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Performance ResearchA Journal of the Performing Arts

ISSN: 1352-8165 (Print) 1469-9990 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rprs20

Circular Paths of Pleasure in Marco Berrettini'siFeel2

Eirini Kartsaki

To cite this article: Eirini Kartsaki (2015) Circular Paths of Pleasure in Marco Berrettini's iFeel2,Performance Research, 20:5, 125-131, DOI: 10.1080/13528165.2015.1095986

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13528165.2015.1095986

Published online: 21 Oct 2015.

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This writing is concerned with questions about repetition and desire in performance practice; it thinks about particular experiences of repetition and the ways in which one may account for these experiences in writing. The above will be discussed in relation to Swiss choreographer Marco Berrettini’s contemporary dance piece iFeel2, performed in Festival d’Automne, Paris, in November 2014. The writing will focus on Lacanian desire, a difficult notion, which Lacan explored throughout his career. Desire for Lacan is seen as lack, the aim of which is to encounter its object, which is always lost or absent. Desire is necessarily related to the drive, another key term for Lacan, which is understood, in the present context, as the constant force, which continuously presses forwards, despite the impossibility of fulfilment. What is fundamental at the level of the drive, Lacan tells us, ‘is the movement outwards and back in which it is structured’, which can be thought of as a closed circuit (1977: 177).

This movement is discussed by Slavoj Žižek in his book Looking Awry; Žižek’s reading of Lacanian desire is particularly interesting to this writing, as it makes an important connection with repetition. Žižek explains a very important distinction between aim and goal in a consideration of the function of desire:

the goal is the final destination, while the aim is what we intend to do.… Lacan’s point is that the real purpose of the drive is not its goal (full satisfaction), but its aim: the drive’s ultimate aim is simply to reproduce itself as drive, to return to its circular path, to continue its path to and from the goal. (1991: 5)

This movement back and forth ensures not the full satisfaction, which is the goal of the drive, but rather the perpetuation of desire, which enables the drive to keep going. Moving

towards and away from the goal ensures that the goal is never fully reached but only momentarily experienced, creating a circular path, which does not have a final destination.1

Such a circular path, which evades a final destination and yet satisfies to an extent, but never fully, is achieved through iFeel2. The piece consists of a single dance routine of six steps, which is repeated in variation for one hour. Two dancers, Marco Berrettini and Marie-Caroline Hominal, are onstage, wearing blue jeans, naked from the waist up. The stage is blue and there are fake plants hanging from the ceiling. There is also a thin rectangular suitcase stage left.

The two dancers face each other, performing the dance routine again and again. One, two, three, four, five, six. One, two, three, four, five, six. The dancers look at each other; it is a continuous gaze. One, two, three, four, five, six. This is a little dance. It is difficult to describe and yet very simple. Six steps: one, two, three, four, five, six. I will give it a go: one to the side, two goes behind, three to the side, four on the front, five on the side and six two feet together. It is a smooth movement either to the right or to the left; in step two the leg goes behind, in four on the front, six two feet together. The first part of the performance establishes the pattern without changing anything; the direction is from

1 I am indebted to Joe Kelleher, Angelina Kartsaki, Theron Schmidt, Eva Aymamí Reñé and Emma Bennett for their thoughtful comments on this work. You are a gem.

Circular Paths of Pleasure in Marco Berrettini’s iFeel2E I R I N I K A R T S A K I

PERFORMANCE RESEARCH 20 ·5 : pp .125-131ht tp : / /dx .do i .o rg /10 .1080/13528165 .2015 .1095986

■■ Marco Berrettini’s iFeel2 ©Marie Jeanson

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left to the right and from right to the left. During the first ten minutes, Berrettini and Hominal look at each other, performing the same routine with no variation; there is a slight twitch of the arm from time to time that indicates the rhythm and seems to be saying: I am still here, it is fine, we can do this.

The piece raises questions about the structure of the spectatorial experience that is an experience of desire, which is going to be thought of here through the work of Jacques Lacan, Slavoj Žižek, Shoshana Felman, Bruce Fink and Steven Connor. The work of the above theorists will be used alongside Greek philosopher Zeno’s paradoxes; in this writing I propose that certain types of repetition, such as the repetitive movement sequence in Berrettini’s iFeel2, provoke a particular type of engagement with it, which can be understood as a perpetual process of searching for satisfaction. In this process, the object of desire is always-already lost and desire’s fulfilment is untenable. The work discussed here seems to re-enact the movement of desire, which traces a circular path, a closed circuit. Within that closed circuit, the experience of repetition resembles that of an internal dehiscence of perpetually wanting, which will become obvious through a discussion of the paradoxes.

Berrettini’s performance stages the process of desiring, which is what the piece gives rise to; and by doing so, it produces more such desiring. The circular paths therefore can be understood here in three different ways: the physical movement of the piece, which repeats again and again and traces a circular path; the shape of the spectatorial experience; and also the work’s methodology, which stages and produces our experience of repetition at the same time. The simultaneous staging and producing of desire can be understood as the double function of repetition in Berrettini’s work.

Zeno’s paradoxes reveal something of the paradox of desire and enable a discussion about the impossibility of being fully in the present, which is thought about both in spatial and temporal terms. Repetition makes a promise, which is inherently perverse; the breach of such promise enables the perpetuation of the process

of wanting, which enables an experience of circular paths of pleasure.

After ten or so minutes, the routine of the steps is established through repetition and starts changing subtly. One, two to the back, three, four to the front, five, six together, one, two to the back, Marie-Caroline sways to the left, three, four to the front, she wears moccasins that are shiny and leather, six together. One, two to the back, Marco touches his thigh, three, four to the back he touches his thigh, Marie-Caroline wonders why, five, six together. One, two to the back, three, four to the front, five, slight lift of the arm, six together. They now start turning slowly to the left, still looking at each other, from a distance. This is very precise and calculated; each step has its place.

Examining Lacanian desire, Žižek draws on Zeno’s paradox, which is based on the myth of Sisyphus, who rolled his stone up the hill, only to have it roll down again and again. The myth of Sisyphus illustrates the impossibility of fulfilment and the movement towards and from the goal, never reaching a destination: ‘we can never cover a given distance X, because, to do so, we must first cover half this distance, and to cover half, we must first cover a quarter of it, and so on, ad infinitum’ (Žižek 1992: 5). In Berrettini’s work, the movement of the dance resembles that of Sisyphus’ ascent and descent: it is to and from the goal of the drive. The movement of the dance is also the movement of desire, which reproduces itself and returns to its circular path, again and again. What I am interested in here is the way itself, the wanting to get there, but not actually doing so. The real source of enjoyment, Žižek suggests, ‘is the repetitive movement of this closed circuit.

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Therein consists the paradox of Sisyphus: once he reaches his goal, he experiences the fact that the real aim of his activity is the way itself, the alternation of ascent and descent’ (1992: 5).

Hominal and Berrettini are not arriving anywhere; they are going back and forth, over and over again, but not reaching a destination. They enable themselves to move, but at the same time they stay put. The real enjoyment is the repetitive movement of this closed circuit: the back and forth; the possibility of movement. Up and down the hill, many, many times.

As I watch them, I realize at some point that apart from the beat, which punctuates the six-step dance, I can hear something else: the continuous sound of a trumpet that lasts for as long as a human breath. Then the trumpet’s monotonous sound turns into a melody. Marco and Marie-Caroline still dance the six steps to the beat of the music and the trumpet continues – then the music changes, and a female voice tells us: ‘I am the nature blue, I am the nature, I am Nathalie D, I am Nathalie S, Dies of nature’. The beat continues and the two dancers keep facing each other. Sometimes Marie-Caroline leans backwards, sometimes forwards. At one point she turns her body towards the audience. Gradually the routine is performed not with a direction to the back of the stage, but rather diagonally. Almost imperceptibly, the direction of the steps starts to change; we see now Berrettini’s back facing the audience, whilst the couple is moving sideways; the step is unchanged.

In this movement back and forth, the steps are performing the movement of desire, to and from the goal. Following this movement, it becomes obvious, according to Žižek, that ‘there is a certain domain in which Zeno’s paradoxes

are fully valid: the domain of the subject’s impossible relation to the object-cause of its desire, the domain of the drive that circulates endlessly around it’ (1992: 6).

iFeel2 teaches us how to desire by offering a world within which we are able to keep going, never reaching an ending. Full satisfaction is not achieved within this space; it is a fantasy. The idea of full satisfaction, iFeel2 seems to suggest, cannot be realized but only exists in this realm of fantasy. If the piece offers a world of fantasy, then that world knows better than to hope for such fulfilment; it knows that this will only occur through the circular path to and from the desire’s goal, which is the aim itself.

It is impossible to cover the path, as it is impossible to cover a distance X, because to do so, we must first cover half this distance and to do so we must cover a quarter of it and so on, ad infinitum. The circular movement illustrates that ‘the realization of desire does not consist in its “being fulfilled”, “fully satisfied”, it coincides rather with the reproduction of desire as such’ (Žižek 1992: 7).

I N F I N I T E R E P E T I T I O N S O F P R O M I S E

Repetition makes a promise, which is perpetually revoked, purposefully. The paradox of such promise has been theorized by Shoshana Felman through the myth of Don Juan. The paradox ‘is revealed here in the fact that the promise not only gives rise to the conflict, but structures it’ (2003: 13). It is possible to keep going precisely because the promise is not kept (2003: 25). The promise of Don Juan – that is, the promise of love and marriage – is the promise of the untenable; promise in this case inherently carries perversity, which seduces Don Juan’s lovers into believing in the possibility and truth of the promise.

Repetition makes a promise: I know the dance; I know it well now. He moves his chest slightly forward and back; he almost smiles. He starts jumping a bit; the steps become little jumps, almost imperceptible little jumps. It becomes a game, but not a children’s game, rather a cynical game. No one wants to give the other person what

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they desire – this is a trap. One wants to make the other believe they have something they want. And then it changes. Six is always soft, it is always soft, barely touching the ground.

The promise of repetition in Berrettini’s iFeel2, like the promise of love, is par excellence a promise that cannot be kept; seduction can be thought of as the process to and from the goal, with no destination. Repetition seduces the viewer believing in a great sense of satisfaction, which never actually takes place. The six-step routine that Berrettini and Hominal perform creates a sense of anticipation, which may give rise to greater pleasures. The repetition of steps from left to right and from right to left and their variations are building towards something that is yet to come.

In another of Zeno’s paradoxes, Achilles runs ten times faster than the tortoise and gives the animal a head start of 10 metres:

Achilles runs those ten metres, the tortoise one; Achilles runs that metre, the tortoise runs a decimetre; Achilles runs that decimetre, the tortoise runs a centimetre; Achilles runs that centimetre, the tortoise, a millimetre; Fleet-footed Achilles, the millimetre, the tortoise, a tenth of a millimetre, and so on to infinity, without the tortoise ever being overtaken. (Borges 1970: 237)

The second paradox makes possible an understanding of experiencing the temporality of desire: like the tortoise, which can never be overtaken, the object of desire is always beyond reach, always one step ahead. No matter how quickly we run, or walk, in this six-step dance, we will not be able to reach it; we approach, but it seems to move further ahead. Always a little bit further away, desire denotes ‘a constant search for something else, and there is no specifiable object that is capable of satisfying it, in other words, extinguishing it’ (Fink 1996: 90). Always chasing the fantasy of the goal, Zeno’s paradox clearly shows that we find an excuse to keep going; the incentive is that the goal seems closer and closer, although it is further and further away. This happens because we keep moving; movement enables hope, which seems to suggest an infinity of possibilities; the work of hope creates the drive necessary for such

investment in chasing the object of desire, which always seems, like Achilles’ tortoise, to win, ahead of us, in this race for pleasure.2

The first real variation takes place when the two dancers perform the same step but without facing each other anymore. They start in the same place, but then work away from each other and back again; the variation confirms a sense of loneliness, which was there already in the first place. Felman suggests that within the promise ‘a sort of internal cleavage, an inherent dehiscence’ is dramatized (2003: 13). In iFeel2 the internal cleavage of promise, the inherent dehiscence, is perhaps the space that Achilles’ tortoise covers, the space of the 10 metres that Achilles gives to the animal as a head start. It is the space that will never be covered, no matter how fast Achilles runs, how many times Sisyphus takes his rock up and down the hill, how hard we try to cover distance X or derive pleasure from repetition. That is because the path to pleasure is circular, not linear, and it renews itself through the breach of promise, inherent in the promise itself.3

T E N U O U S L A B Y R I N T H S O F T I M E

Here we are. In this blue space with these blue plants and blue jeans and blue lights. Here we are. In the middle of nowhere, in Eden. Here we are. No clue how or why, but I know: here we are. I know, here we are, because of the little steps and the little drums and the repetitive music. Something happens, which is yet to take place. The dance makes possible the following: a temporality that is experienced as yet to come, whilst at the same time already always over and done with. The work, through its repetition and variation, makes evident the unrepresentability of the present. In other words, now is always belated whilst it has not yet taken place.

The temporality created by choreographer and dancer Marco Berrettini has a double function. The performance is yet to come and at the same time over and done with. It makes us be there, present, here we are – and not be there at all. We are present and yet unable to be fully there, as Connor suggests in his analysis of Beckett’s repetitions: ‘The essential feature of presence,

2 I use ‘desire’ to refer to Lacanian desire and search for impossible fulfilment and ‘pleasure’ to think of the types of satisfaction desiring fulfilment, albeit impossible, may give rise to.

3 It is worth mentioning that of course not all types of repetition have such an effect; for example, a different kind, which I have discussed elsewhere, is De Keersmaeker’s spinning around in her Four Movements to the Music of Steve Reich: Piano Phase, which enables a very different spectatorial experience, one that resembles in the first instance Barthes’ readerly text, but then transforms into a galaxy of signifiers, not a structure of signifieds (Barthes 1975).

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or of the present, is its incompletion’ (2013). We cannot quite experience what is going on, yet we feel overwhelmed by it: ‘the day or the moment are not there to be grabbed or inhabited until they are already over and done with’ (Connor 2013). So the question arises: are we really here at all?

One final example, perhaps the most elegant of all, but also the one differing least from Zeno. William James … denies that fourteen minutes can pass, because first it is necessary for seven to pass, and before the seven, three and a half, a minute and three quarters, and so on until the end, the invisible end, through tenuous labyrinths of time. (Borges 1970: 242)

Drawing together the two paradoxes, I offer an account of the spatial and temporal impossibility developed through repetition. A search for desire’s impossible satisfaction is experienced both in terms of space (Achilles never reaching the tortoise) and time (fourteen minutes cannot pass). In Berrettini’s iFeel2 the difficulty in grasping the passage of time has to do with the feeling of incompletion as well as the experience of the not-yet; the experience of the performance, like that of a dream, ‘is as close as we can get to pure presence, to something that happens without having happened, though only its groping recurrence discloses this’ (Connor 2013: 3). For, ‘what is the experience of a “now”, but the experience of never being able quite to experience it?’ (ibid.) The present moment of the performance is ungraspable, or uninhabited, yet, it is present. The incomplete, ungraspable present is more present, because we are not able to experience it. And we are not ourselves without this not-yet (2).

The question that this article raises is twofold: How can we account for an experience of Berrettini’s practices of repetition through Lacanian desire? But also, on the other hand, how does Berrettini’s work alter or add to our understanding of the Lacanian theory of desire?4 The first part is examined above in relation to Zeno’s paradoxes that enable an understanding of the temporality and spatiality of desire. The movement gives rise to the desiring of desire itself, which is indeed the aim, but not the goal. Repetition of the steps reveals that there is no final destination, but a reproduction and

perpetuation of desire. Berrettini’s work alters our understanding of Lacanian theory in proposing that the desire of desiring happens through repetition; that is, repetition of the sequence of six steps, again and again, in this space and time. In doing so, iFeel2 draws our attention to the double function of repetition: repetition not only stages but also produces more desire (and more repetition). The repetitive movement of the closed circuit, made possible through the repetition of movement, gives rise to an experience of enjoyment. The six-step routine, which is repeated again and again, creates a particular experience of desire, which resembles the movement of the six-step routine: it is a repetitive, circular movement that goes nowhere, whilst getting everywhere, a movement with no final destination, yet a clear path: that of pleasure. iFeel2 suggests that such a circular path of pleasure, which lies at the heart of Lacanian desire, is achieved through repetition.

A C E R T A I N K I N D O F L O O K

Such an interminable race, the goal of which is untenable, gives rise to questions around terminology. Lacan draws attention to the subtle nuances in translating the French word but. He uses the English words ‘aim’ and ‘goal’ to suggest the differences in our understanding of the functions of desire:

When you entrust someone with a mission, the aim is not what he brings back, but the itinerary he must take. The aim is the way taken. The French word but may be translated by another word in English, goal. In archery, the goal is not the but either, it is not the bird you shoot, it is having scored a hit and thereby attained your but. (1977: 179)

Shooting a bird is not important, but scoring a hit is. The drive, the constant force, which continuously presses forwards, is satisfied without attaining the goal; that is because the drive’s aim is the return into the closed circuit (ibid.). The ideal model of this Freudian idea is a single mouth kissing itself, which is completed by asking, according to Lacan, a single question: isn’t this mouth ‘what might be called a mouth

4 Many thanks to Dominic Johnson for asking me these questions a while back.

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in the form of an arrow? – a mouth sewn up.… closing upon its own satisfaction’ (ibid.)? We kiss other people, because we are unable to kiss ourselves; of all autoerotic activities ‘the most ludicrous, the most obviously unsatisfying and therefore infrequent is kissing oneself’ (Phillips 1993: 94). The circuit is closing upon its own satisfaction, pointing at itself, not shooting a bird, but having scored a hit. iFeel2 can perhaps be experienced as a circuit that is about to close itself in each consecutive moment; now, it will happen now; this perpetual movement gives rise to more desire, greater desire. Lacan’s itinerary is precisely that aim: to follow the events, to come back, to keep going; to enable the drive to move outwards and back within its structure, the circular character of its path.

In Berrettini’s performance the two dancers look at each other whilst at the same time looking back at themselves; they look into each other’s eyes, but in doing that they see a reflection of themselves. They point towards the other with their gaze, perhaps in the shape of an arrow, which returns to them. Within this looking, a looking for something is also taking place; they are looking to discover and satisfy their own desire. This could be paralleled to the Hegelian understanding of pleasure: ‘Whoever seeks pleasure merely seeks his own self according to its accidental side’ (Hegel in Braunstein 2003: 107); the continuous gaze and movement create the closed circuit that Lacan proposes, which poses an invitation to the audience – to join in; to look too and be part of this searching for something, that is the searching for oneself. In doing so, iFeel2 offers the opportunity to not just look, or look for someone or something, but also to return the

gaze back to oneself; that is to look at oneself. The pleasure of the circular path is in this case the pleasure of desiring oneself. Fulfilment here seems to be disguised into giving the other what they want. The other’s desire is ‘manifested in the Other’s gaze at something or someone, but distinct from that something or someone – that elicits desire’ (Fink 1996: 91). It is not who you are looking at, but the looking itself, the act of looking that arouses desire.

T H E P R O M I S E O F E N D I N G

Another variation: the routine is danced with the two dancers very close to each other and in very small steps; Berrettini and Hominal look at each other without touching. Berrettini almost extends his hand at some point to touch Hominal, but he does not. And then it finishes. That small space between them held so tightly ends. Perhaps because this is too much to sustain or too little. Perhaps there is no promise any more, or we now know the premise of the promise; where do we go from here? Nowhere, we stay put. And yet keep moving. The dance continues but there is one more variation. The six steps are performed away from each other; Berrettini and Hominal occasionally meet in the middle of the stage, but they move away from each other too. They perform the dance facing the audience and they occasionally look at each other.

What happens next is difficult to describe, since the description somewhat cancels the experience of the event. But here it is. Remember the trumpet sound coming from nowhere? The breath-long trumpet sound? Here he is, his legs come out from the plant slowly. They are long

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and skinny. He appears, a third figure appears; the plant that has been blocking my view from time to time gives birth to a little plant, a little bush that can walk; the newborn bush-plant-adult opens the suitcase stage left, which turns into a picnic table; he produces a sandwich, which he eats slowly and he sips a frappe. He then moves on to offer the sandwich to the two dancers, who continue dancing.

The third figure is not the yet to come, what we have been waiting for, but affirms that something has taken place. The impossibility of getting there or of being there at all is somehow both confirmed but also cancelled by the third figure and his picnic. The event of his appearance punctuates time and confirms that such an encounter has indeed taken place. At the same time it reminds us of the elusive nature of such an experience – the experience of the circular movement both in time and space that is impossible to live or relive. The distance cannot be covered, the sixty minutes of the performance cannot pass, because first it is necessary for thirty minutes to pass and before that for fifteen minutes to pass and so on, until the end, the invisible end, through the tenuous labyrinths of pleasure.

Repetition does not really end; or it ends by not ending. The tortoise is still running and Achilles is still not able to overtake her. But what happens if he does overtake her one day? Perhaps, he will choose not to. In the same way that Sisyphus will not change his mind one day and stop halfway, take a nap and continue later. Or arrive at the top and muse over the landscape. Time is uninhabited, as it is both, not-yet, and always-already gone. The third figure punctuates the shape of the experience, which is described in the present writing both as a circular one, but also one that can be thought of as a dehiscence, an internal cleavage.

Perhaps it never ends, or perhaps it ends like this: The bush-man mounts the picnic table one two three four five six, ‘how can I know where we came from’, the song sings, the two dancers bounce on the six steps, six beats of the song, the bush-man sits on the picnic table, one two three four five six, bounce, ‘how can I know

where we came from’, ‘what will we choose’, one two three four, ‘run Taylor run’, five six, one two three, ‘came from’, the bush-man, his arms covered in bush, his head covered in bush, his belly covered in bush, extends his arms to offer a little triangular sandwich, ‘run Taylor run’, I keep going, round and round, I keep dancing my six-step routine, ‘how can we know where we came from’, one two three, I keep going, but also I am lost. I have fallen into the inherent gap, the ending, which does not exist anywhere but in the world of fantasy, one two three, ‘no more vegetables on my dinner table’, four five six, Marco chews the sandwich, they touch, without promise, in an effort to save the sandwich from falling. Now I know for certain, we will make it. If a bush can have packed lunch, sip a frappe and mount the picnic table, I am sure we will make it. And for a last time, one, two, three, four, five, six, one.

R E F E R E N C E S

Barthes, Roland (1975) The Pleasure of the Text, trans. by Richard Miller, New York: Hill & Wang.

Borges, Jorge Luis (1970) Labyrinths: Selected stories and other writings, eds Donald A. Yates and James E. Irby, London: Penguin.

Braunstein, Nestor (2003) in Jean-Michel Rabaté (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Lacan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Connor, Steven (2013) ‘A time for such a word: On prophecy and performance’, a talk given at ‘In imagination: The future reflected in art and argument’, University of Sheffield, 4 October 2013.

Felman, Shoshana (2003) Scandal of the Speaking Body: Don Juan with J. L. Austin, or seduction in two languages, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Fink, Bruce (1996) The Lacanian Subject: Between language and jouissance, Chichester: Princeton University Press.

Kartsaki, Eirini (2010) Repeat Repeat: Returns of Performance, PhD Thesis, Queen Mary University of London.

Lacan, Jacques (1977) The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan, London: Penguin.

Phillips, Adam (1993) On Kissing, Tickling and Being Bored: Psychoanalytic essays on the unexamined life, London: Faber and Faber.

Žižek, Slavoj (1991) Looking Awry: An introduction to Jacques Lacan through popular culture, Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press.

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