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2006 36: 464Philosophy of the Social SciencesAnthony KingResponse

How Not to Structure a Social Theory : A Reply to a Critical

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464

How Not to Structure a Social TheoryA Reply to a Critical ResponseAnthony KingExeter University, United Kingdom

In his recent review of my book, The Structure of Social Theory, KarstenStueber rejected my criticisms of contemporary social theory. Against my“hermeneutic” sociology which prioritizes human social relations, he advocatesa return to a dualistic ontology of structure and agency. This reply addressesStueber’s criticisms to re-affirm the ontology of social relations against onto-logical dualism.

Keywords: structure; agency; hermeneutics; social relations

Introduction

There is always a danger when replying to a review of engaging in a tire-some form of academic exchange. Replies can involve tedious hair-splittingover marginal interpretations fuelled by a barely concealed sense of indig-nation. It is hoped that this response to Karsten Stueber’s recent review ofmy book, The Structure of Social Theory, avoids the faults typical of thisgenre. The most for which any author can hope is to be taken seriously, andKarsten Stueber is undoubtedly a serious reader. His review presents theargument of the book clearly and offers measured criticisms of it. I amgrateful to Professor Stueber for writing such a lengthy and detailedaccount of my book. However, since the issue of structure and agency isimportant to social theory and Professor Stueber seeks to defend preciselythe ‘realist’ ontology which The Structure of Social Theory identifies as a

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Author’s Note: I am grateful to Nigel Pleasants for his comments on an earlier draft ofthis reply.

Discussion



central error in the philosophy of the social sciences today, a response maybe appropriate. Indeed, since Stueber complains that “he [King] hardly saysanything about what aspects of a social relation are constitutive for a par-ticular social institution” (Stueber 2006, 101), it may be necessary for meto explain the book further.

As Stueber correctly describes, The Structure of Social Theory advocatesa hermeneutic sociology which rejects ontological dualism. Society shouldnot be conceptualised in terms of structure and agency, that is, in terms ofinstitutions reproduced by individuals. Rather, social life consists exclu-sively of humans embedded in social relations with each other. These socialrelations consist of social interactions and collective practices which arethemselves co-ordinated by shared understandings identifying collectivegoals and the appropriate means of attaining them. Even the most robustand powerful institutions are properly the product of innumerable webs ofsocial relations—of interactions and collective practices—in which humansare engaged. Out of this myriad of interconnecting relations and practices,the institutional reality of society arises as an ‘interaction order’ in Goffman’sfelicitous phrase. In place of structure and agency, The Structure of SocialTheory prioritizes social relations out of which human groups—and ulti-mately all institutions—arise. In this way, The Structure of Social Theoryseeks to establish a social ontology for sociology today while demonstrat-ing the fallacies of the dualistic ontology of structure and agency typical ofcontemporary social theory.

Karsten Stueber provides an accurate description of my hermeneuticposition but he fundamentally disagrees that it constitutes an adequatesocial theory. For him there are elements of society which cannot be under-stood merely in terms of social relations. In order to explain these aspectsof social reality, he claims that the concepts of structure and agency areindispensable. Stueber forwards three arguments against The Structure ofSocial Theory. He rejects my critique of the concept of structure, myaccount of rule-following, and, finally, my description of human agency. Inthis, Stueber correctly identifies the key objections to ontological dualismraised in The Structure of Social Theory. He then offers counter-argumentsin order to rehabilitate the realist concepts of structure and agency.Stueber’s strategy is logical. The problem comes only in the detail of hisdefence of these concepts of structure and of agency. In each case,Stueber’s argument fails to recognize the implications of my criticisms.Ultimately, he re-asserts the standard justifications for structure, rule-following, and agency which appear in contemporary social theory. Hereturns to the social theory which my book sought to refute.

King / How Not to Structure a Social Theory 465



The Concept of Structure

For dualistic theorists like Stueber, institutions or large-scale social phe-nomena, for instance, are dependent upon the humans who comprise them,but they can never be reduced to them. Institutions have emergent powersand they must be analyzed at this supervenient level. Stueber employs theexample of biological emergence to illustrate his point. Just as the proper-ties of biological organisms are not reducible to their constitutive cells, nei-ther are institutions reducible to their constituent members. Stueber iscertainly partially correct. The powers of an institution cannot be reducedto particular individuals or groups of individuals within the organization. Itis self-evident that an institution or a macro-social phenomenon exceeds theactions and knowledge of any particular group or individual within it. Thus,Stueber notes that “policies intended to fight inflation tend to lead to higherunemployment” (Stueber 2006, 101). The actions of individuals and groupsat different locations produce consequences which none intended. Socialscientists must go beyond individuals if they are to provide a theoreticallyadequate account.

My current research examines the transformation of Europe’s armedforces utilising the hermeneutic approach described in The Structure ofSocial Theory. This project is pertinent here because it provides a fullerempirical illustration of what I mean by a “social relation” and the advan-tages of understanding society in terms of relations. As one of the mostpotent institutions, the armed forces usefully illustrate how macro-socialphenomena arise out of the social relations of which they are comprised. Intheir work on the German army in World War II, Janowitz and Shils (1975)famously demonstrated how the Wehrmacht consisted of a series of inter-locking primary groups, in which soldiers were bound into dense socialrelations with each other. The “emergent” power of the Wehrmacht con-sisted precisely of all the co-ordinated actions of all these interdependentprimary groups. It is important to recognize the distinctive character ofsocial relations in these primary groups and the armed forces as a whole.Although Janowitz and Shils emphasized personal bonds, the decisivesocial relations among primary groups of soldiers are, in fact, the expertcollective practices which troops perform together as members of a militaryorganization (King 2006). The relations between soldiers are principallymediated by reference to their shared understanding of military practices.Thus, soldiers are taught to conduct established collective drills, to respondto shared symbols in a coherent manner, and to communicate with eachother in a common way in order to co-ordinate their tactical practices.

466 Philosophy of the Social Sciences



Whatever their personal qualities, soldiers who fail to perform collective,military drills adequately are shamed and excluded from the group. Signif-icantly, soldiers themselves typically eliminate those who are incapable ofperforming collective practices and contributing to the group. Soldiersknowingly enforce practices upon each other and expect each other to com-port themselves in their relations with each other in a militarily recognizedmanner. As one former Royal Marine put it bluntly,

Amongst the Marines there was always the same code of practice: don’t goboff [boast] unless you can back it up with your fists, and always maintain thehigh soldiering standards required of a Marine or expect to be beaten up.(Preece 2004, 160)

Soldiers are locked into a web of dense social relations but there is noimplication that these relations are primarily personal; individual soldiersdo not independently agree to engage in private forms of interaction. If theydid, there would be no recognisable military organization but only diversegroups of individuals locked into un-connected interactions. On the con-trary, the relations between soldiers are informed by common under-standings of proper military practice recognized by the entire force and areaffirmed incessantly through interaction on exercises and operations. Theco-ordinated action of potentially thousands of primary groups, each boundtogether in social relations drawing on shared professional understandings,produces a prodigious collective effect. Thus, in Iraq in 2003, the collectiveeffects of Britain’s 3 Commando Brigade transcended the activities and under-standing of any particular Royal Marine or group of Marines. However, ina series of actions across the Al Faw Peninsula and up into Basra, RoyalMarines adhered to collective drills which they mutually enforced on eachother. The effect of this brigade in the theatre of operations was preciselythe product of all its members, locked into dense social relations, inscrib-ing collective patterns of practice on each other, and co-ordinating them-selves to shared goals.

As the armed forces show, an institution—or a large-scale social phe-nomenon like unemployment—cannot be reduced to particular individualsor groups. However, it is incorrect to claim that an institution supervenes allits members and the collective practices in which they are engaged. On thecontrary, an institution corresponds precisely to all of the interactions andpractices of which it is comprised, taken together as a collective phenomenon.To use Stueber’s own example, the high unemployment which follows infla-tion can be explained entirely as the cumulative product of the interactions




and practices of diverse social groups at different locations. Internationalfinanciers (themselves bound into wider social networks) assert pressure onnational currencies which produces inflation. As a result of this pressure,governments, themselves comprised of groups and locked into wider socialnetworks, are forced to increase tax and interest rates to counter inflation,which in turn discourages consumer spending. This decline in spendingforces industrialists and businessmen to shed workers to protect their prof-its as their turnover declines. At each point, social groups comprised ofinternal social relations and locked into relations with other groups create aself-propelling situation. Increased unemployment is the intention of noone and not reducible to any group, but the concept of structure reifies thesecomplex interaction orders. Instead of embedding humans within everwidening social networks which together produce collective effects, theindividual is isolated from the dynamics of social interaction and con-fronted by a pre-constituted social reality. Individuals then reproduce ortransform structure through their independent activity.

There is, in fact, a danger here that Stueber and I are arguing past eachother. Despite terminological differences, there may be no substantive onto-logical divide between us. We may both simply be emphasising the impor-tance of collective phenomena, which both of us actually regard as morethan isolated individuals. In his recent work on emergence, Keith Sawyer(2005) has described the irreducible properties of collective events withoutreifying social interaction. Sawyer recognizes that humans in groups con-stitute a reality which transcends the individual, and he describes howsociety as a whole consists of the interlocking of large social groups to cre-ate quite distinctive dynamics. Sawyer’s position is broadly compatiblewith my own position, and his concept of emergence could be equated withStueber’s own approach. A rapprochement between my own position andthat of Stueber may well be possible, therefore. Stueber simply prefers theterm “structure” to my “social relations.”

Unfortunately, an enduring and decisive problem persists with Stueber’saccount. He does not just emphasize the distinctive properties of collectiveevents, as Sawyer does. Nor does he use the term “structure” in a purelyheuristic sense. Structure does not refer merely to the broad social contextin which interaction takes place but whose ontology is not explicated fullyfor purely practical reasons (King 1999, 223-24). Rather, he explicitlyenvisages social life as a dualism of structure and agency: “any empiricalinvestigation of social reality has thus also to be aware of both aspects ofsocial reality” (Stueber 2006, 96). Ontologically, society consists of struc-ture and agency for him. Consequently, humans are torn from their proper




place in a nexus of social relations in which collective phenomena appear.Not only is Stueber’s ontology incorrect, but also very serious problemsattend this dualistic conception of society. Once society is understood interms of agency and structure, social scientists must explain the relationshipbetween the individual and structure. They need to explain how struc-ture imposes upon individuals without reducing them to “cultural dopes.”Dualistic theorists often find it difficult not to oscillate between voluntarismand determinism in describing this relationship. Typically, they avoid theissue and claim that individuals are determined by structure or free to do oth-erwise merely as and when it is convenient for them to do so. Alternatively,social theorists have appealed to the concept of rules as a means of bridgingthe divide between agency and structure while simultaneously avoidingeither voluntarism or determinism.

The Concept of Rules

For social theorists like Stueber, rules act as general principles whichguide the individual to act in a predictable way in any particular case.Consequently, individuals dispersed over time and space, all acting in ref-erence to a rule, will act coherently, thereby reproducing the institution inwhich they exist. Stueber espouses precisely this individualist account ofrule-following favored by much contemporary social theory. He insiststhat it is “conceptually necessary” to understand social practice in terms ofindividual rule-following. Initially, this conceptual necessity is purelyheuristic. According to Stueber, it would be impossible to describe a gamelike chess or an institution like the legal system without reference to “gen-eral rules” (Stueber 2006, 100). Yet rules have more than an analytical pur-pose for him. Regular individual practice is the product of general ruleswhich the individual applies in each particular case. Rules are not simplyvital to sociological explanation, therefore, but also to the very possibil-ity of coherent social practice. Stueber seems to advocate a positionvery similar to that of Anthony Giddens here: “A formula is a generalizableprocedure—generalizable because it applies over a range of contexts andoccasions, a procedure because it allows for methodical continuation ofan established sequence. Are linguistic rules like this? I think they are”(Giddens 1995, 20-21).

Yet this notion of general rules is deeply problematic. As Wittgensteinfamously showed and as Stueber himself has discussed at length, appeals togeneral rules applied by the individual do not explain regular social practice




at all (Wittgenstein 1976, §201; Kripke 1982; Stueber 2005). A general rulecould be interpreted in a multiplicity of ways by the individual. For instance,contrary to Stueber’s example, if an individual followed the rules of chessindependently of the social institution of chess playing (the world commu-nity of chess players), that player could develop a quite different game thanthe one we would recognize as chess today. In order for a general rule to beapplied in the appropriate way on any given occasion, individuals need toknow more than the rule. As Wittgenstein claimed, they need a “form oflife” too. For an individual to follow a rule properly, that person mustalready share an understanding about what they are trying to achieve withothers. They must be embedded in social relations with others; they mustbe part of a social group. Only when they have already agreed on their col-lective goals can group members recognize what a general rule implies inany particular instance. Stueber worries that on this collective account ofrule-following, “our only way to refer to it [practice] would be by specificexample or by acting it out” (Stueber 2006, 100). The social scientist wouldbe robbed of any overarching explanatory concept, and individuals wouldnot be able to explain to others how to do things. Social order would beextremely fragile and perhaps even impossible, therefore.

Yet this is how rules operate in social life itself. Supposedly general ruleare, in fact, only limited examples of practice acted out repeatedly. Rulesare not laws which logically dictate what must be the case in all subsequentcases. They are finite exemplars which apply over a limited number ofcases subject to public agreement (Bloor 1997). Rules illustrate broadlyappropriate courses of action in limited areas of activity, but their correctapplication to future circumstances cannot be infallibly assumed from priorevents. Indeed, it is precisely because the significance of a general rule islimited that humans need to affirm its meaning to each other through regu-lar public demonstration. Humans constantly re-affirm with each otherwhat constitutes appropriate rule-following through practice. Social orderdepends upon this constant flow of communication in which appropriatebehaviour (rule-following) is mutually affirmed and re-affirmed by humans.Humans co-ordinate themselves through shared understandings as theyengage in collective practices, not by individual reference to general rules.

The armed forces are useful as an example precisely because they areamong the most codified and rule-bound institutions in existence. There aregeneral rules about almost every aspect of social conduct. For instance, inthe British army, it is a rule that officers are saluted when they and theirsubordinates are wearing headdress. The rule appears to be both simple andgeneral. Anyone should be independently able to apply this rule very easily




once they have been told about it, in the manner which Stueber describes.Yet, in fact, the practice of saluting cannot be conducted correctly merelyby individual reference to this general rule. Thus, recruits will often try toapply the general rule even in cases where it is physically impossible tosalute, with hilarious results. They will give a salute as they are driving, rid-ing bikes, holding equipment, or engaging in physical exercise. As a con-sequence, they will skid their cars, drop equipment, stumble, fall over, orincapacitate themselves. Ironically, they have taken rule-following so seri-ously that they give a salute when the general rule was never meant to beapplied. However, although their actions are absurd, inappropriate salutesusefully demonstrate the nature of rule-following. The general rule could beinterpreted in almost any way by the individual. When recruits salute inap-propriately, they are applying a general rule in a potentially valid way.However, in the context of this social group, the British army, oriented toparticular collective goals, they are wrong. It is only through their observa-tion of the collective practices of experienced members of the British forcesthat they begin to learn when it is appropriate to salute. They follow thepublic practice of others. This public practice then provides a very broadguideline of what might be appropriate in any future situation, but, in theevent, it is no more than a “specific example,” as Stueber fears. In any sit-uation, the gathered group will ascertain appropriate conduct and, there-fore, what constitutes rule-following in that case.

Thus, the practice of saluting is actually more diverse than the mere gen-eral rule would suggest. For instance, on one Royal Marine exercise, a rel-atively unknown, attached army officer surprised a Royal Marine sergeantas he inspected a harbour position at night. On turning round and seeing theunfamiliar officer, the sergeant saluted him briskly. Technically, this wasincorrect. Salutes should not be given in the field even when soldiers arewearing their berets as it conveniently identifies officers to enemy snipers.The officer receiving the salute was manifestly surprised by this breach ofconduct, but he was also flattered by the spirit of respect in which the salutewas made. Although the salute was wrong, in this context of a very experi-enced sergeant giving the salute to an unknown officer, it constitutedcorrect procedure and the officer thanked the sergeant for the gesture.The sergeant had extrapolated from military practice in one context, wherethe salute denotes respect for the hierarchy, to re-apply it where the ruleswere formally different. Nevertheless, given the distant relations betweenthe sergeant and officer, the technically false extrapolation of practice provedto be correct. In this context, establishing a professional relation with anunknown officer was more important than maintaining tactical standard




operating procedures. Society consists of a chain of social interactions inwhich humans engage in collective practices. Past practices are carried for-ward by the participants to the next social interaction, but, at each point,humans must decide collectively what constitutes appropriate practice in thecurrent predicament. Past practice does not determine present action. It is acommon resource upon which humans collectively draw to decide uponappropriate conduct now. Social interactions are like a series of forest clear-ings which are interconnected by paths and trails but the route through eachone of which cannot be predicted precisely by reference to the previousopenings. Previous encounters illuminate the way; they do not prescribe it.

Significantly, although Stueber misreads my discussion of rule-followingto claim that it collapses back into his own rule-individualism, his ownaccount explicitly relies on a collectivist approach. Thus, Stueber notes that“it is granted that such talk [of rule-following] presupposes the existence ofdispositions as conditions for the realization of a certain structure of society”(Stueber 2006, 100; emphasis added). Stueber employs the term “disposi-tions,” while I prefer the term “shared understandings” since the latter avoidsthe individualist and internalist implications of the former, but his point is thesame as mine. In order for rules to be applied properly, humans need to havea shared understanding of what they are trying to achieve. They need to co-ordinate their actions to common ends. Entirely consonant with my ownaccount, Stueber emphasises that

it is, however, no mystery how such common possession of dispositioncomes about; indeed it is part of the function of various institutions of societysuch as schools to inculcate such practical know-how and provide us with therelevant training for developing such skills. (Stueber 2006, 99)

These common understandings arise in the course of social interaction. Forregular practice to occur, humans must engage in repeated interactionswhere understandings are mutually affirmed. Stueber cites the example ofeducational institutions in modern society in creating these understandings,but, of course, this process of collective education never ceases. In everyinstitution, co-ordinated practice is maintained not by reference to rules butthrough a myriad of interactions, meetings, workshops, and informal dis-cussions, where people constantly ascertain and affirm appropriate practice.Stueber wants to explain society by reference to something more definitivethan mere interactions and practices precisely because he views society interms of structure and agency. He sees a void between the two dimensionsof social reality which mere human practice cannot bridge. Consequently,




he is driven to insist upon the existence of general rules which bind indi-vidual and structure in a theoretically comforting way. General rules areconveniently neat in comparison with the bewildering spectacle of empiricalreality. However, in every case, the supposedly general rule collapses intothe messy actuality of interactions and practices, that is, social relations.

The Concept of Agency

Stueber’s dualist vision of individuals following rules to reproducestructure implies a distinctive concept of human agency. Individuals musthave the reflexivity to be able to apply general rules appropriately in orderthat institutions are reproduced. They must consciously understand theirsituation and judge the best form of conduct in it.

They are rational individuals who can situate themselves in their environmentin light of their beliefs about the world, and they can take ownership of theiraction in terms of the relevant beliefs and desires as their reasons for theiractions. . . . It is exactly this reflective ability that to a large extent constituteswhat we commonly refer to as an agent’s autonomy. (Stueber 2006, 102)

It seems that, for Stueber, rationality is a pristine interior voice which is ableto direct individual action; it is the centre-point of reflexivity. Whatever thesocial context, rationality allows individuals to ascertain how they shouldact. This reflexivity avoids social determinism and also explains how indi-viduals are able to innovate and effect social change. Individuals are notdopes but active agents who are capable of manipulating structure. Individualagency is essential for Stueber both ethically and analytically. In this, Stueberis typical of many social theorists writing today. For them, it has becomealmost an axiom that “the individual could have done otherwise.” Individualspossess a private pool of self-consciousness in which a host of possibleactions can be imagined and enacted. Consequently, although objectiveinstitutional structures exist, individual agency, manifested in and throughrationality, is inviolable.

Although it has become almost a truism in Western culture, includingthe “folk psychology” which Stueber invokes, the concept of autonomousindividual agency, articulated through rational self-consciousness, is deeplyproblematic. Although this independent realm of individual consciousnessis invested with great significance by contemporary social theorists, it is notat all clear that it actually plays a major independent role in human agency.




Although self-conscious contemplation seems to predominate in momentsaway from social interaction when humans consider themselves and theiracts alone, in the situational context of social intercourse, its relevancebecomes less obvious. In social interaction, the dynamics of the situationchannel participants mutually into particular courses of agency almost inde-pendently of what they might think alone. Asch’s famous conformity stud-ies are only one example of the power of social interaction over individualagency and rationality. In those studies, individuals were subjected to mod-erate group pressure in the face of which they consented to incorrect per-ceptual judgements about the relative length of different lines which theydid not hold independently. In private, rationality may well demand a cer-tain course of action of an individual. However, the situation eliminates thispath as a possibility. In the course of actual social interaction, humans maymutually drive each other along collective paths of action which neithercould have predicted prior to the interaction.

It is not merely that humans are susceptible to social pressure whichundermines the significance of private rationality. In order to co-operatewith each other and co-ordinate themselves, humans must develop a set ofshared understandings of what they intend to do together. These sharedunderstandings are necessarily distinct from any prior or private ones.Private understandings could never co-ordinate collective practice sincerespective participants could not know what the others’ understandingswere or what actions they implied. To engage in collective practice, partic-ipants must develop shared understandings which transcend their privateconcepts. Consequently, in any situation, agency is not the un-mediatedexternalisation of prior individual rationality but arises jointly as a productof the social interactions in which humans are engaged.

Indeed, it is possible to go further. It is, in fact, highly doubtful whetherit is useful to think of individual reflexivity, even in those supposedly privatemoments of contemplation, as in any way personal. The sociological evidencemore generally suggests that even apparently pristine self-consciousness isitself a social product. As Randall Collins notes of intellectuals, “The groupis present in consciousness even when the individual is alone: for individu-als who are the creators of historically significant ideas, it is this intellectualcommunity which is paramount precisely when he or she is alone” (Collins2000, 7). Collins’s argument avowedly follows Durkheim’s analysis ofAustralian aboriginal ritual in which Durkheim claimed that “the soul isnothing other than the totemic principle incarnate in each individual”(Durkheim 1976, 248). The soul is not so much an individualistic productbut a collective good which is invested in each individual by the group.




Although it appears as the most private and personal property, the evidencesuggests that self-consciousness, as the vehicle of individual agency, is infact the product of the social relations in which an individual exists. Eventheir most private beliefs are dependent upon the concepts and practices ofthe groups of which they are members. It is precisely because supposedlyindividual rationality is always already a group product that humans areable to co-ordinate their interactions so apparently easily. They automati-cally mobilise collective concepts to co-ordinate their interactions.

This does not imply that individuals are irrational or dopes. It is importantto recognize that this sociological account of human agency is not a form ofsocial determinism as Stueber claims. The extraordinary creativity of humanagency is never denied. Together humans must contribute actively to thegroups to which they belong. However, a hermeneutic account denies thevalidity of individual, autonomous agency. In every case, human agency is acollective product, germinated with others and dependent upon the social net-works in which we all exist. Human agency is better understood as the collec-tive product of social relations rather than as an autonomous individual power.

Individualistic theories such as the one which Stueber advocates stum-ble on an empirical fact. If individuals have autonomous agency and alwaysare able to do otherwise by self-conscious reference to their rationality, whyis it that they so rarely do? In reality, individuals almost invariably act inpredictable ways. Their rationality does not lead them into radical forms ofaction as it might. On the contrary, social life is extraordinarily ordered.The answer is that humans do not do otherwise because they are alwaysalready embedded in a network of mutually compelling social relations.Humans act in predictable ways because they are members of groups, butthey do not behave predictably simply out of a passive sense of habit. Thereare cogent reasons why humans conform to social expectations in almostevery case. Crucially, as members of groups, humans have access to criti-cal collective goods. Groups—from hunter-gatherers to professional-statusgroups—provide their members with essential resources such as safety,security, shelter, food, and a diversity of economic opportunities. However,in order to access these collective goods, humans must co-operate withother group members. Only through co-operation with others can individu-als produce and enjoy collective goods. All human groups encourage theproduction of collective goods and police access to them through the mech-anisms of honor and shame. Those who are deemed to have contributed tothe group are honored and are accorded easy access to its collective goods,while non-contributors are shamed and finally excluded from the group.There are tangible benefits and sanctions encouraging co-operation. Through




mechanisms of honor and shame, humans overcome the problems of col-lective action and free-riding which have exercised rational choice theoryso severely. Humans are compelled to co-operate with the threat of exclu-sion from the collective goods of the groups of which they are members.Indeed, the mechanisms of honour and shame render free-riding very diffi-cult as a strategy. This fundamental need to co-operate in order to producecollective goods ensures that it is an extremely rare event when individualsactually exercise their putative right to do otherwise. To do otherwise wouldbe to renege on one’s social relations and all the collective benefits whichensue therefrom. To pursue an individual course of action, however for-mally rational, would lead to shame and exclusion from the group.

Consequently, humans mutually pressurise each other into coherent andpredictable social action out of fear of being excluded from the collectivebenefits of group membership. This is why the most powerful motivation inhuman social life is not individual rationality, as it should be if Stueber’saccount of agency were correct, but the visceral sense of honour and shamewith which we are all so familiar. Significantly, one of the most importantcollective goods which humans enjoy is precisely their social agency. In orderto act, individuals rely on the co-operation of others. Others must respondpredictably, in line with the individual’s intentions; they must understandwhat the individual is trying to do. Consequently, in order to enjoy individualagency, humans must act in a manner which is consistent with the under-standings and interests of their social group. They must act in a way whichencourages others to co-operate. To have social agency, it is necessary not toact as an individual but, on the contrary, to act as a member of a social group.It is necessary to act in deference to one’s social relations (Barnes 1988).

The dependence of human agency on others could be clarified in numer-ous ways, but, once again, the armed forces provide a very useful examplebecause military leadership seems to accord with an individualist concep-tion of agency. Formally, officers in the armed forces are invested with thepower of command. They can give orders which must be obeyed on pain ofsevere disciplinary measures even though these commands can result in thedeaths of the soldiers who are ordered to carry them out, the enemy, or evencivilians. Officers seem to be an ideal example of autonomous agency; theyare invested with power to direct the actions of others. In fact, the phenom-enon of command is different. Officers are invested with the power of lead-ership only so long as they command in a manner consistent with theunderstandings of the members of the platoon, company, battalion, or armedforces as a whole of which they are part. Their apparent autonomous abilityto command is in fact dependent upon their relations with others up and down




the chain of command. For instance, during the Vietnam War, LieutenantWilliam Calley commanded his men to murder women and children at MyLai. They complied with his orders fully and the subsequent massacre seemedto affirm an individualist account of agency, which flowed from a singleperson in an alarming fashion. In fact, the origins of the massacre were agood deal wider. At that time, the U.S. forces as a whole were under extremepressure after the Tet Offensive, and Calley’s platoon had itself recentlybeen involved in an ambush in which some of its members had been killed(Collins forthcoming). Consequently, soldiers in Calley’s platoon werealready actively disposed to conduct extreme acts of violence. Interestingly,Milgram records the testament of one of these soldiers.

Why did I do it? Because I felt like I was ordered to do it, and it seemed likethat, at the time I felt like I was doing the right thing, because like I say, I lostbuddies. I lost a damn good buddy, Bobby Wilson, and it [was] on my con-science. So after I done it, I felt good, but later on that day, it was getting tome. (Milgram 1974, 202)

As this soldier’s chilling testament reveals, Calley’s orders did not imposea course of action on his soldiers from above. Calley’s agency as the pla-toon commander at My Lai was itself dependent on the intense group feel-ings of hatred and revenge. As the designated leader of this group, Calleyonly publicly sanctioned the course of action which the group alreadywanted to take and, indeed, may have undertaken anyway. His order to mas-sacre civilians—his agency as leader—was effective only insofar as it alreadyrepresented the understandings and goals of the group. For all Stueber’sefforts to defend the concepts of structure and agency, we return in the endto the bedrock of social relations. Human agency is a more sociologicalphenomenon than Stueber allows.

Moreover, by understanding human agency sociologically within thecontext of the network of social relations in which it takes place, it is pos-sible to explain both human predictability and innovation. Consequently,it is possible to understand how the grand architecture of social institu-tions not only endures but also is able to change without descending intoeither voluntarism or determinism. As they interact and engage in collectivepractice, humans sustain these institutions together through their dailyco-ordination of a myriad of social relations. With an individual concept ofagency, by contrast, social theorists veer between randomness and deter-minism as they try to preserve personal autonomy and the reproduction ofstructure. They are trapped by structure and agency.




Conclusion: Two Kinds of Social Theory

In concluding his review of my book, Stueber concedes that I

might have succeeded in showing that social theory should think about thesocial realm in a more complex manner by taking into account the oppositionbetween individual agents and social structure but also not merely by takinginto account social relations. (Stueber 2006, 103)

This is a generous admission by a philosopher committed to a dualisticvision. Unfortunately, it misses the point of The Structure of Social Theory.The central argument of that book was not that contemporary social theoryneeded only minor reform at the periphery. The dualistic ontology might beretained as long as theorists acknowledge social interaction a little more. Onthe contrary, the book describes two incompatible visions of social exis-tence. It is possible to conceive of society either in terms of structure andagency or in terms of human social relations. These positions are mutuallyexclusive. The aim of The Structure of Social Theory was to demonstrate notonly that the concepts of structure and agency were flawed but also that, inevery case, they are reducible to social interactions and collective practices.In short, when social theorists appeal to structure and agency, they are in facttalking about human social relations. Indeed, the book claims that any ade-quate sociological explanation always ultimately appeals to a network of socialrelations in which practices occur. The existence of social institutions—including the practice of rule-following—can be understood finally only byreference to the interactions and collective practices of humans in socialrelations. Together, in the course of their interactions, humans are able tosustain collective forms of agency out of which the vast institutions of mod-ern society arise. Structure and agency, by contrast, explain nothing. Thephilosophers of social science have a choice, therefore. They can eitheradopt a social ontology of human relations, which prioritizes interactionsand collective practices, or they can take the path of contemporary socialtheory and commit themselves to ontological dualism. They can understandhuman social life in terms of structure and agency. Stueber rightly recog-nizes that, for me, “it is social relations all the way down.” Precisely.

References

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Collins, R. 2000. The sociology of philosophies. London: Belknap.———. Forthcoming. The sociology of violence.Durkheim, É. 1976. The elementary forms of the religious life, trans. J. Ward Swain. London:

Allen and Unwin.Giddens, A. 1995. The constitution of society. Cambridge, UK: Polity.Janowitz, M., and E. Shils. 1975. Cohesion and disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II.

In Military conflict, edited by M. Janowitz. London: Sage. King, A. 1999. Against structure: A critique of morphogenetic social theory. Sociological

Review 47 (2): 199-227.———. 2006. The word of command: Cohesion and communication in the military. Armed

Forces and Society 32 (3): 1-20.Kripke, S. 1982. Wittgenstein on rules and private language: An elementary exposition.

Oxford: Blackwell.Milgram, S. 1974. Obedience to authority. London: Pinter and Martin.Preece, S. 2004. Among the Marines. Edinburgh, UK: Mainstream.Sawyer, K. 2005. Social emergence: Societies as complex systems. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge

University Press.Stueber, K. 2005. How to think about rules and rule-following. Philosophy of the Social

Sciences 35 (3): 307-23.———. 2006. How to structure a social theory? A critical response to Anthony King’s The

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Anthony King is a reader in sociology at Exeter University. He has published books on foot-ball and social theory, including The European Ritual: Football and the New Europe (Ashgate,2003) and The Structure of Social Theory (Routledge, 2004), and is currently conducting aresearch project on the transformation of Europe’s armed forces.



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