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In The United States District Court For The Southern District Of Florida

-------------------------------------------- x BURDA MEDIA, INC. and BURDA HOLDING : 00-Civ-02034 JLK GmbH & CO. KG, a German Limited Partnership, : : PETITION FOR LEAVE TO Plaintiffs, : SEEK VACATUR OF[RICO] : DEFAULT JUDGEMENT - Against - : FOR LACK OF AB OVO : JURISDICTION CHRISTIAN VIERTEL, HOT LINE DELIVERY, INC. : TELECOMMUNICATION PARTNERS LIMITED*, : TRANSVIDEO*, TV BROADCAST CENTER*, AGATE : REALITY*1, and JOHN LEE, : : (ex parte) Defendants : -------------------------------------------- x

TABLE OF CONTENTS A. PREAMBLE ................................................... 2 B. HISTORIC FACTS and CULTURE ................................. 3 C. Pro Se Statement and Authority to hear the Motion .......... 7 D. THIS COURTS JURISDICTION .................................. 9

i. A Courts Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over a Case Is Proper Grounds for Vacatur Under Rule 60(b)(4)................................................ 13 ii. A Motion Under Rule 60(b)(4) May Be Addressed to a Court in which the Judgment Is Registered ........... 14 iii. A Registering Court Has the Power to Vacate a Default Judgment Entered by a Rendering Court on the Basis that the Rendering Court Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction ................................. 20 iv. This Court shall Consider Viertels Rule 60(b)(4) Motion to Vacate the New York Courts Default Judgment as Void................................................. 26 1 [*]TELECOMMUNICATION PARTNERS, TRANSVIDEO, TV BROADCAST CENTER, AGATE REALITY, are four noms imaginaire de plume, wholesome fabrications by Plaintiffs counsel

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E. THE NEW YORK COURTS JURISDICTION ......................... 27 1. Legal Standard ...................................... 27 2. The New York Courts lacked original ab ovo and Subject Matter Jurisdiction to PROCEED at all, moreover to enter a RICO Default Judgment. .................... 29 F. FIAT UT PETITUR .......................................... 32 A. PREAMBLE

This Motion presents an ostensibly unaddressed, albeit lastly no longer escapable, mandatory question of law whether, after a plaintiff obtains a [tripled RICO] default judgment #00,0823 in the Southern District of New York (97-civ-7167) under more than dubious circumstances [intra], the [RICO colored] default judgment must be voided nunc pro tunc in the FLSD Court of Registration for prima facie lack of ab ovo federal jurisdiction along with lack of subject matter [RICO] jurisdiction2? The only correct answer is: YES.

Also, because [a] motion to vacate a default judgment as void `may be brought at any time` Central Vermont v. Herbert, 341 F.3d 186,189 CA2 2003.

In fact, plaintiffs caliber counsel3 [most certainly not QCs] placed a bold bet on 90+ docket entries under a pseudo case number, 2 Seriatim NY adjudications whether in personam jurisdiction attached to Movant Viertel under a diverted Hague Treaty standard, or, whether 8 other defendants could have been lawfully served is inconsequential and of strictly subordinate importance for the instant analysis. 3 NY Bar member Warren L. Feldman, WLF 4705, BAR # 1920826 self-branded caliber in support of hefty hourly billing rates in NYSD 97-7167 to pad a self-styled RICO DEFAULT JUDGMENT trebling unproven, unaudited and untrue losses suffered from fictitious and

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while these 90+ entries are perfectly Mafioso free, thus RICO- sterile. The conspicuous truancy of a Clerks Certificate of Default [a routine due process prerequisite filing] speaks loudly about the extent of scofflaw iniquities at work inside the Courthouse, bar all BAR ethics, bar RULE 4 respect (a Summons must) and constitutional due process, bar respect for local rules and exceptionally bar a Rule of Law culture, but reconfirming that Might Makes Right4.

B. HISTORIC FACTS and CULTURE subject matter RICO statement missing

Not only because a RICO associable entry or a RICO statement can be located on the public and PACER record, but case initiation was botched, and placed a defective pseudo-Summons permanently on the record, accordingly it is hereby judicially noticed [see] Exhibit A. Plaintiffs pegging of subject matter jurisdiction [Cause: 18:1964 Civil Remedies: Racketeering (RICO) Act - Nature of Suit: 470 Racketeer/Corrupt Organization] was dead on arrival on 09/27/1997 at NYSD Clerks Intake window, as a consequence. In fact, any Nature of absurd Mafia-styled conduct, that BURDA flatly disproved in its June 1997 forensic audit, which authoritatively certified $14+ millions of untainted income for 1995/1996, which Big Law deep-sixed for several years to not disrupt its foreign billing scheme. 4 During a documented debriefing of retired, decades long NYSD staffer C.I. Pinto, a question was put as: Why Big Law & DOJ have been permitted to play their own tunes on Southern Districts piano, C.I. Pinto responded: Our Southern Grand is really theirs, while Chief Clerks organize tune ups for them and provide rubberstamps of bogus clerks [i.e. Melanie L. Lopez] as part of this sad comedy. One of many Fictitious NYSD deputy clerk, Lopez, is on facebook and found here: http://bit.ly/1RnF1ne

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Suit subject matter classification [or in personam jurisdiction] is defunct without a valid Summons to lawfully initiate a civil controversy in Federal Court. Clerical errors notwithstanding.

In Moynihans Courthouse slang: No ticky no washy [sic].

The pendency of stigma and fallout from a [hoodwinked smear] RICO campaign, certainly fictitious, failed to raise red flags in chambers, moreover, despite brazen absenteeism of a Plaintiffs duty to produce a sworn RICO-Statement, judicial duty to Inquest was abandoned-on-call, but docile trebling of judicial sanctions against an alien and a ghost was par for the Court.

In fact, 97-7167 was brazen monetization of pseudo process in a case that never was, but, that purloined $3+ million in legal fees5

5 BURDA reported that NY counsel was TERMINATED [sic] by BURDA in 2006, but Clifford Chance managed to linger freelance on Court records to promote its self-interest for DAMAGE CONTROL for almost a decade until the Second Circuit in CA2: 14-2815 finally began to unglue and TERMINATE the firm pursuant to incontrovertible pro se corporate letters: DOC#32 LETTER, dated 11/04/2014, confirming that Clifford Chance US LLP does not represent Burda Media and Burda Holding GmbH & Company, on behalf of Appellee Burda Holding GmbH & Company, KG and Burda Media, Incorporated, RECEIVED. Service date 11/04/2014 by US mail, CM/ECF.[1387023] [14-2815] [Entered: 12/08/2014 10:37 AM]

DOC#33 ATTORNEY, Anthony Mathias Candido, for Burda Media, Incorporated and Burda Holding GmbH & Company, KG, TERMINATED.[1387430] [14-2815] [Entered: 12/08/2014 01:28 PM] DOC#42 LETTER, dated 02/17/2015, regarding non-participation in this appeal, on behalf of Appellee Burda Holding GmbH & Company, KG and Burda Media, Incorporated, RECEIVED. Service date 02/18/2015 by US mail.[1447744] [14-2815] [Entered: 02/26/2015 04:16 PM]

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from clueless, wealthy German companies and from the pocketbook of billionaire publisher H.E. Senator Prof. Dr. Hubert Burda (75).

The pre-judgment docket entries6 [

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The rendering Court cannot carry the burden with respect to proof of its authority based upon a defective pamphlet which, seemingly, was a look-alike of a 24-carat Summons dream that never was.

Consequently, appellate practice over in personam jurisdiction[ vel non] from a [pseudo] District Opinion, issued 5-18-2004 was without authority, ergo pseudo and without merit and precedence, but ultra vires, thus a genuine appellate nullity, as embarrassing as it might feel to trash an oftimes cited Pro-Plaintiff OPINION, infra, anchored upon an empty, bogus shell. Fiat iustitia ruat caelum.

But, the Second Circuit can also act nobly at other times when proclaiming: In the context of a Rule 60(b)(4) motion, a judgment may be declared void for want of jurisdiction only when the court plainly usurped jurisdiction . . . [i.e.,] when there is a total want of jurisdiction and no arguable basis on which it could have rested a finding that it had jurisdiction. Central Vermont Public Service Corp. v. Herbert, 341 F.3d 186, 190. Thus, defendants9 and pseudo-defendants not only when caught in a xenophobic jurisdiction10, are plainly entitled to attack that judgment under color of law in the court in which it was registered on the grounds that the court that entered the judgment lacked limited, ab ovo federal jurisdiction altogether and consequently lacked subject matter and all other jurisdiction over such a bogus matter.

The rendering court (sometimes referred to as the court of 9 Pseudo Defendant Telecommunication Partners Limited [TPL] was plaintiffs brainchild, a fictitious moniker, and verisimilar based upon fear that RICO trebling of losses against a single RICO judgment debtor, Movant Viertel all by himself, might raise legal odor, thus TPL was creatively added. 10 According to local jurists of reason the Nations Mother Court, SDNY, is routinely gamed by Big Law & DOJ outside public view. Seasoned insiders label the Court a magnet for bad people doing bad things.

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rendition) is here the Nations Mother court, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York that entered the RICO DEFAULT judgment under collateral attack here.

The court in which the RICO DEFAULT judgment was registered and sought to be enforced was the registering court, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida (sometimes referred to as the court of registration).

C. Pro Se Statement and Authority to hear the Motion

Hence, the SDFL must first decide whether a registering court is empowered to consider, under the All Writs Act, Rule 60 or under other authority a Pro Se Movant inartfully, albeit excusably might seek justice, pursuant to Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). Because, a pro se submission, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" and a pro se motion can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears 'beyond doubt' that the [plaintiff] can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.' "Id., at 520-521, 92 S. Ct. at 596, quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)].

[S]ubject matter jurisdiction, because it involves a courts

power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived. Consequently, defects in subject matter jurisdiction require

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correction regardless of whether the error was raised in the District Court United States v. Cotton 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002).

Therefore, pro se Movant, Christian Viertel, files this motion

to vacate pursuant to statutes or the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4)to invalidate a VOID RICO DEFAULT judgment entered by a rendering court on the basis that the rendering court was VOID of its requisite limited o r i g i n a l a b o v o f e d e r a l jurisdiction, and, consequently and separately VOID of [RICO] subject matter over any [real or pseudo] defendant for reasons stated below and, in support thereof, demonstrated by Exhibit A.

In fact, Case 97-7167 was a pseudo case, unduly processed, inadvertently assigned, not disowned but adjudicated by default without an [RICO]Inquest or Statement. The Court record is replete with copies of the pamphlet falsely labeled Summons, a blaringly deficient draft of AO 440 Civil Summons Form. If there ever was a False Start, this was it. One great sampler for a 1L pop-quiz.

First Page of DOC#1 was a novelty pamphlet signed off by 3 Bar associates, who if only perfected, arguendo, could have been a bonafide Court Attendance Notice (CAN), the legal document issued by a court (see: judicial summons). Here, that pamphlet in the instant matter was rendered DEAD ON ARRIVAL [DOA] on 9/27/1997 and thus outside of administrative or judicial jurisdiction of the United States, a pamphlet of authentic nihility.

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D. THIS COURTS JURISDICTION It is well established that a registering court has such

authority and, in this case, should exercise that authority in particular because, Movant submits, a slanderous and continuous googlable public record for a millions-of-dollars RICO DEFAULT judgment remains ONLINE and on legal web-search-sites. Such Judgments have a 20-year life, a continuing validity and enforceability that will extend the opprobrium for 4 more years [to 05 April 2020] unless vacated now, nunc pro tunc.

Plaintiffs massive smear job over absurd Mafia allegations continues daily gravamen and slander by negatively impacting Movants reputational assets and must therefore be vacated now.

This Court is petitioned to examine the underlying question - whether the rendering court had original limited and subject matter jurisdiction [in personam is immaterial and far secondary] over a case - and shall find that original limited and subject matter jurisdiction was absent.

Prima facie evidenced by plaintiffs arrogant disrespect of [sine-qua-non] Rule 4(a)(1)11 which makes (A) name the court[sic] as a Summons must [sic] imperative in pursuit of Federal-case-start-up compliance (inter alia other important elements).

11 FRCP Rule 4. Summons (a) Contents; Amendments. (1) Contents. A summons must: (A) name the court and the parties; (B) through (G).[underline added for emphasis]

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They say, that even lesser gifted BAR associates during hard economic times (1997/8) must comply. These here did not. Perfection of a SUMMONS to obtain a defectless, paradigmatic and serviceable SDNY Court Summons is as jurisdictional as a Crime Element for prosecution, either it is there or it is not, paralegal skills and hubris do not fill the bill.

Original Form AO 440 was just a botched DRAFT, was unperfected [Exhibit A], but, Plaintiffs cared less12, surely oblivious if not arrogant enough to commission a certified Translation in early 1998for this fatal DRAFT into an congruent French Language ASSIGNATION [Exhibit B], word by word, and by .

Consequently, albeit worthless for Hague Treaty service, the omission of a Name of Court rendered the French pamphlet coequally inoperative for worldwide use and Treaty compliant purposes under Hagues Convention for Process Service, thus, also worthless in 06230 Cap Ferrat, Movants private residence since 1985. Other Co-defendants, more fictional RICO goons were, upon information and belief, not in France and thus unserviceable by Legal Process.

A valid Summons is the quintessential element for jurisdiction. The regrettable circumstance that BURDAS paralegals could not cut that mustard, caused dozens of Court administrators, clerks, staff attorneys and Federal Judiciary members to honorably trespass boundaries of Good Faith and left rearranging the Titanics deck chairs, and, more likely, in protection of reputational assets by

12 Or panicked from Angst over humiliation by a botched pamphlet and over restarting PROCESS SERVICE, whatever the truth, Big Law counsel dogged the bullet

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white-washing short comings of a white shoe firm uptown. A court must vacate the judgment as void. Jordon v.

Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701, 704 (6th Cir. 1974)(A void judgment is a legal nullity and a court considering a motion to vacate has no discretion in determining whether it should be set aside). Thereafter, this honorable Court shall consider striking all FLSD registration entries from the public record to meet the ends of justice, and, consider, upon separate submission, to sanction Plaintiffs substandard legal help in New York and Florida, if and when willful blindness or deliberate negligence is found to have caused abuse of judicial FLSD resources, and, decade-long abuse of Movants reputation.

Since an invalid Summons Form suffered a Slip and Fall, was filed and ducked required due diligence, all licensed practitioners shall be held accountable for obsession with fee income13 over ethical conduct owed under oath. These violations resulted in willful failure to [not only] withdraw FLSDs bogus registration soon after the defective Summons Form was spotlighted in Munich in early 2001 by BURDAs Associate Board Member, Prof. Dr.jur. Robert Schweizer.

Still, on May 21, 2001 attorney Andrew D. Zaron [FBN 965790] filed an AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT [WPB ORB 12583 Pg.698, 699] on behalf of BURDAs New York firm Clifford Chance without looking under the carpet. Later, on May 3,

13 from a group of clueless, duped rich aliens

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2003, Bruce A. Goodman [FBN 602302] recorded a JUDGEMENT LIEN CERTIFICATE J02000175921 with Floridas Secretary of State against Movants property for $2,752,278.87 coequally abusive.

Henceforth, infra, Movant hereby adopts selected quotations from a weighty jurisprudential MEMO by outstanding Cuban-American jurist, Hon. EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, see: 245 F.R.D. 213 (PAED 2007): The Judge stated: This Court has subject matter jurisdiction

over this matter under 28 U.S.C. 1963, which vests jurisdiction in district courts to register final judgments that have been entered in other federal courts. A judgment so registered shall have the same effect as a judgment of the district court of the district where registered and may be enforced in like manner. Id.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides that a district court may relieve a party of a final judgment.

Thus, this case turns on three interrelated questions. First, is a courts lack of subject matter jurisdiction a proper basis for a Rule 60(b)(4) motion? Second, may a registering court entertain a Rule 60(b) motion to vacate a judgment, or must a motion under Rule 60(b) be made to the rendering court? Third, drawing on the answers to the first two questions, may a registering court, under Rule 60 (b), vacate the judgment of a rendering court because the rendering court lacked original and subject matter jurisdiction?

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i. A Courts Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over a Case Is Proper Grounds for Vacatur Under Rule 60(b)(4).

Rule 60(b) provides that [o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:... (4) the judgment is void ...Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). A judgment entered by a court that lacks subject matter jurisdiction is void. See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 534 (2005) (Rule [60(b)] preserves parties opportunity to obtain vacatur of a judgment that is void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction ...); Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 575 F.2d 417,422 (3d Cir. 1978) (A judgment may indeed be void, and therefore subject to relief under [Rule] 60(b)(4), if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter ...); 11 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure 2862 (2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter Wright & Miller] (reporting that, under Rule 60(b)(4), a judgment is void if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter).

The Court continued that If jurisdiction was absent, the court must vacate the judgment as void. See Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701, 704 (6th Cir. 1974) (A void judgment is a legal nullity and a court considering a motion to vacate has no discretion in determining whether it should be set aside.); Wright & Miller 2862 (There is no question of discretion on the part of the court when a motion is under Rule 60(b)(4).).

Indeed, a court deciding a motion brought under Rule 60(b)(4)

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has no discretion because a judgment is either void or it is not. Fafel v. Dipaola, 399 F.3d 403, 409-10 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Honneus v. Donovan, 691 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1982, P.C.).

There is no time limit for moving to vacate a judgment as void under Rule 60(b)(4).[N]o passage of time can transmute a nullity into a binding judgment, and hence there is no time limit for such a motion. It is true that the text of the rule dictates that the motion will be made within a reasonable time. However,... there are no time limits with regards to a challenge to a void judgment because of its status as a nullity... United States v. One Toshiba Color Television, 213 F.3d 147, 157 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal citation omitted); see also Wright & Miller 2866 (Although Rule 60(b) purports to require all motions under it to be made within a reasonable time, this limitation does not apply to a motion under clause (4) attacking a judgment as void. There is no time limit on a motion of that kind.).

Wherefore, Movant Viertel may now move under Rule 60(b)(4)to vacate it as void for lack of original or subject matter jurisdiction.

ii. A Motion Under Rule 60(b)(4) May Be Addressed to a Court

in which the Judgment Is Registered.

Motions under Rule 60(b)(4) usually are, perhaps rightfully so, addressed to the court that entered the judgment. A majority of the Circuits have held, though, that, at least in certain circumstances, a court in which a judgment is registered under

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1963 has the authority to hear a Rule 60(b)(4) motion attacking another courts judgment.

Five Circuits14 have held that there are at least some circumstances in which a registering court can hear a Rule 60(b)(4)motion.[Only one Circuit, the Seventh, has held otherwise]

Of course, whether the registering court should hear the motion is a different question, and one that is addressed infra.

The Court continued: Although Rule 60(b)(4) motions are usually addressed to the rendering court, because that court is more familiar with the action, when a rendering court enters a default judgment, the registering court seems as qualified [as the rendering court] to determine the jurisdiction of the rendering court, particularly when the latter is a federal court of coordinate authority. Id. at 733.

14 The Second, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have explicitly held that, under Rule 60(b)(4), a registering court may void a rendering courts default judgment if the rendering court was without personal jurisdiction over the defendant. In Covington Industries, Inc. v. Resintex A.G., 629 F.2d 730, 732 (2d Cir. 1980), the plaintiff obtained a default judgment against the defendant in the District of Georgia and then registered that judgment in the Eastern District of New and the Second Circuit affirmed. When, in an enforcement proceeding, the validity of the judgment is questioned on [the ground of lack of jurisdiction], the enforcing court has the inherent power to void the judgment, whether the judgment was issued by a tribunal within the enforcing courts domain or by a court of a foreign jurisdiction, unless inquiry into the matter is barred by the principles of res judicata. Id. The district court granted the motion and vacated the judgment. Movant submits: In here, res judicata only touches the Hague Treaty [personal] Service imbroglio, sole issue at bar in New York. Consequently the Summons or subject matter defect was left unaddressed by each of the Honorables, overlooked at best, if not in conscious avoidance and through routine kowtow to Magic Circle firms to help salvage a white-shoes reputational assets from becoming vaporware altogether and a hugely costly refund exercise.

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The Second Circuit noted that this position was in accord with Professor Moores view: since by registering the judgment in a particular forum the creditor seeks to utilize the enforcement machinery of that district court [,] it is not unreasonable to hold that the latter court has the power to determine whether relief should be granted the judgment debtor under [Rule] 60(b). Id. at 734 (quoting 7 Moores Federal Practice 60.28(1), at 391-92 (2d ed. 1979))...In Harper MacLeod Solicitors v. Keaty & Keaty, 260 F.3d 389,391 (5th Cir. 2001), the plaintiff obtained a default judgment in the Southern District of Texas and then registered that judgment in the Eastern District of Louisiana. The defendant then moved the Louisiana court to vacate the judgment under Rule 60(b)(4), alleging that the judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction because service of process had been deficient. The district court granted the motion to vacate, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, join[ing] the majority of circuits and hold[ing] that registering courts may use Rule 60(b)(4) to sustain jurisdictional challenges to default judgments issued by another district court. Id.at 395.

Though judicial efficiency and comity among district courts often counsel a registering court to defer ruling on Rule 60(b) motions in favor of the rendering court, such deference is less appropriate when the challenged judgment was issued without the benefit of argument from one party and the basis for the 60(b) challenge is jurisdictional. . . [A] Court of registration effectively can tell a rendering court not to enforce a default

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judgment when the defaulting defendant never appeared in the court of rendition and had a valid jurisdictional complaint. That one district court may exercise such authority over another is a necessary consequence of the established rule that a defendant may challenge a rendering courts personal jurisdiction in a court in which enforcement of a default judgment is attempted. Such authority also reflects the federal systems disdain for default judgments. (Emphasis by underline not in original). In Morris ex rel. Rector v. Peterson, 759 F.2d 809 (10th Cir.

1985), a legal malpractice action, the Colorado district court held that it had the authority to hear the Rule 60(b)(4) motion and that the Kansas court lacked personal jurisdiction. Although the Tenth Circuit reversed on the factual question of whether the Kansas court had personal jurisdiction over the plaintiffs, it held, without discussion, that a court in which a judgment is registered may grant relief under Rule 60(b)... In FDIC v. Aaronian, 93 F.3d 636 (9th Cir. 1996), the defendant was able in the registering court to attack the rendering courts judgment on the basis that the judgment was unconstitutional for lack of due process. The plaintiff had obtained a judgment in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania based on a contracts cognovit actionem clause, which allows a holder of a note to obtain a judgment against the defaulting party without notice to the defaulting party. The defendant took no action in the Pennsylvania court, but, when the plaintiff registered the judgment in the Eastern District of California, the defendant moved under

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Rule 60(b)(4) to vacate the judgment on the grounds that it was unconstitutional for lack of due process. The Ninth Circuit held that the Rule 60(b) motion was properly before the California court. A court of registration has jurisdiction to entertain motions challenging the underlying judgment. Id. at 639.

The EDPA Court continued: There is a second category of

cases in which courts of registration have entertained requests presented by Rule 60(b) motions, and in this narrow category they appear to have entertained the Rule 60(b) motions directly. Several courts of registration have considered Rule 60(b)(4) motions for relief from default judgments on the ground that the judgments were void because the rendering courts lacked jurisdiction over the party against whom enforcement was sought. Covington Industries, Inc. v. Resintex A.G., 629 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1980); Donnely v. Copeland Intra Lenses, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 80 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Radiation Technology, Inc. v. Southern Rad, Inc. 68 F.R.D. 296 (N.D.Ga. 1975) (not expressly stating that the motion for relief was brought under Rule 60(b)); Graciette v. Star Guidance, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). These cases, however, appear to rest on the principle that courts asked to enforce foreign judgments have inherent power to void those judgments if there was no personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor. They are best read as refusals of the courts of registration to dismiss allegations that the judgments were void

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simply because the judgment debtor raised the claim in a motion based on Rule 60(b).See Covington Industries, Inc. v. Resintex A.G., supra, 629 F.2d at 733 ("Because the court below had the power to entertain appellees' motion to grant the relief requested, the outcome of the appeal before us will not be governed by the label placed upon appellees' manner of proceeding.").

However, the First Circuit identified two narrow exceptions to the rule that Rule 60(b) motions must be addressed to the rendering court.8 The first is when the Rule 60(b) motion is akin to an independent equitable action, which is expressly permitted by the Rule. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment . .).

Such is not at bar here in the FLSD. This instant Motion is predicated on 1963, not equity, and

Movant has not invoked this Courts equitable powers. The second exception to the general rule is for Rule 60(b)(4)

challenges to default judgments on the basis that a rendering court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

Thus, the First Circuit seems to be in accord with the Second, Fifth, and Tenth: a registering court can, under Rule 60(b)(4), vacate a rendering courts default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction...Indeed, Professor Moore concurs: a void judgment may

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be collaterally attacked . . . in any subsequent state or federal action in which the judgment becomes relevant. 12 Moores Federal Practice 60.44 (emphasis added).

While the First Circuit, in Indian Head, stated that Rule 60(b) motions should be made to the rendering court, it explained that there exist two situations in which a Rule 60(b) motion may be made to the registering court. And that passage of First Beverages cited by the Seventh Circuit as evidence that the Ninth Circuit is in accord with the Seventh is merely dicta; the Ninth Circuit felt free to ignore First Beverages (1980) when it held in Aaronian (1996) that a registering court could entertain a Rule 60(b) motion challenging the constitutionality of a rendering courts judgment. Finally, contrary to the Seventh Circuits representation, Wright & Miller are actually in accord with the majority view. See Wright & Miller 2865 (If a judgment obtained in one district has been registered in another district, as provided by Section 1963 of Title 28, it is possible that the court in the district of registration has jurisdiction to hear a Rule 60(b) motion. Indeed, several courts have ruled that it is proper for the registration court to entertain a Rule 60(b) motion when the basis for the motion is that the judgment is void for a lack of jurisdiction. (Underline added)

Therefore, the EDPA continued: there are some instances in which a registering court may entertain a Rule 60(b)(4) motion.

iii. A Registering Court Has the Power to Vacate a Default Judgment Entered by a Rendering Court on the Basis that the Rendering Court Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

Hon. Robreno [EDPA] was unable to locate a case in which this question was squarely addressed. In ruling on a courts powers

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under the registration statute, 28 U.S.C. 1963, the Court begins, naturally, with the language of the statute:

A judgment in an action for the recovery of money or property entered in any . . . district court . . . may be registered by filing a certified copy of the judgment in any other district . . . when the judgment has become final by appeal or expiration of the time for appeal or when ordered by the court that entered the judgment for good cause shown. . . . A judgment so registered shall have the same effect as a judgment of the district court of the district where registered and may be enforced in like manner. 28 U.S.C. 1963.

Because the language of the statute provides that a judgment

registered in a registering court shall have the same effect as a judgment entered by a rendering court, the prevailing view is that a registered judgment provides the equivalent of a new judgment in the registering court.

See Stanford v. Utley, 341 F.2d 265, 268 (8th Cir. 1965) (Blackmun, J.) (We have concluded that 1963 is more than ministerial and is more than a mere procedural device for the collection of the foreign judgment. We feel that registration provides, so far as enforcement is concerned, the equivalent of a new judgment of the registration court.). Under this view, 28 U.S.C 1963 provides the registering court with the same inherent powers to enforce the judgment as possessed by the rendering court. Condaire, 286 F.3d at 357.

Taken to the next logical step, if the registering court has the same powers as the rendering court to enforce the judgment,

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then it should also possess the same power to vacate the judgment under Rule 60(b)(4).

Moreover, Congresss purpose in enacting 1963 supports the view that Congress intended for a registering court to have the same authority over a judgment as a rendering court does. Congress enacted 1963 in order to simplify the process (for both litigants and courts) for enforcing judgments. Prior to 1963 a judgment creditor had to file a new suit in the judicial district in which the judgment debtor had assets and then litigate the new suit and obtain a new judgment. Section 1963 was designed to streamline this process, allowing a judgment creditor to simply register the judgment in another judicial district, without having to relitigate it. Home Port Rentals, 252 F.3d at 404 (citing S. Rep. No. 83-1917 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3142); see also Condaire, Inc. v. Allied Piping, Inc., 286 F.3d 353, 356 (6th Cir. 2002) ([Section] 1963 intends to provide the benefits of a local judgment on a foreign judgment without the expense of a second lawsuit. (quoting Hanes Supply Co. v. Valley Evaporating Co., 261 F.2d 29, 30 (5th Cir. 1958)... A comity based reason is not relevant here when a defendant makes a Rule 60(b)(4) motion in a registering court on the grounds that a default judgment entered by the rendering court is void: in entering a default judgment, the rendering court necessarily is relatively unfamiliar with the merits of the case.

The only other reason asserted for this deference is to

promote comity among the federal district courts. There is no issue with respect to one federal district court disturbing another courts ruling on the issue of jurisdiction, because, under the principle of collateral estoppel, if the rendering court ruled on the issue of jurisdiction, then the registering court is precluded

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from examining the merits of that ruling. So the only aspect of comity that is touched upon is a federal district courts interest in seeing its judgments enforced (and not vacated by a court of coordinate authority). [citation ended]

Here, the rendering NYSD Court ruled exclusively on in personam jurisdiction on the basis of the Hague Treaty, and did so ex parte, based on counterfeit USM-94 forms submitted (Exhibit C), without any detectable exam of the Summons specimen, on record in DOC#1 itself15, upon which the District Court relied upon as much as 14 (!) times in its Opinion dated 5-18-2004.

The EDPA continued: This interest, however, must be

balanced against the longstanding principle that [a] defendant is always free to ignore the judicial proceedings, risk a default judgment, and then challenge that judgment on jurisdictional grounds in a collateral proceeding. Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 706 (1982). The defendant is free to challenge the rendering courts judgment in a collateral proceeding; there is no constitutional or statutory requirement that such a collateral proceeding must also be before the rendering court...Finally, a litigant is usually entitled to the forum of his choosing, so long as venue is proper. Van Dusen v. Barrack,

15 This District Order in 97-7167 denying a Motion for lack of in personam jurisdiction via Hagues Treaty was (on an unfit, non-jurisdictional basis for appellate jurisdiction in pseudo-matter) appealed and affirmed in 417 F.3d 292, CA2 (2005), infra.

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376 U.S. 612, 633-34 (1964). Perhaps because a defendant is permitted to suffer a default

judgment and then collaterally attack the jurisdiction of the rendering court, four Circuits have explicitly allowed defendants to make Rule 60(b)(4) motions to registering courts on the basis that the rendering courts lacked personal jurisdiction. See Harper, 260 F.3d at 391; Morris, 759 F.2d at 811; Indian Head, 689 F.2d at 249; Covington, 629 F.2d at 732. But does this rationale also hold true for challenges based on subject matter jurisdiction?

Judge (now Justice) Ginsburg16 would seem to think so:

A defendant who knows of an action but believes the court lacks jurisdiction over his person or over the subject matter generally has an election. He may appear, raise the jurisdictional objection, and ultimately pursue it on direct appeal. If he so elects, he may not renew the jurisdictional objection in a collateral attack...Alternatively, the defendant may refrain from appearing, thereby exposing himself to the risk of a default judgment. When enforcement of the default judgment is attempted, however, he may assert his jurisdictional objection. If he prevails on the objection, the default judgment will be vacated. If he loses on the jurisdictional issue, on the other hand, his day in court is normally over; as a consequence of deferring the jurisdictional challenge, he ordinarily forfeits his right to defend on the merits.

See: Practical Concepts, Inc. v. Republic of Bol., 811 F.2d 1543, 16 Hon. Ass. Justice Ginsberg, allottee for the Second Circuit, has been copied with this Motion

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1547 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Hence, the EDPA Court continues, that this view is in accord

with the Restatement (Second) of Judgments: When the [defendant] knew about the action but perceived that the court lacked territorial or subject matter jurisdiction, he is given a right to ignore the proceeding at his own risk but to suffer no detriment if his assessment proves correct. Restatement (Second)of Judgments 65 cmt. B (emphasis added)...On the other hand, the rationales underlying the requirements of personal and subject matter jurisdiction are quite different. Subject matter jurisdiction is rooted in the inherent power of the court. Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; they can hear cases only insofar as granted that power by Congress and Article III of Constitution. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S.at 702. A defendants challenge to a courts subject matter jurisdiction is not personal to that defendant; rather, this type of challenge is designed to alert the court that it does not have the power to decide the case. Id. Along this vein, a courts lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised by any party (or the court sua sponte) at any stage of the litigation; even an appellate court can dismiss a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. Indeed, subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. See id.

Contd: Personal jurisdiction raises different concerns. It is rooted

in the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. Id. A defendants due process rights would be violated if a court were to hear a case in which the court did not possess personal jurisdiction over the defendant. But, like other personal constitutional rights, a defendant may waive personal jurisdiction. Id.at703. In short,

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while the parties can bring themselves within the jurisdiction of the court (personal jurisdiction), the court must still assure itself that it is constitutionally and statutorily empowered to adjudicate the case (subject matter jurisdiction)...In spite of these differences, though, the power of the registering court to entertain Rule 60(b)(4) challenges should be the same, whether the rendering courts judgment is allegedly void because of a lack of subject matter or personal jurisdiction.

Movant respectfully submits that this Court, as registering

court, has authority to hear Movants instant collateral motion that the New York court lacked not only subject matter [RICO] but coequally lacked all federal jurisdiction over a pseudo case amateurishly anchored upon a ruse and a pamphlet, that was regrettably misjudged by Courthouse staff, law clerks and the Judiciary to be a true Summons form. Therefore the default judgment entered by the New York court against Viertel and fictitious RICO defendant Telecommunication Partners Limited must be deemed void.

iv. This Court Must Consider Movants Motion to vacate the New York Courts Default Judgment as Void.

The efficient administration of justice is furthered by this Court deciding the issue. Judicial economy weighs in favor of this Court deciding the issue.

Movant submits, that this Court has prima facie evidence what

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Plaintiffs counsels Pamphlet [Exhibit A] and BURDAs Translation into French Language, [Exhibit B] speak for themselves, are self explanatory, PUBLIC DOCUMENTS ON RECORD, that are no longer at risk of being doctored up and fiddled with. Therefore, the FLSD Court must consider the merit of Viertels motion to vacate the New York courts judgment for lack of ab ovo and subject matter jurisdiction.

E. THE NEW YORK COURTS JURISDICTION

Now that this FLSD has solid reason for its own jurisdiction to decide whether the Rule 60(b)(4) motion should be granted, it can look to the merits of the motion, namely whether the New York court had original, ab ovo and subject matter jurisdiction.

1. LEGAL STANDARD

Normally, once a defendant moves to dismiss a case for lack of ab ovo, subject matter or personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the court indeed has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the defendant. Here, that opportunity is no longer available. And, plaintiffs BURDA terminated their attorneys, and filed a statement of disinterest during abandonment of the last Appeal, CA2 14-2815. See: Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977) ([Under Rule 12(b)(1),] the plaintiff [has] the burden of proof that [subject matter] jurisdiction does in fact

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exist.). However, Rule 60 is silent, and the case law is unclear, on which party bears the burden17 after a judgment has been entered.

Movant submits, that the panel[s], at their own peril, disregarded or misjudged facts and motives, avoided or rather circumnavigated the Docket Record below, foremost, the overt DEFECTIVE and FATAL Summons attempt, that should have prevented both, the District and the Circuit from proceeding at all, let alone believe a subsequent Hague Treaty Request that was highly suspicious, submitted by dubious practitioners who had covertly scissored out the USM-94 forms integrated Hagues Return Certification (done by Big Law to obscure overt lack of Central Authoritys authentication). In sum: more than shameful RUSES18. The New York Courts19 treated the Constitutions Art.III, IV, V,

17 For purposes of in personam jurisdiction, the Second and Seventh Circuits have squarely placed the burden on the defendant. See Burda Media, Inc. v. Viertel, 417 F.3d

292, 299 (2d Cir. 2005); Bally Export Corp. v. Balicar, Ltd., 804 F.2d 398, 401 (7th Cir. 1986) (If the defendant, after receiving notice, chooses to let the case go to a default judgment, the defendant must then shoulder the burden of proof when the defendant decides to contest jurisdiction in a postjudgment rule 60(b)(4)motion.). As the Second Circuit explained, placing the burden on the defendant reflects the concerns of comity among the district courts of the United States, the interest in resolving disputes in a single judicial proceeding, the interest of the plaintiff in the choice of forum, and the fear of prejudice against a plaintiff who, owing to delay, might in subsequent collateral proceedings no longer have evidence of personal jurisdiction that existed at the time of the underlying suit. Burda, 417 F.3d at 299 (quoting Miller v. Jones, 779 F. Supp. 207, 210-11 (D. Conn. 1991)).

18 which Above The Law routinely labels lawyerly lies 19 While no Circuit has held otherwise, several district courts and at least one commentator have advocated leaving the burden on the plaintiff. See, e.g., Sterling Indus. Corp. v. Tel., Inc.,484 F.

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XIV, the Hague Treaty and Statutory limitations as little more than speed bumps on the ignoble road to faster white collar shoe-super-billing-schemes favoring the Magic Circle. Later, the last panel summarily declined the opportunity to review Movants certified Questions on Appeal (14-2815), in particular, whether or not Big Law was entitled to a compliance exception thus immunizing inexpert bar members from the consequences of imperfect respect for FRCP 4(a)(1)(A) and the must part to insert a Name the Court.

Of course, both NY appeals turned only on the [limited] question whether in personam jurisdiction existed, disregarding, sua sponte, that the Supreme Courts jurisprudence strongly suggests that the plaintiff retains the burden of demonstrating subject matter jurisdiction. See McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936) (holding that the party asserting the federal courts jurisdiction must carry throughout the litigation the burden of showing that he is properly in court).

2. The New York Courts lacked original ab ovo and Subject Matter Jurisdiction to PROCEED at all, moreover to enter a RICO Default Judgment.

Supp. 1294, 1296 (N.D. Mich. 1980); Rockwell Intl Corp. v. KND Corp., 83 F.R.D. 556, 559 n.1 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Waldman, supra, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 536 (Courts should ... requir[e] that plaintiffs in Rule 60(b)(4) motions bear the burden of proving that the court issuing the default judgment had proper personal jurisdiction.).

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The draft of a pseudo COMPLAINT for the NYSD, BURDA stated that subject matter jurisdiction was predicated on 18 U.S.C. 1964(c) and the doctrine of pending jurisdiction. But, subject matter RICO would rank secondary to Original Jurisdiction to duly authenticate a federal controversy by more than a $125.00 Court fee payment. Here, in 97-7167, no controversy was duly filed or reached a level of PACER legitimacy required for a genuine Federal Case to proceed. Such train wrecks can, apparently, happen when a Courts administration is capriciously outsourced to honorarium-based Bar associates, who print up convenient Certificates, Defaults, Orders and [proposed) Judgments on NYSD COURT HEADERS while at 200 Park Avenue, and while in pursuit of foreign billionaires savings accounts.

Counsels first print job surely tanked. BURDA caught on [see FN 4], albeit belatedly, and realized

that had been victimized by the rancid version of New York litigation methodology and BURDA terminated legal representation by Clifford Chance soon after Movants Counsel, in 2006, caused a review of Rogers & Wells Hague Treaty fraud in France and New York, and after an internal BURDA audit of legal expenses billed for this pseudo-proceeding by their New York law firm raised concern.

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In fact, when BURDA unilaterally - settled a [refund] claim against former President Fritz Blumenberg in late 1998, it did decidedly so farthest away from 97-7167, farthest away from absurd RICO delusions and farthest away from Pearl Streets Courthouse, in the legal sanctuary at Germanys Consulate General, in German language and pursuant to German civil [BGB] law, as required by most German directorship agreements. These strictly prohibit all foreign [New York] action, prohibit RICO or other exaggerations, since 1992.

Exclusive Venue with Blumenberg was Munich, Germany. The restraints of this 1992 deal with Blumenberg was best

known to Rogers & Wells German speaking partner[s]20, who deliberately breached their ethical and honest service duty to clients BURDA HOLDING GmbH and BURDA MEDIA by drawing up [and billing $1,900,000+ million] a RICO action process against Blumenberg, the number one RICO defendant. [see: Captions in Exhibit A, B].

BURDAs Management confirmed firstly that no directors or officers of BURDA partook in nor authenticated a single NYSD Court submission, and, secondly, whether a valid Mandate for any NYSD action ever issued to Roger Wells/Clifford Chances cannot be verified from the records at hand.

20 Rechtsanwalt Klaus Heinrich Jander NYBar # 1414358, inter alia

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3. FIAT UT PETITUR In view of the record, which speaks for itself, the District

Court for the Southern District of New York lacked ab ovo, ergo subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claim. Therefore, Viertels motion to vacate nunc pro tunc - the New York courts default judgment as void shall be granted with all other relief this Court deem just and proper.

Respectfully submitted this 15th day of January 2016

Christian T. Viertel, pro se 9858 GLADES ROAD SUITE D-3 #239 BOCA RATON, FL 33434 PB justdueprocess@aol.de (1) 845- 260 9545 Courtesy Copy to Hon. Grassley, Hon. Leahy, Hon. Sensenbrenner, plus courtesy service by email upon Hon. Sen. Prof. Dr. Burda for plaintiff Holding Attachments: Exhibits A,B,C U.S. District Court Southern District of Florida (Miami) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:00-cv-02034-JLK Date Filed # Docket Text 06/07/2000 1 Registration of Foreign Judgment from Southern District of New York against Defendants, Christian Viertel and Telecommunication Partners Limited in the liquidated amount of: $ 2,752,278.87; FILING FEE $20.00 RECEIPT # 823260; B-12 JJO (Former Deputy Clerk) Modified on 06/08/2000

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Exhibit A (1 page plus RIDER)

P.S. Exhibit A embodies the matchless specimen at center of this MOTION. It purported to function compliant to an AO 440 Form Summons in a Civil Case, but, is evidently defective beyond salvage: The Name of Court is left blank despite RULE 4s must precondition for a bonafide Court Attendance Notice (CAN), a legal document issued by district courts (judicial summons). The pamphlet was docketed and filed numerous times in NYSD 97-7167, as in DOC#1, #88, #92, #95, in identical form as shown below. Thus, 97-7167 DOC#1 was borne a novelty pamphlet unadroitly drawn up by Big Laws Bar team Feldman, McCloy Stephanz, Anderson of Park Avenue, NY, and deemed sworn Officers of NY Courts. [Until recently, District Courts too frequently faced defective 440 Forms from scads of lawyerly dimwits to cause the Administrative Office USC to upload its Online-Template for Form 440, which blocks save or prints, unless practitioners selected one Name of Court from a multi-choice drop-down menu shown below]

http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/notice-lawsuit-summons-subpoena/summons-civil-action

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35

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Exhibit B ASSIGNATION DANS UNE ACTION AU CIVIL

P.S. Exhibit B is plaintiffs verbatim translation intended for a Hague Treaty Process Notification [fr: Assignation] intended for Process Service by the French Republics Central Authority in Paris. This translation is verbatim to Exhibit A, the Pamphlet. It was issued on our about late Spring 1997 and serves as PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE that Plaintiffs relied upon the deceased Pamphlet in DOC#1. The translation was docketed/filed numerous times in NYSD 97-7167, under #88, #92, #95, in identical form as shown here. [Whether it reached Paris is now inconsequential] Since a Name of Court is visibly missing < aptly left blank> from this congruent Assignation which, plaintiffs brazenly aver in their pleadings, was submitted to Frances CA as part of a July 14, 1998 USM-94 (Exhibit C 3). Unsurprisingly, plaintiffs lead every NY Federal Judge, outrageously, on the proverbial garden path on which they gamed and won based upon gullibility of Appellate Panel Members demeaning the very system of justice itself:

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Exhibit C 2 page MJ Letter plus counterfeit USM-94

Note: 3: Hague Treaty service, purportedly requested pursuant to NY Court Officer, Mark Andersons on USM-94 forms dated July 14, 1998. Reception and official presence of these forms dated July 14, 1998 was flatly rebuffed by Frances Ministre de la Justice - Garde des Sceaux simply for absence of official intake records. The French were left puzzled when confronted by Movants attorneys with a set of unmatchable submissions dated July 14, 1998, that conflicted with a genuine USM-94 request officially received per July, 7, 1998. Translation of relevant sections (Page 1, Paragraph 2, middle): ... results of our investigation into our archives are, that the Central Authority, represented by this bureau, was engaged per request dated 7th July 1998 demanding notification of documents by MARK R. ANDERSON, esq., ROGERS & WELLS destined for monsieur VIERTEL as representative of companies TV BROAD CAST CENTER and TELECOMMUNICATION PARTENER LIMITED, and that notification was executed on 6th August 1998, thereafter the acts [dossiers] were returned to the requester in the United States. Paragraph 3: In view of the pieces that you transmitted, in particular those (verbal) notes dated 6th and 12th August 1998, it appears that other acts concerning notifications might have been in pendency during that time, but because of total absence of other reference, we are unable to locate even a trace of these requests in the archives of our service, and, therefore, we are unable to verify the modalities/circumstances of apprehension/notification or the entities on target. This official letter clearly and convincingly demonstrates that every one of Esquire Andersons ten July 14, 1998 (3)USM-94 submissions made on 11-12-1998 to Judge Sweet were counterfeit in hindsight, and that Anderson had tried an earlier USM-94 request, dated 7th July 1998, failed and made it vanish from earth, most plausible because his only true service was upon a representative for two (named) corporations [both fabrications by Esquire Feldman] was deemed fatally unfit for a direct RICO Default attack against Movant Viertel, in personam. The New York Courts failed to discharge their judicial burdens to assert that proof of service is legitimate, odorless and not Park Avenue sewer-service by skullduggery and shenanigans. Shenanigans trumped United States exceptionalism in CA2: 04-3426 [Citation: 417 F.3d 292], CA2: 10-2445 (fee default) and CA2: 14-2815 (summarily affirming in personam jurisdiction)

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Page 2 of Letter dated 11-28-2006 by French Central Authority.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA CAPTION: BURDA MEDIA, INC. and BURDA HOLDING : 00-Civ-02034 JLK GmbH & CO. KG, a German Limited Partnership, v. CHRISTIAN VIERTEL, TELECOMMUNICATION

PARTNERS LIMITED CERTIFICATE OF COURTESY SERVICE

I, Prof. Christian T Viertel, hereby certify under penalty of perjury that on 15th January 2016, I served a copy, pdf file of this instant MOTION TO VACATE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT 43 pages (total) by email on the following party on behalf of both unrepresented Plaintiffs: Hon. Senator Prof. Dr. Hubert Burda at burdahu@burda.com Signature