Klotz - Norms Reconstituting Interest

Norms reconstituting interests:global racial equality and U.S.sanctions against South AfricaAudie Klotz

Transnational anti-apartheid activists' extraordinary success in generatinggreat power sanctions against South Africa offers ample evidence that norms,independent of material considerations, are an important factor in determiningstates' policies. Despite a wide range of strategic and economic interests,almost every international organization and state, including the UnitedNations (UN), the Commonwealth, the European Community, the Nordicstates, Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and the United States, adoptedcultural, economic, and military sanctions against South Africa by the mid-1980s.1

Apartheid, a domestic system of political, economic, and social discrimina-tion based on racial categorization, garnered South Africa unparalleled pariahstatus as this broad array of global actors implemented sanctions in support ofracial equality. Norms, such as racial equality, are shared (social) understand-ings of standards for behavior. Thus, a norm of racial equality definesdiscrimination based upon racial categories (as evident in racist language,personal actions, and/or social policies) as bad and individual equality (lack ofdiscrimination) as good. (By describing racism in such simplified terms, I do notintend to imply that norms always present clear dichotomous alternatives.)Consequently, support for South Africa sustains its racist apartheid system;opposition to South Africa signifies support for racial equality.

For extensive discussions and detailed comments I thank Paul D'Anieri, Locksley Edmondson,Lori Gronich, Anita Isaacs, Peter Katzenstein, Cecelia Lynch, John Odell, Judith Reppy, ChrisReus-Smit, Cherie Steele, and Alex Wendt. I gratefully acknowledge financial support for researchand writing from the following institutions: the National Science Foundation's graduate fellowshipprogram, the Social Science Research Council's MacArthur Program on International Peace andSecurity, and the University of Southern California's visiting scholar program at its Center forInternational Studies.

1. For the most comprehensive overview of sanctions against South Africa, see DeonGeldenhuys, Outcast States: A Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1990).

International Organization 49, 3, Summer 1995, pp. 451-78© 1995 by The IO Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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A plausible explanation for these extraordinary sanctions is a strengthenedglobal norm of racial equality: people around the world cared about racialdiscrimination generally, and South Africa in particular, more than everbefore. Yet this explanation goes beyond conventional theoretical perspectivesthat both dismiss a fundamental role for global norms and assume theimportance of U.S. hegemonic leadership. For example, U.S. policymakerswere followers, not the leaders, in arguing that sanctions against South Africawould aid in eliminating that country's institutionalized racial discrimination.But because agreement on what behavior should be does not ensure compli-ance, we need to understand why people in general and U.S. policymakers inparticular came to care about internal South African race relations, why theyfelt compelled to do something about it, and how this ethical concern related toprevailing strategic and economic interests. Thus, this article analyzes oneprocess by which the discourse of "ought" becomes the "is" of behavior.

Since international relations theories generally ignore or underemphasizenorms, analyzing sanctions against South Africa offers an avenue for improvingunderstanding of norms in both theory and practice. Specifically, because theUnited States has been a major power with substantial strategic and economicinterests in southern Africa, this case should easily confirm the structuralmaterialist (neorealist) perspective. For example, for decades those concernedabout U.S. global strategic interests emphasized crucial mineral deposits andvulnerable sea lanes; many also stressed the importance of maintaining amarket economy in South Africa to counter the spread of socialist-orientedgovernments in the southern African region. In addition, U.S.-based multina-tional corporations had significant involvement in the South African economy.2But if the United States were acting simply on strategic or economicconsiderations, it would not have cared about domestic racial discrimination inSouth Africa and would have continued its postwar policy of adamantlyrejecting sanctions, even in the face of growing international pressures.

Thus, in the absence of material structural change—indeed, the mid-1980swere a peak period of U.S. concern over the Soviet challenge—conventionalstructural realism cannot explain the shift to anti-apartheid sanctions in1985-86. There is no structural material reason why the United States shouldadopt a policy that inhibits its interests in the region and reduces support for itspowerful regional ally. Furthermore, explanations based on balancing againstinterests in "black" Africa presume a racially defined characterization of actorsand interests—which goes beyond the theoretical assumptions of materialpower and capabilities. In addition, U.S. sanctions policy is difficult to explaineven within the regimes perspective, which acknowledges a role for normsthrough systemic constraints. Despite unanimous global recognition of a norm

2. See, variously, William Minter, King Solomon's Mines Revisited: Western Interests and theBurdened History of Southern Africa (New York: Basic Books, 1986); Study Commission on U.S.Policy Toward Southern Africa, South Africa: Time Running Out (Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress, 1981); and Christopher Coker, The United States and South Africa 1968-1985: ConstructiveEngagement and Its Critics (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1986).

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of racial equality through UN resolutions as early as 1960, regime constraintremained weak on the apartheid issue. The United States exercised its vetopower in the Security Council, and domestic demands for sanctions laggedbehind long-standing international pressures. Rather than establishing globalnorms and leading policy shifts, as predicted by both realism and regimetheories, U.S. sanctions responded to global anti-apartheid pressures.

Questions arise, therefore, about how global anti-apartheid activists over-came the prevailing indifference among U.S. policymakers—and the generalpublic—to racial segregation in South Africa and how this new concern forracial equality could alter consistent strategic and economic support for SouthAfrica. In contrast to conventional theories, I argue that successful transna-tional anti-apartheid advocates' demands for sanctions demonstrate the crucialrole of a global norm of racial equality in reconstituting U.S. interests. What ismost remarkable about domestic demands for racial equality and sanctionsagainst apartheid is that previously uninfluential arguments for nonracialdemocracy became fundamental components of the definition of U.S. nationalinterests in the mid-1980s.

This constitutive—rather than solely constraining—relationship betweennorms and interests is best understood through a constructivist theory ofinternational politics. Building upon this empirical analysis, I suggest that weshould conceive of state interest formation as a global, rather than an insulateddomestic, process. I am not arguing, however, that this is the only role fornorms or that states always have clearly defined interests. Only if we analyzethis underemphasized constitutive role will we be able to distinguish amongvarious types of and roles for norms, as well as ascertain conditions underwhich norms reconstitute interests. I return to these issues in the conclusion.

Through an overview of international demands for anti-apartheid sanctionsand a summary of U.S. postwar policy, the following section argues that U.S.sanctions against South Africa are an anomaly for conventional realist andregime explanations of international politics and outlines an alternativeconstructivist perspective. The subsequent empirical sections explain thetransnational anti-apartheid movement's success in making apartheid a na-tional political issue within the context of a discourse of racial equality and thesubsequent redefinition of U.S. interests that framed policy debates. Majorityrule in South Africa shifted from a peripheral to a primary concern andpolicymakers adopted sanctions to support racial equality. In conclusion, Iexplore some of the implications of this case for developing a more empiricallyoriented constructivist theory.

Theoretical perspectives on U.S. policy toward South Africa

U.S. adoption of anti-apartheid sanctions is surprising given historical continu-ity in its support for South Africa. Prior to the mid-1980s, policymaking towardAfrica generally remained insulated from UN and domestic pressures as the


United States pursued its strategic and economic interests. Access to mineralsand markets seemed assured under conservative South African governmentssince white-minority rule guaranteed an alliance against communist expansionin the region. Thus U.S. policy prior to the mid-1980s confirms a structuralrealist perspective. Increasing support for racial equality, however, disruptedthe easy correspondence between strategic and economic interests, opening anunprecedented debate over non-racial democracy and U.S. interests in theregion. These debates, and the subsequent adoption of sanctions, illustrate theconstructivist claim that national interests are intersubjective, rather thanderived objectively from the distribution of material capabilities.

Structural realism and postwar U.S. policyGlobal demands for racial equality and for the elimination of South Africa's

apartheid system emerged early in the postwar period. Demands for anti-apartheid sanctions first emerged during the 1950s and gained momentum insubsequent years.3 Notably, in 1960 the UN General Assembly passedResolution 1598 unanimously (with only Portugal abstaining), starting apattern of universal international condemnation of apartheid and rejection ofSouth Africa's domestic jurisdiction defense. The General Assembly subse-quently passed a series of voluntary sanctions against South Africa, over theobjections of Western powers. But as early as 1960, the debate over sanctionsshifted to the Security Council since only its resolutions could requiremandatory action (as stipulated in chapter 7 of the UN Charter). The SecurityCouncil, designed to focus specifically on issues of peace and security, includedapartheid on its agenda beginning with Resolution 134 in 1960, but permanentmember vetoes blocked mandatory sanctions.4 Despite this stalemate oversanctions, innumerable General Assembly and Security Council resolutionssince 1960 continued unanimously to condemn apartheid and reaffirm a normof racial equality.

The United States joined in this condemnation of apartheid, despite thepersistence of its own domestic racial segregation. U.S. voting in the UN thusacknowledged and reinforced a global norm of racial equality even while itresisted concrete multilateral actions against South Africa. Generally following

3. For an overview of the early international debates over apartheid, see Richard E. Bissell,Apartheid and International Organizations (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1977); as well as the debatesummaries and resolutions in United Nations (UN), Department of Information, Yearbook of theUnited Nations (New York: Columbia University Press/United Nations, 1946-88). Hereafter, theseannuals will be cited by title and year.

4. The 1977 arms embargo is the one notable mandatory UN sanction against South Africa. Ittargeted South Africa's aggressive regional military role, defined as a "threat to international peaceand security," and violations of Security Council sanctions against Rhodesia. It was not adopted inresponse to apartheid, as evident in Western permanent members' concurrent rejection ofmandatory economic sanctions. For details of these debates and resolutions see UN, Yearbook ofthe United Nations, 1977.

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Britain's lead, the United States consistently vetoed proposals for mandatorySecurity Council sanctions from the early 1960s through the late 1980s. WhenU.S. relations with South Africa were discussed at all, that country was viewedas a bulwark against communist influence in resource-rich and capitalistsouthern Africa. U.S. policymakers generally considered South Africa's rulingwhites, who shared their concern about communist expansion, as natural alliesfor maintaining stability within South Africa (and hence within the entireregion).5 Thus U.S. policymakers dismissed both sanctions and majority rule asantithetical to U.S. strategic and economic interests.

This ranking of minerals and markets over democracy was even moreapparent during the debates over whether to comply with UN sanctions againstRhodesia. Initially, the United States supported multilateral sanctions toprotest the Unilateral Declaration of Independence announced by (Southern)Rhodesia's white minority government on 11 November 1965. Only after yearsof political pressures to define access to strategic minerals as a vital U.S.national interest did Congress pass the Byrd amendment in 1971, exemptingchrome, ferrochrome, and nickel from sanctions restrictions. In other words,before strategic mineral arguments became politically salient, the UnitedStates had adopted sanctions in support of a norm of racial equality (which wasbeing explicitly flaunted by the white minority Rhodesian regime).6 Concernsabout communism, defined in terms of strategic resources and marketeconomies, clearly took priority over concerns about racial equality anddemocracy.

Prior to the mid-1980s, therefore, material interests—even when theyconflicted with an explicit commitment to racial equality and democracy-motivated U.S. policy toward South Africa and the region. This historicalrecord confirms policy predictions derived from structural realist theory, asillustrated in Figure I.7 Consequently, U.S. policy in the 1980s should haveremained an easy case for structural material explanations. Indeed, the

5. The most explicit statement of this position is National Security Study Memorandum 39,prepared for Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. For details see Mohamed A. El-Khawas andBarry Cohen, eds., National Security Study Memorandum 39: The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa(Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill, 1976). However, similar arguments dominated policy as early asthe Truman administration. See Thomas Borstelmann, Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle: The UnitedStates and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). For anoverview of the South African government's view, see James Barber and John Barratt, SouthAfrica's Foreign Policy: The Search for Status and Security 1945-1988 (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1990).

6. For details of the shift in U.S. policy toward Rhodesia, see Anthony Lake, The Tar BabyOption: American Policy Toward Southern Rhodesia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976).

7. Analyses of policies toward South Africa are rarely explicitly theoretically informed butgenerally conform to either a traditional realist perspective or a domestic politics perspective. Anoteworthy exception is Gerald J. Bender, James S. Coleman, and Richard L. Sklar, eds., AfricanCrisis Areas and U.S. Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), which emphasizes theimportance of bipolarity and superpower intervention in southern African conflicts. For anelaboration on the theoretical tenets and critiques of a structural realist approach, see Robert O.Keohane, ed., Neo-realism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).


THEORY

Systemicdistribution ofmilitary (andeconomic)capabilities

States' interests Policies

Hegemonic powerin southern Africa

APPLICATION

Minerals (andmarkets) w

Support forconservative SouthAfricangovernments

FIGURE l. Structural realism and U.S. postwar policy

popularity of the conservative Reagan administration further bolsters theplausibility of statist assumptions about the autonomy of executive decisionmakers.8 Yet while material U.S. interests in southern Africa did not diminishprior to 1986—indeed the Reagan administration argued that they increasedbecause of Cuban involvement in Angola—U.S. policy did change. A basicstructural realist perspective cannot explain the shift to sanctions because theanti-apartheid movement, demanding that U.S. foreign policy promote racialequality in South Africa, succeeded despite the persistence of these strategicand economic interests.

Regime theory and domestic politicsBecause conventional structural materialist theories view norms as the

powerless product of interests, they offer little analytical leverage in thisempirical case where concern for racial equality preempted material interests.Regime theorists, however, have taken norms more seriously than realists as asource of global policy coordination and thus should offer an explanation ofmultilateral and U.S. sanctions. The politics of racial equality, however, do notfit with the expectations of regime theorists; the United States did not respondto multilateral coercion or incentives.

8. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker's own characterization ofpolicymaking in the early 1980s confirms both an assumption of executive autonomy and thepriority given to strategic concerns, confirming the applicability of a statist approach ascharacterized by Stephen D. Krasner in Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investmentsand U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978). For elaboration, seeCrocker's autobiography, High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood(New York: W. W. Norton, 1992).

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A hegemonic regime perspective, which shares the basic realist emphasis onthe distribution of material capabilities, grants norms limited constrainingeffect through international institutions.9 In this view, the emergence of aglobal norm of racial equality and the enforcement of compliance would resultfrom a prior U.S. commitment, presumably the result of the domestic civilrights movement of the 1960s. But as with structural materialist explanationsgenerally, emphasis on hegemony cannot explain the lack of U.S. leadership inthe sanctions movement, even though U.S. participation in unanimous interna-tional condemnation of apartheid in the UN lent a hegemon's power tostrengthening a global norm of racial equality in the 1950s and early 1960s. Thehistory of international demands for racial equality points to the importance ofnonhegemonic states and nonstate actors (including the Abolitionists in the1800s, Japan in the interwar period, and since 1945, newly independent Africanstates and the transnational anti-apartheid movement) long before the civilrights movement's success in the United States. From this historical perspec-tive, we see U.S. civil rights as part of a global movement toward racial equality,rather than solely an isolated domestic agenda. For example, the U.S. civilrights movement benefited from UN consensus on racial equality, and someactivists even called for UN consideration of U.S. discrimination.10 The realistvariant of regime theory, therefore, cannot explain the politics of racial equalitygenerally or U.S. sanctions against South Africa in particular.

Moving away from the realist emphasis on coercive capabilities, theneoliberal variant of regime theory explains compliance with norms primarilyin terms of cost-benefit analysis: reciprocity prevails and norms becomeinstitutionalized because such arrangements provide substantial benefits,which may outweigh the opportunity costs of not acting immediately based onshort-term interests.11 In this view, a global norm of racial equality could havean impact on or constrain U.S. policy through an organization such as the UN.However, since the United States successfully blocked demands for mandatory

9. See Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Joseph Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations:Europe, America and Non-tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); andsome (but not all) contributions to Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.:Cornell University Press, 1983).

10. For elaboration, see Borstelmann, Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle. For historical overviews ofthe origins and evolution of demands for racial equality, see David Brion Davis, Slavery and HumanProgress (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); R. J. M. Blackett, Building an Antislavery Wall:Black Americans in the Atlantic Abolitionist Movement, 1830-1860 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress, 1983); Paul Gordon Lauren, Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of RacialDiscrimination (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1988); and Vincent Harding, There Is a River: The BlackStruggle for Freedom in America (New York: Vintage, 1981). Explaining the origins of this norm ofracial equality is beyond the scope of this article.

11. See Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World PoliticalEconomy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984); and Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Coopera-tion Under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986). Martin's evaluation of theseclaims suggests significant support for the importance of institutions. See Lisa L. Martin, CoerciveCooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UniversityPress, 1992).


multilateral sanctions in the Security Council—even during the 1980s whileCongress was passing domestic sanctions legislation—little evidence suggeststhat international institutions altered cost-benefit calculations of U.S. policy-makers.12 Furthermore, the United States is not a member of the Common-wealth, which emerged as the primary arena for multilateral sanctions. Thusneither variant of regime theory explains U.S. policy, despite acknowledgmentof a potential role for a norm of racial equality.

Yet regime theory does offer suggestions for linking global norms anddomestic politics. By stressing long-term interests, for example, this perspectivesuggests that even in the absence of a hegemon and its coercive power, greatpowers may be willing to bear costs for abiding by norms under certainconditions. Furthermore, neoliberal theory suggests that domestic politics—rather than solely the distribution of material capabilities—may be animportant determinant of these long-term interests. But since regime theorymakes no claims to explain domestic politics, the question remains howinternational norms are related to domestic politics.13 One reason such asupplementary theory remains elusive is that "domestic factors" is a residualcategory comprising everything that interstate interaction cannot explain.

However, even if regime theorists did provide a specific supplementarytheory, a domestic politics explanation remains insufficient for explaining U.S.sanctions. Although Congress initiated the Comprehensive Anti-ApartheidAct of 1986, which survived the veto of a profoundly popular President, tocharacterize this societal mobilization against apartheid as domestic overlooksthe global nature of the anti-apartheid movement. Domestic activists wereconnected to a transnational social movement that protested apartheid andpromoted sanctions in almost every international organization and state. Byitself a domestic politics explanation leaves open a number of questions,including why foreign policy toward South Africa became such a salientdomestic political issue and why U.S. sanctions were part of a universalresponse to global anti-apartheid activists.14 Figure 2 illustrates these differ-ences between the domestic focus of regime theory and the transnationalnature of the U.S. sanctions case. What needs to be explained, therefore, is thetransnational process by which global activists' demands for racial equality

12. External constraint may, however, have limited overt support for the South African regime,even in the early postwar period when the norm of racial equality was emerging and materialinterests were strong. See Borstelmann, Apartheid's Reluctant Uncle, chap. 4.

13. See Robert O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," InternationalInstitutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Westview,1989), pp. 159-79; and Andrew Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act," in Robert O.Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., The New European Community: Decisionmaking andInstitutional Change (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991), pp. 41-84.

14. The broad range and coordinated nature of international reactions to South Africanapartheid are more than coincidental; for a defense of this claim, see Audie Klotz, ProtestingPrejudice: Apartheid and the Politics of Norms in International Relations (Ithaca, N.Y.: CornellUniversity Press, forthcoming).

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Systemicdistribution ofmilitary andeconomiccapabilities

REGIME THEORY

States' interests

tSupplementarytheory of domesticpolitics

Policies

tRegimes

U.S. POLICY, MID-1980S

Hegemonic powerin southern Africa

Democracy =precondition forminerals (andmarkets)

Sanctions

Global norm ofracial equality

Transnational anti-apartheid activists

United Nations

FIGURE 2. Domestic versus transnational explanations

were transmitted into effective domestic demands for sanctions againstapartheid.

Constructivism and national interestsBy tracing the demands for global racial equality and sanctions against South

Africa within the United States, the following analysis demonstrates howtransnational anti-apartheid activists generated pressures in Congress for apolicy overtly and substantively in support of racial equality in South Africa.Because of its tolerance for white-minority rule, the U.S. administration provedincapable of deflecting these congressional demands, resulting in passage ofthe Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 and the override of PresidentReagan's veto. By the mid-1980s, the discourse of racial equality frameddiscussion of policy toward South Africa, both motivating congressional


demands for sanctions and constraining the executive's power in formulatingforeign policy. Focusing in this way on transnational transmission mechanismsand connecting congressional sanctions policy with a global norm opensdomestic political processes directly to systemic influences and demonstrates abroader role for norms, including substantive effects on states' definitions oftheir interests.15

This case study illustrates empirically one of the fundamental theoreticalclaims of a constructivist theory of international relations: norms are constitu-tive components of both the international system and states' interests.16 Normsare not simply an ethical alternative to or constraint on self-interest. Rather, inthe constructivist view, system-level norms play an explanatory role. Theshifting importance of contending global norms offers a theoretical explanationof interest (re)formation. Thus international actors—even great powers such asthe United States—inherently are socially constructed; that is, prevailing globalnorms, such as racial equality, partially define their interests. U.S. domesticpolitics, for example, changed as global racial equality became increasinglyaccepted during the 1960s. This broader social transformation provided a newcontext for evaluating U.S. interests in South Africa and the region.

Yet primarily because of the paradigmatic characterization of internationalrelations theories as a division between the realists and the idealists, thisconstitutive role of norms remains insufficiently analyzed. In addition, evenmost empirically oriented constructivist discussions focus on the transforma-tion from the medieval to modern state system, rather than on policyexplanation.17 Differing views of interest formation, therefore, are crucial forcomparing and contrasting theoretical claims about norms.18 Regimes are part

15. For elaboration on why this transnational emphasis goes beyond conventional notions ofsovereignty and levels of analysis, see Emanuel Adler and Peter M. Haas, "Conclusion: EpistemicCommunities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program," InternationalOrganization 46 (Winter 1992), pp. 367-90.

16. See especially the following works by Friedrich Kratochwil, "Of Systems, Boundaries, andTerritoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of the State System," World Politics 38 (October1986), pp. 27-52; "On the Notion of 'Interest' in International Relations," InternationalOrganization 36 (Winter 1982), pp. 1-30; "The Force of Prescriptions," International Organization38 (Autumn 1984), pp. 685-708; and Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical andLegal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1989). See also Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," InternationalOrganization 46 (Spring 1992), pp. 391^25; and Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, World of Our Making:Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia: University of South CarolinaPress, 1989). Wendt and Onuf label this perspective constructivist based on the structurationtheory of sociologist Anthony Giddens, the main tenet of which is that structures and agentsreconstruct each other in a dynamic process of iteration. For elaboration on and critiques ofGiddens's theory, see David Held and John B. Thompson, eds., Social Theory of Modern Societies:Anthony Giddens and His Critics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

17. See, for example, John Gerard Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: ProblematizingModernity in International Relations," International Organization 47 (Winter 1993), pp. 139-74.

18. Despite frequently being characterized as articulating a rival research paradigm, constructiv-ists accept many of the substantive aspects of the regimes research agenda. For examples ofsimilarities among institutionalist approaches, see Oran Young, International Cooperation (Ithaca,N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989); and contributions in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-OttoCzempiel, eds., Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge:

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REGIME THEORY

Systemicdistribution ofmilitary andeconomiccapabilities

States' interests

\

Policies

t \ 'Supplementarytheory of domesticpolitics

Regimes

CONSTRUCTIVISM

Systemicdistribution ofmaterialcapabilities

States' interests

>

Constitutive norms

\Policies

, \ fDomestic discourseand institutions

Regimes

FIGURE 3. Contrasting theories of norms and interests

of the external environment in which actors pursue their interests; norms,therefore, do not alter actors' fundamental definitions of their interests orpreference rankings.19 In contrast, for constructivists, state interests aredetermined in part by system-level norms that define interests. Global normsare one form of a more pervasive—constitutive rather than coercive—component of the international system. Figure 3 illustrates these theoreticaldifferences between regime theory and constructivism.

International norms, for a constructivist, do not, strictly speaking, determinebehavior since they constitute identities and interests and define a range of

Cambridge University Press, 1992). On the paradigmatic dichotomy between institutionalapproaches see Keohane, "International Institutions"; and Adler and Haas, "Conclusion:Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflectivist Research Program."

19. See, for example, the emphasis on ideas as "road maps" in Judith Goldstein and Robert O.Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework," in Judith Goldstein and RobertO. Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca, N.Y.:Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 3-30.


legitimate policy options. The legitimation of certain goals and means,therefore, constrains choices even though it cannot predict more than a rangeof possible choices. This lack of determinism is not, however, substantiallydifferent from any of the claims of structural theories; the more narrowly theseexternal constraints limit the range of policy choice, the closer such constraintresembles determinative motivational cause. If structural constraints narrowthe range of choice to fight or die (the basic structural realist argument), thenclaiming that structures cause fighting seems reasonable. Thus a norm of racialequality defines a range of acceptable policies.

The following analysis of changes in U.S. policy toward South Africademonstrates that global norms can affect the reconstitution of interestsdirectly through transnational processes, without interstate interaction ormultilateral coercion. A global norm of racial equality redefined U.S. intereststhrough transnational mobilization, rather than through intergovernmentalbargaining or shifts in structural material conditions. Subsequently, state actionbased on these new or revised interests strengthened norms and institutions (asin the conventional regimes approach). The resulting sanctions policy in turnstrengthened the norm of racial equality both in international institutions andwithin South Africa itself. This case study offers empirical evidence of theconstructivist claim that norms can reconstitute interests and suggests condi-tions under which that claim may hold in other cases.

Global norms and the transnational origins of domesticdemands for sanctions

The transnational anti-apartheid movement's success in mobilizing support forsanctions against South Africa was predicated on uniting concern over the twinissues of U.S. race relations and apartheid. Activists achieved this goal by bothframing the apartheid issue in the context of the prevailing civil rights discourseof equality and increasing their institutional access to decision-making power.The result was the increased salience of their argument that U.S. interests werebest served by actively promoting racial equality and democracy in SouthAfrica. By 1984, racial equality could no longer simply be ignored or sacrificedto preserve stability and profits in South Africa and the region. Apartheid andforeign policy became the focus of intense national debate.

Transnational origins of the anti-apartheid movementThe unprecedented salience of the apartheid issue in U.S. domestic politics

in the mid-1980s resulted principally from African-Americans' participation inboth formulating and implementing anti-apartheid protest. For adherents ofPan-Africanism—historically the core of African-American activism on Afri-can issues—the juxtaposed issues of U.S. and South African race relations

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logically connected as two aspects of political mobilization for global racialequality. One consequence of the long-standing interactions between African-American and African political leaders was the extent to which each group'sviews on African issues, especially apartheid, shared a common Pan-Africanintellectual heritage.20 Continuing and regenerated personal ties maintainedthese commonalities.

Independence for many former African colonies, beginning with Ghana in1957, was one crucial factor in a resurgent African-American interest inAfrican affairs.21 The 1960 Sharpeville killings in South Africa revitalizedAfrican-American attention on the southern region of the continent. As earlyas 1962, the civil rights spokesman Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and SouthAfrican Chief Albert Luthuli (then president of the African National Con-gress) issued a joint statement calling for the imposition of internationalsanctions against South Africa.22 By the early 1960s, African-American interestin South African affairs manifested itself in increasingly organized demands forsanctions, explicitly linking civil rights, the international image of the UnitedStates, and its interests in Africa.23

Through the more race-conscious civil rights and Black Power movements ofthe 1960s, African-Americans articulated a stronger vision of transnationalinterests in African affairs, one reminiscent of earlier Pan-Africanism.24 Astheir own movements radicalized, African-Americans' interest focused increas-ingly on liberation movements, primarily those in the southern African region.African-American radicalization coincided with similar radicalization in theseliberation movements which, since the early 1960s, had launched militaryactions against colonial and apartheid rule. By the end of the 1960s, African-American activists and politicians had committed themselves to pursuing theirinterest in African affairs. One of the most visible signs was RepresentativeCharles Diggs assuming the chair of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee

20. On the historical roots of Pan-Africanism, see Colin Legum, Pan-Africanism: A ShortPolitical Guide (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1962). Unless otherwise noted, the followingdiscussion of the relationship between Pan-African ideology and African-American politicalactivism derives from Bernard Makhosezwe Magubane, The Ties That Bind: African-AmericanConsciousness of Africa (Trenton, N.J.: Africa World Press, 1987); Locksley Edmondson, "BlackAmerica as a Mobilizing Diaspora: Some International Implications," in Gabriel Shaffer, ed.,Modem Diasporas in International Politics (New York: St. Martin's, 1986), pp. 164—211; and PhilipV. White, "The Black American Constituency for Southern Africa, 1940-1980," in Alfred O. Hero,Jr., and John Barratt, eds., The American People and South Africa: Publics, Elites, and PolicymakingProcesses (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1981), pp. 83-102.

21. Activism had been inhibited during the McCarthy era. For details, see Hollis R. Lynch, BlackAmerican Radicals and the Liberation of Africa: The Council on African Affairs 1937-1955 (Ithaca,N.Y.: Africana Studies and Research Center, Cornell University, 1978); and Martin Staniland,American Intellectuals and African Nationalists, 1955-1970 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale UniversityPress, 1991).

22. Magubane, The Ties that Bind, p. 216.23. For details, see White, "The Black American Constituency for Southern Africa, 1940-1980,"

p. 87.24. See Edmondson, "Black America as a Mobilizing Diaspora," pp. 183 and 185.


on Africa in 1969. Diggs was also a founding member, and first chair, of theCongressional Black Caucus, which was established in 1971.

In a less institutionalized setting, two African-American workers initiated aprotest movement against the Polaroid Corporation. They demanded an end tosales of photographic equipment that was being used by the South Africangovernment to implement its controversial pass-law system, which requirednonwhites to carry documentation regulating their work, residence, andinternal travel.25 Protests against Polaroid focused public attention on thedivestment dimension of the apartheid controversy, foreshadowing subsequentdebates over corporate involvement in South Africa. In reaction to thearguments over the ethical responsibilities of corporations such as Polaroid,African-American Rev. Leon Sullivan, himself a corporate board member,devised the Sullivan Principles as corporate guidelines for enhancing the livingand working conditions of their black South African employees. Criticizingthese principles and the philosophy behind them, advocates of divestment, onthe other hand, saw such ameliorative measures as drastically insufficient; theyargued for complete corporate withdrawal as well as government (andinternational) enforcement of economic disengagement.

Two tracks within the anti-apartheid debate thus emerged out of thePolaroid controversy: corporate responsibility and U.S. government policy.Pursuing both of these dimensions, grass-roots protests spread. Debates overapartheid began to reach the national political level for the first time; indeed,Africa policy had never before been a focus of national politics, with the briefexception of the Kennedy presidential campaign. During the 1976 presidentialcampaign, Democratic candidate Jimmy Carter emphasized the need toincrease the role of African-Americans both in foreign policy generally andpolicy toward Africa in particular. The subsequent role of civil rights activistAndrew Young, as permanent representative to the UN, in formulating theCarter administration's South Africa policy blurred the previous distinctionbetween external pressure on government policy and participation in policymak-ing itself.

Nevertheless, Carter's appointment of Young did not forestall continuedpressure, from both African-Americans and other activists, for a stronger U.S.response to South African racial policies. African leaders as well as African-Americans indeed were disappointed in the lack of substance in Young's SouthAfrica policy, notably his lack of support for sanctions.26 Until the 1980s, theliberal economic argument that increasing investments in South Africa gradu-ally would eliminate apartheid segregation still prevailed among most policy-makers—even among many committed advocates of racial equality, including

25. For details of the Polaroid controversy and its consequences, see White, "The BlackAmerican Constituency for Southern Africa, 1940-1980," pp. 89-90.

26. For a discussion of Young's role, see Henry F. Jackson, From the Congo to Soweto: U.S.Foreign Policy Toward Africa Since 1960 (New York: William Morrow, 1982), pp. 153-60.

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Young. Sanctions advocates, therefore, needed to undermine the liberalreform argument; they succeeded with a national interest argument.

Anti-apartheid sanctions as a national issueBy the late 1970s, liberal arguments of economic reform lost ground to

increasingly organized advocates of sanctions. In 1977, the lobbying groupTransAfrica was established under the aegis of the Congressional BlackCaucus and with additional support from civil rights groups. Initially Rhodesiawas TransAfrica's focus, but in the anti-apartheid movement's perspective,Rhodesian white minority rule was not a separate issue from South Africanwhite minority rule. With a mandate to lobby the government on African andCaribbean issues, the organization garnered support from elected officials,specialists on Africa, religious leaders, and other observers of African affairs inits efforts to force action on the South Africa issue. Not surprisingly, since theorganization's head, Randall Robinson, was a former assistant to Representa-tive Diggs, the House Subcommittee on Africa became the focal point forpressure, although during the Carter presidency Robinson also had directaccess to important State Department and administration figures.27

TransAfrica's establishment manifested the increased effectiveness andvisibility of African-American activism on southern African issues. TransAfri-ca's alliance with the Congressional Black Caucus signified a shift towardelectoral politics, in addition to activists' previous efforts to protest and toinfluence the executive directly. While the targets of protest widened, thesocietal base for activism also expanded. In addition to its domestic activism,TransAfrica maintained direct contacts with the transnational anti-apartheidmovement and was given official observer status by the Organization of AfricanUnity.28 Furthermore, the alliance behind TransAfrica marked the incorpora-tion of transnational Pan-Africanism into the more politically mainstreamintegrationist perspective, linking domestic issues of black freedom to Africanones.29 Advocates of sanctions, including Robinson, now argued that long-termU.S. interests were best served by allying with the black South Africanmajority.30

In response to dramatically escalating conflict within South Africa in thelatter half of 1984, TransAfrica played a critical role in expanding publicawareness of, and organizing protest about, apartheid. Allied grassroots groupsthroughout the country also contributed to the dispersion of pressure beyondthe federal level down to corporations, state and local governments, andinvestment groups (including universities, pension funds, and other private

27. For details on Robinson and TransAfrica, see ibid., pp. 123-26.28. Ibid., p. 125.29. Edmondson, "Black America as a Mobilizing Diaspora," pp. 194-95.30. See, for example, Randall Robinson, "The Reagan Administration and Southern Africa,"

TransAfrica Forum 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 3-6.


investors). Although these various groups had histories of protesting fordivestment, they were no longer acting on their own. Protests became morecoordinated and consequently began to receive greater publicity. TransAfricain particular received widespread national publicity when its director and asmall group of activists began taking their protests against apartheid directly tothe South African embassy in Washington, D.C. Quickly arrested and thenreleased, these protesters, under the aegis of their newly formed Free SouthAfrica Movement, coordinated a continual flow of pickets outside the embassyin the ensuing months. National visibility spread as demonstrations increas-ingly included prominent personalities (such as the music star Stevie Wonderand former President Jimmy Carter's daughter Amy) as well as congressionalmembers (including Republican Senator Lowell Weicker of Connecticut).Sympathizers across the country began similar protests at other South Africanconsulate facilities.

Numerous voices, within both society and government, contributed to linkingapartheid to support for (or at least tolerance of) racism at home. In 1984 JesseJackson, an African-American civil-rights activist, brought the issue of apart-heid into his presidential campaign, provoking his more centrist opponents toaddress the topic in their pronouncements.31 For apartheid to have gainednational attention, this linkage needed to be articulated in terms that appealedto more-mainstream politicians than had the prior Pan-African conceptualiza-tions, which appealed to African-Americans and left-oriented activists. Indeed,a widely shared public belief in racial equality underpinned increasing supportfor sanctions.32

Much of the political salience of the arguments proffered by sanctionsproponents rested upon their ability to draw an explicit connection betweenU.S. racial issues and the institutionalized racism of South Africa. Theyarticulated a duty to act against South Africa based upon ideals of democracyand justice—principles often cited by conservative Republicans. For example,advocates of racial equality argued that foreign investment, whether or not itwas supported by government incentives, implicated corporations in theperpetuation of the apartheid system. As Roger Wilkins so succinctly put it,sanctions proponents argued that "Americans are getting rich from thesemi-slave labor of black South Africans and our government is encouragingthem to continue doing that."33 Activists advocated a twofold response:corporate economic withdrawal and restrictions on relations with the SouthAfrican government.

31. For more on Jackson's role, see Edmondson, "Black America as a Mobilizing Diaspora," p.192; Magubane, The Ties that Bind, p. 224; Anthony Sampson, Black and Gold: Tycoons,Revolutionaries, and Apartheid (New York: Pantheon, 1987), p. 166; and Pauline Baker, The UnitedStates and South Africa: The Reagan Years (New York: Ford Foundation, 1989), p. 30.

32. Public opinion research confirms that broad-based support for racial equality precededdemands for congressional action. See Kevin A. Hill, "The Domestic Sources of ForeignPolicymaking: Congressional Voting and American Mass Attitudes Toward South Africa,"International Studies Quarterly 37 (June 1993), pp. 195-214.

33. Roger Wilkins, "Demonstrating Our Opposition," Africa Report 30 (May-June 1985), p. 31.

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Advocacy of sanctions and divestment had become two concurrent dimen-sions of a political perspective that identified implicit and explicit support forwhite-minority rule by both corporations and the U.S. government as detrimen-tal to black South Africans as well as U.S. influence in the world. Democracy,proponents argued, took precedence over cold war strategic relations andprofits. By 1984, transnational pressures had succeeded in putting apartheid onthe national agenda; the pro-sanctions policy perspective reached the highestranking policymakers. After years of debate and mobilization, advocates ofracial equality successfully linked apartheid and domestic race relations. Butwith a U.S. administration adamantly opposed to sanctions, Congress becamethe focal point for national debate and ultimately the vehicle for policy change.

Racial equality and definitions of national interests

The discourse of domestic race relations became extraordinarily important inchanging public—and congressional—thinking about policy toward SouthAfrica. Following the successful politicization of the apartheid issue in terms ofjustice and democracy, politicians (with a few notable exceptions) had becomesensitized to the potentially damaging political linkage between tolerance forapartheid and tolerance of racism at home. By late 1984, even those senatorsand representatives who had not previously been committed advocates of racialequality recognized the importance of publicly rejecting apartheid and support-ing sanctions. A split between moderate and conservative Republicans overracial equality resulted not only in rejection of the Reagan administration'spolicy of "constructive engagement" but also in a fundamental redefinition ofU.S. interests, which gave priority to nonracial democracy. Furthermore,passage of congressional sanctions legislation both institutionalized this policychange and added momentum to the global sanctions movement.

Rejecting constructive engagementThe increasing importance of a norm of racial equality within foreign policy

debates enabled opponents of the traditional U.S. policy to challenge thefundamental assumption that national interests were best served by supporting(or tolerating) white-minority rule in South Africa. Distancing themselves fromthe appearance of tolerating racism led congressional representatives toadvocate domestic South African reform. Because the Reagan administrationpolicy of constructive engagement appeared to tolerate white-minority rule, itbecame the focal point for domestic and congressional criticism.

Designed in 1981 by Chester Crocker, Reagan's Assistant Secretary of Statefor African Affairs, constructive engagement advocated "quiet diplomacy"based on three fundamental premises: the United States could contribute toevolutionary change in South Africa; some degree of outside intervention wasnecessary to promote "positive" movement in this direction; and influence


could be exerted best by rewarding significant reforms made by the white-minority government. Crocker rejected sanctions as punitive and counterpro-ductive. Particularly concerned with Soviet influence in the region, he consid-ered Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola, linked to South African withdrawalfrom Namibia, far more important than apartheid.34

Despite strong continuities across administrations, two significant differ-ences distinguished constructive engagement from previous Republican ap-proaches: Crocker believed that the white-minority South African governmentwas a reforming autocracy (and hence subject to influence) and that support forthe government's efforts at reform should be public. In contrast, Secretary ofState Henry Kissinger's policy in the 1970s presumed that the white SouthAfrican government would not reform in response to external pressures(indeed it presumed that the South African government would continue tomaintain internal stability indefinitely) and considered public dissociation fromthat government as essential for minimizing the political costs of U.S.cooperation with it in pursuit of U.S. national interests in the region.35

The policy of constructive engagement also differed from the liberaleconomic view of reform, which was predominant in the Carter administration,because it did not assume that evolutionary political reform would resultinevitably from increased economic development.36 Thus Crocker aimed toavoid not only the sharp rhetoric and high visibility of the Carter administrationbut also the secret support given to South Africa under the Nixon administra-tion. In promulgating a policy of constructive engagement, Crocker empha-sized limitations on any U.S. attempt to influence change within South Africa.Such attempts, he argued, should be directed primarily at the white govern-ment, which could be swayed only if a friendly relationship were established.Constructive engagement thus reiterated the historical equation of strategicand economic interests that primarily valued stability in the region.

Despite his recognition of the need for some kind of domestic South Africanreform, Crocker's policy left the Reagan administration particularly vulnerableto international and domestic criticism as it moved to strengthen previouslysevered ties with the South African government. To many observers, construc-tive engagement blatantly supported white-minority rule. Even increasedmilitary cooperation was documented in leaked secret policy documents in1981.37 This impression was further strengthened by President Reagan's

34. Crocker originally proposed constructive engagement in Chester Crocker, "South Africa:Strategy for Change," Foreign Affairs 59 (Winter 1980/81), pp. 323-51. See also Crocker, High Noonin Southern Africa; Baker, The United States and South Africa; and Coker, The United States andSouth Africa, 1968-1985.

35. For a detailed explanation of Kissinger's policy see El-Khawas and Cohen, National SecurityStudy Memorandum 39.

36. For a critique of the liberal view of the relationship between economic change and apartheidreform, see Stanley B. Greenberg, "Economic Growth and Political Change: The South AfricanCase," Journal of Modem African Studies 19 (December 1981), pp. 667-704.

37. These policy documents were published in a special edition of TransAfrica News Report,August 1981 and are reprinted in Baker, The United States and South Africa, Appendix A, pp.105-112.

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apparent personal sympathy for whites in South Africa (a view reinforced by hissupport from conservatives, especially in the South). Some also questionedCrocker's personal sympathies, since his wife was Rhodesian-born and theyowned stock in companies operating in South Africa. Senator Jesse Helms, incontrast, had attempted to block Crocker's nomination for fear that he wasoverly sympathetic to the black African perspective.38

The Reagan administration's reputation for supporting white-minority rulewas becoming entrenched. At a 21 March 1985 press conference (held inresponse to recent deaths of black South Africans), President Reagananswered a question about whether the administration would alter its policy inresponse to the continuing wave of South African government violence againstblacks by declaring, "I think to put it that way—that they were simply killed andthat the violence was coming totally from the law and order side ignores the factthat there was rioting going on . . . it is significant that some of those enforcingthe law and using the guns were also black policemen."39 A strongly wordedresponse by Democratic Congressman William Gray (Congressional BlackCaucus member and author of sanctions legislation) indicated a growingdiscontent with Reagan's insensitivity: "At best, I would describe [Reagan's]statements as symbolic of the worst kind of ignorance and insensitivity byanybody that I've ever seen in all my years in public office. At worst, I wouldhave to say that they were racist.... [His comment] basically shows that thePresident sees [apartheid] only as a black-white issue, and he's on the side ofwhite folks. And I think that's tragic, because it's not a black-white issue. It's anissue of justice versus injustice."40 In response to increasing criticism that hisadministration supported white rule in South Africa, President Reagan finallymade a speech denouncing apartheid on 10 December 1985 (InternationalHuman Rights Day). He nevertheless justified the progress made throughconstructive engagement. Particularly disturbing to his critics were Reagan'smisleading assertions about South African support during the two world wars;in fact, members of Afrikaner-dominated South African government (in powersince 1948) had previously been imprisoned as Nazi sympathizers. EvenCrocker acknowledged the damage from Reagan's insensitivity.41

Characterizing support for South Africa as support for racism held seriouspolitical ramifications, which became increasingly evident in the schismdeveloping between the Reagan administration and Congress. For the first fouryears, Crocker had been given the benefit of the doubt by most Republicans(although other opponents continued to criticize him for overlooking the issueof black political rights). This grace period, however, came to an end by late

38. For details of opposition to his nomination, see Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa.39. For the full text of Reagan's comments, see U.S. Department of State, Office of the

Historian, "Remarks by President Reagan at a News Conference, March 21,1985," doc. 158, in TheUnited States and South Africa: U.S. Public Statements and Related Documents, 1977-1985(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1985), p. 307.

40. Congressman William H. Gray III, interviewed by Paula Hirschoff, Africa Report 30(May-June 1985), p. 50.

41. See Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, pp. 81 and 231.


1984 when both regional southern African and internal South African violencesharply increased.42 The political linkage between domestic and internationalracial issues was the instigation for this conservative reevaluation. Congres-sional representatives who previously were uninterested in the details offoreign policies toward African countries no longer gave the administrationfree rein as their own concern for their domestic (electoral) image increased.Particularly discontented were moderate Republicans who, in response to theincreasingly prevalent impression of Reagan as insensitive to racial concerns,decided to voice their opposition openly. These former Reagan supportersbecame crucial in creating bipartisan support for sanctions legislation.

But unlike activists with histories of interest in South African affairs, thesemoderates were influenced by a number of domestic political contingenciesthat led them to reconsider national interests in, and policy toward, SouthAfrica. In part concerned by the electoral dimension of domestic racial issues,centrist Republicans hoped to gain increased support from middle-class blacksin their broader efforts to create a new style of Republican party that wouldappeal to younger and southern constituents.43 Given the broad, rather thanconstituency-specific, nature of the support for sanctions, these moderateRepublicans hoped to limit damage to their overall national agenda bydistancing themselves from Reagan's policy of constructive engagement.44

Particularly surprising was the adoption of a specific foreign policy issue—whether or not to adopt sanctions against South Africa—in a midterm electionyear. This new Republican concern had immediate and concrete effects on thesanctions debate.

The political salience of public support for racial equality led these moderateRepublicans to promote anti-apartheid sanctions. In a much publicized letterto South African Ambassador Fourie in December 1984, a group of thesemoderates expressed their concern about increasing violence in South Africa,going so far as to warn that they would consider supporting partial sanctions ifsubstantial change were not quickly forthcoming. In explaining his motivationsfor a move that circumvented the policy of his party's leader, RepublicanSenator Robert Walker of Pennsylvania described the thinking behind hisdrafting of that letter:

The letter grew out of discussions among several of us over several months.I found myself increasingly anxious to publicly express opposition to apart-heid, and as I discussed it with my closest colleagues, I found that they too

42. Two (Nkomati and Lusaka) regional accords between South Africa and its neighbors, whichCrocker had held up as successes of constructive engagement, fell into disarray as South Africaadopted a more aggressive regional military strategy. For details of these accords and SouthAfrica's broader regional policies see Barber and Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy.

43. Baker, The United States and South Africa, p. 36.44. Congressional representatives were responding to broad national debates, rather than

simple concern for their own reelection. Using public opinion data and voting records, Hill arguesthat there is "no evidence of direct constituency transmission of South Africa attitudes to theirrepresentatives." See Hill, "The Domestic Sources of Foreign Policymaking," p. 210.

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felt the time had come to have conservatives voice their repugnance regard-ing that policy of official segregation. We also were disturbed to see all con-servatives lumped together as supporters of, or at least acquiescing to,apartheid. We decided to take steps to break this stereotype by taking apublic step to show our disapproval. We set out to define ourselves as agroup of conservatives who were clearly anti-apartheid. This, we felt, wouldsend a signal to the South African government that it cannot count on allconservatives to "look the other way." We hoped this move would changethe tenor of the debate not only in this country, but in South Africa aswell.45

Other leading Republicans expressed similar views. Thus, moderate Republi-cans had come to agree with anti-apartheid activists that failure to respond toSouth Africa's apartheid policies meant condoning racism. In the politicalclimate of the mid-1980s only the most conservative Republicans were deaf tosuch accusations.

As a result of increasing Republican support, bipartisan consensus on partialsanctions—as the policy that could most clearly and quickly demonstraterejection of apartheid—subsequently emerged during 1985 in open oppositionto the administration policy of constructive engagement. Supporting—orrefusing to criticize—South Africa had become politically unacceptable for allbut the most conservative. The Reagan administration's failure to carrymoderate Republicans created unusual dissension over the broad definition ofU.S. interests in southern Africa. Which specific policy would replace Reaganpolicy, however, depended on subsequent debates over the importance ofnonracial democracy for U.S. interests in the region.

Debating democracyDeclining congressional support demonstrated that Reagan, unlike previous

Presidents, could no longer rely on orthodox assumptions that white-minorityrule would protect U.S. strategic and economic interests in South Africa.Promoting stability in the region, advocates of racial equality argued, meantpromoting substantial South African internal political reforms, specificallydemocracy in the form of majority rule. Anti-apartheid sanctions representedthe most effective means of both pressuring the white-minority government forreforms and signaling support for opponents of white rule. Support forsanctions, in other words, was equated with support for racial equality.

As moderate Republicans joined long-standing opponents of apartheid inarticulating the view that absence of South African reform actually promotedthe spread of revolutionary ideas, they opened a broader debate over thenature of U.S. interests in the region. This new phase of debate over sanctionscentered predominantly around differing analyses of reform. Since traditional

45. Robert S. Walker, "A Conservative Viewpoint Against Apartheid," Africa Report 30(May-June 1985), p. 55.


conservatives viewed controlling the spread of communism as the sole concernfor U.S. policy, they viewed domestic reforms as inevitably destabilizing; blackdissent was seen as instigated by communist activists trained abroad ratherthan as a legitimate response to apartheid. In contrast, opponents of apartheidhad always given greater credence to internal dissent. Most noteworthy in the1980s, however, was that moderate Republicans increasingly recognized thelegitimacy of black South African demands for majority rule.

Although in no way giving up their concern over the spread of communism,these Republicans did, nevertheless, reject the formerly held narrow focus onstrategic interests. Without an emphasis on democracy, that view had blindedthem to the serious implications of growing unrest in South Africa. Theirassessment of the nature of the threat to U.S. interests had changed now thatRepublicans acknowledged racial equality. As Senator Walker, a leadingRepublican sanctions advocate, observed:

It hardly needs to be mentioned that South Africa plays a critical rolethrough its opposition to communist expansion in sub-Saharan Africa. Thishas turned South Africa into a case where too many conservatives haveturned a blind eye toward apartheid in the name of being pro-Western andanti-communist. . . . The option is a dismantling of apartheid that movesSouth Africa toward human rights guarantees while preserving pro-Westerngovernment. In short, apartheid is eating away at the stability of South Af-rica. There is a danger that if it continues, the oppressed may seek libera-tion through violence and/or Marxism. We then could lose the very ally weregard as so vital. Better that we should help show the way toward reform.46

In other words, apartheid undermined South Africa's stability and conse-quently its value to the United States. Seeing their own calls for partialsanctions as a warning to a "friend" rather than a threat to an "enemy," theyhoped to encourage gradual reform to forestall a more violent revolution.Demands for democracy based on racial equality, therefore, were no longerdismissed as communism in disguise but rather became a prerequisite toretaining access to minerals and markets.

But since Chester Crocker's political analysis of both a communist threat anda need for reform paralleled that of moderate Republicans, his inflexibilitytoward their requests for policy modifications remains surprising. Two factorsare particularly important in explaining this intractability: in response topressures from more conservative Reaganites, Crocker was attempting to stifledemands for more severe actions toward the ruling white South Africangovernment and, in order to attain a settlement on Namibia—the policy areawhich most concerned him—he wanted a cooperative relationship with theSouth African government.47 On the latter issue, Crocker differed considerably

46. Walker, "A Conservative Viewpoint Against Apartheid," pp. 54-55.47. See Baker, The United States and South Africa, pp. 16 and 41; Minter, King Solomon's Mines

Revisited, pp. 310-12; and Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa.

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with both moderate Republicans (who were more concerned with SouthAfrican reform) and right-wing Republicans (who wanted a stronger reactionto the presence of Cuban troops in the region), leaving him open to attacksfrom all sides, not just from inveterate anti-apartheid activists. On balance,Crocker's emphasis on regional strategic interests, especially Cuban troops inAngola, outweighed his moderate support for democratization.

In addition, Crocker's preference for moderate reformers of apartheid ledhim to minimize the importance of both black South African actors whosupported faster change, such as the African National Congress (ANC), andthe degree of violence inherent in the system of apartheid. Sharing theconservative view that the violence of internal conflict resulted from critics ofthe white government, Crocker concluded that support for government-initiated reform could control that violence. In sharp contrast, critics of thatfundamentally conservative perspective emphasized the role of the governmentin creating and perpetuating violence. In their view, therefore, not only didsupport for the South African government guarantee continued violence butalso slower reform ensured longer suffering. Consequently, they viewedstronger pressure on the South African government to implement immediateand drastic change as the necessary and appropriate U.S. response. Thesediverging views of the relationship between violence and reform fueled thevociferous sanctions debates of the 1980s and perpetuated the perception thatthe U.S. administration supported the white-minority regime.

With its emphasis on negotiations over Namibia rather than the eliminationof apartheid, the administration proved incapable of reaching a compromisewith moderate Republicans. Following their December 1984 letter to the SouthAfrican ambassador, a number of Republicans joined in sponsoring sanctionslegislation in both the Senate and House of Representatives. In 1985, theHouse passed sanctions legislation by a vote of 295 to 127, due in part to thesupport of fifty-six Republicans. Republican Senators Roth of Delaware andMcConnell of Kentucky introduced legislation in the Senate, where Reagansupporters Robert Dole and Richard Lugar became key actors in an attempt tofind a suitable compromise between Congress and the administration. Broker-ing an agreement to forestall restrictions on investments in South Africa, theyconvinced President Reagan to abide by a much-reduced package of restric-tions on governmental loans, exports of computers to the South Africanmilitary and police, exports of nuclear-related technologies, and the import ofSouth African-made arms. The executive order also encouraged corporationsto follow a code of conduct similar to the Sullivan Principles. Furthermore, itestablished an advisory committee to provide additional recommendations inthe future.48

48. U.S. Department of State, "Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other Transactions InvolvingSouth Africa," Executive Order 12532, 9 September 1985, in United States and South Africa, doc.176, pp. 365-68.


This temporary compromise, however, failed to placate critics either withinthe Republican party or among other congressional members, who renewedproposals for sanctions legislation in the next session. As the administrationsought to change the image but not the substance of its policy, internal andregional violence continued to increase, with international criticism flaring asSouth Africa launched raids on neighboring countries in May 1986. At thesame time, the Commonwealth's Eminent Persons Group further substanti-ated impressions of South African President P. W. Botha as intransigent whenit released its report calling for international sanctions.49

Ironically, Republican brokering for an executive order actually increasedcriticism of the administration, as Reagan and his advisers were drawn intodebates over which types of sanctions should be implemented; whethersanctions should be adopted was no longer a question. Openly breaking withthe conservatives within their party in October 1986 (just before midtermelections), moderate Republicans had clearly decided that some sanctionswere better than none when they joined Democrats to override the President'sveto of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) by overwhelmingmargins (313 to 83 in the House and 78 to 21 in the Senate).50

The major provisions of the CAAA, which went beyond the previousexecutive order, comprised restrictions on new investments, as well as ex-panded restrictions on government loans, imports from South Africa (includinggold coins), trade assistance, tourism promotion, and elimination of doubletaxation agreements. Furthermore, the act made mandatory a code of conduct(based upon the much-vaunted Sullivan Principles) for U.S. corporationsoperating in South Africa. Additional "positive" measures including educa-tional aid and legal assistance were included, as was the possibility of furthersanctions after a followup report from the President within twelve months. TheCAAA also established conditions for the removal of these sanctions, includingthe release of political prisoners, lifting of the state of emergency, lifting banson political activity, repealing the Group Areas Act and Population Registra-tion Act, and entering into "good faith" negotiations with representatives ofthe black majority.

Accepting the need for democratic reform in South Africa did not necessar-ily mean that policy simply followed the demands of committed advocates ofracial equality. Despite bipartisan agreement on the CAAA, substantialdifferences remained over which types of sanctions should be included in theact, as evident in the potpourri of measures finally written into the legislation.One of the most contentious aspects of the sanctions debates was over theutility of the Sullivan Principles (or similar codes of conduct). Republicansplaced substantially more faith in the ability of U.S. firms to influence political

49. For details, see The Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons, Mission to South Africa(London: Penguin, 1986).

50. The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986: PL 99-440 U.S. Statutes at Large 100 (1986),pp. 1086-116.

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reform. While acknowledging that such firms may contribute to improved livingconditions for a small percentage of South African workers, skeptics morefundamentally questioned the capability of these firms to have substantialpolitical influence, particularly as these corporations had not demonstrated anyprevious interest in influencing the political direction of the South Africangovernment. Even harsher critics viewed corporations as benefiting fromgovernment repression and therefore saw no reason for them even to try toinfluence reform.

In addition, committed advocates of racial equality viewed sanctions as anadditional means of encouraging the South African government to recognizeblack opposition groups, particularly the ANC. Such expectations can be seennot only in official pronouncements of groups like the Free South AfricaMovement and TransAfrica but also in the nature of conditions that wereappended to the CAAA. Indeed for many, Nelson Mandela's imprisonmentcame to symbolize these demands. Nevertheless, many congressional membersremained unwilling to grant the ANC such status, frequently promotingalternatives such as Zulu Chief Gatsha Buthelezi.51 The vagaries of policytoward South Africa thus reflected continuing debates over the perception ofSouth African activists as terrorists versus freedom fighters.52

Incorporating a norm of racial equality into the definition of U.S. interests,therefore, altered the range of legitimate policy choices but did not determine aparticular policy outcome. Liberal economic arguments that increased U.S.investment would encourage South African reform were considerably discred-ited (compared with their former dominance) and strategic arguments weresubordinated to and modified by a commitment to democratization. At end, theUnited States adopted sanctions to signal, internationally and domestically, itssupport for racial equality through majority rule.

Strengthening a global norm of racial equalityPassage of sanctions legislation did not automatically guarantee long-term

support for racial equality. In practice, however, congressional action didstrengthen the U.S. commitment to racial equality, both within its policymakingprocess and globally. It will remain problematic to test the degree to which thisnew perspective supporting racial equality became embedded domestically,because the apartheid issue lost its salience in light of South African PresidentF. W. de Klerk's domestic reforms beginning in 1990. However, U.S. policyunder the Bush administration and South African reforms both offer additional

51. For a discussion of how black South African groups perceived U.S. aid, see Lynda M.Clarizio, United States Policy Toward South Africa (New York: Lawyer's Committee for HumanRights, 1989), pp. 40 and 66.

52. On U.S. characterization of the ANC as a terrorist organization, see Thomas J. Redden, Jr.,"The U.S. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986: Anti-Apartheid or Anti-African NationalCongress?" African Affairs 87 (October 1988), pp. 595-605.


reasons to view the shift in fundamental policy assumptions as part of a broaderprocess of diffusing and embedding a norm of racial equality.

Most immediately, Secretary of State George Shultz's 1987 advisory reportevaluating enforcement of the specific provisions of the sanctions packagerecommended policies that reinforced the direction established by the CAAA:distancing from the white regime, strengthening ties with black opposition,cooperating on international sanctions, and increasing assistance to neighbor-ing states. No longer treating the ANC as a terrorist organization to beshunned, the administration increased efforts to improve ties, including ameeting between Shultz and ANC President Oliver Tambo in 1987. Inaddition, the new direction of U.S. policy toward South Africa continued intothe Bush administration, which abided by congressional conditions for liftingsanctions even after the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990 (and after bothBritain and the European Community announced their intention to lift theirsanctions). Only after President de Klerk's reforms in 1991 did the Bushadministration announce that, in its interpretation of the law, South Africa hadfulfilled all the conditions for lifting sanctions.53 Thus by institutionalizing anew tenet of policy—that majority rule in South Africa must be encouraged—passage of the CAAA inaugurated a period of more consistent U.S. oppositionto white-minority rule in South Africa.

U.S. sanctions policies also had broader implications, both for the globalmomentum toward sanctions in the mid-1980s and for the reform efforts withinSouth Africa. Shortly after the passage of the CAAA in 1986, the transnationalanti-apartheid movement succeeded in persuading members of the Common-wealth to institute substantive economic sanctions. The European Community,as well as such crucial trading partners as Japan, also adopted restrictions,following the U.S. lead.54 Particularly noteworthy in these sanctions packageswas a relatively consistent list of conditions for South African reform, the sameconditions articulated in the CAAA. It is this very list of conditions for reformsthat de Klerk followed when repealing the legal pillars of apartheid andopening up the political process in South Africa. De Klerk did not, however,grant blacks the right to vote, nor was this explicitly a condition for liftingsanctions (though in retrospect many anti-apartheid protesters might wish ithad been). Moreover, de Klerk explicitly defended his reforms on the basis thatapartheid restrictions were "evidently unjust, in conflict with the Christianvalues to which we profess to aspire, contrary to internationally acceptablenorms and a certain recipe for revolt, revolution and civil war."55

53. New York Times, 11 July 1991, p. Al .54. See Geldenhuys, Outcast States; Lauren, Power and Prejudice; Commonwealth Secretariat,

The Commonwealth at the Summit: Communiques of the Commonwealth Heads of GovernmentMeetings, 1944-1986 (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1987); and Martin Holland, TheEuropean Community and South Africa (London: Pinter, 1988).

55. New York Times, 3 May 1991, p. A l l . For a more detailed discussion of the role ofinternational sanctions in South African reforms, see Klotz, Protesting Prejudice, chap. 9.

Norms 477

Thus U.S. anti-apartheid sanctions were one important component of anextraordinarily successful transnational drive for the enforcement of a globalnorm of racial equality. Indeed, the shift in policy toward South Africapresaged new directions in post-cold war policy. In the absence of anoverarching anticommunist framework, the relationship among the strategic,economic, and ideological components of U.S. interests has become increas-ingly contested. The ranking of democracy as a prerequisite to minerals andmarkets, first evident in the new policy toward South Africa in the 1980s,persists in the 1990s. In addition, TransAfrica and the Congressional BlackCaucus retained the increased influence for African-Americans in policymak-ing institutions, as evident in their role in pressuring the Clinton administrationon its Haiti policy. In order to promote democracy and market economies, theUnited States now adopts economic sanctions regularly.

Theoretical implications

U.S. debates over minerals, markets, and democracy in South Africa demon-strate the inherently social nature of national interests. As a global norm ofracial equality became increasingly accepted in domestic U.S. politics, advo-cates of democracy for South Africa successfully linked issues of civil rights andapartheid through the discourse of equality and national interests. Conse-quently, even moderate Republicans in Congress recognized the social costs ofabrogating this norm of racial equality, both for their own party's domesticinterests and for U.S. global interests, resulting in a significant shift in U.S.foreign policy. By altering U.S. policy, furthermore, transnational anti-apartheid activists redirected this great power's influence toward supportingglobal enforcement of a norm of racial equality, both among South Africa'strading partners and within South Africa itself. National interests, therefore,are socially constructed in a global process of norm diffusion.

Constructivist theory claims that states are socially constructed, yet we havefew comparative studies that offer an empirical basis for improving ourunderstanding of the ways in which processes of social construction operate.This case study suggests directions for further empirical research into interestformation. Comparing anti-apartheid activists' experiences in the UnitedStates with those in Britain, for example, indicates that the context of the U.S.civil rights discourse, as well as the institutional differences between thecongressional and parliamentary political systems, explain this transnationalsocial movement's success in the former and frustration in the latter.56 Thesecontrasting experiences suggest that the permeability of preexisting discursiveframeworks and institutions to transnational influences is a plausible direction

56. For a detailed analysis of the failure of the anti-apartheid movement in Britain, see Klotz,Protesting Prejudice, chap. 7.


for formulating hypotheses about interest change. Comparative studies offoreign policymaking and additional analyses of transnational social move-ments will increase our understanding of this global process of interestformation.

Constructivist theory also claims that agents and structures reconstitute eachother in an iterative process but thus far has retained the traditionalassumption of states as units. While a focus on transnational diffusionprocesses rejects the traditional assumption of state autonomy, a morecomplete understanding of social construction requires individual-level analy-sis of agency. Individuals, for a wide range of reasons, may conform with normseven if they are not personally committed to those ideals. The Reaganadministration, for example, adopted sanctions through an executive order in1985 despite numerous other indications that as individuals they lacked astrong commitment to racial equality. While the presumption of self-interestedmotivation can be modified to accommodate the social costs that produced thispolicy change, further studies into the relationship between discourse andindividual motivations would be required for a fuller understanding of theconditions under which discourse changes individual attitudes; that is, whennorms have their strongest effects.

Constructivist theory argues that global norms are part of the explanation forthe definition of state and individual interests. The result is a reformulatedresearch agenda that illuminates the independent role of norms in determiningactors' identities and interests.

Klotz - Norms Reconstituting Interest

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