IN THE OHIO SUPREME COURT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF OHIOUPON RELATION ETC.

Appellant

vs.

CITY OF SOLON, OHIO, et al.

Appellees.

CASE NO. 07-05478th District Ct. of Appeals CA 06 87926Trial Court Case No. CV 05 579156

BRIEF OF APPELLEES', CITY OF SOLON, OHIO, ET AL., INOPPOSITION TO APPELLANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF

JURISDICTION

APPELLANT,STATE OF OHIO UPONRELATION OF ANTHONYC. KOCAK:

Anthony C. Kocak, Pro Se

523 North Main Street (Apt. D-2)Grafton, Ohio 44044Telephone: 440-396-5405

COUNSEL FOR APPELEE,CITY OF SOLON, ET AL.:

Fax: 216-621-1127

Cleveland, Ohio 44113Telephone: 216-621-657

Robert C. McClelland (0012352)(Counsel of Record)David J. Matty (0012335)Shana A. Samson (0072871)Rademaker, Matty, McClelland & Greve55 Public Square, Suite 1775

APR 25 2007

MARCIA J. MENGEL CLERKSUPREME C 0810F

TABLE OF CONTENTSPa e

1. STATEMENT OF APPELLEE'S POSITION AS TO WHY THISCASE IS NOT A CASE OF PUBLIC OR GREAT GENERALINTEREST AND WHY THIS CASE DOES NOT INVOLVE ASUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION ............................ 1

II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS ..................................... 2

III. ARGUMENTS CONTRA APPELLANT'S PROPOSITIONS OF LAW..... 3

A. Argument Contra Appellant's Proposition of Law No. I ............... 3

1. Pro Se Litigants Should be Held to the Same Standard As OtherLitigants in Ohio Courts ......................................................... 3

2. The Appellate Court Properly Affirmed the Decision of the TrialCourt Granting Solon's Motion to Dismiss .................................... 4

B. Argument Contra Appellant's Proposition of Law No. II ............... 8

1. The Ohio Revised Code Sections Cited by Appellant do not Applyin this Case ... .. . ....... .......... .. .. ... ... ......... .... .............. ...... ...... 8

IV. CONCLUSION ........................................................................ 10

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TABLE OF AUTHORITYCitation Page

Cases

Holman v. Keegan, 139 Ohio App. 3d 911, 746 N.E.2d 209 (6th Dist. Erie County 2000).... 3

In re ICLNDS Notes Acquisition, LLC, 259 B.R. 289 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001) ................ 3

Kilroy v. B.H. Lakeshore Co. (1996), 111 Ohio App.3d 357, 676 N.E.2d 171(Ohio App. 8 Dist.) ...... ..... . .... ..... ....... .. .... .. ... ... ............... . ..... . .. ... .. ....... .. .. .. .. . 4

Meyers v. First Nat. Bank of Cincinnati, 3 Ohio App. 3d 209,444 N.E.2d 412 ( 1st Dist.Hamilton County 1981) .................................................................................. 3,4

Sabouri v. Ohio Dept. ofJob & Family Serv., 145 Ohio App. 3d 651, 763 N.E.2d 1238(10th Dist. Franklin County 2001 ....................................................................... 3

State, ex rel. Alben v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 133,1996-Ohio-120 .. . . . . .. .. .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . .. . . .. .. . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. . . . . . . . . ..... 6

State, ex rel. Brammer v. Hayes (1955), 164 Ohio St. 373, 130 N.E.2d 795 ....................... 4

State, ex rel. Bush v. Spurlock ( 1989) 42 Ohio St.3d 77, 537 N.E.2d 641 .......................... 5

State, ex rel. Doerfler v. Otis ( 1918), 98 Ohio St. 83, 94, 120 N.E. 313 ............................ 9

State, ex rel. Fattlar v. Boyle (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 123, 1998-Ohio-428 ......................... 6

State, ex rel. Gerspacher v. Coffinberry (1952), 157 Ohio St. 32, 104 N.E.2d 1 .................. 6

State, ex rel. Governor v. Taft ( 1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 1, 640 N.E.2d 1136 ......................... 7

State, ex rel. Hodges v. Taft (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 1, 591 N.E.2d 1186 ............................ 4

State, ex rel. Karmasu v. Tate ( 1992), 83 Ohio App.3d 199, 614 N.E.2d 827 ..................... 5

Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 532 N.E.2d 753 ......................... 5

State, ex rel. Millington v. Weir ( 1978), 60 Ohio App.2d 348, 397 N.E.2d 770 .................. 5

State, ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 451,1999-Ohio-123 ............................................................................................. 5

State, ex. rel. Wipert v. Board of Education of Xenia Tp. School District (1931), 45 Ohio App.421, 187 N.E. 255 .................................................:........................................ 7

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Ohio Statutes

O.R.C. § 3.30 ............................................................................................ 10

O.R.C. § 3.22 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . ... 6

ORC § 2307.06 ...... ... . .. .. .... ... .... .............. .... . ............. .: .... . ........ ......... ......... 7,8

Solon Charter Provisions

Article III . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. .. . .. . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . .. .. . . . . . .. .. . . .. . . . . .. .. .. .. . . . . . . . . .. 8

Article IV, Section 9 ....................................................:.................................. 9,10

Constitutional Provisions

Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution ............................................................... 8,10

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I. STATEMENT OF APPELLEE'S POSITION AS TO WHY THIS CASE ISNOT A CASE OF PUBLIC OR GREAT GENERAL INTEREST AND WHYTHIS CASE DOES NOT INVOLVE A SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONALQUESTION

Contrary to Appellant's argument, this case is not one of public or great general interest.

Appellant asserts that there are two issues that make this case of public or great general interest.

The first, regarding pro se litigants, is not of great public or great general interest because Ohio

case law is clear regarding the status of pro se litigants. As discussed in more detail below,

under Ohio law, pro se litigants shall be held to the same standard as other litigants. The second

issue, regarding home rule municipalities, is not of public or great general interest because as a

home rule municipality, Solon can regulate official bonds for city officials. There is no novel

issue or unique proposition of law presented by Appellant to warrant farther review by this Court

as a matter of public or great general interest. The instant matter is only of interest to the parties

involved.

Nor is a substantial constitutional issue at stake. The Cuyahoga County Court of

Common Pleas reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to Appellant and determined

that Appellant had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. It is undisputed

that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy according to Ohio law and certain elements must be

satisfied in order pursue a petition for writ of mandamus according to the Ohio Revised Code.

Upon appeal, the Eighth District Court of Appeals determined that Solon's Motion to Dismiss

had been properly granted, when viewed in the light most favorable to Appellant. The decision

rendered in the instant matter in favor of Solon was based upon existing standards of review

which were correctly applied. No substantial constitutional question is present for review.

The trial court found in favor of Appellee Solon, as did the appellate court, which by

granting Solon's motion to dismiss on the merits, determined that Plaintiff had failed to state a

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claim upon which relief may be granted. In addition, the appellate court determined that Solon,

as a home rule municipality, can regulate official bonds for public officials. While this case may

be of great interest to the Appellant, it does not involve issues of public or great general interest.

In the absence of any substantial constitutional issues or issues of public or great general interest,

Appellant's appeal should not be allowed.

H. STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

Appellant, Anthony Kocak, filed a Complaint and Petition for Writ of Mandamus with

the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas on December 8, 2005. The Complaint and

Petition for Writ of Mandamus names as Respondents the City of Solon, Kevin C. Patton, Sally

Deitrick, Jack Clifford, Dianne Garrett, Susan A. Drucker, Robert J. Pelunis, John T. Scott,

Edward K. Suit, David J. Kras, Lon Stolarsky, Edward H. Kraus, Roger J. Goudy, D. William

Weber, Fred J. Wendel, Chief Wayne Godzich, Lt. Christopher Viland, Lt. Bruce Felton, Lt. Jim

Abramowski, Carol Haddon, Jan Kozelka, Michelle Moretto, Phil Foley, and Kim Perry

(hereinafter referred to collectively as "Solon" or "Appellee").

In his Complaint and Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Appellant requests that Solon,

through its duly appointed Director of Finance, D. Williani Weber, forfeit all official bonds held

by Solon and distribute an amount of $521,750 per bondholder to Appellant. The Appellant's

Prayer reads as follows:

For these reasons, Anthony Kocak, as Victim of Constitutional Violations,asks the Treasurer of the City of Solon, Ohio Mr. D. William Weber to releaseto Anthony Kocak all bonds underwriting this action, not the bonds forAnthony Kocak, that are attached in this case, in an amount of $521,750 perbondholder, or for the face amount of each bond, whichever is greater, andthat this court set a date for hearing for said forfeiture.

Appellant asserts in his Complaint and Petition for Writ of Mandamus that Solon failed to

produce the official oaths of office to form and content and, Solon failed to require official bond

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underwriting prior to the performance of official duties. Thus, based upon this assertion,

Appellant argues that he is entitled to a writ of mandamus commanding Solon to forfeit all

official bonds.

On January 12, 2006 a Motion to Dismiss Appellant's Complaint and Petition for Writ of

Mandamus was filed on behalf of the City of Solon and the Solon officials and employees named

in Appellant's original Complaint. The trial court granted Solon's Motion to Dismiss on March

3, 2006. Appellant subsequently filed an appeal with the Eighth District Court of Appeals on

March 24, 2006 naming only Mayor Kevin C. Patton, Finance Director D. William Weber, Clerk

of Courts Jan Kozelka and Auditor Phil Foley. The parties briefed the issues and the Court of

Appeals heard oral arguments on January 16, 2007. On February 12, 2007, the Eighth District

Court of Appeals issued an opinion affirming the decision of the trial court granting Solon's

Motion to Dismiss. The instant appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court ensued.

III. ARGUMENTS CONTRA APPELLANT'S PROPOSITIONS OF LAW

A. Argument Contra Appellant's Proposition of Law No. I.

I. Pro Se Litigants Should be Held to the Same Standard As Other Litigants inOhio Courts

Ohio law permits individuals who are parties to legal proceedings to represent themselves

personally without a lawyer. See In re ICLNDS Notes Acquisition, LLC, 259 B.R. 289 (Bankr.

N.D. Ohio 2001). However, such individuals are not entitled to special treatment and are

presumed to have knowledge of the law and legal procedures. See Sabouri v. Ohio Dept. of Job

& Family Serv., 145 Ohio App. 3d 651, 763 N.E.2d 1238 (10th Dist. Franklin County 2001).

Despite Appellant's argument to the contrary, pro se parties are bound by the same rules and

procedures as one who retains counsel. See Holman v: Keegan, 139 Ohio App. 3d 911, 746

N.E.2d 209 (6th Dist. Erie County 2000); Meyers v. First Nat. Bank of Cincinnati, 3 Ohio App.

3

3d 209, 444 N.E.2d 412 (1st Dist. Hamilton County 1981). It is well-established Ohio law that a

pro se party is presumed to have knowledge of the law and correct legal procedure and is held to

the same standard as other litigants. See Kilroy v. B.H. Lakeshore Co. (1996), 111 Ohio App.3d

357, 676 N.E.2d 171 (Ohio App. 8 Dist.).

Consequently, Appellant is held to the same standard as any other litigant in this case.

Appellant is not entitled to special treatment due to his status as a pro se litigant. Appellant's

Complaint and Petition for Writ of Mandamus were dismissed because the Appellant was unable

to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. As evidenced by the trial court's journal

entry and the opinion of the Court of Appeals, Appellant was provided with meaningful access to

the courts.

2. The Appellate Court Properly Affirmed the Decision of the Trial CourtGranting Solon's Motion to Dismiss

Appellant's Complaint and Petition for Writ of Mandamus fail to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. Appellant can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that

would entitle him to the relief requested in his Complaint and Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

Mandamus is an extraordinary civil action that can be maintained to enforce only a clear legal

right. See, State ex rel. Brammer v. Hayes ( 1955), 164 Ohio St. 373, 130 N.E.2d 795. In

essence, when a court grants a writ of mandamus, the court orders the person or persons against

whom the writ is issued to do something. Since mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, in order

to grant a writ of mandamus, the court must find that

1. the relator has a clear legal right to the relief prayed for,

2. the respondent is under a clear legal duty to perform the requested act, and

3. the relator has no plain and adequate remedy at law.

See, State, ex rel. Hodges v. Taft ( 1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 1, 1, 591 N.E.2d 1186.

4

In order for a complaint in mandamus to lie it must be sufficient according to the Rules of

Civil Procedure, thus, the complaint must adequately state a cause of action. See, State ex rel.

Millington v. Weir (1978), 60 Ohio App.2d 348, 350, 397 N.E.2d 770. A complaint in

mandamus states a claim if it alleges existence of a legal duty and want of an adequate remedy at

law with sufficient particularity so that respondent is given reasonable notice of the claim that is

being asserted. See, State ex rel. Bush v. Spurlock (1989) 42 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 537 N.E.2d 641.

In determining whether a mandamus petition sets forth a cognizable claim, the court must

presume all factual allegations of the petition are true and make all reasonable inferences in favor

of the nonmoving party. See, Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192, 532

N.E.2d 753. Dismissal of a mandamus petition based on failure to state a claim on which relief

can be granted is proper only if it appears beyond a doubt that relator can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim that would entitle relator to relief. See, State ex rel. Karmasu v. Tate

(1992), 83 Ohio App.3d 199, 202, 614 N.E.2d 827.

Since mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, Ohio courts have determined that the relator

must substantiate a clear legal right to the relief, that the respondent is under a clear legal duty to

perform the requested act, and that the relator has no plain and adequate remedy at law.

Appellant is unable to establish any of the three requirements of an action in mandamus under

Ohio law.

Appellant has no clear legal right to relief because Appellant failed to show that he has a

beneficial interest in the requested acts set forth in his Complaint and Petition for Writ of

Mandamus. "It is well established that before an Ohio court can consider the merits of a legal

claim, the person seeking relief must establish standing to sue." State ex rel. Ohio Academy of

Trial Lawyers v. Sheward (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 469, 1999-Ohio-123. Without a beneficial

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interest in the requested relief, Appellant is unable to show that he has standing to bring a

mandamus action against Solon and the named Solon officials and employees. If the relator has

no right to have a specific act performed, mandamus will not issue. See, State ex rel. Fattlar v.

Boyle ( 1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 123, 1998-Ohio-428. The burden of establishing such a clear right

is on the relator, and if there is a substantial doubt as to the relator's right, the writ should be

refused, See, State ex rel. Alben v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 133, 1996-

Ohio-120; see also, State ex rel. Gerspacher v. Cofftnberry ( 1952), 157 Ohio St. 32, 104 N.E.2d

1.

Appellant asserts that he is entitled to mandamus because Solon's oaths of office are not

in compliance with Ohio law. There is no dispute that the Ohio Revised Code requires that all

public officials take an oath of office prior to performance of their duties. See ORC § 3.22. The

oaths are signed and unambiguously state that the official will support the Constitution and laws

of the United and the State of Ohio. Moreover, the oaths affirm the faithful, honest and impartial

discharge of duties. The oaths of office utilized by Solon clearly meet the requirements of ORC

§ 3.22. Thus, Appellant cannot show that he has a clear legal right to the relief requested.

Appellant is unable to establish that he has a clear legal right to the forfeiture of the

official bonds because Solon officials are not required to furnish bonds unless it is deemed

necessary by city council pursuant to Article IV, Section 9 of the Solon Charter, The

requirement of official bonds for the officials and/or employees is discretionary under the Solon

Charter. Consequently, Appellant's argument that all Solon officials and employees are required

to furnish bonds and Appellant is entitled to forfeiture of these bonds and monetary damages due

to Solon's failure to furnish said bonds is incorrect. Appellant is unable to meet his burden of

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establishing a clear legal right to the relief requested. The trial court and the appellate court were

correct in holding that Appellant failed to demonstrate his clear legal right to relief.

Appellant also failed to demonstrate Solon's clear legal duty to perform the act requested

in his Petition for Writ of Mandamus-forfeiture of Solon's official bonds. A writ of mandamus

will not issue unless respondents have failed to perform some act that the law requires. See,

State ex. rel. Wipert v. Board of Education of Xenia Tp. School District (1931), 45 Ohio App.

421, 423, 187 N.E. 255. Appellant's Complaint and Petition for Writ of Mandamus do not

demonstrate that Solon or any of the officials named in the Appellant's Complaint have a clear

legal duty to release "all bonds underwriting in this action...in the amount of $521,750 per

bondholder, or for the face amount of each bond, whichever is greater." As stated above, Solon

public officials are not required to furnish bonds unless it is deemed necessary by Council

pursuant to Article IV, Section 9 of Solon's Charter. It is well established that a court cannot

create a duty in mandamus; thus, Appellant's Complaint and Petition for Writ of Mandamus

were properly dismissed. See, State ex rel. Governor v. Taft (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 1, 640 N.E.2d

1136.

In addition, Appellant's mandamus action was properly dismissed because the Appellant

has other adequate remedies at law. Appellant appears could pursue an action according to

O.R.C § 2307.06 on an official bond, thus another remedy at law does exist. O.R.C § 2307.06

states

When a person forfeits his bond, or renders his sureties liable thereon, a personinjured thereby, or who is entitled to the benefit of the security, may bring anaction thereon, in his own name, against the person and his sureties, to recover theamount to which he is entitled by reason of the delinquency, which action may beprosecuted on a certified copy of the bond. A judgment for one delinquency doesnot preclude the same for another person from bringing an action on theinstrument for another delinquency.

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An action pursuant to O.R.C § 2307.06 is another adequate remedy at law and when another

adequate remedy at law exists, mandamus must not be issued.

For the reasons stated above, the appellate court properly affirmed the trial court's

decision granting Appellee's Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim because Appellant

failed to establish the elements necessary to pursue an action in mandamus according to Ohio

law.

B. Argument Contra Appellant's Proposition of Law No. II.

1. The Ohio Revised Code Sections Cited by Appellant do not Apply in this Case.

Appellant's principal argument in his Complaint and Petition for Writ of Mandamus is

that Solon is in violation of Ohio law for its failure to require official bonds for all city officials

guaranteeing faithful performance. A review of Ohio l6w and Solon's Charter reveals that

Appellant's assertion is unfounded.

Solon is a home rule and local self-government municipality according to in Article

XVIII of the Ohio Constitution. As such, the home rule amendment to the Ohio Constitution

gives municipalities the ability through the authority to exercise all powers of local self-

government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such regulations, as the municipality

deems appropriate. The power conferred to Solon under Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution

allows Solon greater power to regulate its own affairs. Pursuant to home rule authority, the City

of Solon has duly enacted and adopted a Charter for the City of Solon, which has been in full

force and effect at all times herein. Article III of the Solon Charter states that:

The City of Solon shall have all the powers, general or special,governmental or proprietary, which may now or hereafter lawfully bepossessed or exercised by municipalities under the laws of Ohio. Allsuch powers may be exercised in the manner prescribed in this Charter;or, if not prescribed herein, in such manner as Council may determine;or, unless a contrary intent appears in this charter or in the enactments

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of the Council, as may now or hereafter be provided by the laws ofOhio.

Article IV, Section 9 of the Solon Charter states that officers, employees or members of

any board or commission of the City "may be required by the Council from time to time, to

furnish a bond or bonds for the faithful performance of his or her duties, and the Council mav

provide that the premium for any such bond shall be paid by the City." (emphasis added). The

Solon Charter does not mandate that all officers, employees or members of boards or

commission furnish bonds. The Charter clearly states that Solon City Council "may" require

officers, employees or members of any board or commission furnish a bond.

There is no controversy at issue with regard to the plain language and reading of Article

IV, Section 9 of the Solon City Charter. "Where the language of a charter is plain, clear, and

unambiguous, it must be given its usual and ordinary meaning...." State ex rel. Doerfder v. Otis

(1918), 98 Ohio St. 83, 94, 120 N.E. 313. The Solon Charter speaks for itself, and its language is

plain, clear, and unambiguous. In accordance with Article IV, Section 9 of the Charter of the

City of Solon, City Council requires that the Mayor and Finance Director furnish bonds

guaranteeing the faithful performance of their official duties. Under the discretion of the City

Council, official bonds for Mayor Kevin Patton and Finance Director D. William Weber are

currently held. Mayor Patton's official bond is in the amount of two thousand dollars

($2,000.00) and Finance Director Weber's treasurers bond is in the amount of ten thousand

dollars ($10,000.00). These bonds comply with Ohio law as to the form and content of bonds.

Appellant has not challenged these bonds or set forth any argument that they fail to comply with

Ohio law.

Appellant's argument that Article IV, Section 9 of the Solon Charter is in conflict with

the general laws of the State of Ohio is unfounded. The Ohio Revised Code does not require that

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all municipal officials and/or employees be bonded. Appellant asserts that Ohio Revised Code §

3.30 is applicable in this case and Solon's Charter is in conflict with this section. O.R.C. § 3.30

states,

A person elected or appointed to an office who is required by law to give a bondor security previous to the performance of the duties imposed on him by hisoffice, who refuses or neglects to give such bond or furnish such security withinthe time and in the manner prescribed by law, and in all respects to qualifyhimself for the performance of such duties, is deemed to have refused to acceptthe offrce to which he was elected or appointed. Such office shall be consideredvacant and shall be filled as provided by law.

This section only applies to those officials who are "required by law to give a bond or security"

and in no way mandates that all persons elected or appointed to an office are required by law to

give a bond. Therefore, there is no conflict.

Official bonds for the City of Solon officials and/or employees are discretionary under

Article IV, Section 9 of the Solon Charter. As a home rule, charter municipality, Solon is within

its discretion to require bonds for certain public officials. The trial court and appellate court

properly determined that Solon is a self-governed municipality enumerated in Article XVIII of

the Ohio Constitution and the Charter clearly indicates that Solon City Council may require

officers, employees, or members of any board or commission to furnish a bond. Thus, there is

no conflict between the state laws and the Solon Charter.

IV. CONCLUSION

Appellant failed to establish a valid action for mandamus against the City of Solon and

the twenty-four named Solon officials and employees. Even presuming all factual allegations of

the petition are true and making all reasonable inferences in favor of the Appellant, it appears

beyond a doubt that Appellant can prove no set of facts in support of any claim entitling him to

relief. As stated above in detail, Appellant does not have a clear legal right to the relief prayed

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for, Solon is not under a clear legal duty to perform the requested act, and Appellant has other

adequate remedies at law. Thus, the appellate court properly affirmed the trial court's order

granting Solon's Motion to Dismiss Appellant's Complaint and Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

Respectfully Submitted,

Q"U-C1ti^G^ROBERT C. MCCLELLAND (0012352)DAVID J. MATTY (0012335)SHANA A. SAMSON (0072871)Attorneys for Defendants, City of Solon, et al.Rademaker, Matty, McClelland & Greve55 Public Square - Suite 1775Cleveland, Ohio 44113(216) 621-6570Fax: 216-621-1127

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

A copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Opposition to Jurisdiction of Appellees, City of

Solon, et al., has been forwarded by regular U.S. Mail to the following on this 2#A- day of

Apri12007.

Anthony C. Kocak523 North Main Street, Apt. D-2Grafton, Ohio 44044

Shana A. Samson

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