IN THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH AT KARACHI (Execution Jurisdiction under section 44A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908)

Foreign Execution Application No.S.. of 20Reented on.. 2 Mena Energy DMCC a company incorporated in Dubai, the United Arab Emirates (company registration no DMCC2181) Having registered office is at 34th Floor, Silver Tower, Jumeirah Lake Towers, PO Box 92502, Dubai, United Arab Emirates

Deputy Regsar (0.S

Decree-Holder

Versus

Hascol Petroleum Limited Suite 105-106, 1st Floor, The Forum G-20, Khayaban-e-Jami, Block-9, Clifton, Karachi.

Judgment-Dehtor

Execution Applcation under section 44A read with Order XXI Rule 11 of

the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

THE

ORDER SHEET THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH KARACHI

Execution N 51 of 2019

1D. TE RDER WITH SIGNATURE OF JUDGE

For hearing of CMA Nos: 143 of 2021 300 of 2019 301 of 2019

For earing of Exe ion Applic: n.

06-05-2021

Mr. ljaz Ahmad Zahid, Advocate for the Decree Holder Mr. Arshad M. Tayebaly, Advocate for the Judgment Debtor

**********

Pursuant to last order ated 28-04-2021, learned counsel for

the Judgment Debtor files statement to enclose list of immovable assets of the Judgment Debtor. Same is taken on record, a copy whereof has been supplied to the learned counsel for the Decree

Holder. Heard learned counsel. Reserved for orders. Couns

desiring o file synope, may do so within a weel

SHAUAN/tA"

E R

TWO RUPEE

PAKISTAN COURT FEE

THE HIGH COURT OF SINDH, KARACHI

Execution No. 51 of 2019 IMena Energy DMCC versus Hascol Petroleum Limited]

Men Tnergy DMCC, through Mr. jaz Ahd Zahid, Advocate.

Decree Holder

Hascol Petroleum Limited through Mr. Arshad M. Tayebaly, Advocate.

Judgment Debtor

Date of hearing 06-05-2021 Date of decision 12-10-2021

ORDER

Adnan Iqbal Chaudhry J. - This Execution Application is brought under section 44-A CPC for enforcing a foreign judgment dated 15-06-2018 passed in case No. CL-2015-000620 by the High Court of

Justice, Business and Property Courts of England and Wales, Commercial Court (QBD).

2. By the foreign judgment, the Decree Holder [DH, a company incorporated in the UAE, has been awarded USD 9,500,000/- against the Judgment Debtor JD], a company incorporated in Pakistan. The Execution is filed at Karachi as the JI has assets a: Karachi. The foreign judgment is as follows:

"MENA ENERGY DMCC Claimant FIVE RUPEES

and

ASCOL PETROLEUM LIMITED Defendant

Judgment by consen

UPON reading terms of the Settlement Agreement dated 19 January 2018 between the parties AND UPON the parties having consented to the terms of this Judgment

PAKISTAN COURT FEE

BY CONSENT IT IS ORDERED THAT:

Judgment be entered for the Claimmnt in the stum of LIS$9,500,000 The Defendant shall pay the sni' sum of IS$9, 0,000 forthwith

There be no order as to costs 0r inierest.

1.

2.

5.

Daled this 15th day of June 2018."

Page 1 of 13

The JD has filed objections to the Execution. An earlier order 3

requiring the JD to deposit the decretal amount is presently suspended in HCA No. 241/2020 on the JD's contention that the

deposit required by Order XXI Rule 23-A CPC does not apply to a foreign decree. Mr. ljaz Ahmed, learned counsel for the DH pressed for a hearing of the Execution submitting that the order passed in the HCA does not stay the hearing of the objections. To that, Mr. Arshad

Tayebaly, learned counsel for the JD concededl

A. Section 44-A CPC reads as under:

"44-A. Execution of decrees passed by Courts in the United Kingdom and other reciprocating territory. (1) Where a certified

copy of a decree of any of the superior Courts of the Unite Kingdom or any reci procating territory has been led in a Dist

Cou.t, the decree nay be exec'l in Pakistan 1s if it had been

pased by the Dist:ict Court. (2) Together with the certified copy of the decree shall be filed a certificate from such superior Court stating the extent, if any, to which the decree has been satisfied or adjusted and such certificate shall, for the purposes of proceedings under this section, be

conclusive proof of the extent of such satisfaction or adjustranent. (3) The provisions of secticn 47 shall as frcun the filing of e certified copy of the decree apply to the proceedings of a District Court

executing a decree under this section, and the District Court shall refuse execution of any such decree, if it is shown to the satisfaction of the Court that the decree falls within any of the exceptions specified in clauses (a) to (f) of section 13.

Explanation 1. "Superior Courts", with reference to the United Kingdom, means the High Court in England, the Court of Sess.c in Scotland, the High Court in Northern Ireland, tne Court of Chancery of the County Palatine of Lancaster and the Court of Chancery of the County Palatine of Durham.

Explanation 2. "Reciprocating territory" means the United Kingdom and such other country or territory as the Federal Government may, from time to time, by notification in the official Gazette, declare to be reciprocating territory for the purposes of this section; and "superiorCourts", with reference to any such territory, means such Courts as may be specified in tho said notification.

Explenation 3. "Decr:e", with refercnce to a superior Court, means any decree or judgment of such Court under which a sum of money is payable, not being a sum payable jin respect of taxes or other charges of a like nature or in respect of a fine or other penalty, and

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with reference to superior Courts in the United Kingdom, includes judgments given and decrees made in any Court in appeals against such decrees or judgments, but

b) in no case includes an arbitration award, even if such award is enforceable as a decree or judgment."

Sub-section (3) of secticn 44-A CPC tipulates that the Court shall refuse oxecution of a foreign decree if it is shown to the

satisfaction of the Court that the decree falls within any of the

exceptions specified in clauses (a) to (f) of section 13 CPC, which in turn stipulates as follows:

"13. When foreign judgment not conclusive.- A foreign judgTent shall be conclsive as to any matter thereby directly adjudicated upon between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title except -

(a) Where it has not been pronounced by a Court of competent jurisdiction; (b) Where it has not been given on the merits of the case; (c) Where it appears on the face of the proceedings to be founded

on an incorrect view of international law or a refusal to recognize the aw of Pakistan in cases in which such law is

applicable; (d) Where the proceedings in which the judgment was obtained

are opposed to natural justice; (e) Where it has been obtained by fraud;

( Where it sustains a claim founded on a breach of any la* in force in Pakistan."

5. It is not disputed by the JD that the foreign judgment is a

decree by a 'superior Court of the United Kingdom' within the

cOU meaning of section 44-A CPC and its Explanation clauses. As regards the words 'District Court in section 44-A, Mr. ljaz Ahmed Advocate

THE

submitted that those include the High Court of Sir:h at Karach exercising 'District Cotrt jurisdiction'1 in civil suits within its

HO

pecuniary jurisdiction; hence the Execution before this Court. To that, Mr. Arshad Tayebaly, learned counsel for the JD did not object.

6. The objections of the JD are that the foreign judgment/decree is not 'conclusive within the meaning of otion 13 C,ergo

Full Bench of the High Court of Sindh in Rin1pa Sunbeann Cooperative Housing Society v. Karacli Metropolitan Corporation (PLD 2006 Karachi 444).

Page 3 of 13

inexecutable, and the DH can at best file a suit on the basis of the

foreign judgment. To elaborate, Mr. Arshad Tayebaly Advocate first

submitted that since the foreign judgment is hased on a settiement

agreement between the parties, it cannot be said to have been given

'on the merits of the case' within the meaning of clause (b) of section

13 CPC. For that, he placed reliance on Gudemetla China Appalaraju v.

Kota Venkata Subba Rao (AIR (33) 1946 Madras 296). Second, he

submitted that payment to the DH under the Settlement Agreement

conditior ed on an approval of the State Bank of Pakistan (SPP

approval], also a requirement of section 5 of the Foreign Exchange

Regulation Act, 1947; and therefore, until the SBP approval, the

foreign decree cannot be executed, alternatively, it will be hit by

clause (c) of section 13 CPC for refusing to recognize Pakistani law.

Learned counsel added that ne JD has applied to the SBP for said

approval, bi: the same has yet to be issued. Mr. Tayebaly's third

objection was that the foreign decree based on the Settlement

Agreement was only a contract between the parties, and in view of

the enunciation in Peer Dil v. Dad Muhammad (2009 SCMR 1268), :he

remedy of the DH was not an Evecution but E uit for bre: f

conract. The last ojection takn was that by clause 16 o the

Settlement Agreement the parties had agreed that only the Courts of

England and Wales would have jurisdiction to decide any dispute

arising under or in connection with the Settlement Agreement.

7. Mr. az Ahmed, le uned counse! for the DH somitted tha

before the ioreign Court there was a claim by the DH and a counter

claim by the JD; that the counter-claim of the JD was dismissed and it

was held liable to the DH, and that is whern the parties entered into

the Settlement Agreement dated 19-01-2018; that under clause 6.1 of

the Settlement Agreement as amended by Addendum dated

23-01-2018, a draft of the consent judgment signed by both parties

and been retained in escrow with the stipulation that if the JD does

not pay, the DH will be free to present the consent judgment to the

foreign Court for sealing, and that is how it came to be passed; and

Page 4 of 13

therefore in such circumstances, section 13(b) CPC was not altracted.Learned counsel submitted that the case of Gudemetla relied upon by the JD was distinguishable, and he in turn relied on the cases of Abdul Wahid v. Abdul Ghani (PLD 1963 Karachi 990) and Ghulam Hussain v.

Fatima Bibi (PLD 1975 Lahore 95). As regards the SBP approval, Mr. ljaz Ahmed submitted that obtainir such ann val was

obligatior of the JD;at not only d the JD1ay making tr requisit pplication to the SBP, it also did not pursue the same; that the JD cannot take advantage of its own wrong; that in any case, the SBP approval for remitting the money abroad is no impediment to the Execution, as once the money is recovered at Karachi, thr will apply to the SBP for remittin it abroad. R garding Peer Dil's case, learned counsel submitted that said case was not for the proposition that an Execution can never been filed to enforce a compromise decree, and in that regard he relied on Montgomery Flour and General Mills v. MCB Bank Ltd. (2015 CLD 1590) and Samba Bank Ltd. v. Sty Bhais (2013 CLD 2080)

8. Heard the learned counsel and perused the record.

9. It is settled that by virtue of section 13 CPC a foreigm judgment as between the parties thereto is accepted in Pakistan as being conclusive as to the matter thereby directly adjudicated, provided it does not fall within any of the exceptions listed under section 13; and that a foreign judgment that qualifies under section 44-A CPC can be executed thereunder in Pakistan as a decree; but if the Pakistani Court

E A

is satisfied that the foreign judgment falls within any of the exceptions to section 13, then it is to refuse execution, for then

ONIS

Pakistani law does not recognize such decre= to be conclusive between the parties. The fine line between the rule of conclusivenessof a foreign judgment under section 13 CPC and the rule of res judicata

2 Grosvenor Casino Ltd. v. Abdul Malik Badruddin (1397 SCMR 323), nd Muhammad Ramzan v. Nasreeu Firdous (PLD 16 SC 174).

Page 5 of 13

was explained by the Supreme Court of India in R. Viswanathan v.

Rukn-ul-Mulk Syed Abdul Wajid (AIR 1963 SC 1) as under:

"(35) The rule of conclusiveness of a foreign judgment as enacted in S. 13 is some-what different in its operation from te rule of res

judicata. Undoubteclly both the rules are founded upon the principle of sanctity of judgments competently rendered. But the rule of res

judicata applies to all matters in issue in a former suit which have been heard and finally decided between the parties, and includes

matters which might and ought to have been made ground of attack

or defence in the former suit., The rule of conclusiveness of foreign

judgments applies only to matters directly adjudicated Manifestly, therefore, every issue heard and finally decic ed in a foreign cou: is not conc!usive between the parties. What is

conclusive is the judgment. Again, the competence of a Court for the

application of the rule of res judicata falls to be determined strictly by the municipal law; but the competence of the foreign tribunal

must satisfy a dual test of competence by the laws of the State in

which the Court functions, and also in an international sense."

on.

In R. Viswanatharn, the Supreme Court of India had also he.cd

that in considering whether a judgment of a foreign Court is

conclusive, the domestic Courts will not enquire whether conclusions

recorded thereby are supported by the evidence, or are otherwise correct, because the binding character of the judgment may be

displaced only by establishing that the case falls within or.e or more of the six clauses of section 13 CPC and not otherwise. That observation in R. Viswanathan was also endorsed by a learned Division Bench of this Court in Karachi Gas Company Ltd. v. Hasham Issag (PLD 1981 Kar 197).

HE HI

10. The first objecticn raised by the JD is that the roreign jucdgunt falls within the exCeption clause c section 13(b) CPC, i.e. it has not HaNI

been given 'on the merits of the case', rather it is on the basis of a

settlement agreement between the parties. In support of that objection, Mr. Arshad Tayebaly Advocate placed reliance on Gudemetla China Appalaraju v. Kota Venkata Subba Rao (AR (33) 1946 Madras 296). In that case a

ronsent decree was passed by a court in a

territory in India governed under French law, and a single Judge of the Madras High Court held that such decree was not on the merits of

Pare &of 13

the case and thus hit by section 13(b) CPC. It appears that such

finding was given in facts where no dispute/case was pending

between the parties before the foreign court, rather they had

approached that court with a draft consent decree so as to create a

collateral for a contract between them inasmuch as, under the French

law prevailing in that territory, immovable property thereat co

only be made liable uunder a decrrn of a French rourt. On the her

hanc, in the instan ase, the consonu judgment was passed to dispose

of a case pending between the parties before the foreign court.

Therefore, the case of Gudemetla is clearly distinguishable. In fact, it

was similarly distinguished by a Division Bench of the Rajasthan

High Court in Satya Narain v. Balachand IR 1955 Rajhan 59) to

that judgr ents of foreign observe tha: indemetla was not for the v

courts on compromise are not judgments on the merits of the case.

The Division Bench then went on to hold:

"6. therefore, an 'ex parte' decree which was based on evidence is a judgment on merits, we feel thata judgment bas on a compromise entered into by the parties is i no worse posi on, the place of evidence in such a case being taken by the consent of the defendants. What happened in this case was that the defendants originally contested the suit and filed their written statements. Later on, they decided to compromise the matter and a decree was passed on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties. We are of opinion that sSuch a decree must be held to be conclusive an cannot be held to be one not on the merits."

Gudemetla was again distinguished in Molammad Abdullav. a M., bdul Rahim (AIR 1985 Madras 379) where it was held:

S. 13(b) by itself does not speak about any controversy. The element of controversy may be relevant only to find out whether the adjudication was on merits. .... This is not a case of a iudgment being obtained on the simple grouncd defendan: or on his failur: to comply with a provision of law. This is

"6.

non-appearance of the

a case of a controversy existing on the date of the suit, which got solved by the judgment-debtor agreeing to take a decree subsequently..permittedthe passing on of a judgment on service of summons duly on the defendant and taking note of a written consent for a decree the defendant, it would stil be a_judgment orerits, havin

. f the procedure adopted by a foreign Court

1alities of a jucient."

Page 7 of 13

11. Given the case-law discussed above, it cannot be laid down as a

rule that every foreign judgment by consent of the parties is not a

judgment on the merits of the case so as to attract section 13(b) CPC

The case-law shows that where such question is raised, the enfor Court inevitably co1siders the cirunstances in which the judgnent came to be passel by consent. Therefore, I proceed to examine that

aspect.

12. Recitals to the Settlement Agreement show that the parties were litigating under contracts of supply of gasoil and fel oil where under shipments were made by the D to the JD at Karachi. The

foreign court seized of the case had split the trial into two parts, the

first to determine liability between the parties, and the second to

determine quantum of liability. The first part of the trial determined against the JD by judgment dated 16-02-2017 (reported as Mena

Energy DMCC v. Hnscol Petroleunm Ltd., [2017] 1 Lloyd's Law Reports 607). It was just before the second part of the trial that the parties came to an agreement on the quantum of the JD's liability and the manner of its payment to the DH, i.e. the Settlement Agreement dated 19-01-2018, which was then modified by an Addendum dated 23-01- 2018.

13. Under the Settlement Agreement, the JD agreed to pay a sum of USD 9,500,000/- in full and final settlement of the DHs claim pending before the foreign court, in four installments commencing from 19-05-2018 (clause 1.2) by remitting the same to the DI's bank account at Dubai (clause 2.1). In the meanwhe, the JD was o provide to the DH bank guarantee; in PKR equivalent to each installment from a bank in Pakistan (clause 5). The parties agreed to retain with COU HE HI

an escrow drafts of four consent judgments duly signed by the parties, the first one being for USD 9,500,000/-, with the stipulation that if the JD does not pay the first installment or coes not furnis ne

bank guarantee, th the entire nount of LD 9,500,000/- will immediately become due and owing, and the DH will be at liberty to present the consent judgment to the foreign court with the prayer to

Page 8 of 13

pass/seal the same and proceed to enforce it (clauses 6.1, 6.2 and (.7 as modified by the Addendum). Upon the execution of the Settleme Agreement the parties agreed to apply to the foreign court for a consent order to stay the case pending before it until the enforcement of the Settlement Agreement becomes necessary (clause 7). The JD did not make any payment under the Settlement Agreement, nor did it provide the agreed bank guarantees. herefore, the DH presented the draft of the first comsent judgment of USD 9,500,000/- to the foreign court with an application to pass/seal the same. Notice of that application was given to the JD. However, the JD's Solicitors informed the foreign court that the JD did not wish to

contest the passing/sealing of the consent judgment (pages 33 237); and that is how it came to be passed. 14. hus, before tihe foreign court the circumstances were that by a prior judgment the JD had already been held liable to make payment to the DH; that pending trial for determining the quantum of the JD's liability, the JD agreed to pay a certain sum to the DH in full and final settlement; and then on its failure to pay he JD conse.ited to the passing of a judgment against it for the agreed sum. In my view, those circumstances were the very 'merits of the case' before the foreign court on which it proceeded to pass judgment. Surely, the words 'merits of the case' in section 13(b) of the CPC are not intenc to require a discussion of the evidence in a case where the defern.ant cOUN accepts liability and concedes jugment. The case of Satya Narain supra takes the same view. Therefore, in the given circumstances, the

HE HIO

foreign judgment against the JD was on the merits of the case, not falling under clause (b) of section 13 CPC.

15. Mr. Arslhad Tayebaly, learned counsel for the D had then relied on Peer Dil v. Dad hammad (2009 SCMR 1268) to submit that against a compromise decree, which is essentially a contract between the parties, the remedy of the aggrieved party is not an Execution but a suit for breach of contract. However, one look at the foreign judgment/ decree reproduced above will show that though it is by

Page 9 of 13

consent of the parties, it is not a compromise decree in the sense

propounded by learned counsel, in that it does not incorporate the terms of the Settlement Agreement nor does it direct the JD to make

payment in line with its contract with the D. Rather it is money daree directin ne JD to par "orthwith". "2 circumstances leading o the foreign decree clearly show that it came to be passed not to

maintain the Settlement Agreement, but as a consequence of the

breach of the Settlement Agreement.

16. Nevertheless, Peer Dil's case docs not expourd the argumen: of

learned counsel for ihe JD. In that case, the facts were that during arbitration the parties arrived at a compromise resulting in a consent

award which was then made rule of court by decree. Subsequently, the party who alleged breach of the consent award filed suit for

specific performance. The other party contended that the suit was barred by res judicata by reason of the decree whereby the award was

made rule of court. To that objection to the maintainability of the suit the Supreme Court answered that since the decree was of a

compromise agreement, it was essentially a contract, and on the breach thereof a fresh cause of action had arisen making the suit maintainable. Regards the question whether a compromise decree is executable, it was observed that: "Whether a subsequent suit is barred by reason of section 47 CPC depends upon the existence of a decree which is executable for the purpose of the relief sought to be enforced in subsequent suit." Thus, Peer Dil does not lay down that a

compromise decree can never be execu'ed, but that esh suit to enforce th compromise agreement can be filed where the compronmise decree does not cover the relief sought in the fresh suit. In Montgomery Flour and General Mills v. MCB Bank Ltd. (2015 CLD 1590) a learned Division Bench of the Lahore High Court had also observed that Peer Dil does not bar execution of all com mise decrecs.

17. Clause 3 of the Settlement Agreement recognized that n

order for the JD to make payment to the DH out of Pakistan, the JD would be required to obtain the SBP approval, and the JD undertook to use

its best endeavors to obtain such approval. Mr. Arshad Tayebaly submitted that clause 3 of the Settlement Agreement was

incorporated keeping in view section 5 of the Foreign Exchange

Regulation Act, 1947 prevalent in Pakictan which plac es a restrictic:

on payments from Pakistan to a person resident outside Pakistan

except with the approval of the SBP. Learned counsel therefore

submitted that under the Settlement Agreement the SBP approval was a condition to payment, and until such approval is given by the

SBP the decree is inexecutable. However, in taking suc stance

Icarned counse! did not demonstrate that the JD is otherwise willing and able to make payment. Clause 4 of the Settlement Agreement had

provided that if the SBP approval is not obtained prior to the due date

of an installment, the JD shall pay simple interest on the installment

6% per annum unless the JD deposits an equivalent amount in PK?

an Escrow Account ir. Pakistan perning the SBP approval. Thcugh the JD did make an application to the SBP for the requisite approval, but pending such approval it did not opt to deposit the money in an

escrow account to avoid interest, nor is it willing to make the deposit in Court. Therefore, the case is not that the JD is ready with the

payment but for the SBP approval

18. EOU, Nonetheless, as already stated, the foreign decree does not E R

require payment to be made as per the Settlement Agreement, but it is

a money decree. This Execution is brought to enforce the money HgN

decree, not the Settlement Agreement. Therefore, the commitmer of

the JD under clause of the Settlement Agreeme: that it will tain

theP approval, s no impediment to the Execution of the foreign decree. This is not to say that the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 are ignored by the foreign decree, but only that the DH has been left to the law that is applicable to enforce the decree. Presently, when there is no amount available fc: remitting to

the DH abroad, the provisions of section 5 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act have yet to be triggered. At this stage, recovery of that amount is being sought by attachment and sale of the local assets of the JD, which proceeds, if any, will obviously materialize in Pakistani rupee with this Court. It will then be for the DH to obtain the approvals required under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 read with the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992 for

converting and transferring that money abroad.

19. The last objection raised by Mr. Arshad Tebaly was t nat this Court does nc: have jurisdir on inasmuc as, by clause 16 of the Settlement Agreement the parties had agreed that only the Courts of

England and Wales would have jurisdiction to decide any dispute arising under or in connection with the Settlement Agreement. However, as already discussed, the matter before this Court is fo

execution ci the foreign ecree under sectiorn 44-A CPC, and not to. adjudicating any dispute between the parties under or in connection with the Settlement Agreement. Therefore, clause 16 of the Settlement Agreement is also no impediment to this Execution.

20. To conclude, the foreign decree is conclusive betwaen the parties within the meaning of section 13 CPC and is executable under

section 44-A CPC. Consequently, the objections of the JD are

dismissed and the Execution is allowed.

The assets of the JD that are sought to be attached and sold are

mentioned in the Execution Application read with CMA No

300/2019 and 301/2019. Under cover of statements dated 28-04-2021

and 05-05-2021 the J') has also filed a list of its assets. Therefore, subject to any charge or encumbrance existing on those assets, and as

a first step towards execution, the following assets of the JD are

hereby attached until further orders as follows:

(1) The JD i: prohibited from transferr'ng the shares held by it in the fcowing companies together with any bonus and right shares:

3H

(a) Hascombe Lubricants (Pvt.) Ltd., having its office at Suite N 105-106, The Forum, Khayaban-e-Jami, Block 9, Clifton, Karachi;

(b) VAS LNG (Pvt.) Ltd. having its office at Suite No. 102, 1st Floor, The Forum,

Khayaban-e-Jami, Block 9, Clifton, Karachi; ()

having its office at Plot No.s D-15 to D-18, G5 and , North Western Industr'al Zone, Por asim Autho ty,

Bin Qar im, Karachi.

Hascol Terminals Ltd.

(i) JD is prohibited from withdrawing or transferring the

credit balances of its barnk accounts maintained with the banks

listed in CMA No. 300/2019, the details of which are in

Appendix 'A' to this order (filed by the JD), and said banks are restrained accordingly.

(ii) The D is prohibitecd from transferring or charging in any way the immovable properties listed in Appendix 'B to this order.

The above order of attachment of movables shall be transmitted

by the office to the companies and banks mentioned in sub-paras (1)

and (i) above as per Order XXI Rule 46(2) CPC, and said cor anies and banks shall report compliance to the Nazir of this Court. Along with the relevant compliance of Order XXI Rule 54(2) CPC, the

attachment order of the immovable properties in sub-para (ii) above

shall be communicated to the relevant record keepers and Registrar of

properties. CMA No. 143/2021 stands disposed of as ahove.

HON Karachi

Dated: 12-10-2021

Lim ash and Bank Balances

eptember 30, 2020

Cash in Hand 7,535,455

Cash at Bank

NBP S Cor 3050274495 HBML FDA' 20436714217521

85,021,477

Faysal Bank Barkat Islamic CITUS 5785729015 80K S 0046-00297-01-1 LOP S 6580009159700010

224,999,997 56,991

3,529,410 47,144,726

MCB S 0675088641004155 2,505,791

NIB Bank Ltd Current NIB S CIf 1654721

ASK S Cif 0150100047992

ASK C Cor 0150100580527

HBL PLS 0786-7916710101 117.856,642 NBP C ISL 4321418335 1,072.064 BAF S- 5505-5000-817269 2.263,170 Summit Bank - LBD

S DP 03040039676100 198,520,767 FB S Main 0110145000007119 6,143,706 ALBARAKA SO132386875706 3,046 ASK-S CIf 0i51650511007 63,461,269 BIP S PIDC 108858660130221 ICBC S CIf 010000000037584

357,833

10,35. SMBL SK 199526202714104319

DIBPL S CIf 0499801002 4,113,122

140,956,444 HBL CMG 427991744403 82,185,012 Dividend 211445 127,451,712

121,711,874 Dividend 210618 HMBL C Cf 20311714217521 HBL - LPG 79179326-03

HMBL IBB A/C 714-103612

190,142,752 5,830,887

914,497 CITIC 0201379008 331,497 Dividend 203491 96,955,387 SAMBA S 2000054421 68,911.274 MCB CMGG

MBLS CIf O101770055 1,859,191 FWB S Cif 0006004221560003 76,672 FWBL TDR

ASK CLO100055039 32,517,281 HBML Mult 20614714217521 2,076 NBP C SKP 4054225520 1,179.910

BIP S PIDC 108800031 660201 2,499,320 HBML TDA 20410714217521

SILK C Main 2002719838 ,170 BOP C 6020009 159700015 362 HBL C HO 00287900401502 6,6,53

2 395 Dividena 179852 Div'uend 184639 2,78,460 FW3 C Cif 000600422 1510001 28,634.528

Dividend 197089 2,158,504 NBP C MCH 4008439323 6,989,417 NBP C OG 4098514206 7,458 Dividend 173001 790,483 NBP C FSD 4003212835 796.7 760

608,882 vidend 164963 SMBL CL 12220311714133423 21,362,921

Ou ER

S ND

ividend 163708

SMBL199526202714113344 Dividend 173091 SMBL A L 12220620714144198

620.514 572.928 148,710

MCB S Isl 110001977 5000 UBL S CIH 000229975646 BOK C 0046-00297-00-5

67 97 502 292 278

102,103 880

38,7 720

ALBARAKACO102386875403 BAF C-5505-0050-00780142

ASK-CMD 9697070000498 999,999

Apperdie- s

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. List o O

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eal Estate P

roperties

Description of Asset

Daulatpur Depot

Mehm

oodKotDepot

Description Taluka Qazi Ahmed, District Shaheed Benazirabad Qasba Gujrat, Tehsil Kot Addu, District M

uzzafargarh Pakpattan Road, Tehsil &

District Sahiw

al

9 KM, Lahore Sarghoda Road, Chak D

hantpura, Machike, D

istrict Sheikhupura 9 KM

, Lahore ho

da Road, Chak Dhantpura, M

achike, District Sheikhupura

tion

Sa D

epot

Mac

po

t B

Machike

Depot -C

LPG Term

inal Land

Plot No. G-2, B

-26 and

B-27 N

orth

Western

Industrial Zone, Port Q

asim A

:thority, Karachi

Kotlajam Dagar, Tehsil & District Bhakhar

LPG Station, adjacent to Baqai Cadet Colleg, Gadap, Karachi

Kotlajam D

epot G

as Dep

ot

Petrol pu

mp

constructed on

land measuring 3K

1

0M

situated

at M

ain Raiw

ind Road, H

adb

ast M

ouza Bhobatti, T

ehsil Raiw

ind,DistrictLahore H

ascol 4-Askar 1, Y

usufUm

er,R

etailO

utlet

HascolO

fficeThe Forum

Suite 105-106, Khayaban-e-Jam

i, Block-9, Clifton, Karachi O

ffice No. 5-1, m

easuring 6,010 Sq. Ft., 5" Floor, constructed

ov

er P

lot No.

19, Khayaban-e-Aiwan-e-Iqbal, Lahore

Laho

ice

OU

R

OH