kGuard : Lightweight Kernel Protection against Return-to-user Attacks
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Transcript of kGuard : Lightweight Kernel Protection against Return-to-user Attacks
kGuard: Lightweight Kernel Protection
against Return-to-user Attacks
Vasileios P. Kemerlis, Georgios Portokalidis, Angelos D. KeromytisNetwork Security Lab,
Department of Computer Science, Columbia University, USA
21st USENIX Security Symposium (August, 2012)
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Outline Why Return-to-user (ret2usr) ? Threat model Protection with kGuard Implementation Evaluation Discussion and Future Work
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Compile-time protection
ASLR, StackGuard, and etc.
Why Return-to-user (ret2usr) ?
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Administrator Process
Attacker
User Process
System Kernel
Privileged Machine Code
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Another Reason NULL pointer dereference errors had not
received significant attention.We usually see them as vulnerabilities for
DoS attacks. But they may be used to gain privileges.
CVE-2011-1888 (Windows)CVE-2009-2908 (Linux)CVE-2009-3527 (FreeBSD)CVE-2009-2692 (Linux, Android)
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A example (CVE-2009-2692) [link]
if the socket descriptor belongs to a vulnerable protocol family, the value of the sendpage pointer in line 742 is set to NULL.
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Previous Approaches Previous approaches to the problem are
either impractical for deployment in certain environments or can be easily circumvented.Restricting mmap
○ Can be circumvented [link]PaX
○ Platform and architecture specific○ performance
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In this paper We present a lightweight solution to the
problem. kGuard is a compiler plugin that
augments kernel code with control-flow assertions (CFAs)which ensure that privileged execution
remains within its valid boundaries and does not cross to user space.
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Threat Model We ascertain that an adversary is able
to completely overwrite, partially corrupt (e.g., zero out only certain bytes), or nullify control data that are stored inside the address space of the kernel.
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Protection with kGuard We propose a defensive mechanism
that builds upon inline monitoring and code diversification.
kGuard is a cross-platform compiler plugin that enforces address space segregation,
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CFAR (transfer by register)
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CFAM (transfer by memory)
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Can be skip for optimization
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Bypass Trampolines Like return-oriented programming
It is possible to find an embedded opcode sequence that translates directly to a control branch in user space.
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Code Diversification Against Bypasses Code inflation
randomizing the starting address of the text segment
inserting NOP sleds of random length at the beginning of each CFA
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Code Diversification Against Bypasses (cont.) CFA motion
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Implementation GCC 4.51
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Evaluation Our testbed consisted of a single host,
equipped with two 2.66GHz quad-core Intel Xeon X5500 CPUs and 24GB of RAM, running Debian Linux v6 (“squeeze” with kernel v2.6.32).
NOP sled before CFA: 0 ~ 20
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Preventing Real Attacks
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Translation Overhead Kernel image size increased
X86: 3.5%X86-64: 5.6%
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Performance Overhead Macro benchmarks
Building a vanilla Linux kernelMySQL v5.1.49
○ Its own benchmark suit (sql-bench)Apache v2.2.16
○ Its utility ab and static HTML files
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Macro Benchmark ResultkGuard PaX
x86 X86-64 x86 x86-64
Building Kernel 1.03% 0.93% 1.26% 2.89%
sql-bench 0.93% 0.85% 1.16% 2.67%
ab 0.001% - 0.01%
0.001% – 0.01%
0.01% - 0.09%
0.01% - 0.67%
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Micro Benchmarks
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Discussion and Future Work Custom violation handlers
Persistent threats
CFA motion at runtime
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Q & A
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