Kimpo Provisional Regiment, andthe Korean Marine Corps regimentalso returned to the division's con-trol.

Once it returned to the main lineof resistance, the 1st MarineDivision again assumed operationalcontrol over VMO-6 and HMR-161.Cloud cover at first impeded theaerial observers from VMO-6, butthey successfully directed fourartillery fire missions on 8 Julyagainst targets behind enemy lines.On 10 July, Marine helicoptersfrom HMR-161 delivered some1,200 pounds of rations, water, andother cargo to Marine outposts.

Ten Days of Patrols

taken out.

Company I, reduced to fewer thantwo-dozen effectives, regainedcontrol of the outpost. Another pla-toon from the same companyimmediately moved forward toreinforce the survivors.

Throughout the fighting at Berlinand East Berlin, storms had dis-rupted the movement of suppliesby sending the Imjin out of itsbanks and destroying a bridge. Thebad weather also created mud thathampered movement on the battle-field and brought clouds thatreduced visibility from the cockpitsof supporting aircraft. At aboutnoon on 8 July, however, fourMarine F9Fs took advantage ofground-based Marine radar toattack targets a safe distance fromEast Berlin. Led by the commander

officer of Marine Fighter Squadron311, Lieutenant Colonel BernardMcShane, the jets dropped five tonsof bombs on bunkers and troopconcentrations.

The recapture of East Berlinenabled the last of the Turkishtroops to withdraw, in effect com-pleting the relief of the 25thInfantry Division. The 11thMarines, commanded after 5 Julyby Colonel Manly L. Curry,resumed its normal mission ofdirect support of the 1st MarineDivision, as did the 1st TankBattalion. By 13 July, the companyof amphibian tractors that had beenguarding prisoners of war at AscomCity rejoined the battalion underthe control of the division. TheReconnaissance Company, the

574

Regaining Outpost East Berlinon 8 July, which coincided with theresumption of truce negotiations atPanmunjom, did not end theChinese pressure on the Marines.After dark on the 8th, ColonelGlenn C. Funk, who had assumedcommand of the 7th Marines on 27March, moved a platoon from theregiment's 3d Battalion and four M-46 tanks into position to strengthenthe main line of resistance. Thetanks had just arrived at Hill 126,an outcropping just to the rear ofthe battle line, when the Marinesheard the sound of trucks frombeyond Chinese lines. From thehilltop, the M-46s directed 90mmfire against known Chinese posi-tions, and the noise of truck motorsended. Chinese troops, who mean-while had advanced from theassembly area on Vegas, probedOutpost Berlin and struck astronger blow against East Berlin.Fighting raged for almost twohours before fire from mortars,artillery, and tanks forced theenemy to break off the action atabout 0315 on the morning of 9July.

After Lieutenant Colonel Ce-reghino's Marines ended this latest

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A171052

Whether on the frontlines or in reserve Marines were paid monthly in MilitaryPay Certificates, a substitute for U.S. currency used to curb black market activi-ties. With little to spend it on, most Marines saved their money or had allotments

threat to East Berlin, the Chineseremained content to jab at the divi-sion rather than try for a knockout.Entire days might pass duringwhich Marine aerial or groundobservers and patrols saw few, ifany, signs of Chinese. The enemyseemed to be improving his tun-nels and bunkers instead of ven-turing out of them to mount anattack. The Marines still underwentsporadic shelling, but the bom-bardments did not approach inferocity those of 8 and 9 July.

Mines for a time proved deadlierthan artillery and mortars, as on 12July when these weapons killedfour Marines and wounded eight.At least one minefield contained anew type of Russian-designedweapon that could be detonatedby pressure or with a trip wire.Most of the fields employed minesfamiliar to the Marines, types thatmay have been newly planted orperhaps had lain dormant underthe frozen ground and becomedeadly when the weather grew

warmer and the earth softer.Although the enemy did not

attack on the scale of 7-8 July,Chinese patrols repeatedly clashedall along the division's front withthose sent out by the Marines, Onthe night of 12 July, for example, a13-man patrol from the 5thMarines encountered a force ofChinese near Outpost Esther, and acombat patrol from the 7thMarines, looking for the enemynear Elko, engaged in an 18-minute firefight.

As the frequency of patrolactions increased, flooding againinterfered with the supply effort.On the night of 14-15 July, theImjin River reached a maximumdepth of 26 feet. Only the solidly-built Freedom Bridge, carrying theroad to Panmunjom across theswollen stream, could be useduntil the water subsided.

On the night of 16-17 July,patrols from the 5th Marinesengaged in two firefights, sufferingno casualties in the first, near

Outpost Hedy, while killing threeChinese and wounding one. Theregiment's second patrol of thenight ran into an ambush near Hill90. The Chinese proved moreaggressive than in recent days, pin-ning down the patrol and unleash-ing a flurry of mortar and artilleryfire that wounded every memberof a unit Sent to help break theambush. Another group of rein-forcements succeeded, however, inreaching the embattled patrol.After two hours of fighting andseveral attempts to isolate and cap-ture individual Marines, theChinese withdrew, having suffered22 killed and wounded. Whenseven Marines failed to return tothe main line of resistance, a pla-toon from the 5th Marinessearched the battle site and recov-ered six bodies.

The third firefight of the nighterupted just after midnight in thesector of the 7th Marines, when a30-man patrol from Company A,1st Battalion, was ambushed afterit passed through a gate in thebarbed wire northwest of OutpostAva. Between 40 and 50 Chinese,supported by mortars, opened firewith grenades and small arms.After a 15-minute exchange of firein which as many as 18 Chinesemay have been killed or wounded,the ambush party vanished intothe darkness. As the Marines fromCompany A returned through thegate, a head count revealed fourmen missing. A recovery squadcrossed and recrossed the areauntil dawn drew near but foundonly three bodies. One Marinefrom Company A remained miss-ing; three had been killed and 21wounded.

The actions near Outpost Elkoand in front of the Ava gate lentcredence to Chinese propaganda.Since the 1st Marine Divisionreturned to the main line of resis-tance, Chinese loudspeakers had

The never tiring doctors and coipsmen treat the wounded. At the forward aidstations patients are examined and their wounds dressed; few are dischargedand most prepared for further evacuation.

National Archives Photo (USMc) 127-N-A173337

575

gone beyond the usual appeals tosurrender, on at least one occasionwarning of the fatal consequencesof going on nighttime patrols. Thisthreat, however, probably reflect-ed a Chinese policy of maintainingoverall military pressure after theresumption of truce talks ratherthan a specific effort to demoralizethe Marines.

Whatever the purpose of theenemy's propaganda, the Marinepatrols continued. On the nightafter the ambush of Company A,1st Battalion, 7th Marines, a com-bat patrol from the regiment'sCom-pany C advanced as far asthe Ungok hills to silence amachine gun that had been harass-ing the main line of resistance and,after a successful 20-minute fire-fight, left a Marine Corps recruitingposter to mark the point of farthestadvance. Meanwhile, the KoreanMarines had four patrol contactswith the enemy, none lasting morethan a few minutes.

The combat outposts like theBerlins, Esther, and Ava hadbecome increasingly vulnerable.By mid-July, General Pate directedhis staff to study the possibility ofthe 1st Marine Division's shiftingfrom a linear defense—the contin-uous main line of resistance andthe network of outlying combatoutposts in front of it—to a systemof mutually supporting defensivestrongpoints that would result ingreater depth and density. TheChinese attacks of 7 and 8 July onBerlin and East Berlin served as acatalyst for the study that GeneralPate launched. As the I Corpscommander, General Clarke, laterexplained, these actions demon-strated that American minefleldsand barbed wire entanglementshad channeled movement be-tween the main line of resistanceand the combat outpost lines intocomparatively few routes that hadbecome dangerously familiar to

the enemy. As a result, Chinesemortars and artillery could savagethe troops using these well-worntracks to reinforce an embattledoutpost, withdraw from one thathad been overwhelmed, or coun-terattack to regain a lost position.Indeed, General Maxwell D.Taylor, in command of the EighthArmy since February 1953, agreedthat the enemy could, if he choseto pay the price in blood andeffort, overrun any of the existingoutposts, and endorsed the con-cept that General Pate's staff wasstudying. The change in tactics,however, had not yet gone intoeffect when the Chinese nextattacked the Marine positions, butthe new assault forced 7th Marinesto adopt, in a modified form, theprinciples of depth and densitythat the division commander wassuggesting.

When the enemy againattacked, a ceasefire seemed immi-nent. President Rhee agreed on 11July to accept American assurancesof future support and enter into atruce. By the 19th, the negotiatorsat Panmunjom seemed to haveresolved the last of the majorissues. On this very date, however,the Chinese struck.

The Fighting Intensifies

Heavy downpours hamperedfrontline combat and grounded the1st Marine Aircraft Wing for a totalof 12 days early in July. Rain fellon 22 days that month, but thewing nevertheless reported 2,668combat sorties, more than half ofthem flown in close support allalong the United Nations line. Theairmen supported their fellowMarines on the ground with some250 missions, four-fifths of themusing ground-based radar by nightor day.

The weather improved aftermid-month, enabling aerial activity

576

to increase at a critical moment,for on the night of 19-20 July, theChinese again assaulted CombatOutposts Berlin and East Berlin—now manned by the 3d Battalion,7th Marines, which had relievedLieutenant Colonel Cereghino's 2dBattalion—and also menacedOutposts Dagmar and Ingrid, heldby elements of the 5th Marines.The positions of the 5th Marinesheld firm, thanks in part to accu-rate fire from the 11th Marines, hutBerlin and East Berlin were in perilalmost from the outset.

After a savage bombardment ofboth Berlins and nearby segmentsof the main line of resistance,Chinese troops at 2230 on thenight of the 19th stormed theridgeline where the two outpostswere located, attacking East Berlinfirst and Berlin immediately after-ward. Company I, 3d Battalion, 7thMarines, commanded by FirstLieutenant Kenneth E. Turner, gar-risoned both outposts, posting 37Marines at East Berlin and 44 atBerlin. Mortars, machine guns,howitzers, and 90mm tank gunsblasted the advancing Chinese insupport of Company I. Despite thefirepower massed against him, theenemy overran both outpostswithin three hours.

A duel between American andChinese gunners continued afterthe fall of the two Berlins. Theenemy fired some 3,000 roundswhile overwhelming the outpostsand trying to neutralize the nearbymain line of resistance and theartillery batteries behind it. OneTurkish and two Army artillerybattalions joined three battalionsof the 11th Marines—two of105mm and one of 155mm how-itzers—in responding to theChinese bombardment, batteringthe assault force, its supportingmortars and howitzers, and theassembly areas used by reinforce-ments in exploiting the early suc-

cess. Barrage and counterbarragecontinued into the morning of 20July; at 0520, for example, Chineseshells were exploding at the rate ofone per second on the main line ofresistance immediately behindOutposts Berlin and East Berlin.

Meanwhile, at 0400 LieutenantColonel Paul M. Jones, in com-mand of the 3d Battalion, 7thMarines, alerted Companies D andE of the regiment's 2d Battalion,already under his operational con-trol, to counterattack Berlin andEast Berlin at 0730. Half an hourbefore the scheduled time, Jones

received word to cancel the coun-terattack. Rather than restore theoutpost line, General Pate shiftedelements of the division reserve,the 1st Marines, to strengthen themain line of resistance in the eventthe enemy should try to exploit hiscapture of the two Berlins.

While Colonel Wallace Nelson's1st Marines reinforced the mainline of resistance, air power andartillery tried to neutralize the Out-posts the Chinese had captured.Since a ceasefire seemed only daysaway and any attempt to regainthe lost ground would result in

577

severe Marine casualties, therewould be no counterattack torestore a position that seemedalmost certain to be abandonedwhen a demilitarized zone tookshape after the end of hostilities.Instead, air strikes and fire fromtanks and artillery scourged thelost outposts to prevent Chinesefrom using them to mount anassault on the main defenses.Especially effective were attacksby Marine airmen against Berlinand East Berlin and bombardmentby Army 8-inch and 240mm how-itzers, adjusted by Marine aerialobservers, which shattered bun-kers and collapsed almost all thetrenches on both enemy-held out-posts.

Colonel Jones' 3d Battalion, 7thMarines, estimated that the deadlyfighting on 19-20 July had killedperhaps 75 Chinese and woundedas many as 300, thus crippling anenemy battalion that had to bereplaced by a fresh unit. The 7thMarines and attached units lost sixkilled, 118 wounded, and 56 miss-ing, but 12 of the missing men sur-vived as prisoners of war andreturned in the general exchangewhen the fighting ended.

Once the enemy captured Berlinand East Berlin, the critical terrainfeature on the right of the sectorheld by the 1st Marine Divisionbecame Hill 119, nicknamedBoulder City, the segment of themain line of resistance nearest thetwo lost outposts and therefore thelikely objective of any deeperChinese thrust. Company D, 2dBattalion, 7th Marines, (attached tothe regiment's 3d Battalion) heldBoulder City itself. Company E ofthe 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, (alsoattached to the 3d Battalion) joinedCompanies H and I of the 3dBattalion in defending the highground extending from behindBoulder City—although withinsupporting distance—to Hill 111 at

I

XH$I 190

XJe,sey

5H11l 139

31

'31A

7th Marines SectorDivision Right

19-20 July 1953C) USMC Outposts

Enemy Hills

0 500 1000 2000

2 II

578

the boundary between the 1stMarine Division and the Com-monwealth Division. The newly-arrived 2d Battalion, 1st Marines,under Lieutenant Colonel Frank A.Long, moved into positionbetween the 3d Battalion, 7thMarines, on its right andLieutenant Colonel Harry A.

Hadd's 1st Battalion, 7th Marines,on its left. The 2d Battalion, 7thMarines, served as regimentalreserve.

The introduction of LieutenantColonel Long's battalion, whichcame under control of the 7thMarines, served as the first step ina planned relief of the 7th Marinesby the 1st Marines. For now, thenewly arrived battalion added fur-ther depth and density to the mainline of resistance, organizing Hill126 and the other commandingheights in its sector. In effect, three

Department of Defense Photo (USMc) A173925

Marines of the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, board armored personnel carriers to betaken to the front. As a result of the critical tactical situation and number ofcasualties suffered during the Berlin operations the battalion was positioned inthe center of the regimental main line of resistance as the first step in the relief ofthe 7th Marines.

battalions, rather than the two pre-viously defending the regimentalarea, formed a crescent of strong-points designed to contain anddefeat any offensive launchedfrom Berlin and East Berlin.

In the sector held by the 7thMarines, Outpost Ava, manned bya squad from Company A of theregiment's 1st Battalion, survivedon the far left, near the boundarybetween the 7th and 5th Marines.Boulder City, formerly a compo-nent of a continuous main line ofresistance, now functioned as anoutpost of the reconstituteddefenses. By 22 July, Company G,3d Battalion, 7th Marines, hadtaken over Boulder City, from the

regiment's Company D, whichreverted to the control of its parentbattalion, the 2d, in reserve.

The Last Battle

Signs of an imminent Chineseattack multiplied as July drew to aclose. The probable objectivesseemed tp include Outposts Hedyand Dagmar, hut instead of attack-ing either in force, the enemy sentonly a token force, wearing burlapcamouflage, that appeared nearHedy on 21 July. The defendersopened fire, killing three of theChinese, and the survivors fled.

Marine Fighter Squadrons 115and 311, released by the Fifth Air

579

Force to support the UnitedNations troops fighting in centraland eastern Korea, joined MarineAttack Squadron 121 in poundingthe Chinese threatening the 1stMarine Division. Recurring cloudcover produced frequent down-pours that interfered with opera-tions during the critical period of21-23 July, but the three squadronsnevertheless flew more than 15radar-directed missions that drop-ped some 33 tons of bombs.

As the threats to Outposts Hedyand Dagmar abated, Chineseforces menaced Boulder City,where Company G, 3d Battalion,1st Marines, commanded by FirstLieutenant Oral R. Swigart, Jr.,

Men of the 1st Marines move toward the jrontlines to rein-force other Marines fighting at Hill 11, known informally

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A173715

as Boulder City. Little did they know that they would see thelast of the war's heavy .fighting.

manned the defenses after reliev-ing Company D, 2d Battalion, 7thMarines. On the evening of 24July, hostile mortars and artillerybegan hammering Swigart's pe-rimeter. Marine artillery and 4.5-inch rocket launchers immediatelyresponded against targets thatincluded a Chinese regiment mass-ing behind Hill 139, northwest ofenemy-held Outpost Berlin.

At 2030, Chinese troops beganprobing the right of the 1st MarineDivision's line. After a powerfulbarrage by mortars and artillery,the assault force hit Hill 111 at thefar right of the positions held bythe 7th Marines, then shifted toBoulder City near the boundarybetween the 3d Battalion, 7thMarines, and the attached 2dBattalion, 1st Marines. As he hadon 7 July, when he sought to cap-italize on the Marine division's

Marines.When the Chinese attack began,

the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines,attached to the 7th Marines, hadalready taken over positions thatincluded Boulder City. The 3dBattalion, 1st Marines, command-ed by Lieutenant Colonel Roy D.Miller, was relieving the 3dBattalion, 7th Marines, as Com-pany H took over Hill 111 andCompany G defended the criticalground at Boulder City.

At about 1930 on 24 July theenemy attacked Hill 111 and sooncracked the perimeter nowmanned by Company H of Miller'sbattalion. For about 50 minutes,the Chinese clung to a salient onthe hilltop, but then withdrew.

580

After this flurry of action, appar-ently intended to divert attentionfrom Boulder City, the enemyignored Hill 111 until the morningof 25 July, when artillery fire bat-tered the perimeter but no infantryassault followed.

The two Chinese battalionsattacking on the Marine right hadtheir greatest success at BoulderCity, seizing a portion of thetrenchline defended by CompanyG, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines. In anattempt to exploit this foothold,the enemy attacked the Berlin andEast Berlin gates, passagesthrough the wire that the Marineshad used to supply and reinforcethe two outposts before both wereoverwhelmed. Cloud cover pre-vented aerial observers from sup-porting the troops protecting thegates, and the Chinese managed togain control of Berlin gate and

takeover of the lines of the 25thInfantry Division, the enemysought to take advantage of therelief of the 7th Marines by the 1st

Second Lieutenant Raymond G. Murphy

An ardent athlete Wi~h a major in phy. ical e~u~ation ~Iurph wa.' born inPueblo, oj rado, 10 1930, and wa. commissioned In the Manne CorpsRe. elTes in 1951. In Korea. he wa:. a"'arded a ilver tar ,\Iedal for hi

actions on 22 \" mber 1952 in a saulting an enemy str ngpoint. Th n hi heroi. magain a a plato n ommander with ompany ,1't Battalion, 'Sth larine, on 3February 19')3, reulted in a Medal of Honor \vith a citati n, whidl read in part:

L ndeterred by the increasing intene enemy fire, he immediately 10 ared casual­ties a the} fell and made 'ieveral trip up and clo\\ n the fire-swept hill to directevacuation team' to the wounded, personally carrying many of the 'tri kenMarine to safety. When reinforcements were needed b th ~ assaulting I ment:.,Se ond Lieutenant Murphy employed part of hi unit a upport and, during theensuing battle, personally killed t\ 0 of the enemy \\ ith his pistol. '\ ith all the wounded evacuated and tha'. aulting units beginning to di<;engage. he remained behind with a carbine to cover th movement of friend-ly forces off the hill and, tllough uffering inten 'e pain from his previou - wound", eized an automati rifle toprm'ide more firepower when th enemy reappeared in the trenches.

fter the war, he joined the Reserves and wa. di. charged as a captain in 1959.

.!\ \ \1t.'t.llnm: I'hotu (.Ollec..1UITl

110 pitalman Hammond" pbtoon wa ubjected to a murderou' barrage of ho­tile m !tar and artillery fire, followed by a vici us as aull b onru hing enemytro p:.. Res lutely advancing through the verirabl curtain of fir to aid hi nick­en comrades, IIospiwlman Hammond mov d am ng the stalwalt gani on of

larine' and. although critically wounded him elf, \'aliandy continued to admini:.­tel' aid to th ' other wounded throughout an e hau'ting four-hour period. '\ h nthe unit was ord I' d to withdraw, he kill.fully directed the e acuation of casual­ties and remained in the fire-swept area to a' i t the corp men of the relievingunit [ ompany F, 2d Battali n, 5th Marines] until he was 'lnlck by a round of enemy mortar fire and fell. mor­tally wounded.

Born in 19.31, Hammond enlisted in the "avy in 1951. igned to theMarine Corp as a "Hospitalman," he gave his life at Sanae-dong, Korea,erv­ing \vith ompany C, I 'it Battalion, 5th brine, n 26 larch 195.3. Hi Iedal

of II n r citati n read . in part:

Hospital Corp man Frand C. Hammond

fter lh \\'ar, a school in hi homet wn of Alexandria, irginia, a medical clinic at amp Pendleton, alifornia. andthe Knox-class destroyer Fra7lcis Hammond (DE 106 ) were named in hi hon r.

-Captain John . Chapin, (. I R (Ret)

mount a second determinedassault on the Boulder Cityperimeter. Hand-to-hand fightingraged all along the 700 yards oftrench that Lieutenant Swigart'sMarines still held. The company'sammunition ran low, and theplight of casualties becameincreasingly difficult as Chinesefire killed two of Boulder City'seight corpsmen and wounded

most of the others. By midnight,Swigart's company could musterno more than half its earlierstrength, but it still clung to therear slope of Boulder City. In thewords of one of Company G'sMarines, "only a never-say-dieresistance was keeping the enemyfrom seiZing the remainder of theposition."

Casualties had further eroded

the strength of the Boulder Citygarrison, when Captain Louis J.Sartor, at 15 minutes after midnighton the morning of the 25th, ledCompany I, 3d Battalion, 1stMarines, toward the hill to rein­force Swigart's survivors. TheChinese intercepted and correctlyinterpreted the coded radio mes­sage ordering Sartor's Marines for­ward, thus obtaining information

581

that enabled enemy artillely andmortars to wound or kill about athird of the reinforcements.Despite the deadly barrage, muchof Company r reached BoulderCity, joined forces with the rem­nants of Swigart's garrison, andtook part in a counterattack led by

Captain Sartor that recaptured thehill by 0330. Further reinforce­ments from Company E, 2dBattalion, 7th Marines, andCompany E, 2d Battalion, 1stMarines, arrived by 0530 to con­solidate the position. A fewChinese, however, continued to

cling to posItIons on the slopesnearest their main line of resis­tance.

Since the enemy still controlledthe approaches to Boulder City, hewas able to mount another attackon that position at 0820, 25 July.Fire from Marine mortars and

Hospital Corpsman Third CIa s William R. Charette

~ati\'e of Ludington, 1ichigan, harett was born in 1932 and nlisted in the

U.,. 'avy in 19-1. For his a'tions during the earl morning hour... of rlarch 19')3 in the Panmunjom orridor, while attached to ompany F, 2d

Battalion, th larine., he wa. rec mmended for and later re ei\ed the l\Jedal ofIlonor. I lis citation reads, in part:

'\ hen an enemy grenade land d within a fe\, feet of a .\larine he was altending,he immediatel thr \\' himself upon th stricken man and absorbed the entire con­cu.-sion of the deadly mis. i1e with hi:> b dy. lthough su raining painful facial~ ounds, and undergoing. hO'k from the intenity of th blast which ripped thhelmet and medical aid kit from his person, lIospital orpsman Third Class ,.", \1"1,,,,1<' I'hOl" ("II,·",,,"

harelte re ur efLIII improvis d emergen y bandages by tearing off pan of hisc1Olhing. and gallanu} ontinued to admini. tel' medi al aid to th wounded in his own unit and to those inadjacent platoon area. as well. . .. I ving to the sid of anouler ca ualty \\ ho \\as '>uffering excnJciating painfrom a s rious leg \\ ound, 110. pital orpsman Third Cia s hal' ne stood upright in the trt:nch line and expos 'dhims If to a deadly hail of enemy fire in ord I' to lend more effective aid to the \ ictim and to allevi:1tt: hisanguish while being r m "ed to a position of safety.

liraculously surviving his wounds. he rose to th rank of master chief hospiLaI orpsman before retiring in 19ho. pital fa ility at the aval ~Iedical enter, Portsmouth, Virginia, is named for Corpsman Charette.

Sergeant Daniel ~ Matthew

Born in an uys, alifornia. in 1931. Matthew. enlisted in the Marine Corpsin 1951. After c mpl ting r' Tuit LrJining he was assigned to the bt Battalion.3d Jarine', (It amp Pendleton. California. He sailed f I' K rea in Janual)

1953. joining ompany F. 2d Battalion, th ,\Iarine'>. On 28 larch 1953 he was killedin a count rattack on Vegas Ilili. Hi l\ledal of TIonaI' citation reads, in pan:

. ergeant Malthew fearlessl advanced in the atta k until hi~ squad was pinneddown by a murderous. weep f fire from an enem machine gun located on thepeak f the outpo. t. b 'erving that the deadl fire pre\'ented a corp man fromremO\ing a 'ounded man I 'ing in an open area full expos d to the brunt of thed a.'tating gunfire. he work d hi way to the base of the hostile rna -hine-gunemplacement, leaped onto th I' ck fortification urrounding the gun and. takingthe enem b completl'urprise, single-handedl charg d the ho tile emplacement with his rille. Ithough'e erely wounded when the enem} brought a " ithering hail of fire to bear upon him. he gallantly continuedhis valiant one-man a sault and, firing hi~ rille with deadly effectin~ne ~. 'iucceeded in killing t\yO of the enemy.routing a third and complet I)' ... ilencing the enemy weapon. thereb enabling his comrad s to evacuate the·trick n :\Iarine to aafe po. ilion. [J Ie died of) his wound. before aid could reach him.

aptain John hapin. l. 1 R (Ret)

582

Staff Sergeant Ambrosio Guillen

Born in La .Junta, olorado. in 1929, uillen gre up in EI Paso. Texa ; heenli'ted in the Marine Corps in 19 7. fter sea duty and serving as a drillinstruct r at Marin C rps Recruit Depot. an Diego. he ~ as aSSigned as a pla­

to n sergeant with ompany F. 2d Battalion. 7th Marine., in Korea. He died of\V und incurred n ar onguch-on r July 19'53. Ir nically, the cea 'efire wa sign dt\VO days later. [lis Medal of Honor itation reads. in pan:

With his unit pinned down, when the outpost was attacked under cover of dark­nes - by an e -timated force of two enemy ballalions supported by mortar andaltillery fire. h delib rately exposed himself to the heavy barrage and ,macks LOdirecL his men in d fending their po -itions and personally supel i. e th > treatment I>"p.'rtm"m "Illdm'" Ph",,, 1I "1(,) IO-()o~

and evacuation of th wounded. Tn 'pired by his leadership, the.:: platoon qui kly rallied and e.::ngage.::d the enemyforce in fierce hand-to-hand c mbal. Although critically wounded during Lhe course of the banle. 'talT ,'ergeantGuillen refused medi al aid and continued to direct his men throughouLthe remainder of the engagement untilthe enemy \ as defeated and thrown into disorderly retreat.

A middle seh 01 in El Paso. Texa . i named for Staff ergeant Guill n.- aptain John C. Chapin, ICR (Ret)

Aerial view of the pockmarked terrain in front of Boulder City taken from anHMR-161 helicopter. Although the monsoon rains ofJuly limited normal supportmissions, when weather conditions cooperated planes of the 1st Marine AircraftWing worked from morning to sundown unleashing tons of ordnance onChinese positions seen just beyond the Marine sector of the line.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A173886

artillery, and from the 90mmweapons of 10 tanks dug in on theMarine positions, played the keyrole in breaking up the newassault, although the last of theattackers did not withdraw untilafternoon. The M-46 tanks proveddeadly against advancing Chinesetroops, but also presented an invit­ing target for Chinese artillery andmortar crews, who directed some2,200 rounds at the armored vehi­cles. Aircraft also helped repulsethe 25 July attack on Boulder City,as when Panther jets flew ninemissions, guided by Marine radaron the ground, against hostilepositions threatening Boulder Cityand nearby defensive strong­points.

Before midnight on 24 July, inan attack perhaps loosely coordi­nated with the thrust at BoulderCity, Chinese forces hit the posi­tions held by the 5th Marines. Afterprobing the defenses of OutpostsDagmar and Esther, the enemyconcentrated against the latter,manned by elements of CompanyH, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines. TheChinese tried to isolate Outpost

Esther by shelling and patrollingthe routes leading there from themain line of resistance and suc­ceeded in overrunning outer por­tions of the perimeter. The defend­ers, commanded by Second

Lieutenant William H. Bates, pre­vailed because of the skillful useof their own weapons, includingflamethrowers and the support ofmortars, machine guns, tanks, andthe always-deadly artillery. The 3d

583

Battalion, 11th Marines, fired 3,886rounds against Chinese troopsattacking Outpost Esther, and hos-tile gunners matched this volumeof fire. The Marines suffered 12killed and 98 wounded in the fight-ing that began at Dagmar and con-tinued at Esther, while Chinesecasualties may have totaled 195killed and 250 wounded.

Dawn on 26 July brought a lullin these last battles. Chineseattempts to revive their attack byinfiltrating reinforcements throughthe site of Outpost Berlin failed,thanks to accurate fire from Marineriflemen and machine gunners.The 1st Marines completed its reliefof the 7th Marines at 1330. That

night, the enemy probed BoulderCity for the last time, sending apatrol from captured OutpostBerlin that failed to penetrate thedefensive wire and shortly aftermidnight dispatching another pla-toon that prowled about beforeMarine fire repulsed it.

Although the last of the Chineseattacks seized Outposts Berlin andEast Berlin, they failed to wrestBoulder City from its Marinedefenders. Had the enemy cap-tured Boulder City, he might haveexploited it and seized the highground to the south and east, fromwhich he could have fired directlyinto the rear areas that sustainedthe 1st Marine Division in its posi-

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tions beyond the Imjin River. Infighting the Chinese to a standstillduring July 1953, the division suf-fered 1,611 casualties—killed,wounded, and missing—the mostsevere losses since October 1952when savage fighting had raged atOutposts Carson, Reno, and Vegas,and on the Hook. Chinese lossesduring July 1953 may have exceed-ed 3,100.

The Final Patrols

During the last few nights ofcombat in July, Marines continuedpatrolling aggressively, eventhough a truce was fast approach-ing. The Last Parallel—a wartime

National Archives l'hoto (USMC) 127-N-A173809

A Marine holds a wounded buddy onto an armored per- Marines aid station during the heavy fighting in the Berlinsonnel carrier being brought to the 3d Battalion, 1st sector.

memoir by Martin Russ, a corporalin Company A, 1st Battalion, 1stMarines, in July 1953—describesan action that took place justbefore the truce, as the 1st Marineswas taking over from the 7thMarines. A Lieutenant fromCompany A, 7th Marines, led a 30-man combat patrol, made up ofmen from Companies A of bothregiments, that set out fromOutpost Ava near midnight and

crossed a rice paddy on the way toraid Chinese positions on the Hill104. A reconnaissance probe,which had preceded the raidingparty, reported the presence ofChinese on the approaches to theobjective.

The route to Hill 104 followed atrail flanked by waist-high rice,growth that not only impeded off-trail movement, but also mightconceal a Chinese ambush. The

soft muck in which the rice thrivedprovided poor support for sometypes of mines, thus reducing onethreat to the patrol, but movingthrough the paddy would havesnapped the brittle rice stalks andcreated noise to alert any lurkingambush party. Balancing less noiseagainst greater danger from mines,the Marines decided to follow thetrail.

The patrol's point man, as heapproached the far end of the ricepaddy, found a trip wire stretchedacross the trail and followed it to aRussian-built, antipersonnel mineattached to a stick thrust deep intothe mud and aimed to scatterdeadly fragments low across thesurface of the trail. The patrol halt-ed, bunching up somewhat as themembers tried to see why the lieu-tenant was moving forward to con-fer with the point man. At thismoment, Chinese soldiers crouch-ing hidden in the rice opened firefrom as close as 50 feet to theMarines.

The fusillade wounded thepatrol leader and within 10 sec-onds killed or wounded nine ofthe first 10 men in the patrol.Dragged into the paddy by mem-bers of the ambush party, the lieu-tenant disappeared until he sur-faced in the exchange of prisonersafter hostilities ended. The pointman proved luckier, however,hurling himself to the ground assoon has he realized what washappening, finding cover besidethe trail, and escaping injury. Fromthe rear of the patrol, the other sur-vivors fired at the muzzle flashes ofthe Chinese weapons. Marine fire-power prevailed, silencing theenemy after five or so minutes,although not before six membersof the patrol had been killed, 14wounded, and the wounded lieu-tenant carried off as a prisoner.The survivors regrouped andmoved forward, retrieving as many

Two members of the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, quickly clean a semi-automaticM-1 carbine with grenade launcher after firing in support of a night patrol. Athird Marine take a break in one of the sandbagged culverts, which providedoverhead cover along the trench line.

National Archives Photo (usMc) 127-N-A173671

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Nationsi Archives Photo (LJSN) 80-G-62573I

Flanked on the left by Gen Otto P Weyland, USAF corn- and VAdm Joesph j. clark Seventh Fleet commandei Genmanding general of Far East Air Forces, and on the right by Mark W Clarke, commander in chief of United NationsVAdm Robert P Briscoe Commander, Naval Forces Far Easi, forces, countersigns the armistice agreement at Munsan-ni.

as they could of the dead andwounded. A half-dozen Marinescovered the patrol's withdrawal,preventing the Chinese from encir-cling the group. When the menwho had helped evacuate thewounded returned from the aidstation and reinforced the firepow-er of the hastily formed screeningforce, the Chinese vanished intothe night.

The Marines kept up theirpatrolling until the moment thetruce took effect. On the night of27 July, according to Martin Russ,his company sent out a patrol

scheduled to return shortly beforethe fighting would end at 2200. Asthe Marines prepared to move Out,Chinese mortars fired on OutpostAva, through which the patrolstaged, and nearby portions of themain line of resistance. The bom-bardment wounded five membersof the patrol and two of theMarines defending the outpost.

The patrol returned as planned,and at 2200, Russ, who was not amember, watched from the mainline of resistance as white star clus-ters and colored flares cast a pul-sating light that set the shadows

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dancing in ravines and paddiesand on hillsides, while the finalshells fired in the 37-month warexploded harmlessly. As Russdescribed the scene:

A beautiful moon hung low inthe sky like a Chinese lantern.Men appeared along thetrench, some of them hadshed their flak jackets andhelmets. The first sound weheard was the sound of shrillvoices.... The Chinese weresinging. A hundred yards orso down the trench, someone

was shouting the MarineCorps Hymn at the top of hislungs. Others joined in bel-lowing the words. All alongthe battle line, matches flaredand cigarettes glowed, but nosnipers peered through tele-scopic sights to fire at thesetargets. The war had ended.

After the Ceasefire

The ceasefire agreement, whichwas signed on the morning of 27July and went into effect 12 hourslater, required that both the UnitedNations forces and the Communistenemy withdraw from the mostadvanced positions held when thefighting ended. In effect, the aban-doned area formed the trace of aMilitary Demarcation Line, as theopposing armies fell back 2,000yards to organize new main battlepositions, thus creating the 4,000-yard Demilitarized Zone betweenthem. The Marines built as theydestroyed, evacuating certain por-tions of the old main line of resis-tance, giving up some of its out-

posts, and dismantling fortifica-tions simultaneously with theirconstruction of the new line and itsmutually supporting strongpoints.

A No-Fly Line supplemented thecontrols imposed by the Demilita-rized Zone. Restrictions on themovement of aircraft appliedthroughout the Demilitarized Zoneand in a corridor extending fromthe vicinity of Panmunjom toKaesong. Only helicopters couldfly beyond the No-Fly Line, pro-vided they remained 500 yardsfrom the Military DemarcationLine.

Establishing theDemilitarized Zone

The armistice document set atimetable for the creation of theDemilitarized Zone. Within 72hours after the ceasefire went intoeffect, the combatants were toremove "all military forces, sup-plies, and equipment" and reportthe location of "demolitions, mine-fields, wire entanglements, andother hazards" capable of imped-

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ing the safe movement of the orga-nizations that would oversee thearmistice—the Military ArmisticeCommission, its Joint ObserverTeams, and the Neutral NationsSupervisory Commission. For 45days following the initial 72 hours,the parties to the ceasefire wouldsalvage the materials still in thedesignated Demilitarized Zone,using only unarmed troops for thetask. Meanwhile, during the 10

days after 27 July, Chinese orNorth Korean troops took over alloffshore islands, east coast andwest, that lay north of the 38thParallel. The United Nationsretained control of Taechong-do,Paengyong-do, Sochong-do, andYongpyong-do, along with U-do,Tokchok-to, and Kangwha-do, allof them off the west coast andsouth of the demarcation line.

Since the agreement of July 27called for a truce rather thanpeace—indeed, it sought to ensurea cessation of hostilities until "afinal peaceful settlement isachieved"—the possibility existedthat the fighting might resume.Despite the shower of flares andthe singing that marked themoment the truce went into effect,some battle-tested Marines fullyexpected a Chinese attack in thehours after the ceasef ire. As theskies lightened on the morning of28 July, Chinese commandersobtained permission to recover thebodies of their men killed in thefinal assaults on Marine positions.The sight of "the enemy movingaround within a stone's throw ofour front lines" underscored thepossibility of renewed attacks, butnothing happened, and as themorning wore on, it became obvi-ous that the truce was holding—atleast for the present.

Like the Chinese, the Marinesused the first morning of the cease-fire to recover the bodies of menkilled in recent days. Most of the

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-626455

Marines take a well-deserved rest after word of the armistice is passed. Less than24 hours after the signing of the armistice, Marine units began withdrawingfrom the Demilitarized Zone to their new battle positions.

Following the armistice, the commanding general of the 1stMarine Division, MajGen Randolph McC. Pate, his chief ofstaff ('ol Lewis W Walt; and the commanding officer of the

National Archives Photo (USMG) 127-N-A173878

1st Marines, Col Wallace M. Nelson, survey the aftermath ofthe battle for Boulder City.

dead had fallen at Hill 111 andBoulder City. By the end of theday, all the bodies had beenretrieved and were on the way tothe rear.

In the three days immediatelyafter the armistice took effect,some 50 companies of Marineinfantry, both American and SouthKorean, began dismantling the olddefenses, with the help of elementsof the division's engineers.Working day and night—taking fre-quent breaks during the daytimeheat, sleeping during the threehours after noon when the heat

portable lighting to take advantageof the comparative cool of thenight—the Marines and the Koreanservice troops helping themremoved supplies and ammunition,tore apart bunkers, and stacked thetimbers for shipment to the newbattle line. Some of the work par-ties treated the bunkers like trench-es and filled them with earth,which then had to be shoveled outto provide access to the salvage-able timbers.

Dismantling the old battle linerequired the removal of somestructures on elements of both the

line of resistance, while at the sametime building the new main battleposition and sealing off theDemilitarized Zone that the truceestablished between the contend-ing armies. Some of the formerMarine outposts like Bunker Hill,Esther, and Ava lay north of theMilitary Demarcation Line. As aresult, the Marines could be sure ofhaving access to them only duringthe 72 hours after the ceasefirebegan. Moreover, anything sal-vaged from Bunker Hill or nearbyOutpost Hedy had to travel over aprimitive road described as "partic-ularly tortuous," which made thewas most enervating, and using combat outpost line and the main

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transfer "of first the ammunitionand then the fortification materialsa physical ordeal." Further compli-cating the dismantling of these dis-tant outposts, a horde of reporters,photographers, and newsreel cam-eramen arrived, eager to recordthe activity of both the Marinesand the Chinese soldiers whocould be seen tearing down theirown defenses on nearby ridgelinesor hilltops.

Salvaging building materialsproved to be hard work, whethertearing apart structures on thecombat outpost line or on themain line of resistance. The picks,shovels, and steel pry bars avail-able to the infantrymen could notremove timbers, measuring up to12 inches square and secured by

spikes 10 to 24 inches long, thatformed the skeleton of bunkersmeasuring perhaps 12 by 20 feet.Wherever possible bulldozers borethe brunt, but heavy trucks fittedwith power winches and even towtrucks helped out, as did mediumtanks, their guns removed so theycould enter the demilitarized area.The Marines found that the fastestmethod of dismantling a bunkerwas to uncover it, winch it out ofits hole, and bounce it down thehill it had guarded.

Once the bunker had been dis-assembled, the Marines manhan-dled the timbers onto vehicles,usually several two-and-one-half-ton trucks, although heavier vehi-cles saw service during the first 72hours until the ban took effect on

dozed under, andtion points.

disarmed tanks, tank retrievers,and other vehicles that fit thearmistice agreement's imprecisedefinition of "military equipment."Fortunately, two-and-one-half-tontrucks could still be used over thenext 45 days, although restricted todesignated routes of access intothe Demilitarized Zone.

As the dismantling of the aban-doned defenses went ahead onschedule, the 1st Marine Divisionmoved into its new positions, atransfer completed by the morningof 1 August. The main battle posi-tion, to the rear of the former line,consisted of a succession ofstrongpoints. From the division'sright-hand boundary near theSamichon River, the new lineformed a misshapen arc encom-

usable timber carried to salvage collec-

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-626370

Marines begin the task of dismantling bunkers on the aban-doned main line of resistance after the ceasefire went intoeffect on 27July. Trenchlines were filled in, tank slots bull-

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