Kent Political Almanac Third Issue

Issue 3 (2016) 1

Kent Political Almanac

‘Global Edition’ Third Issue

2 Kent Political Almanac

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

Moonira Mamoon

EDITORIAL BOARD

Agathe Hugel

Claudia Hill

Emil Tan

Eugenie Megally

Mathilde Lang

Philip Gonzalo Taylor

James Walker

Kent Political Almanac

School of Politics and International Relations

Rutherford College, University of Kent

Canterbury, Kent, UK.

CT2 7NX

Blog: http://blogs.kent.ac.uk/kentpoliticalalmanac/

E-mail: [email protected]

ABOUT THE KENT POLITICAL ALMANAC

The Kent Political Almanac was created to provide a platform for academic

debate and peer-reviewed publication opportunities for students in Politics

and International Relations. This journal’s purpose is to showcase the School’s

best undergraduate and postgraduate essays.

The initiative came from students of the School of Politics and International

Relations, which led to the journal being launched in November 2013.

All articles are peer-reviewed by both students and members of the School’s

academic staff. We are proud to be an entirely student-led publication,

supported from our School of Politics and International Relations at the

University of Kent.

ACADEMIC ADVISORS

Dr Paolo Dardanelli

Professor Elena Korosteleva

Ms Eske Van Gills

Dr Ian MacKenzie

Mr Igor Merheim-Eyre

Dr Pak Lee

Dr Ruth Blakeley

LAYOUT & DESIGN

Mehdi Abakarim

Robert Small

Issue 3 (2016) 3

CONTENTS

The ontology of ‘terrorism’: The impact of definition 4

Imperial China, East Asia, and five centuries of regional peace and security 12

The clash of titans and the failure of diplomacy in 19th century China 18

Europe’s Achilles heel: A common army? 25

A state in limbo: Serbia and the politics of transition 32

Has increased EU immigration affected levels of Xenophobia in the UK? 38

Disengaged or disillusioned:

Political participation in Britain today 47

To what extent does neo-trusteeship impact on state sovereignty 56

GLOBAL EDITION

Welcome to this special issue

In its third year running, the Kent Political Almanac (KPA) continues to

provide an opportunity for Politics and International Relations

students at the University of Kent to have their work published on a

professional platform. This publication marks the third issue of the

KPA and the first of two editions in 2016. It takes a different

perspective from previous publications in that the articles within are

focused on different issues across the world, hence following a ‘global’

theme.

This student-led journal has substantially grown over the years and we

hope to develop our publication more in terms of exposure and

number of editions throughout the year. We would like to thank all of

the authors who contributed to this issue and those who had

submitted their works to the KPA in general. We have continued to

receive a very high quality of papers across the board from students,

which in turn, holds promise to the future.

Of course, none of this would be possible without the committed team

of editors who had volunteered their time in reviewing the selected

works and assisting the authors reach a high standard in their writings.

We are also especially grateful to the members of staff from the

School of Politics and International Relations, who gave their time to

be part of the review process and helped advertise this opportunity to

both undergraduate and postgraduate students.

We hope that you will enjoy reading this issue of the KPA, as it will

surely take you on a journey across the world through a political lens!

Moonira Mamoon

Editor-In-Chief


‘Terrorism’ is one example of Walter Gallie’s “essentially contested concepts”1. This can be illustrated by exploring how the mechanisms behind the definitional debate of ‘terrorism’ have ultimately impacted the way in which we understand the phenomenon itself. Alongside this, the underlying question underpinning this enquiry shall also be addressed; specifically how is it that the definitional debate has impacted on our perception of terrorism, resulting in a deeper level of investigation. ‘Terrorism’ shall therefore not be conceptualised here. Instead this article is aimed at examining competing definitions of the term, as a means of showing how this has shaped our ability to better conceptualise terrorism. Also, the term ‘definitional debate’ shall be understood as the outcomes of the discourse between perspectives surrounding the definition of ‘terrorism’. By utilising a dialectic method of analysis, three central definitional mechanisms that shape the conceptual debate will be investigated. The terms definitional mechanism’, or ‘method’, shall be utilised throughout this piece, representing an approach to definition that intern programs (or mechanises) an explicit outlook on the concept, and therefore the phenomenon itself. These mechanisms that shall be discussed are: the ‘nature of the act’, the ‘nature of the actor’, and the ‘motive of the definer’. Overall, the definitional debate surrounding ‘terrorism’ impacts our understanding of the phenomenon because definition in turn, adapts our ontological perspective as to what ‘terrorism’ is in resulting from the principles of our definitional mechanisms.

The ‘Nature of The Act’ Firstly, in defining by the ‘nature of the act’, our ontological perception of ‘terrorism’ is impacted upon by improving our understanding. Although scholars have spent decades attempting to find a common definition of terrorism, the concept itself is now more illusionary than ever2. In an attempt to break this illusion, one of the ways ‘terrorism’ may be defined is by the ‘nature of the act’ that it constitutes, allowing ‘terrorism’ to be best grasped as a tactic or method of fighting, not as an ideology3. In defining terrorism by this mechanism, we shall look at the aggregated frequency of definitional elements in our key concept. This shows us that an overarching definition would term an ‘act of terrorism’ as: “Involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role”4. Brian Jenkins argues that ‘terrorism’ must be defined by what is done, encapsulating not only the role of violence and force that appears in the definition above; but also the intent to incite wider terror, separating terrorist activity from criminal activity5. Thus, in this way we are able to isolate criminal violence or hate crimes from ‘terrorism’, as for ‘ terrorism’: “The immediate victims are not as important as the broader message sent to the public”6. This allows us to differentiate between criminality such as the cartel activity of Pablo Escobar in Colombia, to the paramilitary activity of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Britain and Ireland for example. Hence, this boils down to the incitement of terror and use of violence within terrorism that is perceived to be altruistic, as for the example of the IRA compared to a criminal, such as Pablo Escobar, follows an egocentric path7. Relating this to our enquiry, by placing an emphasis on ‘the act’ at the source of the definition, the debate clarifies our ontological grasp of the phenomenon, distinguishing it from criminality and as a form of ideology.

BY KIERAN O’MEARA

A crucial element impacting our understanding of ‘terrorism’ is in its own definition. This article will explore three ways in which the definition of ‘terrorism’ impacts our understanding of the phenomenon itself.

Through a dialectic analysis, this article explores the debate surrounding the ontology of terrorism itself and shall ultimately investigate the flaws in the numerous conceptualisations surrounding the notion that ‘terrorism’, in itself, is simply an ‘essentially contested concept’.

The aim of this piece is no more than to take a journey of conceptualisation that is indeed lacking within the wider literature, synthesising the orthodox and critical perspectives in an attempt to find the ontology behind our key concept.

To demonstrate this, there will be an analysis of three conceptual mechanisms of ‘terrorism’ by the: ‘nature of the act’, ‘nature of the actor’, and more controversially, ‘nature of the definer’.

Overall, this article shall show that the mechanical adaptations of definitions ultimately influence what we perceive ‘terrorism’ to be, and it is consequently these mechanisms that limit our understanding of the wider phenomenon.

1 W.B. Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 56 (1955/1956), 167-198 (p.167). 2 H Cooper, ‘Terrorism: The Problem of Definition Revisited’, American Behavioural Scientist, 44.6 (2001), 881-893 (p.891). 3 C.A.J. Coady, ‘Defining Terrorism’, in Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues, ed. by Igor Primoratz (Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 3-14 (p.7). 4 Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler, ‘The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terror-ism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 16.4 (2004), pp.777-794 (p. 777). 5 Brian Jenkins, The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation: RAND Paper Series, 1980) <http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P6563.html> [accessed 4 December 2015] (p.1-2). 6 Alan B. Kreuger, What Makes A Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), p.15. 7 David J. Whittaker, The Terrorism Reader (New York: Routledge, 2007), p.9.

THE ONTOLOGY OF ‘TERRORISM’:

THE IMPACT OF DEFINITION

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8 Charles Kegley, International Terrorism (New York: St Martin’s, 1990), p.11-12. 9 Stephen Nathanson, Terrorism and the Ethics of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p.20. 10 David J. Whittaker, Terrorists and Terrorism: In The Contemporary World (London: Routledge, 2004), p.4. 11 Noam Chomsky and Gilbert Archer, Perilous Power: The Middle East and US Foreign Policy Dialogues on Terror, Democracy, War and Justice (London: Penguin Books, 2007), pp.1-2. 12 Rosemary H.T. O’Kane, Terrorism (Harlow: Pearson, 2012), p.8. 13 Walter Z. Laqueur, Terrorism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977), p.79.

Alternatively, this perception can be undermined, as defining terrorism by the ‘nature of the act’ does not alter our ontological perception of our central phenomenon. In the confusion of this debate, its sentiment is captured by the thinker Christopher Joyner, who argues that the phenomenon of ‘terrorism’ eludes a distinct and precise definition; one only knows it when it is seen, making a universally agreed definition unrealistic8. This definitional mechanism, although placing the concept within perceived ‘objective’ boundaries, impacts only to the superficial ease of definition; causing confusion and misconception through its attempt to prescribe a universality of action to the concept9. Even though defining by the ‘nature of the act’ separates ‘terrorists’ from criminals, it cannot separate ‘terrorists’ from guerrilla movements in their actions: “What distinguishes terrorists from the others is not the extent of violence”10. Thereby militant guerrilla groups, for instance the Marxist Guerrilha do Araguaia in Cold War Brazil who fought against military rule, cannot be distinguished from groups such as the religious doomsday faction Aum Shinrikyo in Japan; or even to an extent the violent anti-abortionist groups in the United States of America (US) today. It is in this manner the definitional debate is flawed and consequently holds no impact on our ontological understanding of the phenomenon, due to the debate’s definitional mechanism at its source: the ‘nature of the act’.

Nevertheless, although this mechanism in theory allows for clarity, it can be said the definitional debate makes no impact on our understanding of the phenomenon and creates a clouding impact on our ontological grasp. As we have seen, defining by the ‘nature of the act’, although demystifies to a certain extent what defines ‘terrorism’, does not assist us in defining who is a ‘terrorist’ upon partisan or structural lines. This permits us to define both non-state and guerrilla movements as terrorists; but also states, impacting our understanding through its uncertainty. For an illustration, prominent critical thinker, Noam Chomsky argues that by defining ‘terrorism’ according to the use of violence or force through intimidation, we are able to consider states, such as the US under Reagan’s administration in the 1980s, as international terrorists11. In defining terrorism by the ‘nature of the act’, we obscure our understanding in the complexity of identifying the terrorist actor. Thus, the conduct of The Soviet Union or the US during the Cold War may be paralleled to violent non-state movements, such as the Zionist Lehi (Stern Gang) who acted to remove Britain from Palestine and create a Jewish state; or Hamas who, in their perspective, act to free Palestine from Israeli occupation12. Apart from projecting contradiction, this reinforces the claim made by Walter Laqueur in his conceptualisation of ‘Terrorism’, stating that such debates about finding a detailed definition will “continue for a long time…[and] will not result in a consensus”13. Therefore, the discourse surrounding the ‘nature of the act’ does hold an ontological impact on our understanding of ‘terrorism’ as a phenomenon, not an impact of clarity, but rather perpetuating contestation that ultimately allows us to disregard our antithesis due to the effect this mechanism holds at the linguistic source of definition.

““In defining terrorism by the ‘nature of the act’, we obscure our understanding in the complexity of identifying the terrorist actor.”


The ‘Nature of The Actor’ Connecting to the limitations of our first definitional method, in distinguishing between actors, we shall now see that the debate surrounding ‘terrorism’ by ‘the nature of the actor’, allows for an enhancing impact upon our understanding of ‘terrorism’, ultimately adapting our ontological perception of the phenomenon. The orthodox thinker Bruce Hoffman argues that what constitutes ‘terrorism’ through the ‘nature of the actor’ is a “subnational group or non-state entity”14. It is precisely what this method of definition addresses in which the previous cannot, allowing a critique of Jenkins’ perspective. Although this evaluation of the first definitional method produces some form of clarity, the critical perspective in the debate contests its grounds. Here, the critical episteme rests within Max Horkheimer, who stated orthodox thinkers perceive society to be a “sum-total of facts: it is there and must be accepted”15. Utilising this, orthodox scholars such as Hoffman, Laqueur or Martha Crenshaw see the world in this way, subscribing to the conventional order and therefore prescribing terrorists explicitly as non-state actors16. This is highlighted by Ruth Blakeley, who contends that due to this orthodoxy the concept of state terrorism, illustrated by the policy of the global north to the global south of for example in Latin America, is not brought to the forefront of the conceptual definition17. Consequently, the definitional debate surrounding the ‘nature of the actor’ has clearly impacted our ontological understanding of terrorism, as the orthodox-critical debate of this method has allowed us to include state actors as ‘terrorists’, not simply non-state actors; consenting us to view certain state’s policy as acts of ‘terrorism’.

On the other hand, by debating through the definitional mechanism of the ‘nature of the actor’, our ontological perception of ‘terrorism’ remains unchanged. Our antithesis shows credibility, as there is an endemic issue among thinkers like Hoffman in defining ‘terrorism’ through the violence of non-state actors where the methodological issues of selection-bias in terrorism studies are projected18. It is by using critical perspectives; we are able to see that ‘terrorism’ has been “virtually appropriated by mainstream political discussion to signify atrocities targeting the West”19. This definitional mechanism has produced a major focus on left-wing groups, such as the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) of Iraq and Turkey who seek national independence, or the Sandinistas of Nicaragua as socialist revolutionaries20. This has occurred due to the ideological biases of orthodox scholars, who remove right-wing state-sponsored groups from definition, such as the US sponsored Nicaraguan Contras in opposition to the Sandinistas, sanctioning critical theorists to define states’ actions as ‘terrorism’ through sponsorship21. Thus, the definitional debate does not impact on our ontological understanding of ‘terrorism’ as a phenomenon because the mechanism to which definitions have been forged in the debate, by the ‘nature of the actor’, are inherently defective and subject to selection bias’ that only produce false understandings of the phenomenon in the first place; consequently making the debate ineffective in its impact on our ontological

14 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), p.40. 15 Max Horkheimer, ‘Traditional and Critical Theory’, in Critical Theory: Selected Essays, ed. by Max Horkheimer (New York: Continuum, 1982), pp 188-252 (p.199). 16 Harmonie Toros, Terrorism, Talking and Transformation: A Critical Approach (New York: Routledge, 2012), pp. 18-19. 17 Ruth Blakeley, ‘Bringing the State Back into Terrorism Studies’, European Political Science, 6 (2007), pp. 228-235. 18 Alex Minz and David Brule, ‘Methodological Issues in Studying Suicide Terrorism’, Political Psychology, 30 (2009), pp.365-371, (p.365). 19 Alexander George, Western State Terrorism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), p. 1. 20 Richard Jackson, ‘An Argument For Terrorism’, Perspectives On Terrorism, 2 (2008), pp 25-32, (p. 26). 21 Ibid., p.26.

“The orthodox-critical debate of this method has allowed us to include state actors as ‘terrorists’, not simply non-state actors; consenting us to view

certain state’s policy as acts of terrorism.”

Issue 3 (2016) 7

22 Paul Wilkinson, ‘International Terrorism: New Risks to World Order’, in Dilemmas of World Politics, ed. by John Baylis and N.J. Rengger (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 228-260, (p.229). 23 Hannah Arendt, ‘Ideology and Terror: A Novel Form of Government’, The Review of Politics, 15 (1953), pp. 303-327, (p.310). 24 David J. Whittaker, The Terrorism Reader (New York: Routledge, 2007), p.4.

understanding.

Nonetheless, defining ’terrorism’ by the ‘nature of the actor’, impacts our ontological perception of the concept, but meanwhile holds little effect upon our understanding of the phenomenon as a whole, deepening contestation. Here, the debate allows us to see that ‘terrorism’ is a method of violence committed on random targets to influence the wider political behaviour, applying to both state and sub-state organisations, and therefore is simply a ‘special’ form of political violence22. To relate this to our investigation, this only furthers confusion in understanding ‘terrorism’ as this amalgamation of both the orthodox and critical perspectives, being an outcome of the definitional debate towards the ‘nature of the actor’, may also encompass internal state terror. This notion is discussed primarily by the renowned scholar Hannah Arendt, who argued that terror within totalitarian regimes is not simply for the suppression of the population, but also to signify the state’s ‘perfect rule’ through terror23. Consequently, as a result of the debate’s outcome surrounding this definitional mechanism, state action characterised by both internal and external terror may be embraced as ‘terrorism’. Thus, Nazi Germany’s internal terror, the US’s foreign policy throughout the Cold War and Al-Qaeda’s agency for example, may all be referred to as acts of ‘terrorism’. This therefore allows us to reject our antithesis, as the debate impacts our ontological understanding of the phenomenon because the definitional debate clouds our ontological grasp by incorporating too many factors, that is inherently connected to this definitional mechanism.

The ‘Nature of the Definer’ Linking to both previous definitional methods employed within the debate, here

this focus is inverted; concentrating on how the definitional characteristics of

‘terrorism’ adapt alongside the motive of the definer, concluding that this

mechanism assists our understanding that in turn; adapts our ontological

perceptions. The definitions currently employed by the Federal Bureau of Investi-

gations (FBI) and the US State Department reflect official institutional positions:

stressing coercion, unlawfulness, and premeditation of violence; all reinforcing

and legally entrenching the orthodox perspective within state law24. Many legal

scholars argue that the resoluteness of law officially constitutes the way in which


we define the world, influencing our ontological perceptions25. For example, White concludes, “Whoever has the power to define legitimacy has the power to define terrorism”26. Hence, as the state holds the power to define legitimacy, placing it in itself, these institutional definitions allow us to see ‘terrorists’ as those that fit the legal, and thus official actions of ‘terrorism’ such as individuals currently held in the US’s Guantanamo Bay detention camp27. In line with the debate’s critical perspectives, these acts of counterterrorism may in fact constitute ‘terrorism’, leading to the state apparatus’ definitional adjustment when necessary, so as to not include the actions of themselves within their own definitions28. Therefore, the definitions by states ultimately hold the ability to paint the phenomenon for the desired political effect, adapting our current ontological acuity of ‘terrorism’, permitting us to encompass the legal nature of definition as part of the phenomenon in itself; as state action to combat the phenomenon fit, in many ways, their own definition. Therefore the definitional debate impacts our ontological understanding of ‘terrorism’ as a result of the debate surrounding the ‘motive of the definer’, that is consequent only to this definitional mechanism at the source of deliberation: the ‘motive of the definer’.

Alternatively however, in order to project the antithesis, the effect of the debate surrounding the ‘motive of the definer’, holds no ontological impact upon our understanding of the overall phenomenon. Jörg Friedrichs outlines that the conflict between individuals and states to define ‘terrorism’ is a continual or perpetual struggle, and the actions in addition to motivations of terrorists continually blur the lines between ‘good’ and ‘evil’29. Although the status quo is challenged in this manner, the allies and beneficiaries of a hegemonic order in the international sphere have no interest in adapting the status quo, so to accommodate hegemony. This point is uniquely demonstrated by one of the United Nations’ definitions of ‘terrorist activity’ as “intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians and non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act”30. This illustrates and sustains the view presented by Friedrichs, as the language utilised highlights the orthodoxy that rests within the status quo of the definitional debate. This outlines that institutional definitions are specifically created subjectively, flawing our objective ability to understand the overall phenomenon31. For that reason, the debate surrounding the effect of who defines the concept holds no impact upon our ontological understanding of the phenomenon, because these institutional definitions are innately subjective so to sustain the orthodox status-quo in definition; showing no real impact of the wider debate upon our intellect. Finally, the wider definitional debate that encapsulates the ‘motive of the definer’

explains in its totality the multifaceted nature as to why ‘terrorism’ is so complex to

define and the complexity of the debate’s impact, weakening or ontological

understanding of the concept itself. The focal outcome of the definitional debate is

25 Stephen E. Barkan, Law and Society: An Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2015), p.9. 26 Jonathan R. White, Terrorism: An Introduction (Belmont: Wadsworth, 2003), p.9. 27 Amnesty International USA. Torture and Other Ill Treatment (New York: Amnesty International USA, 2015) <http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/issues/torture> [accessed 5 December 2015]. 28 Noam Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest For Global Dominance. (New York: Holt Paper-backs, 2003), p.188-189. 29 Jorg Friedrichs, ‘Defining the International Public Enemy: The Political Struggle Behind the Legal Debate on International Terrorism’, Leiden Journal of International Law, 19 (2006), pp. 69-91, (p. 89-90). 30 The United Nations, A More Secure World: Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. (New York: The United Nations, 2004). <http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/ historical/hlp_more_ secure_world.pdf> [accessed 7th December 2015] (p. 164). 31 David J. Whittaker, The Terrorism Reader (New York: Routledge, 2007), p.4.

“Whoever has the power to define legitimacy has the power to define terrorism. ”

Issue 3 (2016) 9

32 Ben Saul, ‘Attempts to Define “Terrorism” in International Law’, Netherlands International Law Re-view, 52 (2005), pp.57-83, (p.58). 33 Alex P. Schmid, The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (London: Routledge, 2011), p.49. 34 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), p.18.

that of an ontological change, showing us that a legitimate state, or international institution has the ability to subjectively adapt these ‘official’ definitions to enforce an orthodoxy referencing the ‘nature of the actor’, that is within the interest of these institutions32. Therefore, we are able to deduce that the meaning behind ‘terrorism’ has adapted with the political circumstances of the time33. For example within the US, the definition of ‘terrorism’ was redefined after the attacks on the World Trade Centre in September 2001 to re-accommodate non-state violence34. Although the definitional debate allows us to understand that the ‘motives of the definer’ effect definition due to political circumstances, this naturally has a consequent effect on the way in which we ontologically view the world, permitting definition according to bias. However, this produces little clarity by only showing the concept and therefore the phenomenon is subjectively defined, clouding our understanding of universality to the phenomenon overall. Thus, this mechanism of definition produces a negative impact upon our understanding, but an ontological impact nonetheless.

Conclusion This article has shown that the outcomes of the definitional debate surrounding the concept of ‘terrorism’ have adjusted our ontological perceptions of the phenomenon. Within this enquiry, three ontological adaptations have impacted on our understanding of ‘terrorism’, which occur out of the definitional mechanisms applied to define the concept. This has shown how the definitional method that is applied to the debate adapts our ontology by impacting on our understanding of the act of ‘terrorism’, which may then be considered a ‘terrorist’ and also on the impact to which the definer them self has on these constructs. Although the nature of this adaptation is contestable, whether positive or negative in clarifying our understanding of the concept, an ontological change in our perceptions of ‘terrorism’ have thus undoubtedly occurred following the definitional debate.

Additionally, I can now reveal that the question at the heart of our investigation itself was flawed; implying that the definitional debate unsurprisingly influences our understanding of the phenomenon. This flaw allowed us to explore in further depth the multi-faceted nature of the overall topic, which could not have been investigated if this defect was not inherent to our enquiry. Therefore, the results of the definitional debate surrounding the concept of ‘terrorism’ has impacted


the way in which we perceive how the phenomenon works, as a direct effect of the way in which it is debated; based upon which definitional mechanism is utilised to approach definition. This outcome holds political consequences, as it permits an analysis of ‘terrorism’ through the numerous definitional mechanisms within its conceptualisation; providing further critical tools through which to view the phenomenon in the future. This in itself prompts further research in to other, unconventional, definitions and their impact. Nevertheless, it is clear that Gallie’s assumption that ‘terrorism’ is an ‘essentially contested concept’ is not only pivotal to the definitional debate’s outcomes so far, but will for the foreseeable future.

Bibliography

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Arendt, Hannah, ‘Ideology and Terror: A Novel Form of Government’, The Review of Politics, 15 (1953) Barkan, Steven E., Law and Society: An Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2015)

Blakeley, Ruth, ‘Bringing the State Back into Terrorism Studies’. European Political Science, Vol. 6, No. 3 (2007)

Chomsky, Noam and Gilbert Archer, Perilous Power: The Middle East and US Foreign Policy Dialogues on Terror, Democracy, War and Justice (London: Penguin Books, 2007)

Chomsky, Noam, Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest For Global Dominance (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2003)

Chomsky, Noam and Vltchek, Andre, On Western Terrorism: From Hiroshima to Drone Warfare (New York: Pluto Press, 2013)

Coady, C.A.J., ‘Defining Terrorism’ in Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues, ed. by Igor Primoratz (Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004)

Cooper, H, ‘Terrorism: The Problem of Definition Revisited’, American Behavioural Scientist, 44 (2001)

Dugard, John, ‘International Terrorism: Problems of Definition’, International Affairs, 50 (1974)

Friedrichs, Jorg, ‘Defining the International Public Enemy: The Political Struggle Behind the Legal Debate on International Terrorism’, Leiden Journal of International Law, 19 (2006)

Gallie, W.B., ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 56 (1955/1956)

George, Alexander, Western State Terrorism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991)

Hoffman, Bruce, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006)

Horkheimer, Max. ‘Traditional and Critical Theory’ in Critical Theory: Selected Essays, ed. by Max Horkheimer (New York: Continuum, 1982)

Jackson, Richard, ‘An Argument For Terrorism’, Perspectives On Terrorism, 2 (2008)

Jenkins, Brian, The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems (London: RAND Corporation, 1980) <http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P6563.html> [accessed 4

December 2015]

Issue 3 (2016) 11

Kegley, Charles, International Terrorism (New York: St Martin’s, 1990)

Kreuger, Alan B., What Makes A Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007)

Laqueur, Walter Z., Terrorism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977)

Minz, Alex. and David Brule, ‘Methodological Issues in Studying Suicide Terrorism’, Political Psychology, 30 (2009)

Nathanson, Stephen, Terrorism and the Ethics of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010)

O’Kane, Rosemary H. T., Terrorism (Harlow: Pearson, 2012)

Saul, Ben, ‘Attempts to Define “Terrorism” in International Law’, Netherlands International Law Review, 52 (2005) Schmid, Alex P., The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (London: Routledge, 2011)

Toros, Harmonie, Terrorism, Talking and Transformation: A Critical Approach (New York: Routledge, 2012)

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Whittaker, David J., Terrorists and Terrorism: In The Contemporary World (London: Routledge, 2004)

Whittaker, David J., The Terrorism Reader (New York: Routledge, 2007)

Wilkinson, Paul, ‘International Terrorism: New Risks to World Order’ in Dilemmas of World Politics, ed. by John. Rengger Baylis (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992)


This article seeks to address why Imperial China enjoyed five centuries of relative peace with its neighbouring states between the founding of the Ming dynasty and the Opium Wars, and the role that China played in maintaining such peace and security. This period of history is notable because it reflects an unusually long era of relative peace. This article’s arguments, however, will reinterpret this period according to empirical historical circumstances and defines China’s external political realities through the lens of David Lake’s writings on theories of hierarchy1 in International Relations (IR). To that end, I will question whether the five centuries were as peaceful as had been previously stipulated, then interpret China’s role in this period based on its military primacy, tributary relations, and the degree of pragmatism practised by China’s leaders. Finally, the phenomenon whereby China sat atop a cultural hierarchy, which was by no means based solely in security or economic concerns and was not the sole means by which China’s external relations were conducted, plays a subsequent role in the state of affairs of China’s role in maintaining East Asian peace and security in the timeframe of the proposed question. But first, to frame such inquiries within the wider context of contemporary debates in IR theory on the issue of hierarchy, it is important to justify why we should glance back in time to the IR of China’s periphery in an age prior to and later concurrent with the emergence of the Westphalian inter-state system on the European continent. This article will ultimately conclude that this ancient, obscure, and often overlooked time-period and settings have an abundance of fascinating case studies for the avid IR scholar.

The crisis of anarchy in IR theory: Why hierarchy matters

Owing to the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the easing of East-West tensions, the

subsequent end of the Cold War and the ‘unipolar moment’, being the concept of

fundamental anarchy in the international environment, has been subject to

resurgence in literature that seeks to define, identify, and explain hierarchy in IR2.

This is problematic because the well-established IR positions of Realism and of

Neoliberal Institutionalism take international anarchy to be their foundation for a

belief of the state as the principal actor on the global landscape3. A theme that has

emerged in the resultant literature of this spat between the venerable concept of

international anarchy and the up-and-coming subject of hierarchy in IR is an identity

crisis for the former postulate; for how can there be anarchy if there is the imposition

of sets of values over others4 as a result of hierarchy or hegemony in international

affairs5? For John Hobson, the existence of international hierarchy has been apparent

throughout the age of imperialism and the post-colonial era, because successive

generations of European academia have undermined the sovereignty of much of the

world outside of Western Europe6, and in doing so created a European hierarchy

based in the post-colonial period on a nonsensical claim in the superiority of

BY JOE DAY

From 1368 to 1841 there was a long and enduring time of peace and regional security in East Asia. This was quite unprecedented making it a fascinating case study in the field of International Relations studies. This article attempts to comprehend the role played by Imperial China, which is by far the largest and most materially preponderant actor in the region during this time. Analysis in this article focuses on theories of hierarchy in IR according to David Lake, and contrasts such ideas of Security Hierarchy and Economic Hierarchy with the contemporary political reality. Through this method, it can be concluded that during the four centuries of peace and regional security in question, Imperial China does not fit quite perfectly with either of these designations. Rather it appears to have created for itself through the factors of pragmatic external relations, tributary relations, and material preponderance - a Civilizational Hierarchy that binds China’s neighbours in a Sino centric regime. Perhaps this is due to the unique geographic location of Chinese civilization relative to its neighbouring powers, which served well to maintain regional peace and security over time.

1 David A. Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations (New York: Cornell University Press, 2009), p.1-16. 2 David A. Lake, ‘Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics’,

International Security, 32 (2007), p.48. 3 Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Why States Act through Formal International Organizations’,

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42 (1998), pp.3–32. 4 Ian Hurd, ‘Legitimacy and Authority in international Politics’, International Organisation, 53 (1999),

p.383. 5 Tim Dunne, ‘Society and Hierarchy in International Relations’, International Relations, 17 (2003), pp.

303–20. 6 John Stuart Mill, ‘A Few Words on Non-intervention’ in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill XXI, ed. by

J. M. Robson (Toronto: University Press, 1984), p.118.

IMPERIAL CHINA, EAST ASIA, AND FIVE

CENTURIES OF REGIONAL PEACE AND

SECURITY

Issue 3 (2016) 13

7 John Hobson, ‘The Twin Self-Delusion of IR: Why ‘Hierarchy’ and Not ‘Anarchy’ Is the Core Concept of

IR’, Journal of International Studies, 42 (2014), p.569. 8 Ian Clark, ‘How Hierarchical Can International Society Be’, International Relations, 23 (2009), p.476. 9 Warren I. Cohen, East Asia at the Center (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), p.222. 10 Ibid., p.221. 11 Jay P. Corrin, June M. Grasso, and Michael Kort, Modernization and Revolution in China (New York:

M.E. Sharpe, 2009), p.6 12 Sujian Guo, Chinese Politics and Government: Power, Ideology and Organization (London: Routledge,

2013), p.50. 13 Cohen, p.216.

European rationalism7. Ian Clark further demonstrates that the existence of global hierarchy, or even global hegemony does not fundamentally contradict the concept of international anarchy, for the sound rationale that the former two conceptions do not infer “unchecked primacy”8. Hence, the concept of hierarchy in IR studies does not undermine traditional Realist and Neoliberal positions, but rather enhances the scope of their theoretical implications. That being said, David Lake’s writings is perhaps more theoretically generalisable and operational for the purposes of this inquiry when compared to those of Hobson, which is why this article draws more attention to the former and none to the latter.

The problems of peace: Five centuries of intermittent conflict

The premise of the inquiry that this article seeks to answer is problematic because it infers a long period of near uninterrupted peace in East Asia, when the historical truth is that China alone was involved in several military conflicts in this period and was not always successful. China had fought a lengthy war in the sixteenth century against Buddhist Mongols, the Zunghars, resulting in the subjugation of Tibet as a protectorate of the Qing empire until the “Qing invasion [of Tibet] in 1751”9 that followed the assassination of two Chinese scholar officials a year earlier. In the same period, Qing armies had not been able to defeat the Burmese after Burma sacked Laos, drawing China into an unsuccessful war in the decade after 175010. The premise that East Asia was totally peaceful during this period is not accurate as although wars between China and its neighbours, Japan, Vietnam, and Korea was uncommon; conflicts between China and other entities and states did occur. Therefore, we can assess China’s role in maintaining regional peace and security in this light by making the generalisation that the major civilizations in East Asia were not fundamentally changed by conflict with China where it existed, but that conflict did exist nonetheless when states and entities infringed upon China’s interests.

Imperial China’s military primacy: The implications of military power on hierarchy

An argument could be made in that China enjoyed military primacy during this

period, and subsequently was able to deter attacks by other states in the region,

thus reducing the likelihood of conflict whilst extending its hierarchy over other

actors through the use of legitimate military force. Due to its large population and

relative technological superiority11, as well as a domestic culture which

“[glorified] self-sacrifice for the collective”12, China certainly enjoyed military pri-

macy in the region at this time, so much so that from the midst of the 17th to 18th

century, China was the dominant force in East Asia13. It stands to reason that

China’s strength relative to its neighbours served to deter them from aggression

against it, and China’s territorial size blocked most avenues of conflict between

“How can there be anarchy if there is the imposition of sets of values over others as a result of hierarchy or hegemony in international affairs?”


its neighbouring states. Therefore it can be argued that China maintained a level of peace and security in the region through a security hierarchy of varying strength with external polities, for example exhibiting stronger hierarchy in Tibet, where military occupation granted the Chinese many actions to legitimately command where “hierarchy is high”14, whilst not exhibiting such behaviour elsewhere. The militarily hierarchical justification for China’s role in maintaining a generally stable state of affairs in East Asia at this time, by virtue of its unilateral military strength certainly provides some insight into the matter, is by no means exhaustive in understanding why China played an ultimately significant role in East Asian peace and security at this time.

天下 (Tianxia) “Under Heaven”: cultural power, Sino-centrism and

Civilisational Hierarchy Another crucial aspect of China’s behaviour that helped cordial relations to be enjoyed across East Asia at this time was its insistence upon the Sino-centric tributary system. This system emerged during the rule of Emperor Wu (141-87 BCE) where it was deemed “economically unfeasible” and “militarily unsustainable” for China to annex its neighbours15, and that all subsequent relations between China and these vassal states would “focus on the ritualistic façade of the Chinese Emperor’s superiority”16. From this perspective China was considered “the glorious centre” from which, the further one strayed and the less civilised one was considered17. From this grew the Sino-centric notion that relations were to be based on a Confucian hierarchy, in which “each member state had their prescribed place”18. With the Chinese Emperor being seen as the ‘Son of Heaven’19, the Chinese state received tributes from states that engaged in this system. This order of superiority enabled the Chinese to willing to engage in trade and peaceful relations20. The Confucian system however had also transcended strained relations between China and its neighbours, such as between 1736-1799, when even “Burma and Nepalese Gurkhas accepted tributary status”21, or earlier still, prior to Japan’s expulsion from the tributary system when “the Shogun accepted that role for pragmatic reasons to profit from trade”22. Because the tributary system included the adoption of Confucian practises in the lesser states, this strengthens China’s moral leadership in the region because “Confucian thinking reflects deeply rooted Chinese concepts”23, which significantly points to China at this time as a potential hegemon and guarantor of peace and security. The impact of the tributary system in creating peaceful relationships through “shared values, norms, and institutions”24 cannot be understated in East Asia at this time, and this Sino-centric system heavily suggests that China played a crucial role in regional peace and security through Confucian hierarchy, which in turn be-haved like a form of hierarchy in IR that has not been covered by, but is not at odds with, Lake’s writings on international hierarchy.

Chinese pragmatism: the maintenance apparatus of peace and security Chinese pragmatism with regards to their external relations during this time was another crucial factor in the role China played in East Asian regional security. As already established, by the mid-17th century China was the preeminent power in East

14 Lake (2009), p.45. 15 Yuri Pines, The Everlasting Empire: The Political Culture of Ancient China and Its Imperial Legacy

(Princeton University Press, 2012), p.35. 16 Pines, p.35. 17 Grasso, p.3. 18 Ibid., p.26. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Cohen, p.221. 22 Ibid., p.230. 23 Grasso, p.17. 24 Brett Bowden, The Empire of Civilization: The Evolution of an Imperial Idea (Chicago: University of

Chicago Press, 2014), p.103.

Issue 3 (2016) 15

25 Cohen, p.243. 26 Ibid., p.218. 27 Cohen, p.217. 28 Ibid., p.220. 29 Ibid., p.226.

Asia, and although it is easy to view Chinese actions at this time as pertaining solely to the tributary system, China’s leaders “recognised emerging power structures, and responded pragmatically”25. This is perhaps best exhibited by Qing China’s pragmatic responses in dealing with the Russian eastward expansions into Siberia, which caused a security dilemma for the Qing leadership whose Manchu homeland faced the potential of Russian aggression at this time. After two separate instances of Sino-Russian conflict over the Albazin settlement, the Russian leadership opted for a negotiated settlement and the Qing leadership responded pragmatically by considering the Russians as equals by joining with them to negotiate the Treaty of Nerchinsk 168926. The reason why the Qing leadership responded pragmatically by not attempting to extend tributary status to Russia, lies in Chinese pre-occupation in the province of Xinjiang, where discontented local Muslim populations and outside nomads became a threat to China’s security due to unruly behaviour that likely stemmed from the decline of overland trade routes in favour of the emerging European sea trade routes in East Asia27. Therefore, it can be drawn that from these circumstances, China was capable of altering the way in which it treated outside powers to balance relationships and reduce the likelihood of crippling security dilemmas outside of the tributary system, which nonetheless remained a crucial part of China’s external relations at this time. Even by treating the Russians as equals, against their Confucian and Sino-centric world view, the Chinese still insisted on kowtow, the ritual of prostrating oneself before the Chinese emperor to acknowledge their superiority28, to a Russian delegate of Peter the Great who was sent to Peking in 1719 for diplomatic purposes. In this sense, as stated by Cohen, the concept of imperial power is similar in meaning to both the Qing and European powers29 because China behaved in its external relations in various manners; some tributary, some as relationships of equals, and in other places exercising military power readily. This rational and pragmatic approach to external relations credits China with a central role, which to a great extent, kept regional relations cordial and peaceful through power balancing.


Civilisational hierarchy in IR: A summary of concluding thoughts Throughout this analysis of China’s role in East Asian peace and security in the specified timeframe, it appears that Lake’s theories of economic or security hierarchy is not applicable because there was no division of sovereignty between China and its neighbours30. For such hierarchies to exist, dominant states’ authority should cover “both the subordinates external relations and internal practises”31; this refers to a reduction of the sovereignty of the lesser states in these areas. But owing to the relative autonomy that tributary states enjoyed32, no such reduction of sovereignty took place in East Asian states at this time except with regards to their acceptable subordinate position to China, a single area of external policy, which infers that there were “relatively few actions that [the dominant state] could legitimately regulate”33 leading to a low hierarchy, according to the provisions of Lake’s theory applied to East Asian international relations at this time.

However, the Tianxia system afforded to China a veil of superiority that characterised its relations with many East Asian neighbour states, which although did not reduce their autonomy or sovereignty (with the exception of their status relative to China). This state of affairs can be understood in a relational approach where authority rests on a “social contract”34 between the dominant state providing a political order to the subordinate state, and in many cases China’s neighbours drew their own domestic sovereignty from their proximity to the Sino-centric system. This is best exhibited when the Vietnamese rebel leader offered tribute to China after the defeat of the Vietnamese ruling forces that previously called for Qing assistance35. This factor points to a Chinese civilizational hierarchy that promoted peace and security in the region at this time. To further support this, Japan’s informal relationship with China outside of the tributary system can be observed in that the formal relations between the two countries were almost impossible in the 18th century36, yet trade and informal contracts continued because China enjoyed a good relation with its tribu-tary, Korea who acted as “the middlemen between China and Japan”37. Through this complex relationship with its East Asian neighbours, China proved itself to be the central actor in many contemporary East Asian interstate relations at this time.

To summarise, China’s role in maintaining East Asian peace and security is best exhibited by the implications of its civilisational hierarchy, drawn primarily from its tributary relations, the degree of pragmatism exercised by its leaders in external relations, and its military primacy in the five centuries in question, all of which in tandem produced a relatively stable regional order.

Bibliography Abbott, Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal, ‘Why States Act through Formal International Organizations’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42 (1998)

Bowden, Brett, The Empire of Civilization: The Evolution of an Imperial Idea (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 2014)

Clark, Ian, ‘How Hierarchical Can International Society Be’, International Relations, 23

(2009)

Cohen, Warren I., East Asia at the Center (New York: Columbia University Press,

2000)

Corrin, Jay P., June M. Grasso, and Michael Kort, Modernization and Revolution in

30 Lake (2009), p.3. 31 Ibid., p.50. 32 Pines, p.35. 33 Lake (2009), p.45. 34 Ibid., p.3. 35 Cohen, p.223. 36 Ibid., p.230. 37 Ibid., p.231-2.

Issue 3 (2016) 17

China (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2009)

Dunne, Tim, ‘Society and Hierarchy in International Relations’, International

Relations, 17 (2003)

Guo, Sujian, Chinese Politics and Government: Power, Ideology and Organization

(London: Routledge, 2013)

Hobson, John, ‘The Twin Self-Delusion of IR: Why ‘Hierarchy’ and Not ‘Anarchy’ Is the Core Concept of IR’, Journal of International Studies, 42 (2014)

Hurd, Ian, ‘Legitimacy and Authority in international Politics’, International

Organisation, 53 (1999)

Lake, David A., Hierarchy in International Relations (New York: Cornell University Press, 2009)

Lake, David A., ‘Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in

World Politics’, International Security, 32 (2007)

Mill, John Stuart, ‘A Few Words on Non-intervention’ in Collected Works of John

Stuart Mill XXI, ed. by J. M. Robson (Toronto: University Press, 1984)

Pines, Yuri, The Everlasting Empire: The Political Culture of Ancient China and Its

Imperial Legacy (Princeton University Press, 2012)


This article will disprove the assumption that the Anglo-Chinese Opium Wars of

1839-42 and 1856-60 were merely caused by trade deficiencies between Britain and

China. Instead it will argue that the negotiations, which could have stopped both

wars, were impossible to come to fruition due to deep cultural and societal divides

between mercantilist Westphalian Britain and the Confucian tributary hierarchical

hegemon China. In terms of operationalisation; firstly this article will examine the

orthodox explanation of the Opium Wars focusing on British trade deficiencies and

investigate how mercantilist tenants might have influenced British reactions to Lin

Zexu’s abolishment of opium trade. Secondly, the article will investigate the theory

that cultural and societal misunderstandings over opium led to both wars. In order to

do so, the British perspective of the banning of opium as an economic protectionist

tool will be contrasted with the moral Chinese philosophical standpoint of filial parity.

Furthermore it will also examine the cultural clash between British pragmatic

searches for wealth compared to Chinese appeal to morality to the British crown.

This article will conclude that the defining factor, which led to both Opium Wars, was

Sino-centrism as it greatly hampered Chinese ability to negotiate with Britain by

prompting a war that could have been avoided by simple regulation of trade through

equalitarian diplomacy.

Chronology of events The First Opium War was fought between the United Kingdom, at the side of the

British East India Company, against the Chinese Qing Empire from 1839 to 1842. The

orthodox understanding of the casus belli for the war is disputes over trade

regulations relating to the opium trade. Britain, being a protectionist colonial empire,

was greatly reliant on positive balances of trade with other nations and on its export

of Indian opium to the rest of Asia. This became problematic due to Chinese refusals

to legalise and tax opium trade as well as their prompt seizure of British opium stock

without compensation in China. This gave the impression that Chinese actions forced

the British to enter a naval war with the Qing Empire in order to improve its balance

of trade with China. Later in 1857, a Second Opium War erupted as Britain was

unsatisfied with the trade terms and implementation of the 1842 ‘Treaty of Nanking’

that ended the First Opium War.

BY HÉCTOR GARCIA LOPEZ

This article seeks to portray The

Opium Wars as series of events

that could have been avoided by

simple negotiation between

China and Britain. Conversely,

negotiations did not materialise

due to strong philosophical and

cultural divides between both

empires, rather than the

orthodox view that British trade

caused the war. Economics is

also seen merely as a condition

for disagreement but not as the

sole factor precipitating war. In

terms of operationalisation, this

article relies both on

quantitative methods through

the use of statistics relating to

trade and economy, while also in

qualitative methods such as

international relations theory

and Sino-British philosophical

debates.

THE CLASH OF TITANS AND THE FAILURE

OF DIPLOMACY IN 19TH CENTURY CHINA

Issue 3 (2016) 19

1 Kevin H. O’Rourke, ‘British trade policy in the 19th century: a review article’, European Journal of Politi-

cal Economy, 16 (2000), pp.829-942, (p.830). 2 David Kinsella, Bruce Russet and Harvey Starr, World politics: the menu for choice 10th edition

(California: Wadsworth, 2013), p.290. 3 Martin Wolf, Why globalization works, (Connecticut: Yale Nota Bene, 2005), p.33. 4 Warren I. Cohen, East Asia at the center: four thousand years of engagement with the world (New

York: Columbia University Press 2000), p.241. 5 Melissa Banta, ‘Commodities, currencies, and the balancing of trade within a chronicle of China trade’,

(Boston: Harvard Business School, 2015) <http://www.library.hbs.edu/hc/heard/commodities-

currencies.html> [accessed November 1, 2015]. 6 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘The development of the opium problem in China within a

century of international drug control’. (United Nations, 2010) <https://www.unodc.org/documents/

wdr/WDR_2008/WDR2008_100years_drug_control_origins.pdf> [accessed November 1, 2015];

Stephen C. Lockwood, Augustine Heard & Company, 1858-1862: American Merchants in China

(Cambridge: East Asian Research Center, 1971), p.22. 7 Leslie Marchant, The War of the Poppies (History Today, 2002) <http://www.historytoday.com/leslie-

marchant/wars-poppies> [accessed November 1, 2015], p.52-55.

Britain: The economically driven state At prima facie, the British reliance on positive balances of trade stemming from

mercantilism appears to be the quintessential cause of the Opium Wars. The

British still subscribed to mercantilism until 1846 when the repeal of the British

Corn Law irreversibly pushed Britain towards trade liberalisation1. Mercantilism

assumes that global trade is a zero sum game, in other words, where one actor’s

gain is the equivalent to a loss for the second actor in the pair2. Additionally

mercantilism also assumes that in order to become more prosperous, a state is to

maintain a positive trade output, which translates into a surplus of exports

compared to imports3.

However China became a thorn in the British Empire’s foot, as it was extremely

difficult to create a positive balance of trade to satisfy mercantilism. While the

commodity imports of Chinese tea, ceramics and silk were crucial to the British,

especially tea as the English market required 2,235,000 pounds by 1750 and

“[during] the 18th century China was the world’s only source of tea”4.

Contrastingly the Chinese had little need for traditional British exports such as

woollens and raw cotton5. In order to eradicate the trade deficit, Britain started

the sale of opium, which already had a small market within china through the

tributary Arab trading (50 tonnes in 1650), quickly becoming 57% of all imports

into China (1390 tonnes in 1835), as shown in the figure below6. Additionally

Britain was doubly relying on the opium trade as an 1832 Parliamentary committee

enquiry had concluded that monetary benefits from exporting Bengali Opium

would also allow balancing of the Indian budget7.

The abolishment of the opium trade within China combined with the British

reliance on it spawned a perceived casus belli to start the First Opium War. Lin

Zexiu the special imperial commissioner for the end of the opium trade directly


sized 20,283 chests and 200 sacks of opium that were “held” by the British Govern-

ment. Charles Eliot, the British superintendent, relied on his confidence on West-

phalian international norms dictating that the subsequent destruction of the opium

would require compensation from the Chinese government. However as a caveat, it

can be noted that such norms of behaviour were only followed by Westphalian

states, hence British logic was limited to the extent that compensation can only be

given if it is understood by all parties that the cultural norms require compensation in

this situation8. Nevertheless, “Lord Palmerston announced in September 1839 that

the only way to deal with China was to give it a good beating and explain after-

wards”9. In other words, Britain was to go to war with China in order to declare that

compensation was due no matter the cultural misunderstanding between the na-

tions. Nevertheless British reliance on trade through mercantilism is not to blame for

the First Opium War, as it cannot by itself explain the pre-war failure of negotiations

over trade regulation between both parties. Rather, we need to turn to the culture-

philosophical clash between both nations to explain those misunderstandings.

A clash of East and West: Two diametrically opposed ontologies of life As mentioned previously, Palmerston misunderstood the cultural motives for the ban

of opium trade. The British, due to their mercantilist mind set, believed that the ban

was a protectionist trade measure in order to sell Chinese lower quality opium; hence

gaining a monopoly over the market rather than allowing free trade that gave British/

Bangladeshi opium an advantage10. However, reality could not be further from the

truth as China was pursuing moral goals rather than profit. Under Confucianism, the

concept of Xiao (filial piety) is crucial as it is the structure that holds society and gov-

ernment from collapsing. Hence taking into account that “according to Confucian

custom, the body was not something the individual possessed for his own use but

rather entrusted to him by his ancestors”11. As the use of opium is clearly damaging

to the body and to the fulfilling of the social responsibilities of Chinese citizens, it will

also become a great affront to Xiao as disrespecting one’s own body is also disrespect

to your ancestors. Furthermore under Tianming (Mandate of Heaven), the Daoguang

emperor was morally forced to halt opium use within China. In order to maintain the

Tianming, the emperor was to be benevolent and caring for his subjects, which in

turn means to uphold the Xiao that was morally incompatible with opium abuse as

described above. If the wellbeing of the people were not protected, the ruler would

simply be deemed a tyrant and forfeit the approval of Heaven allowing people to

rebel until a better governor gains the Tianming12.

Although the British also found the consumption of opium immoral, the socio-

cultural priorities of the British were polar opposites of the Chinese governance

under Tianming. Lin Zexu did indeed try to appeal to moral principles by sending a

letter to Queen Victoria, within the letter Lin also points out the hypocrisy of the

equalitarian Westphalian system.

“I have heard that the smoking of opium is very strictly forbidden by your country;

that is because the harm caused by opium is clearly understood. Since it is not

permitted to do harm to your own country, then even less should you let it be passed

on to the harm of other countries “ (Brooklyn College 1996)13.

8 June M. Grasso, Corrin Jay and Michael Kort, Modernization and revolution in China: from the Opium

Wars to the Olympics (New York: M.E Sharpe, 2009), p.36. 9 Ibid, p.36. 10 Marchant. 11 Grasso, p.34. 12 Yuri Pines, Foundations of Confucian thought: intellectual life in the Chunqiu period, 722-453 B.C.E,

(Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 2002), p.57-59.

13 Lin Zexu Lin Tse-Hsu, Letter of Advice to Queen Victoria, (Brooklyn College, 1996) <http://

Issue 3 (2016) 21

14 Ibid. 15 Robert A Bickers, The scramble for China: foreign devils in the Qing Empire, 1832-1914, (London:

Penguin, 2012), p.77. 16 Marchant. 17 Lin Zexu. 18 David E. Mungello, The great encounter of China and the West, 1500-1800, (Lanham, Oxford: Row-

man & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), p.47.

This meant that British citizens were not to consume opium, as it was known to

be dangerous. However when profits were involved, the ideals of wealth creation

discussed in the principles of mercantilism superseded moral standings, despite

that fact that other state’s citizens were being harmed14. Furthermore, there

were also claims that the British knew they were wrecking the Chinese economy

due to the strain opium sales were creating on the bi-metallic system15. Opium

traders often insisted on being paid with silver, which is also simultaneously the

metal required to pay taxes to the Chinese government. Poor Chinese citizens

were only paid in copper, hence had to exchange copper for silver to pay taxes

and opium purchases. Also, due to the scarcity of silver, an inflation of exchange

rates had followed, which caused havoc on the prices of commodities16. However,

some historians17 point out that there is a possibility that the Queen may have

never seen such letter, in which case the theory that the philosophical thirst for

wealth supplanted the moral priorities of the British would lack evidence due to

the fact that the moral appeal never would have been heard by the British court.

China: The central kingdom or the hubris that sealed their fate? Ultimately while the previously discussed cultural disparities between both

nations are important, the defining cause of the Opium Wars was not the lack of

British empathy towards the problems generated by opium, and nor the strain

that caused to the philosophical importance of Tianming for Chinese governance.

But rather it was the Chinese Sino-centrism that made any sort of mutually

beneficial negotiation between both parties impossible.

On the domestic cultural level, China suffered from ethnocentrism; defined as

“the belief that Chinese culture was superior to other cultures”18. The principles

forging ethnocentrism are based on Confucianism, through Dao tong

(Transmission of the Way) and Zheng Dao (the true way), stating that any truth is

handed down from the ancients to Confucius and in turn to current scholars

which contrasted with the ideals of radical change stemming from the

enlightenment in Europe. While some interpretations see the ancients as any

wise human being, the Neo-Confucian scholars in power at the time preluding the

Opium Wars; saw the truth of the ancients to be limited to Chinese scholars. This

then created a xenophobic vision of the non-Confucian world making it difficult

for China to partake in the equalitarian system of Westphalian diplomacy.

In international relations China acted as “Zhongguo”, the hegemon in a unipolar

world where all the other states were to bend down to its cultural and military

hegemony. Under such assumption, an extremely stable tributary system

flourished under which the Sinic zone states of Korea, Annam, and

“Defining cause of the Opium Wars was not the lack of British empathy ... But rather it was the Chinese Sino-centrism that made any sort of mutually beneficial negotiation between both parties impossible. ”


Ryukyu Island had hailed Chinese superiority. This superiority was declared by

prostration through the Kowtow of emissaries as well as the sending of gifts to the

Chinese empire. The cornerstone of Chinese hegemony and legitimacy was the Sinic

zone’s borrowing of Confucian styled government principles, hence de-facto defining

it as superior to their ulterior government systems. However, China was not a

hegemon within a unipolar world, but rather a decaying hegemon within a bipolar

world whom acted on the diplomatic scene as a unipolar hegemon19. As seen on

the figure below20, the share of China’s GDP started steadily declining from the 1820

and onwards, while the western share of GDP steadily increased in reaching a level

close to parity at the onset of the First Opium War.

Due to its ethnocentrism and perceived international hegemony within the tributary

system, China refused any sort of negotiations with Britain, which caused the Opium

Wars. Often it is assumed that China refused negotiation due to the McCartney’s

refusal to Kowtow and that Qianlog nor any of his successors were ready to consider

real negotiation with the British21. Regardless, the ‘ethnocentric’ China greatly

underestimated British military power, which made them chose to concentrate in

taming internal turmoil within China such as the anti-Qing White Lotus revolts. This

was done under the assumption that a state outside of the Chinese cultural sphere of

influence could not be powerful22. Yet Britain was the military hegemon of the

century due its recent industrial revolution development such as the steamboat and

modern rifles23. Furthermore, due to China’s acclimatisation to the tributary system

and its relative lack of knowledge of the Western world, China failed to understand

that diplomacy was necessary. Lin “arrive[d] at Guangzhou to dictate not to

negotiate”24, as he would to a Sinic tributary state. This lack of communication

allowed Palmerston to misunderstand Chinese intentions and gave him the casus

belli for the First Opium War. China did not see the British as a hegemonic threat in a

bipolar world but rather as petty barbarians, as Lin described the British in his letter

19 David C Kang, ‘Hierarchy and Legitimacy in International Systems: The Tribute System in Early Modern

East Asia’, Security Studies, 19 (2010), pp.591-622, (p.596-600). 20 Angus Maddison, Percentage of World GDP (last 500 years) (University of Groningen, 2008) <http://

visualeconsite.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/01/percent-world-gdp-15001.jpg>

[accessed November 1, 2015]. 21 Cohen, p.242. 22 Grasso, p.33. 23 David Killingrav, Margarette Lincoln and Nigela Rigby, Martine empires British imperial maritime trade

in the nineteenth century (Suffolk: Boydell Press, 2006), p.100. 24 Grasso, p.35.

Issue 3 (2016) 23

25 Lin Zexu. 26 Grasso, p.39.

to the Queen25. The causes of the Second Opium War are merely extensions of

the first; as the British disheartened with treaties requested renegotiation Bei-

jing’s refused to treat official representatives in an acceptable manner as they

were still perceived as barbarians. The lack of an apology for the murder of a

French missionary was used as the pretext to invade and force China to negotiate,

as China would not do so under diplomatic official channels causing the Second

Opium War26.

Conclusion Both Opium Wars were indeed caused by a philosophical clash between two cul-

tures and two notions of government and society. While the British started the

military invasion, their casus belli could have been discarded by simple regulation

of opium trade or by satisfying British trade deficiencies with other imports both

catering to Xiao and Tianming. Ultimately the blame for both wars lies on the

deep philosophical incompatibility between Sino-centrism and diplomacy. It is to

be noted, however, that this article’s conclusions are limited to the extent of

other barriers to diplomacy such as the vested interest of other Western nations

or language barriers.

Bibliography Banta, Melissa, ‘Commodities, currencies, and the balancing of trade within a

chronicle of China trade’, (Boston: Harvard Business School, 2015) <http://

www.library.hbs.edu/hc/heard/commodities-currencies.html> [accessed

November 1, 2015]

Bickers, Robert A., The scramble for China: foreign devils in the Qing Empire, 1832

-1914, (London: Penguin, 2012)

Cohen, Warren I., East Asia at the center: four thousand years of engagement

with the world (New York: Columbia University Press 2000)

Grasso, June M., Corrin Jay and Michael Kort, Modernization and revolution in

China: from the Opium Wars to the Olympics (New York: M.E Sharpe, 2009)

Kang, David C., ‘Hierarchy and Legitimacy in International Systems: The Tribute

System in Early Modern East Asia’, Security Studies, 19 (2010)

Killingrav, David, Margarette Lincoln and Nigela Rigby, Martine empires British

imperial maritime trade in the nineteenth century (Suffolk: Boydell Press, 2006)

Kinsella, David, Bruce Russet and Harvey Starr, World politics: the menu for

choice 10th edition (California: Wadsworth, 2013)

Lin Zexu, Lin Tse-Hsu Letter of Advice to Queen Victoria, (Brooklyn College, 1996)

<http://acc6.its.brooklyn.cuny.edu/~phalsall/texts/com-lin.html> [accessed 1

November 2015]

Lockwood, Stephen C., Augustine Heard & Company, 1858-1862: American Mer-

chants in China (Cambridge: East Asian Research Center, 1971)

Maddison, Angus, Percentage of World GDP (last 500 years) (University of Gronin-

gen, 2008) <http://visualeconsite.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/

uploads/2008/01/percent-world-gdp-15001.jpg> [accessed November 1, 2015]

Marchant, Leslie, The War of the Poppies (History Today, 2002) <http://

www.historytoday.com/leslie-marchant/wars-poppies> [accessed November 1,

2015]


Mungello, David E., The great encounter of China and the West, 1500-1800, (Lanham,

Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005)

O’Rourke, Kevin H., ‘British trade policy in the 19th century: a review article’, Euro-

pean Journal of Political Economy, 16 (2000)

Pines, Yuri, Foundations of Confucian thought: intellectual life in the Chunqiu period,

722-453 B.C.E, (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 2002)

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘The development of the opium problem

in China within a century of international drug control’. (United Nations, 2010)

<https://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2008/

WDR2008_100years_drug_control_origins.pdf> [accessed November 1, 2015]

Wolf, Martin, Why globalization works, (Connecticut: Yale Nota Bene, 2005)

Issue 3 (2016) 25

1Philip H. Gordon, ‘Europe’s Uncommon Foreign Policy’, International Security, 22 (1997), pp.74-100, (p.

96). 2 Robert Dover, ‘The EU and the Bosnian Civil War 1992/95: The Capabilities/Expectations Gap at the

Heart of EU Foreign Policy’, European Security, 14 (2005), pp.297-318, (p.297). 3 Stephan Keukeleire and Tom Delreux, The Foreign Policy of the European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave

Macmillan, 2014), p.173. 4 Asle Toje, ‘Strategic Culture as an Analytical Tool History, capabilities, geopolitics and values: the EU

example’, Western Balkans Security Observer, 14 (2009), pp.1-23, (p.2). 5 Michael E. Smith, ‘Researching European Foreign Policy’, Politics, 28 (2008), pp.177-187, (p.180).

The comparative lack of military strength of the European Union (EU) has long

been seen as its Achilles heel. Academic scholars, such as Gordon1, have gone as

far as to say that EU’s regional security objectives would be impossible to achieve

without a robust Union military. The idea of the ‘capabilities-expectations gap’

following the end of the Bosnian Civil war has long been at the centre of

discourse of EU foreign policy2, based mainly around this lack of a common army

to enforce policy. This combined with the failure to reach the necessary self-

sustaining 180,000 active and stand by troops for the Helsinki headline goals, can

be seen as a poor omen for the start of a Common European Security and

Defence Policy (CSDP). There is logic in the argument that as the Common

Security and Defence Policy, it would inherently require an army in order to

function; however to do so fails to account for the nuanced multilateral agenda

that CSDP works under and hopes to achieve. Therefore, this article shall assess

the CSDP in accordance with how it adheres to its definition in the treaty of

Lisbon; that it shall: ‘draw on civilian and military assets…for peacekeeping,

conflict prevention and strengthening international security…with the principles

of the UN charter’3. This will be demonstrated through discussions around the

issues of limiting analysis around the lack of a European army, by showing how

CSDP missions are possible and active instruments of EU policy. Then, it is argued

instead, that the lack of a coherent common strategic culture, as defined by

Longhurst of being a ‘distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes and practices regarding

the use of force’4, is the primary hindrance to CSDP. For purposes of argument,

the concept of an ‘army’ shall be treated as collective armed forces, thus

including maritime and air forces as well as a land force.

An army as a means of assessing policy

Firstly, to view CSDP through the narrow traditional lens of military capacity

inherently limits how we can perceive its effectiveness. The EU is not a nation

state nor is its CSDP focussed solely upon classical hard power coercion, so

approaching the topic from this perspective is both limiting and inappropriate.

Discussion on CSDP should therefore take into account the other resources

(primarily economic and civilian) the EU has to use, and the less threatening style

of power the EU wishes to project5 as a normative power.

BY JAMES HENRY KELLY

The comparative lack of military

strength controlled by the EU

has long been seen as its Achilles

heel in regards to exerting policy

as a global power. This article

finds however that to judge the

EU’s CSDP purely by the lack of a

common army is misleading;

both in terms as a unit of analy-

sis and in regard to the types of

missions the EU carried out un-

der CSDP (namely civilian orien-

tated and peacekeeping opera-

tions). The EU has also demon-

strated that it has advanced de-

ployment capabilities with a

global reach through operations

such as Atalanta. The problem

with CSDP though is not the lack

of a common army, but instead a

lack of a common strategic cul-

ture across member states. Until

this is resolved there shall always

be a limitation on the capacity of

CSDP.

EUROPE’S ACHILLES HEEL: A COMMON

ARMY

“The comparative lack of military strength of the European Union has long been seen as its Achilles heel. ”


As such, CSDP should be seen through the objectives that are set out in its doctrinal

publications; namely the Petersberg tasks, European Security Strategy (ESS) and

European Neighbourhood policy (ENP). These documents establish the parameters,

wider strategic objectives, and regional ambitions of CSDP. Broadly speaking, they

have an emphasis on action through multilateral means, be it militarily with NATO or

for humanitarian purposes with the UN or other regional bodies (African Union etc.)6.

Considering this, it would seem that to judge the CSDP by the lack of EU unilateral

military prowess; would be using entirely the wrong criteria as the work it carries out

is characterised as being multilateral in both scope and design.

Secondly, the capabilities that a modern army would have on an EU level would be

limited in a post-cold war strategic setting as many objectives have already been

achieved without one. The traditional primary objective of an army, to ensure the

territorial sovereignty of a state, has become less imperative in Europe7 and is

achieved already by the presence of national armed forces in the member states.

Thus the roles of a common army would focus on further pursuing the goals currently

being fulfilled by national armies: war-fighting, peacekeeping, internal security and

policing8. Peacekeeping has already been implemented extensively, using both

civilian and military elements, as shall be discussed in the following sections. Policing

is also an active element of CSDP, with an EU Gendarmerie force taking part in

Policing missions as far away as Afghanistan. Internal security is becoming a more

prescient issue in CSDP, most specifically in regard to the current migration crisis

whereby the interplay between internal and external security is becoming more

evident. For instance the level of institutional co-operation and coordination among

member states with the EU Gendarmerie can be said to be extensive9. As Bigo

indicates however, the increasing transnationalism of security in the EU has centred

on new actors such information and intelligence companies; thus to focus on police

and armed forces – or the lack of a common one in this instance – alone misses the

core component of the approach to internal security taken in the CSDP10. A common

army would then only introduce a war-fighting capability to CSDP, and as this is not a

priority of Petersberg tasks, ESS, or part of any common strategic culture in Europe, it

would unlikely be utilised for such a purpose.

CSDP missions The EU has undertaken a plethora CSDP operations without a common European

army. The range and scope of CSDP missions in the past 12 years cannot help but be

considered extensive; with a total of 33 completed and ongoing missions. These

missions have been located in the nearer European neighbourhood, Saharan and

sub-Saharan Africa, and even as far as South Asia with the monitoring mission in

Aceh11. To put this in perspective, the UN has undertaken 20 peacekeeping missions

in that time, and 14 if we discount missions which have been continuous since before

2003 like the observation missions in India and Pakistan12. Although the scopes

6 European Council, ‘Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy- Providing

Security in a changing world’ (Brussels: European Union, 2008), (p. 11). 7 Timothy Edmunds, ‘What are armed forces for? The changing nature of military forces in Europe’, Inter-

national Affair, 82 (2006), pp.1059-1075, (p.1065-6). 8 Ibid., p.1062. 9 Jörg Monar, ‘EU Internal Security Governance: the case of counter terrorism’, European Security 23

(2014), pp.195–209, (p.195). 10 Didier Bigo, ‘Internal and External Aspects of Security’, European Security, 15 (2006), pp.385-404,

(p.401-402). 11 European Union, ‘Ongoing missions and operations’, <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-

operations/> [accessed 9 December 2015]. 12 United Nations, ‘List of Peacekeeping operations: 1948-2013’, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/

documents/operationslist.pdf> [accessed 9 December 2015].

Issue 3 (2016) 27

13 Keukeleire and Delreux, p.181-2. 14 Ibid., p.21. 15 Ibid., p.182. 16 Esther Barbé and Benjamin Kienzle, ‘Security Provider or Security Consumer?’, European Foreign

Affairs Review 12 (2007), pp.517-536, (p.526-532).

of these missions are dissimilar in numbers and type of units deployed, these

figures demonstrate that the EU has not been lax in the years since CSDP came

about. CSDP has been more than active in the multilateral security arena and to

ignore its impact would be to belittle a large portion of international security

missions carried out since the start of the millennium. To understand the singular

role EU has in international security, it is worth discussing the roles civilians play

as well as traditional military forces in the security missions of CSDP.

The civilian aspect Notably, the characteristics of such 21 missions that the EU had carried out under

CSDP were categorised as ‘civilian missions’. These are defined by the

deployment of non-military actors in order to ensure security, with idea of

creating longer-term stabilisation13. With the use of police, judges, and civil

servants, these missions work to ensure the rule of law and that civil

administration can continue. By their very nature, military forces would be

insufficient in securing these objectives, at best being able to secure martial law.

Civilian based missions are a manifestation of Europe’s Civilian power14, an

aspect, which distinguishes the EU in its security role on the global stage. The use

of civilians in security and defence allows the EU to capitalise on its strengths to

make up for its comparative lack of military strength and resolve. Indeed the use

of civilian missions was introduced by Sweden and Finland to the EU so they

would not have to compromise on their principles of neutrality but still help with

collective defence and security15. Civilian missions have also meant that the EU

has been able to build a new security identity for itself within its neighbourhood.

The EU Border Assistance Mission in Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) saw, through

the implementation of CSDP, the EU’s conflict management stance changed from

from that of being a security consumer to that of an ‘emerging security provider’,

in the words of Barbé and Kienzle16. Under the framework of the newly created

ENP, the EU gave extensive support to the Moldovan government in regards to

border control and customs, whilst also rapidly expanding diplomatic dialogues. Though it is true that the presence of Russia in Transnistria has limited the

forcefulness with which the EU could act and extending diplomatic sanctions as


the most serious instrument, the extensive use of civilian missions was a fully

competent way to extend EU security interests without being geopolitically

inflammatory. In a relatively small space of time, the EU was able to create a conflict

management role for itself, projecting a clear security and defence policy in the face

of the traditionally powered Russia, all without the presence of a common European

army. Reconceptualising security and defence, expanding it from a purely military

endeavour to include civil and bureaucratic muscles of the EU, brought about the

possibility of successful CSDP. This is not to say either that the military operations of

CSDP, though smaller in scope to their NATO counterparts, are lacking in impact; as

shall be discussed in the next section.

Military operations without a common army

Though the Helsinki Headline goals for a European rapid reaction force were not

reached and a common European army has not come into force, it does not mean

that the EU is completely toothless. The Saint-Malo declaration of 1998, whereby the

French and British met to push forward ESDP, introduced the concept of EU

‘Battlegroups’. These groups of 1500 soldiers serve on a six-month stand-by and are

made up of contributions from participating member states under the leadership of

one commanding country. Though these have not been tested in the field, the

reasons for which are discussed in the next section, they have proven that member

state militaries have been able to coalesce their forces to an extent.

The co-ordination of national forces to increase efficiencies, as indicated by the

second ESS paper where a section focuses on the establishment of ‘a more effective

and capable Europe’17, is an active part of CSDP. Within this section, there are

comments on the successful creation of the European Security and Defence College

to coalesce strategic training, which demonstrates how the commanders of the

member states militaries are working together more closely. The character of CSDP,

just as the rest of EU foreign policy, shows its core strength through multilateral

dealings; be it through the co-ordination among member states or interaction with

other international organisations.

The remaining twelve CSDP missions that are classified as military operations are

equally as diverse as their civilian equivalents. A clear success story of CSDP military

operations is that of Operation Atalanta where the EU mandated mission to protect

shipping and deter piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Atalanta has proved as the first EU

naval operation that the EU is capable of projecting a continuous force at sea, for an

extended period of time, which can help to provide security in one of the world’s

most dangerous trade lanes. This blue water naval capability is one shared with only

a few of the great powers and speaks to the scope that CSDP has by capitalising on

the combined military assets of its member states. More so, Atalanta has also

demonstrated that the EU can undertake such operations without losing its focus as a

humanitarian actor working within the auspices of the UN and international law18. All

this demonstrates that the EU is capable of utilising military assets whilst still keeping

within the guidelines of the Lisbon treaty without the presence of a common armed

force. Though one could argue that the EU was far from fighting alone, with a

significant NATO and non-NATO force being deployed in Operation Ocean Shield, the

continual presence of EU mandated ships shows that common defence and security

is far from impossible. CSDP successes aside, it would be naïve not to acknowledge

17 European Council, p.9. 18 Marianne Riddervold, ‘Finally flexing its muscles? Atalanta – The European Union’s naval military op-

eration against piracy’, European Security, 20 (2011), pp.385-404, (p.401).

Issue 3 (2016) 29

19 Christopher O. Meyer, ‘Theorising European Strategic culture: Between convergence and the persis-

tence of national diversity’, CEPS Working Document, 204 (2004), pp.1-23, (p.5-7). 20 Keukeleire and Delreux, p.20. 21 Gordon, p.89. 22 Anand Menon, ‘European Defence Policy from Lisbon to Libya’, Survival, 53 (2011), pp.75-90, (p.88). 23 Michal Kořan, Czech Foreign Policy 2007-2009: Analysis (Prague: Institute of International Relations,

2010), p.373. 24 Jolyon Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,

2014), (p.240-241). 25 Anna Bacikowska, ‘EU Battlegroups- ready to go?’, European Institute of Strategic Studies, 40 (2013),

pp.1-4, (p. 4).

limitations to its effectiveness. The fundamental problem lies with disjointed po-litical will and how member states respond to different crises that is the threat to a successful CSDP. To which point, there would be little use for a common Euro-pean army without first a common strategic culture.

The true challenge: A common strategic culture

As pointed out by Meyer, the problem is not necessarily the lack of strategic cul-

ture, but the many different strategic cultures that is the weakness of CSDP19. The

differing strategic priorities and cultures of member states limit the extents to

which the EU can respond in a collective manner and for common security and

defence purposes. In the broadest terms, this split is between those states that

seek European security to be a purely continental EU policy area versus those

who seek a NATO centric (and hence US alliance focussed) strategy20. The split is

made worse by the fact that the two primary security actors of the EU, France

and the UK, are divided into these camps respectively. This indeed formed the

crux of Gordon’s argument back in 1996 as to the limitations of EU military

capability21. The Saint-Malo declaration demonstrates clearly that European

security co-operation outside of NATO still requires the mutual strategic

co-operation of these two powers. Though the UK would largely prefer a bilateral

Anglo-French centred European security structure with support from the US, the

long-term success of CSDP would rely upon a more multi-lateral approach utilising

all possible EU military assets22.

The split is not just amongst the larger powers of the Union, as Central European

states such as the Czech Republic since the fall of the Eastern bloc has largely

taken an Atlanticist approach to security23. Denmark goes even further with its

active participation with NATO but an opt-out clause with its defence relations to

the EU. Naval action in the Gulf of Aden was a clear demonstration of this Danish

approach to international security by participating as part of NATO but not as part

of the EU taskforce. This is to say nothing of the four officially neutral countries of

the EU, which though signature to the solidarity clauses, would be constrained in

how they could respond to the request for aid by a member state by their na-

tional laws. The result of all this is that different states contribute varying

amounts of manpower and funding to operations, which in the longer term is

unlikely to be sustainable24.

Disagreement among member states as to the role of the EU as a security actor

has led to the closest thing the EU has to an army, the Battlegroups, being

untested and ineffectual. The lack of political support for a common course of

action in crises such as South Sudan in 201025 and more recently the war in

Ukraine, has meant that the EU’s rapid reaction force has yet to be implemented.

If the EU continues to lack the strategic and political will to use the Battlegroups


when called upon, then CSDP shall also continue to lack a crucial rapid response

capability.

Conclusion

The lack of a common European army has not been the Achilles heel rendering CSDP

impossible that some commentators have stated. Coordinated member state

contributions have meant that CSDP has been able to carry out a diverse range of

missions all in accordance with its mandated principles of humanitarianism and

multilateralism. The unique emphasis on the civilian element in European security

policy can be seen as further limiting the necessity for a common army. These

conclusions are not to say that the EU would suffer in having a more robust,

autonomous military apparatus, but for that to be an effective means of achieving

security objectives through more coercive methods a clearer common strategic

culture within the Union would have to be defined. The lack of a common strategic

culture is the clearest detriment to the overall effectiveness of CSDP, however steps

have been taken to co-ordinate and combine logistical and military assets in order to

mitigate it. In short, CSDP not impossible, but will always be more limited in scope

without the necessary unity of strategy. The next step would be to see if a

continental strategic focus could be found, but the political gravity it would take for

some member states to get there would likely change the entire nature of the

European project.

“CSDP not impossible, but will always be more limited in scope without the necessary unity of strategy.”

Issue 3 (2016) 31

Bibliography

Bacikowska, Anna, ‘EU Battlegroups- ready to go?’, European Institute of Strategic

Studies, 40 (2013)

Barbé, Esther and Benjamin Kienzle, ‘Security Provider or Security Consumer?’,

European Foreign Affairs Review 12 (2007)

Bigo, Didier, ‘Internal and External Aspects of Security’, European Security, 15

(2006)

Dover, Robert, ‘The EU and the Bosnian Civil War 1992/95: The Capabilities/

Expectations Gap at the Heart of EU Foreign Policy’, European Security, 14 (2005)

Edmunds, Timothy, ‘What are armed forces for? The changing nature of military

forces in Europe’, International Affair, 82 (2006)

European Council, ‘Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strat-

egy- Providing Security in a changing world’ (Brussels: European Union, 2008)

European Union, ‘Ongoing missions and operations’, <http://

www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/> [accessed 9 December

2015]

Gordon, Philip H., ‘Europe’s Uncommon Foreign Policy’, International Security, 22

(1997)

Howorth, Jolyon, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union (Basingstoke:

Palgrave Macmillan, 2014)

Keukeleire, Stephan and Tom Delreux, The Foreign Policy of the European Union

(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014)

Kořan, Michal, Czech Foreign Policy 2007-2009: Analysis (Prague: Institute of In-

ternational Relations, 2010)

Menon, Anand, ‘European Defence Policy from Lisbon to Libya’, Survival, 53

(2011)

Meyer, Christopher O., ‘Theorising European Strategic culture: Between conver-

gence and the persistence of national diversity’, CEPS Working Document, 204

(2004)

Monar, Jörg, ‘EU Internal Security Governance: the case of counter terrorism’,

European Security 23 (2014)

Riddervold, Marianne, ‘Finally flexing its muscles? Atalanta – The European Un-

ion’s naval military operation against piracy’, European Security, 20 (2011)

Smith, Michael E., ‘Researching European Foreign Policy’, Politics, 28 (2008)

Toje, Asle, ‘Strategic Culture as an Analytical Tool History, capabilities, geopolitics

and values: the EU example’, Western Balkans Security Observer, 14 (2009)

United Nations, ‘List of Peacekeeping operations: 1948-2013’, <http://

www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/operationslist.pdf> [accessed 9 De-

cember 2015]


A mythical history

When considering the state of affairs in the Balkans it is imperative to deliberate the

nature of Serbia, a principal and authoritative state of the region. The history of

Serbia is vast, but there has been ‘no continuous polity or territory with that name’1

which makes contemplating its history a significantly challenging goal. Instead it is

necessary to consider Serbia’s history from its role in Yugoslavia since the formation

of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in 1918 under a constitutional

monarchy due to its status as ‘the only Balkan country to have a truly distinctive

foreign policy stance’2. Though Yugoslavia was recognised in 1922 at the Conference

of Ambassadors and subsequently renamed in 1929 as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia,

the rise of communism does not become an aspect of Serbian affairs largely until the

Second World War. Serbia in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia saw the state to ‘be theirs to

rule’ and ‘dominated parliamentary life’ largely thanks to sustained support from the

Slovene and Muslim parties as well as the Croatian boycott, which were abstaining

from parliamentary life for a period as they wished for more autonomy3.

One of the reasons put forward for Serbia’s dominant stance in Yugoslavian matters

was that, as well as having a Serbian entity within Yugoslavia, Serb diaspora is spread

across the Balkans. In this sense, Yugoslavia acted as a border, a combined state,

where the once divided Serbs could now ‘unite ethnically within one state’ for the

first time in recent history4. The other states did not have such an incentive to unite

under the Yugoslavian experiment and as such the relationship was often strained

due to Serbia’s divisive quasi-leadership in the Balkans. Serbia’s supremacy in Yugo-

slavian affairs will be important when discussing its later transition and the historical

developments, including the Yugoslav wars, as much of the tension had been built up

prior to World War II. The Yugoslav experiment was doomed to fail as a result of the

Serbs wanting greater federal control whilst the Croats rebelled the other way,

pushing for greater autonomy and lacking in the collective sentiment of the Serbs.

Yugoslav statesmen and revolutionary Tito went as far as to presumably include

‘American assurances into his plans to crush the liberal tendencies in Croatia, as

many disgraced Croatian politicians have claimed’5.

The greatest coalition Yugoslavia had seen since 1918 came in the form of a coup

against the monarch Peter II as a result of the adherence to the Tripartite Pact

between Germany, Italy, and Japan. Pavlowitch describes this as ‘the last straw for

the Serbian opposition’ that favoured allied support rather than an axis allegiance6.

Without an official declaration of war and under the codename ‘Punishment’, an

offensive was launched to crush the rebellion; Belgrade and Yugoslavia

unconditionally surrendered after eleven days of bombing and twenty days after the

coup. Following the Nazi invasion, the fragmentation of Serbia and Yugoslavia

remains key when looking at the history and state of affairs that exist as a result of

the underlying tensions which dominated the politics of transition taking place

towards the end of the century. Slovenia was split, Montenegro was taken by Italy,

Albania acquired Kosovo and part of Macedonia, and Germany occupied most of

1Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Serbia: The History behind the Name (London: Hurst & Company, 2002), p.vii. 2 David A. Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda, Yugoslavia and After (Addison Wesley Longman, 1996), p.1. 3 Pavlowitch, p.135. 4 Dyker and Vejvoda, p.10. 5 Batovic, Ante, The Balkans in Turmoil – Croatian Spring and the Yugoslav Position Between the Cold War Blocs 1965-1971 (LSE Cold War Studies Programme) <http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/Analysis-Archive/workingPapers/batovic.pdf> [accessed March 22 2016]. 6 Pavlowitch, p.138.

BY MATTHEW SEARY

This article takes an in-depth

look into the history of Serbia

and how social and political

tensions have kept the state in a

limbo with the rest of the world.

Serbia is an extraordinary case as

the tumultuous history of its

people has created rifts and

bonds with its neighbours in a

complex tapestry of politics. It

will consider how Serb diaspora

had led to a warped view of its

own history and the effect this

has on its modern status. It will

also delve into and analyse how

the Yugoslav wars have affected

relationships with neighbours

and goes on to assess the

challenges that Serbia faces with

integrating into the modern

geopolitical climate. The latter

part of this article will focus on

how Serbia has made many steps

forward and will equally discuss

these, looking to the future

prospects for a Serbia so ravaged

by transition over the past

century that it remains to the

modern day in an odd limbo with

both its neighbours and the

European Union.

A STATE IN LIMBO: SERBIA AND THE

POLITICS OF TRANSITION

Issue 3 (2016) 33

7 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Holocaust Encyclopedia: Jasenovac (Washington D.C.: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2005). <http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005449> [accessed October 14 2015]. 8 Pavlowitch, p.142. 9 Ibid, p.134. 10 Ibid, p.151. 11 Ibid, p.153. 12 Leslie Benson, Yugoslavia: A Concise History (Palgrave, 2001), p.107.

Serbia. A notable outcome from the occupation and fragmentation was the crea-

tion of the ‘Independent State of Croatia’ that comprised of Croatia, Bosnia and

Herzegovina, with parts of Serbia. A puppet state of Germany, the fascist interim

governments carried out a widespread genocide campaign that resulted in

‘between 320,000 and 340,000 ethnic Serbs’ being murdered fuelling more racial

tensions7. Sadly, ethnic cleansing would be a continued theme of Yugoslavian

affairs and continued to contribute to the fragmentation of the Yugoslav state8.

The effect of the Second World War on the Balkans The Second World War saw the communists turn into a ‘disciplined and well-

organized’ federalist Yugoslav party under the leadership of Josip Tito9 . Invaded

by Axis powers in 1941, the anti-Nazi resistance – the ‘Yugoslav Partisans’ – was

led by Tito. With a mixed ethnic background, Tito appealed to Serbs and Croats

alike and wished to return Yugoslavia to its state as a federation. Although seen

‘once again as a Serb-based movement’, this continued to highlight the larger

interest Serbs took in political affairs even whilst the government was in exile and

Germany ruled over the land10. The popularity of communism in Yugoslavia was,

however, not widespread; Serbia had much stronger ties to communism and the

threat of ‘vindictive Serbs’ resulted in a general revolt by German armed anti-

communist Albanians11. By 1945, the Albanian revolt and Axis powers had been

expelled largely due to the Yugoslav Partisans and limited support from Soviet

forces. A new Yugoslavia was to be formed; however, this would set up six federal

republics rather than a unitary monarchy and this was the first existence of a

‘Serbia’ since 1918. The issue with such a relationship is that without appropriate

integration, ‘nationalist rivalries’ would become ‘embedded in this system’; it

could be, if cynically considered, that the EU suffers from German-Franco

interests producing rivalries of a similar nature to what Yugoslavia and Czechoslo-

vakia suffered from12. The federal budget is one such example as it saw Slovenia


and Croatia accounting for over half the full amount, and only Serbia and

Montenegro were net beneficiaries despite Serbia accounting for a large amount of

Yugoslavia’s territory, especially with its two autonomous regions of Kosovo and

Vojvodina. Similar to Czechoslovakia, the failure to treat the former states (Slovakia/

Croatia) with equal status would work to break apart this tenuous relationship.

Whilst the new Yugoslavia thrived economically for a sustained period, one could

only note that underlying tensions also prospered as a result of prior World War II

conflicts, ethnic cleansing, and Serbia’s natural inclination to front the Yugoslavian

experiment. Combined, these factors caused a fragmentation that would tear it apart

from the inside and provide a difficult period of transition that would see 'all the

successor states suffer from a problem of democratic deficit’ and suffer from the

struggle to join the global community13.

The Yugoslav wars also left a sour taste in the states involved, which would permeate

the politics of transition for most of the nations, particularly Serbia that was the main

pro-Yugoslav nation and ethnic group. The Serbs were also largely terrorised and

displaced as a result of the Serb diaspora that left them as the biggest minority in

Yugoslavian federal entities, especially Croatia. Rape was reportedly used

‘deliberately as an instrument to terrorise the civilian population’ as late as 1999 in

the region14. Almost four million people were displaced and 140,000 killed in violent

attacks and neither side was innocent. In 2007 Milan Martić, a leader of Croatian

Serbs, was convicted of murder, persecution, torture and attacks on civilians and

sentenced to thirty-five years’ imprisonment, possibly as revenge for the acts of

genocide carried out against his people in the aforementioned World Wars – though

human rights violations were not few and far between. Indeed, there have been

arguments that ‘women [were] being raped in … camps all over the country’ and such

places did exist to help the morale of men; an archaic view that women were the

spoils of war that pervaded in the late 90s15. The conflict left the region ‘deeply

divided and economically weak’ and no state has addressed the past human rights

abuses adequately, although Serbia does show minor efforts towards this goal16.

Serbia and many other former Yugoslavian states are still dogged by their past, and

refuse to acknowledge much of what happened, often trying to shift the blame to

each other. The violent, often critiqued as genocidal, wars of the Yugoslav states will

continue to hold Serbia back from into transitioning into a modern liberal democracy

or from fully mending its relations with its neighbours.

In limbo with Europe: The remands of a Yugoslav experiment Serbia’s politics of transition has been dominated by European politics, particularly

that of the European Union (EU). Being the largest state in the Balkan region and one

that touted itself as the most influential member in the Yugoslavian days, Serbia has

been interfered with mostly by international authorities since the fall of Yugoslavia.

Indeed, since the collapse of Milosevic’s regime in 2000 ‘Serbia’s membership of the

EU has been one of the best supported objectives among the citizens of Serbia’ and

13 Dyker and Vejvoda, p.5. 14 Human Rights Watch, Serb Gang-Rapes in Kosovo Exposed (Human Rights Watch, 2000). <http://www.hrw.org/news/2000/03/20/serb-gang-rapes-kosovo-exposed> [accessed October 23 2015]. 15 New Internationalist, Weapon of War (New Internationalist, 1993) <http://newint.org/features/1993/06/05/rape/> [accessed October 19 2015]. 16 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Press Release (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 2007) <http://www.icty.org/sid/8870> [accessed October 25 2015].

“The conflict left the region ‘deeply divided and economically weak’ and no state has addressed the past human rights abuses adequately”

Issue 3 (2016) 35

17 Wolfgang Petritsch and Goran Svilanovic, Serbia Matters: Domestic Reforms and European Integra-tion (Nomos, 2009), p.41. 18 Ibid., p.45. 19 Ibid., p.28. 20 Ibid., p.45. 21 Ibid., p.38. 22 Petritsch and Svilanovic, p.26. 23 Ibid., p.26. 24 Judy Batt, ‘The Question of Serbia’, Challiot Paper no. 81, 11 (2005). <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp081-English.pdf> [accessed October 20 2015]. 25 Petritsch and Svilanovic, p.30. 26 Ibid., p.44.

by its governments17. Of course, this is supported by the fact ‘seventeen elections

resulted in more or less comfortable majorities for parties advocating the Euro-

pean future of the country’, a future aimed towards integration with western

liberal democracy and a path away from the days of old communist regimes18.

This advocates rather glaringly that Serbia is looking for a future as a Serbian state

within the EU, away from its past intentions of forming a new Yugoslavia; suggest-

ing cooperation with its neighbours is one of its utmost priorities. However, ‘it is

clear that not all the residual post-Yugoslav problems have been resolved either’

and Serbia is only beginning its transition into the EU and as a liberal democracy –

these could possibly be considered almost synonymous19. Serbia has begun to

transition but faces a long struggle in the face of adversity, suffering from ‘the

slow pace with which laws are adopted by parliament, economic difficulties, a

lack of coordination and widespread corruption’20.

In line with Serbia’s pro-EU and positive outlook towards liberal democracy, the

country has also shown a ‘high degree of responsibility towards and cooperation

with its neighbouring countries’ with greater trade relations and slowly acknowl-

edging its past transgressions21. For example, close to Pristina ‘Serbian and Alba-

nian businesses of all kinds now sit cheek by jowl in a way that has not been seen

since 1999’ as a result of the transition from and acceptance of its past22. The

health of a liberal democracy and pro-European attitude is in recent history un-

dermining the negative repercussions of the ethnic cleansing and nationalistic

tensions that dominated Yugoslavian and Serbian affairs; once again the Serb

diaspora is promoting integral relations in the Balkans. Such attitudes have also

pushed forward the collapse of the Serbian Radical Party that ‘imploded by the

autumn [of 2008], splitting into two and thus neutralising itself as a nationalist

threat’23.

Serbian nationalism, a constant theme in this article, was a continued obstacle

that held Serbia back from transitioning into a modern liberal democracy. Batt

described Serbian nationalism as continuing to ‘pose threats both to Serbia’s

neighbours and to Serbia’s prospects as a liberal-democratic state’ but with the

implosion of the Serbian Radical Party, these threats are becoming neutered24.

Education in Serbia about the atrocities carried out has begun, although it is

somewhat limited - even if limited, it is still a step in the right direction and sig-

nals the continuation of a modernising and transitioning state. The Balkans are

arguably more united than they have ever been with most wanting EU member-

ship and trade between the states shows increasing prosperity; ‘the area is, to all

intents and purposes, a single cultural’ state’25. Indeed, such cooperation be-

tween Balkan states highlights the preliminary transitioning of not just Serbia but

the whole region, to an extent. Even the European Commission ‘always reported

steps in the right direction’ in regards to its transition26.

However, whilst the outlook of Serbia may be bright, transition is slow and tedi-

ous especially with Serbia’s EU application being held in limbo until the Kosovo

problem is resolved. The politics of transition for Serbia has been tainted by its


‘predominant conviction of national superiority, deep-rooted prejudices against

Serbia’s neighbours and the feeling of being the “chosen people”’, and despite the

collapse of the Radical Party this is still largely prevalent in parts of Serbian culture27.

Serbia’s inability to release Kosovo as an independent state became a continued

issue for its transition into the EU as ‘an EU member state may not have territorial

claims on a neighbour’ and yet this remains contentious to this day28. Even if Serbia

may have wishful intentions from pro-EU elections, past grudges will not allow them

to move forward in transition. As a result, we can conclude from Serbia’s attitude

that ‘Serbian nationalism will continue to pose threats both to Serbia’s neighbours

and to Serbia’s prospects as a liberal-democratic state’ due to the imperialistic nature

of the claim it holds upon Kosovo29. The imperialistic attitude nurtures the

democratic deficit that Serbia has long lacked and undermines any transition to the

global democratic sphere. ‘Serbia has to find its place in the world, and in Europe in

particular’30.

Can the Kosovo issue be resolved and allow for the continuing transition of Serbia?

Very possibly, but it still faces large corruption within its political system and the

ethnic tensions and public upset that will invariably come following the ‘departure’ of

Kosovo. In addition, the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 has stated neither side’s

desires, the wording allowing both Kosovo and Serbia to believe they are in the right.

Indeed, the Balkans are considered with such magnitude that even the world powers

are perplexed with how to resolve the issue, letting it play out naturally as opposed

to interfering. ‘The establishment of ‘full cooperation’ with the International Criminal

Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and a more honest and frank discussion of

the recent past’ are necessary for the continued transition of Serbia into a full liberal

democracy with global significance31. Serbia cannot continue to ignore its past and it

shows no signs of doing so; the opportunities for change are there, but they are slow.

No state in Europe, arguably, has gone through as much transition as Serbia in recent

history and it shows, as historical ‘obfuscation still have a significant influence on

politics’32.

Conclusion: What now for Serbia? Serbia’s economic, social, and political transition has only really just begun, but

shows glimmers of hope. Long-term attributes of Serbia such as the suffering

democratic deficit, mythological perspective with which ethnic Serbs view their

history, and the Serb diaspora that led to a sense of superiority from the Serbs in the

Yugoslavian experiment, explain the slow state of transition. This is a result of Serbia

being caught in limbo with the rest of Europe and its failure to often accept the issues

of its past, characterised by the cases decided in the ICTY and Serbia’s indecision over

Kosovo. These are all issues that Serbia appears to be working to resolve, cooperating

closely with neighbours, and teaching the public from a more neutral perspective of

history. Until Serbia can essentially move on from its past, or learn from it, it will

remain contentiously stuck half in the EU and half out, half in the present, half in the

past; Serbia must continue to make steps forward with western democracy to

complete its transition. For now, ‘Serbia, newly liberated from the burden of

sanctions, has yet to be welcomed back into the global family’33.

27 Ibid., p.113. 28 Petritsch and Svilanovic, p.36. 29 Batt, p.11. 30 Petritsch and Svilanovic, p.115. 31 Ibid., p.38. 32 Ibid, p.39. 33 Dyker and Vejvoda, p. 2.

Issue 3 (2016) 37

c

Bibliography Batovic, Ante, The Balkans in Turmoil – Croatian Spring and the Yugoslav position

Between the Cold War Blocs 1965-1971 (LSE Cold War Studies Programme)

<http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/Analysis-Archive/workingPapers/

batovic.pdf> [accessed March 22 2016]

Batt, Judy, ‘The Question of Serbia’, Challiot Paper no. 81, (2005) <http://

www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp081-English.pdf> [accessed October 20

2015]

Benson, Leslie, Yugoslavia: A Concise History (Palgrave, 2001)

Dyker, David A., and Ivan Vejvoda, Yugoslavia and After (Addison Wesley Long-

man, 1996)

Human Rights Watch, Serb Gang-Rapes in Kosovo Exposed (Human Rights Watch,

2000) <http://www.hrw.org/news/2000/03/20/serb-gang-rapes-kosovo-

exposed> [accessed October 23 2015]

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Press Release

(International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 2007) <http://

www.icty.org/sid/8870> [accessed October 25 2015]

New Internationalist, Weapon of War (New Internationalist, 1993) <http://

newint.org/features/1993/06/05/rape/> [accessed October 19 2015]

Pavlowitch, Stevan K., Serbia: The History behind the Name (London: Hurst &

Company, 2002)

Petritsch, Wolfgang, and Goran Svilanovic. Serbia Matters: Domestic Reforms and

European Integration. (Nomos, 2009)

United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Holocaust Encyclopedia: Jasenovac

(Washington D.C.: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2005) <http://

www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005449> [accessed October 14

2015]


The independent variable of this report is the level of EU immigration to the UK and

the dependent variable is the xenophobic sentiment of UK citizens towards

immigrants. To operationalise, xenophobia is defined as ‘an attitude of hatred or

contempt’ for foreigners1. For the purposes of this article, this definition will be

narrowed and defined as a negative sentiment towards foreigners; shown through

various behaviours associated with anti-immigrant beliefs. This anti-immigrant

sentiment will be measured in two ways: firstly, by studying the vote for

anti-immigrant party, UKIP, and analysing if there has been an increase in their vote

as EU immigration levels increase, and secondly by using survey data from British

participants and studying responses to questions about immigration. By studying the

changes in the responses, the measurement of changes in xenophobia within UK

citizens can be shown as immigration from EU increases.

This article hypothesises that increased levels of EU immigration, specifically from

Eastern Europe since 2004, has increased xenophobic sentiments of UK citizens. This

predominantly based on the notion of British citizens believing that European

immigrants are occupying their jobs. The causal theory is that the increase in

European immigration (IV) has subsequently led to the surplus of skilled labourers in

the market. Industries thus decide to employ Europeans for their qualified skills and

lower costs. Consequently, less skilled British workers are not being employed in

comparison and also view EU workers as stealing British jobs, which is specifically

reinforced by numerous conservative media sources and UKIP. Therefore, British

workers feel they are unable to find jobs because of immigrants and so, xenophobic

sentiment (DV) increases. By measuring the levels of EU immigration, the responses

to questions on immigration and its impact on British jobs; allows us to evaluate how

the IV manipulates the DV and establish if these mechanisms to the causal theory are

valid.

sLincoln Allison, ‘Xenophobia’ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) <http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199207800.001.0001/acref-9780199207800-e-1487?rskey=jQaSI5&result=1581> [accessed 28 November 2015].

BY DANIEL LEWIS QUIRK

This article establishes that there is a

relationship between the increased

levels of EU immigration to the UK

and increasing xenophobic sentiment

of British citizens. It does so by using

data on immigration levels and

comparing these to the votes for

anti-immigrant parties and negative

responses to survey questions on the

subject of immigration from 1994 to

2014. It also goes further by looking at

the regional impact of immigration on

the views of British citizens and how

those variations differ in relation to

different levels of immigration. Data

has been utilised from a variety of

respected sources including the

Plymouth Elections Centre, Migrants

Watch UK, the British Attitudes Survey

and a selection of academic works.

The findings suggest that as

immigration from the EU has

increased in the UK, especially since

2004, and so too has xenophobic

sentiment. This has been

demonstrated by an increase in the

votes for anti-immigrant parties since

2004 and the shift towards negative

responses in surveys on the impact of

immigration on employment. Also

from this research, it can be inferred

that UK regions that have experienced

higher levels of EU immigration

generally hold more negative views on

immigrants. Establishing this

relationship is important with respect

to the contemporary debates

surrounding this issue and upcoming

referendum on Britain’s membership

of the EU, particularly as immigration

is currently one of the most important

issues for British voters.

HAS INCREASED EU IMMIGRATION AFFECTED

LEVELS OF XENOPHOBIA IN THE UK?

Issue 3 (2016) 39

2 Migration Watch UK (2014) <http://www.migrationwatchuk.org/statistics-net-migration-statistics/#create-graph> [accessed 27 November 2015].

The comparisons used in this article are divided into two areas of study: firstly,

the impact of immigration on votes for anti-immigrant parties and secondly, the

impact of immigration on changing negative responses to immigration in surveys.

For the first area, we would expect to see the UKIP vote increase as levels of im-

migration increase after 2004. We should also see a rise in their vote in years of

EU enlargement and subsequent years. The rise in Eastern European immigration

should also show a rise in UKIP’s vote. In the second area of this article, we should

expect to see the negative responses given on immigrants increase after 2004.

We should also see regions in the UK with higher levels of EU immigrants re-

sponding more negatively about the impact immigrants have on employment.

EU immigration and the UKIP vote

By studying Graph 12, it is clear to see that 2004 was the year EU immigration had

increased dramatically compared to its previous years. We also see that in the

same year, a peak of ≤6.8% in UKIP’s local elections vote share. 2006 and 2007

also shows a higher vote for UKIP with sustained high European immigration in

those years. However, the real increase in UKIP’s vote was in 2013 and 2014

when EU immigration increased to unprecedented levels. Although this data can-

not explain the causation, it infers a serious relationship between the increase in

the UKIP vote and the increases in levels of EU immigration. Graph 1 would sug-

gest that the rise in immigration has led to an increase in xenophobia causing a

dramatic increase in the vote for anti-immigrant UKIP, especially since 2004 when

immigration levels surged.


An issue is that the initial data for Table 13 and Graph 1 on UKIP votes was supposed

to be accurate for each year, however data for UKIP as a distinct

group did not begin until 2008 meaning that the data from 1994-2007

is based on results for UKIP listed under ‘other parties’. Therefore the

percentages used were less-than-or-equal-to that stated, however

the vote for UKIP and others in these years was so small that this does

not dramatically affect the data. If the data had existed however, it

would provide more valid information. In terms of application, this

data is useful as it can explain UKIP’s vote increase and demonstrates

that the UK is becoming more xenophobic and so if the media and

politicians were aware of this, they may seek to address it. Further

research on this subject should seek to validate the mechanism of the

role of media and whether it has accelerated the xenophobic

sentiment in the years 2003 to 2014 to further add to this research.

When comparing EU immigration levels from the EU8/EU2 and the rest of the EU

separately to the UKIP vote in contested wards4, we see the influx of Eastern Euro-

pean immigrants is the main driver of the rise of xenophobia. Graph 25 shows that

immigration from the rest of the EU has been mostly stable with moderate increases,

however it is predominantly the increase of migration from Eastern states that has

added dramatically to immigration levels. We can clearly see that the years of 2004,

2011, and 2013 all show a rise in the vote for UKIP and also experienced high levels of

EU8/EU2 immigration. The vote for UKIP had been declining before 2004 but the

subsequent rise in Eastern European immigration would be an evident reason for the

increase in UKIP’s vote. The UKIP vote also surged in 2009, which can be explained

3 The Election Centre Plymouth (n.d) <http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/191861/Plymouth-UKPGE-electoral-data-report-final-WEB.pdf> [accessed 27 November 2015]. 4 Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin, Revolt on the Right: Explaining support for the radical right in Brit-ain (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), p.73. 5 Migration Watch.

Issue 3 (2016) 41

by the two previous years having high immigration levels from the EU8/EU2. From

this it can be concluded that the increase in EU immigration from 2004, brought on

from the Eastern enlargement, has increased the vote for anti-immigrant UKIP and

thus would infer that there has been an increase in the xenophobic sentiment in

Britain.

EU immigration and xenophobic responses to immigration survey

questions

Whilst the previous section suggests strong evidence for a relationship between

increasing EU immigration and rising xenophobia, it does not directly explain the

mechanisms of the causal theory. This section will provide evidence for such

mechanisms. The question in focus can be exemplified in the data collected from

1995, 2003, and 2013 British Social Attitudes Surveys on ‘Immigrants from other

countries living in Britain’. The focus on the impact of immigration on British jobs

will perhaps help to explain the validity of the mechanisms of the causal theory.

Table 46 shows that there has been an increase in the percentage of people who

strongly agree to the question and a decrease in those who disagree, between the

years 2003-2013. The 2003 responses are more positive than those of 2013, which

infers an increase in xenophobic sentiment and that more citizens now believe that

immigrants are occupying British employment. We can therefore infer a shift in the

xenophobic sentiment of British respondents between these years and the reason

for the increase in those who strongly agree in relation to the increase in EU immi-

gration from 2004.

6 British Social Attitudes Survey (2013) <http://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/media/38108/immigration-bsa31.pdf> [accessed 27 November 2015].


Graphs 3, 4 and 57 illustrate the change in responses to the question. It can be

observed that in 2003, 44.8% of respondents agreed with the statement, whereas

this was over half of responses in 2013. Analysis suggests that there has been an

increase in those believing that immigrants are taking British jobs, thus there has

been an increase in xenophobia in UK citizens. The significant increase in ‘strongly

agree’ responses from 12.3% to 18.2% again reinforces this argument. Whilst this

survey may not represent views of the whole population and its sample is relatively

small, this data is still useful in giving us an insight into the changing views of British

citizens towards immigrants. To conclude, the overall responses have seen an

increase in negative sentiment towards immigrants when comparing the 2003 results

to the 2013 ones, and the increase of immigration in 2004 onwards would explain

this change. Therefore, increased EU immigration has increased xenophobia.

To establish whether this increase in xenophobia in the survey responses is due to

the increase in immigration from 2004, we need to compare the regional and

national responses with the populations of EU immigrants within those areas to see if

higher levels of EU immigrants in those areas have led to an increase in the negative

responses.

7 Ibid.

“Analysis suggests that there has been an increase in those believing that immigrants are taking British jobs, thus there has been an increase in

xenophobia in UK citizens.”

Issue 3 (2016) 43

8 Owen Hawkins, House of Commons Library Briefing Paper: Migration Statistics (United Kingdom: House of Commons, 2015) <http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN03845#fullreport> [accessed 27 November, 2015], p.16. 9 Ibid. 10 British Social Attitudes Survey.

Table 58 and Map 19 show that London, the South-East, the East-Midlands and

Eastern England all have the highest percentages of EU immigrants in their

populations. The North-East region has the lowest population percentage. We

therefore should expect to see London, with 12.1% of its population being EU

immigrants, having the most negative responses towards immigrants and the

North-East being more positive or neutral. Additionally, regions that have a higher

percentage of EU nationals in their populations should show more xenophobia

change since 2003 compared to those with the lowest, as they would have felt the

impact of increased immigration more and are perhaps more likely to give

negative responses on the impact of immigration on British jobs.

By studying Table 610, it is evident that there was variation in the responses in

2013. Londoner responses have relatively the lowest ‘agree’ response to the


question on immigrants taking British jobs, this is surprising as its population is 12.1%

EU. This would counter the hypothesis that higher immigration levels lead to

xenophobia. Conversely, London has a history of multiculturalism and there are more

employment opportunities in London than other areas of the UK, perhaps suggesting

there are less negative impacts on locals in relation to immigration than other areas.

London’s history of immigration and employment opportunities means it might view

immigration differently to other areas. However, when looking at the change in

London responses from 2003 to 2013, we still see that the ‘agree’ responses

increased by 7.5%, inferring that immigration still has some xenophobic response in

London. If we look at regions with high percentage populations of Europeans, we see

they have some of the highest increases in the agree response. The East-Midlands

saw a 14.6% increase and the South-East 6.4%. Areas with lower EU immigrant

populations like the West-Midlands saw the ‘agree’ response fall by 4.8%. 2013’s

‘agree’ response standard deviation was 8.82, suggesting regional variations that

should be expected with different immigrant populations, inferring different

numbers of immigrants makes British citizens think differently about immigrant

impacts on jobs causing xenophobia differences. This all strongly suggests that there

is evidence for the mechanism that British people view their jobs are given to

immigrants and thus xenophobia rises.

However, some cases do not fit this trend. Wales with 2.2% of its population being

EU immigrants, much lower than the South-East, saw an increase of 13.4% in those

who agreed in some way that immigrants take British jobs and was the region with

the highest agreement response. This contradicts the hypothesis as xenophobia has

increased in Wales where there are fewer immigrants from the EU than in other

areas. In contrast, further analysis allows us to explain this unusual occurrence as

Wales has economic issues and issues in employment that may also add to

xenophobic sentiment more than other areas that are not experiencing the same

economic difficulties. Therefore, the economic conditions intensify the xenophobic

sentiment in Wales and can therefore explain this phenomenon.

The data from Table 6 mostly suggests that there is an increasing xenophobic

sentiment in the UK, especially in regions where EU immigrant populations are larger.

On the whole, regions with higher EU population percentages have very high agree

response percentages too. The mean change in the agree response from 2003 to

2013 was +5.48 and the mean agree responses in 2013 was over half (51.5%), again

reinforcing the hypothesis by showing that high levels of EU immigration after 2004

has increased the xenophobic sentiment of UK citizens. It also strengthens the

mechanism in this relationship that EU immigrants occupying British jobs have led to

this increase in xenophobia.

.

Issue 3 (2016) 45

Conclusion

The data evidence suggests the hypothesis, that higher EU immigration has

increased xenophobia because of the fear of job loss, is correct. The data on the

vote share of anti-immigrant parties has seen a dramatic increase since 2004. It

shows that xenophobic sentiment has increased since around 2004, when EU

immigration surged in Britain after EU expansion into Eastern Europe. It also

clearly shows periods of high immigration from the EU to the UK through the data

of higher votes for UKIP and other anti-immigrant parties. Findings also suggest

that Eastern European immigration has particularly contributed to increasing

xenophobia in Britain. Thus, it can be concluded from this that there seems to be

significant evidence of a relationship between increasing immigration from the

EU and xenophobia in UK citizens. Additionally, the changes in survey responses

can explain and consolidate this relationship further.

Whilst this comparison between anti-immigrant votes and immigration levels

suggests a relationship, it doesn’t explain why. Survey responses have shown that

the areas of the UK with higher levels of immigrants tend to have higher negative

responses towards immigration and employment and that since 2003, there has

been an increase in the negative response nationally showing xenophobia is on

the rise. Whilst some regions like London do not follow this pattern of high

immigration causing more xenophobic sentiment, these examples have distinct

differences from other areas. Perhaps it is due to their different views on

immigration and can therefore be classified as anomalies. Thus, this not only

allows us to accept the hypothesis but also supports the mechanism that some

British people fear immigrants taking British jobs and this is a reason driving

increased xenophobia as a result of increased immigration.


This research is highly relevant given the current political situation in the UK with

regards to UKIP, the European Union, and immigration. Whilst it is not the sole

reason for UKIP’s success, the surge in UKIP’s popularity in UK politics can be partially

explained as originating from the increasing levels of EU immigration, particularly

from Eastern Europe, since 2004. Furthermore, this research examines how

immigration from the EU has currently affected Britain’s views towards immigrants

and other EU citizens. It can be maintained that the increase in EU immigration has

caused a notable increase in anti-immigrant views among British citizens and this

may have a substantial impact on the way in which some voters will decide in the

upcoming referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU. Therefore, this research

helps us to begin to identify the possible implications of increased EU immigration

and xenophobia in Britain on contemporary British politics.

Bibliography

Allison, Lincoln ‘Xenophobia’ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) <http://

www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199207800.001.0001/acref-

9780199207800-e-1487?rskey=jQaSI5&result=1581> [accessed 28 November 2015]

British Social Attitudes Survey (2013) <http://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/media/38108/

immigration-bsa31.pdf> [accessed 27 November 2015]

Ford, Robert and Matthew Goodwin, Revolt on the Right: Explaining support for the

radical right in Britain (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014)

Hawkins, Owen. House of Commons Library Briefing Paper: Migration Statistics

(United Kingdom: House of Commons, 2015) <http://

researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN03845#fullreport>

[accessed 27 November, 2015]

Migration Watch UK (2014) <http://www.migrationwatchuk.org/statistics-net-

migration-statistics/#create-graph> [accessed 27 November 2015]

The Election Centre Plymouth (n.d) <http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/

__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/191861/Plymouth-UKPGE-electoral-data-report-final-

WEB.pdf> [accessed 27 November 2015]

“It can be maintained that the increase in EU immigration has caused a notable increase in anti-immigrant views among British citizens and this

may have a substantial impact on the way in which some voters will decide in the upcoming referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU.”

Issue 3 (2016) 47

1 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (London: Penguin Group, 1762/1968), p.141. 2 William Maloney, ‘Political Participation Beyond the Electoral Arena’, in Developments in British Politics 8, ed. by Patrick Dunleavy, Richard Heffernan and Philip Cowley (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp.98-116 (p.98). 3 Lucy Lee and Penny Young, ‘A Disengaged Britain? Political Interest and Participation over 30 Years’, in British Social Attitudes 30, ed. by Alison Park and others (London: NatCen Social Research, 2013), pp.62-86 (pp.64, 69). 4 Miranda Phillips and Ian Simpson, ’Disengaged or Disconnected? Trends in Attitudes towards Politics’, in British Social Attitudes 32, ed. by John Curtice and Rachel Ormston (London: NatCen Social Research, 2015), pp.122-145 (p.124).

‘In the brief moments of its freedom, the English people makes such a use of that

freedom that it deserves to lose it’1… For Rousseau the will of the ‘third estate’ or

public interest in England was undermined by the citizens’ lack of political

participation and the representative government’s placing of private interest

before the public good. These words still resonate with the more contemporary

concern about a ‘crisis of participation’ in the UK, which derives from the low

electoral turnouts in the 21st century as well as from the deepening distrust in

politicians to represent the electorate2. In terms of these two variables, electoral

participation and trust in politicians have both dropped significantly since the

1980s and thus, it can be superficially concluded that citizens in Britain are indeed

disengaging from politics3. However, for many modern political scientists, as well

as for Rousseau, political participation means much more than just voting or party

politics. For instance, Phillips and Simpson define political engagement as broadly

as to be ‘any behaviour that involves people either in the political process or in

wider political activity’4. This definition includes in itself a vast variety of political

action from political campaigning, joining pressure groups, and signing petitions

to even discussing politics with friends. Therefore, the validity of the claim that

citizens in Britain are disengaging from politics needs to be assessed more broadly

than only based on electoral participation in order to gain better understanding

of the nature of the presumed British political apathy and, importantly, of the

possible demographic unevenness in levels of political participation.

This article will first look into voting, which is arguably the most visible expression

of political engagement, and the electorate’s falling participation in party politics.

Second, the other less formal ways of participation will be explored to highlight

the difference between the public’s interest in politics and disinterest in party

politics. Finally, the important question of who actually participates in the society

will be examined. It will be argued that, rather than disengaging from politics, the

British public has become disillusioned with the formal political establishment,

and, while those with civic skills and other resources have been able to resort to

other means to accompany their electoral voice, those with fewer resources have

found it increasingly meaningless to participate for the time being. In other

words, the distinction between disengagement and disillusionment allows us to

understand the crisis of electoral participation against a larger background, where

interest in informal participatory politics still remains. It is also important to

realise the disparity in the participation rates of the opposite ends of the society,

which can potentially have consequences on the functioning of democracy, as

BY OTTO ILVESKERO

Based on the historically low

turnouts of the recent general

elections, the public’s falling

identification with political

parties, and the decreasing sense

of civic duty, it could be

superficially argued that British

voters are disengaging from

politics. However, this essay

argues that the picture is not as

simple as it might seem. Based on

the most recent British Social

Attitudes survey and Audit of

Political Engagement, it can be

seen that rather than

permanently disengaging from

politics, the electorate has

become gradually disillusioned

with the formal political

establishment, and while those

with civic skills and material

resources have been able to

resort to other means to

accompany their electoral voice,

the less well educated have found

it increasingly meaningless to

participate for the time being.

DISENGAGED OR DISLLUSIONED?

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN BRITAIN

TODAY


those at the bottom become increasingly apathetic and put off by the political

establishment.

Disengagement: Falling turnout and party identification

Electoral participation is required in a representative democracy for the state to

remain legitimate and effective5. In Britain, the 2001 general election saw only 59.8%

of the voters make their way to the ballot box on the election day, marking the

lowest level of electoral turnout since 19186. This 12-point crash from the 1997

general election followed the record low turnouts of the 1999 European Parliament

election and the 1998-2000 local elections7. According to Bromley and Curtice, this

period marked a change in the study of elections in the UK from why do people vote

for certain parties to why do some people not vote at all8. Certainly, electoral

participation has run counter to the cognitive engagement model, which claims that

people’s political participation increases with their increased ability to access and

process information. However, despite the constantly growing levels of education

and increased availability of information throughout the new millennium, turnout has

remained lower than any time since 19229. To explain this historical low, scholars

have often used the changes in party identification and perceptions of voting as a

civic duty as indicators.

First, the number of people who identify either “very” or “fairly” strongly with a party

has dropped from 46% in 1987 to 37% in 201410. Even more importantly, the number

of those who do not claim a party identification at all has more than doubled from

8% in 1987 to 19% in 201411. What makes this especially significant is that according

to Whiteley, the portion of the public with a strong party identification is over two

and a half times more likely to vote than those with no party alignment12. This

development has also had an effect on the levels of other forms of formal, party

politics related, participation. For instance, party membership has declined from the

already low numbers between 7% and 9% in the 1980s to a mere 1% of the public13.

In some surveys these numbers are likely to be exaggerated, however, as the section

of the electorate that frequently responds to political surveys is more likely to be

interested in politics and thus more politically aware and active14.

5 Paul Whiteley, Political Participation in Britain: The Decline and Revival of Civic Culture (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p.9. 6 Catherine Bromley, John Curtice and Ben Seyd, ‘Political Engagement, Trust and Constitutional Reform’, in British Social Attitudes 18: Public Policy, Social Ties, ed. by Alison Park, John Curtice and Katarina Thomson (London: SAGE Publications, 2001), pp.199-225 (p.200). 7 Ibid., p.200. 8 Catherine Bromley and John Curtice, ‘Where Have All the Voters Gone?’ in British Social Attitudes 19, ed. by Alison Park, John Curtice and Katarina Thomson (London: SAGE Publications, 2002), pp.141-167 (p.141). 9 Charles Pattie, Patrick Seyd and Paul Whiteley, Citizenship in Britain: Values, Participation and Democ-racy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp.138-140; Phillips and Simpson, p.125. 10 Phillips and Simpson, p.136. 11 Ibid., p.136. 12 Whiteley, p.46. 13 Russell J. Dalton, Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 5th edn (Thousand Oaks: CQ Press, 2008), p.42; Phillips and Simpson, p.125. 14 Phillips and Simpson, p.125; Catherine Bromley and John Curtice, ‘Are Non-Voters Cynics Anyway?’ Journal of Public Affairs, 4 (2004), 328-337 (p.333).

“Despite the constantly growing levels of education and increased availability of information throughout the new millennium, turnout has

remained lower than any time since 1922”

Issue 3 (2016) 49

15 Hansard Society, Audit of Political Engagement 12 (London: Hansard Society, 2015), p.26. 16 Phillips and Simpson, p. 137. 17 Ibid., p.138. 18 Electoral Commission, The May 2015 UK Elections (London: Electoral Commission, 2015) <http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/190959/UKPGE-report-May-2015-1.pdf> [accessed 28 January 2016] (p. 12). 19 Oliver Hawkins, Vaughne Miller and Jeremy Hardacre, Commons Briefing Paper RP14-32 (London: House of Commons Library, 2014), p.44. 20 Hansard Society, p.7. 21 Ibid., p.12. 22 Bromley and Curtice (2002), p.153.

Second, whether voters still see the act of voting as a duty marking a ‘good

citizen’ has also been used to explain the drop in turnout. This sense of civic duty

matters because it is frequently reported to be the top reason for peoples

participation15. What can be seen is that there has been a steady decrease in the

past thirty years from the three-quarter of participants who believed it is

everyone’s duty to vote in 1987 to 57% in 201316. Additionally, the number of

people who say voting is not worth the costs has grown around five times higher

during the same time period17. Thus, based on these indicators it could be quickly

concluded that the British public is gradually disengaging from electoral politics.

However, although voting has evidently been lower in the last fifteen years than

at any point since the early interwar period, it has gradually increased since 2001,

reaching a turnout of 66.4% in the 2015 general election18.

Similarly, turnout in the European elections has returned to above 30% from the

record low in 1999. In fact, the following 2004 European elections marked the

highest UK turnout on record at 39%19. This development has not been mirrored

by an increase in the sense of civic duty, nor was there a sudden drop in the

perceptions of voting as a civic duty between 1997 and 2001 that would directly

explain the sudden drop in turnout between those elections. Importantly, the

majority of Britons still view voting as their civic duty, while 61% agree that

Parliament remains necessary to British democracy20. Likewise, the public’s

claimed likelihood to vote has not significantly changed in the past decade, which

is still the stance held by 69% of the population21. These aspects go to suggest

that the contemporary low in turnouts might only be a temporary setback in the

political engagement of the British public.

Disillusionment: Interested in politics, uninterested in party

politics

If voting and the parliament are still desirable overall in the eyes of the public,

there must be something else that continues to disengage, at least temporarily,

so many of those who are registered to vote from electoral politics. Bromley and

Curtice suggest that the perceived similarity of the parties and the closeness of

the race in the run up to the elections are factors to be considered when studying

the public’s disengagement. The scholars state that the electorate’s motivation to

vote in 2001 was reduced by the lack of stimulus to those with weak party

identification and a weak sense of civic duty, meaning that more voters had not

suddenly become disengaged but that a larger proportion of those who were al-

ready distanced from the system were not interested enough to vote due to the

similarity of the main parties and the unexciting race22. Their evidence shows that

between 1997 and 2001 the levels of turnout and perceived lack of variety

between the large parties changed considerably more among those with weak

sense of civic duty and party identification compared to those with stronger ties


to the political system23.

Since 2001, when Labour led on average by 14% in the final week polls, turnouts have

risen in the subsequent elections as the polls have been closer, with the Conservative

lead in 2010 being 7% and only 1% in the famously misleading polls of 2015, which

further strengthens the two scholars’ argument24. In addition, although still

remaining low, the perceived difference of the two main parties has increased after

the 2005 elections25. Thus, it is important to understand that in the midst of this

decrease in the sense of civic duty and party identification, that if provided with

sufficient stimulus, even those who are currently perceived as being disengaged from

politics could make their return to the ballot box. Here, it seems that the British

voters are increasingly disillusioned with party politics, to which they perceive as dull

and not sufficiently matching their views rather than permanently disengaged from

it. Moreover, this disillusionment with party politics can also be seen in the public’s

confidence in the political system. For example, the levels of system efficacy, or how

responsive people view the political system to be to their demands, have remained

low since they dipped in the mid-1990s, while trust in politicians had in politicians

had in 2013 (17%) fallen to less than half of what it had been in 1987 (38%)26.

Additionally, nearly seven in ten Britons agree that the system is in need of

improvement27. Interestingly, there is no evidence that the overall levels of social

trust or even trust in other public entities such as the police, would have decreased

over the same period of time. This rules out the structural explanation of Putnam’s

social capital model that assumes a link between social and political trust28. Based on

this, scholars such as Dalton have suggested that the public has turned to less

traditional ways of participation, such as political consumerism (e.g. product boycotts

and buying fair trade) and protests, because they feel that the political system

inadequately responds to their needs29.

Certainly, as system efficacy has decreased, a rise in people’s personal efficacy, or the

public’s confidence in their own ability to have a say in how the state is run, has been

identified30. Dalton explains this development by using the cognitive engagement

model, stating that the better-educated and self-mobilised individuals favour

referendums over elections and communal activities over campaign work31. Perhaps

the 85% turnout in the Scottish independence referendum, as well as the evidence

that a membership of voluntary associations is more common than a being part of a

political party, could give some basis to this theory 32. Also, the public is no less

engaged in politics than before when it comes to the low-level everyday engagement

23 Ibid., p.154.

24 Ipsos MORI, Final Polls in the 2001 General Election (London: Ipsos MORI, 2001) <https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/poll.aspx?oItemId=1257> [accessed 28 January 2016]; Ipsos MORI, Final Election Poll (London: Ipsos MORI, 2010) <https://www.ipsos-mori.com/Assets/Docs/Polls/final-voting-intention-topline-election-2010.pdf> [accessed 28 January 2016] (p. 1); Ipsos MORI, Final Election Poll (London: Ipsos MORI, 2015) <https://www.ipsos-mori.com/Assets/Docs/Polls/GE2015_final_poll_topline3.pdf> [accessed 28 January 2016] (p.1). 25 John Curtice, ‘Bridging the Gulf? Britain’s Democracy after the 2010 Election’, in British Social Attitudes 28, ed. by Alison Park, Elizabeth Clery, John Curtice, Miranda Phillips and David Utting (London: NatCen Social Research, 2012), pp.1-20 (p.8). 26 Lee and Young, p.70; Phillips and Simpson, p.135-6. 27 Hansard Society, p.7. 28 Bromley, Curtice and Seyd, p.218-9. 29 Dalton, p.54-5. 30 Lee and Young, p.71. 31 Dalton, p.54. 32 Hansard Society, p.18.

Issue 3 (2016) 51

33 Phillips and Simpson, p.127-30. 34 Bromley, Curtice and Seyd, p.202. 35 John Curtice and Ben Seyd, ‘Is There a Crisis of Political Participation’, in British Social Attitudes 20: Continuity and Change over Two Decades, ed. Alison Park, John Curtice, Katarina Thomson, Lindsey Jarvis and Catherine Bromley (London: SAGE Publications, 2003), pp.93-107 (p.94). 36 Hansard Society, p.26.

such as following political news or discussing politics, nor are they significantly

less interested in politics than in the past33. Therefore, at a glance, this would

seem to imply that, as the public has grown more dissatisfied with the political

system, the disillusioned have turned to other forms of participation in order to

voice their opinion.

Unequal participation: A class division

Bromley, Curtice and Seyd explain that those who are involved in other forms of

political engagement tend to be the same people as those who vote in

elections34. What this means is that there seems to be a divide between those

who try to maximise their influence by participating in a variety of ways and those

who are disillusioned and thus, do not participate at all. Curtice and Seyd further

discuss less formal ways of engagement as an ‘add-on’ to electoral participation

and distinguish between well-educated ‘super activists’ and less educated

non-participants as the opposite sides of the engagement scale35. Citizens with at

least an undergraduate degree are twice as likely to claim that they understand

politics than those with no formal qualifications, which can also explain their

willingness to participate more in political activities, such as contacting an MP,

which can assumed to require a fair amount of political knowledge and

communication skills36.


The most recent British Social Attitudes survey goes to show that these activists

prefer low cost individual activities, such as signing a petition or boycotting a

product, to high cost collective actions, such as protests37. This is highlighted by the

findings that two-thirds of Britons report having signed a petition and just over a

third claims to have taken part in political consumerism, while the proportion of

people who have taken part in a demonstration still remains below 20%38.

Furthermore, the most recent Audit of Political Engagement found that slightly over

50% of Britons reported having not taken part in any of the forms of participation in

the last twelve-month period39. The survey even reported slight decreases in the

levels of participation in most of the categories of participation, but this might only

be a temporary drop. Thus, while ‘chequebook participation’, meaning being involved

in political movements by donating, and signing petitions seem to be popular options

within the public for raising an opinion outside the formal realm of participation, it

should be understood that these are tools of those well-educated citizens who feel

like the government is not responsive enough to their demands and thus try to

maximise their own voice40. This means that there is a threat that the less well

educated will become increasingly voiceless, because, apart from voting, the

difference in political engagement between people with different levels of education

is clearly tilted towards those with at least an undergraduate degree.

Lastly, while education is clearly an important element of political engagement, this

perceived gap in engagement seems to be created by the distribution of other

resources as well. The civic voluntarism model of participation assumes that these

resources, such as time and money, are a product of social structures that stem from

factors such as education and upbringing. Survey evidence shows that those who

have taken part in five or more political actions, the ‘super activists’, are much more

likely to be well earning, professional workers with a higher education degree41.

Interestingly, and as mentioned above, these educated upper-middle-class citizens

are mainly the same people who are also more likely to vote in the elections42. Then,

on the opposite side of the engagement spectrum lie manual workers and young

people. Only 16% of young Britons today claimed that they were certain to vote

before the 2015 elections, which is well below the national average of the certainty

to vote (49%). While those in social grades C2DE – consisting of the skilled and

unskilled working classes as well as the lowest, non-working class – have a

significantly lower level of personal efficacy (12%) than the upper social classes

(21%)43. However, young people’s lack of participation is nothing new, as they have

always been the demographic least likely to be interested in politics or to have a

strong sense of civic duty44. Although there is nothing to say that young people could

not get more involved as they reach middle age, the disillusioned, less educated

citizens in lower income occupations are being trampled in the social status hierarchy

as income inequality and average levels of education increase. This in turn lowers the

relative social status of these people, which is likely to diminish their involvement in

the society45.

37 Phillips and Simpson, p.127. 38 Phillips and Simpson, p.127. 39 Hansard Society, p.30. 40 Maloney, p.106, 109-111. 41 Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, p.94. 42 David Denver, Christopher Carman and Robert Johns, Elections and Voters in Britain (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 43 Hansard Society, pp.6, 37. 44 Bromley and Curtice, p.160. 45 Whiteley, p.48-9.

Issue 3 (2016) 53

46 Hansard Society, p.34. 47 Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, p.147-9.

Accordingly, the lower classes are clearly less interested in politics as well as less

satisfied with the current political system than grades ABC1, meaning the upper,

middle and lower middle classes46. Also, the way in which all political participation

is mostly the realm of those with the resources goes clearly against the

equity-fairness theory of participation, or the relative deprivation model, which

understands participation as being a consequence of an individual’s perception of

an unjust lack of resources in comparison to other groups47. Therefore, it can be

seen that, while high-income professionals are still participating in the political

system, the citizens with fewer resources are at risk of becoming even quieter and

more apathetic than they already are.

Conclusion

Based on the evidence, it can be argued that the British citizens are not

disengaging from politics, but that they are disillusioned with it instead. Moreover,

this disillusionment is mainly contained in party politics, as although the measures

considering formal political participation might give validity to the statement that

the public does not make the best out of its freedom to participate, the electorate

overall is practically no less interested in politics or engaged in the less visible

forms of it than in the past. There is, however, a distinctive demographic

unevenness in the levels of participation when it comes to the forms of political

activity outside party politics, where those with the most resources utilise all the

means available to maximise their political input and those with the least

resources are discouraged from participating at all. While the British public might

not deserve to lose its freedom to participate, those with fewer resources and ties

to the political system who are increasingly more disillusioned may feel that

freedom to participate in politics is simply not worth the costs. Rather than

becoming permanently disengaged from politics, they choose to stay home for

now because they receive fewer incentives and are not encouraged to join with

their perceived unresponsive political system, to which they feel, does not care

about them. Perhaps these citizens feel that the political system is disengaging

from them rather than the other way around.


Bibliography

Bromley, Catherine, John Curtice and Ben Seyd, 'Political Engagement, Trust and Con-

stitutional Reform’, in British Social Attitudes 18: Public Policy, Social Ties, ed. by Al-

ison Park, John Curtice and Katarina Thomson (London: SAGE Publications, 2001), pp.

199-225

Bromley, Catherine and John Curtice, ‘Where Have All the Voters Gone?’ in British

Social Attitudes: 19th Report, ed. by Alison Park, John Curtice and Katarina Thomson

(London: SAGE Publications, 2002), pp. 141-167

Bromley, Catherine and John Curtice, ‘Are Non-Voters Cynics Anyway?’ Journal of

Public Affairs 4 (2004), 328-337

Curtice, John and Ben Seyd, ‘Is There a Crisis of Political Participation’, in British Social

Attitudes 20: Continuity and Change over Two Decades, ed. by Alison Park, John Cur-

tice, Katarina Thomson, Lindsey Jarvis and Catherine Bromley (London: SAGE Publica-

tions, 2003), pp. 93-107

Dalton, Russell J., Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced In-

dustrial Democracies, 5th edn (Thousand Oaks: CQ Press, 2008)

Denver, David, Christopher Carman and Robert Johns, Elections and Voters in

Britain (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012)

Electoral Commission, The May 2015 UK Elections (London: Electoral Commission,

2 0 1 5 ) < h t t p : / / w w w . e l e c t o r a l c o m m i s s i o n . o r g . u k / _ _ d a t a / a s s e t s /

pdf_file/0006/190959/UKPGE-report-May-2015-1.pdf> [accessed 28 January 2016]

Hansard Society, Audit of Political Engagement 12 (London: Hansard Society, 2015)

Hawkins, Oliver, Vaughne Miller and Jeremy Hardacre, Commons Briefing Papers

RP14-32 (London: House of Commons Library, 2014)

Ipsos MORI, Final Polls in the 2001 General Elections (London: Ipsos MORI, 2001)

<https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/poll.aspx?

oItemId=1257> [accessed 28 January 2016]

Ipsos MORI, Final Election Poll (London: Ipsos MORI, 2010) <https://www.ipsos-mori.com/Assets/Docs/Polls/final-voting-intention-topline-election-2010.pdf> [accessed 28 January 2016] Ipsos MORI, Final Election Poll (London: Ipsos MORI, 2015) <https://www.ipsos-mori.com/Assets/Docs/Polls/GE2015_final_poll_topline3.pdf> [accessed 28 January 2016]

Lee, Lucy and Penny Young, ‘A Disengaged Britain? Political Interest and Participation

over 30 years’, in British Social Attitudes 30, ed. by Alison Park, Caroline Bryson, Eliza-

beth Clery, John Curtice and Miranda Phillips (London: NatCen Social Research,

2013), pp. 62-86

Issue 3 (2016) 55

Maloney, William, ‘Political Participation Beyond the Electoral Arena’, in Develop-

ments in British Politics 8, ed. by Partick Dunleavy, Richard Heffernan and Philip

Cowley (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 98-116

Pattie, Charles; Patrick Seyd and Paul Whiteley, Citizenship in Britain: Values,

Participation and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004)

Phillips, Miranda and Ian Simpson, ‘Disengaged and Disconnected? Trends in

Attitudes towards Politics’, British Social Attitudes 32, ed. by John Curtice and

Rachel Ormston (London: NatCen Social Research, 2015), pp. 122-145

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, The Social Contract (London: Penguin Group, 1762/1968)

Whiteley, Paul, Political Participation in Britain: The Decline and Revival of Civic

Culture (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012)


1Tod Moore, ‘Violations of Sovereignty and Regime Engineering: A Critique of the State Theory

of Stephen Krasner’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 44 (2009), pp.497-511 (p.499). 2 William Bain, ‘The Political Theory of Trusteeship and the Twilight of International Equality’, International Relations, 17 (2003), pp.59-77 (p.68). 3 Stephen Krasner, ‘Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States’, International Security, 29 (2004), pp.85-120 (p.85).

TO WHAT EXTENT DOES

NEO-TRUSTEESHIP IMPACT ON STATE

SOVERIEGNTY?

BY KAY BINDER

This article seeks to analyse the

relationship between the UN

state-building approach of

neo-trusteeship and

state-sovereignty in order to

evaluate the consequences the

former has on the latter. By first

evaluating differing academic

approaches to sovereignty to

form an operational definition,

analysis on sovereignty in relation

to neo-trusteeship will outline the

compromising relationship

between the two. This article will

also demonstrate the effects of

neo-trusteeship with the case

studies of East-Timor and Kosovo

in order to determine to what

extent the approach threatened

their sovereignty. Ultimately,

neo-trusteeship poses a threat to

orthodox sovereignty; however,

when considering a deconstructed

concept of the term, it is

suggestible that one type of

sovereignty must be

compromised in order to build

upon another.

The concept of sovereignty can be found at the heart of many political debates

concerning when and why states should exercise power, often relating to issues of

territory and ethnic or cultural conflicts. This article engages with the controversy

regarding sovereignty in relation to neo-trusteeship, a policy instrument utilised by

the United Nations (UN) and state actors to intrusively aid countries in which

conflict and government failure are endemic. The question of whether or not

neo-trusteeship is a threat to sovereignty is relevant today as we witness the

evolution of state security threats with ever increasing globalisation and

interconnectedness between countries. This article discusses the concepts of

trusteeship and neo-trusteeship in order to determine the fundamental

characteristics of each approach to state intervention with regards to sovereignty

and infringement on the state.

By focusing on the decline of trusteeship and the assumed need for its revival in a

new form, the role and potential threat of neo-trusteeship in today’s

post-imperialist world will be assessed. Before this, I will explore the concept of

sovereignty in order to develop an understanding of the autonomy of states in the

international sphere and what significance the inherent sovereignty of a state has

when faced with interior political chaos. Finally, the essay will objectively evaluate

the threat neo-trusteeship poses to the sovereignty of UN member states by

assessing the success of past interventions, before concluding that although

neo-trusteeship fundamentally infringes upon and threatens a traditional concept

of sovereignty, the initiation of neo-trustee policy is often warranted by desperate

and otherwise uncontrollable circumstances to build the domestic sovereignty of

failed states.

Sovereignty In order to evaluate the threat posed by neo-trusteeship to the autonomy of a

state, it is necessary to analyse the somewhat ambiguous concept of sovereignty.

The original idea of sovereignty was espoused by Jean Bodin in 1576 and has been

defined in a variety of ways in academic literature since1. The traditional orthodoxy

of state sovereignty is most widely associated with its unwavering commitment to

non-intervention in other states2. This definition posits that no foreign actor has

the right to interfere or have a direct influence in the domestic politics of an

independent and sovereign state. As put by Krasner,

the fundamental rules of this definition of sovereignty

are: ‘recognition of juridically independent territorial

entities and non-intervention in the internal affairs

of other states’3. It is this type of integral state

sovereignty, which dictates the basic requirement

to let states be totally independent and in control

of their own interior political state of affairs.

Another perspective is to divide this conventional

approach to sovereignty into three different elements:

international legal sovereignty, Westphalian

sovereignty, and domestic sovereignty. International

Issue 3 (2016) 57

legal sovereignty refers to the recognition of ‘juridically independent territorial

entities’ that have the right decide to enter into treaties or agreements4. Westphalian

sovereignty decrees the rule of refraining from ‘intervening in the internal affairs of

other states’, which most resembles the form of sovereignty explained previously5.

Finally, domestic sovereignty describes the ‘nature of domestic authority structures’

and to what extent they are able to control actions within a country’s borders6. With

this approach Krasner aims to overcome the flawed, yet unchallenged, principles of

orthodox sovereignty by interpreting the need to separate internal sovereignty from

external sovereignty and seeing how these differing theoretical components can be

compromised by another7. For example, due to a determined effort to not threaten

Westphalian sovereignty of states, such as the failed states of Somalia and Rwanda, a

moral obligation to protect was disregarded despite high levels of human suffering.

This raises the normative question of which type of sovereignty is important to

uphold, and under what circumstances. With these questions in mind, we can look at

the different forms of trusteeship, which have evolved over time and evaluate their

ability to mitigate these threats that the competing notions of sovereignty have

highlighted.

‘Old trusteeship’ and ‘new trusteeship’ Extending from this understanding of sovereignty, we can begin to evaluate

neo-trusteeship as a threat, but we must first define the approach of trusteeship and

explore its formation and decline. In its simplest form trusteeship ‘presupposes a

relationship in which a natural person or a legal person is responsible for the well

being of persons who are incapable of acting for themselves’8. With regards to

international relations, the role of foreign governance in trust territories was

legitimised by the assumed need that after the Second World War, certain states

needed trusteeship to develop a greater capacity of national administration and

governance. It was also under this former doctrine of the need to manage

populations who were incapable of managing themselves, in which European colonial

powers vindicated their ‘civilizing missions’ throughout Africa and Asia9.

Unlike neo-trusteeship, the former strategy of trustee states was not to rebuild

administrations and government and exit as soon as possible, but to dominate

weaker states with colonial policies and utilise them for political gains on the global,

political stage. Kwame Nkrumah espoused this line of thinking, in that trusteeship

was merely thinly disguised support of ‘deception, hypocrisy, oppression, and

exploitation’10. This point is exemplified by the rapid decline of trusteeship during the

era of anti-colonialism and decolonization in trustee territories. During this era of an

increased political apathy towards foreign actor intervention within domestic politics,

countries under colonial rule were faced with populations fighting for independence

whilst embracing revolutionary ideas of self-determination and sovereign national

identity.

Considering the somewhat sudden deterioration of trusteeship, it is surprising that

since the 1990s there have been signs of the revival of this foreign policy strategy in a

new and developed form. An explanation for this revival is offered by Lyon, who

suggests that this remitting of trusteeship is closely linked with plans ‘for the future

revitalisation of the United Nations and other international organisations’, thus

4 Ibid., p.87. 5 Ibid., p.87. 6 Ibid., p.88. 7 Stephen Krasner, ‘Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States’, International Security, 29(2004), pp.85-120 (p.85). 8 Bain, p.59. 9 Rob Jenkins, ‘Collateral Benefit Iraq and Increased Legitimacy for International Trusteeship’, Dissent, 53(2006), (pp.72-75). 10 Kwame Nkrumah, Towards Colonial Freedom: Africa and the Struggle Against World Imperialism (London: Heinemann, 1962), p.35.


11 Peter Lyon, ‘The Rise and Fall and Possible Revival of International Trusteeship’, The Jour-nal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 31(1993), pp.96-110 (p.96). 12 James Fearon and David Laitin, ‘Neo-trusteeship and the Problem of Weak States’, Interna-tional Security, 28(2004), pp.5-43 (p.11). 13 David Lake and Christopher Fariss, ‘Why International Trusteeship Fails: The Politics of Ex-ternal Authority in Areas of Limited Statehood’, Governance, 27(2014), (pp. 571-572). 14 Fearon and Laitin, p. 6. 15 Kofi Annan, Two concepts of sovereignty (The Economist: International, 1999) <http://www.economist.com/node/324795> [accessed 3 March 2015].

theorising the future growth of the involvement of the UN in global affairs11.

Unlike its predecessor, neo-trusteeship involves a largely multilateral approach to

rebuilding failed states which includes the potential involvement of international

and regional organisations, states, NGOs and corporations; therefore the UN has

the ability to play a role in the legitimisation of state intervention, but is not

exclusive in its ability to partake in such action12. The rise of international

organisation de-legitimised the world order dominated by state empires, and neo

-trusteeship was adopted as a means to manage newly independent states as

they were introduced into the global, political arena. A defining feature that

separates trusteeship from neo-trusteeship is that the latter does not assume

that sovereignty of the state is completely withdrawn, but rather suspended until

a stable state has been fully formed13. There is still however the suggestion that

although trusteeship flouts all principles of self-determination and state

sovereignty, neo-trusteeship poses a notable threat to the state sovereignty of

UN member states as UN actors intervene within their borders, despite the

rationally justified intentions used to validate such action.

Neo-trusteeship as a threat to the sovereignty of UN member

states So far, this article has explored the differing concepts of sovereignty and

neo-trusteeship as separate ideas. It is now necessary to evaluate the relationship

they have with each other and the effects of this relationship within specific

neo-trustee states in order to measure to what extent neo-trusteeship threatens

sovereignty. The developing threats of ‘political disorder, misrule and humiliation

in the Third World’14 prompt the argument that the UN and major power

interveners must play an active role in restoring peace and structuring

administrations within such states, not only for their benefit, but to also alleviate

potential threats posed to other countries. These new global threats of

globalisation and the broadening of international co-operation have shaped the

Issue 3 (2016) 59

redefining of state sovereignty. Consequently, the relationship between the UN and

its member states has shifted, as its role to protect has never been as relevant.

Contrary to the anterior ideas of people being the instruments of their state, the

roles have been reversed15. It is in parallel to this, that the augment arises in relation

to the sovereignty of people, and powerful external actors should guarantee their

ultimate protection from threats posed by their own state. UN protection of states

through neo-trusteeship not only has the potential to benefit failing states on a

national scale, but prevent the consequences of national crises having a directly

negative effect at an international level.

However, despite the convincing arguments for the need of the revival of neo-trustee

systems, in academic literature there is little argument to suggest that neo-

trusteeship and sovereignty can co-exist without one or the other being

compromised. Moore definitively concludes that it is only local actors who can ‘act in

a sovereign way… [Who] have to be given every chance to construct… their own

regimes and institutions without external coercion’16. The right of nations to

self-determination enshrined in the UN Charter and described by Lenin as embodying

‘political self-determination, state independence, and the formation of a national

state’ unveils the paradox of the UN system of neo-trusteeship as it undermines the

self-determination it aims to advance17. Nevertheless, these arguments fail to take

into account any historical examples of what happens, or has the potential to

happen, if war torn states without a functional administrative system are essentially

left to their own devices for the sake of protecting orthodox sovereignty and their

right to act independently of third parties. If a state is a member of the UN, it must

do what is necessary to preserve its domestic sovereignty by building a state

authority with the means to control affairs within its borders in order to best protect

the individual rights of its citizens, even if this means allowing a neo-trusteeship

system to compromise the aforementioned Westphalian notion of sovereignty.

Furthermore, it is easy to attack the concept of sovereignty which subordinates state

intervention to the right to self-determination if we reflect on the humanitarian

disasters which followed the end of the Cold War in Somalia, Rwanda and Yugoslavia,

as they highlight what states can inflict on their populations if they have no authority

able to control or influence them. Historical evidence affirms that the principle of non

-intervention embodied in Article 51 of the UN Charter has been held up ‘too well’ if

we refer to the Rwandan Genocide the Security Council failed to prevent18. Kofi

Annan, the former Secretary-General of the UN, further challenged this concept by

describing the UN Charter as a means of protecting ‘the sovereignty of peoples’ as it

was ‘never meant as a licence for governments to trample on human rights and

human dignity’. Notably, he also specified that ‘sovereignty implies responsibility’,

evidently suggesting that unless a state utilises its interior powers to responsibly

empower and protect its populace, then it is itself breaching its own sovereignty19. If

we adopt this line of thinking, we can expand the argument that neo-trusteeship

does not threaten the sovereignty of the state if this sovereignty has been already

marginalised by the state in question. By allowing neo-trusteeship to build authority

structures within a state, and therefore consequently enhancing domestic sover-

eignty, intervening powers redevelop the Westphalian sovereignty that was initially

breached. Moreover, the UN and multilateral actors should never risk disasters such

as genocide and widespread conflict in order to uphold such a restrictive concept, as

intervention and invasion are far from being synonymous.

16 Moore, p.507. 17 Vladimir Lenin, The Right of Nations to Self-Determination (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972) <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/self-det/> [accessed 14 March 2015]. 19 Kofi Annan, Secretary-General Reflects on “Intervention” in Thirty-Fifth Annual Ditchley Foun-dation Lecture, (New York: United Nations, 1998) <http://www.un.org/press/en/1998/19980626.sgsm6613.html> [accessed 6 March 2015]


20 Richard Caplan, ‘From Collapsing States to Neo-Trusteeship: The Limits to Solving the Prob-lem of ‘Precarious Statehood’ in the 21st Century’, Third World Quarterly, 28 (2007), pp. 231-244 (p. 231-233). 21 Elisabeth Schleicher, Positive peace in Kosovo: A dream unfulfilled (Berlin: Peter Lang, 2012), p.2. 22 Lise Morjé Howard, ‘Neotrusteeship, Neighbors, and the United Nations’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 656 (2014), pp.116-135 (p.117). 23 Howard, p. 121. 24 Ulrich Preuss, States of Sovereignty: The future of Kosovo, international law and second-class statehood (UK: Rethinking Global Order, 2007) <https://ip-journal.dgap.org/en/article/getFullPDF/20703> [accessed 12 March 2015].

Nevertheless, this is not to say that neo-trusteeship

has always been successful in restoring or

rebuilding the collapsed political systems of newly

independent states. To best highlight how

neo-trusteeship can function with varying success in

different countries, I will now draw upon evidence

from two states that have been subject to neo-trustee

systems.

The cases of Kosovo and East Timor The cases of Kosovo and East Timor are useful to

study in order to gauge how successful

neo-trusteeship has been in rebuilding territories

divided by violent conflict, as the visible results of

each intervention are remarkably different. Despite

the two states being comparatively similar in many

aspects, since international territorial administrations

were initiated in 1999 it has been clear that East Timor

has largely benefitted from the intrusive neo-trusteeship systems in which foreign

international actors took control of the basic functions of each state, as opposed to

Kosovo where the situation is little improved since gaining independence20.

Schleicher concisely concludes that whilst international organisations have managed

to successfully improve security, economic and social issues; the Kosovo is ‘still

calamitous’ where unemployment and poverty are its ‘most intractable problems’21.

Thus, highlighting that regardless of Kosovo receiving triple the amount of

international aid ($14 billion in total) and having experienced a longer and

deeper-rooted neo-trusteeship intervention, it has not reaped any significant

benefits22. The reasons for this apparent failure can be attributed to several different

characteristics of Kosovo, such as the distinct ethnic conflicts that ultimately

fractured the state. However, the manner in which neo-trusteeship was enacted had

a direct causal effect on its ultimate failure.

Unlike East-Timor, the intervention in Kosovo was enacted without international

consensus, clear legal authority and was not delivered in a single, uncomplicated

form23. It is commonly theorised that neo-trusteeship can only be successful if the

enacting powers are unanimous in their planned strategies and have achieved a

consensus on the international stage alongside backing from the UN, which in turn

legitimises any action taken. Taking this into account, we can posit that the

legitimacy of the intervention in Kosovo was questionable and therefore the posed

threat to sovereignty was not fully justified. In addition to this, the approach used in

Kosovo undermined any achievable aims by investing in the idea that sovereignty

could be introduced gradually to the state despite the ‘orthodoxy of sovereign

equality’ which assumes that it is not possible for a state to exist in a

‘semi-autonomous’ entity. Furthermore, nowhere in the plan for the neo-trusteeship

system in Kosovo laid out by UN Secretary General Ahtisaari ‘is the legal status of

Kosovo’s future explicitly stated’24. For these reasons we can causally link the failing

Issue 3 (2016) 61

of neo-trusteeship policy to the consequent failings of Kosovo to be internationally

recognised as an independent, sovereign state. Conversely, it was the UN that led all

aspects of the foreign assistance in East Timor and the mission demonstrated a clear

authority structure with UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)

acting as the sole sovereign authority25. Despite limitations to both cases, Kosovo and

East Timor illustrate the necessity to take into account how best to manage

neo-trusteeship in a way that initially undermines sovereignty, but has the ultimate

and feasible aim of reinstating sovereignty to a newly self-determined and

independent state.

Conclusions

This article has interpreted the fundamental differences between trusteeship and

neo-trusteeship in order to determine to what extent the former policy model is a

threat to member states of the UN. First by evaluation of different approaches to

sovereignty adopted by academics to best form an operational conceptualisation of

the idea, then through assessment of sovereignty in relation to neo-trusteeship and

the compromising relationship between the two. This was demonstrated by the two

contrasting cases of the success of neo-trusteeship in Kosovo and East Timor, which

concentrated on the specific UN approaches to the treatment of sovereignty in each

state in how the differing approaches led to the ultimate failure of the Kosovo

mission and the divergent accomplishment in East Timor.

After appraising the different arguments found during my research, I conclude that

neo-trusteeship poses a threat to orthodox sovereignty, which asserts that no states

should meddle in the domestic affairs of another state. However, when considering a

deconstructed concept of sovereignty, in which the internal and external are

separated in sovereignty, I determine that the threat posed to Westphalian

sovereignty by neo-trusteeship is a necessary contradiction to be made in order to

build upon a different aspect of sovereignty by developing internal authority

structures of a failing state. This necessary contradiction enables the UN to be a

global leader in state-building missions, and sustains an argument that supports

future neo-trustee interventions.

25 Howard, pp. 128-129.

“The threat posed to Westphalian sovereignty by neo-trusteeship is a necessary contradiction to be made in order to build upon a different aspect of sovereignty by developing internal authority structures of a failing state. ”


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Issue 3 (2016) 63

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