Kat (Civil Law)

8/6/2019 Kat (Civil Law)

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 123968 April 24, 2003

URSULINA GANUELAS, METODIO GANUELAS and ANTONIO GANUELAS, petitioners,vs.HON. ROBERT T. CAWED, Judge of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union (Branch29), LEOCADIA G. FLORES, FELICITACION G. AGTARAP, CORAZON G. SIPALAY and ESTATE OFROMANA GANUELAS DE LA ROSA, represented by GREGORIO DELA ROSA, Administrator,respondents.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails, on a question of law, theFebruary 22, 1996 decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 29, in Civil

Case No. 3947, an action for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation.

The facts, as culled from the records of the case, are as follows:

On April 11, 1958, Celestina Ganuelas Vda. de Valin (Celestina) executed a Deed of Donation of RealProperty 2 covering seven parcels of land in favor of her niece Ursulina Ganuelas (Ursulina), one ofherein petitioners.

The pertinent provision of the deed of donation reads, quoted verbatim:

xxx xxx xxx

That, for and in consideration of the love and affection which the DONOR has for the DONEE,and of the faithful services the latter has rendered in the past to the former, the said DONORdoes by these presents transfer and convey, by way of DONATION, unto the DONEE theproperty above, described, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; but in the eventthat the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescindedand of no further force and effect.

xxx xxx xxx.3

On June 10, 1967, Celestina executed a document denominated as Revocation of Donation4 purporting toset aside the deed of donation. More than a month later or on August 18, 1967, Celestina died withoutissue and any surviving ascendants and siblings.

After Celestina's death, Ursulina had been sharing the produce of the donated properties with privaterespondents Leocadia G. Flores, et al., nieces of Celestina.

In 1982, or twenty-four years after the execution of the Deed of Donation, Ursulina secured thecorresponding tax declarations, in her name, over the donated properties, to wit: Tax Declarations Nos.18108, 18109, 18110, 18111, 18112, 18113 and 18114, and since then, she refused to give privaterespondents any share in the produce of the properties despite repeated demands.


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Private respondents were thus prompted to file on May 26, 1986 with the RTC of San Fernando, La Uniona complaint5 against Ursulina, along with Metodio Ganuelas and Antonio Ganuelas who were alleged tobe unwilling plaintiffs. The complaint alleged that the Deed of Donation executed by Celestina in favor ofUrsulina was void for lack of acknowledgment by the attesting witnesses thereto before notary public Atty.Henry Valmonte, and the donation was a disposition mortis causa which failed to comply with theprovisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and testaments, hence, it was void. Theplaintiffs-herein private respondents thus prayed that judgment be rendered ordering Ursulina to return tothem as intestate heirs the possession and ownership of the properties. They likewise prayed for thecancellation of the tax declarations secured in the name of Ursulina, the partition of the properties amongthe intestate heirs of Celestina, and the rendering by Ursulina of an accounting of all the fruits of theproperties since 1982 and for her to return or pay the value of their shares.

The defendants-herein petitioners alleged in their Answer6 that the donation in favor of Ursulina was intervivos as contemplated under Article 729 of the Civil Code,7 hence, the deed did not have to comply withthe requirements for the execution of a valid will; the Revocation of Donation is null and void as theground mentioned therein is not among those provided by law to be the basis thereof; and at any rate, therevocation could only be legally enforced upon filing of the appropriate complaint in court within theprescriptive period provided by law, which period had, at the time the complaint was filed, already lapsed.

By Decision of February 22, 1996, the trial court, holding that the provision in the Deed of Donation that inthe event that the DONEE should predecease the DONOR, the "donation shall be deemed rescinded andof no further force and effect" is an explicit indication that the deed is a donation mortis causa,8 found forthe plaintiffs-herein private respondents, thus:

WHEREFORE the Court renders judgment declaring null and void the Deed of Donation of RealProperty executed by Celestina Ganuelas, and orders the partition of the estate of Celestinaamong the intestate heirs.

SO ORDERED.9

The trial court also held that the absence of a reservation clause in the deed implied that Celestinaretained complete dominion over her properties, thus supporting the conclusion that the donation is

mortis causa,10 and that while the deed contained an attestation clause and an acknowledgment showingthe intent of the donor to effect a postmortem disposition, the acknowledgment was defective as only thedonor and donee appear to have acknowledged the deed before the notary public, thereby rendering theentire document void.11

Lastly, the trial court held that the subsequent execution by Celestina of the Revocation of Donationshowed that the donor intended the revocability of the donation ad nutum, thus sustaining its finding thatthe conveyance was mortis causa.12

On herein petitioners' argument that the Revocation of Donation was void as the ground mentionedtherein is not one of those allowed by law to be a basis for revocation, the trial court held that the legalgrounds for such revocation as provided under the Civil Code arise only in cases of donations inter vivos,but not in donations mortis causa which are revocable at will during the lifetime of the donor. The trial

court held, in any event, that given the nullity of the disposition mortis causa in view of a failure to complywith the formalities required therefor, the Deed of Revocation was a superfluity.13

Hence, the instant petition for review, petitioners contending that the trial court erred:

I. . . . WHEN IT DECLARED NULL AND VOID THE DONATION EXECUTED BY CELESTINAGANUELAS;

II. . . . WHEN IT UPHELD THE REVOCATION OF DONATION;


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III. . . . IN RENDERING ITS DECISION ADVERSE TO PETITIONER URSULINA GANUELAS. 14

Petitioners argue that the donation contained in the deed is inter vivos as the main consideration for itsexecution was the donor's affection for the donee rather than the donor's death;15 that the provision on theeffectivity of the donation after the donor's death simply meant that absolute ownership wouldpertain to the donee on the donor's death;16 and that since the donation is inter vivos, it may be revoked

only for the reasons provided in Articles 760,17

76418

and 76519

of the Civil Code.

In a letter of March 16, 1998,20 private respondent Corazon Sipalay, reacting to this Court's January 28,1998 Resolution requiring private respondents "to SHOW CAUSE why they should not be disciplinarilydealt with or held in contempt" for failure to submit the name and address of their new counsel, explainsthat they are no longer interested in pursuing the case and are "willing and ready to waive whateverrights" they have over the properties subject of the donation. Petitioners, who were required to commenton the letter, by Comment of October 28, 1998,21 welcome private respondents' gesture but pray that "forthe sake of enriching jurisprudence, their [p]etition be given due course and resolved."

The issue is thus whether the donation is inter vivos ormortis causa.

Crucial in the resolution of the issue is the determination of whether the donor intended to transfer the

ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed.22

Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the former, the act is immediatelyoperative even if the actual execution may be deferred until the death of the donor, while in the latter,nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the donee until the death of the donor-testator.23 The followingruling of this Court inAlejandro v. Geraldezis illuminating:24

If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor's death, meaning that the full or nakedownership of the donated properties will pass to the donee only because of the donor's death,then it is at that time that the donation takes effect, and it is a donation mortis causa which shouldbe embodied in a last will and testament.

But if the donation takes effect during the donor's lifetime or independently of the donor's death,meaning that the full or naked ownership (nuda proprietas) of the donated properties passes tothe donee during the donor's lifetime, not by reason of his death but because of the deed ofdonation, then the donation is inter vivos.

The distinction between a transferinter vivos and mortis causa is important as the validity or revocation ofthe donation depends upon its nature. If the donation is inter vivos, it must be executed and accepted withthe formalities prescribed by Articles 74825 and 74926 of the Civil Code, except when it is onerous in whichcase the rules on contracts will apply. If it is mortis causa, the donation must be in the form of a will, withall the formalities for the validity of wills, otherwise it is void and cannot transfer ownership.27

The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa are the following:

1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, whatamounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) andcontrol of the property while alive;

2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; butrevocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to disposeof the properties conveyed;

3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.28


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In the donation subject of the present case, there is nothing therein which indicates that any right, title orinterest in the donated properties was to be transferred to Ursulina prior to the death of Celestina.

The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation but thatCelestina intended to transfer the ownership of the properties to Ursulina on her death, not during herlifetime.29

More importantly, the provision in the deed stating that if the donee should die before the donor, thedonation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect shows that the donation is apostmortem disposition.

As stated in a long line of cases, one of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa is that thetransfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the donee.30

More. The deed contains an attestation clause expressly confirming the donation as mortis causa:

SIGNED by the above-named donor, Celestina Ganuelas, at the foot of this deed of donationmortis causa, consisting of two (2) pages and on the left margin of each and every page thereofin the joint presence of all of us who at her request and in her presence and that of each other

have in like manner subscribed our names as witnesses.31 (Emphasis supplied)

To classify the donation as inter vivos simply because it is founded on considerations of love and affectionis erroneous. That the donation was prompted by the affection of the donor for the donee and the servicesrendered by the latter is of no particular significance in determining whether the deed constitutes atransferinter vivos or not, because a legacy may have an identical motivation.32 In other words, love andaffection may also underline transfers mortis causa.33

In Maglasang v. Heirs of Cabatingan,34 the deeds of donation contained provisions almost identical tothose found in the deed subject of the present case:

That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR for the DONEE, x x x. the

DONOR does hereby, by these presents, transfer, convey, by way of donation, unto the DONEEthe above-described property, together with the buildings and all improvements existing thereon,to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the eventthat the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemedautomatically rescinded and of no further force and effect. (Emphasis supplied)

In that case, this Court held that the donations were mortis causa, for the above-quoted provisionconclusively establishes the donor's intention to transfer the ownership and possession of the donatedproperty to the donee only after the former's death. Like in the present case, the deeds therein did notcontain any clear provision that purports to pass proprietary rights to the donee prior to the donor's death.

As the subject deed then is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, the formalities of a will underArticle 728 of the Civil Code should have been complied with, failing which the donation is void and

produces no effect.35

As noted by the trial court, the attesting witnesses failed to acknowledge the deed before the notarypublic, thus violating Article 806 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testatorand thewitnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another withthe office of the Clerk of Court. (Emphasis supplied)


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The trial court did not thus commit any reversible error in declaring the Deed of Donation to be mortiscausa.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Corona, JJ ., concur.Puno, J ., took no part. Knows one of the parties.


Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 24955 September 4, 1926

JULIAN SOLLA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,vs.URSULA ASCUETA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Marcelino Lontok for plaintiffs-appellants.Antonio Belmonte, Miguel Florentino, Jose A. Espiritu and Camus, Delgado and Recto for defendants-appellants.

VILLA-REAL, J.:

These are two appeals by the plaintiffs and defendants, respectively, from the judgment of the Court ofFirst Instance of Ilocos Sur, the dispositive part of which is as follows:

The court finds that the plaintiffs Rosenda Lagmay and Silvestra Sajor are the surviving legateesof the testratrix Maria Solla; that the plaintiff Julian Solla and Lucia Solla are heirs of Sergio Solla;Ambrosio Lagmay is the heir of the deceased Cayetana Solla; Francisco Serna, 2. and JuanaBaclig of the deceased Josefa Solla; Pedro Serna and Agapita Serna of the deceased JacintoSerna, and that Pedro Garcia is nephew and heir of the deceased Matias Seveda.

That the defendant Ursula is the widow of the deceased Leandro Serano; that the otherdefendants Simeon, Cesario, Santiago, Primitiva and Maxima, surnamed Serrano, are thechildren and heirs of the said Leandro Serrano, who died on August 5, 1921; that SimeonSerrano is the executor of Leandro Serrano and possesses the property claimed by the plaintiffs.

That Leandro Serrano during his lifetime also possessed and enjoyed the said property up to theday of his death; that this property, the possession or delivery of which is sought by the plaintiffs,should be separated from the estate of Leandro Serrano, with the exception of the parcel of landbought from Matias Seveda, Exhibit 5; and the defendants, especially Simeon Serrano, areordered to separate and deliver the same to each and everyone of the plaintiffs together with one-half of the fruits, or the value thereof, from September 5, 1921; that the parcels of land referred toare indicated in Maria Solla's will Exhibit B and more particularly described in plaintiffs' Exhibit A.It is ordered that a partition, in accordance with the law, be made of the land in which the plaintiffshave a participation. It is also ordered that the defendants, especially, the executor SimeonSerrano, deliver to the plaintiffs their respective share in cash or in other property, as a legacy,with one-half of the costs against each of the two parties. It is ordered.


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In support of their appeal, the defendants-appellants assigned the following supposed errors ascommitted by the trial court in its judgment, to wit:

1. The trial court erred in holding that the lack of appropriate description of each parcel of land claimed isno bar to this action, and that said defect was ignored in the stipulation of facts;

2. The trial court erred in holding that at the trial of the case the attorneys for both parties also agreedbefore the court that the latter might decide the case on Exhibit A is evidence of the plaintiffs, and inholding that said Exhibit A is a correct statement of the property left by the deceased Maria Solla and thatthe attorney for the defendants admitted it as such;

3. The trial court erred in not considering in its judgment Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the defendantsas evidence, and considering the document Exhibit 4 of said defendants as deficient, weak and worthlessevidence;

4. The trial court in not holding that the action of the plaintiffs in this case has prescribed;

5. The trial court erred in interpreting and holding that paragraph 3 of Leandro Serrano's will, Exhibit C,ordered the delivery of the legacies left by Maria Solla in her will Exhibit B, to the plaintiffs, and that said

paragraph affects each and everyone of the parcels of land in the property deeds of Leandro Serano,Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, and in holding that the said paragraph 3 of Leandro Serrano's will cancelsall of the rights acquired by him, and is the immediate cause of the action brought by the plaintiffs;

6. The trial court erred in not holding that the third clause of Leandro Serrano's will, Exhibit C, refers onlyto the pious bequests specified in Maria Solla's will, Exhibit B;

7. The trial court erred in ordering the separation and delivery of the unidentified and undetermined estateof Leandro Serrano, together with half of the fruits or their value from September 5, 1921, and in orderingthe partition of the unidentified and undetermined property between the parties without designating theshares;

8. The lower court erred in ordering the defendants to separate and deliver the property in question to theplaintiffs, as well as one-half of the fruits of the same from September 5, 1921;

9. The lower court erred in not holding the same of the property of Maria Solla was inherited by LeandroSerrano by universal title and some by renunciation and sale by the legatees, which title was furtherprotected and cleared by acquisitive prescription, and in not holding that said property of Maria Solla wasmerged with the estate which passed into the hands of the universal heir Leandro Serrano;

10. The lower court erred in holding that the property in question does not belong to the estate of LeandroSerrano;

11. The lower court erred in issuing the order of December 13, 1924 reinstating Rosenda Lagmay as oneof the plaintiffs, and in holding that Lucia Solla is one of the plaintiffs when her name as such plaintiff had

been stricken out;

12. The lower court erred in not considering the last amendment presented by the plaintiffs to theiramended complaint;

13. The lower court erred in not considering the amended answer of the defendants of October 14, 1924;

14. The lower court erred in denying the motion for dismissal of September 3, 1924; and


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15. The lower court erred in denying the motion for a new trial filed by the defendants.

On the other hand, the plaintiff-appellants, in support of their appeal, assign the following supposed errorsas committed by the trial court in its judgment, to wit:

(1) The trial court committed an error in holding that the silence of the plaintiffs leads to the belief that they

consented to the exclusive enjoyment of the said property by Leandro Serrano; and (2) in not ordering thedefendants, as heirs of Leandro Serrano, to render an account to the plaintiffs of the products of the landsof the deceased Maria Solla from the time the said Leandro Serrano took possession thereof as executorof the deceased Maria Solla.

The case having been called for trial on October 15, 1924, the parties submitted the following statementof facts and petitioned the court to render judgment thereon:

AGREEMENT

Both parties admit the following facts to be true:

1. Da. Maria Solla died in June, 1883, in the municipality of Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, leaving a willexecuted and recorded in accordance with the laws then in force, but which had not beenprobated in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure.

2. There were named in said will, as legatees, Sergio Soll, Cayetano Solla, Josefa Solla, JacintoSerna, Rosenda Lagmay, Silvestra Sajor and Matias Seveda, and Leandro Serrano, as universalheir, with their shares given them by the will above-mentioned.

3. Said legatees or their descendants or heirs did not judicially claim their legacies during the life-time of Leandro Serrano, of which he had taken possession, neither was any testamentaryproceeding instituted for the settlement of the estate left by Maria Solla and that Leandro Serranodid not deliver the legacies in question, which he possessed in his name until his death, havingdeclared the property for taxation as his own and collected the income therefrom for himself.

4. That the plaintiffs Julian Solla, Lucia Solla, Ambrosio Lagmay, Rosenda Lagmay, FranciscoSerna, 2. Juana Baclig, Pedro Serna, Agapita Serna and Pedro Garcia are the descendants orheirs of some of the original legatees, two of whom are the plaintiffs Silvestra Sajor and RosendaLagmay; and the defendants are heirs of Leandro Serrano.

5. That the said legacies produce 35 uyones of play net annually, and maguey, which theplaintiffs claim amount to P1,000 as against P300 claimed by the defendants.

6. That the property of the legacy situated in Cabugao passed into possession of Simeon Serranoby virtue of Leandro Serrano's will as executor thereof, and that said legacies have been and aremixed with other property of the estate of Leandro Serrano.

The plaintiffs present as evidence their Exhibits B and C and the defendants also present asevidence their Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.

Therefore, both parties pray Honorable Court to render upon the stipulation of facts, the factsproven by the documentary evidence, and in accordance with law, with the costs againstdefeated party.

Vigan, October 14, 1924.


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(Sgd.) ANTONIO DIRECTOAttorney for the plaintiffs

(Sgd.) MIGUEL FLORENTINO

ANT. BELMONTEAttorneys for the defendants

Later in the morning of the same day the parties again appeared before the court, and the followingproceedings were had:

A little after ten.

COURT. Attorneys Antonio Belmonte and Antonio Directo again appear and ask the court toreceive their respective documentary evidence in this case. Attorney Directo presents Exhibit A,which is certified copy of the clerk of the court and is made a part of the complaint. exhibit B is acertified copy of Mria Solla's will and plaintiffs' Exhibit C is a certified copy of Leandro Serrano'swill.

BELMONTE. I agree with the stipulation of facts that these documents are integral parts thereofand the court should consider them as such.

COURT. Have you any objection?

BELMONTE. There is an agreement between both parties that there will be no objection, that isto say, that all the evidence may be admitted as part of the stipulation.

COURT. The exhibits mentioned in the stipulation are admitted as part of the same.

BELMONTE. The defense also presents Exhibit 1, as evidence and as an integral part of the

statement of facts, which is a duly registered possessory information; Exhibit 2 is also a dulyregistered possessory information; Exhibit 4 is a public document wherein the legateesrenounced the legacies in question; Exhibit 5 is a deed of sale; Exhibit 6 is a Spanish translationof Exhibit 5; Exhibit 7 is a composition title issued by the State, all of which refer to the land inquestion.

COURT. Each and every one of the exhibits presented by the Attorney Belmonte also forms apart of the stipulation of facts between both attorneys and are admitted.

BELMONTE. And with this presentation of evidence we submit the case for the decision of thecourt.

Exhibit A mentioned by the parties in their second appearance, consists of a list of the property which it issaid was left by the deceased Maria Solla.

Exhibit B is the nuncupative of the said deceased Maria Solla executed on April 19, 1883.

Exhibit C is the will of Leonardo Serrano, universal heir of Maria Solla, executed August 22, 1921.

Exhibit 1 is a possessory information proceeding covering 15 parcels of land situated in the municipality ofCabugao, Province of Ilocos Sur, instituted by Leandro Serrano on April 1, 1895, and registered in the


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registry of deeds on April 25, 1895. Leandro Serrano, in his application, claims to be the absolute ownerin fee simple of said 15 parcels. Said petition is supported by the testimony of Julio Solla, Apolonio Solla,Mauro Solla and Juan Solla, children of Sergio Solla, one of the legatees named by the deceased MariaSolla.

Exhibit 2 is another possessory information proceeding covering 36 parcels of land situated in the

municipality of Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, instituted by Leandro Serrano on March 20, 1895 and registered inthe registry of deeds on May 20, 1895. Leandro Serrano, in his petition, also claims to be absolute ownerin fee simple of the said 36 parcels ands is supported by the testimony of Juan Solla, son of the legateeSergio Solla.

Exhibit 3 is another possessory information proceeding covering 65 parcels situated within themunicipality of Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, instituted by Leandro Serrano on March 26, 1895 and registered inthe registry of deeds on April 24, 1895. Leandro Serrano, in his petition, claims to be the absolute ownerin fee of said land.

Exhibit 4 is the record of certain proceedings of the president of the municipality of Cabugao at theinstance of Leandro Serrano in which formal renunciation of their respective legacies is made by thelegatees named in Maria Solla's will.

Exhibit 5 is a deed of sale made by Matias Sevedea in favor of Leandro Serrano of one parcel of landinstituted in Cabugao which he had received from Maria Solla as a legacy.

Exhibit 7 is a royal title issued by the Spanish Government in favor of Leandro Serrano to six parcels ofland situated in the barrio of Alongoong of the municipality of Cabugao of the Province of Ilocos Sur.

It also appears from the record that Leandro Serrano took possession of the property left by Maria Sollaimmediately after her death which occurred on June 11, 1883, and continued in possession of the sameuntil his death, which took place on August 5, 1921, having instituted possessory informationproceedings, declared the property for taxation, paid the land tax on the same and enjoyed its productsexclusively.

On account of the intimate relation between them, we shall consider the first two assignments of errortogether.

The defendants-appellants that the trial court erred in considering plaintiffs' Exhibit A as a part of thestipulation of facts, disregarding the complete absence of a description of the land which they to recover.

From folio 2 of the transcript of the stenographic notes it appears that on the morning of October 16, 1924the attorney for the defendants, Mr. Antonio Belmonte, agreed to the admission of all of the documentaryevidence presented at that time as a part of the agreement, among which is found the document ExhibitA, which contains a list of the supposed legacies left by the deceased Maria Solla, to the predecessors ininterest of the plaintiffs, with their respective descriptions, which were the subject-matter of the complaintherein, leaving to the sound discretion of the court to weigh the same. It is true that the court found that

six of the parcels described therein were the exclusive property of Leandro Serrano and are covered bythe royal title, Exhibit 7 of the defendants, but this does not in any manner mean that the other parcelswere not those left by the testratix Maria Solla to her brothers and nephews.

Therefore, the first and second assignments of error are groundless.

In regard to the third assignment of error of the defendants-appellants that Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7having been presented as evidence by the defendants and admitted by the plaintiffs as an integral part ofthe stipulation of facts, it was an error not to give full weight to said documents.


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The fourth assignment of error of the defendants-appellants raises the question of prescription of theplaintiffs' action.

It appears from the stipulation of facts that, aside from the renunciation mad by the legatees of theirrespective legacies, according to Exhibit 4, Leandro Serrano was in possession of the property left byMaria Solla from June 11, 1883 until August 5, 1921, having obtained a possessory information in his

favor, which was duly registered in the registry of deeds, exclusively enjoyed the products thereof,declared it as his property for the purpose of taxation and paid the corresponding land tax thereon,without any of the legatees or their successors in interest having formally nor judicially claimed any titlethereto or asked for any share of the products, or contributed to the payment of the land tax.

Furthermore, in the possessory information proceedings wherein Leandro Serrano claimed to be theabsolute owner in fee simple of the lands involved therein, the children of Sergio Solla, one of the legatesof the deceased Maria Solla, testified in support of the petitions.

So that under the provisions of articles 1940 and 1957 of the Civil Code, as well as the provisions ofsections 38, 40 and 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the plaintiffs have lost by, extinctive prescription,not only all right of action to recover the ownership of the property left to their predecessors in interest, butalso whatever right of ownership they have had to the same because of Leandro Serrano's exclusive,

open, peaceful and continuous possession which was adverse to all the world including the legatees andtheir successors, for the period of thirty-nine years under claim of ownership, evidenced not only by hisapplications for possessory information, but also by his exclusive enjoyment of the products of saidproperty, even if it is considered that the legatees have not renounced their part in the legacy hasgiven him, by operation of law, exclusive and absolute title to the said properties. (Bargayo vs. Camumot,40 Phil., 857, 869.)

The fifth and sixth assignments of error raise the question of the true interpretation of the provisions of thelast will of the testratix Maria Solla in regard to the obligation imposed upon the universal heir named byher, Leandro Serrano, and of the provisions of the last will of the latter in regard to the obligation imposedby him upon his heir, and executor Simeon Serrano, one of the herein defendants-appellants.

The following are the pertinent parts of Maria Solla's will:

I also and order that there be given, in the way of legacies, to my brother Sergio Solla and sistersCayetana Solla and Josefa Solla, to my nephew Jacinto Serna and to Rosenda Lagmay andSilvestra Sajor whom I have raised, and to my servant Matias Seveda, distributed in the followingmanner . . . I also declare that I have no forced heirs, my parents and my two sons having died,and I am at liberty to name any their I care to and whom I consider proper. Therefore not havinganyone who inspires me with confidence and is willing to comply strictly with my orders andrequests in this will, I desire and hereby name Leandro Serrano, my grandson, as my universalheir who is a legitimate son of my son Modesto Solosa, and is single; and besides I have raisedhim from infancy, and have not yet given him anything notwithstanding that he has always beenwith me, always helping me; and I desire him to comply with the obligation to give or deliver to theparish priest of this town a sufficient sum of money necessary for a yearly novena for an ordinaryrequire mass for the first eight days thereof and on the ninth, or last day, a solemn requiem mass,

with vigil and a large bier, for these masses and for the repose of my soul and those of myparents, husband, children and other relatives. I repeat and insist that my heir shall execute andcomply with this request without fail. And at the hour of his death he will insist that his heirscomply with all that I have here ordered.

The pertinent parts of the will of Leandro Serrano (Exhibit C) are as follows:

Third. I command my executor to put all of my property in order, separating first the property ofhis deceased grandmother Capitana Maria Solla, because she directed in her will that her


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property be distributed strictly in conformity with her wishes and as she earnestly requested thecompliance of her bequests I obligate my heirs to comply with the same; for that reason it is mywish and I really should like to deliver it to my granddaughter, Corazon Serrano, my adopteddaughter, but as she is already dead, I deliver it to her father Simeon Serrano because among mychildren he is the only one who is very obedient to me and I hope he will comply with all myorders and those of his grandmother Maria Solla. In fact he is the only one of my children whowas able to help me in all my troubles and he is the most obedient one of them; because,although I became angry with him and threatened him many times, he paid no attention to myreprimands. Such is not the case with my other children, who, when I became a little angry, eachtime drifted farther away and have never offered me any help, which had accused me much pain,but, nevertheless, they continue to be my children and I do not exclude them.

xxx xxx xxx

Fifth. On occupation of the fact that all of the property of the deceased Capitana Solla was givento my son Simeon I order him not to forget annually all the souls of the relatives of mygrandmother and also of nine and to have a mass said on the first and ninth days of the yearlynovena and that he erect a first class bier.

xxx xxx xxx

I insistently order that the property of my deceased grandmother Capitana Maria be disposed ofin conformity with all the provisions of her will and of mine.

As may be seen Maria Solla named grandson Leandro Serrano in her will as her universal heir to herproperty and ordered him to strictly comply with her orders and requests and that at the hour of his deathto make the same insistence upon his heirs to comply with all that she has ordered.

As may also be seen Leandro Serrano named his son Simeon Serrano, as executor of his will and that hedirected him to put all of his property in order and to separate that which came from his deceasedgrandmother Maria Solla, which he gives to his said son Simeon Serrano and orders that same bedisposed of exclusively in conformity with the wishes of his said grandmother, not forgetting the souls of

all of his grandmother's relatives and of his own for whose repose nine masses were to be said annuallyduring nine days, with a solemn mass on the first and last days.

Now, then, what are the orders and requests that Maria Solla wanted the universal heir named by her inher will, Leandro Serrano, to faithfully comply with and to make his heirs comply with, and what are theorders of Maria Solla which Leandro Serrano ordered his executor and heir Simeon Serrano to complywith?

In the first place, there is the distribution of the legacies given in her will to her brothers, nephew,protegees and servant. In the second place, the delivery of a sufficient sum of money to the parish ofCabugao for the annual novena, consisting of eight ordinary masses and one solemn requiem mass,together with vigil and bier on the last day for the repose of the soul of the testratix and her parents,children, husband and other relatives; and in the third place, the order that Leandro Serrano demand, withthe same insistence, that this heirs comply with all that she had ordered. Leandro Serrano have compliedwith all of these commands and orders during his lifetime, some wholly and others partially. The ordersand requests that he could and should have fully complied with during his lifetime were to distribute thelegacies and to order his heirs to comply with all her wishes specified in her will. The order or request thathe was able to comply with only partially was to deliver to the parish priest a sufficient sum of moneynecessary for the annual masses for the repose of the soul of Maria Solla and her parents, husband,children and other relatives.


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It is not logical to suppose that Maria Solla in ordering Leandro Serrano to insist in his will that his heirsafter his death comply with all the requests contained in her said will, referred to the orders and requeststhat he could and should comply with during his lifetime, because neither is it logical nor reasonable tosuppose that she for a moment doubted that the person whom she had named as her universal heir for, according to her, he was the only person in whom she had any confidence would comply with herrequests. If that is so, Maria Solla could not have referred to other than the pious orders and requests,because, by reason of their nature, they were the only ones which Leandro Serrano could not whollycomply with during his lifetime, but that his heirs would continue to do so. And Leandro Serrano, incomplying with the requests of Maria Solla in his will by ordering his son Simeon Serrano, to whom hebequeathed all of the property received from the former, to comply with all of the requests of the same,could not have meant but those requests which Maria Solla wished complied with by the heirs of LeandroSerrano which are those relating to the pious bequests. She confirms this on the fifth clause of her willquoted above, in which she says: "On account of the fact that all the property of the deceased CapitanaSolla is bequeathed to my son Simeon I order him not to forget the souls of my grandmother's relatives."From this is evidently appears that Leandro Serrano bequeathed all of the property of the deceased MariaSolla to his son Simeon Serrano only in order that he might comply with her pious requests. Furthermoreif to ease his conscience it had been Leandro Serrano's desire to deliver the aforesaid legacies to thelegatees or to their successors in interest he would have done so during his lifetime or would have said soclearly in his will and would not have given all of his said property to his son Simeon Serrano.

In order to determine the testator's intention, the court should place itself as near as possible in hisposition, and hence, where the language of the will is ambiguous or doubtful, should take intoconsideration the situation of the testator and the facts and circumstances surrounding him at the time thewill executed. (40 Cyc., 1392.) Where the testator's intention is manifest from the context of the will andsurrounding circumstances, but is obscured by inapt and inaccurate modes of expression, the languagewill be subordinated to the intention, and in order to give effect to such intention, as far as possible, thecourt may depart from the strict wording and read word or phrase in a sense different from that which isordinarily attributed to it, and for such purpose may mould or change the language of the will. such asrestricting its application or supplying omitted words or phrases. (40 Cyc., 1399.)

In the present case, it clearly appearing that it was Mari Solla's intention, in ordering her universal heirLeandro Serrano in her will at the hour of his death, to insist upon the compliance of her orders by hisheirs, that the latter should comply with her pious orders and that she did not mean her orders concerningher legacies, the compliance of which she had entrusted to Leandro Serrano, we are authorized to restrictthe application of the words "all that I have here ordered" used by the said Maria Solla and the words "allher orders" used by Leandro Serrano in their respective wills limiting them to the pious orders andsubstituting the phrase "in regard to the annual masses" after the words used by both testators,respectively.

The trial court, therefore, committed an error in interpreting the order to Leandro Serrano mentioned in hiswill as applicable to the provisions of Maria Solla's will relative to the legacies and not to pious bequestsexclusively.

As to the remaining assignments of error, they being merely corollaries of the fifth and sixth, the pointsraised therein are impliedly decided in our disposition of said two assignments last mentioned.

With respect to the appeal of the plaintiffs-appellants, the two assignments of error made therein arewithout merit in view of the foregoing considerations and the conclusions we have arrived at with regardto the assignments of error made by the defendants-appellants.

In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the judgment appealed from must be, as hereby,reversed in all its parts and the complaint dismissed, without special findings as to costs. So ordered.


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In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA. SEVERINA A. VDA. DEENRIQUEZ, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,

vs.

MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.

Manuel A. Zosa, Luis B. Ladonga, Mariano A. Zosa and B. G. Advincula for appellants.

C. de la Victoria for appellees.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a documentpurporting to be his Last Will and Testament now marked Exhibit "A". Resident of the City of Cebu, hedied on January 14, 1943, in the municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he was an evacuee. He leftproperties estimated at P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees inExhibit "A", filed a petition for its probate in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins andnephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed opposition.

During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified without contradictionthat in his presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho wrote out in longhand Exhibit"A" in Spanish which the testator spoke and understood; that he (testator) signed on he left hand marginof the front page of each of the three folios or sheets of which the document is composed, and numberedthe same with Arabic numerals, and finally signed his name at the end of his writing at the last page, allthis, in the presence of the three attesting witnesses after telling that it was his last will and that the saidthree witnesses signed their names on the last page after the attestation clause in his presence and in thepresence of each other. The oppositors did not submit any evidence.

The learned trial court found and declared Exhibit "A" to be a holographic will; that it was in thehandwriting of the testator and that although at the time it was executed and at the time of the testator'sdeath, holographic wills were not permitted by law still, because at the time of the hearing and when thecase was to be decided the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code permitted the execution of

holographic wills, under a liberal view, and to carry out the intention of the testator which according to thetrial court is the controlling factor and may override any defect in form, said trial court by order datedJanuary 24, 1952, admitted to probate Exhibit "A", as the Last Will and Testament of Father SanchoAbadia. The oppositors are appealing from that decision; and because only questions of law are involvedin the appeal, the case was certified to us by the Court of Appeals.

The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under article 810 thereof provides that a person may executea holographic will which must be entirely written, dated and signed by the testator himself and need notbe witnessed. It is a fact, however, that at the time that Exhibit "A" was executed in 1923 and at the timethat Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills were not permitted, and the law at the time imposedcertain requirements for the execution of wills, such as numbering correlatively each page (not folio orsheet) in letters and signing on the left hand margin by the testator and by the three attesting witnesses,requirements which were not complied with in Exhibit "A" because the back pages of the first two folios of

the will were not signed by any one, not even by the testator and were not numbered, and as to the threefront pages, they were signed only by the testator.

Interpreting and applying this requirement this Court in the case of In re Estate of Saguinsin,41 Phil. 875,879, referring to the failure of the testator and his witnesses to sign on the left hand margin of every page,said:

. . . . This defect is radical and totally vitiates the testament. It is not enough that the signaturesguaranteeing authenticity should appear upon two folios or leaves; three pages having been written on,the authenticity of all three of them should be guaranteed by the signature of the alleged testatrix and her
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witnesses.

And in the case of Aspe vs. Prieto,46 Phil. 700, referring to the same requirement, this Court declared:

From an examination of the document in question, it appears that the left margins of the six pages of thedocument are signed only by Ventura Prieto. The noncompliance with section 2 of Act No. 2645 by theattesting witnesses who omitted to sign with the testator at the left margin of each of the five pages of thedocument alleged to be the will of Ventura Prieto, is a fatal defect that constitutes an obstacle to itsprobate.

What is the law to apply to the probate of Exh. "A"? May we apply the provisions of the new Civil Codewhich not allows holographic wills, like Exhibit "A" which provisions were invoked by the appellee-petitioner and applied by the lower court? But article 795 of this same new Civil Code expressly provides:"The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it ismade." The above provision is but an expression or statement of the weight of authority to the affect thatthe validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time of the testator's death or at the timethe supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided by the court but at thetime the instrument was executed. One reason in support of the rule is that although the will operatesupon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of his estateamong his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and

in reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act. This ruling has been laid down by thiscourt in the case of In re Will of Riosa, 39 Phil. 23. It is a wholesome doctrine and should be followed.

Of course, there is the view that the intention of the testator should be the ruling and controlling factor andthat all adequate remedies and interpretations should be resorted to in order to carry out said intention,and that when statutes passed after the execution of the will and after the death of the testator lessen theformalities required by law for the execution of wills, said subsequent statutes should be applied so as tovalidate wills defectively executed according to the law in force at the time of execution. However, weshould not forget that from the day of the death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legateesand devisees under it becomes a vested right, protected under the due process clause of the constitutionagainst a subsequent change in the statute adding new legal requirements of execution of wills whichwould invalidate such a will. By parity of reasoning, when one executes a will which is invalid for failure toobserve and follow the legal requirements at the time of its execution then upon his death he should be

regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by intestate succession, andno subsequent law with more liberal requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as toexecution should be allowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rightsin the estate by intestate succession. The general rule is that the Legislature can not validate void wills(57 Am. Jur., Wills, Sec. 231, pp. 192-193).

In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and Exhibit "A" is denied probate. Withcosts.

G.R. No. L-23770 February 18, 1926

MAGIN RIOSA, plaintiff-appellant,vs.PABLO ROCHA, MARCELINA CASAS, MARIA CORRAL and CONSOLACION R. DE CALLEJA,defendants-appellees.

Domingo Imperial for appellantMariano Locsin for appellees.

AVANCEA, C.J.:
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Maria Corral was united in marriage with the deceased Mariano Riosa, it being her first and only marriageand during which time she bore him three children named Santiago, Jose and Severina. The latter diedduring infancy and the other two survived their father, Mariano Riosa. Santiago Riosa, no deceased,married Francisca Villanueva, who bore him two children named Magin and Consolacion Riosa. JoseRiosa, also deceased, married Marcelina Casas and they had one child who died before the father, thelatter therefore leaving no issue. Mariano Riosa left a will dividing his property between his two children,Santiago and Jose Riosa, giving the latter the eleven parcels of land described in the complaint. Upon thedeath of Jose Riosa he left a will in which he named his wife, Marcelina Casas, as his only heir.

On May 16, 1917, the will of Jose Riosa was filed for probate. Notwithstanding the fact that MarcelinaCasas was the only heir named in the will, on account of the preterition of Maria Corral who, being themother of Jose Riosa, was his legitimate heir, I Marcelina Casas and Maria Corral, on the same date ofthe filing of the will for probate, entered into a contract by which they divided between themselves theproperty left by Jose Riosa, the eleven parcels of land described in the complaint being assigned to MariaCorral.

On October 26, 1920, Maria Corral sold parcels Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10 and 11 to Marcelina Casas for thesum of P20,000 in a public instrument which was recorded in the registry of deeds on November 6, 1920.On November 3, 1920, Marcelina Casas sold these eight parcels of land to Pablo Rocha for the sum of

P60,000 in a public document which was recorded in the registry of deeds on November 6, 1920. OnSeptember 24, 1921, Pablo Rocha returned parcels No. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 to Maria Corral stating in thedeed executed for the purpose that these parcels of land had been erroneously included in the sale madeby Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas.

The Court of first Instance denied the probate of the will of Jose Riosa, but on appeal this court reversedthe decision of the lower court and allowed the will to probate. 1 The legal proceedings for the probate ofthe will and the settlement of the testate estate of Jose Riosa were followed; and, at the time of thepartition, Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas submitted to the court the contract of extrajudicial partitionwhich they had entered into on May 16, 1917, and which was approved by the court, by order ofNovember 12, 1920, as though it had been made within the said testamentary proceedings.

From the foregoing is appears that the eleven parcels of land described in the complaint were acquired by

Jose Riosa, by lucrative title, from his father Mariano Riosa and that after the death of Jose Riosa, byoperation of law, they passed to his mother Maria Corral. By virtue of article 811 of the Civil Code theseeleven parcels of land are reservable property. It results, furthermore, that parcels 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and9 still belong in fee simple to Maria Corral, and that parcels 10 and 11 were successively sold by MariaCorral to Marcelina Casas and by the latter to Pablo Rocha. Lastly, it appears that Magin andConsolacion Riosa are the nearest relatives within the third degree of the line from which this propertycame.

This action was brought by Magin Riosa, for whom the property should have been reserved, againstMaria Corral, whose duty it was to reserve it, and against Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha aspurchasers of parcels 10 and 11. Consolacion Riosa de Calleja who was also bound to make thereservation was included as a defendant as she refused to join as plaintiff.

The complaint prays that the property therein described be declared reservable property and that theplaintiffs Jose and Consolacion Riosa be declared reservees; that this reservation be noted in the registryof deeds; that the sale of parcels 10 and 11 to Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha be declared valid onlyin so far as it saves the right of reservation in favor of the plaintiff Magin Riosa and of the defendantConsolacion Riosa, and that this right of reservation be also noted on the deeds of sale executed in favorof Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha; that Maria Corral, Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha give a bondof P50,000, with good and sufficient sureties, in favor of the reservees as surety for the conservation andmaintenance of the improvements existing on the said reservable property. The dispositive part of thecourt's decision reads as follows:


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For the foregoing reasons it is held:

1. That the eleven parcels of land described in paragraph 6 of the complaint have the character ofreservable property; 2. That the defendant Maria Corral, being compelled to make thereservation, must reserve them in favor of the plaintiff Magin Riosa and the defendantConsolacion Riosa de Calleja in case that either of these should survive her; 3. That Magin Riosa

and Consolacion Riosa de Calleja have the right, in case that Maria Corral should die beforethem, to receive the said parcels or their equivalent.

In virtue whereof, the defendant Maria Corral is ordered: 1. To acknowledge the right of MaginRiosa and Consolacion Riosa de Calleja to the reservation of the said parcels of lands describedin the complaint, which she shall expressly record in the registration of said lands in the office ofthe register of deeds of this province; 2. To insure the delivery of said parcels of lands, or theirequivalent, to Magin Riosa and Consolacion Riosa de Calleja, should either of them survive her,either by a mortgage thereon or by a bond in the amount of P30,000, without expresspronouncement as to costs.

The other defendants are absolved from the complaint.

Inasmuch as the reservation from its inception imposes obligations upon the reservor (reservista) andcreates rights in favor of the reservation (reservatarios) it is of the utmost importance to determine thetime when the land acquired the character of reservable property.

It will be remembered that on May 16, 1917, Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas entered into a contract ofextrajudicial partition of the property left by Jose Riosa, in which they assigned to Maria Corral, as herlegitime, the parcels of land here in question, and at the same time petitioned for the probate of the will ofJose Riosa and instituted the testamentary proceeding. In support of the legality of the extrajudicialpartition between Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas the provision of section 596 of the Code of CivilProcedure is invoked, which authorizes the heirs of a person dying without a will to make a partitionwithout the intervention of the courts whenever the heirs are all of age and the deceased has left nodebts. But this legal provisions refers expressly to intestate estates and, of course, excludes testateestates like the one now before us.

When the deceased has left a will the partition of his property must be made in accordance therewith.According to section 625 of the same Code no will can pass property until it is probated. And even afterbeing probated it cannot pass any property if its provisions impair the legitime fixed by law in favor ofcertain heirs. Therefore, the probate of the will and the validity of the testamentary provisions must bepassed upon by the court.

For the reasons stated, and without making any express finding as to the efficacy of the extrajudicialpartition made by Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas, we hold that for the purposes of the reservation andthe rights and obligations arising thereunder in connection with the favored relatives, the property cannotbe considered as having passed to Maria Corral but from the date when the said partition was approvedby the court, that is, on November 12, 1920. In the case of Pavia vs. De la Rosa (8 Phil., 70), this courtlaid down the same doctrine in the following language:

The provisions of Act No. 190 (Code of Civil Procedure) have annulled the provisions of article1003 and others of the Civil Code with regard to the pure or simple acceptance of the inheritanceof a deceased person or that made with benefit of inventory and the consequences thereof.

x x x x x x x x x

The heir legally succeeds the deceased from whom he derives his right and title, but only afterthe liquidation of the estate, the payment of the debts of same, and the adjudication of the residue


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of the estate of the deceased, and in the meantime the only person in charge by law to attend toall claims against the estate of the deceased debtor is the executor or administrator appointed bya competent court.

As has been indicated, parcels 10 and 11 described in the complaint were first sold by Maria Corral toMarcelina Casas who later sold them to Pablo Rocha. In this appeal it is urged that Marcelina Casas and

Pablo Rocha, who were absolved by the court below, be ordered to acknowledge the reservation as toparcels 10 and 11, acquired by them, and to have the said reservation noted on their titles. Thisargument, of course, is useless as to Marcelina Casas for the reason that she transferred all her rights toPablo Rocha.

It has been held by jurisprudence that the provisions of the law referred to in article 868 tending to assurethe efficacy of the reservation by the surviving spouse are applicable to the reservation known as "reservatroncal," referred to in article 811, which is the reservation now under consideration.

In accordance with article 977, Maria Corral, reservor, is obliged to have the reservation noted in theregistry of deeds in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law which fixes the period of ninetydays for accomplishing it (article 199, in relation with article 191, of the Mortgage Law). According toarticle 203 of the General Regulation for the application of the Mortgage Law, this time must be computed

from the acceptance of the inheritance. But as this portion of the Civil Code, regarding the acceptance ofthe inheritance, has been repealed, the time, as has been indicated, must be computed from theadjudication of the property by the court to the heirs, in line with the decision of this court hereinabovequoted. After the expiration of this period the reservees may demand compliance with this obligation.

If Maria Corral had not transferred parcels 10 and 11 to another there would be no doubt that she couldbe compelled to cause the reservable character of this property to be noted in the registry of deeds. Thisland having been sold to Marcelina Casas who, in turn, sold it to Pablo Rocha the question arises whetherthe latter can be compelled to have this reservation noted on his title. This acquisition by Pablo Rochatook place when it was the duty of Maria Corral to make the notation of the reservation in the registry andat the time when the reservees had no right to compel Maria Corral to make such notation, because thisacquisition was made before the expiration of the period of ninety days from November 12, 1920, the dateof the adjudication by the court, after which the right of the reservees to commence an action for the

fulfillment of the obligation arose. But the land first passed to Marcelina Casas and later to Pablo Rochatogether with the obligation that the law imposes upon Maria Corral. They could not have acquired abetter title than that held by Maria Corral and if the latter's title was limited by the reservation and theobligation to note it in the registry of deeds, this same limitation is attached to the right acquired byMarcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha.

In the transmission of reservable property the law imposes the reservation as a resolutory condition forthe benefit of the reservees (article 975, Civil Code). The fact that the resolvable character of the propertywas not recorded in the registry of deed at the time that it was acquired by Marcelina Casas and PabloRocha cannot affect the right of the reservees, for the reason that the transfers were made at the timewhen it was the obligation of the reservor to note only such reservation and the reservees did not themhave any right to compel her to fulfill such an obligation.

Marcelina Casas, as well as Pablo Rocha, Knew of the reservable character of the property when theybought it. They had knowledge of the provisions of the last will and testament of Mariano Riosa by virtueof which these parcels were transferred to Jose Riosa. Pablo Rocha was one of the legatees in the will.Marcelina Casas was the one who entered into the contract of partition with Maria Corral, whereby theseparcels were adjudicated to the latter, as a legitimate heir of Jose Riosa. Pablo Rocha was the veryperson who drafted the contracts of sale of these parcels of land by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas andby the latter to himself. These facts, together with the relationship existing between Maria Corral andMarcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha, the former a daughter-in-law and the latter a nephew of Maria Corral,amply support the conclusion that both of them knew that these parcels of land had been inherited byMaria Corral, as her legitime from her son Jose Riosa who had inherited them, by will, from his father


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Mariano Riosa, and were reservable property. Wherefore, the duty of Maria Corral of recording thereservable character of lots 10 and 11 has been transferred to Pablo Rocha and the reservees have anaction against him to compel him to comply with this obligation.

The appellant also claims that the obligation imposed upon Maria Corral of insuring the return of theseparcels of land, or their value, to the reservees by means of a mortgage or a bond in the amount of

P30,000, also applies to Pablo Rocha. The law does not require that the reservor give this security, therecording of the reservation in the registry of deeds being sufficient (art. 977 of the Civil Code). There isno ground for this requirement inasmuch as, the notation once is made, the property will answer for theefficacy of the reservation. This security for the value of the property is required by law (art. 978,paragraph 4, of the Civil Code) in the case of a reservation by the surviving spouse when the property hasbeen sold before acquiring the reservable character (art 968 of the Civil Code), but is not applicable toreservation known as reserva troncal(art 811 of the Civil Code). In the case of Dizon and Dizon vs.Galang (page 601, ante), this court held that:

* * * As already intimated, the provisions of the law tending to give efficacy to a reservation by thewidowed spouse mentioned in article 968 are applicable to the reserva troncalprovided for inarticle 811. But as these two reservations vary in some respects, these rules may be applied tothe reserva troncalonly in so far as the latter is similar to a reservation by the widowed spouse. In

the reserva troncalthe property goes to the reservor as reservable property and it remains sountil the reservation takes place or is extinguished. In a reservation by the widowed spouse thereare two distinct stages, one when the property goes to the widower without being reservable, andthe other when the widower contracts a second marriage, whereupon the property, whichtheretofore has been in his possession free of any encumbrance, becomes reservable. These twostages also affect differently the transfer that may be made of the property. If the property is soldduring the first stage, before becoming reservable, it is absolutely free and is transferred to thepurchaser unencumbered. But if the sale is made during the second stage, that is, when the dutyto reserve has arisen, the property goes to the purchaser subject to the reservation, withoutprejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law. This is the reason why the law provides thatshould the property be sold before it becomes reservable, or before the widower contractsanother marriage, he will be compelled to secure the value of the property by a mortgage uponcontracting a new marriage, so that the reservation may not lose its efficacy and that the rights ofthose for whom the reservation is made may be assured. This mortgage is not required by lawwhen the sale is made after the reservation will follow the property, without prejudice to thecontrary provisions of the Mortgage Law and the rights of innocent purchasers, there being noneed to secure the value of the property since it is liable for the efficacy of the reservation by awidowed spouse to secure the value of the property sold by the widower, before becomingreservable are not applicable to the reserva troncal where the property goes to the ascendantalready reservable in character. A sale in the case ofreserva troncalmight be analogous to asale made by the widower after contacting a second marriage in the case of a reservation by thewidowed spouse.

Since Maria Corral did not appeal, we cannot modify the appealed judgment in so far as it is unfavorableto her. As she has been ordered to record in the registry the reservable character of the other parcels ofland, the subject of this action, the questions raised by the appellant as to her are decided.

The judgment appealed from is modified and Pablo Rocha is ordered to record in the registry of deeds thereservable character of parcels 10 11, the subject of this complaint, without special pronouncement as tocosts. So ordered.


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Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-46364 April 6, 1990

SULPICIA JIMENEZ and TORIBIO MATIAS, Petitioners, vs. VICENTE FERNANDEZ alias HOSPICIOFERNANDEZ and TEODORA GRADO, Respondents.

PARAS, J.:

Before Us is a petition for review on certiorariof the following Decision 1 and Resolution 2 of theHonorable Court of Appeals: (1) Decision, dated March 1, 1977 in C.A.-G.R. No. 49178-R entitled"Sulpicia Jimenez, et al., v. Vicente Fernandez, et al." affirming in toto the judgment of the Court of FirstInstance of Pangasinan, Third Judicial District in Civil Case No. 14802-I between the same parties and (2)Resolution dated June 3, 1977 denying plaintiffs-appellants' motion forreconsideration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

As gathered from the records, the factual background of this case is as follows: chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The land in question is the Eastern portion with an area of Four Hundred Thirty Six (436) square metersof that parcel of residential land situated in Barrio Dulig (now Magsaysay), Municipality of Labrador,Pangasinan actually covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 82275 (Exhibit A) issued in the name ofSulpicia Jimenez.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The entire parcel of land with an area of 2,932 square meters, formerly belonged to Fermin Jimenez.Fermin Jimenez has two (2) sons named Fortunato and Carlos Jimenez. This Fortunato Jimenez whopredeceased his father has only one child, the petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez. After the death of Fermin

Jimenez, the entire parcel of land was registered under Act 496 in the name of Carlos Jimenez andSulpicia Jimenez (uncle and niece) in equal shares pro-indiviso. As a result of the registration caseOriginal Certificate of Title No. 50933 (Exhibit 8) was issued on February 28, 1933, in the names of CarlosJimenez and Sulpicia Jimenez, in equal shares pro-indiviso.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtuallaw library

Carlos Jimenez died on July 9, 1936 and his illegitimate daughter, Melecia Cayabyab, also known asMelecia Jimenez, took possession of the eastern portion of the property consisting of 436 squaremeters.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On January 20, 1944, Melecia Jimenez sold said 436 square meter-portion of the property to EdilbertoCagampan and defendant Teodora Grado executed a contract entitled "Exchange of Real Properties"whereby the former transferred said 436 square meter-portion to the latter, who has been in occupation

since.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On August 29, 1969, plaintiff Sulpicia Jimenez executed an affidavit adjudicating unto herself the otherhalf of the property appertaining to Carlos Jimenez, upon manifestation that she is the only heir of herdeceased uncle. Consequently Transfer Certificate of Title No. 82275 was issued on October 1, 1969 inpetitioner's name alone over the entire 2,932 square meter property.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library


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On April 1, 1970, Sulpicia Jimenez, joined by her husband, instituted the present action for the recovery ofthe eastern portion of the property consisting of 436 square meters occupied by defendant TeodoraGrado and her son.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint and holding the defendant, TeodoraGrado, the absolute owner of the land in question; ordering the plaintiffs to pay to the defendant theamount of P500.00 as damages, as attorney's fees, and to pay the costs ofsuit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 20)

Petitioner appealed the above judgment to the respondent Court of Appeals and on March 1, 1977,respondent Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the same in toto.Said decision was renderedby a special division of five (5) justices, with the Hon. Lourdes San Diego,dissenting.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioners within the reglementary period granted by the Honorable Court of Appeals, filed therewith a

motion for reconsideration. But said motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in itsresolution dated June 3, 1977.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In their appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals from the aforequoted decision of the trial court, hereinpetitioner raised the following assignments of error to wit:

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

I chanrobles virtual law library

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT MELECIA CAYABYAB, ALSO KNOWN ASMELECIA JIMENEZ, IS NOT THE DAUGHTER OF CARLOS JIMENEZ.

II chanrobles virtual law library

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT MELECIA CAYABYAB, ALSO KNOWN ASMELECIA JIMENEZ, HAS NO RIGHT TO SELL THE LAND IN QUESTION TO EDILBERTOCAGAMPAN.

III chanrobles virtual law library

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN DID NOTBECOME THE OWNER OF THE LAND IN QUESTION BY VIRTUE OF THE DEED OF SALE (EXH. "1")EXECUTED BY MELECIA CAYABYAB, ALIAS MELECIA JIMENEZ, IN HIS FAVOR.

IV chanrobles virtual law library

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT TEODORA GRADO DID NOT BECOME THEOWNER OF THE LAND IN QUESTION BY VIRTUE OF THE DEED OF EXCHANGE (EXH. "7")EXECUTED BY HER AND EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN.

V chanrobles virtual law library


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THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE TITLE OF APPELLANT SULPICIAJIMENEZ OVER THE LAND IN QUESTION CAN NOT BE DEFEATED BY THE ADVERSE OPEN ANDNOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF APPELLEE TEODORA GRADO.

VI chanrobles virtual law library

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE APPELLEE TEODORA GRADO IS THEABSOLUTE OWNER OF THE LAND IN QUESTION IN THE LIGHT OF THE DECISION OF THESUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF LOURDES ARCUINO, ET AL., V. RUFINA APARIS ANDCASIANO PURAY, G.R. NO. L-23424, PROMULGATED JANUARY 31, 1968, WHICH CASE IS NOTAPPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.

VII chanrobles virtual law library

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AND ORDERING THE APPELLANTSTO PAY THE APPELLEES THE SUM OF P500.00 AS ATTORNEYS FEES PLUS THE COSTS.

From the foregoing, this petition for review was filed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

We find merit in the petition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

From the start the respondent court erred in not declaring that Melecia Jimenez Cayabyab also known asMelecia Jimenez, is not the daughter of Carlos Jimenez and therefore, had no right over the property inquestion. Respondents failed to present concrete evidence to prove that Melecia Cayabyab was really thedaughter of Carlos Jimenez. Nonetheless, assuming for the sake of argument that Melecia Cayabyab wasthe illegitimate daughter of Carlos Jimenez there can be no question that Melecia Cayabyab had no rightto succeed to the estate of Carlos Jimenez and could not have validly acquired, nor legally transferred toEdilberto Cagampan that portion of the property subject of this petition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of thedeath of the decedent (Art. 777, Civil Code). Moreover, Art. 2263 of the Civil Code provides as follows:

Rights to the inheritance of a person who died with or without a will, before the effectivity of this Code,shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and by the Rules of Court . . . (Rollo,p. 17)

Thus, since Carlos Jimenez, owner of one-half pro-indiviso portion of that parcel of land then covered byOriginal Certificate of title No. 50933, died on July 9, 1936 (Exhibit "F") way before the effectivity of theCivil Code of the Philippines, the successional rights pertaining to his estate must be determined inaccordance with the Civil Code of 1889.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Citing the case of Cid v. Burnaman (24 SCRA 434) wherein this Court categorically held that:

To be an heir under the rules of Civil Code of 1889 (which was the law in force when Carlos Jimenez diedand which should be the governing law in so far as the right to inherit from his estate was concerned), achild must be either a child legitimate, legitimated, or adopted, or else an acknowledged natural child - forillegitimate not natural are disqualified to inherit. (Civil Code of 1889, Art. 807, 935)

Even assuming that Melecia Cayabyab was born out of the common-law-relationship between her mother(Maria Cayabyab) and Carlos Jimenez, she could not even be considered an acknowledged natural childbecause Carlos Jimenez was then legally married to Susana Abalos and therefore not qualified to marry


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In this instance, again We rule for the petitioner. There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches orstaleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances. Thequestion of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and since laches is an equitabledoctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat justice orto perpetrate fraud and injustice. It would be rank injustice and patently inequitous to deprive the lawfulheirs of their rightful inheritance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez is entitled to the relief prayed for, declaring her to be the sole and absoluteowner of the land in question with right to its possession and enjoyment. Since her uncle Carlos Jimenezdied in 1936, his pro-indiviso share in the properties then owned in co-ownership with his niece Sulpiciadescended by intestacy to Sulpicia Jimenez alone because Carlos died without any issue or otherheirs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

After all, the professed objective of Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act or the lawwhich established the Torrens System of Land Registration in the Philippines is that the stability of thelandholding system in the Philippines depends on the confidence of the people in the titles covering theproperties. And to this end, this Court has invariably upheld the indefeasibility of the Torrens Title and in,among others, J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Macalindong (6 SCRA 938), held that "the right of theappellee to file an action to recover possession based on its Torrens Title is imprescriptible and not

barred under the doctrine of laches.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution dated March1, 1977 and June 3, 1977 in CA G.R. No. L-49178-R are SET ASIDE.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Melencio-Herrera, J., took no part.

Miciano v. Brimo (case where the decedent wanted RP laws instead of his turkish law to apply to theintrinsic validity of his will and whoever contests it loses his "mana" - note that in the end, RP laws stillapplied by the processual presumption as no evidence of turkish law presented): Although Andre Brimoopposed his brother's will, he's not deemed to have contested the legacy because the choice-of-lawclause in the will was contrary to law-but since there's a policy of giving primacy to the last will and testament of the testator, the court shouldhave adopted apolicy centered approach instead of the mechanical application oflex nationalii.

MOST SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP APPROACH: decedent was a resident of RP, executedwill in RP, intended RP law to apply, will concerned properties located in RP - can justify applicationof RP Law

DISINGENUOUS CHARACTERIZATION (applicable choice-of-law rule is determined by how theissue was characterized by the court. So if characterize the main issue to call for the forum'sapplication of its own susbtantive law): here, court could characterize the main issue as a propertycase instead of succession to justify the application of RP laws - lex rei sitae

UVCayetano v. LeonidasSummary: decedent who was a former Filipino citizen naturalized as a citizen of Pennsylvania, executeda will in US which did not leave anything to her father, who was her sole compulsory heir. Court held thatsince the decedent was already a US Citizen at the time she made her will, US laws would apply as tointrinsic validity (thus, no need for legitimes - her father would not have aything)Facts


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Decedent: Adoracion CamposSurviving heirs:

Father: Hermogenes - only compulsory heir

Sisters: Nenita Paguia, Remedios Lopez and Marieta Medina

-Hermogenes executed anAffidavit of Adjudication whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownershipof the entire estate of Adoracion

-11 months after, Nenita Paguia filed apetition for the reprobate of a will of Adoracion, which wasallegedly executed in the US and for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceasedtestatrix.- An opposition to the reprobate of the willwas filed by Hermogenes:

will in question is a forgery

intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void

even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same could not apply

inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury to him- Hermogenes filed a Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or Interests): confirmsvalidity of will-TC: admitted last will and testament, allowed probate inRP- Hermogenes filed apetition for relief:

withdrawal of his opposition was secured through fraud

+ motion entitled "Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside the Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss thecase for lack of jurisdiction.-TC: dismissed: failed to present evidence in support of itWILL:

Adoracion was a US citizen, a permanent resident of Pennsylvania at the time she made the will

She died in Manila while temporarily residing with her sister

Made in accordance with Pennsylvania law, probated and registered in Penn. after her death

WON the intrinsic validity of the will can be passed upon during probate of the will? YES HERE.GR: probate court's authority is limited only to:

the extrinsic validity of the will

due execution

testatrix's testamentary capacity

Compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law

X: where practical considerations demand intrinsic validity to be passed uponWON the will is valid even if the compulsory heir was deprived of his legitime? YES

1.It was sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizenand a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.

2. Capacity to succeed is governed by thelaw of the nation of the decedent: law ofPennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. [Article 16(2) and 1039 of the CivilCode]

3. Pennsylvania law: no legitimes, testator could give away entire estate to strangers!WON the will (which completely deprived compulsory heir of share) is against public policy? NO-used Bellis v. Bellis: whatever public policy or good customs may be involved, Congress has notintended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationalsUV

Interpretation of Wills

-governed by rules of interpretation of decedent's NATIONAL LAWAmbiguity...GR: where terms clear and unambiguous, lex intentionis should be followed (A1370)X: ambiguous: intention of the party or the exact meaning may be inferred by

referring to the context of the instrument itself

Referring to testator's contemporaneous and subsequent acts in keeping with the nature of thedocument

Presumptions


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Interpretations of ambiguous phrase should be determined accordance w/ the laws and customs

of the state most probably in the mind of the grantor or testator when he used the words, and whichhe is presumed to be most familiar [SPECIFIC LAW IN MIND]

Different dispositions: interpretation by which dispositions would be operative shall be preferred

[interpret for validity]>>>presume that the testator intended a lawful will

Revocation

Art. 828: will revocable at any time before the death of testator>>>cannot waive or restrict right to revoke a willArt. 829:Revocation done outside RP + domicile outside RP: validity depends on:

1. Law of the place where will was made (lex loci celebrationis)

2.Law of the place where testator had his domicle (lex domicili)Revocation done outside RP + domicile in RP:

1.Law of the domicile2.Law of the place of revocation

Art 830: When wills deemed revoked in RP:1.By implication of law2.By some will, codicil, or other writing, executed as provided in the case of wills3.By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the intention of revoking it, by thetestator himself, or by some other persons in his presence and by his express direction

Problem:Testator domiciled in State A, already had a will. Revoked will in accordance with laws of State A.Transferred domicile to State B, where revocation done in State A invalid. Died in State B.Is the revocation valid?Common law: apply law of domicile at time of deathRP: law of the place of revocation

Probate-adjudication that the last will and testament of a person was executed with all the formalities required bylaw-authentication of the will-merely procedural: follow law of the forumBUT: look at foreign law if suit made as to extrinsic requirements in the execution of the will

When will shall be disallowed (rule 76, section 9, ROC):(a) If not executed and attested as required by law;(b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the time of its execution;(c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;(d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary, or ofsome other person for his benefit;(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the instrumentshould be his will at the time of fixing his signature thereto.-proving wills made in foreign country: prove

1.Will duly executed in manner required by law2.Testator had testamentary capacity at the time of execution of will

TESTAMENTARY CAPAITY: capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction in which the testator isengaged at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the persons who would naturally be

supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument willdistribute his property among the objects of his bounty [Jocson v. jocson]-wills made and probated in foreign country in accordance with laws of that country [Rule 77, section 1]:

should be filed and recorded in the proper RTCDue execution and testamentary capacity of testator does not need to be proved again (note: sabi ni

Sir B it should still undergo probate proceedings in RP)Art 817, NCC (same ~ similar to Sec 636 of old CivPro rules): A will made in the Philippines...by a citizen or subject of another country,...which is executed in accordance with the law of the country of which he is a citizen or subject,...and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own country,


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shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of the Philippines.Common law:

o Movable properties: will admitted to probate valid at the last domicile of the testator as valid

everywhereo Immovable properties: probate of the will in his last domicile does not affect the conveyance of

land which is subject to lex situs

Kat (Civil Law)

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