage following theteachings of Nichiren, who held that only faithin the Lotus Sutra, the putative final teachingsof the historical Buddha Sakyamuni, and thepractice of chanting namu-myōhō-renge-kyōwere effective means of achieving salvation inthis degraded age, mappō, the Latter Days ofthe Buddha’s Dharma. All other teachings wereslander that must be rejected.

Toda Jōsei (1900-1958, standing), andM a k i g u c h i T s u n e s a b u r ō(1871-1944). Photo from Wikicommons(https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Tsunesaburo_Makiguchi_and_Josei_Toda.jpg)

Nichiren invited persecution by politicalauthorities of his day when he petitioned themilitary government in Kamakura to abandonsupport of Tendai, Shingon, Pure Land, andother temples, and he otherwise challenged theestablished order, leading the Kamakuragovernment to exile him twice and attempt toexecute him once. In the centuries since hislifetime, Nichiren has served as a biographicalmodel for those willing to martyr themselves ina righteous struggle against corrupt authority,a model that has inspired the life courses ofcountless clergy and laity.37

The centuries since the Kamakura era have

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also seen a specifically political agenda takeshape in the Nichiren tradition: the sandaihihō, or Three Great Secret Dharmas. Theseare 1) the daimoku, the title of the Lotuschanted as namu-myōhō-renge-kyō, 2) thedaigohonzon, a calligraphic mandala with thedaimoku at its center inscribed by Nichiren onthe 12th day of the 10th month of 1279, and 3)the honmon no kaidan, a “true ordinationplatform,” a government-sponsored facilitywhere the daigohonzon will be enshrined andworshipped by the chanting of daimoku uponthe conversion of all people to Nichiren’sBuddhism. The first two of these Three GreatSecret Dharmas were realized in Nichiren’slifetime, and after the Kamakura era the kaidanobjective remained a distant hope beyondpractical attainment.

Nichiren (1222-1282). Photo available here(http://dasenkunda.hatenablog.com/entry/2015/06/07/155140)

Until the rise of Soka Gakkai. Makiguchi andToda were imprisoned in 1944 by Japan’swartime authorities for violating the PeacePreservation Law when, in keeping withorthodox Nichiren practice, they refused toenshrine State Shinto talismans from the GrandShrine at Ise; Makiguchi died of malnutritionwhile incarcerated. After his release in July1945, Toda set about reviving his mentor’sorganization. He ultimately renamed it SokaGakkai, broadening the group’s mandate as he

expanded the study association into a massreligious movement. In May 1951, Todaannounced the start of Soka Gakkai’s GreatMarch of Shakubuku; shakubuku a NichirenBuddhist term at this point interpreted by theGakkai essentially as “break and convert.” ByApril 1958, Soka Gakkai claimed in excess ofone million households, and by the end of the1960s it claimed more than seven million. TheGakkai’s growth in these decades was driven inno small part by the inspiring objective of the“ordination platform,” reinterpreted by Todaand subsequently by his successor, thirdGakkai president and now Honorary PresidentIkeda Daisaku, as the kokuritsu kaidan, the“national ordination platform,” following amodern Nichirenist reinterpretation that calledfor support from the National Diet for theconstruction of a facility that would mark theconversion of the Japanese populace toexclusive worship of the Lotus.

Soka Gakkai political activity emerged in theinterest of securing the complete conversion ofthe populace and realizing the final ofNichiren’s Great Secret Dharmas. In 1954,Soka Gakkai established a Culture Division(Bunkabu): for the Gakkai, “culture” meant“electoral politics” at this point. The CultureDivision oversaw adherents who campaignedon behalf of fellow members who were runningfor office as independent candidates. If onewished to select a single watershed momentmarking a shift in Soka Gakkai’s status inJapan, it would be the Upper House elections ofJuly 8, 1956, when three Gakkai-sponsoredcandidates were elected to the National Diet.The July 9, 1956 Osaka edition of the Asahishinbun described this electoral success as“masa ka” ga jitsugen, “The ‘Unspeakable’ HasCome True,” to announce news of Soka Gakkaiofficial Shiraki Gi’ichirō’s victory.38 For the firsttime, a massive so-called shinkō shūkyō, “newlyar i sen re l ig ion ,” occup ied seats ingovernmental power. The Gakkai leadershiptied this political momentum to its religiousaims. From August 1, 1956, Toda issued an

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essay titled “Ōbutsu myōgō ron,” “On theHarmonious Union of Government andBuddhism,” in which he wrote that “we [SokaGakkai] are concerned with politics because ofthe need to realize kōsen rufu [the conversionof the populace], the spreading of the sacredphrase namu-myōhō-renge-kyō, one of theThree Great Secret Dharmas. In other words,the only purpose of our going into politics is theerection of the kokuritsu kaidan.”39

But something more than the lure ofeschatological Nichiren Buddhist objectiveswas inspiring people to join Soka Gakkai. In the1950s, Soka Gakkai largely attracted sociallymarginalized people – women, the poor, theuneducated, and others who fell through thecracks as Japan moved toward its postwar“economic miracle.” The Gakkai offereddisenfranchised people unmatchedopportunities to realize a potent combination ofaspirations, which included: 1) TranscendentBuddh is t emanc ipat ion through anuncompromising practice. 2) Opportunities tosacrifice meaningfully within a rankedhierarchical system based on a legitimacy-granting pedagogical model: Soka Gakkai wasand is, fundamentally, a gakkai, or a “studyassociation.” 3) Political power. Occupyingseats in government prevented critics fromaccusing Soka Gakkai of pretending to belegitimate. Political power was indisputablyreal power, and Soka Gakkai was, and remains,the only religious organization to secure alasting and influential presence in the NationalDiet and in local governments.40

Because engagement in electoral politics wasconceived as part of a transcendent religiousmission, Gakkai members were propelled bythe conviction that electioneering contributeddirectly to the realization of kōsen rufu and theconstruction of the ordination platform. Thiszeal led some adherents to violate electionslaw. Gakkai members first faced indictment inJune 1956, charged with kobetsu hōmon,“house-to-house campaigning,” which is

prohibited by Japanese elections law. In anevent dubbed the “Osaka Incident,” in July1957 a total of forty-five Gakkai members wereindicted for distributing packs of cigarettes,caramels, and money to Osaka residences aspart of a bid to elect Nakao Tatsuyoshi, whowas running for the Upper House in a by-election. Among those arrested was IkedaDaisaku, then a Gakkai Young Men’s Divisionleader.

Ikeda Daisaku (1928- ). Available here(http://www.daisakuikeda.org/)

Ikeda spent two weeks in jail and yearsafterward in court before having all chargesagainst him cleared in 1962. Outside observersmay regard the “Osaka Incident” as a matter oflegal wrangling, but Gakkai narrativesmemorialize Ikeda’s imprisonment andconfrontation with the Osaka Public Prosecutorin Nichiren Buddhist terms, characterizing histribulation as a righteous triumph over corruptstate tyranny, one that justified his position asheir to his jailed mentor Toda, the wartimemartyr Makiguchi, and ultimately to Nichirenhimself. When Gakkai members take part in a

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Komeito campaign today, they can turn to theOsaka Incident to connect their efforts as Ikedadisciples to a model of Nichiren Buddhistmartyrdom that transcends concerns over aspecific candidate or Komeito policies. Theparticipants chanting in June 2013 for “mentor/ disciple victory” in Mrs. Origuchi’s livingroom would certainly have linked theirelectioneering to this pivotal event in IkedaDaisaku’s biography.

By the time Komeito was founded in November1964, just over fifty years ago, electioneeringwas a built-in feature of regular Gakkaipractice, and the “ordination platform”objective was a well-known feature of the group– intensely attractive to adherents, and viewedas an existential threat by the Gakkai’sreligious and political rivals. Gakkai criticsroutinely turned to two articles from the 1947Constitution to make their case: Article 20states that “No religious organization shallreceive any privileges from the State, norexercise any political authority,” and Article 89reads “No public money or other property shallbe expended or appropriated for the use,benefit or maintenance of any religiousinstitution or association or for any charitable,educational benevolent enterprises not underthe control of public authority.” The Gakkai’sentrée into electoral politics was widelyinterpreted as a direct violation of Article 20, inspite of constitutional guarantees of freedom ofassociation and religious belief. The objectiveto construct a “national ordination platform” byDiet decree was more difficult to defend, as itdid appear to potentially violate Constitutionalprohibition of the Japanese state frombestowing privileges on a religious organizationor funding a religious enterprise.

Fears of a Gakkai plot to install Soka Gakkai asJapan’s state religion with Ikeda Daisaku as atheocratic leader were heightened after thefounding of Komeito and the expansion ofelectoral activities into the Lower House of theNational Diet. In the January 1967 general

election, Komeito ran one candidate in each ofthirty-two multiple-member constituencies.Twenty-five were elected, making Komeito thethird-largest opposition party in the Diet. In the1968 Upper House election, Komeito captured15.5% of the popular vote, up from 3.5% in the1956 Upper House race. Forty-seven Komeitocandidates were elected to the Lower House inDecember 1969, when the party claimed 10.9%of the popular vote, moving Komeito into thespot of third-biggest party in the Diet after theLDP and the Socialist Party, and in January1970 Soka Gakkai claimed 7.55 millionadherent households.

As it turned out, the end of the 1960s markedan abrupt halt to Soka Gakkai’s, and Komeito’s,meteoric rise. Matters came to a head in 1969with a series of events since labeled the genronshuppan bōgai mondai, or “problem overobstructing freedom of expression and thepress.” Komeito’s surge in the polls and SokaGakkai’s seemingly inexorable growth from themid-1950s into the late 1960s inspired acorresponding emergence of a robust anti-SokaGakkai / Komeito media industry. The mostwell-known example of anti-Gakkai media fromthis time was Soka Gakkai o kiru, publishedlater in English as I Denounce Soka Gakkai.Unsurprisingly, the book painted a luridportrait of Soka Gakkai and Komeito as amenace to Japanese democracy. I DenounceSoka Gakkai would most likely have beengreeted with limited public notice were it notfor measures taken by Gakkai and Komeitoleaders to attempt to forestall its publication.Akahata , the Japan Communist Partynewspaper, and the book’s publisher broke astory that the book’s author Fujiwara Hirotatsu,a Meiji University professor and publicintellectual, had received a phone call from a“famous politician” who passed on a requestfrom the Komeito leader that he pull IDenounce Soka Gakkai from publication. The“famous politician” did not give his name, butFujiwara claimed he recognized the voice ofTanaka Kakuei, then secretary general

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(kanjichō) of the Liberal Democratic Party andlater a powerful prime minister. It is clear thatlinks between Komeito and the LDP wereforged decades before the two parties formedthe coalition that operates today. The Tanakaconnection appears to have been especiallyimportant: close cooperation between TanakaKakuei and Komeito politicians, particularlyKomeito Diet member Takeiri Yoshikatsu, wereat the heart of the normalization of diplomaticrelations between Japan and the People’sRepublic of China in 1972, and it is evident thatnetworks between the LDP and Komeitoremained open after this time.41

The I Denounce Soka Gakkai scandal resultedin radical transformations of both Soka Gakkaiand Komeito. On May 3, 1970, Ikeda Daisakuissued a formal apology to the people of Japanand announced a new policy of seikyō bunri,the “separation of politics and religion.” SokaGakkai and Komeito were declared separateorganizations, the religion renounced plans toconstruct the “national ordination platform,”and it eliminated the use of politically chargedterms such as ōbutsu myōgō. Meanwhile,Komeito members resigned from positionswithin Soka Gakkai, and Soka Gakkairenounced decision-making capacities for theparty’s personnel, finances, and candidacy.

In sum, the religion and the party accrued costsand benefits during this early growth period:

Costs: Fallout from the 1970 incident struck ablow to Komeito’s fortunes in the polls. Theparty dropped from 47 to 29 elected Dietrepresentatives in the 1972 elections, andthough it rose to 56 officials in 1976, the mostit has ever held, it never again experienced themassive swell in support it enjoyed in the fiveyears after Komeito’s founding.

Soka Gakkai lost more than power among theelectorate when it severed official ties withKomeito and renounced goals to build anational ordination platform: it lost itsmomentum as a mass movement. It made only

modest gains after 1970. In contrast to itsgrowth by orders of magnitude in theimmediate postwar years, the religion claimed7.62 million adherent households in 1974, upfrom 7.55 in 1970, and since the early 1980s itshas claimed just over 8.2 million adherenthouseholds and has held steady at 8.27 millionfor the last decade.42 It is probable that Gakkaimembership growth was already peaking bythe end of the 1960s and that a flattening of itsmembership numbers was inevitable. In spite ofthese qualifications, the events of 1970 mark awatershed moment in Soka Gakkai’s history,the point when the group began to shift towardcultivating the needs of a second generationborn to the converts who flocked to SokaGakkai during its years of explosive growth inthe 1950s and 60s.

Benefits: The generations that have followedthe official religious / political division havebeen reared within a Gakkai milieu in whichelectioneering for Komeito has remained anadherent’s duty, on par with chanting theLotus, carrying out shakubuku conversion, andotherwise contributing to Soka Gakkai’sinstitutional goals. Komeito is an ordinarypolitical party in most senses, in that it carriesout the usual business of getting elected,seeing to the needs of its constituents,policymaking, negotiating with interest groups,and other responsibilities associated withordinary behavior by political parties. However,an obvious difference between Komeito andother Japanese parties is the understandingthat in every election, from a town assembly tothe National Diet, every devout Gakkai membercan be counted on to fire up the vote-gatheringmachine that generations of Gakkai adherentshave kept running since the heady days of SokaGakkai’s early political activities.

A Legacy of Peace Promotion

Given the routinized nature of Soka Gakkai’selectioneering, one might assume that devoutmembers will get out the vote no matter how

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Komeito changes its policies, and no matter thepartnerships it forges. The sight of protestorsoutside the Diet in the summer of 2015 castdoubts on this assumption. As the Abe Cabinethas grown bolder in its quest to revise theConstitution’s peace clause, and as Komeitocontinues to adjust its position on securityissues to follow its coalition partner’s rightwardshift, questions arise as to how, or evenwhether Soka Gakkai can continue to treatelectioneering for Komeito as a component ofits practice.

There are Gakkai members, at all levels of theorganization, who are beginning to questionthe apparent naturalness of Soka Gakkaisupport for Komeito. The protestors thatcaptured media attention before the September19 vote indicate that some ordinary adherentsare dismayed by the move away from peacepromotion. Their sentiments are shared bysome within the Soka Gakkai administrationitself. On Wednesday, September 9, 2015, Ireceived an unexpected call at my NorthCarolina State University office from a Gakkaiadministrator who is at the front lines ofpromoting Soka Gakkai as an internationalorganization dedicated to fostering peace; not amember I know well, but an adherent familiarwith my research on Soka Gakkai and Komeito.He quickly clarified that he was calling tospeak to me about conflicts between hisprofessional obligations and his personalconvictions: he was in the difficult position ofhaving to speak for a Gakkai administrationthat disavowed connection to the protestorswhile he personally commiserated withAmerican adherents who were dismayed whenthey learned of Komeito’s support for thesecurity laws.

The administrator was withering in his critiqueof Komeito, particularly of what he perceived asa dismissive attitude its Diet members weretaking about concerns expressed by Gakkaiprotestors: “If Komeito were to declare to theirsupporters that the long-term goal of the

security legislation was in fact to create acountry with no war, that engaging the Self-Defense Forces was part of realizing this goal,then Soka Gakkai people may come tounderstand,” he suggested. Instead, heremained unconvinced by the explanationsoffered by Tōyama Kiyohiko and other Dietpoliticians. He also seemed to think that theirconfidence in Gakkai members’ support wasoverblown. “I believe that, should there be evenone incident with the Self-Defense Forcesbetween now and the July 2016 Upper Houseelections, you will see a radical shift againstKomeito among Gakkai members,” hepredicted.

He was also disappointed with the reaction bySoka Gakkai officials. When I mentioned to himthat administrators at the Gakkai’s Office ofPublic Affairs told me the protests in front ofthe Diet were mattaku kanchi ga nai (absolutelyunconnected) to Soka Gakkai, he immediatelycried out “that is absolutely false!” Hereminded me that on August 6 and 9, 2015, onthe 70th anniversary of the Hiroshima andNagasaki nuclear attacks, The Soka GakkaiPeace Committee promulgated a statementtitled “Upholding the Sanctity of Life” thatconfirms Japan’s responsibility for the sufferingof people in Asia during the Pacific War andasserts that the happiness of common people ispredicated on the abolition of war.43 Makingpublic these concerns would indicate that SokaGakkai is not in fact “unconnected” toprotesting members who urge Komeitopoliticians to hold to the peace activismcultivated within the religion, he stressed.

At the end o f our conversa t ion , theadministrator expressed serious concernsabout the onerous responsibilities placed onGakkai adherents in Japan during everyelection. “Kōsen rufu is a serious undertaking.Constantly asking everyone to drop everythingto focus on an election – this is like asking anathlete training for the Olympics to stoptraining every six months to spend two or three

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months on something else.” Up to now, politicalactivities have been understood by the Gakkaias a component of kōsen rufu, as integral to thespread of their religious mission. “But is thisreally the case?” he asked. “Is this [electoralpolitics] really in line with what we’re doing?”

As this administrator’s concerns indicate, themost important issue at stake for Gakkaiopponents of the new legislation is SokaGakkai’s, and Komeito’s, historical focus onpeace. Most members identify the beginning ofSoka Gakkai’s peace movement in an addressin Yokohama by Toda Jōsei on September 8,1957, when he called for an abolition of thehydrogen bomb and declared that “anyone whoventures to use nuclear weapons, irrespectiveof their nationality or whether their country isvictorious or defeated, should be sentenced todeath without exception.”44 Under Ikeda, SokaGakkai dropped some of this fiery rhetoric butretained its interest in denouncing war. Thispriority manifested in Komeito: its officialfounding statement of July 17 1964 affirms that“it is only through the singular path of theBuddhist philosophy of absolute pacifism” thatthe world will attain salvation from the horrorof war. After its 1970 split from its religiousparent, Komeito found purchase with its Gakkaivoters as a defender of Article Nine and, atleast initially, as a critic of Japan’s maintenanceof the Self-Defense Forces.

Gakkai members who came of age in the yearsafter 1970, like the administrator whocontacted me, grew up singing the praises ofpeace – sometimes literally. From the 1970s,Gakkai members were taking part in casts-of-thousands “world peace culture festivals”(sekai heiwa bunkasai) at sports arenasdedicated to their mentor Ikeda Daisaku, whowas then transforming himself into aninternational humanitarian in dialogue withpeace activists.

Soka Gakkai Hiroshima Youth Peace Culture Festival,1 9 8 2 . P h o t o a v a i l a b l e h e r e(http://www.hiroshima-soka.jp/butterfly/img/02_ph_08.jpg)

In April 1981, Soka Gakkai registered as a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) with theUnited Nations High Commissioner forRefugees (UNHCR), part of a movementinitiated by Gakkai sub-organizations thatpushed the entire organization toward peace-oriented engagement. The Youth Divisionorganized Soka Gakkai’s first Peace Conferencein 1979, and in December 1980 the MarriedWomen’s Division established the Soka GakkaiWomen’s Peace Committee, a sub-group thatbecame a driving force behind many of theGakkai peace activities that have emerged overthe last three decades. From January 1983,Ikeda began to issue annual “peace proposals,”essays that call for international cooperationand suggest avenues for conflict resolution, andbeginning in this period Soka Gakkai began todefine itself as founded on three pillars: peace,culture, and education. In the 2015 PeaceProposa l , Ikeda Da isaku ca l l s for a“rehumanization of politics and economics,”actions for alleviating suffering that will triggera “chain reaction of empowerment” that will inturn inspire the “expansion of friendship acrossdifferences to build a world of coexistence.”45

Soka Gakkai, in other words, continues toactively promote peace.

Gakkai Member Reactions to the Anti-

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Security Legislation Protestors: A BuddhistRebuke of the Rebukers

But not every member who came of age withinSoka Gakkai’s milieu of peace activism is anopponent of the new security laws. In fact, theprotestors at the demonstrations may comprisea small, vocal minority within Soka Gakkai. Thisis not to say that the average Gakkai member inJapan is an uncritical Komeito supporter.Rather, mass media coverage of public SokaGakkai dissent has forced individual adherentsto come to terms with why they supportKomeito, and it has called upon them to clarifyto themselves and one another where theythink their religion and its affiliated politicalparty are headed in the future.

Between September 22 and 29, I correspondedin writing (in Japanese) with just over a dozenGakkai adherents I have come to know throughfifteen years of sustained ethnographicfieldwork as a non-member researcher ofgrassroots-level Gakkai activities in Japan.Their responses indicate that supportingKomeito remains a central, if increasinglycomplex, component of Gakkai life. Themembers I know have developed sophisticated,and at times startlingly innovative, ways ofinterpreting the new laws in relation to theirunderstanding of Nichiren Buddhist principlesand the teachings of their mentor IkedaDaisaku. Here, I provide some sampletranslations from a few of the members whogave me permission to translate their wordsunder pseudonyms.

The members whom I quote below, with theexception of the last person I cite, are SokaUniversity alumni who graduated years agofrom the Young Men’s Division into the Men’sDivision, a milestone most Gakkai men mark atthe age of forty. They range in age from theirmid-forties to their mid-fifties, and all aresecond-generation Gakkai adherents who livein the Greater Metropolitan Tokyo Area. Theyrepresent what one might think of as the

paradigmatic Soka Gakkai success story: theirparents grew up in poverty in the postwaryears and sacrificed to send their sons to thethen comparatively new Soka University(founded in 1971), where these fukushi –“fortune children,” the Gakkai term for thoseborn into adherent families – studied hard andearned success in a variety of vocations aftergraduation. Given their rearing within SokaGakkai’s flagship school, they representsomething of a male Gakkai elite. In futureresearch, I intend to broaden my inquiry intocontemporary Gakkai perspectives on peaceand security by bringing in more voices frommembers who did not come from Gakkaischools, and particularly from women members– a crucial demographic in Gakkai politicalactivism, as the episode at Mrs. Origuchi’shome I relayed above demonstrates. However,my preliminary inquiry into the attitudes ofsome representative Gakkai men provides uswith a window into the attitudes of local-levelGakkai leaders who are knowledgeable aboutthe issues that surround the security legislationand thoughtful about formulating ways toencourage others to continue supportingKomeito, even as the party changes course. Asfukushi reared in Gakkai schools, they areclassmates and possibly fr iends withsignatories to the Soka University associationcondemning the new laws, and they sharemuch with Amano Tatsushi, the second-generation Gakkai member who circulated theanti-security legislation petition. But, as weshall see, they hold very different views.

Mr. Nishino, a member in his early fifties,works in systems administration for a firm incentral Tokyo. He lives just over Tokyo’smunicipal border in suburban ChibaPrefecture, where he serves as a shibu(Chapter) leader, in which capacity he overseesapproximately two hundred Gakkai households.He responded in detail to a direct question Iposed him: what do you think of Komeito’ssupport of the security legislation?

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Fundamentally, I take the positionof support ing the secur i tylegislation. Stated bluntly, 1) I’mmostly satisfied with the content ofthe bills, 2) I’m a person withadministrative responsibilitieswithin Soka Gakkai, and 3) I findthe opinions of the oppositioncamp discomforting. I did notbroadcast my opinion, so it mayhave appeared that I tacitly agreewith the protestors. I want to makemy stance clear.

Considering Soka Gakkai’s supportof Komeito, I feel that we nowstand at a crossroads. For a longt ime Komeito served in theopposition, and we could point tohumble (perhaps microscopic)instances of practical attainments;t h e s e g a v e u s a s e n s e o fsatisfaction. Times changed, theparty jo ined the governingadministration, and within a shorttime (frankly, to our surpriseddelight) we were able to learnwhat it is like to realize campaignpledges and policies beyond ourexpectations. A Gakkai and theupper leadership of a politicalparty that savored memories [ofthese victories] was born. Ofcourse, we local supporters havec o n t i n u e d o u r a c t i v i t i e sunchanged. This is because SokaGakkai is the face of unifiedsupport of Komeito.

But then why has support dividedwithin the Gakkai’s local divisions?My personal feeling is that, at root,the organization is split between 1)one group that experienced thepurity, or nobility, of the good olddays of Komeito and Soka Gakkairesisting authoritarian power, 2) a

second group made up of peoplewho wield authority and, as theyreceive all the criticism, take allthe responsibility for running theorganization. Both groups, indifferent ways, extract quotationsfrom Ikeda-sensei’s thought andphilosophy as they pit themselvesagainst one another. So, seen fromoutside, it is perhaps difficult tocomprehend what is going on.Particularly because the theme thistime is “peace,” given the volumeof Ikeda-sensei’s writings andspeeches on this theme that areproducts of their specific time, andfrom those that speak to universalconcerns, I would have to say thatthe protesting group has the edge.

Nishino went on to reflect on where he believesSoka Gakkai is headed in the future. To makehis points clear, he relied on complex NichirenBuddhist interpretations to frame his negativeopinion of Gakkai adherents who opposedKomeito. His explanations extended far beyondthe current fracas to encompass an innovativeexegesis of Nichiren’s concepts, a doctrinalelaboration that forms part of his attempt toprepare Gakkai members for a post-IkedaDaisaku world:

The doctrine of the religiousorganization indicates that thereshould not even be one hair ofcompromise, but in everydaydispatch of the core activities ofproselytizing, solicitation ofsubscriptions to the Seikyōshinbun, and administration, it isobvious that various opinionsemerge. A splendid aspect of SokaGakkai is that, ultimately, differingmembers reach a consensus asthey mutua l ly respect oneanother’s views. I am profoundly

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convinced by Ikeda-sensei ’sguidance on this point when hesaid “were Christ, the Buddha, andMuhammad to meet once to speakwith one another, they would reacha great mutual understanding forthe happiness and peace ofhumankind.” 4 6

So, in times like these, whenopinions within the Gakkai’sadministration and those ofanother support organization donot match up, what is there to do?I believe that an easy standard fordetermining this comes from thedoctrine of gojū no sōtai [five-levelcomparison] found in NichirenBuddhism. 1) Naigai sōtai, or Innerand Outer Comparison (Buddhismor non-Buddhist teachings). 2)Daishō sōtai, or Greater and LesserCompar ison (Mahāyāna orHīnayāna Buddhism). 3) Gonjitsusōtai, or Provisional and TrueMahāyāna Buddhism Comparison(pre-Lotus Sutra teachings of thehistorical Buddha and the Lotus).4) Honjaku sōtai, or Origin andTrace Comparison (the origin(honmon) portion of the Lotus andthe trace (shakumon) portion). 5)Shudatsu sōtai, or Sowing andHarvesting Comparison (theBuddhadharma harvested beyondthe text and the Buddhadharma ofthe text). Up to this point, NichirenShōshū and Soka Gakkai are inaccord, but in continuing thesedistinctions, my colleagues and Ihave the following personal take:6) Shūsō sōtai, or Sect and GakkaiComparison (Nichiren Shōshū orSoka Gakkai). 7) Chisō sōtai, orIkeda and Soka Comparison(Ikeda-sensei or Soka Gakkai).47

I th ink that , r ight now, thedistinction needed to preserve acorrect religion is level seven. Thefaction opposing the securitylegislation cites from Ikeda asmuch [as other Gakkai members].But who gains from their actions?People on the anti-Soka side who,as “Gakkai watchers,” gatherprotestors’ comments as theirprofession; mass media that makesa profit from viewers attracted tospecial reports on Soka Gakkai;and shady, parasitic communistswho secretively aim to expand thestrength of their party. If peopleacting as members within SokaGakkai bring about this kind ofdisorder, even if they employ manycitations from Ikeda-sensei’swritings, and even if they seek torealize noble intentions, onecannot call them disciples of Ikeda-sensei who correctly receive andpass on the dharma; they arenothing other than “worms withinthe lion’s body” who infest SokaGakkai.48

N o t a l l t h e m e m b e r s w i t h w h o m Icommunicated expressed their views withNishino’s level of doctrinal elaboration. Mr.Hamasaki, an engineer in his mid-forties whoworks for a European firm and travelsextensively overseas, struck a pragmatic tone:

The security legislation hasbecome a topic of discussionoverseas as well, hasn’t it? And therelationship between Komeito andSoka Gakkai, and the relationshipbetween these organizations andthe demonstrations has beenwritten about in the mass media.Even within Soka Gakkai there arepeople with various ways of

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thinking, I think, so there must bepeople who oppose this legislation.

But for me, personally, I thinkpolitical commitment and Gakkaimobi l izat ion are separate.Regarding the people who were atthe SEALDs demonstration holdingup placards with Toda-sensei’s faceand other images on them – I doubtthese people were true Gakkaiadherents. This is because usually,if you are a Gakkai member, youwould not bring a photograph ofthe shishō [Great Mentor] Toda-sensei to a place like that. I alsodon’t think you would carry the tri-color flag to declare “I oppose thisas a Gakkai member!” to a protestorganization that knows nothing[about Soka Gakkai]. So I thinkthese are the usual anti-Gakkaipeople or those who are using theGakkai in a put-up job. Or they areGakkai members, but maybe oneswith bizarre ideas.

That being said, regarding thislegislation, there appear to bearguments for and against, and nota simple case for supportingKomeito. Rather than saying Isupport the [security legislation]decision, I think Komeito mustcarefully manage this issue.Komeito depends on the LDP’soverwhelming numerical strength,so I’m not certain where Komeitoshould intercede, but I want to seethe party play its role in exercisingrestraint from within the governingcoalition.

There a re peop l e who a rediscussing connections betweenArt ic le Nine and HonoraryPresident Ikeda’s past thinking,

publications, and guidance, but Ithink these are separate fromcreating legislation. When there isan uproar about security issues(and it appears as if this is mostlybecause the mass media fans theflames when it identifies groupsthat are making the most noiseabout political matters), in eachins tance and i n eve ry e raarguments are made in an ad hocmanner. But if you want to have areal discussion, you must analyzeinterpretation of Article Nine, therole of the Self-Defense Forces, thecontent of the U.S.-Japan SecurityTreaty, and the relationship withthe United Nations, otherwise areliable discussion and conclusionwill not emerge.

Seen this way, I personally thinkthat Komeito was left seeking away forward to propose the bestpossible policy.

Other members were distraught by thedivisions within Soka Gakkai over the securityissue. Mr. Andō, an engineer near fifty years ofage, spends his time outside work and Gakkaiactivities amassing recordings of classicalmusic and taking spectacular naturephotographs. He also expressed support forKomeito, but with a willingness to acknowledgecritiques and a palpable sense of anguish, onehe seeks to assuage through an appeal to faith:

Regarding this recent legislation –a quiet dispute has been spreadingin my local District (chiku) .Marr ied Women’s Div is ionmembers have been lamenting thatthere are some whose hearts aretorn, some who have come to nolonger speak with friends, somewhose friends have refused to

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receive the Seikyō shinbun. Fromlong ago, everyone has valued“solidarity of faith” (shinjin nodanketsu) as the most importantthing, so expressing negativeopinions is difficult, and I thinkthat everyone believes they mustalways put on a positive face. Thisis why many members have grownsilent, I think.

The people putting on a radicalperformance in the mass media ofcarrying the tri-color flag reallyaren’t Gakkai members – my wifeand I laughed together when wetalked about this.

Komeito members came to ourDistrict to speak one on one withthe Men’s Division about thislegislation, but even from the pointo f v iew o f those o f us w i thresponsibilities within SokaGakkai, the amount of informationthey provided was absolutelypaltry. You only see positive newswritten in the Kōmei shinbun[Komeito’s newspaper]. Membersaren’t willing to listen to outsidevoices, or the media, so the basisfor cultivating individual opinionsis certainly very limited.

I believe that Komeito aims at a“middle course” (chūyō) no matterif times are peaceful or if there isan emergency. This is the middlepath (chūdō). They are thinking ofhuman life first – this I believe.

I imagine that, no matter how openDiet debate may be, the reality isthat there must be strictly-keptsecrets about international affairs.The rul ing part ies of Japandetermined that there is a need tocreate this new legislation – I have

to believe this.

So, there is one Komeito Dietmember named Tōyama Kiyohikowho is central to support of thislegislation. He was my kōhai[junior] at Soka Gakuen [SokaSenior High School] in the samedormitory. He’s an earnest,intelligent, and courageous kōhai.I f he says “ th i s i s good ,” Imust...not believe him (laughs).

If I think about it on my own, I amnot sure if this legislation is goodor not . I t ’ s not a proact ivereaction, but I have faith in whatKomeito handles. In Gakkaiguidance, there is the ishin tai’e[faith in place of wisdom] way ofthinking.49 This means substitutingfaith in the place of wisdom. Thesewords always come to mind when Iask others to support Komeito.

Humans are not only rationalbeings, I think. Intuition andmatters one cannot describe butmove one’s spirit are important topersonal action. For this reason Ithink that something you “believe,”without questioning where it camefrom, is very important. Haven’twe sort of forgotten the value ofwhat it means to “believe” inmodern society?

This does not mean that if onebelieves rationality is useless; onemust study more to deepen one’sunderstanding of the issues.Through this one determines “whatd o I b e l i e v e ? ” a n d h o w t odetermine happiness f romunhappiness, needless to say.

I don’t really understand thislegislation, and I am still in a

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quandary about how to talk abouti t w h e n I ’ m c a l l e d o n t orecommend it to others, but atleast I believe in Komeito as aparty that respects human life.

All of the members with whom I communicatedexpressed skepticism as to whether or not theprotestors filmed carrying the tri-color flag atdemonstrations were in fact members of SokaGakkai. Mr. Tsuda, who called himself an“ordinary Men’s Division member” in hismessages to me, posited that, even if theprotestors were members, they were dupedinto creating a media spectacle: “It’s fine if thetri-color flag appears when Gakkai membersare being interviewed, but even in scenes [ontelevision] when there is no interview it seemsas if the flag is filmed deliberately (are thesereally Gakkai members? Seems weird). Becauseof this, the people of Japan and Gakkaimembers alike are being tricked.” He alsoexpressed doubts about the legitimacy of thepetition circulated by faculty, staff, and alumniof his alma mater Soka University: “Happily,there do not appear to be any protestingmembers in my area, but some Gakkaiinte l l igents ia are taking part in thedemonstrations, thanks to the petition. In truth,this protest movement at Soka University, itseems as if it is being guided by someone fromHokkekō.50 If there were really a big protestmovement at Soka University, it would be muchbigger news, I think.”

Some members recognized a diversity ofopinion among their fellow local members evenas they expressed distinctly centrist, possiblyeven right-leaning, sentiments. Mr. Takazawa,a musician who lives and works in westernTokyo, acknowledged that “around me thereare people expressing opinions both for andagainst. For me, I think this kind of law shouldperhaps pass after Constitutional revision –maybe? This country’s citizens, includingm y s e l f , a r e s o f t w h e n i t c o m e s t o

understandings of security matters. When itcomes time to support Komeito candidates inthe next election, they will ask that this issuenot be presented as the face of their platform;because Soka Gakkai is an organization thatmaintains an antiwar philosophy, this protesterupted. But Komeito is the mitigating factorpreventing the exercise of military force. This ishow we can appraise the matter.” Others wereeven more blunt: “I’m in opposition to those inopposition to the security legislation,” statedMr. Nishimura, who is something of an elderstatesmen among this group of Soka Universityalums. “Within Soka Gakkai of my region, theserecent events have not had any effect. In orderto explain the Komeito decision, we must readNingen kakumei, revisit Gakkai history, andensure that Komeito does not distance itselffrom its position to curb authoritarian power.The history of the Gakkai is one of combattingauthoritarianism; we know the fear ofauthoritarian power. For this reason, becauseKomeito joined the coalition and secured aplace from which to control violent coercivepower, it must maintain its responsibility to theJapanese people by preserving this role. To dothis, the party chose to accommodate thesecurity policy, I think.”

Among those I have come to know in my yearsof ethnographic research, some have movedaway from Soka Gakkai. One member, whom Iwill call Mr. Sonoda, has grown deeply bitterabout what he sees as Soka Gakkai’s singularfocus on Ikeda Daisaku at the expense ofreverence for Nichiren Buddhism. Though hewas born to a devout Gakkai mother and washimself a dedicated adherent until two yearsago, he now secretly chants to an object ofworship received from Nichiren Shōshū – asacrilege unthinkable to Gakkai adherents –and has taken to deriding Komeito as “theKōmei wing of the Liberal Democratic Party.”His opposition to the Gakkai and Komeito,however, has not translated into opposition tothe security legislation. Instead, he expressed achilling eagerness for a cathartic resolution to

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the simmering regional conflict, an attitudethat makes Gakkai accommodation of the newsecurity laws appear moderate by comparison:

East Asia, North Korea, Russia,China – in these places you can seedifferent kinds of friction [withJapan]. America does not want tosend its own people into Japan’sfights (this is obvious, right), but ifit does nothing these fights willgrow into huge conflicts. Countriesthat regard Okinawa and theNorthern Territories as their ownare fomenting conflict to advancetheir colonization plans; Russiaand China are arming for this.

If they don’t protect the country’scitizens, what is the point ofpoliticians?! If there is a conflict, Iwill volunteer. This is absolutelymy own opinion, but I think thisnew legislation is indecisive. Ithink it would be good if Japandeclares that, if China or Russiainvade, we will melt down all thenuclear plants in the country.

Conclusion: Can Komeito Take SokaGakkai Support for Granted?

It is not only politicians who think about thebenefits of remaining in power. Gakkaimembers are some of very few politicallyengaged people in Japan who can vividly recallwhat it is like to be in government and inopposition. This gives them a rare and valuableperspective on the costs and benefits ofKomeito’s compromises. During my fieldworkwith Gakkai members in Japan, I was struck bythe opinions I heard between 2009 and late2012, when Komeito and the LDP were inopposition and the Democratic Party of Japanwas in power. My Gakkai friends expressedfrustration about being in opposition. This

three-year interim clearly reminded them ofdecades of helplessness through which theyand those in their parents’ and grandparents’generations struggled, when they wereridiculed for belonging to what was dubbed byreligious and political rivals a “religion of thepoor.” Ridiculed, but also feared forrepresenting what many opponents painted asa nefarious plot to use Komeito to install a post-war Soka Gakkai theocracy. Earning therespect (however grudging) of one’s opponents,having a chance to demonstrate as a governingparty that fears of a Gakkai / Komeitotheocratic plot are unfounded, keeping Komeitowithin the government as a mitigating forceagainst LDP intransigence: these are worth ahigh price to Gakkai adherents. They arewilling to sacrifice founding principles andexpend considerable effort explaining whymaintaining Komeito support, even after policyreversals, is both rationally and ethicallydefensible.

Gakkai members strategically adapting toKomeito’s shift away from pacifism is by nomeans a new development. In late 2003, thecoalition government then led by PrimeMinister Koizumi Jun’ichirō provided financingfor military operations, refueled allied navalvessels, and, most controversially, sent Self-Defense Force troops to take part in the IraqWar. Though only a few hundred SDF troopsserved without casualties until 2006 in non-combatant roles, the presence of Japanesesoldiers and sailors in the middle of a war in aforeign country triggered public outrage.Komeito, as part of the ruling coalition, wasforced to defend its support for the Iraqdispatch to the public and to its own angrymembers. Anne Mette Fisker-Nielsen, in herethnography of politically engaged SokaUniversity students, took note of ways youngGakkai adherents came to terms with theirsupport for Komeito during the Iraq War. Insome cases, the students she interviewedregarded the SDF as a force sent to help thepeople of Iraq, while others stated that Komeito

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should have opposed the LDP-led Iraq dispatcheven if it meant a return to the opposition.Most, however, appeared to settle on apragmatic position akin to that taken by theadherents I cited above: Komeito representsGakkai interests best, it is optimally suited tomitigate against the LDP’s worst policies, and,ultimately, being in government is infinitelymore effective than being in opposition.51

Similarly, Robert Kisala collected survey dataand conducted interviews with Gakkaimembers that, as he put it, demonstrated their“difficulty of maintaining the pacifist positionwithout abandoning all engagement withsociety.”52 Kisala discovered that, due topractical dilemmas occasioned by Komeito’spolitical success and their then-comparativelyrecent cooperation with the Liberal Democratson the 1992 Act on Cooperation for UnitedNations Peacekeeping Operations, or the PKOlaw, Soka Gakkai members were among themost willing of the peace-promoting religiouspractitioners he surveyed to allow foraccommodations to an absolute pacifist stance.

Pragmatic support for Komeito by its Gakkaisupport base has persisted even as Gakkaimembers were filmed protesting outside theDiet. Results from the most recent local-levelelections indicate that voter turnout forKomeito candidates does not appear to havesuffered. In fact, local Komeito candidates are,in some cases, enjoying unprecedented levelsof support. For example, in city councilelections held across Japan on September 6,13, 20, and 27, in almost all cases all Komeitocandidates won their seats, and in four cases –Inagawa City and Inami City in HyōgoPrefecture, Kusatsu City in Shiga, and Matsudain Kanagawa – candidates tallied record-highnumbers of votes.53 In most cases thesecandidates ran unopposed, and the totalnumber of votes in each case was very small,yet these results indicate that support for localKomeito politicians remains reliable. It remainsto be seen if politicians who enjoy more

national prominence will continue to receivesupport from their Gakkai supporters.Municipal politicians do not write securitylegislation, after all, and they frequently earngood reputations for their concern for localissues. Stakes will be higher during the UpperHouse election, slated for July 2016, when 121of the 242 seats will be up for reelection.

I have described multiple reasons to believethat Komeito support remains central to Gakkaifaith, which would indicate that Gakkai voterswill respond to calls to get out the vote duringnext summer’s Upper House election. However,easy assumptions about this support should beavoided. Change appears to be in the air:Gakkai adherents, perhaps sharing Mr.Nishino’s sense that Soka Gakkai stands at acrossroads, have taken to the streets to protestKomeito, and their administrators areexpress ing their d ismay to outs iderresearchers. There is also precedent for Gakkaimembers to make their dismay heard at thepolls. As it turns out, non-action by Gakkaivoters can exert a transformative effect:members are capable of practicing whatanthropologist James C. Scott termed “tokenresistance”: foot-dragging, dissimilitude, andother seemingly inconsequential tactics carriedout by individuals that, when amassed, producepowerful “weapons of the weak.”54

The clearest recent expression of Gakkai-member dissent manifested in the July 13, 2014gubernatorial election in Shiga Prefecture, avote held less than two weeks after theunpopular July 1 cabinet decision to allow forcollective self-defense. Koyari Takashi, aformer advisor to Abe’s cabinet and successorto the outgoing LDP governor, lost the electionto Mikazuki Taizō from the Democratic Party ofJapan.

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Mikazuki Taizō (Democratic Party of Japan)celebrates his election victory. Photo from the JapanT i m e s(http://jto.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/n-shigaldploss-a-20140715-870x677.jpg)

In an analysis of electoral data, Steven Reed atChūō University posits that, although 92percent of Komeito supporters voted for Koyari– two percentage points higher than Koyarisupport among LDP voters – the total numberof Komeito voters was down from previouselections, and that the absence of Gakkaisupporters accounts for the margin in favor ofMikazuki.55 Thus, while Komeito politiciansregard compromise with the LDP as asuccessful strategy to remain in power, Gakkaimembers do not necessarily hold the sameview, and, depending on the timing of eventsand the mood of the constituents, some arewilling to make their dissatisfaction clearthrough their own compromises – namely, byholding back on the Gakkai practice ofsoliciting votes.

There are other factors at work to changesupport for Komeito. Hinted at but notexplicitly discussed in the responses by myGakkai informants was anxiety about changesthat will occur after the lifetime of HonoraryPresident Ikeda. He is eighty-seven years ofage, and has not been seen in public for years.There is ample evidence that the Gakkai

administration is working to routinize hischarisma in order to ensure that memberactivities continue at today’s vigorous paceeven after Ikeda’s official passing. Localmembers themselves are remarkably self-reflexive about the shift their own organizationis undergoing. Mr. Andō mused about this tome in the course of describing his faith-drivensupport of Komeito: “charismatic leadership(karisumateki shidōryoku) is thinning andcentrifugal power is strengthening remarkably.There is a need for us to construct a mode ofmanaging the Gakkai and supporting Komeitofor the new generation.”

In sum, though there is precedent for Gakkaidissent to manifest at the polls, and there aretransformations within Soka Gakkai that loomin its near future, it would be unwise to see thetelevised protestors as representing awholesale shift by Soka Gakkai againstKomeito. Coverage of Gakkai dissenters bymass media outlets and scholarly observerswho are staunchly opposed to the Abe Cabinetand the security legislation can come across asan expression of wishful thinking, as theselective use of evidence to support apredetermined conclusion. Recent discussionswith members and historical precedent makesit difficult to believe that millions of Gakkaiadherents, like the members who gathered withMrs. Origuchi to help the Tokyo Assemblycandidate seek reelection, will simply jettisonthis core component of their religious practice.In order to gain a fuller picture of what ishappening among Gakkai political activists, wemust carry out investigations into Komeito’sSoka Gakkai voter base. We must learn fromGakkai members who do not seek mediaattention yet nonetheless work constantly tosolicit votes in their local areas. It is only bytaking their positions into account that scholarsof Japanese rel igion and polit ics wil lunderstand how the country’s most powerfulvoting bloc will operate in the future.

Levi McLaughlin is Assistant Professor at the

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Department of Philosophy and ReligiousStudies, North Carolina State University. Hiswork on Komeito appears in Komeito: Politicsand Religion in Japan (IEAS Berkeley, 2014).He is completing a manuscript titled SokaGakkai: Buddhism and Romantic Heroism inModern Japan.

His sincere thanks go to Axel Klein and StevenReed for their invaluable help with this article.

Recommended citation: Levi McLaughlin,"Komeito’s Soka Gakkai Protesters andSupporters: Religious Motivations for PoliticalActivism in Contemporary Japan", The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 13, Issue 41, No. 1,October 12, 2015.

Notes

1 For coverage of the security legislation andcases made by its critics, see Hornung, Jeffrey.“Abe on His Heels: The Prime Minister’sDomestic Standing After the Security Reforms.”(https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/japan/abe-his-heels) Foreign Affairs, 19 September2 0 1 5 ; A s a h i s h i n b u n(http://www.asahi.com/extra/articles/SDI201509192709.html) 19 September 2015. TheJapanese press was particularly concerned byforeign coverage of the rumble in the Diet andthe demonstrators outside the building; see theA s a h i s h i n b u n ’ s t i m e l i n e(http://www.asahi.com/topics/timeline/?keyword=平和憲法) on the heiwa kenpō (PeaceConstitution).

2 This event attracted considerable noticewi th in and outs ide Japan . See here(http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/30/us-ja p a n - p o l i t i c s - p r o t e s t -idUSKCN0QZ0C320150830).

3 A s a h i s h i n b u n(http://www.asahi.com/articles/ASH9F659TH9FUZPS569.html) 14 September 2015.

4 For an overview of Soka Gakkai, see here

(http://www.wrs.vcu.edu/profiles/SokaGakkai.htm) and McLaughlin, Levi, “Sōka Gakkai inJapan,” in Nelson, John and Inken Prohl, eds.Brill Handbook of Contemporary JapaneseReligion. Brill: Handbooks on ContemporaryReligion, 2012: 269-308. For a detailedexamination of Komeito, see Ehrhardt, George,Axel Klein, Levi McLaughlin, and Steven S.Reed, eds., Kōmeitō: Religion and Politics inJapan. University of California, Berkeley:Institute of East Asian Studies Japan ResearchMonographs Series 18, 2014.

5 A collection of these striking images, whichcirculated via Twitter, Youtube, and otherp l a t f o r m s , i s a v a i l a b l e h e r e(http://togetter.com/li/867610).

6 For a quantified analysis of Komeito’s highstatistical average of electoral successes, a ratethat depends on the party’s ability to assess itschances based on 1) the number of SokaGakkai voters in each district and 2) theassumption that Gakkai voter turnout is almostequal to the number of Gakkai adherents ofvoting age, see Smith, Daniel M. “Party Idealsand Practical Constraints in Kōmeitō CandidateNominations,” in Ehrhardt et al., 2014,139-162.

7 For discussions of social welfare-orientedconcessions and other policies Komeito hasfought for in coalition, see Hasunuma, Linda,and Axel Klein, “Kōmeitō in Coalition,” inEhrhardt et al. 2014, 240-265.

8 See coverage of this from October 13, 2015 int h e J a p a n T i m e s(http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/10/13/business/economy-business/government-considers-multiple-levels-2017-consumption-tax-hike/#.Vh1lW7RViko) and October 14, 2015f r o m t h e Y o m i u r i s h i n b u n(http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/20151013-OYT1T50109.html?from=ytop_top).

9 Murakami Shigeyoshi, Sōka gakkai =Kōmeitō. Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1967. Shimada

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Hiromi. Kōmeitō vs. Sōka Gakkai. Tokyo: AsahiShinsho, 2007.

10 The Asia-Pacific Journal has providedconsiderable coverage of SEALDs. See here(http://www.japanfocus.org/-Chiharu-Takano/437 5 / a r t i c l e . h t m l ) a n d h e r e(https://apjjf.org/-Robin-O_Day/4376/article.html) for key resources.

1 1 S e e h e r e(https://twitter.com/rockin_revo/status/621579865813200896). Ōbai Tōri’s Twitter feed isaccessible here: https://twitter.com/obtr3.

12 Discussions of the split between Soka Gakkaiand Nichiren Shōshū appear in McLaughlin2012.

1 3 Soka Gakkai members would locateNichiren’s discussion of ōbai tōri in the Ongikuden as it appears on page 784 in theNichiren Daishōnin gosho zenshū (Tokyo: SokaGakkai), Soka Gakkai’s 1952 edited collectionof Nichiren’s writings better known to itsadherents as the Gosho: “When one comes tosee that each – the cherry, plum, peach, anddamson – is a thing that is, in itself, theuncreated three bodies [understood here torefer to the True Buddha] without undergoingchange, th is i s the def in i t ion of a l l -encompassing.”

14 Ikeda expounded numerous times on ōbaitōri. Members today will most likely encounterhis thoughts on this topic in a recent reprint ofone of his more popular works: Ikeda Daisaku,Kōfuku to heiwa o tsukuru chie dai ni-bu (jō).Tokyo: Seikyō Shinbun, 2015.

15 Many papers and broadcast media outletscarried coverage of the Gakkai protestors.These images appeared early on Ideanews(http://ideanews.jp/archives/6324), a blogmaintained by the journalist HashimotoMasato, and circulated widely through socialmedia.

1 6 S e e h e r e(https://www.facebook.com/groups/1490510651236516/).

17 For an examination of kokka kangyō carriedout by Nichiren Buddhists from Nichirenhimself to the twentieth century, see Stone,Jacqueline I., “Rebuking the Enemies of theLotus: Nichirenist Exclusivism in HistoricalPerspective.” Japanese Journal of ReligiousStudies 21 2-3, 1994, 231-259.

1 8 Q u o t e d i n N i h o n k e i z a i s h i n b u n(http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGKKASDE25H03_V20C15A7PE8000/) 26 July 2015. It isimportant to note that Murayama, as head ofthe Japan Socialist Party, cooperated withformer Komeito politicians in coalitiongovernment in the mid-1990s and that he wasdeeply invested in security legislation issues forhis entire career. His own reinterpretation inthe mid-1990s as Prime Minister recognizingthe constitutionality of the SDF and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty changed the JapanSocialist Party’s longstanding opposition tothese institutions.

19 Mainichi shinbun 3 August 2015.

20 Mainichi shinbun 5 August 2015.

21 For Shimazono’s Twitter feed see here(https://twitter.com/shimazono), and for hisblog, see here (http://shimazono.spinavi.net/).

22 See, for instance, Shimazono’s analyses(http://shimazono.spinavi.net/?p=675) ofIkeda’s stance on collective self-defense, ananalysis that quotes extensively from theToynbee-Ikeda exchange 1972 that waspublished in English as Choose Life: A Dialogue(New York: I.B. Taurus, 2007).

2 3 T w i t t e r f e e d a c c e s s i b l e h e r e(https://twitter.com/amachin888).

24 Amano’s petition and appeal appear on hisblog (https://hakushi.amebaownd.com/). This

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site includes a link to a Youtube clip of himsubmitting the petition and a chronicle ofsupport he has received from like-mindedGakkai adherents.

25 The petition and the Yūshi no Kai’s manifesto(in Japanese, English, Spanish, and Italian) isa v a i l a b l e h e r e(http://sokauniv-nowar.strikingly.com/). ATwitter and blog from a related organizationthat sent out a “Statement of Opposition to theSecurity-Related Bills, by Soka Alumni –Friends of Article 9,” a separate effort that hasgathered over 300 signatures, are availablehere (https://twitter.com/sokaalumnipeace) andhere (http://blog.sokaalumni-peace.com/).

26 Galtung, Johan and Daisaku Ikeda, ChoosePeace: A Dialogue Between Johan Galtung &Daisaku Ikeda. London: Pluto Press, 1995.

27 An interview carried out by the SasakawaPeace Foundation USA with Kitagawa in whichhe outlines these points is available here(http://spfusa.org/nippon-com/limited-exercise-of-collective-self-defense/).

28 These shifts are discussed in Klein, Axel,“Komeito – Rock ‘n’ Row the Coalition Boat,” inPekkanen, Robert J., Steven Reed, and EthanScheiner, eds. Japan Decides 2014: TheJapanese General Election. London: PalgraveMacMillan, forthcoming, 72-86.

29 For Tōyama’s full explanation, see here(http://toyamakiyohiko.com/know/2015/09/6192.html).

3 0 See Ueda’s discussions on this point(https://www.isamu-u.com/2015/07/21/【いさむの一言（7月21日）】安全保障政策のあり/).

31 For analysis of Komeito’s emphasis onjitsugenryoku, see Hasunuma and Klein, 2014.

3 2 Correspondence with senior Gakkaiadministrator, 9 August 2015.

3 3 N i k k a n g e n d a i(http://www.nikkan-gendai.com/articles/view/news/163338/3) 3 September 2015.

34 All names of Gakkai members in this episodeand in the accounts that appear below arepseudonyms.

35 Found on pages 1192-1193 of the NichirenDaishōnin gosho zenshū reproduced in part,with interpretation offered by Ikeda Daisaku, inthe June 2013 issue of Daibyaku renge, SokaGakkai’s monthly study magazine.

36 George Ehrhardt discusses the f-tori tactic ofgaining non-member votes in “HousewifeVoters and Kōmeitō Policies,” in Ehrhardt etal., 2014, 187-211.

37 This account of Soka Gakkai and Komeito’sdevelopment is derived from McLaughlin, Levi,“Electioneering as Religious Practice: A Historyof Sōka Gakkai’s Political Activities to 1970,” inEhrhardt et al., 2014, 51-82.

38 Reproduced in Ikeda Daisaku no kisekiHenshū Iinkai, ed., Ikeda Daisaku no kiseki Vol.1. Tokyo: Ushio Shuppansha 2004, 11.

39 Toda Jōsei, Kantōgenshū. Tokyo: SōkaGakkai, 1956, 204.

40 Other religious organizations make theirpresence felt in Japanese electoral politics, yetno other organization has yet come close tomatching Soka Gakkai in this arena. Fordiscussions of why this may be the case, seeKlein, Axel, and Steven R. Reed, “ReligiousGroups in Japanese Electoral Politics,” inEhrhardt et al., 2014, 25-48.

41 LDP-Komeito negotiations from the party’sfounding through diplomatic normalization withChina and other key episodes up to the 1999coalition agreement, are detailed in Abe, Yukiand Masahisa Endo, “Kōmeitō’s UncertainDecades between Religion and Politics,” inEhrhardt et al. 2014, 83-109.

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42 Realistic assessments of Soka Gakkai’smembership place its membership atapproximately 2% of the Japanese population.See McLaughlin 2012.

43 The Soka Gakkai Peace Committee (SōkaGakkai Heiwa Iinkai) released its statement inJapanese as “Shūsen / hibaku 70-nen ni yosete”in the Seikyō shinbun on 15 August 2015 and inEnglish as “Upholding the Sanctity of Life” inthe SGI-USA newspaper World Tribune on 4September 2015. Intriguingly, the statement’sopening passages, which acknowledgeJapanese responsibility for war atrocities inChina, Korea, and other Asian countries, bringto mind the language of apology the Japanesegovernment is frequently critiqued for notemploying.

44 Gakkai members turn to a detailed account ofToda’s 1957 address in the “Senden” [Address]chapter of the novelized history of Soka Gakkait i t l ed Ningen kakumei [The HumanRevolution], Vol. 12 (Ikeda Daisaku, Ningenkakumei Vol. 12. Tokyo: Seikyō Shinbun, 2007,89-156). A partial English translation of hisa d d r e s s i s a v a i l a b l e h e r e(http://www.joseitoda.org/vision/declaration/), asite maintained by Soka Gakkai International.

45 The 2015 Peace Proposal, titled “A SharedPledge for a More Humane Future: ToE l i m i n a t e M i s e r y f r o m t h e E a r t h ”(http://www.daisakuikeda.org/assets/files/peaceproposal2015.pdf).

46 In December 1995, Ikeda met in Tokyo withthe Argentinian human rights activist andNobel Peace laureate Adolfo Pérez Esquivel fora dialogue that was translated as “Message forthe Age of Human Rights – What does the ThirdM i l l e n i u m R e q u i r e ? ”(http://www.iop.or.jp/Documents/0717/ikeda_esquivel.pdf). In this exchange, Ikeda cited hismentor Toda on the topic of inter-religiouscooperation, crediting Toda with the following:“If giants like Nichiren Daishonin, Shakyamuni,

Jesus Christ, Mohammed, Marx, and otherscould come together for a conference theywould talk in terms of compassion and love.They would discuss, make concessions, andrespect each other. For the attainment of theeternal happiness of humanity, their greatshared goal, they would abolish war, violence,and conflict and would agree perfectly on waysto bring real peace and true prosperity.” Thisstance differs considerably from the manyharsh crit iques Toda leveled at jakyō(heterodox faiths), a term he applied to everyreligion outside Nichiren Shōshū Buddhism,and the tone struck by Gakkai publicationsunder his auspices, including the 1951Shakubuku kyōten [Handbook of Conversion],which provided Gakkai members with detailedarguments to use against rival religions,including Christianity.

47 Nichiren set out the five comparisons in hisKaimokushō [Opening of the Eyes] that laterNichiren scholars codified as the gojū no sōtai(fivefold comparison) to reinforce Nichiren’sargument for the superiority of exclusiveembrace of the Lotus over all other teachings.In her analysis of Nichiren’s categories,Jacqueline Stone notes that Nichiren wascarrying out his own version of kyōhan(doctrinal classification), effectively elaboratingon the Tendai Buddhist tradition in which hewas trained. See Stone, Jacqueline, OriginalEnlightenment and the Transformation ofMedieval Japanese Buddhism. Honolulu:University of Hawai‘i Press, 1999, 265-266.One might posit that Nishino and his colleaguesare, in effect, extending the Nichiren Buddhisttradition of kyōhan.

48 “Worms within the lion’s body” (shishishinchū no mushi) is an analogy from theBrahmā Net Sutra that refers to evil monkswho destroy the dharma from within theBuddhist community.

49 Ishin tai’e, “substituting faith for wisdom,” isa principle derived from the Lotus Sutra, in

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which Śāriputra, the wisest of the BuddhaŚākyamuni’s disciples, obtains enlightenmentthrough faith alone. Nichiren held forth on thisprinciple in his 1277 treatise Shishin gohonshō,“On the Four stages of Faith and the FiveStages of Practice.” Gosho, 338-343.

5 0 Hokkekō is a Nichiren Shōshū layorganization that opposes Soka Gakkai. Firstestablished in 1962, it gained converts after ex-Gakkai members joined in the wake of the 1991Soka Gakkai / Nichiren Shōshū schism.Hokkekō is routinely vilified by Gakkai leadersas a nefarious force bent on perverting thedharma, and, as Tsuda’s remarks indicate,Gakkai members remain vigilant for signs ofHokkekō members in their midst.

51 Fisker-Nielsen, Anne Mette. Religion andPolitics in Contemporary Japan: Soka GakkaiYouth and Komeito. London and New York:Routledge, 2012. Chapter 3, “A Case ofInterpretation? Komeito Supporters as PoliticalPawns, Right-Wing Collaborators, or Political

Actors” details voter attitudes during thepivotal events of the Iraq dispatch.

52 Kisala, Robert. Prophets of Peace: Pacifismand Cultural Identity in Japan’s New Religions.Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1999,84.

53 Komeito posts all of its election results on itsh o m e p a g e(https://www.komei.or.jp/election/result/).

54 Scott, James C. Weapons of the Weak:Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. NewHaven: Yale University Press, 1985.

55 Data to support Reed’s observations werediscussed by NHK commentator AdachiY o s h i m a s a(http://www.nhk.or.jp/kaisetsu-blog/100/192994.html) on 15 July 2014 and by the Sankeis h i n b u n(http://www.sankei.com/politics/news/140724/plt1407240021-n1.html) on 24 July 2014.