Kiwis in UNTSO Jan 2002

New

Zea

land

’s Inv

olvem

ent

in

Unit

ed N

ati

ons

Truc

e Su

perv

isio

n

Murray Simons New Zealand’s Involvement in UNTSO of 19

Index

INDEX ..................................................................................................................................................................... 2 DISCLAIMER ........................................................................................................................................................... 2 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................................... 3 REGIONAL HISTORY ................................................................................................................................................ 3 THE CREATION OF MODERN ISRAEL ....................................................................................................................... 4 MIDDLE EASTERN ATTITUDES ................................................................................................................................ 5 UNTSO’S FORMATION AND CHANGING MANDATE ................................................................................................ 6 THE VALUE OF UNTSO .......................................................................................................................................... 8 WHY NEW ZEALAND GOT INVOLVED ...................................................................................................................... 8 NATURE OF NEW ZEALAND’S INVOLVEMENT ....................................................................................................... 10 THE ISSUES RELATING TO NEW ZEALAND'S INVOLVEMENT .................................................................................. 12 THE FUTURE OF NEW ZEALAND IN THE MIDDLE EAST ......................................................................................... 14 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................................................ 15 BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................................................... 17 APPENDIX A FACTS ABOUT UNTSO .................................................................................................................... 19

Disclaimer

The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author

only and do not represent those of either the United Nations,

the New Zealand Government, the New Zealand Defence

Force nor Massey University. This paper may be reprinted or

quoted provided that no source association is made to any of

the above organisations.

This paper was written in 2001 just prior to the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade

Centre. The subsequent Global War on Terror and various wars conducted in the

Middle East were not known at the time of writing.


Introduction

Every evening, four-year-old Mohammed watches the same video. He puts the

cassette on by himself and calls his baby sister to join him. It is a short film,

primitively made, which lasts no more than five minutes. There is a row of

buildings in a bleak landscape and then, suddenly, an explosion. ‘There’s my

daddy,’ says Mohammed. Mohammed’s father, Salah Ghanour, rammed a car

packed with 450 kilograms of explosives into an Israeli convoy, in South

Lebanon, on 25 May 1995. He blew himself to pieces and killed twelve Israeli

soldiers. Hezbollah filmed the event, just as they record all their major

operations, .... Salah’s last wish and testimony was that his son Mohammed

should become a Resistance fighter. ‘If my son wants to follow in his father’s

footsteps, then of course he can go,’ said Maha [Salah’s widow]. ‘I can live

with that and will fulfil Salah’s wishes.’ In the meantime, Mohammed will

continue to replay the last few minutes of his father’s life as his bedtime

viewing.1

It is difficult for New Zealanders to understand

the problems of the Middle East. The conflict

drags on continuously despite the efforts of all

leading nations to broker peace. The United

Nations has maintained a presence ever since the

creation of Israel yet still the death toll rises

daily.

To the average New Zealander, the solution

seems simple. Compromise from both sides

would resolve much of the problem. Yet

compromise is a difficult concept in the Middle

East. The cultures and beliefs of people in the

region are so removed from those in Aotearoa

that understanding their differences is not easy.

The aim of this paper is to explore the Middle

East situation, through New Zealand eyes, and to

consider the value of our continued involvement.

In doing this, two key questions will be

addressed: firstly, ‘Why does New Zealand

commit military personnel to UNTSO and what

has been the extent of that commitment?’; and

second, ‘What impact has UNTSO had on the

region?’.

The opening section of this paper reviews the

region’s early and recent history, thus putting

into context the deep rooted hatred and

xenophobic attitudes that dominate over any

other normal behaviour. The next section looks

at the formation and contribution that the United

Nations Truce Supervision Organisation

(UNTSO) has made to regional stability. From

here the paper explores the reasons for New

Zealand’s initial involvement in the Middle East

before summarising the nature of that

involvement up until 2001. A cost-benefit 1 Hala Jaber, Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance. Columbia University Press. 1997. p1-6

comparison is then made with consideration

being given to the factors that keep us involved

today. This then leads on to a speculative section

looking at what the future may hold for the

region, including the possibility of New

Zealand's continued involvement.

Regional History

Since prehistoric times, the Middle East has been

of major importance. Its geographical location

made it the only land bridge, and therefore a

natural choke point, between the African

Continent and the rest of the known world. The

region brought together differing cultures and

religions, and was a critical zone for trade,

migration and campaigning. Control of the area

was essential for any successful empire.

During the past five millennia, various

significant empires have occupied the land. The

first recorded inhabitants were the Canaanites

who lived in city states. By the start of the second

millenium BC the adjacent empire of Egypt had

spread out and conquered the land. Their rule

began to weaken by the 14th century BC and

soon new invaders arrived. A group of Semitic

tribes known as the Hebrews and the Philistines

were among the first of these new occupiers.

Popular belief has it that around 1270 BC Moses

led the Israelites out of Egypt into what they

believed was their ‘promised land’. The modern

day names of Palestine and Israel come from

these last two groups of people who, to this day,

both hold claim to the land.


In about 1000 BC, David founded the Israelite

Kingdom, with the town of Jerusalem being its

capital. Solomon, David’s son and successor, led

the kingdom to even greater heights developing

a reputation for its intellectual and commercial

excellence. After Solomon’s death, however, the

kingdom split in half creating the northern state

of Israel and the southern state of Judah.2 Both

regions failed to maintain their former glory. By

722 BC, Israel had been conquered by the

Assyrians3and in 586 BC Judea fell to the

Babylonians. These occupiers destroyed

Jerusalem and exiled most of the inhabitants.

In 539 BC, Persia overran the Babylonians and

allowed the Jews to return to Judea and to rebuild

their capital. While in exile, the Jews had written

the Old Testament and further developed their

religion. Over time various other empires

invaded the region. These included among

others, Alexander the Great and, of course, the

Romans. It was during the Roman occupation

that Jesus was born and eventually crucified. The

continued persecution of the Jews led to a revolt,

followed by the second destruction of Jerusalem.

In 132 AD, the Jews made another attempt to

revolt but by 135 they were subdued and those

who remained were dispersed into exile. This

particular departure, known as the Diaspora (or

‘the scattering’), did not end their problems as

they continued to be persecuted wherever they

went.

Palestine, as it was known, was eventually lost

to the Muslim Arabs in 700 AD with Jerusalem

being installed as the first Qibla (the direction

Muslims face when praying). Today it is still

pivotal to their religion; being considered their

third most holy place. With the exception of the

brief occupation by the Christian Crusaders in

the 11th and 12th centuries, the Arabs controlled

the region for 1300 years. During this time, the

Islamic religion and culture became firmly

established.

The Turkish Ottoman Empire conquered the

lands of Levant4 in 1516 and maintained control

for most of the 500 years that followed. Towards

the end of this period (1897), an Austrian

Jew5founded the ‘World Zionist Movement’ to

encourage Jewish resettlement back in the lands

of Palestine. He also advocated the creation the

2 From whence comes the name Jew. 3 From whence comes the name Syria. 4 Levant is from the old French name for the area,

from the word meaning ‘to rise’ in reference to the

land where the sun rises. Today it is a name used to

describe the region without reference to periods of

time or bias to any particular party.

Jewish State of ‘Israel’. Tel Aviv, the first

modern Jewish town, was founded in 1909 and

Jews continued to return to their ‘Promised

Land’. By World War One, the xenophobic

Palestinians had formed an Anti-Zionist

organization to resist Jewish build-up and had

also agreed to rebel against the Turks on the

promise of being granted their own land by the

British. But the British had also offered the land

to the Jews in return for their help towards the

war elsewhere. To make matters worse, the

British made commitments to France and Russia

on the division of the area.

The Creation of Modern Israel

Today’s problems in the region stem from the

period that followed World War One. After

Britain had promised the land to a number of

parties, an inevitable state of instability

prevailed. This situation deteriorated further

following the unrewarded Israeli support the

Allied campaign in World War Two. By 1945,

an uncontrollable mass migration of European

Jews began to flood into Palestine. Britain

attempted to stem the flow but became further

entwined in an un-winable situation.

Anglo/Israeli relations degenerated further with

violent attacks against the occupying British.

Various attempts were made to resolve the

matter but in 1948 Britain declared the mandate

unworkable and withdrew from the region. They

handed the problem over to the newly formed

United Nations (UN). The following day, Jewish

leaders declared the creation of the State of

Israel. The four neighbouring Arab nations

supported the Palestinians and attacked this new

entity. The end-state of this conflict saw Israel

not only defend itself, but actually enlarge its

area. Jordan did however occupy the West Bank

and Egypt held the Gaza Strip.

Following the 1948 ‘War of Independence’, a

truce was arranged by the United Nations and the

first UN observers6 were sent in to establish the

United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation

(UNTSO). Since this time however, peace has

seldom been observed. For the next seven years

the agreed Armistice Lines were largely

respected but on 29 October 1956, Israel invaded

the Sinai Peninsula up to the Suez Canal. Again

the UN brokered a truce and created the United

5 Theodore Hertzl. 6 The First UNMOs were in fact Military Attaches

posted to Palestine. – Source, Michael Chivers,

Senior New Zealand National Officer in UNTSO

2000-1. From an unpublished personal interview

September 2001.


Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to monitor

the withdrawal. In 1967, Egypt asked the UN to

remove its force and Israel promptly launched

what was to become known as ‘The Six Day

War’. By the end of this conflict, Israel occupied

all of the Sinai, Gaza Strip, the West Bank, part

of the Golan Heights and all of Jerusalem.

The period between 1967 and 1973 became

known as the ‘War of Attrition’ and saw a

number artillery barrages, air strikes and cross

canal commando raids between Israel and Egypt.

While an Israeli – Egyptian cease-fire was

brokered by the United States in 1970, terrorist

attacks continued to be launched by the newly

formed Palestinian Liberation Organisation

(PLO). These attacks included bombings,

aircraft hijackings, and the infamous 1972

Olympic Games attack. While Israeli attention

was being distracted by the terrorist attacks, the

Arab states began to build up their stocks of

Soviet supplied arms.

On Saturday 6 October 1973, during the Jewish

Holy day of Yom Kippur, Egypt and Syria

launched simultaneous attacks on Israel. Despite

the surprise, nature and the numerical difference,

Israel repelled the two invasions and actually

gained new ground. By the 22nd of October, the

UN had managed to broker another cease-fire,

which this time included the establishment of

demilitarised zones. UN observers were

positioned to monitor these zones. In 1979 the

UN largely withdrew from the Sinai and were

replaced by the Multi-national Force and

Observers (MFO), at the request of Egypt.

UNTSO is still involved in verifying the

demilitarised zone of the Golan Heights.

Lebanon became the new problem area for Israel

in the 1980s. After being evicted from of Jordan,

the PLO (an umbrella organisation for a number

of Palestinian resistance movements) moved into

Lebanon, capitalising on the freedom of

movement offered by the country’s civil war that

was raging at the time. Lebanon had suffered

similar problems to Palestine at the end of World

War Two, in that the French who had ‘inherited’

the greater Syria, agreed to partition the coastal

lands away and handed them over to the

Maronite Christians. The parliamentary

constitution was written in favour of the

Maronites who intended to rule over this land.

Population growth however meant that, in time,

Christians were no longer proportionally

dominant in Lebanon and the other religions 7 For more see

http://www.hizbollah.org/english/frames/index_eg.ht

m

wanted a fairer share. This became intertwined

with a number of other issues which all led to the

Lebanese Civil War.

Using Lebanon as a launch pad, the PLO

continued to make small-scale attacks into Israel.

In response, Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982

under the name ‘Operation Peace for Galilee’.

They eventually withdrew to the Israeli

Controlled Area (ICA) of South Lebanon where

they set up the South Lebanese Army (SLA).

New groups emerged to resist this occupation

and to return Palestine to Arab control. The two

most notable were the Hezbollah (Party of God)7

and Amal (Hope), both of which still survive

today, despite the fact that Israel withdrew

completely from Lebanon late in May 2000.

In 1987, the Arabs living in Israel, started what

became known as ‘Intifada’ (uprising); violent

protests calling for Arab self-rule. This led to the

1993 Camp David Accords where Israel and

PLO came to an understanding and exchanged

letters recognising each other’s right to peaceful

existence.8 The PLO denounced the use of

violence and in return was given control over

Gaza and a number of West Bank towns. In

October 2000 a second Intifada was called to

gain full self-governance of the Palestine

Territories (West Bank and the Gaza Strip) and

in particular, the removal of the Jewish

Settlements there. At the time of writing, this

conflict was still dominating Israeli military

attention and, despite numerous international

attempts, did not look likely to end peacefully.

Middle Eastern Attitudes

Part of the Middle Eastern problems can be

traced back to the forced westernisation on a

tribal people. The beginning of the twentieth

century saw the main victors of WWI divide up

a land that had been subjected to authoritative

dynasties. While the empires had boundaries, the

occupants held no loyalty to either their country

or the absent rulers. Instead, political identities

were derived from religious connections or local

kin group ie family, tribe or neighbourhood.9

Patriotism was, and to many, still is, a foreign

concept. The cartographic polygons used to

carve up the Middle East took little account of

natural bonds such as common history, religion

or ethno-linguistic heritage. In most cases, the

delineation of countries was based more on the

8 The United States brokered a deal was signed in

Camp David. 9 Thomas Freidman From Beirut to Jerusalem

Harper Collins Publishers, 1990. p87

http://www.hizbollah.org/english/frames/index_eg.htm



oil needs of the Western world than on wishes of

those most directly involved. Regional

instability was inevitable, given the forced

creation of, what would otherwise have been,

non-naturally forming groups.

The problems of the Middle East can not be

blamed on any one party. While the attitudes of

both sides are antagonistic, both claim the sole

right to the land.10 Efforts to declare Jerusalem

an international city struggle to retain a foothold.

The partition of Palestine, recognised by Ben

Gurion11 in the 1930s, and again promoted by

Britain (before handing the problem over to the

United Nations) has yet to be completely

implemented. The cycle of distrust continues to

spin uncontrollably despite the efforts of all the

world’s best diplomats.

UNTSO’s Formation and Changing Mandate

The United Nations Truce Supervision

Organisation was established to observe and

maintain a truce or cease-fire in the Middle East.

Back then, as it is now, UNTSO was an unarmed

observer group of military officers who

patrolled, observed and reported back to the

United Nations. Another early function was the

provision of Good Offices between the five

states making up the mission area (Israel, Egypt,

Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon). While the Good

Offices are no longer provided in the same way,

much of their function continues to be done

through the liaison work of UNTSO. With the

changing borders and cease-fire lines, UNTSO

has moved its area of operations and evolved its

mandate accordingly.

The United Nations first became involved in the

area on 2 April 1947 when it was asked by

Britain to consider the problem. The UN set up a

special committee (UNSCOP) which developed

and presented what became known as the United

Nations Partition Plan. This plan proved to be

unworkable and when Britain’s mandate over

Palestine concluded on 15 April 1948,

widespread fighting broke out. By the 17th of

April, the Security Council had called for a

cease-fire and six days later set up the Truce

Commission for Palestine. Assisted by a

mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden,

10 "We declare openly that the Arabs have no right to

settle on even one centimetre of Eretz Israel...Force

is all they do or ever will understand. We shall use

the ultimate force until the Palestinians come

crawling to us on all fours."-Rafael Eitan, chief of

staff of the Israel Defense Forces, quoted in The

New York Times, April 14, 1983.

the commission was charged with supervising a

four-week truce. On the 11th of June the first 93

military observers established UNTSO. Initially

based in Cairo, the HQ later moved to Haifa and

then on to its present location in Jerusalem.12

When the four-week period expired, fighting

broke out again and the observers had to be

withdrawn. The UN brokered a further cease-

fire, this time of an indefinite period. When

reformed, UNTSO was much larger and better

placed to cover the area involved. In September

1948, Count Bernadotte, the Chief Mediator was

assassinated, and had to be replaced by an acting

mediator. The role of the mediator, and that of

the Truce Commission, was eventually

redundant and both institutions ceased to exist in

June 1967. Leading up to that time however,

Mixed Armistice Commissions (MAC) were

established. These consisted of equal numbers of

representatives from each party, along with UN

observers whose job it was to resolve

complaints. Four separate MACs were created:

Israel-Syria (ISMAC), Egypt-Israel (EIMAC),

Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan-Israel (HKJ-I-

MAC), and Israel-Lebanon (ILMAC).

The success of the MACs depended on the

support and acceptance by both parties. As a

result of the Suez War in 1956, Israel withdrew

from the EIMAC and then following the Six-day

War in 1967, the remaining MACs were also

denounced. Although the UN accepted the

closure of EIMAC, following the signing of the

1979 Camp David Accords, the remaining

MACs are still technically in existence. UNTSO

maintains these instruments in the event that

Israel agrees to return to the respective peace-

tables.

On the Israeli-Syrian border, UNTSO has

maintained a presence along both sides of the

agreed cease-fire line. With the assistance of the

United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

(UNDOF),13 Observer Group Golan (OGG)

maintains static Observation Posts (OPs) and

conducts regular inspections of military

hardware within the zone of disengagement.

OGG is divided into two detachments, one based

in Damascus (OGG-D) and one in Tiberias

(OGG-T). The Headquarters for OGG is based at

Camp Fouar in Syria. As part of the

disengagement agreement, personnel from

11 Ben Gurion is considered Israel’s founding father. 12 This last move was on 25 May 1949 – United

Nations, Blue Helmets, 1996, p22 13 For more on UNDOF see

www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/undof

http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/undof


UNDOF must only come from countries that are

not permanent members of the United Nations

Security Council. This restriction means that

UNTSO observers from those countries,14 who

are assigned to the Israel-Syria border, must

work in a separate liaison unit based solely in

Damascus (Observer Detachment Damascus,

ODD).15

The Observer Group Sinai (OGS) maintained the

border between Israel and Egypt. This group was

set up and attached to the Second United Nations

Emergency Force (UNEF II) also with two

detachments: Observer Group Sinai, based in

Cairo (OGS-C) and Observer Group Sinai based

in Jerusalem (OGS-J). Since 1979, with the

demise of UNEF II and the establishment of the

Multinational Force Observers (MFO),

UNTSO’s involvement has been renamed

Observer Group Egypt (OGE) and has been

reduced to four observers. The headquarters

moved from Cairo to Ismailia.

The Jordanian-Israeli border has also seen a

dramatic reduction16 in hostilities and

consequently, UNTSO’s involvement was

intially reduced to a Liaison Office in Amman

(UNLOA). For a while, a small team of

observers conducted some inspections in the

area south of the Dead Sea, as well as liaising

with the Jordanian authorities and assisting UN

personnel travelling either through or within the

country. Now the office is closed completely.

Lebanon is the only country with whom Israel

continues to have problems. While the strife of

the civil war has now long passed, the threat of

terrorist groups operating out of South Lebanon

continues.17 The Israeli Defence Force (IDF)

invaded Lebanon in 1982 with the aim of

eliminating the Palestinian Liberation

Organisation (PLO) from Beirut and environs. In

1985, the IDF withdrew to the Southern Zone,

known as the Israeli Controlled Area (ICA)

where they continued to maintain a military

14 Except Great Britain, the other four permanent

members are all currently involved. 15 United Nations, Blue Helmets, 1996 p30. 16 A peace treaty has been signed between the two

countries and embassies are established. 17 Timur Goksel (UNIFIL Senior Advisor) quoted in

Janes Defence Weekly, 5 September 2001. p21 and

32. 18 On the pretext that UN Resolution 425 has not

been fully met. 19 The Arabic name for Jerusalem. 20 “…the liberation of Jerusalem [is] rooted deeply

in the ideals of Hezbollah” from The Hezbollah

Homepage available at

http://www.hizbollah.org/english/frames/index_eg.ht

m

presence, including the establishment of the

South Lebanese Army (SLA). Making good on

an election promise, the then Prime Minister of

Israel, Ehud Barak, withdrew all IDF troops

from Lebanon in early 2000. Two of the

resistance groups who set up during the Israeli

occupation still exist today. While the Amal

Party have dropped their military action, and

now focus only on politics, the Hezbollah have

continued the fight.18 No longer happy to see

Israel out of Lebanon, their new mandate is the

freedom of Jerusalem (el Qud)19 from ‘the

Zionist enemy’.20

The Lebanese border is used by many Arab

countries to exercise their objection to Israel’s

existance. Lebanon struggles to shake off the

reputation of being a puppet state for Syria.

While Syria still wants back the Golan Heights,

it is not in a position to launch an attack from

within their own country.21 Not only can they not

afford the financial cost of such a conflict, they

can not risk losing more ground, given that

Israel’s modern arsenal can easily reach

Damascus from the high ground. Instead, Syria

has, until recently,22 supported groups like

Hezbollah both financially as well as with free

passage of weapons and fighters to training in

places such as Iran and many former Eastern

Block Countries.23 In the short period following

the attacks in the United States on 11 September

2001, Syria was however quick to distance itself

from any connection with state sponsored

terrorism. In its new position as an elected

member to the UN Security Council, it publicly

denounced the attacks and offered support to the

United States. At the time of writing, Syria was

still maintaining a low profile in terms of

supporting the Hezbollah.

While the Hezbollah’s level of activity has

reduced dramatically since the IDF withdrawal

in 2000, they continue to launch attacks into

21 Anthony Cordesman Israel, Syria military balance

CSIS Report: Decline in Spending Enervates Syria’s

Strength

available at http://www.csis.org/stratassessment/

reports/IsraelSyriaRealities.pdf 22 The two causes for this change are their election to

the UN Security Council and their urgency to

distance themselves from the State Sponsored

Terrorism Target List issued by the United States

following the September 11 terrorist attacks. 23 Anthony H. Cordesman, The Arab-Israeli

Conventional Military Balance in 2000. available at

Center for Strategic and International Studies

http://www.csis.org



http://www.csis.org/


northern Israel on a six to eight week cycle.24

Throughout 2001, their main area of interest has

been the disputed Chebba Farms area – currently

occupied by Israel although technically on the

Lebanese-Syrian border within the Golan

Heights Area of Disengagement.

UNTSO’s involvement on the Lebanese-Israeli

border is supported by United Nations Interim

Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).25 Similar to

UNDOF, UNIFIL is an armed force of around

5000 soldiers. At the time of writing UNIFIL

was in the process of downsizing to around 2000

personnel. Their reduction reflecting the

improving environment of the area following the

withdrawal of the IDF. UNTSO continues to

maintain static OPs as patrol bases and conducts

daily checks on the Blue Line – ‘an imaginary

line agreed to by both parties, but not a border’.

Like OGG on the Golan Heights, Observer

Group Lebanon (OGL) is likely to remain a

permanent feature on the Israeli-Lebanese

border for the foreseeable future. UNTSO also

has a Liaison Office in Beirut

(UNLOB/ILMAC).

UNTSO’s current area of operations continues to

be on Israel’s borders although troubles within

the country are now drawing greater attention.

The second Intifada continues at the time of

writing yet Israel constantly rebuffs the

Palestinian calls for military observers. The UN

can not establish peacekeeping or observer

groups without the consent of both parties. With

the support of the United States, Israel continues

to resist international pressure to allow

peacekeepers into the occupied Palestinian

Territories on the grounds that no country

supports their occupation and therefore

peacekeepers would be biased. Yet as the United

States strives to involve Arab states in the global

coalition against terrorism, it is more anxious for

a peaceful resolution in Israel. It is now taking a

tougher stance with both parties to resolve the

matter quickly. Even if an international force is

agreed to, the likely operation will primarily be

an armed force followed up by UNTSO

observers. Although UNTSO’s mandate may be

modified to include a new Israeli border, the

overall mission will remain the same: To observe

and report on activities that threaten peace and

security in the region.

24 One such attack was made just two and a half

weeks after the terrorist attacks in the United

States. 25 For more on UNIFIL see

www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unifil

The Value of UNTSO

Despite the presence of UNTSO, Israel and her

neighbours have engaged in many wars over the

past 53 years. To the outsider, UNTSO appears

to have failed on many occasions. But the

mandate of UNTSO has been simply as a truce

supervision organisation and is therefore solely

responsible for observation and reporting - not

peacekeeping nor peacemaking. While in the

early days, the provision of ‘Good Offices’

allowed for the resolution of minor differences,

these no longer exist today and with most of

Israel’s borders now stable, UNTSO’s value is

perhaps now reducing.

Despite failing to stop the various wars, UNTSO

has had a number of successes. In addition to the

resolution of minor differences, initially by the

MACs and now by the liaison offices, other

small scale positive functions continue to be

provided. UNTSO still offers communication

between the protagonist parties, thereby

reducing unnecessary escalation in hostilities

based on misunderstanding. Over the years it has

also arranged prisoner exchanges and the safe

return of personal property. Yet the greatest

value that UNTSO continues to offer is that it is

the eyes and ears of the United Nations, on the

ground, in the Middle East. This allows for the

General Assembly and the Security Council to

monitor and protest to any party that breeches

agreed truce conditions. This includes the build

up of arms in demilitarized zones.

UNTSO was designed to assist parties that the

United Nations believed wanted peace. The past

half-century has failed to deliver an absolute

cease-fire although most of the borders are now

fairly stable. The new volatile border is that with

Israel and the Palestinian Territories. As yet,

UNTSO has no formal involvement in that area

but should probably expect to be the first to be

called upon should a force be required.

Why New Zealand got involved

Participation in international peace-

support operations flows naturally from

New Zealand's consistent support for the

United Nations and strong commitment to

collective security, which pre-dates the

founding of the United Nations.26

26 B. Bennet, New Zealand's Moral Foreign Policy

1935-1939: The promotion of Collective Security

through the League of Nations, Wellington, 1988

pp9-33. Cited in John Crawford, In the Field for

Peace: New Zealand's contribution to

http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unifil


On the 29th of November 1947 the UN General

Assembly debated and then agreed on a

resolution calling for the partition of Palestine.

During the discussions, New Zealand sided with

the lobby advocating the simultaneous

implementation of peace enforcement. They

insisted on an international force, proportionally

represented by all nations that would police the

region, suppress violence and maintain public

services in support of the Partition Plan.27 During

the committee vote for the partition, New

Zealand abstained because of its strong belief in

the need for a more influential force to protect

the population. When the vote was held in the

General Assembly however, New Zealand voted

in support of the motion on the grounds that it

agreed with the partitioning of Palestine and that

the unarmed observers of UNTSO would be

preferable to no force at all. Despite its

compromise at the very end, New Zealand had

remained steadfast in its stance on the need for a

stronger force.

“I have said, and I will say it again, that

if the United Nations assumes…

responsibility for the partition of

Palestine, it should unquestioningly

assume, at the same time, the duty of

protecting the population of that country

against any disturbance that might

result, and should prepare itself

accordingly…”28

New Zealand was first asked to support UNTSO

in a tangible way in August 1953. Dag

Hammarskjöld, the UN Secretary General,

approached Sweden, Denmark and New Zealand

about the provision of two officers towards the

mission. His motives were to increase not only

the size of UNTSO but also the geographical

spread of contributing countries.29 The

memoramdum from the Department of External

Affairs to Cabinet was favourable:

“Membership of the United Nations

involves a moral obligation to contribute

international peace-support operations: 1950-

1995. New Zealand Defence Force, 1996 p7. 27 Department of External Affairs. The United

Nations: Report of the New Zealand Delegation on

the Second Regular Session of the General Assembly

Held in New York, 16 September-29 November,

1947. Publication no. 60, Wellington, 1948, p128.

Quoted in Julian Hansen, New Zealand Involvement

in Multilateral Peacekeeping 1952-1993. Masters

Thesis, University of Auckland, 1994. 28 Sir Carl Berendsen in The United Nations: Report

of the New Zealand Delegation on the Second

towards a solution of United Nations

problems. In the present instance the

obligation is greater in that New Zealand

is one of the states which voted in favour

of the decision to partition Palestine.

Then too, in view of New Zealand’s

special interest in the Middle East it

appears desirable that New Zealand

participate in an activity designed to

maintain tranquillity in that region.”30

Although New Zealand was becoming

increasingly concerned about defence issues in

Asia, its main focus was still the Middle East.31

In 1952, New Zealand had committed itself to

basing a fighter squadron in Cyprus as a part of

Commonwealth defence arrangements known as

the Middle East Defence Organisation. New

Zealand’s strong opinions on the need for a

protection force in Palestine, at the time of the

vote, would have enhanced External Affairs’

feelings of obligation to support such a request.

Although there were now several reasons why

New Zealand should support the request,

effecting it was not so simple.

Despite the enthusiasm of External Affairs, the

New Zealand armed forces were not so amenable

to the idea. The 1950s were a time of full

employment so even maintaining existing

establishments was difficult.32 This problem was

further compounded with the extra commitments

to Korea and the Commonwealth Defence plans.

On top of all this, the NZ Army did not believe

that peacekeeping operations provided useful

experience for military personnel.33 All three

services declined the invitation to supply

officers.34 When the suggestion of supplying

Territorial Officers was raised, a further and

possibly the main problem became apparent. The

New Zealand Defence Force was already on a

very tight budget and was not prepared to cover

the additional salaries of two more officers.35

Territorial Force (TF) officers had already

proven to be a workable solution for

peacekeeping operations. The NZ Army had

Regular Session of the General Assembly Held in

New York, 16 September-29 November, 1947.

Publication no. 60, Wellington, 1948, p144. 29 Until this time the contributing nations were

limited to Belgium, France and the United States. 30 Quoted in John Crawford ‘Forty Years in the

Field’, New Zealand International Review Vol.19

(5): 17-19, Sept/Oct 1994 31 Crawford, 1994, p17. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid, p18 34 Hansen, p101. 35 The total cost for two officers was only £2200.


given short service regular force commissions to

TF personnel to serve with UNMOGIP in

Kashmir.36 This particular case however,

reduced the Army’s overall establishment by the

same number of officers and the Army was

simply not prepared to exasperate the problem

by carrying any further vacancies for UNTSO.37

The NZDF’s reluctance to support UNTSO

presented a problem for the government. In an

attempt to resolve the matter, External Affairs

offered to pay the officer’s salaries from their

budget. The respective Ministers of Finance,

Defence and External Affairs however continued

to debate the full value of such a commitment.

Mr MacDonald, the Minister of Defence, was

conscious of the message being sent to the UN if

New Zealand did not supply observers yet at the

same time he was also aware of the strain even

two officers would place on the military.38 The

Minister of Finance, Mr Bowden, argued that

contributing to UNTSO was inconsistent with

the government’s direction of reducing Defence

spending and that our contribution to Korea

should be seen as being enough.39 Eventually the

Government decided to decline the UN’s

invitation because of its “other military

commitments”.

Over the next two years, the conflicts between

Israel and its neighbours continued to draw

international attention. As a result, New

Zealand’s attitude towards UNTSO began to

improve and in April 1954, the NZ UN

representative was directed to inquire about

UNTSO’s need for further personnel. At the

time, UNTSO only had 40 observers and was

planning to expand the operation. They had

asked the contributing countries to increase their

commitment but when Sweden was unable to

supply two more officers, the UN turned to NZ.

Once again, The Department of External Affairs

was strongly in favour and emphasized the

importance to Cabinet. By now New Zealand

had been elected to a chair on the UN Security

Council and therefore had an “added

responsibility” to support such missions. A

second argument used by External Affairs

related to the British concerns about the tensions

on the Jordanian border. The United Kingdom

had a defence treaty with Jordan and was

36 To this day, all TF officers must resign their

commission and take up an RF commission for the

duration of their overseas deployment. 37 United Nations Panel of Field Observers, 2 April

1954, PM 277/5/9, NA. Quoted in Hansen, 1994 38 T.L. MacDonald, Office of the Minister of

Defence, to Minister of External Affairs, T.Clifton

Webb, handwritten memorandum, 20 October 1953,

PM 277/5/9, NA.

therefore actively involved in the region. The NZ

government of the day was particularly loyal to

Britain and so, on the 4th of May 1954, they voted

in favour of contributing two observers to

UNTSO. External Affairs were responsible for

paying the salaries.40

Nature of New Zealand’s Involvement

On 21 July 1954, Majors Geoffery Austin and

Alan Smith were sent over to Jerusalem and were

subsequently assigned to the Jordan-Israel

Mixed Armistice Commission (HJK-IMAC).

The main task of this commission was to

investigate and report any breeches of the

armistice agreements. Their arrival coincided

with a particularly difficult time for the region.

The two New Zealand officers found themselves

very busy yet this situation also allowed them the

opportunity to quickly earn a reputation for high

standards and professionalism.41

The contribution and reputation of New

Zealanders in UNTSO continued to grow. Late

in 1955, External Affairs received a further

request from the UN for one or two more

observers to UNTSO. Given that External

Affairs were paying the salaries and that there

was a ready supply of suitable TF Officers, the

Army Department agreed to supply a further two

observers. Ironically though, External Affairs

had now become ambivalent to the notion,

believing that our contribution of two was

credible enough given the size of our country.42

In January 1956, Cabinet decided that New

Zealand would offer only one additional

observer, bringing our contribution to three out

of a total of 43 in UNTSO at that time.

The situation in the Middle East continued to

deteriorate and further requests for observers

were soon made. Following his visit to Palestine,

the UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld,

made a personal request to New Zealand for four

more observers. This request was received on the

24th of April 1956, six months before the Suez

Crisis. The New Zealand Government treated the

request with great urgency and within six days

had agreed to the increase. The additional four

were however only approved for one year.

39 Minister of Finance, Mr Bowden, to Minister of

External Affairs, T. Clifton Webb, memorandum, 5

November 1953, PM 277/5/9, NA. 40 This situation continued up until 1989 when

Defence took over the cost. 41 Burns to Cordier, 5 July 1957, EA1,277/5/9, NA.

Cited in Crawford, 1996, p 17. 42 Hansen, p104


Nonetheless, New Zealand’s contribution of

seven observers, out of a total of 61, made it one

of the largest contingents in UNTSO. When

considered in proportion of New Zealand’s

population, the contribution far exceeded that of

any other country.

The domestic problems of supplying observers

and the undulating situation in the Middle East

meant that New Zealand’s contribution

continued to fluctuate. By June 1957, External

Affairs realised that the one year limit on the

increased numbers was about to expire and

sought a more permanent policy on our level of

contribution. Meanwhile developments in

Egypt43 meant that UNTSO had allowed New

Zealand’s contribution to fall down to five.44

Following consultations with both the Army and

Treasury, the Government agreed to allow the

two additional observers to complete their tours,

although once those two were complete then the

total contribution would return to the normal

three. This level was still considered by Treasury

as ‘generous and in excess of the number

required of New Zealand’.45 Conversely,

External Affairs argued that we should maintain

a significant level of involvement because of the

problems the UN was having finding suitable

contributing nations46 and because of the

usefulness of our contribution.

“New Zealanders are regarded as

particularly good at this kind of work,

which requires a high degree of initiative,

coolness and tact in situations which, if

mishandled, could lead to an outbreak of

hostilities.”47

The resulting decision by Government was that

the number of observers supplied to UNTSO

would be set with an upper limit of five. This

meant that if the situation allowed, the number

should revert to three. By June of 1958, the

Minister of Defence called for a meeting with the

Prime Minister to discuss the number of New

Zealand observers in Palestine. Preempting this

meeting, the Ministry of External Affairs

approached their minister, who was also the

Prime Minister, Mr Walter Nash, and convinced

43 The implementation of the UN Emergency Force

(UNEF) later known as UNEF I 44 The work of UNTSO in Egypt was reduced due to

the newly created UNEF. For more see Crawford

1996, p18; also Hansen Peacekeeping pp 105-6; and

Blue Helmets, pp 24-25 and 43-45. 45 Secretary to the Treasury L. Williams to Minister

of Finance, 5 July 1957, PM 277/5/9, NA. Quoted in

Hansen, p 105. 46 Communist countries were not considered suitable

and many of the remaining nations were associated

him that the situation had not improved to the

point where the contribution should decrease.

Additionally, UNTSO had just been tasked by

the Security Council to establish observers on

the Lebanon-Syria border. Cabinet voted in

favour of External Affair’s recommendation to

retain the contribution level at five.

A further ‘urgent appeal’ from the UN Secretary-

General in July of 1960 resulted in the usual

concerns being raised within the three ministries.

The United Nations had set up a new operation

in the Congo Republic (ONUC) and as has often

been the case, UNTSO contributed experienced

personnel to help with the establishment. One of

those personnel happened to be a New Zealander

and therefore needed to be replaced in Palestine.

Treasury agreed on the need, in view of the fact

that New Zealand was not contributing to ONUC

in any other way, but wanted the number to

return to five once the Congo issue was resolved

and the seconded officer returned to Palestine.

Cabinet considered the matter and then on 1

August 1960, voted to increase the contribution

to UNTSO by two, even though only one was

requested.48 Although the approval was only

temporary, it did allow the Army to send over

two more officers. What in fact happened was

two New Zealand officers were seconded down

to ONUC and the number of New Zealanders in

UNTSO remained at five.

For the next 16 years, New Zealand’s

contribution of five observers remained

constant. Despite the National Party’s 1975

election manifesto promising greater support for

the United Nations, Treasury initially attempted

to downsize our contribution, and then in 1976,

pushed for the withdrawal of our entire

contribution.49 It was eventually decided to

reduce the number of New Zealand observers

down to four. Despite numerous requests to

increase the number again, New Zealand

continued to decline on the grounds of financial

limitations and the fact that New Zealand was

already contributing more than its proportional

share. The one exception was in 1986 when a

special request was made for a New Zealand

officer in UNTSO to be seconded over to the

with one side or the other in the various conflicts,

thus making them unsuitable also. 47 Secretary of External Affairs to Acting Minister of

External Affairs, 12 July 1957, PM 277/5/9, NA. 48 New Zealand had a surplus of officers at this time. 49 John Crawford ‘Change and Continuity in New

Zealand’s Policy on Peacekeeping, 1952-1992.’ An

unpublished paper available from Defence Library,

Wellington. nd


United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

(UNIFIL). Approval was given for the level to

return up to five for one year only. This was seen

as the perfect opportunity for the Labour

Government to make-good on its 1984 election

promise to strengthen the authority of the United

Nations.50

In mid 1993, the United Nations decided to

increase the size of UNTSO and asked for a

proportional increase from the contributing

countries. This meant a further three positions

for New Zealand, bringing the total contribution

to seven. Around the same time, New Zealand

was also invited by the United Nations to provide

a senior officer for the post of Deputy Chief of

Staff in Jerusalem, an offer that New Zealand

accepted. The provision of seven observers has

been maintained until September 2001 when a

New Zealand officer51 was posted in as the Chief

Observer OGG-T. His arrival coincided with the

departure of an unreplaced New Zealand

observer. Prior to this, the appointment of senior

officers were always seen as being extra to the

normal commitment. 52 Since the late 1990s,

though, the New Zealand Army has struggled to

find suitable spare officers to supply UNTSO

given its high number of other contributions to

world peace. As a solution, the Army invited the

Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) to meet

its obligations to fill two of the positions.53 This

contribution ratio of five Army and two RNZAF

remains the time of writing with most of the

Army positions now being filled by RF.

The Issues relating to New Zealand's Involvement

From the outset, New Zealand’s involvement in

UNTSO has been primarily a foreign affairs

matter. Particularly in the early days of our

involvement, it was solely the Ministry of

External Affairs (now the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs and Trade, MFAT) who pushed for New

Zealand's contribution. Appreciating the

importance our involvement would have on both

trade and other alliances, External Affairs fought

long and hard in the face of both Defence and

Treasury opposition. Treasury presented the

ubiquitous and eternal problem of the financial

costs in supporting such a mission. Defence, who

50 Hansen, p 108. 51 Lt Col Mike Baker. 52 In effect reducing New Zealand’s commitment to

six observers and one senior position. The vacancy

left by this situation has been covered by

Switzerland who are currently over-strength. 53 The official ratio of positions is one Royal New

Zealand Navy, two RNZAF and four NZ Army-

had not budgeted for additional costs at that time,

supported this argument.

While the cost factor continues to be a negative

aspect to peacekeeping it needs to be kept in

perspective. There are financial gains from trade

deals abroad, not only within the areas affected

by conflict but also with those countries who

appreciate our contribution to world peace. The

internal issue of which governmental department

paid for the peacekeepers was resolved by

External Affairs who, valuing the contribution,

offered to pick up the tab. This was particularly

necessary when the Army claimed they could not

spare any Regular Force (RF) officers and had to

employ additional TF officers on short-term

commissions.

Until the late 1980s, the Army downplayed the

benefit of being involved in peacekeeping. From

the beginning, they argued that peacekeeping

operations did not provide any useful training for

their officers for what was then seen as

traditional military skills. In keeping with this

argument, they initially only sent older, combat

experienced TF officers. By 1958 however,

External Affairs had noticed a trend of Regular

Officers being sent and concluded that the Army

were now using the mission as a training ground

for their more junior officers.54 It was also seen

as an opportunity of giving the Army first-hand

operational knowledge in what was still seen as

a strategically important area. The Army’s

counter argument for using RF personnel was

that they could no longer find suitable TF

officers.

“…although there may be some value to

the Department through the experience

gained by these officers, they could be

more usefully employed in other

positions. No particular benefit is derived

by Army from the scheme.”55

As had been the practice since the early days,

External Affairs had been conducting pre and

post tour interviews with observers. While the

knowledge gained from the observers during the

post-tour interviews was seen as superficial and

of little value, it did give the Department a

working knowledge of the training value

perceived by the individuals. By the early 1980s,

source: Major Mike Chivers the New Zealand Senior

National Officer in UNTSO Sep 2000- Sep 2001. 54 Around the senior Captain/junior Major rank

level. 55 Army Secretary to Secretary of External Affairs,

24 June 1958, Army 243/2/47, NA quoted in

Hansen, p110


Foreign Affairs were aware that Defence was

now limiting the length of tours to UNTSO

because of the long waiting list of volunteers and

to enable as many officers as possible to benefit

from serving in the mission.56 In early 1989, the

then Ministry of External Relations and Trade

(MERT), convinced Treasury that the Army

were actually getting significant benefit from the

mission and that they should now shoulder the

costs.

The diplomatic benefits of contributing to

UNTSO continue to be the most significant

positive. New Zealand's contribution to world

peace and its support of the United Nations

remains as important today as it did in 1948. The

question now, is whether UNTSO is seen as a

worthy mission to contribute personnel towards.

While high profile missions provide the biggest

yield in terms of international mana, other

factors are also important.

The New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs

and Trade has a set of criteria to help determine

the value of contributing to peacekeeping

missions.57 The factors are divided into three

headings: National Considerations,

Achievability and Acceptability. Of the first one,

UNTSO provides significant value. National

Considerations includes elements such as

enhancing security in regions of strategic or

economic interest to New Zealand, enhancing

New Zealand's bilateral or multilateral

relationships, supporting humanitarian

objectives, and offering a distinctive role for

New Zealand. All four of these factors show why

UNTSO is important to New Zealand and

suggests the likelihood of our continued support.

‘Achievability’ is a consideration that New

Zealand also deems essential before committing

to an operation. While the political mandate

provides the framework for success, such an

outcome still seems a long way off. The listed

objectives and operational concept are both

flexible and well planned to allow for changes

when necessary. The provision of humanitarian

assistance along with good command and

control also provide confidence in the

operation’s success. Finally, there is strong

international support for the sustainment of the

operation. All of the essential elements for

‘Achievability’ are met.

56 Hansen, p112 57 Criteria for Assessment of Proposed Contributions

of New Zealand Personnel to Peacekeeping,

Peacemaking and Peace Enforcement Operations

Pursuant to Security Council Mandates, Ministry of

Foreign Affairs and Trade, August 1993.

The final aspect that requires close scrutiny by

MFAT, is the question of ‘Acceptability’. Do the

New Zealand public support the mission? The

whole issue of public support for Defence in

New Zealand was reviewed during a poll in 1984

(following the ANZUS rift). This study revealed

that peacekeeping operations were seen as one of

the most popular aspects of the armed forces.58

Given the current environment of post cold war,

new world order, the public of New Zealand

seem even more in favour of such none

aggressive operations with the intent of

stabilising world security. This attitude waxes

and wanes with the increasing and decreasing

attention New Zealanders have for domestic

versus international issues, but generally

speaking it appears positive. Heightened media

attention on foreign conflicts, and our

involvement in peacekeeping, has increased the

average New Zealander’s awareness of the

plight many face.

UNTSO is a mission without an end date. One of

the factors MFAT considers, is the duration of

the commitment or whether there is adequate

provision for the review and termination of our

support if and when the situation changes. New

Zealand has always retained the right to review,

reduce or increase its contribution if the costs

and risks change significantly, relative to the

benefits. While there is no foreseeable end to

UNTSO, New Zealand does not feel trapped into

the mission and therefore has no need to seek an

early escape.

New Zealand wants to retain an ability to

respond to other tasks and missions without

feeling over-committed. Unlike larger missions

(Bosnia and East Timor)59, UNTSO does not

represent a large commitment that will impact on

other short notice missions. With only seven

officers currently in UNTSO, the overall outlay

of operationally-ready personnel is low. It

should however be remembered that the

combined impact of all small UN missions

supported by New Zealand is starting to have an

impact on the NZ Army’s ability to support both

Bougainville and East Timor. The current

solution is to increase the number of positions

being filled by Navy and Air Force, although this

too is a limited resource.

58 Defence and Security: What New Zealanders

Want, Report of the Defence Committee of Enquiry,

Wellington, July 1986, pp 47-48. Quoted in

Crawford, ‘Change and Continuity in New

Zealand’s Policy on Peacekeeping, 1952-1992.’ 59 A reinforced company and a battalion (-)

respectively.


The New Zealand Government continues to

review our ongoing support for UNTSO. While

the cost of sending observers remains an issue,

this is balanced against the benefits offered.

Such benefits include, to a limited extent,

operational experience and training for the

military, but more importantly our international

profile in terms of ‘doing our bit’. New Zealand

wants to maintain a presence on the world stage

and to be seen to be a good international citizen.

With a small population and limited wealth, the

real question is not so much whether we should

be involved with the UN, but in which mission

areas and to what extent. Is our current level of

contribution towards UNTSO appropriate and

what is the likely future of New Zealand's

involvement in the Middle East?

The Future of New Zealand in the Middle East

By 2001, most of the original 1954 motives for

involvement in UNTSO have gone. New

Zealand is now more independent from Britain,

preferring regional links to colonial ones. Trade

with the Middle East has also changed. Whereas

in 1954, New Zealand had no trade in the region,

current trade is both varied and increasing. The

only original motive for New Zealand’s

involvement in the Middle East is its support for

the United Nations. There is however one other

similarity between 1954 and 2001, that is the

ongoing issue of financial limits on Defence

spending. The demise of the Cold War has seen

a global decrease in military spending, and a

redirection of attention to new threats, including

terrorism. In keeping with this, in 2001 the New

Zealand Government made radical changes to

the NZDF, both in terms of hardware and in its

mission. Unlike in the 1950s, where

peacekeeping was not seen as important, today

such operations are very much a part of the

NZDF’s key outputs.60 In addition to this though,

New Zealand is an active participant in the

international coalition’s world-wide fight

against terrorism following the terrorist attacks

in the United States on 11 September 2001. New

Zealand is likely to reconsider its military

spending and goals to support this new war. At

the time of writing it was too early to tell whether

this new aspect would be seen as complementary

60 Key Outputs of the New Zealand Defence Force

available at

www.army.mil.nz/about/g_strategicov.cfm 61 OGL is considered to be the most operationally

demanding of all the posts, yet even that is very low

level. The greatest benefit is the exposure to terrorist

operations conducted by Hezbollah on a regular

basis. Setting up a new mission Area in the

to UN peacekeeping or in competition (in terms

of defence spending).

While contributing to the UN will still be seen as

important, New Zealand must spread its limited

military resources wisely. New Zealand must

consider if the situation in the Middle East still

warrants the level of support it is showing.

Clearly the problems facing Israel are integral to

the Middle Eastern connection to the terrorist

problems of the world. Public awareness is high

and therefore their support is likely to reflect

those concerns. The high profile of the problems

also gives New Zealand kudos to third party

countries who see us ‘doing our bit’ for world

peace. In terms of UNTSO, the current level of

contribution is not the biggest in the mission, but

it is disproportionately high when considered in

terms of our population.

The training and experience benefits gained

from UNTSO are again beginning to wane. The

way UNTSO is currently using Military

Observers (UNMOs),61 means that the mission is

not demanding and many see their tour as a year

off from work. Although officially an

unaccompanied posting by New Zealand

standards, the UN treat it as a family mission and

nearly all observers bring their entire family with

them.62 Affectionately the mission is known, to

those involved, as the UN Travel and Shopping

Organisation (UNTSO). Over the years the

training value gained from UNTSO has swung

backwards and forwards. In the earliest years,

New Zealand had a wealth of war-time soldiers

to call upon. This was maintained through the

1950s with Korea and then into the late 1960s

and early 70s with Vietnam. During the 1980s

however, and to a lesser extent the 1990s, the

New Zealand Army was actively seeking

overseas posts to give its personnel real time

operational experience. It was during this period

that the Army used RF rather than TF personnel

for UNTSO. Today however, with NZ involved

in so many other UN missions around the world,

and in particular the large commitments to East

Timor, MFO, the Solomon Islands and

Bouganville,63 such experience is no longer

unique. The most positive military benefit

gained from UNTSO is the experience of

working with so many diverse nationalities.

Palestinian Territories would perhaps offer some

useful experience. 62 This situation was beginning to change in 2001 as

less and less families chose to come 63 Note that New Zealand’s current contribution to

the MFO, 26 personnel, is now larger than that to the

Peace Monitoring Group in Bounganville.


Exposure to nearly 50 different countries,64

means that UNTSO does provide, albeit

indirectly, useful interoperability training to

those who serve there.

The remaining question relates to the future of

UNTSO. New Zealand’s continued involvement

depends largely on the future of the mission

itself. As has been the case in the past, UNTSO

has had a changing mandate and mission area.

The current situation could see UNTSO re-

deploy into the Palestinian Territories. This

could mean a reduction on the other borders or

an increase in the overall size. Either way, the

UN would maintain its normal policy of waiting

to hear informally about a country’s willingness

to increase support before formally requesting a

change.65

Tied in with the future of UNTSO is the question

of peace in the Middle East. As has been shown

in the earlier sections on the history of the region,

eternal peace seems unlikely. UNTSO has a non-

terminating mandate. This means that, for the

foreseeable future, peace is not expected to be

self-supporting in the region. Even if Israel

concludes peace treaties with each of its

neighbours, there are other Arab nations who

still strongly oppose the existence of ‘the Zionist

entity’. These fundamentalist countries are

unlikely to ever give up their cause. Even in the

wake of the US terrorist attacks, some Islamic

factions blame Israel for the US’s problems.

The future of peace in the Middle East very

much depends on the United States’ response to

the attacks on their territory. If they and the

world alliance choose a path of all out war

against all terrorist entities, then the shape of the

Middle East will change significantly. Either

way, this will not change the importance of

stability of Israel’s borders in the near future.

Therefore, with the continued need for UNTSO,

the high public profile of the Middle East, and

our trade links to the region, New Zealand looks

likely to continue its contribution to regional

stability in and around Israel.

Conclusion

The aim of this paper was to explore the Middle

East situation, through New Zealand eyes, and to

consider the value of our continued involvement.

To do this, it was first necessary to understand

64 While the number of countries contributing

military observers to UNTSO is only 22, the spread

is much greater when civilian staff and

UNIFIL/UNDOF are considered.

the long history of conflict in the region. The

various occupying armies and limited resources

during the past 5000 years have brewed a

situation where conflict germinates easier than

peace. Even in recent history, the region now

known as the Middle East has been a hotspot for

conflict. The creation of ‘The State of Israel’ saw

the start of renewed fighting between Israeli

Jews and local Arabs. Israel’s neighbours have

continued to attack or repel attacks during

several major confrontations.

Since Israel’s inception, the United Nations has

been involved in trying to maintain peace in the

region. In 1947 the UN first became involved

when Britain, the former authority in the region,

asked for help in resolving the land disputes. In

1948 the UN set up commissions, appointed

mediators and established the United Nations

Truce Supervision Organisation. Since that time,

UNTSO has assisted in maintaining peace

through low level dialogue at the local level and

by reporting back to the UN Headquarters in

New York to help broker larger scale

resolutions.

New Zealand has participated in UNTSO since

July 1954, with between two and seven military

observers, making it our longest running

peacekeeping commitment. Our reasons for

involvement stem from our concern for the long

history of conflict in the area and our colonial

links to Britain. Over the years, both domestic

and international issues have meant that New

Zealand has either increased or decreased its

contribution of observers. Today New Zealand

maintains a level of seven observers in the

region, including one senior appointment.

The value of New Zealand's contribution focuses

mainly on the diplomatic front through the

foreign affairs portfolio. Our contribution to the

United Nations helps promote New Zealand’s

image as a good international citizen and helps

keep trade and political links open. A secondary

benefit gained by New Zealand is the

opportunity for officers to serve overseas with

other nationalities and to gain operational

experience. This second aspect has decreased in

importance over the past few years although

overall, our contribution to UNTSO is still seen

as important.

The terrorist attacks on the United States have

focused the world’s attention on the problems of

the Middle East. The current situation in this

65 This policy was introduced quite early on in the

UN’s history following some embarrassing

situations.


region is very unstable and peace does not look

set to break out for a long time yet. With the

continued need for UNTSO, it is likely that New

Zealand will continue to support the operation

for the foreseeable future. New Zealand does

however, already have heavy commitments to

other UN missions around the world and will

now be looking at how it can help in the war

against terrorism, therefore the level and extent

of our support for UNTSO will continue to be

reviewed.

When will it all end?

When they begin to love their children more than they hate each other.66

66 Richard Day, a psychologist at the [Beirut]

American University. Quoted in Friedman, p230


Bibliography

Blanford, N., ‘Mission Impossible’ Janes Defence Weekly, p21. 5 September 2001.

Blanford, N., ‘Interview: Timur Goksel, UNIFIL Senior Advisor’ Janes Defence Weekly, p32. 5

September 2001.

Brown, D., ‘ANZACs help preserve Mid-East Peace’, Asian Defence Journal, p 81-84 November 1983

Cordesman A. Israel, Syria military balance CSIS Report: Decline in Spending Enervates Syria’s

Strength available at http://www.csis.org/stratassessment/ reports/IsraelSyriaRealities.pdf

Cordesman, A. The Arab-Israeli Conventional Military Balance in 2000 available at Center for

Strategic and International Studies http://www.csis.org

Crawford, J. ‘Change and Continuity in New Zealand’s Policy on Peacekeeping, 1952-1992.’ An

unpublished paper available from Defence Library, Wellington. nd

Crawford, J. ‘Forty Years in the Field’, New Zealand International Review Vol.19 (5): 17-19, Sept/Oct

1994

Crawford, J. In the Field for Peace: New Zealand's contribution to international peace-support

operations: 1950-1995. New Zealand Defence Force, 1996

Defence Committee of Enquiry, Report of the Defence and Security: What New Zealanders Want,

Wellington, July 1986

Department of External Affairs. The United Nations: Report of the New Zealand Delegation on the

Second Regular Session of the General Assembly Held in New York, 16 September-29 November, 1947.

Publication no. 60, Wellington, 1948

Freidman, T., From Beirut to Jerusalem Harper Collins Publishers, 1990

G2 Branch, United Nations Truce Supervision, Unpublished notes prepared by the NZ Army Land

Command for issuing to NZ Observers posted to UNTSO. March 2001 edition

Hansen, J. New Zealand Involvement in Multilateral Peacekeeping 1952-1993. Masters Thesis,

University of Auckland, 1994.

Jaber, H., Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance. Columbia University Press. 1997.

Johnson, A., ‘The United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation’. [NZ] Army News Issue 65, 28 July,

1993, p9

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Criteria for Assesment of Proposed Contributions of New Zealand

Personnel to Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace Enforcement Operations Pursuant to Security Council

Mandates, August 1993.

Tadulala, N.K., The Role of UN Peacekeeping in the Middle East: A Case Study on Lebanon. An

unpublished research paper project, Department of History, Massey University, 1997.

Terrill, W. A., ‘The Lessons of UNTSO’ Conflict, Volume 9, 1989

Thakur, R., ‘Peacekeeping’ New Zealand as an International Citizen: Fifty years of United Nations

Membership. Wellington: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1995.

United Nations, Blue Helmets. New York, UN Department of Public Information, 1996.

http://www.csis.org/


Unpublished interdepartmental documents of the New Zealand Government

Army Secretary to Secretary of External Affairs, 24 June 1958, Army 243/2/47, NA

MacDonald, T.L., Office of the Minister of Defence, to Minister of External Affairs, T.Clifton Webb,

handwritten memorandum, 20 October 1953, PM 277/5/9, NA.

Minister of Finance, Mr Bowden, to Minister of External Affairs, T. Clifton Webb, memorandum, 5

November 1953, PM 277/5/9, NA.

Secretary of External Affairs to Acting Minister of External Affairs, 12 July 1957, PM 277/5/9, NA.

United Nations Panel of Field Observers, 2 April 1954, PM 277/5/9, NA.

Internet links

Lebanon and Hezbollah issues:


http://dailynews.yahoo.com/fc/World/Israel___Lebanon_Relations

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/12_09_01/art17.htm

Middle Eastern Attitudes:

http://www.sefarad.org/publication/lm/042/5.html

http://www.bnaibrith.ca/institute/articles/dm010730.html

http://www.hoffman-info.com/palestine5.html,

http://www.lawsociety.org/Intifada2000/articles/sanctuary.htm

http://www.adl.org/regional/Israel/default.htm

New Zealand Army

http://www.army.mil.nz/about/g_strategicov.cfm

http://www.army.mil.nz/ops/middleeast_more.cfm

The Wye River Memorandum (October 23, 1998)

http://www.Israel.org/mfa/go.asp

United Nations

http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/untso



http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/troop/tcuntso.htm

http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/maps/pk/untso.htm

General News items

http://www.cnn.com/

http://www.dnd.ca./dcds/missions/untso_e.htm


http://dailynews.yahoo.com/fc/World/Israel___Lebanon_Relations

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/12_09_01/art17.htm

http://www.sefarad.org/publication/lm/042/5.html

http://www.bnaibrith.ca/institute/articles/dm010730.html

http://www.hoffman-info.com/palestine5.html

http://www.lawsociety.org/Intifada2000/articles/sanctuary.htm

http://www.adl.org/regional/Israel/default.htm

http://www.army.mil.nz/about/g_strategicov.cfm

http://www.army.mil.nz/ops/middleeast_more.cfm

http://www.israel.org/mfa/go.asp

http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/untso



http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/troop/tcuntso.htm

http://www.cnn.com/

http://www.dnd.ca./dcds/missions/untso_e.htm


Appendix A Facts about UNTSO

HEADQUARTERS

Government House, Jerusalem

DURATION

11 June 1948 to present

CHIEF OF STAFF

Major-General Franco Ganguzza (Italy)

STRENGTH (31 July 2001)

140 military observers, supported by 107 international civilian personnel and 113 local civilian staff

CONTRIBUTORS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,

Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,

Sweden, Switzerland and United States

FATALITIES

12 military observers

17 other military personnel

6 international civilian staff

3 local staff

_______________________

38 Total

FINANCIAL ASPECTS

Method of financing

United Nations regular budget

Appropriation for year 2001

$22.8 million

Kiwis in UNTSO Jan 2002

Documents

Transcript of Kiwis in UNTSO Jan 2002