KaylaMorgan'sParalegalPortfolio

Kayla E Morgan3205 Lloyds LaneApartment 4NMobile, AL 36693

334-322-2635 [email protected]

OBJECTIVE STATEMENT

To obtain employment within a reputable company that encourages persona l and professional growth while utilizing my educational and professional skills.

SUMMARY OF QUALIFICATIONS

While obtaining my degree, I learned more than I ever thought possible. I consistently maintained a 4.0 average while doing my legal studies which has allowed me to add to growing legal knowledge. While completing my internship, I was guided in using legal research programs such as Westlaw and Casemaker. Beyond the legal field, I have eight years of work experience in dealing with people, and I have one year of experience in dealing with equipment such as computers and fax machines.

In addition to this, I have spent nearly ten years working in the customer service industry and I have a great deal of experience with sales and public relations. Furthermore, my legal knowledge continues to grow every day. I never stop learning!EDUCATION

Lincoln Memorial University Bachelor’s Degree in HistoryMinor in EnglishCumulative GPA: 3.5

Graduation Date: Dec, 2012 Cum Laude

South University, Montgomery Graduation Date: Dec, 2014Associate’s Degree in Paralegal StudiesCumulative GPA: 4.0

LEGAL INTERNSHIP EXPERIENCE

Law Offices of Hampton and Ford, LLC , Montgomery, ALJune 2014 - August 2014

120 hour Legal Externship

For about two months, I was an intern for Hampton and Ford, LLC. I sat at the front desk where I answered and forwarded phone calls, directed clients on where to go, and provided them with necessary forms for them to fill out. I also had a computer on my desk, which allowed me to practice different methods of legal research. My supervisor would sometimes provide me with a fictitious situation or circumstance involving a legal issue, and then he would have me do the proper research on it. I also know my way around a computer. Furthermore, I have spent over seven years in customer service work as well as handling cash and money transactions.

WORK EXPERIENCE

Cashier, Winn Dixie 2006-2007

Cashier, Country’s BBQ 2007-2013

Cashier, Chappy’s Deli 2013-present

Kayla Morgan’s Paralegal Portfolio

PROFESSIONAL, EDUCATIONAL AND PERSONAL REFERENCES

Diane Porter, Former Boss2610 Zelda RoadMontgomery, Alabama 36107(334)262-6211

Wendy Morrison, Personal Friend3331 Bedford LaneMontgomery, AL 36109 (334)322-0781

Anna Moncrief, Personal Friend526 Wesley Avenue Nashville, TN 37207 (615)476-8401

John Davis, Attorney5355 Vaughn RoadMontgomery, AL 36116(334)353-9131


` Paul Wooten V. Beverly Morton et al.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama

2012 WL 3241786 (Ala.Civ.App.)

Procedural History

This case was appealed to the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals by Mr. Paul Wooten after he was served declaratory judgment orders by the trial court and ordered to pay his grandchildren’s attorney fees. He appealed and his grandchildren filed a motion to dismiss the appeal.

Statement of Facts

Paul Wooten sued his family members, “the grandchildren”, in trial court in order to gain more control for himself as his wife’s conservator and as the person representative of his wife’s family’s estate, due to her suffering from Alzheimer’s disease. The trial court declared that the executor’s deeds did not align with the decedent’s will, and were therefore null and void. Mr. Wooten was also removed as his wife’s next friend.

Issues

Does Mr. Wooten have standing to appeal the judgment of the trial court? Did the trial court err in their removal of Mr. Wooten as the next friend of his wife? Did not Mr. Wooten have standing to prosecute this appeal? Did the trial court improperly vacate the notice of lis pendens?

Answer

Yes, Mr. Wooten did have standing to appeal, but the trial court did not err in removing him as the next friend. That judgment is affirmed. No, Mr. Wooten did not have standing to prosecute this appeal due to him no longer being the executor or the next friend. The trial court did not improperly vacate the notice of lis pendens, because Mr. Wooten laced standing to appeal the parts of the judgment that dealt with this wife’s estate or the estate title, and therefore he lacked standing to complain. However, the grandchildren’s request for attorney fee paid by Mr. Wooten on appeal is denied.

Reasoning

For the most part, this court agreed with the trial court. However, they said that the trial court erred when ordering Mr. Wooten to pay attorney fees, because they failed to comply with the requirements imposed on it in the Alabama Litigation Accountability Act.

Decision

The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals affirms in part, reverses in part, and remands in part on the grounds that the trial court failed to properly cite reasons for the ordering of attorney fees as it was required to do.


United States District Court For the Middle District of Alabama

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Laura Raskin Case No. 3648829A

-vs-

Defendant Bradley Harper Judge John Doe

Comes now plaintiff and for her cause of action against defendant alleges:

1. Plaintiff Laura Raskin and the decedent’s estate sue Defendant Bradley Harper for the

injuries and wrongful death of the decedent sustained in an automobile accident caused by

the negligence of the plaintiff. Jurisdiction of this court is based on 28 U.S.C.A. §

1332(a). The amount in controversy in Plaintiff Laura Raskin’s claim equals or exceeds

$75,000, exclusive of interests and costs. This court has supplemental jurisdiction to hear

and determine the claim of plaintiff Laura Raskin under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(a). Venue is

in conformity with the provisions of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(a).

2. Plaintiff Laura Raskin resides at 413 Monty Road, Destin, Okaloosa County, Florida.

3. Defendant Bradley Harper resides at 334 Green Road, Montgomery, Montgomery

County, Alabama.

4. On October 17th, 2000, Defendant Bradley Harper was operating his pickup truck along

County Road 13. Mr. Nordby was also driving along the same road just ahead of Mr.

Harper.


5. At the above mentioned time and place, Defendant Bradley Harper drove his vehicle at en

excessive rate of speed, which caused him to collide with the rear side of Mr. Nordby’s

car.

6. The above mentioned collision was caused by the negligence of the defendant. Such

negligence included, but was not limited to, driving at an excessive rate of speed, failing

to maintain control of the pickup, improperly passing, failing to signal a pass, and failing

to keep a proper lookout, all in violation of the motor vehicle laws and regulations then

and there in full force and effect in the State of Alabama.

7. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of the defendant, as mentioned above,

Decedent William Nordby sustained serious and permanent injuries that led to his death.

During Mr. Nordby’s treatment, he also incurred $115, 345 in medical expenses. Plaintiff

Laura Raskin then incurred $4,772 in funeral and burial expenses for Mr. Nordby.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Laura Raskin demands judgment for relief against the defendant

in an amount to be determined at trial, but no less than $400,000, plus costs.

PLAINTIFF DEMANDS A JURY

________________________

Plaintiff

Sworn to and subscribed before me on this the 17th day of March, 2014.

_________________________

Notary Public

Respectfully submitted this the 17th day of March, 2014.

_________________________

Attorney For Plaintiff


Client Letter

Dear Mr. Harper:

In accordance with the discussions of your case with my senior attorney, I am writing to

inform you that Mr. Attorney has agreed to represent you in connection with the case brought

against you by Mrs. Raskin and the decedent’s estate. I would like to thank your for accepting

our law firm to represent you.

At this time, I would like to discuss some strengths and weaknesses of your case, as well

as what you can expect during the court process.

I believe the biggest weakness of your case is Mrs. Raskin’s cause against you for failing

to maintain control of your pickup. The court may decide that, even if Mr. Nordby did turn

unexpectedly, you should have had enough control over your truck to avoid a collision or at least

avoid such a serious outcome.

There are two defenses that I believe could possibly benefit your case. The first is

contributory negligence. This would be mean that Mr. Nordby was also acting negligently

enough to contribute in causing to causing the crash. This is an affirmative defense, which means

that if the court accepted this as a defense, then it would protect you from having to pay

anything. It is beneficial that your case is being tried in Alabama, because Alabama is one of the

few states left that still accepts contributory negligence as a defense.

The next defense that may possibly help you is superseding cause. This means that there

was an unforeseeable intervening cause that led to an accident or issue. In your case, this would

be Mr. Nordby’s unexpected turn, which you wouldn’t have been able to foresee. If the court


accepts this as a defense, then you would also be protected from having to pay anything, even if

you were previously determined to have acted negligently.

Now I would like to explain to you some of the things you can expect from this process.

Mr. Attorney may file a motion to dismiss your case, meaning that there is not enough

evidence to go to trial, but it is unlikely that the court will grant that due to the evidence and the

seriousness of the case.

The next thing you can expect is discovery and deposition. This is where both your

attorney and the plaintiff’s attorney will exchange documents and information about the case.

Deposition is a questioning period. You will be asked questions about the accident, which you

will have to answer under oath. Everyone will probably also have some meetings with the judge,

and he or she will advise us on what to do, help make decisions, and set up dates for future parts

of the procedure.

The next part will be the trial. The plaintiff, in this case represented by the decedent’s

estate, will go first in presenting their causes and evidence against you. Then, your attorney will

respond. Keep in mind that the plaintiff is the one that has the burden of proving their case, not

you. If for some reason the court finds the plaintiff’s evidence to be insufficient, then the causes

against you will be dismissed. In a civil case, such as this one, the plaintiff is required to prove

their case by preponderance of the evidence. This means that most of their evidence, or the

majority of it, must prove their case, rather than all of it.

If the judge accepts your defense and rules in your favor, then the case will end and you

will not be required to pay anything. If the judge rules for the plaintiff and against you, then you


will be ordered to pay. You can appeal if you would like, or send your case to a higher court for

review, but there is no guarantee that the ruling would be any different.

In the description of your case, it mentions that you had a passenger during the crash, a

Mr. James Patner. Would Mr. Patner would be willing to make a witness statement for you under

oath? If he could testify that you were not speeding and that there was nothing you could have

done to avoid the crash, then it may help your case.

Once again, I thank you for accepting our law firm to represent you. As I will do at this

time, Mr. Attorney has asked me to set forth our fee agreement. His fee for legal services is $150

an hour, plus any other expenses that may be incurred, such as postage, deposition charges, filing

charges, and other related expenses. My attorney’s office will bill you monthly, depending on the

amount of work that was done that month for your case or your file. At this point in time, it is

difficult to the exact amount of time and expense it will take to adequately represent your case.

Please remember this is a fee estimate and may be subject to change.

The fees you have already deposited to the firm will be held in in our Lawyers’ Trust

Account. You will be provided with a monthly statement of fees, costs, and expenses. You are

also responsible for paying fees, costs, and expenses in excess of the funds that we hold. Should

we exceed the retainer, you will be billed monthly additional fees and expenses, and payment of

this must be made within thirty days. The firm reserves the right to withdraw should these fees

not be paid. Please be aware that we may ask that additional sums be deposited in the trust

account should it be necessary to cover additional fees and expenses.

You may be sent pleadings, documents, correspondence, and other information

throughout the case. These copies will be your file copies, and I ask that you retain them. The


information will also be kept in a file in your attorney’s office. Please bring your file to all of the

meetings at the firm so that we may have access to all the necessary information. The original

documents will be returned to you once all of the legal work necessary for your case has been

completed. Your file at the law firm, which will be closed once the case has been completed, will

be stored for approximately ten years. Once the time has passed, the file will be destroyed, unless

you instruct us now in writing to hold your file longer.

I have included a copy of this letter for your review, signature, and to return to me in a

postage-paid envelope. If any of the information in this letter is not consistent with your

understanding of the agreement, please contact Mr. Attorney before signing the letter. Otherwise,

please sign the enclosed copy of this letter and return it to me.

On behalf of the firm, we are happy to represent you in this matter. If you have any

questions, please contact Mr. Attorney at your convenience.

Very truly yours,

Kayla Morgan

Kayla Morgan, Paralegal

I have read this letter and consent to it. Furthermore, I grant and give my informed consent after

Mr. Attorney has proposed the course of conduct, has communicated adequate information, and

has explained all material risks and reasonable available alternatives to the proposed course of

conduct.

______________________


MEMORANDUM

TO: Attorney

FROM: Kayla Morgan

DATE: June 12, 2014

RE: Incarcerated Husband’s Company

QUESTION PRESENTED

Can the Husband get his company back? What rights does he have while incarcerated? Is his

Wife’s Power of Attorney still valid? Does the son now legally own the company and assets that he

transferred to himself? Are the Husband’s stock certificates still valid?

BRIEF ANSWER

The husband would be allowed to file an action to get his company back, as well as a lawsuit

against his son, but he may run into some obstacles. His wife’s Power of Attorney is no longer valid. The

son is guilty of self-dealing and elder abuse, which may lead to his loss of the company and assets. The

Husband should reasonably be allowed to retain control of his stock.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Husband, who has been incarcerated for over 20 years, has been married to his wife for 54

years. His gave his wife Power of Attorney over him in 1997 while incarcerated in Georgia, though he is

now housed in Alabama. In 2007, the Wife filed for and was granted a divorce, but she later had the

divorce set aside.


Before incarceration, the Husband owned his own company with the stock split between him,

his Wife, and their three children, though the Husband owned the most of it. In 1997, the Husband’s

stock was transferred to his Wife, who then transferred it to their youngest daughter. This was an odd

move, as the Husband and Wife had previously said that this daughter would never be able to run a

company. When an investigation on the Wife was complete, she was found to be incompetent and was

appointed a Conservator, or guardian, by the Court.

Meanwhile, the couple’s youngest son has taken control of the company, has replaced nearly all

of the employees, and is driving the company towards financial ruin. The couple’s oldest child, another

son, is also incarcerated on the same charges as his father, though he is due to be released soon.

The Husband has still retained possession of his original stock certificates, and he wants his

share of the company back. He also wants to know what his rights are. He believes that the Power of

Attorney that his wife had over him may no longer be valid due to her filing for divorce and being

declared incompetent.

DISCUSSION

One of the first issues in this case is whether or not the Wife still has Power of Attorney over her

Husband.

In section 26-1 of the Alabama Code, in regards to the Durable Power of Attorney, it states, “Any

authority granted to the spouse under a durable power of attorney shall be revoked if the marriage of

the principal is dissolved or annulled, or if the parties are legally separated or a party to divorce

proceedings.” Ala. Code § 26-1-2 (1975).

This rule clearly states the revocation of the power of attorney right, due to the couple’s

divorce. Also, because the Power of Attorney agreement was completed and signed in Georgia, one

must also look at Georgia law. Section 10-6-36 of the Georgia Code states, “A written power of attorney,


unless expressly providing otherwise, shall not be terminated…until some other judicial proceeding shall

terminate the power.” Ga. Code Ann. § 10-6-6.

In this case, the Wife filed for and was granted a divorce from her husband. Even though she

later had that set aside, her filing for and receiving the divorce thereby terminated her Power of

Attorney over her husband. Both Alabama and Georgia law state that a judicial proceeding, such as a

divorce as in this case, will dissolve the legal power that one has over another. There was also no

provision in the Power of Attorney agreement stating that it would remain in effect even if a divorce or

separation occurred.

In the case of Maynard v. Hill, in speaking of divorce, it states, “A divorce ends all rights not

previously vested. Interests which might vest in time, upon a continuance of the marriage relation, were

gone. A wife divorced has no right of dower in his property; a husband divorced has no right by the

courtesy in her lands, unless the statute authorizing the divorce specially confers such right.” Maynard

v. Hill 8 S.Ct. 723 (U.S. 1888). These statements from this case provide a clear example of the essence of

total separation that occurs due to a divorce. This relates to the separation, not just of persons but of

any other connections as well, that occurred during this case between Husband and Wife.

Because of that, and in addition to the Wife being declared incompetent, she no longer has any

legal power over her husband.

There also remains a question of what rights, if any, the Husband has. For one thing, the

Husband may possibly be able to file a Shareholder’s Derivative Suit in order to regain control of his

stock. However, it will not be easy for him. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, there are

some regulations and restrictions listed for what prisoners can and cannot do when it comes to

litigation. The five basic rules are:

1. “The prisoner must exhaust internal prison grievance procedures before they bring a case to

Federal court.


2. The prisoner must pay his or her own court fees.

3. Courts may throw out a prisoner’s case if they find it “frivolous” or “malicious”.

4. Prisoners cannot file a claim for emotional or mental injury unless they can prove that they

also suffered a physical injury.

5. If the inmate lies or presents false information in the lawsuit, the judge may revoke some of

their credit for time already spent in prison.”

In regards to these procedures, the Husband should not have to worry about the first rule, as

that applies to inmates who are filing lawsuits about their confinement or their treatment while

incarcerated.

The Husband’s biggest concern, however, would probably be paying his court costs. Even if he

has the money to do so, the prison may be allowed to deny him access to his prison account. In Chriceol

v. Phillps, the court states, “Prison officials' denial of prisoner's request to withdraw money from his

prison account to pay costs of instituting civil rights action against officials did not constitute denial of

prisoner's right to access to courts, as there was no evidence of actual injury in that prisoner's fee was

paid and complaint was successfully filed.” Chriceol v. Phillips 169 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 1999). There is

nothing to say that something like this could happen to the Husband, but in case it did, he would be up

against quite an obstacle.

Another issue that arises is the son’s validity on now owning and running the company. In Title

43 of the Alabama Code, it states, “If a personal representative violates the duty against self-dealing

described by this section, a voidable title to assets sold results.” Ala.Code 1975 § 43-2-841. The son is

guilty of self-dealing, as he has taken control of his father’s company as well as transferred the stock and

assets to himself. Under this, the son may possibly have a voidable title.

In the case of Walding v. Walding, the court states, “A trustee, being a fiduciary, cannot engage

in a transaction which involves self-dealing, such as sale of personally held property to the trust estate.


When a transaction involving self-dealing occurs, a court of equity will allow the cestui que trust the

option of affirming or disaffirming the transaction, regardless of whether or not a loss has occurred.”

Walding v. Walding 56 ,181 (Ala. Civ. App. 1975). Due to this statement, as well as the rule in the

Alabama Code, the Husband should have a strong case against his son for self-dealing.

In addition, the Husband may also have an action against his son for elder abuse, as the son has

taken advantage of both his parents due to their respective situations, though probably more so with his

mother.

In title 38 of the Alabama Code, under definitions for various kinds of elder abuse, it states,

“Material Exploitation: The unauthorized use of funds or any resources of an elderly individual or the

misuse of power of attorney or representative payee status for one's own advantage or profit. Examples

include stealing jewelry or other property and obtaining the elderly person's signature for transfer of

property or for a will through duress or coercion.” Ala.Code 1975 § 38-9D-2. This is exactly what the son

did to his mother. It is not known exactly how he coerced her, but his method does not matter, as what

he did constitutes abuse in any fashion.

Also, in the case of Giordano v. Wachovia Mortg., FSB, it states:

“The elements of a claim of financial elder abuse are as follows:

(a) ‘Financial elder abuse of an elder or dependent adult occurs when a person or entity does any of the

following:

(1) Takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains real or personal property of an elder or dependent

adult for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, or both.

(2) Assists in taking, secreting, appropriating, obtaining, or retaining real or personal property of an elder

or dependent adult for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, or both.


(3) Takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains, or assists in taking, secreting, appropriating,

obtaining, or retaining, real or personal property of an elder or dependent adult by undue influence.”

Giordano v. Wachovia Mortg., FSB 2011 WL 1130523 (N.D. Cal. 2011).

The description in this case solidifies the laws against Elder Abuse as defined in the Alabama

Code, and there is no doubt that the son is guilty of Elder Abuse.

Another question that the Husband had was whether or not he could get his company stock

back, as he still retained his original stock certificates. Title 10A of the Alabama Code states: “Subject to

the provisions of the certificate of formation, the estate of a member or shareholder who was a person

duly licensed or otherwise legally authorized to render the same professional service as that for which

the professional association was organized may continue to hold stock or membership pursuant to the

certificate of formation for a reasonable period of administration of the estate, but shall not be

authorized to participate in any decisions concerning the rendering of professional service.” Ala.Code

1975 § 10A-30-1.07.

Based on this rule from the Alabama Code, the Husband should reasonably be allowed to still

have control of his company stock, as he is the one who still retains the proper documentation.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Husband still retains his basic constitutional and legal rights while

incarcerated. He does have the right to file an action to regain his previous control of the company, as

well as a lawsuit against his son for self-dealing and elder abuse if he desires, but he will face some

potential problems. For one, he is required to pay his own court costs and fees, and the prison may

disallow him access to his prison account if they deem it necessary. His wife no longer has Power of

Attorney over him, however, due to their divorce, which means that he has the right to make his own

decisions now. In short, the Husband has the same rights that any other reasonable person would have,

but he is still subject to various provisions and restrictions that apply to people who are incarcerated.


Table of Authorities

Cases

Maynard v. Hill 8 S.Ct. 723 (U.S. 1888).

Chriceol v. Phillips 169 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 1999).

Walding v. Walding 56 ,181 (Ala. Civ. App. 1975).

Giordano v. Wachovia Mortg., FSB 2011 WL 1130523 (N.D. Cal. 2011).

Statutes

Alabama Code

Georgia Code Annotated

Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996


IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, ALABAMA

DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF: ⃰

RITA STAR, ⃰

PETITIONER, ⃰ CASE NO. 5362526

AND ⃰

BOBBY GOLDDIGGER, ⃰

RESPONDENT ⃰

PETITION FOR DIVORCE

COMES NOW the Petitioner, Rita Star, by and through counsel, and petitions this Court for a

divorce. As grounds therefore, the Petitioner would show unto the Court the following:

1. Petitioner, Rita Star, is over the age of nineteen (19) years and is a resident of

Montgomery County, Alabama.

2. Respondent, Bobby Golddigger, is over the age of nineteen (19) years and is a resident of


3. The parties were lawfully married on, to-wit: July 10, 2002, in Montgomery,



4. There have been two (2) children born as of the relationship of the parties, to-wit: Venus,

whose date of birth is April 10, 2003; and Serena, whose date of birth is April 10, 2003.

The Petitioner is the fit and proper person to have custody of the minor children.

5. There exists between the parties such a complete and total incompatibility of

temperament that the parties can no longer live together as Husband and Wife.

6. There has been such a breakdown of the marriage relationship that it is irretrievably

broken, and further attempts at reconciliation would be futile and not in the best interests

of the parties.

7. The parties have acquired certain real and personal property that is subject to an equitable

division by this Court.

8. The parties have incurred certain debts and obligations which are subject to an equitable

assignment by this Court.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Petitioner prays that this Court will

take jurisdiction of this case, that Respondent be made a party thereto and required to

answer all averments of this complaint, and that this Court will issue an Order granting

unto Petitioner the following relief:

A. A Decree of Divorce forever dissolving the bonds of matrimony now existing

between the parties;

B. Awarding the parties and equitable division of the real and personal property;

C. Assigning an equitable division of the parties debts and obligations;

D. Awarding the Petitioner primary physical and legal custody of the minor children,

and child support pursuant to Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Judicial

Administration;


and

E. Awarding Petitioner such other, further, and different relief to which she may be

entitle under the premises.

DATED this the 2 nd day of November, 2014.

Rita Star

Petitioner


STATE OF ALABAMA )

MONTGOMERY COUNTY )

Before me, the undersigned authority, a Notary Public in and for said State at large,

personally appeared Rita Star, the Petitioner in the above-styled cause, who is personally known

to me and who, being first duly sworn, doth depose and says that she has read the foregoing

statements and that said statements are true and correct to the best of her knowledge,

information, and belief.

Rita Star

Petitioner

Sworn to and subscribed before me on this the 2 nd day of November, 2014.

Kayla Morgan

NOTARY PUBLIC

My Commission expires: December 25, 2015.

Respectfully submitted on this the 2 nd day of November, 2014.

Kayla Morgan

Kayla Morgan


Attorney for Petitioner

P.O. Box 89849

Montgomery, AL 36109

Phone: (334) 123-4567

Fax: (334) 899-1123

Email: [email protected]

OF COUNSEL:

Morgan and Co. LLC.

P.O. Box 72728

Montgomery, AL 36109

Phone: (334) 123-4567

Fax: (334) 899-1123

mailto:[email protected]


STATE OF

ALABAMA

COUNTY OF MONTGOMERY

DURABLE HEALTH CARE POWER OF ATTORNEY

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS THAT I, Kayla Morgan , of

Alabama , City of Montgomery , County of Montgomery ,

Alabama, hereby make, constitute and appoint Joe Bob Marshall ,

whose address is

1234 Cherry Street Lane , to act as my agent or attorney in fact,

to make health care and related personal decisions for me as authorized in

this document. Should

Joe Bob Marshall for any reason be unable or unwilling to act,

temporarily or

permanently, then I appoint Anna Melon , of Nashville, Tennessee as

such

agent/attorney in fact, with the same authority.

By this document I intend to create a durable power of attorney upon, and

only during, any period of incapacity in which, in the opinion of my health

care agent/attorney in fact, after consultation with my health care providers,

I am unable to make or communicate a choice regarding a particular


healthcare decision. This document is intended to complement and

supplement any Advanced Health Care

Directive and/or Durable Power of Attorney for financial matters that I may

have executed or may execute in the future. It is my desire to receive

appropriate medical treatment so long as there is a reasonable hope of

recovery, but I do not want my life artificially extended beyond any

reasonable hope of recovery to a meaningful quality of life and I do not want

to prolong the dying process. I do not intend by this document to authorize

or request euthanasia or assisted suicide but to avoid being

unwillingly sustained in a condition that is only a semblance of life; or to be

allowed to endure pain for which there is treatment available, whether or not

recovery is possible.

I grant to my agent full power to make decisions for me regarding my health

care. In exercising his/her authority, my agent shall attempt to communicate

with me regarding my wishes if I am able to communicate in any way. If my

agent cannot determine the choice I want made, then (s)he shall make the

choice for me based upon what (s)he believes I would do if I were able, or if

unable to so determine, then based upon what (s)he believes to be my best

interests. I intend the power given to be as broad as possible, except for any

limitations in my Advance Directives or set out hereinafter.

Accordingly, unless so limited, my agent is authorized:

To consent to, refuse or withdraw consent to any and all types of medical

care, treatment, surgical procedures, diagnostic procedures, medications


and use of mechanical or other procedures affecting bodily functions;

including, without limitation, artificial respiration, nutritional support and

hydration, and cardiopulmonary resuscitation;

To have access to and have the right to disclose medical reports, records

and information to the extent that I would myself;

To authorize admission to or discharge from any hospital, residential care or

related facility, even against medical advice;

To contract for health care or related services, without the agent incurring

personal liability therefore;

To hire and fire medical, social service or related personnel responsible for

my care;

To authorize or refuse to authorize any medication or procedure to relieve

pain, even though such use may lead to temporary discomfort or addiction,

or inadvertently hasten the moment of death;

To make anatomical gifts of part of all of my body for medical purposes,

To authorize an autopsy and direct disposition of my remains, to the extent

permitted by law, and

To take any other action necessary to effectuate the intent and purpose of

this broad grant of powers, including, without limitation, granting any waiver

of release from liability required by any health care provider or related

agency, and

To sign any document relative to health care in any way whatsoever and

pursuing legal action in my name at the expense of my estate, should that


be necessary to enforce compliance with my wishes as determined by my

agent pursuant to the authority given herein.

Without in any way limiting the broad powers herein granted, I express the

hope that, circumstances

permitting, my agent will consult family and friends for their advice and

support in arriving at what may be difficult decisions; but the final decisions

shall be that of my agent.

No person who relies in good faith upon any representation of my agent or

successor agent shall be liable to me, my estate, my heirs or assignees, for

recognizing the agent’s authority. Although no compensation of my agent is

contemplated, (s)he shall be entitled to reimbursement of any and all

reasonable expenses incurred as a result of carrying out any provision of this

document.

Invalidity of one or more powers shall not invalidate any others.

I am in full control of my mental faculties and I understand the contents of

this document and the effect of this grant of powers to my agent.

Dated this first day of November , 2014 .

_________________________

Grantor

WITNESSES

I believe the Grantor to be of sound mind and able to make decisions of this

kind. I did not sign his/her name and I am not the health care agent. I am not


related to the Grantor by blood, adoption or marriage, and not entitled to

any part of his/her estate. I am at least 19 years old and am not directly

responsible for his/her medical care or expenses.

_________________________

Signature of Witness

Mary Sue Jones

Name of Witness

Date: 11/01/2014

And

________________________

Signature of Witness

Bobby Joe Smith

Name of Witness

Date: 11/01/2014

ATTESTATION

I, the undersigned authority in and for said County in said State, hereby

certify that

Kayla Morgan , whose name is signed to the foregoing Durable Health

Care Power of Attorney, and who is known to me, acknowledged before me

on this day that, being informed of the contents of the said document, (s)he


executed the same voluntarily, before the witnesses whose names appear

above, on the day the same bears date.

Given under my hand this first day of November , 2014.

__________________________

Notary Public

My commission expires:

November 1, 2016

SIGNATURES OF AGENTS

I, Susan Malone , am willing to serve as Health Care Agent.

Signature: ______________________ Date: 11/01/2014

I, Wendy Morrison , am willing to serve as Health Care Agent if

the first-named Agent cannot serve.

Signature: ____________________ Date: 11/01/2014


QUITCLAIM DEEDThis indenture witnesseth that John Smith, an adult resident of Here County, RELEASES AND QUIT CLAIMS TO Billy T. Kid, an adult resident of Here County, for and in consideration of one hundred thousand dollars, the following described real property:

Start at 25° North, head Southwest 20° to point of origin. Continue Southwest for 300ft, then east 19° to iron pin, then right 10° to iron pin, then west 200ft until iron pin.

Commonly known as: One 2nd Street, Somewhere, Alabama

11/14/2013 John SmithDATE NAME OF GRANTOR


STATE OF Alabama, Here COUNTY

Before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said Here County and Alabama, this 14 day of November, 2013, personally appeared John Smith, and acknowledged the execution of the foregoing Quit Claim Deed as his/her free and voluntary act and deed. In witness whereof, I have hereunto subscribed my name and affixed my official seal.

KAYLA MORGANNotary Public

State of Alabama SUMMONS Case Number

Unified Judicial System CIVIL 5362526

Form C-34 Rev 6/88

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY.

Plaintiff Rita Star v. Defendant Bobby Golddigger

NOTICE TO Bobby Golddigger

THE COMPLAINT WHICH IS ATTACHED TO THIS SUMMONS IS IMPORTANT AND YOU MUST TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION TO PROTECT YOUR RIGHTS. YOU OR YOUR ATTORNEY ARE REQUIRED TO FILE THE ORIGINAL OF YOUR WRITTEN ANSWER, EITHER ADMITTING OR DENYING EACH ALLEGATION IN THE COMPLAINT WITH THE CLERK OF THIS COURT. A COPY OF YOUR ANSWER MUST BE MAILED OR HAND DELIVERED BY YOU TO THE PLAINTIFF OR PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY KAYLA MORGAN WHOSE ADDRESS IS P.O. BOX 89849 MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA 36109.

THIS ANSWER MUST BE MAILED OR DELIVERED WITHIN 30 DAYS AFTER THIS SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT WERE DELIVERED TO YOU OR A JUDGEMENT BY DEFAULT MAY BE ENTERED AGAINST YOU FOR THE MONEY OR OTHER THINGS DEMANDED IN THE COMPLAINT.


_____________________________________________________________________________

TO ANY SHERIFF OR ANY PERSON AUTHORIZED by the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure:

□ You are hereby commanded to serve this summons and a copy of the complaint in this action upon the defendant.

□ Service by certified mail of this summons is initiated upon the written request of Rita Star pursuant to the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure.

Date: November 5, 2014 Betty Burns By: December 5, 2014

□ Certified Mail is hereby requested. Rita Star / Kayla MorganPlaintiff’s/ Attorney’s Signature

RETURN ON SERVICE:

□ Return receipt of certified mail received in this office on November 2, 2014 .

□ I certify that I personally delivered a copy of the Summons and Complaint do Bobby Golddigger in Montgomery County, Alabama on November 5 th , 2014.

November 5 th , 2014 Kayla Morgan Date Server’s Signature

Hand Delivered P.O. Box 89849

Type of Process Server Address of Server

(334) 123-4567

Phone Number of Server

KaylaMorgan'sParalegalPortfolio

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