Karma and reincarnation in Advaita Vedānta

ARVIND SHARMA

KARMA AND REINCARNATION IN

ADVAITA VEDANTA

One may start with the truism that the doctrine of karma and rebirth is central to Hinduism and to the school of Advaita VedGnta within it. But from this point onwards the situation starts getting complicated. As with some other doctrines of Advaita, part of the difficulty is psychological. As Eliot Deutsch remarks: “There is perhaps no other basic doctrine in Indian philosophy which has had such a hold upon the popular thinking and practical religion of India and which, in spite of Plato’s Republic and Phaedo, has met with as much resistance among Western philosophers, as the doctrine of karma.“’ But the statement as it stands is misleading. It is not so much the doctrine of karma but the allied doctrine of reincarnation which Westerners find hard to accept. Deutsch indeed subsumes it under karma2 but from the point of view of a modern philosophy of religion the distinction is not without its significance. It is important to recognize that the doctrines of karma and of reincarnation, although logical corollaries, are analytically separable doctrines, even though the two intermesh neatly. For instance, theoretically it is possible to have (1) karma with reincarnation; (2) karma without reincarnation; (3) reincarnation without karma, and (4) belief in neither. For karma implies the idea of moral justice and reincarnation that of being reborn as a living being again. Thus Hinduism represents a case of karma with reincarnation; that is, moral justice working itself out through a series of lives. Christianity and Islam represent cases of karma without reincarnation but with resurrection. Moral justice is secured not through a series of lives but through a post-mortem existence either in’hell or heaven. The case of reincarnation without karma is represented by many a “primitive tribe” where belief in reincarnation exists but is not linked to moral conduct in this life.” Modern Marxist materialism may be said to reject both karma and reincarnation and the doctrine of class struggle is seen in terms of an assertion of communal justice.

Journal of Indian Philosophy 18: 219-236, 1990. 0 1990 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

220 ARVIND SHARMA

It is clear then that the real difficulty with the doctrine of karma felt by Westerners is not with karma as such but with the allied concept of reincarnation. The distinction between the two is important even when studying Hinduism in relation to Hindus. A survey among college respondents disclosed that

a basic distinction must be made between karma that is passed from one existence over to a later existence and karma that is passed from one moment of this life to another later time in this same life. The students wanted to make this distinction clear, with 56 percent believing in both types of karma, while a large number of those who did not believe in karma as something carrying over from one life to the next did hold that it is an active force in the successive stages of this present life!

This point will emerge again towards the end of the paper as philosophical rather than sociological in significance. In the meantime it will be helpful to stay with the traditional account of karma as found in Advaita Vedanta - by which the positive and negative experiences in this life are causally connected with the good or evil nature of actions performed in past lives. The question one would like to ask at this stage is this: what “proofs” if any are offered within Advaita VedZnta in support of this doctrine of karma (as inclusive of reincarnation)?

II

Eliot Deutsch has subjected the doctrine of karma to a close examination “within the metaphysical and epistemological framework of Advaita Vedanta”. He reaches the conclusion that “for Advaita Vedanta karma is a ‘convenient fiction’; a theory that is undemonstrable but useful in interpreting experience”.s A critical examination of his views regarding both the epistemological undemonstrability of karma and its empirical utility will go a long way towards placing the Advaitic doctrine of karma in the hot seat of modern philosophical scrutiny.

Deutsch maintains that none of the six prum@as or means of valid knowledge admitted by Advaita Vedlnta: prutyuksu (perception), upumcinu (comparison), unupulabdhi (non-cognition), unum&u (inference), arthtiputti (postulation), and iubdu (testimony), can demonstrate the validity of karma. 6 Deutsch, in presenting his case,

KARMA AND REINCARNATION IN ADVAITA VEDANTA 221

weaves both traditional and modern arguments together. It will be helpful to examine these arguments successively under the various epistemological categories mentioned above.

Perception

Deutsch argues that the “law” of karma cannot be established through perception “simply because it is not an object like a table, a tree, or a pot that is available to immediate sense experience. Praty+a yields knowledge of the qualities of an object (like its colour, size, texture) and the relations that constitute it (e.g., the universal “tableness” in the perception of a table); it does not and cannot yield knowledge of law- like relations between objects in Nature”.’

The argument is correct. However, it does not go far enough, for it deals only with external perception. But internal states such as pain, etc. are also perceived. Karma operates through merit and demerit or pu~yu and pipa so we must ask the further question: are these states subject to direct internal perception? The Advaitic answer is that

religious merit (pu~yu) and demerit (@pa), although they are modes of the antu~kuruy or mind as the internal organ are not perceivable because they lack the ‘fitness’ to be directly perceived like pleasure and pain. They are only inferable or knowable through verbal testimony?

So although this point was not considered by Eliot Deutsch his position still holds.

Comparison

The knowledge that the “law of karma is operative in nature” cannot be proved through upamkau or comparison according to Deutsch because “judgments founded on upamhaa are of the sort ‘Y is like x’, where X is an object immediately perceived and Y is an object previously perceived and now brought to consciousness in the form of memory”.9

The analysis does not go far enough. The above view represents the narrow though standard version of upamba in Advaita.

An earlier view found in Sahara’s commentary on Jaimini’s siitras (1.1.5) takes it in the wider sense of any analogical ‘knowledge of an unperceived object as being similar

222 ARVIND SHARMA

to some known object’. Sahara says, ‘just as you feel your self, so by upamcina you can believe that others also feel the existence of their selves’.“’

On such a broader view the application of upam&za to karma may have to be reconsidered, for one may now distinguish between unum&a or inference and yukti: “an argument which gives certain knowledge is inference; while an argument that shows that something is probable is yukti”. Lest one be inclined to dismiss probabilistic knowledge too easily it may be noted that if we modify the usual instance of inference of smoke and fire: “where there is smoke there is fire” into “where there is fire there is smoke” we have moved from anumtina to yukti.

Since there is fire there, there is smoke. This is yukti because what is said is quite probable, but not certain. In a red-hot iron ball there is fire, but no smoke. The various arguments advanced as inferences for God’s existence are only yuktis. They show that it is probable that God is; but they cannot prove that God is.”

Now on the analogy of corn being sown, ripening, dying and growing again from the seed the possibility of reincarnation is generated. Yukti applies, but although thus refined the point made by Eliot Deutsch still holds as pramti~as need to confer certain and not probable knowledge in order to qualify as such.

Non-cognition

The technical term for this means of knowledge is anupalabdhi and its judgments are of the sort that a “specific object is non-existent at a given time or place”.12 A judgment such as the existence of karma is difficult to bring in relation to it.

The argument here needs to be carried beyond the point developed by Eliot Deutsch for the simple reason that his own conclusion falls within the ambit of this pram+ - that karma cannot be cognized and is therefore non-existent. He writes:

it is generally recognized today that there is at least one requirement that a theory about an experience must satisfy if it can be empirically validated. One must be able to move (directly or indirectly through deduction) from the theory to the data of which it is about and determine by observation whether the theory or hypothesis does bring the data together in a confirming way. According to this basic requirement, karma is undemonstrable. There is no way known to us whereby one can observe


one’s “previous life” and its effect upon one’s “present life”. One can, in principle, see if one’s conduct determines one’s being in one’s “present life”; one can see whether one’s actions do reverberate back into one’s nature and condition one’s personality: one cannot, however, as far as we know, see beyond this. “As one acts, so one becomes” is, in principle, demonstrable within one’s “present life”: as a law that extends beyond one’s “present life”, however, it is undemonstrable; and to assert it in this form as a literal truth would involve an unjustified extrapolation from a limited phenomenal fact. In Kantian language, it would be extending a concept beyond experience.”

Two questions need to be answered satisfactorily if the non-existence of karma can be said to have been established by Deutsch through non-cognition: (1) “Does non-cognition of a thing always lead to a knowledge of non-existence?” (2) “If not, when does it do ~0.“‘~

It is clear that non-cognition does not always imply non-existence as can “be easily seen from the fact that we do not judge the non- existence of a visible thing, say a chair, in a dark room, simply because we do not have any visual knowledge of it”.is

This brings us to the second point. The appropriateness of concluding non-existence from non-cognition arises when “the object not known would have been known, had it been present there, under those very circumstances”.” A concrete example will help. “If a jar, while perceived from a distance through a visual sense, is not perceived through touch, we cannot, from the absence of tactual knowledge, judge its non-existence; because it is not capable of being perceived through a sense under these circumstances”.”

Now if we transfer this logic to the case of karma an interesting situation arises. For it is claimed within the Advaitic tradition that ‘what is not known would have been known’ if the object - in this case, clairvoyant knowledge - had been present. Deutsch states that “the Advaitin does not use this claim as a support for karma”. But it has to be accepted that the Advaitin does support the claim that such knowledge can be acquired ” although it is not used as an argument for rebirth. The entire passage of Eliot Deutsch from which the above statement is extracted needs to be cited as a vital point is involved here.

It is of course true that the rciju-yogins claim that “by bringing the residual tendencies (smiduiras) into consciousness [through concentration] (satiyuma) the knowledge of previous lives (plirvu-j&i) is obtained” (Yogu SUtra, II, 18); nevertheless, the Advaitin

224 ARVIND SHARMA

does not use this claim as a support for karma, and even if he did, he would be faced with the difficulty, similar to that of “parapsychology” in general, of establishing new empirical laws of nature on the basis of the “extra-sensory” perceptual experience of a privileged few. Until such time as a direct apprehension of previous life-states is obtainable in such a way that it can serve as confirming data for karma, karma must clearly be held to be undemonstrated. And it must also be held to be undemonstrable so far as the ability to obtain this data would seem to require a different kind of person - biologically, physically - than the man we know today. When one asserts empirical undemonstrability, it is understood that one is concerned with man as he now is, and not with man as he may conceivably evolve.”

The idea of man evolving into something else is a red herring from the point of view of Advaita which allows for such perfectibility right here in this world in the form of the jivunmuktu who cult recall such lives.

Another point is suggested by the example of the pot which can be seen but not touched. The visual sense differs from the tactile. So does one prum&zu differ from another. Now the prum@ru one needs to turn to in matters such as karma is scripture which is authoritative for Advaita with regard to both dhurma and bruhmun.20 By focussing on Sruti only as a source of knowledge of the non-dual Brahman, Eliot Deutsch has correctly shown that such a view of reality makes the doctrine of karma not amenable to scriptural proof. The &uti, however, is also a source of dhurmu and in this capacity clearly upholds the doctrine of karma.

Inference

Eliot Deutsch treats of this means of knowledge both in its limited sense of “inference” or anumtinu and in its extended sense of rational demonstration or tarku. Inference itself he treats in its strictly Advaitic sense of induction, as distinguished from the Western sense, as will become clear later.

Eliot Deutsch claims that the doctrine of karma cannot be demonstrated by inferential procedures. Firstly,

valid inference requires an invariable concomitance between the major and middle terms. Now karma cannot be established by inference for the simple reason that the nature of inferential reasoning in Indian philosophy precludes the possibility of a universal law like the doctrine of karma being the conclusion of an inference. It might be the result of simple induction, but not of inference as such.2’


Secondly, when we examine the Advaitic view of inference we find that

Advaita holds that the universal proposition, the vycipti, must be the conclusion not of the inference, but of an induction by simple enumeration. Two things may be taken as universally related, on this model of induction, when in our experience there is no exception to their relatedness. And here it is clear that karma cannot even be a genuine vytipti, for the consequences of moral action, as affecting the actor over a period of innumerable births, are largely unseen, and hence they cannot be seen to be in uncontradicted relatedness to the actions. Induction, and hence ultimately inference, for Advaita, depends on perception and can extend no further than drawing out the implications of the relations based on perception.22

As for the rational demonstration of karma as part and parcel of the Advaitic world-view, if the ultimate reality is non-dual Brahman then

there is nothing within the state of being designated by ‘Brahman’ or ‘Atman’ that admits of being subject to karma. In its true nature the self is eternal and hence is untouched by anything that pertains to the jiva or the empirical world of names and forms (nama-@a). Karma, then, is only a ‘relative’ idea; and it does not follow from the real nature of being. Its necessity is not logically implied by the metaphysical principles of Advaita, and its denial does not lead to consequences that are self- contradictory. Karma, therefore, when looked upon as a rational concept or idea as distinct from an empirical, scientific theory, is not demonstrated, and, within Advaita Vedlnta, it is rationally undemonstrable.‘2

Eliot Deutsch is quite correct here. Advaitic tradition itself con- cedes that truths about dharma and bruhman are non-inferential in nature, like that of the existence of God, and if there is only one undifferentiated reality called Brahman then from that point of view karma makes no sense indeed. As the popular Advaitin text Vivekctidamani states (574):

There is neither birth nor death, neither a bound nor a struggling soul, neither a seeker after liberation nor a liberated one - this is the ultimate truth.?”

In other words, no karma!

Postulation

Postulation or urthtiputti is important because Advaita formally tries to establish the doctrine of karma on the basis of this pram&uz.25 It is

226 ARVIND SHARMA

that means of knowledge “when a known fact cannot be accounted for without another fact” and so we “postulate the existence of that other fact”.26 The standard example is of a person who does not eat by day but continues to be stout. It is postulated that he eats at night.*’ D. M. Datta thus points out the significance of this prum@za in an Advaitic context:

The Advaitins use this method also in supposing some unperceived facts and principles for explaining experienced facts. For example, they suppose the existence of an objectless blissful consciousness during dreamless sleep, in order to explain the memory we have on rising from such a sleep when we say, ‘I had a comfortable sleep; I did not know anything then.’ We can, again, trace this method of postulation in the supposition (made by the Advaitins for explaining the world and empirical experience) that the six things viz. the individual, God (isvara), pure consciousness, MBya, the difference between the individual and God, and the relation between Maya and Pure consciousness, are all beginningless. In fact, all necessary and indispensable suppositions, such as power or potential energy in things necessary for explaining their effects, the law of Karma necessary for explaining the otherwise inexplicable good and bad lucks of persons, and the existence of God for explaining the distribution of fruits in accordance with an individual’s actions, etc., are cases of Arthapatti. It has thus a very wide scope.2X

Eliot Deutsch’s critique of this position is telling:

But karma is not justified by this pramrina, for it does not fulfill the requirement of uniqueness. Karma is not the only possible supposition that accounts for the good and bad luck of persons (i.e., the differences in their moral, intellectual, and spiritual capacities) as indeed many others (e.g., divine predestination or naturalistic hereditary factors) have been put forward and have been capable of generating strong belief. Karma is thus not established by arthtipatti: it is not the only way by which inequali- ties can be made intelligible.*’

Scripture

Eliot Deutsch interprets scriptural authority as used in Advaita to demonstrate that the doctrine of karma cannot be established by this prum@a either. According to him huti is “based ultimately on accept- ing insights obtained through spiritual experience”,30 that the school of Advaita VedrInta has a clear conception of the “content of that experience”,3’ namely, that it is an

experience of unity or identity: one cannot experience sequential time - past, present, future - when one is in a state which transcends all categories of time (nirvikalpa samadhi, turiya). Karma, therefore, cannot be a content of spiritual experience.j2


The argument is sound as far as it goes but it overlooks the implications of two vital aspects of Sruti. One of these has already been referred to, that it is a source of knowledge not just of Brahman but also dharma; in fact, as Eliot Deutsch himself comments “for those truths that transcend reason and the senses”“” and dharma is one of them.“4 The second point is that although the Vedas proclaim the doctrine of Brahman they are themselves part of Maya. Eliot Deutsch cites Sadkara on Mandfikya Karika IV. 73 to the effect that:

The existence of such objects as scripture, etc., is due to empirical existence which is illusory . . . Scripture [and the distinction between] teacher and taught is illusory and exists only as a means to the realization of Reality.35

If the scripture is in the realm of Maya then it can surely be a _ _ source of valid knowledge of what is valid within Maya, the realm in which the doctrine of karma falls and is clearly upheld in the Upanisads: Brhadaranyaka IV. 4.5; Chandogya IV. 15.5-6; Katha 5.7; KaGtaki 1.2.; Svetasvatara V. 12; etc. That the Sruti does espouse the relative or empirical standpoint as distinguished from the Absolute is clearly acknowledged in Advaitic works.36 The following enigmatic exchange between Ramana Maharsi and an inquirer is perhaps to be understood in the context of the two levels of truth as well:

M.: If you are perfect, why do you fear to be reborn? It indicates imperfection. D.: Not that I fear. But you say that I must be reborn. M.: Who says it? You are asking the question. D.: What I mean is this. You are a Perfect Being; I am a sinner. You tell me that 1

being a sinner must be reborn in order to perfect myself? M.: No, I do not say so. On the other hand I say that you have no birth and there-

fore no death. D.: Do you mean to say that I was not born? M.: Yes, you are now thinking that you are the body and therefore confuse yourself

with its birth and death. But you are not the body and you have no birth and death.

D.: Do you not uphold the theory of rebirth? M.: No. On the other hand, I want to remove your confusion that you will be reborn.

It is you who think that you will be reborn. See for whom this question arises. Unless the questioner is found, the ques-

tions can never be set at rest. D.: This is no answer to my question. M.: On the other hand, this is the answer to elucidate the point and all other doubts

as well. D.: This will not satisfy all others.

228 ARVIND SHARMA

M.: Leave others alone. If you take care of yourself others can take care of themselves.

Silence followed. He left in a few minutes apparently dissatisfied with the discourse. Sri Bhagavan said after a few minutes: This will work in him. The discourse will

have its effect. He does not admit any Reality. Well - who is it that has determined everything to be unreal? Otherwise the determination also becomes unreal.”

III

Modern Advaitins have tried to present the traditional doctrine of reincarnation in a way more acceptable to a modern philosophy of religion, specially inasmuch as it is Western. On this account they tend to be critical of the Advaitic doctrine on the following counts: (1) that it does not allow for human freedom and responsibility as by tracing at least some events of this life to past life it becomes deterministic; (2) the inclusion of animals and gods as possible forms of reincarnation seems far-fetched; (3) there is no rational support for the hypothesis, and (4) the idea that karma is “beginningless” makes little sense.

Advaitic thinkers have responded to these challenges. It has been pointed out that the doctrine of karma allows for human freedom both theoretically in general; as well as practically developed in Advaita in particular. The first point is well illustrated by an account of the doctrine by M. Hiriyanna which makes up for its length by its lucidity. He points out that the doctrine of karma:

extends the principles of causation to the sphere of human conduct and teaches that, as every event in the physical world is determined by its antecedents, so everything that happens in the moral realm is preordained. If all that man does is thus preordained, it may be asked whether the doctrine does not become fatalistic and therefore leave no room to him for the exercise of freedom. To answer this question, it is necessary to explain what exactly is meant by ‘freedom’. To be controlled by extraneous factors in what one does is not to be a free agent; but freedom does not therefore mean the total absence of determination or mere caprice. To act with arbitrarily shifting motives would be to act from impulse, as many lower animals do. Hence freedom should be regarded as consisting not in unrestricted license, but in being determined by oneself. When therefore we ask whether belief in karma does not result in fatalism, all that we mean is whether it does or does not preclude self- determination. That it does not is evident, because the doctrine traces the causes which determine an action to the very individual that acts. Since, however, those causes cannot all be found within the narrow limits of a single life, it postulates the theory of satistira or the continued existence of the self @a) in a succession of lives. Thus the theory of transmigration is a necessary corollary to the doctrine of karmaJx


The doctrine of karma in Advaita emphasises the distinction _ _ between three kinds of karma - agami, saricita and pnirabdha. This

trichotomy is clearly elaborated in Vivekacudamani (verses 452-453) and its significance in the present context is thus elaborated by T.M.P. Mahadevan:

Saricifa is all the accumulated karma of the past. Part of it is seen in the character of the individual, his tendencies and aptitudes, inclinations and desires, etc. Prrirabdha is that portion of the past karma which is responsible for the present body. Agtimi is the coming karma which includes also the karma that is being gathered at present. An apt analogy is usually given to bring home to our minds the element of freedom that karma involves. Imagine a bowman, with a quiver of arrows, taking aim at a target. He has already sent a shaft; and another arrow he is about to shoot. The bundle of arrows in the quiver on his back is the suficifa; the arrow he has shot is prtirabdha; and the one which he is about to send forth from his bow is cigcimi. Of these, he has perfect control over the saricitu and 6gami; it is only the prrirabdhu that cannot but take effect. Man has the freedom to reform his character and alter his ways. Only the past which has begun to take effect he has to suffer?”

A more specifically Advaitic assertion of human free will is found in the popular Advaitic text Paricadasi which says that “God in man is transformed into effort”.40 The following comment by Radhakrishnan may be read as an elaboration of the role of ISvara in this context:

The universe is not one in which every detail is decreed. We do not have a mere unfolding of a prearranged plan. There is no such thing as absolute prescience on the part of God, for we are all his fellow-workers. God is not somewhere above us and beyond us, he is also in us. The divine in us can, if utilized, bring about even sudden conversions. Evolution in the sense of epigenesis is not impossible. For the real is an active developing life and not a mechanical routine.4’

Eliot Deutsch finds it even possible to take the view that the doctrine of karma was actually developed Advaitically to encourage effort:

The sages of the Upanisads were also no doubt aware that there is an enormous distance that most persons must cover before they are even prepared to pursue a life of the spirit; and also that even if they were able to embark upon the spiritual quest, they still could end in any number and kind of failures. It just doesn’t seem possible that one life is sufficient for most men to attain mo@a. Many persons, no matter how hard they try, no matter how devoted they are to the quest, actually attain very little. How then, the gurus must have asked, can we avoid discouragement and retreat among our students? The doctrine of karma solves this difficulty very directly. No effort goes to waste. What one cannot attain in this life, one will attain, or be better prepared to attain, in another life:’

230 ARVIND SHARMA

On the point of divine and animal incarnations some modern Advaitins prefer to interpret these metaphorically. Thus Radhakrishnan suggests:

When it is said that the human soul suffers the indignity of animal life, the suggestion is figurative, not literal. It means that it is reborn to an irrational existence comparable to animal life, and not that it is actually attached to the body of an animal.43

The question of rational support for the doctrine from an Advaitic point of view was discussed in the previous section. Modern philosophy relies on rationalism and empiricism to establish its conclusions. Eliot Deutsch subsumed four of the prumci~as or means of valid knowledge admitted in Advaita under empiricism. Perception, comparison, non-cognition all have a “common element” in that “their fundamental origin and locus is perceptual” and therefore empirical experience. 44 Testimony could be considered empiricist in the sense that it too ultimately appeals to experience, though spiritual rather than empirical experience. 45 The other two - inference and postulation - were subsumed under rationalism and Deutsch tried to show that Advaita could not establish karma either empirically or rationally. The strengths and weaknesses of his individual arguments have been discussed earlier. Inasmuch as the rational-empirical approach is deemed to be “scientific” a modern Advaitin will probably tend to concur with Karl Potter:

One major criticism of the karma theory is that it is untestable, but similar criticism can be made of theories in physics, for example those affected by the exigencies of quantum jumps or those which come under the restrictions suggested by Heisenberg’s indeterminacy principle. Defenders of the theories in question respond that these difficulties are technical or technological, that in principle the theories are testable at least within broad limits. But surely the same can be said of the karma theory. It is not in principle untestable, though in practice it is because of technical difficulties. The difficulties arise from our inability to determine with precision which person now alive inherits which past person’s karmic residues. If one complains that it is precisely the responsibility of the karma theorist to convince us that rebirth takes place at all, that there are any karmic residues, the parallel complaint may be recorded against the physicist who postulates unobservable microparticles. In both cases it is clear enough that what is to be explained is observable; in both cases the explanation involves postulation of unobservables. Technological advances may in time make possible testing of both types of theories - we may build bigger and better microscopes, or find theoretical ways of controlling the effects of quantum jumps or indeterminacy, and likewise we may eventually discover ways of identifying karmic residues and vrisun~s and so of re-identifying them in another body at a later timeP6


It should be noted that this criterion differs from the one rejected by Deutsch who focussed not on the technology of verification but rather on an anthropology, suggesting that verification required “a different kind of person - biologically, physically” than the “man we know today”.“7 But Deutsch overlooks the fact that the development of depth psychology did not involve a new man; it involved a new technique. Till such time as experimental confirmation or disconfirma- tion of karma is forthcoming most Advaitins will perhaps lean to the view that “belief in rebirth seems to be the least unsatisfactory of the views held about the future of the human being after death”.48

The question of the beginninglessness of karma remains to be tackled. In Advaita, karma is amidi or beginningless because jiva is amidi. Jiva arises because of ignorance or nescience, avidyti, which is antidi. Let us tackle the last issue first in the form of the dilemma: which precedes which: avidyti the jiva or jiva avidyti? But

the difficulty arises only if we regard the one as preceding the other. But if we regard ignorance and individuality as two interdependent aspects of the same fact, as a circle and its circumference, or a triangle and its sides, or fatherhood and sonhood, the difficulty does not arise.4y

The other issue - that of karma too being beginningless along with jiva is a more general issue and its general resolution as suggested below would be admissible to Advaitins if not to non-Hindus. The point has been explained with remarkable succinctness and clarity by M. Hiriyanna:

Here, no doubt, a question will be asked as to when the responsibility for what one does was first incurred. But such a question is really inadmissible, for it takes for granted that there was a time when the self was without any disposition whatsoever. Such a view of the self is an abstraction as meaningless as that of mere disposition which characterises no one. The self, as ordinarily known to us, always means a self with a certain stock of dispositions; and this fact is indicated in Indian expositions by describing karma as beginningless (an&%). It means that no matter how far back we trace the history of an individual, we shall never arrive at a stage when he was devoid of all character. Thus at all stages it is self-determination ?”

In this section some objections which may be raised to the traditional account of karma in Advaita Ved%nta in modern philosophical terms were discussed, just as in the previous section objections which may be raised to the traditional account of karma in Advaita Vedanta

232 ARVIND SHARMA

in traditional philosophical terms were surveyed. It seems fair to conclude that in both cases while it might not be possible to prove the doctrine with absolute certainty, it seems to be equally the case that the doctrine cannot with absolute certainty be established as demon- strably false. As in the case of the existence of God it seems to be a doctrine about which reasonable persons might reasonably differ.

IV

The paper may now be brought to a close with three concluding remarks of a general nature on karma.

The first is that according to Advaitic thought the involvement of the jiva in the process of satixira or rebirth is beginningless. This would imply that the stock of karma or accumulated karma of the jivas must be immense - being beginningless - then how much room for real initiative is left with the jivas. This point is of some interest not merely to Advaitic but also to Hindu and even Indian thought in general. Or, in more technical terms, is not the dimension of pnirabda karma and saficita karma so great that agami or present karma is just a small tip of the iceberg and that essentially on the Advaitic view most of life in terms of empirical events is predetermined? Or is it the case that karma is generated and worked off at far greater a pace than one imagines?

Either situation suggests a second consideration. How do we distinguish between old and new karma? And between one’s own and another’s karma? A simple illustration should suffice. Suppose A performs an act of charity towards B. Now: (1) Did A perform it under the influence of his past karma or is it new karma; (2) Did A perform it under the influence of B’s past karma or present karma? How is all this worked out? Is there a celestial super computer or what?

But a third and final consideration may be philosophically more challenging. This approach would be to see the doctrine of karma in the light of the essential Advaitic position. This essential Advaitic position is that our empirical existence - in all its states of waking, dreaming and deep sleep, is characterized by mental activity in some form - or a flow of thoughts, if you will, the process of ratiocination,


along with sense perceptions and emotions themselves being a part of this flow. It is the quintessential Advaitic claim that there is a state of consciousness which transcends this flow of thoughts and that its experience is liberative. Now the question to ask is: liberative of what? The traditional Advaitic answer is - liberative of rebirth. But to say this is to overanswer the question for what the Advaitic experience is really liberative of is the dualistic nature of the flow of thoughts as they are being experienced right now. What the doctrine of rebirth suggests is that this flow continues after death; and that it has an antenatal history. But this is a gratuitous claim in the sense that it is not central to the Advaitic thesis but an extension of it.

Very briefly: the concepts of karma and rebirth can be detached. Karma means any form of mental activity in any of the states of consciousness. Advaitic realization nullifies this karma: this is the core claim.

This conclusion needs to be understood carefully. The fundamental feature of life is the persistence of dualistic experience in some form - latent or manifest - in all the states of consciousness known to normal existence: waking, dreaming and deep sleep. This is obvious in the case of waking and dreaming while in the case of deep sleep it is argued that the memory of our having slept testifies to the persistence of such consciousness during sleep. All such dualistic existence is Karmic in nature - the idea of reincarnation only extends it to previous and later births. Hence the analytical need to distinguish between karma and reincarnation; to identify karma as the core concept and to define mok+a or liberation as its ultimate nullification. So to conclude on a highly controversial but in our view correct note: Advaita is concerned with the overcoming of karma rather than of reincarnation.

The question, however, at this point may be reasonably raised whether the popular concept of karma as implicated in reincarnation, which even traditional Advaita accepts, can in any way be reconciled with the more austerely Advaitic conclusion reached here that Advaita is concerned with karma rather than reincarnation. More specifically one may wonder whether the concept of karma as grounded in cosmic justice has anything to do with karma as that ground-bound state from which one seeks cosmic release. If both just and unjust persons are

234 ARVIND SHARMA

characterized by dualistic consciousness which is the real culprit, then what significance, if any, does the moral quality of their karma possess in this context? On this the Advaitic position, both traditional as represented by Sarikara and modern as represented by Ramana, is in agreement - (1) that a basic morality is a necessary (but not a sufficient condition) for obtaining release and (2) although both good and evil deeds constitute bondage, evil deeds have to be often overcome by good deeds as they represent a far greater entanglement of the self in the not-self because of the greater measure of egocentricity and consequently greater measure of alienation they imply from non- dualistic consciousness. If, however, good deeds are performed to achieve individual ends these individual ends will be achieved in due course but still constitute bondage. If, on the other hand, various good deeds were performed with a single goal in mind, namely, the purifica- tion of the inner self (titmaiuddhi) to achieve mo@a, then they will eventually promote release rather than merely auspicious cosmic recycling. In other words, good karma as karmayoga facilitates the elimination of dualistic consciousness while good karma as kurmabhogu reinforces dualistic consciousness and reincamatory overflow.

The point to be specially appreciated here is that both karma and mok+a relate to an ultimate state of affairs but that such ultimacy relates to the empirical realm in the case of karma and the metaphysical realm in the case of moba. If one surveys the world as one normally (i.e. dualistically) experiences it, it seems at times that the virtuous suffer and the wicked prosper - that it lacks justice. Advaita, in line with scripture, maintains that such injustice is only apparent and not real - that ultimately appearances notwithstanding, cosmic justice prevails. This insight is embodied in the doctrine of karma (and reincarnation). Advaita then makes the further claim that although karma and rebirth ensure justice in the empirical realm characterized by multiplicity they do not ensure beatitude, for the dualistic mode of consciousness - which is characterized by karma (and in due course reincarnation) - is basically antithetical to it. The world of multiplicity around us is itself apparent rather than real, and ultimately, appearances notwithstanding, there is only one reality. The obstacle to its realization is karma (and not reincarnation, which is really only a consequence of karma).


NOTES

’ Eliot Deutsch, Advaita Vedtinta: A Philosophical Reconstruction (Honolulu: East- West Center Press, 1969) p. 68. ’ Ibid., p. 61, fn. 3. ’ See Wendy Doniger O’Flaherty, ed., Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980) pp. 137-l 64. ’ Philip H. Ashby, Modern Trends in Hinduism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 64. s Eliot Deutsch, op. cit., p. 69. h Eliot Deutsch notes that the six prama‘nas belong to later Advaita and that Satikara refers only to pratyaha, anumcina and Sabda (op. cit., p. 69, fn. 6). 7 Ibid., p. 70. ’ M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1932), p. 46, fn. 3. ‘) Eliot Deutsch, op. cit., p. 70. I” D. M. Datta, The Six Ways of Knowing (University of Calcutta, 1972), pp. 156- 157. ‘I K. Satchidananda Murty, Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedtinta (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 143. For probability and theistic proofs see John H. Hick, Philosophy of Religion (third edition) (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1983), pp. 25-27. I2 Eliot Deutsch, op. cit., p. 70. Ii Ibid., pp. 70-71. For a different view see Wendy Doniger O’Flaherty, ed., Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 259-260. ” D. M. Datta, op. cit., p. 167. I5 Ibid., p. 167. I6 Ibid., p. 168. I7 Ibid., pp. 169-170. Ix K. Satchidananda Murty, op. cit., p. 138. lo Eliot Deutsch, op. cit., p. 7 1. I” Eliot Deutsch and J.A.B. van Buitenen, A Source Book of Advaita Vedrinta (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1971). pp. 6-7. ?I Eliot Deutsch. op. cit., p. 72. ?? Ibid., p. 72, fn. 9. 23 Ibid., p. 13. !’ Swami Madhvananda, Vivekachudamani of Shri Shankaracharya (Calcutta; Advaita Ashrama, 1966) p. 221. Js Eliot Deutsch, op. cit., p. 73. x D. M. Datta, op. cit., p. 237. ?’ Charles A. Moore, ed., The Indian Mind (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1967), p. 129. lx D. M. Datta, op. cit., p. 246; emphasis added. lL) Eliot Deutsch, op. cit., p. 74. B’ Ibid., pp. 74-75. j’ Ibid., p. 75.

236 ARVIND SHARMA

32 Ibid., p. 16. 33 Ibid., p. 75. 33 K. Satchidananda Murty, op. cit., p. 10. js Eliot Deutsch, op. cit., p. 75. This is standard Advaita doctrine; see K. Satchida- nanda Murty, op. cit., pp. 99-102. 36 For instance, on the discussion of the nature of the liberated man and his relation to prcirabdha karma the VivekaciidImar$ says: “If the effects of ignorance are destroyed with their root by knowledge, then how does the body live? - it is to convince those fools who entertain a doubt like this, that the Shrutis, from a relative standpoint, hypothesize Prarabdha work, but not for proving the reality of the body etc. of the man of realization” (Swami Madhavananda, op. cit., pp. 178-179. 37 Talks with Sri Ramana Maharshi (Tirwannamalai: Sri Ramansramam, 1972), p. 602. 3x M. Hiriyanna, The Essentials of Indian Philosophy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1949) pp. 46-47. 3y T. M. P. Mahadevan, Outlines of Hinduism (Bombay: Chetana Limited, 1971), pp. 60-61. 4’1 Cited in Satischandra Chatterjee and Dhirendramohan Datta, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy (University of Calcutta, 1968), p. 18, fn. 1. 41 S. Radhakrishnan, The Hindu View of Life (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927) pp. 54-55. Parts of the following passage from the same book are also often cited (ibid., p. 54): “The principle of Karma reckons with the material or the context in which each individual is born. While it regards the past as determined, it allows that the future is only conditioned. The spiritual element in man allows him freedom within the limits of his nature. Man is not a mere mechanism of instincts. The spirit in him can triumph over the automatic forces that try to enslave him. The Bhagavadgitti asks us to raise the self by the self. We can use the material with which we are endowed to promote our ideals. The cards in the game of life are given to us. We do not select them. They are traced to our past Karma, but we can call as we please, lead what suit we will, and as we play, we gain or lose. And there is freedom.” ” Eliot Deutsch, op. cit., p. 78. J3 S. Radhakrishnan, The Brahma Stitra (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1960), p. 204. Also see pages 194-198 on the question of Karma and predetermination. ‘J Eliot Deutsch, op. cit., p. 70. J3 Ibid., p. 15. ” Wendy Doniger O’Flaherty, ed., op. cit., pp. 259-260. J7 Eliot Deutsch, op. cit., p. 71, fn. 8. dx S. Radhakrishnan, The Brahman SUtra, p. 207. 4y Satischandra Chatterjee and Dhirendramohan Datta, op. cit., p. 415. 5” M. Hiriyanna, The Essentials of Indian Philosophy, pp. 47-48.

Faculty of Religious Studies McGill University 3520 University Street Montreal. Canada H3A 2A7

Karma and reincarnation in Advaita Vedānta

Documents

Transcript of Karma and reincarnation in Advaita Vedānta