KASHMIR A DISPUTED

LEGACY

ALASTAIR LAMB

ROXFORD BOOKS 1991

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INTRODUCTORY

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INTRODUCTORY INTRODUCTO@Y

Maharaja's Instrument of Accession.

examination.

This, too, it seemed was the opinion of the

Government, Sir H. Shawcross (who

out ~ h m i r z

his, his rth: U a1 %, f wch ble that *h% \ fell

INTRODUCTORY INTRODUCTORY

down profoundly, betrayed their trust, by conspiring with the Indian related to the potential future of the State of Jammu and KasHmir. side in the entire process of partition. Conspiracies are notoriousl~ It is certain that the leaders of Pakistan, M.A. Jinnah, Liaquat Ali hard to prove. Are there any grounds for such sentiments? Some Khan and many others, believed that the Gurdaspur award, where evidence on this point has already been examined: and it is certainly the tract concerned by virtue of its Muslim majority should under the sufficient to raise a number of doubts as to the absolute veracity of terms of Partition as set out by the British have gone to Pakistan, was the version of events which, for example, has been presented the somehow manipulated So that it was placed in India. Further, they

were convinced that Mountbatten had a part in this piece of sleight of hand. The documents which have been published in the final volumes of The Transfer of POWO do not demonstrate that they were mistaken even if they do not prove absolutely that they were correct. These documents, in other words, fail to show that justice was done whatever the underlying verities might be.

The accession issue is not so well illuminated by documentary evidence. However, enough has come to light to show the following.

First: Ne4u-u and other Congress leaders had from the outset of

deological and geopolitical, mu and Kashmir should accede to India. Nehru's

Commander of the armies of-both India and Pakistan, wr this point. The documents in London on 28 September 1947 that: r of POWO which have been examined here can

September 1947 the merit of Jammu and

S measures, such as the provision of military intment of Mehr

aja's indecisiveness. t all this was going on, such as was supplied

Years later with the publication of Sardar Vallabhbhai have cast some light.

rent that the actual

awaharlal Nehru and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel in with Sheikh Abdullah. The proposal that. Sheikh

dministration after accession the Indian leadership as a and the provision of Indian ther interpretation of the ications between Srinagar, revealed in Mehr Chand

rship were well aware of eikh Abdullah in Nehru's household at this

cruc-al juncture; and, no doubt, they drew their own conclusions. indeed, that the only h m . ~ ~ standi possessed by either was i s an Finally: Mahajan's narrative also contains the fascinating suggestion interested neighbour or that which was conferred by invitation from

that the first Indian troops were landing at Srimgar airfield before the parties directly involved. The ,Poonch rebels, and &en the process of accession had been completed. If so, then the Kashmir, sought Pakistani assistance.' The Maharaja sought the intervention of the Indian Army in the Kashmir dispute could well assistance of India. Contemporary history abounds with examples of be another of those episodes, of this type of situation. example, where the military cour India has used in this context the word "aggressionJ7. The forces act of war taking place before the politic who ~rossed the Jhelum in the early hours of 82 October 1947 were to organise its formal legitimisation. E "aggressors" sponsored by Pakistan; and, therefore, no solution to the context, is the fact that the Indian troo Kashmir problem was possible until that "aggression" had been on 27 October 1947 found other Indian troo "vacated". The Indian presence in the State of Jammu and Kashmjr patiala men, already established there and else was by the express invitation of the Maharaja in order to repel this patiala forces had arrived, it seems, on about 17 October "aggression": it was, therefore, perfetly legitimate. ~ u t who was is to say before the tribal crossing of the b October. at the crossing of the Jhelum by parties of

These two questions, the timing o f t tribesmen on the night of 21/22 October 1947 was at h e and the date of arrival of the Patiala ents in the political struggle then going on been touched upon by the Pakistani side in the Kashmir debate State of Jammu and Kashmir. The clearing of the way into the all these years; and, not surprisingly, the Indian side has not at Ih-f~el was not that of forced entry by the tribesmen but of out of its way to draw attention to the matter. were, by rebels within the State of Jammu

The chronology and interpretation of St of an entity which in two days was to accession which have been set out itself the independent sgte of Azad Kashmir. The participa- number of conclusions which certainly the tribesmen in what amounted to a civil war could weU. be opinion, at least as interpreted by Indian diplomats. We will ed to represent an error of political judgement on the part ourselves here to two issues, the status of Azad Kashmir who sough their assistance; but it would be difficult in these questioi of who were the "aggressors" in those crucial days ckumstances to classify it as part of an act of external to 27 October 1947. 4

On 15 August 1947 the State of Jammu ajan's chronology, there is not in reality a intents and purposes an independent state ween the position of these tribesmen on interpretation of the lapse of Paramountc and that of the Indian Army airlifted to S r h g a r on 27 independence of the State of Azad K that moment on 27 October, it can be argued, the State territory mainly in the old Poonch Jagir in which the c as still technically independent. The Maharaja, apart from Poonch City itself, had completely eion of the Maharaja an just about the Azad Kashmir's first President, Sardar Mohammed Ibra there at the invitation of the Poonch an elected member of the Jammu an s of the independent stare of Azad for a constituency in Pooch, could certa er accession, which it seems highly probable did not measure of popular mandate, at least as until afw the Indian intervention started, could it for Sheikh ~ b d u l l a h . ~ now defending their own land

On 26 or 27 October 1947 the Ma Moreover, whatever might be argued in defence of Did he bring, even in theory, A e Indian intervention on 27 certainly an interesting question which 0 t the Patiala troops, who were international lawyers. subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief ofthe

~f the various movements in opposition to the arrived after accession. They were there befme the which were taking place in Poonch (an 2 October6 Indeed, a good case can be made that 1947 were rebellions, within an independent sta t response to the arrival of the concern were they of either India or Pakistan? as "aggressing" against .whom?

INTRODUCTORY

Such arguments indicalc, i j nothing elsc, drat there is rro s~mple lq&lic explnnaion nf the origins of the Karllmir dispute; and none which eonferr absdule n~oral nght an one side only. The vcwon of events presented in accounts sympthetic to the Indian position d ~ $ nor accord luih dl the evidence; and wen narratives rnrtcn c v i l h ?/ Pakislani bias oft.cn fail LO d e w r ~ rlle s~nbiguitics in the resctt hlah~j~n' s devlutating aurobiegmphy hu been in p n n ~ since 1% yet ibimplintiohrs would seem so far ta have received surprising little mrnment.'

the problcm including tile need. and possih2e-;m! deterwkacim of rhe will of the people ~f,the;$fi

, Kashmlr. The evduiion of the Ihbmtr d i s p ~ t r # ~ &*xt ' - &&g and more, and ~ L S increa~ing corn:

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interpretations of b e issues, involved tbe stau I 'and Kashmir as a political en~ity in its- : economic iniclrcsts of the various pardes, 'catiane, and the ymblern of self deter

coatainedclot only Muslims but also Hiq this is the ~ ; ~ b j ~ t of ille second half of?

-a I F , : r* 3 .. L I - .a 1

1 . %%& P n p . 1948, a/). mf.. k n I\', Nib. 1.

2, Thcrc i s a masdvc corplhs of litcmtutt from the ~ndimv;

'7 ~IOTES ro CI-II~I~TER VI I t

01 l t l r Lbbrnja's accc~qitm. h e , For es;r~n]>lc- 1-1 c.. ;\g.;tr.will, h r l b ~ l k Pro& - 1~ bbwl AxprcLc. A l l ~ l ~ a h d 1975).

41s hap11 ar ivc awr.

- . .. . . . - . . polr-err orwr tlefcrtce aud Col-cign rt lat~onx~ 111;s wits 3 q ~ a n d i ~ d cclndi(io1l 01 . wc%rioi~. IL ~ i i r ~ r f l rhar ,II ike inolnclrl of i l ic Tl?nsfe~ Power rlle Slate Arlnrd . - Fomcs wcw taken undcl ll\e comrnanrl of tic Armcd Furccs or Itldia; ant1

:.deplortncll~ bcyoitd the I n d a ~ l crternal h d r m (as rlrc Sparc crl-lsnrlrtu rnd ~shlnrr was ~ i r i ~ i l ~ d pnnr to j o i i ~ i~ rg Intlb) ir.ab tvlrhfict~ doubt Crem that t~mc 3

mac~cr of forehp jbolicy whicli could wrly bc audiurincd 1,). lie Cnvcrtr~ncu~ or '.dlq at (Ire l i ~ ~ l r e e ~ 1rucl I t ivould JCCII~ LO ColIw, ~hewhre, rlrnr eitliei ~ h c Pnlialir 5 & . r ~ r r I r l liaslirnlr itr blacill~t \icllmio~r or llru Alrficlu I l ~ d u n C n l r r ~ i t u ~ i ~ i ~ nr t l l r l $r prwcrtcc rras approved Irs New I)rItll, I f t l ~ c farrt~rr, tlren flicir stiltuh on r I l ~ gcchinr;tblc io~erprrta~ion war very clrnilar lo t h t of rhe h t l ~ a n ~ r i b c r r ~ i ~ ~ : i f &litter, I ~ C Q rile Cwcrninou 01 Iirdia was spolrronng dih+c~ 1nilii~r.y i ~ ~ r o l v ~ g j n the Share of Jaln~rrn m d li,?stmJr h c r ~ r c ulle tnlul '.agg~~non'l. Icr alolle @laharap's arcmtnl~

r ~ R L norled t l i~q rIiscre]ki~~c!, hcrwccn itre v ~ r i n i ~ ~ ~ i n r r ; l d \ ~ ~ rr when it wag culnrncnml upon hl A.G.P. II'ngbl during r ream-11 Scl~ool 01 hcrfic Studws of tlic A ~ u t n l ~ m h ' a l i ~ n ~ t ;I, or1 96 Oc~obrr 19GG Wlighl's paper, -'Tile Origjns of

~ p u i c : A Na~~alive". Iro~~erer. &)a no1 dlaw znv ml\duxlon hm .rumaiivc ~ J L V ~rbore tlirn t l icl , 11 L ~ L J L tlrnc. t l ~ c p r m n i qrit1i01.

q;pubLisIicJ rcicrc~lce lo rlds discrep~ncy ~ I r i c h I an 6nd IS, w+m, @- dl+, p 3.19 i<'nlpcr~. Jwwrcr, clnws mu urnclos~0115 fmm it He $& r. @.arnak conlirtcnr rhar, 11 [rue. Mahajarr's sdom MU grave ~IOLL~IP UFO uwat V.P. Llel~un as ;r ~+hncsr. ant) not 011ly In ~ I r c I \ \ i l l t r r of i h ~ 51~1~:

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KASFILIIR AND T H E 1947-85 'I I .

: *, , : : . ; M-Am J innah '~ immediate reactlon on hearing of the arrival of fie

Sikh batulioa ar Srinagir was to order Central Sir ~ f ~ ~ , acting Comn\andels-~n-chielof the Pakis~an Army, send in his.arvn troops. 1 - h e the Pakisrai~ side was at a real dis;ldv?nragr. Th'a-& of lndia and l'akiswn 1vel.c at ihat rnomcnt still ur>drr l)le same supl'enrc cornniand. Sil~ce 27 Ocmbel and r l ~ c Indlan accep.nce oE rile State of Jamnru and Kashn~ir's accession J[ was clear that any ~'irkislani rnili~l-). actitrn in the State ~rtbuld bc also be a drrecr col.iAic~ will) the forces of Indla. Tlre Army Supreme Comnrander, Auchjn-

THE FIRST KASHMlR WAR leek. rvould not agrcc to what amounted lo an i n t e r - ~ o r n l ~ i o ~ m r .

AND THE INTERVENTION OF THE Graccy w.75 ins~ructed LO tell M.A. - J ~ n r ~ a l ~ rllat if Rkistam regulars Imr. all Brilish ojhccrs \vouJd

UNITED NATIONS 1947 TO 1964 the Pakistan Army. ~ I . A . jinmll, ifi these

I . erne mrl tual suspicion 'Elourl~ba~ed, [ 10 Lahore on 1 Nove~nbcr to Jircmg tlah and Liaquat Ali Khan. Jawahark] 16, because of illness (he said, to

any hiounrhtten; and Sardar Valhbhbhai Pate1 more or Ira to go (lie did nu1 consider that there was any lliing to discuss. n being in his view a k l u l e ancl unconduional). Tlrtls the rkro

en pul to M.A Jinnalr the suggesttan t h ~ the [C?&nlir d be seuled by a plebiscite. pcrhaps held ulrder thc

ns; but only. oC course, fo)lowlng of o d c r , vllich meant in practice the clcfeat and

Irom the Sute oC Jammu and Kashrnir of the P&an L desist lrnnr aiding and abetting. in

detected n o mcrit rvha~soever in the idea of the r thcsc p a r ~ i ~ u l a r conditions rr~hicli he saw ar Loth humrliating ro Pakisran. C~ven the overwhelming

he SULC of Jammu and ieb~siite should I>e needed

On the Yakisran si y circumslances except LO bat., a5 a compromise mlb~on hange iu claims toJunag;ldh

rvirh a Hindu majofi~)' had by tndla) for India's claim

ring rile opening pirue of the ar Ali Khan had not ruled out

could rrlell find for India i ( i ~ llah Tlic views of the M w b

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N a( rc ac Goye Moui issue supei r e S L 0 1

ithd ibes ~eir , , M.X. j

lehisci t e lsulting tulslim (

ashniir, ; all: there c re State sh akistan. ' - lrthecr ., whew, i[ ivi

banp p r t or J: htrernrnent t prob: hute both M. ?,,passibility that a WUCE Were encru!

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1CASHMIR AND THE L'S 19~~i-ij!j

Lnguc kadn.rlliy Sheikh A hlullall a ibis stiige arc clear enough- b e ~ \ ~ ~ ~ n 1 nc1i.n lrrd Pakislani ledsr hcame i n c r a b g l p ' - m ~ s Liaqrlal Mi Khnll was ro tell la~vaharlal Nchru on 16 Norernhr: 4 fic~imonjous find. i n consequence. the prospect of any ,,, seltlement passed away ncvcr rr, retI,rtl. Other Indfi.Pakisrani -

Hvhile ti+, Qujding. w,l\o has bee11 an apllr of - - . Ithe Indian1 . . discussiorrs, rrotably during Liaquat Ali Kllan's anendance *at a - - Congress for many year,. srrhtts atmu1 the sage ha1tci1lg a ~ ~ a ! ' life- nleermg of the Joint Defence C:ouncil j11 New Delh j in the fiqt week I

. ~ , ~ ~ o ~ t and rrccdonl of 111s pcoyle for pe~solrd prof L and power, the of 1)eccmber 1945, in~rncdiatel~ followed by a vlsit lo Lallox b '

lcdels the hluxlinls of Kashmir . . . (e-6. Chaudhli Ghulam r klounlh~len. Nehru. Baldev S ~ g h and GopaIastuanli A yyefigar , hbbas] . . . are rottiilg ln jail.' brought about no i ~ l p r o ~ e m e n t in the sitt~ation." The Pakistan side 1 demanded h h ~ h a l the 1 ndiins rvilhdrarv from tile State and that the Sheikh rZlxJullah Enrel-gerrcy Government give way a cal.elaker Ddml~liskr&H-I whicll \Vas a1 lcasl neut1.d in tile 1 ndo-P;rkistarri dtspule: only tllen could a pleb~scite be held. 'The Indianb, as we]] Mfiulltbatten. wnlained convincd L ~ L LIIC Pakis~nis \yer.e tll;ck as tllievef w i ~ l l [he ~ribesrnen and ollrer rebels in Kaslrmir; and lhbY

ult for ~ l r d l wab llappel>ing lay c lrldian side ~011cluded funller direct talks eaclershrp were qrijw pojntlcss.8

1917 JawaharW Nchru indica~ed Lo Liaqu~t ~ d ; cons~dering, albeit reluctantly, in\litation of

Naclons observe~r to come m India 2nd advisc on h e prupwcl Ali Khan showed no ~niual enthrlsiasm for

Nalrons mediation. What, after all, t i V ~ s t l l c ~ ta medlale? Went ahead with rhc preparation of a Formal appr~ach to tire Natio~rs, complaining 01' Pakistan; aggression in I(arllnrir. A

C the Indian case was despaul~cd ro Tor comment to Klrall on 22 December; and, before a reply could ,

as sen1 t o tlic Unj~ecl Nations . .b - I was ,-ither excluded totally or in some w)' neutralikd. Jinn e die Security Council on the I .

- proposals ti1et-e not, On thc hcc of ir. ur11-ea~@lc: the Un 0th Lndia and Yaki~bn ,tr, work "1.1 ;' and practical pm+ibilitics, of &is added inter- ,

dimension to dhe d~spure: rnean~dlae he .rvar .in , b b i r ' . r ' - III

n . , .-.

ontlii of 1947, rllile high level hdmp&js- , 1 , 1

solve 1lle crrsis. I ndlan ti-oops succeedd in bredking , T r.rihal ofknsivc and stcuring tlleir own hold over

e same lime the G~lgit regon on 3 Nor.ernl>er 1947, hip of the commander of the Gilgi~ Scow,, Majar

all \'@stige or Dogrr rule a n d cIeclareJ for ing day- Already. with the unwL of L ~ I C \vimr

amniu and Kasllrnir was fat ng effectively cut in two by an

, hat he felt that rhe whole af'hir wa.9 a de ng ln the State of Jammri end n Army and thc Eorcc* ofwhal

sals, which we* - repeated Government of Azad j(a&& lly declared its indtrpcn&hce

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K A S H H ~ H AND THE UN hU745 KASIIMIR AND THE UN 1947-65

for which t1lel.e was then no sausfactory aI=m&re. W i h . . ~ jn defence o[ Srioagar). The .4rad ~ u l d also have gone the rest of Ladakh. pmk., ~ . & . ib

gmpditicd access to Crrrrrrai Aria shut off, lndia m@ ha* [ats* reinforced by a rela~lvely small numbcr oc itn intercsl in the Vale of Kashmir; and in cansequenec seine certainlv nohil~g like rhc 100,000 ~l.ra n w w d settlement might have been easier. It is not known indicated), began increasingly to receive supporl from Pakis \vhe&tr the Pakistani command at his time fi l ly understud the regula5 (ant1 a very small number of foreign \loluntecrs - much sigrriCLcancc of Kargil: it probably did. T h e setback to chc Paliiswni been made of the involvcmenl, for cxar northern campaign. there can be no doubt, was to have grave Force Sergeant, Russel Haight by nam conscguenccs (or lhe future of Sino-lndian rehiions in that in quesllon of individual Pakistarr i soldiers taking their leave. as it enabled lndla in he late 19505 to try tc, give pracdwl rrxp~asion ro on the Kashmjr front. By klay 1948, hose cartograpllic claims to Ihe Aksai Chin which were to k dangerolrsly towards the Poon ~ublished for the hrst binre in 1954 (and concerning the origins of C ; n e y re\lersed hrs decision of *ch we have specula~ed in Chapter 4). CommltrnenL o f regular Pakistanr rroop The check ro the Pakistani advance from Baltisran also m m t chn1 (a [act which Pnkrstan publicly adrnirkd in duly 1948); th Pakistani control in h e w+rories no stage durrng rhe first Kaslrniir war were Indian n the map the Sure of Jammu and Kashmir now numbered by Pakisrani regulars- into two prrions of comparable area. Pakistan

The increased Pakinani rnvolvcmcrrl io the ligll~ing Gilgir region, Baltism and a narrow strip of Kuhmir paslblc to hold a line through PO d hlirpur in Jammu along the West Punjab as t,lell as jn the Murafirabd District Ladakh. rhe bulk of Kashmir Province and determilled Indian atucks whicli , and a porlion of Poonch. ~~d Kashnliri forces alone Thus clle 1948 the Indian5 develaped an orfe~sivc in junction of ~ l l e L<isheirgai~ ga and Jhelum Rivers surviv which not oaly [reed Poonch town from Pakisranl invesunenl

of an Arad Kashmir Governine~it, the nuclcus 0 t h m w n e d to bring the Indian Army LO the West Punjab State free from boll1 India and he Maliarajn. The front hmir in two. Pakistan responded lvith a pian Indian forces and Azad Kashmir became in due course any respects parallels that which h e y were to adopt during half of the L~shrnlr cease-fire h e . ir war of 3 965, and one which ALbar Khan had originally

- f ie easlern poriron of thc oe;lse-fire line emerged in October 19.17 as t.he l o g i d opening move any bct\ilcen Indian and Pak~stani forccs, the latter heft? [or the Irberd~ion of he entirc Slate ofJamrnu 2nd Kasllrnlr Scouts and otller professionals wilh v ra rule- Pakistani Corres were wilhdnwn not only fmm ~ z d Ka5hmilL men, for conrro! of the mir front but also from Indian h d e r

region OK Pakis~an proper: they were concentrared in canrpaign \&h an offensive baed olh ab near Jarnmu for an attack which was inlended to lndus towards Leh. the capi~al of Lads Indian line of communication inro the Stare from the for a time 10 cut the main Srinapr-Lell road at intention was LO bring about a kind of coun~eled n~ih a remarkable operailon involvin which the bulk of rhe Indian forces in the State of

Kashmir \could be CUL off and obliged rn surrender. PatE Ja contingent distingulslled itseli: 'The Paki ere involved, as the evenrs of 1965 show clearly enough, hold on to Kargil town, nor could hey maintain ous Indian counter to such a move was LO a t ~ c k Lahore elsewhere in Ladakh, Skardu BaItislan (whlch an unmslricted war in August 1948 after a siege OF some six. month) fonr.ard b e up he ~ndus." abuon of the war in bd &pr

The intensity with which the Ind ations leading to a ceae-&re whi& ti& probably evidence of the appreciauo nd on 27 July 1949 India a d Par-[ retain an Indian presence on Ihe Northen t;rrivcs signed aL Karachi an zgrmcnt &lgg.J suggsted in Chapter 4). Kargil dominated the Stace of Jammu and Kanl~mir whjd . tbt

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- I , rn ~nsrrnlln ;4h-0 I t lE L:N 19-47-65 K ~ \ s ~ ~ ~ ~ I R . % N D FIE UN 194s-85 A. .

. I d I :. .. : m m A 11 outbWak of rlle 1963 war, was to mark ihe effective linrir of the and Kashrnir- The Indian argument was based olr ttle vahidity of he r Maharaja's accession to India Pakis~an had no liglll to aid .the Fa\lereignties of the rwo States. I

tllough p~riial and ternporavy, ser tribesmen 01. to pcrmit its nationals to take part ia die Kashmir due ille fact that in late 1948 the comm fighting. Over the nexr lcrv months rhir case was developed at pat bo& India and Pakistan rircre length by Goplarwaml Ayyengar, a former Prime Minister of. che

Srate olJammu and Kashmir and a Minister in clle Indian Gover-h- 1 .

mrnt. rrho was aided by a tcam which includcd Sheikh AMullG. served; and with the incrcasin From the outset thc Indians concentrated on the singk legal point of

the h.Id~araja's access~on which they refuscd comjder in rhc rvi,jer Doubtless k r h -]awaharlal Nehru and context of rhe pardtion oC the crnire sub con tin en^. The whole issue,

so Gapduwamt Ayyenyar said on nrany occasions, arae from jrnnilh died in Sepl~rnbc~ 1948) werc rclu lJakistan's 'ermr" in aiding and abetting the Pattr~n tribal invaders in ad\lisers even molr SO) to tier: thetr newly indcpende~~t I

nlutually de5lr.o~ eat h other. Finally. i l r the State aC Jammu and Kashmir. AL tllis early stage, it is wor~ll Kashmir situation can certainly be aaributed in sonic degree noting, Lhe lndian side rook care not to m11 Pakistan (at least in the illfluence of ihe Untted Nations. United Nations - i r was no( so moderate elsewhere) an '$ggressor",

Ouuic[e commentaiors on the Kashmir problem Ilave though such I-estraini was subsequently to be abandoned. concentr;?e on h e tjiuted Nations aspects. Tltis is pw~ly Pakis~an, ably represenled by its Foreign Minister, Si. M. Zarrullah Kashmir was one of the firs[ d~sputes put lihm, approached the question in a fundamentdly differm t rvay. I t

I i t s c l ~ a t i o n a ~ t h c e n d ~ f W o r l d W d r I 1 denied, na~urally enouglr, all Indian chargcs of illegal actions in many quarlcrs to be a crucial ex penment asjjsting rile lribcxrnen. It represented the utualian in the Smte of

I . quarrels between nations by intermtion ~aI&mu and Kashmir ar cssentinlly one of popular revolt a g h s t he e\ler, dle empllas~s on the Unilecl NaLionr dcrive from of&r,esivr rcgime of the Mallaraja. I t contest4 h e validity of rhc \vo]ume reports and other doclirnen~. to which Kas ~aharaja's accession to 1 ndia. Beyond these point9 of detail. onk United Nations has given rise. 'l'he result. perl~aps, has might a i ~ ~ ~ t say. Pakistan, however, raised a mrrcb more fbn&*

I misleading. ,411 the l l nired Nations Itas bcrn able to do.: menr&issue. The Kashmir problem, so ZaCmllah Khan said, arose as ' of problem has heen LO devlsc formulae for a possible set part df-a wider Indian project for the very suppressicm o l Pakismn lend its p a d onices in a~tenipts al arbi itself. evidcncc of tildian kypncrisy. the Slate of J m m u arld . . Kashmir dispute the Uni~ed Na~rons has never pas sslon LO India, which [ndia accepted, was compared 10 power or the mandate to enforce a seulement- it (: unagadh's accession to Pakinan, which India had and r ~ o m m e n d . Th~rs nrany 01- us disc aside. In bath cases, i~ WLS pointed OUL, Lht d e r was

l i ~ o n to his subjects. the Slate of Jammu and KaShmir a Hindu ruler over Musllms and the Sute of Junqbadh the

- C.learly, the argument ran, lndia was inlmuccd in Hence there is lit~le point in cmrnin ihan the mere tcchni~dity 01 accession a legally micrascoprc deta~l evcry plan : i t wanted terrj tory. comc what may, wid1 nr rvitbout

gression" on a truly epic scale. With such a on, India was unable m accept Partition and

the nor~h-\~~estern tract. of tile old British Raj, i nature of die S O ~ U U O ~ ~ which i~ proposed4" used, l ndia l i d used fraud, oppression, even

Ii was. we hatre alrcady seen. thc attempi to prevent and Lhtn undo Partition: the I 1

K a s h i r to he Securrty Council. 0 mil' were bui scenes in a lar larger drama. L ~e~resen~a t ive , P.P. Rllai, lransmitte OC the State or Jarnrnu and Kuhmir, P&jsmn

1 Council the Indian case as it had been sent to Saurity Council set up a ~mrnisaion wfiicli would cease-fire, follo\ved by the witlldrawal oC all outside ming from Ind~a or Pakisran, as the preludt to the

to instruct Pakistan to desix~ from fully inlparhl State oC Jammu Kashmir

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