Jurado v. Stone, First Amended Complaint

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

ARISTIDES JURADO

and

N.G., a minor child, through his father and next best friend ARISTIDES JURADO,

Plaintiffs,

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

CASE No. 2:15-cv-0074

Judge Frost

Magistrate Judge Kemp

v.

OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL – SUPREME COURT OF OHIO,

and

AMY C. STONE, in her official capacity as Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, and in her individual personal capacity,

and

SCOTT J. DREXEL, in his official capacity as Disciplinary Counsel, Supreme Court of Ohio

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

And

FRANKLIN COUNTY COMMON PLEAS COURT, DIVISION OF DOMESTIC DIVISION, JUVENILE BRANCH

and

TERRI JAMISON, in her official capacity as Domestic & Juvenile Judge, and in her individual personal capacity,

and

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Case: 2:15-cv-00074-GLF-TPK Doc #: 12-13 Filed: 04/09/15 Page: 1 of 411 PAGEID #: 1591

THOMAS MCCASH, in his official capacity as Court-appointed Guardian Ad Litem, and in his individual personal capacity,

and

BLYTHE M. BETHEL, in her official capacity as Court-appointed (former) Guardian Ad Litem, and in her individual personal capacity,

) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

And

OHIO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION,

and

RICHARD T. GARCIA, in his official capacity as Investigator, Ohio Civil Rights Commission, and in his individual personal capacity,

and

BRADLEY S. S. DUNN, in his official capacity as Reconsideration Supervisor, Ohio Civil Rights Commission, and in his individual personal capacity,

And

OHIO OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,

and

CAROLYN E. GUTOWSKI, in her official capacity as Assistant Attorney General, Ohio Office of the Attorney General, Civil Rights Section, and in her individual personal capacity

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

And

PETROFF LAW OFFICES, LLC.

and

ERIKA SMITHERMAN, Esq., Petroff Law Offices, LLC.

) ) ) ) ) ) )

ii


and

KATHRINE JO HERNANDEZ (LAMBERT),

And

A.S. LECLAIR COMPANY, INC. doing business as BROOKSEDGE DAY CARE,

and

AMY LECLAIR, Owner and Co-Director Brooksedge Daycare,

and

ANGELA ALEXANDER SAVINO, Esq. Perez & Morris, LLC.,

And

EAGLE SCHOOL OF HILLIARD, INC. doing business as THE GODDARD SCHOOL – HILLIARD II (CROSGRAY),

and

GRETCHEN WILSON, Director The Goddard School – Hilliard II

and

KIMBERLY “KIM” EAGLE, Owner Eagle School Of Hilliard, Inc. d/b/a The Goddard School – Hilliard II

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

Defendants,

) ) ) )

iii


SUMMARY OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................ v

I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1

I.A. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ........................................................................................................ 1

I.B. NATURE OF ACTION AND RELIEF SOUGHT .................................................................................. 13

II. JURISDICTION ............................................................................................................... 25

III. VENUE .......................................................................................................................... 25

IV. PARTIES ........................................................................................................................ 26

IV.A. PLAINTIFFS .......................................................................................................................... 26

IV.B. DEFENDANTS ....................................................................................................................... 27

IV.C. CO-CONSPIRATORS ............................................................................................................... 42

V. SUMMARY OF CHRONOLOGICAL FACTS, EVENTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ............... 43

VI. SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS – INTENTIONAL UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION .................. 96

VII. SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS – THE CONSPIRACY .......................................................... 120

VII.A. THE AGREEMENTS ENTERED BY DEFENDANTS FORMING THE MASTER CONSPIRACY ......................... 120

VII.B. OBJECTIVES AND GOALS OF THE CONSPIRACY ........................................................................... 198

VII.C. BACKGROUND OF THE CONSPIRACY AND THE FAMILY LAW INDUSTRY ............................................ 198

VII.D. UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES AND ACTS PERPETRATED BY CONSPIRATORS DEFENDANTS ........................... 204

VII.E. ONGOING CONSPIRACY SUCCESSFUL SO FAR ............................................................................ 254

VII.F. EVIDENCE SHOWING CONSPIRACY IS SUBSTANTIAL— HUNDREDS OF AUDIO AND VIDEO RECORDINGS ..................................................................................................... 256

VII.G. EVIDENCE SHOWING CONSPIRACY IS SUBSTANTIAL— MISCELLANEOUS E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE AND RELATED DOCUMENTATION ................................................................. 298

VII.H. EVIDENCE SHOWING CONSPIRACY IS SUBSTANTIAL— CONCEALED E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE .......... 299

VII.I. EVIDENCE SHOWING CONSPIRACY IS SUBSTANTIAL— LAY WITNESSES, COURT EMPLOYEES AS WITNESSES AND OPINION TESTIMONY BY OTHER WITNESSES ...................................................... 303

VII.J. EVIDENCE SHOWING CONSPIRACY IS SUBSTANTIAL— TRANSCRIPTS OF COURT PROCEEDINGS, DOCKET ENTRIES, OTHER FILINGS AND FORMAL DOCUMENTATION .............................................. 305

VIII. ALL LOCAL REMEDIES EXHAUSTED & ABSENCE OF ADEQUATE STATE FORUM .............. 327

IX. CLAIMS & CAUSES OF ACTION...................................................................................... 330

X. REQUEST FOR RELIEF ................................................................................................... 372

XI. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 393

XII. CONSOLIDATED APPENDIX OF EXHIBITS - INDEX .......................................................... 394

iv


TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................ v

I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1

I.A. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ........................................................................................................ 1

I.B. NATURE OF ACTION AND RELIEF SOUGHT .................................................................................. 13

I.B.1. For Preemption by Federal Law, Seeking Injunctive and Declaratory Relief ............................................................................................. 14

I.B.2. For Constitutional Challenges to State Laws, Rules, Official Practices, seeking Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive and Declaratory Relief ...................................................................................... 14

I.B.3. For Systematical Violations of the Prohibitions of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and of State Discrimination Laws, Seeking Preliminary Injunctive Relief, Damages and Demand for Jury Trial ....................................................................................... 18

I.B.4. For Systematical and Random Violations of the Prohibitions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, seeking Damages and Demand for Jury Trial ................................................... 19

I.B.5. For Civil and Criminal Offenses Against Children, the Family and the Community according to State and Common Law and Federal Statutes, Seeking Preventive Relief, Permanent Equitable Relief, Damages, Other Types of Relief, Demand for Jury Trial, and Judicial Referral to Appropriate Authorities ................................................................. 20

I.B.6. For Unlawful Acts, Fraud, and Other State-Law and Common-Law Torts, Including Civil Conspiracy to Commit these Acts, Seeking Damages and Demand for Jury Trial ................................ 22

I.B.7. For Premeditated Deprivation of Constitutional Rights and Protections under Sec. 1983 and Sec. 1985, and Resulting Injuries, Seeking Preliminary and Permanent Equitable Relief, Damages, and Demand for Jury Trial .................................... 22

II. JURISDICTION ............................................................................................................... 25

III. VENUE .......................................................................................................................... 25

IV. PARTIES ........................................................................................................................ 26

IV.A. PLAINTIFFS .......................................................................................................................... 26

IV.B. DEFENDANTS ....................................................................................................................... 27

v


IV.B.1. Judiciary Branch Defendants ............................................................................ 27

IV.B.2. Executive Branch Defendants .......................................................................... 31

IV.B.3. Private Corporate-Type Defendants ................................................................ 35

IV.B.4. Private Individual Defendants .......................................................................... 38

IV.C. CO-CONSPIRATORS ............................................................................................................... 42

IV.C.1. State Actors ...................................................................................................... 42

IV.C.2. Private Actors ................................................................................................... 42

IV.C.3. Other Unnamed Conspirators or Named Conspirators Not Named as Defendants ...................................................................................... 42

V. SUMMARY OF CHRONOLOGICAL FACTS, EVENTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ............... 43

V.A. PRE-CUSTODY DISPUTE.......................................................................................................... 43

V.B. NOVEMBER 2012 - CUSTODY LITIGATION BEGAN ....................................................................... 45

V.C. JANUARY 2013 - EQUAL SHARED PARENTING AND UNSUPERVISED PARENTING TIME WITH OVERNIGHTS ORDERED BY THE JUVENILE COURT ......................................................................... 47

V.D. MARCH 2013 - DEFENDANT BETHEL APPOINTED AS GUARDIAN AD LITEM ...................................... 47

V.E. MAY 2013 – MENTAL AND PHYSIOLOGICAL HARM PRODUCED BY EXTREME DISTRESS LANDED JURADO IN THE HOSPITAL ....................................................................................................... 52

V.F. MAY 2013 - JURADO’S FIRST ATTEMPTS TO SEEK HELP AND REDRESS WRONGS .............................. 53

V.G. JULY 2013 – FIRST MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENT OF CONSPIRACY —CONCERTED EFFORT TO COMMIT FRAUD UPON THE COURT WITH THE FABRICATION OF THE OVERINVOLVED FATHER BY DEFENDANTS BETHEL, SMITHERMAN, PETROFF LAW, LECLAIR, BROOKSEDGE AND LAMBERT .......... 55

V.H. JULY 2013 - JURADO’S SECOND ROUND OF ATTEMPTS SEEKING HELP ............................................ 56

V.I. JULY 2013 - SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT SUDDENLY EXPANDED – ODJFS AND OCRC AS FIRST STATE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES INVOLVED DUE TO BROOKSEDGE CONDUCT .................................... 57

V.J. AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 2013 - DEFENDANTS ENTERED INTO NEW AGREEMENT TO CARRY OUT THE LAWSUIT SUBSIDIARY SCHEME – INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF INJURIES TO THE CHILD TO FRAME JURADO FOR INVOLVING CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL AND AUTHORITIES WHICH FORMED BASIS FOR LAWSUIT .............................................................................................................. 59

V.K. OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 2013 - OOAG AND OCRC JOINED THE LAWSUIT SUB-SCHEME AND THE MASTER CONSPIRACY’S SUBSIDIARY PLAN FOR CAUSING FINANCIAL HARM TO JURADO ................ 65

V.L. OCTOBER 2013 – CONSPIRACY SUB-SCHEME TO CAUSE FINANCIAL HARM AND UNDUE HARDSHIP STARTED .............................................................................................................. 71

V.M. OCTOBER 2013 - JURADO BEGAN INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION OF SUSPECTED CONSPIRACY AND BEGAN TAKEN PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES ........................................................................ 75

V.N. NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2013 - CONSPIRACY SUB-SCHEME TO FRAME JURADO FOR NEGLECTING AND CAUSING CHILD INJURIES RESUMED ................................................................. 76

vi


V.O. DECEMBER 2013-JANUARY 2014 – BEGINNING OF NEW SUBSIDIARY SCHEME TO COVER UP BETHEL’S UNLAWFUL CONDUCT AND TO RETALIATE - JUDICIARY BRANCH DEFENDANTS ENTERED THE AGREEMENT ..................................................................................................... 78

V.P. SEPTEMBER 2014 - RETALIATION SOARED AS DIRECT RESULT OF THE REVEALING OF JURADO’S INTENTION TO SEEK FEDERAL RELIEF, AND THE DISMISSAL OF ORIGINAL ACTION IN MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION BY SCO AS REINFORCEMENT OF THE CARTE BLANCHE GIVEN TO DEFENDANT JUDGE JAMISON .................................................................................................. 90

V.Q. DECEMBER 2014 – MCCASH AS DEFENDANT JAMISON’S ENFORCER AND THE CONSPIRACY’S CATALYTIC AGENT ................................................................................................................. 92

V.R. DECEMBER 2014 –MARCH 2015 - DEFENDANTS GODDARD SCHOOL, GRETCHEN WILSON, KIMBERLY EAGLE ESCALATED THEIR PARTICIPATION WITH SMITHERMAN, LAMBERT AND MCCASH IN MULTIPLE OVERT ACTS IN FURTHERANCE OF THE CONSPIRACY ..................................... 94

V.S. MARCH 2015 - JUVENILE COURT’S REINFORCEMENT OF MALEVOLENT CONSPIRATORIAL CONDUCT BY GODDARD SCHOOL DEFENDANTS AND OTHER COLOR OF LAW ABUSES ......................... 95

V.S.1. March 2015 –Defendants McCash and Judge Jamison Acted Under the Color of Law to Cover Up Willful Acts of Child Endangerment by Perpetrators the Goddard School, Eagle and Wilson in Close Coordination with Co-Conspirators Lambert and Smitherman—As Overt Acts to Reach the Goals of the Conspiracy ................................................................... 95

V.S.2. March 2015 – Defendant Judge Jamison Abused her Authority Without Restrain when Protecting Defendants The Goddard School and Eagle; Judicial Transgressions included Coaching the Witness during Direct and Cross Examination and Unlawful Preclusion of Indispensable Material Evidence ............................................................................................. 96

V.S.3. Defendant Judge Jamison Willfully Deprived and Conspired to Deprive Plaintiffs’ Federal Constitutional Rights; Official Ratification of Increased Alienation of Parent and Child that had been Intensely Pursued by Defendants Lambert, Smitherman, Goddard School, Wilson, Eagle and McCash; .............................................................................. 96

V.S.4. Jamison’s Ultimate Overt Act in Furtherance of the Conspiracy’s Subsidiary Plot that Started Over 2 Years Ago to Deprive Jurado of Equal Protection [of the Law] in respect to Accessing the Daycare facilities to visit his son .............................. 96

VI. SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS – INTENTIONAL UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION .................. 96

VI.A. FIRST SIGNS OF UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION BY DEFENDANT BROOKSEDGE ..................................... 96

VI.B. RACISM BY GUARDIANS AD LITEM A REAL PROBLEM IN OHIO AND FRANKLIN COUNTY ....................... 97

VI.B.1. Legal Scholar’s View of Racial Bias in GAL Program ......................................... 98

vii


VI.B.2. Pro Se Complainants Seeking Help in Dealing with GAL Issues Almost an Every-Day Occurrence At Capital University-Sponsored Self Represented Resource Center in Franklin County Common Pleas Court Building ........................................... 99

VI.C. DEFENDANT BETHEL’S CONSCIOUS RACIAL-ETHNIC BIAS ............................................................ 100

VI.C.1. Normalcy and Impartiality Before Learning the Color and National Origin of the Parents; First Neutral Recommendations.......................................................................................... 101

VI.C.2. Drastic Reversal of Opinions when Learned that “Hernandez v. Jurado” was Not a Dispute Between Two Hispanic Parents – Mother-Father Equality Provision Under ORC 3109.042(A) is only Applicable Between Parents of Same Race, Color and Ethnicity .................................................... 103

VI.C.3. Aligned with Lambert’s Goals that Produced Absurd Results, Against Reason and Available Evidence as Sign of Intentional Discrimination and Conspiracy – Mandatory & Strict Daycare Attendance & Forced Confinement of the Infant Child ..................................................................................................... 105

VI.C.4. Direct Evidence of Racially-Motivated, Ethnic-Driven Hostility: Bethel’s Racially Charged and Derogatory Language......................................................................................................... 106

VI.C.5. Torment, Oppression and Persecution by Bethel Became a Normal Part of Jurado’s Daily Life ............................................................... 107

VI.C.6. Bethel - from GAL to Lambert’s De Facto Advocate ...................................... 108

VI.C.7. Bethel as Jurado’s Main Adversary in the Custody Proceedings, Persecuted Him as He Placed the Best Interest of the Child First ................................................................................ 113

VI.C.8. Bethel’s Racially Motivated Misconduct Ramped Up: Became Integral Figure in the Overarching Conspiracy against Jurado ................................................................................................. 117

VI.C.9. Bethel’s Racism Drove Her to Engage in Pattern of Unlawful Conduct and Acts of Fraud Upon the Court Against Her Own Interests ............................................................................. 117

VI.D. DISPARATE TREATMENT BY DEFENDANTS ODC AND STONE ON THE BASIS OF RACE AND ETHNICITY ......................................................................................................................... 117

VI.D.1. Similarly Situated Grievants ........................................................................... 117

VI.E. UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION IN THIS CASE NOT ONLY TARGETS PLAINTIFFS BUT ALL PATERNAL FAMILY MEMBERS BECAUSE OF THEIR PANAMANIAN ANCESTRY.................................................. 118

viii


VI.E.1. Disparate Treatment of Minor N.G.’s Panamanian Grandparents By Defendants Brooksedge, LeClair, Lambert and Petroff law Firm ........................................................................ 118

VI.E.2. Overt Collaboration between Defendants Smitherman, McCash, Lambert, Judge Jamison and the Goddard School to Intentionally Disrupt and Sever the Familial Bond and Relationship between Plaintiff minor N.G. and his entire Paternal Panamanian Family .......................................................................... 119

VII. SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS – THE CONSPIRACY .......................................................... 120

VII.A. THE AGREEMENTS ENTERED BY DEFENDANTS FORMING THE MASTER CONSPIRACY ......................... 120

VII.A.6. To Pre-arrange or Pre-Determine each One of Jurado’s Actions, Cases, Administrative Complaints or Grievances to Disfavor Him and Preclude the Determination of His Claims on the Merits ...................................................................................... 176

VII.B. OBJECTIVES AND GOALS OF THE CONSPIRACY ........................................................................... 198

VII.C. BACKGROUND OF THE CONSPIRACY AND THE FAMILY LAW INDUSTRY ............................................ 198

VII.D. UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES AND ACTS PERPETRATED BY CONSPIRATORS DEFENDANTS ........................... 204

VII.D.1. Unlawful Acts by OOAG .................................................................................. 204

VII.D.2. Unlawful Activities and Conduct by Defendants OCRC, Dunn and Garcia ............................................................................................. 206

VII.D.3. ODC-SCO Defendants Unlawful Acts and Practices ....................................... 207

VII.D.4. Unlawful Acts and Conduct by Judge Jamison ............................................... 211

VII.D.5. Unlawful Conduct and Acts by Defendant Bethel .......................................... 232

VII.D.6. Unlawful Acts Perpetrated Jointly by Defendants Lambert, Bethel, Petroff and Smitherman .................................................................... 241

VII.D.7. Unlawful Acts by Defendant McCash ............................................................. 249

VII.D.8. Unlawful Activities, Conduct and Acts by Defendants Brooksedge, LeClair, Alexander-Savino, Goddard-School of Hilliard II, Wilson and Eagle ........................................................................ 254

VII.E. ONGOING CONSPIRACY SUCCESSFUL SO FAR ............................................................................ 254

VII.F. EVIDENCE SHOWING CONSPIRACY IS SUBSTANTIAL— HUNDREDS OF AUDIO AND VIDEO RECORDINGS ..................................................................................................... 256

VII.F.1. Recordings involving Defendant OOAG ......................................................... 256

VII.F.2. Recordings involving Defendants OCRC, Dunn and Garcia ............................ 259

VII.F.3. Recordings involving Defendants the Juvenile Court, Judge Jamison and Thomas McCash .............................................................. 265

ix


VII.F.4. Recordings involving Defendants The Goddard School-Hilliard II, Kim Eagle and Gretchen Wilson ..................................................... 267

VII.F.5. Recordings involving Defendant LeClair, Brooksedge and Alexander-Savino ............................................................................................ 282

VII.F.6. Recordings involving Defendant Lambert ...................................................... 292

VII.F.7. Recordings involving Defendant Bethel ......................................................... 295

VII.F.8. Recordings Involving Conspirators Not Named as Defendants ..................................................................................................... 297

VII.G. EVIDENCE SHOWING CONSPIRACY IS SUBSTANTIAL— MISCELLANEOUS E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE AND RELATED DOCUMENTATION ................................................................. 298

VII.G.1. E-mails and Hand-Written Notes Between Defendants Gutowski and Garcia Proving Agreement to Deprive Jurado of his Rights and Protections under the Fourteenth Amendment .................................................................................................... 298

VII.G.2. E-mails between Defendant Garcia and Plaintiff Jurado Showing Garcia’s Misconduct, Disparate Treatment of Jurado, and Intentional Acts to Deny Jurado his Equal Utilization of Public Facilities and of Services Offered by the State Government .................................................................................... 298

VII.H. EVIDENCE SHOWING CONSPIRACY IS SUBSTANTIAL— CONCEALED E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE .......... 299

VII.H.1. E-mail Dated Aug. 1, 2013 from Bethel, to Lambert and Smitherman Disparaging Jurado and Giving Advice to Lambert on the Exact Topics to Bring up During Interviews with Dr. Smalldon ........................................................................................... 299

VII.H.2. E-mails Sent Between May 2013 and February 2014 by Bethel to Jurado and his Counsel Purported to be Close Communications, but Secretly and Unethically “Blind-copied” to Co-Conspirators Lambert, Smitherman and Dr. Smalldon ......................................................................................................... 299

VII.H.3. Set of Covert E-Mails Sent Between September and October 2013 Between Defendants Bethel, LeClair, Smitherman and Lambert Discussing their Plan of Filing a Lawsuit Against Jurado, and Included Communications Between Bethel and her Abettor Dr. Smalldon Regarding The Lawsuit ..................................................................................................... 301

VII.H.4. Email from Oct. 29, 2013 between Defendants Shows Confidential Information Collected during Jurado’s Interview with Children Services as part of their Investigation, Being Leaked back to Defendants as the

x


Product of Bethel’s Interference with and Undermining the Integrity of the Agency’s operations. ....................................................... 302

VII.H.5. Emails Sent Between October and November 2013 by Bethel to All the Parties Blasting Jurado for Taking the Child to the E.R., for the Resulting Involvement of FCCS and for the Disenrollment of the Child from Brooksedge, were also Sent in Secrecy to Dr. Smalldon by the Use of Blind-Carbon-Copy (BCC) ................................................................................ 302

VII.I. EVIDENCE SHOWING CONSPIRACY IS SUBSTANTIAL— LAY WITNESSES, COURT EMPLOYEES AS WITNESSES AND OPINION TESTIMONY BY OTHER WITNESSES ...................................................... 303

VII.J. EVIDENCE SHOWING CONSPIRACY IS SUBSTANTIAL— TRANSCRIPTS OF COURT PROCEEDINGS, DOCKET ENTRIES, OTHER FILINGS AND FORMAL DOCUMENTATION .............................................. 305

VII.J.1. Transcript of Proceeding from July 8, 2013 as one the most significant evidence of Concerted Action in Furtherance of the Conspiracy, when he was declared “Overinvolved Dad” and Not allowed to access the Daycare and Visit his son, all the result of fraudulent misrepresentations by Conspirators .............................................................. 305

VII.J.2. Record of Phone call Made in July 2013 Showing Concerted Action between Lambert and Bethel to Corruptly Influence and Tamper with Jurado’s Expert Witness, Dr. Mastruserio ................................................................................ 306

VII.J.3. Itemized Bills from Bethel Showing Extensive Communications PROVING AGREEMENT Between Her, Smitherman and Alexander-Savino In Preparation of the Subsidiary Scheme of The Lawsuit Prior to the Triggering Event ............................................................................................................... 306

VII.J.4. Itemized Bill from Defendant McCash supporting extensive Unlawful, Ex-Parte Communications with Defendant Jamison ......................................................................................... 307

VII.J.5. Juvenile Court Entry dated Dec. 26, 2014, Drafted by McCash with Decisions Endorsed by Judge Jamison and Orders issued on Dec. 18, 2014 ...................................................................... 309

VII.J.6. Transcript Of Dec. 18, 2014 Court Proceeding With Judge Jamison Shows Multiple Overt Acts By Jamison and McCash In Furtherance Of The Conspiracy .................................................... 310

VII.J.7. Continuance of Hearing Issued on Aug. 27, 2014 for Removal of Bethel Shows Collaboration between Defendants Jamison, ODC, SCO and John Doe in the sub-

xi


scheme to Protect Bethel, Cover Up her misconduct, and Retaliate against Jurado ................................................................................. 312

VII.J.8. Transcript of Sep. 24, 2014 Court Proceeding Proves Retaliation by Jamison and Complete Deprivation of Jurado’s Right to Due Process; Shows Judicial Transgressions and Indication of Participation by ODC and SCO ................................................................................................................. 313

VII.J.9. Defendant Judge Jamison’s Response Filing in case 2015-AP-005 to the Chief Justice of SCO showing at least 10 instances of intentional misrepresentations and deceptive conduct ........................................................................................................... 314

VII.J.10. The Mar. 13, 2014 Transcript Shows Jamison’s Radical Change of Posture Against Jurado as a Sign of Entering Agreement with Co-Conspirators, and to Retaliate after Recent Dismissal Of Jurado’s Grievance Against Bethel By ODC ................................................................................................................. 324

VIII. ALL LOCAL REMEDIES EXHAUSTED & ABSENCE OF ADEQUATE STATE FORUM .............. 327

IX. CLAIMS & CAUSES OF ACTION...................................................................................... 330

IX.A. PREEMPTION BY FEDERAL LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO STATE LAWS, PROCEEDINGS, PRACTICES AND OFFICIAL CONDUCT ................................................................... 330

IX.B. COLOR OF LAW DEPRIVATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND FEDERAL STATUTORY RIGHTS UNDER 42 U.S.C. §1983 ................................................................................................... 338

IX.C. VIOLATIONS OF THE PROHIBITIONS UNDER TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 ................... 354

IX.D. CONSPIRACY TO INTERFERE WITH OR TO DEPRIVE PLAINTIFFS’ CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND CIVIL RIGHTS ACCORDING TO 42 U.S.C. §§1983 AND 1985 .............................................. 360

IX.E. UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION AND PUNISHMENT UNDER 42 U.S.C. §2000A ET SEQ. ..................... 364

IX.F. STATE LAW AND COMMON LAW CLAIMS ................................................................................. 366

X. REQUEST FOR RELIEF ................................................................................................... 372

X.A. RELIEF IN EQUITY ................................................................................................................ 372

X.A.1. Preliminary and Immediate Relief .................................................................. 372

X.A.2. Permanent Relief ............................................................................................ 380

X.B. COMPENSATORY DAMAGES .................................................................................................. 383

X.B.1. Compensatory Damages for Economic Losses ............................................... 383

X.B.2. Compensatory Damages for Non-Economic Loses ........................................ 385

X.C. PUNITIVE DAMAGES ............................................................................................................ 389

X.C.1. Punitive Damages against Conspirators Acting Under the Color of Law .................................................................................................... 389

xii


X.C.2. Punitive Damages Against Conspirators Engaging in Private Conduct .............................................................................................. 390

X.D. OTHER RELIEF .................................................................................................................... 391

XI. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 393

XII. CONSOLIDATED APPENDIX OF EXHIBITS - INDEX .......................................................... 394

xiii


COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND

I. INTRODUCTION

I.A. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

ALARMING LOSSES AND TRENDS IN INFANT DEATHS: OHIO’S INFANT MORTALITY CRISIS

1. After public uproar and international reaction over the growing rate of infant deaths

in many Ohio communities over the past decade, and the State’s poor scoring overall in

national infant mortality surveys, the lasting health crisis finally caught the attention of

community leaders, state government officials, and the state legislature in recent years. But

even with a number of measures taken and in place for several consecutive years—such as the

implementation of state and local prevention programs, public awareness campaigns, and the

dedicated attention of public health officials to the crisis as a critical issue—slowing down the

trends has become a multidisciplinary struggle.

The United States trails almost all other developed nations in infant mortality and Ohio ranks near the bottom among the states. Ohio ranks 48th overall in the United States - despite being responsible for the 7th largest amount of births.

This paragraph was quoted from recently published Fact Sheets by Ohio Department of Health

and its collaborative organizations, like the ones issued in Dec. 2013 and 2014 included in

Exhibit AC1-B1, pages 34–36 of the Consolidated Appendix of Exhibits. A similar statement was

also included in the 2009 OBBO Report about the alarming statistics on preterm births in

Franklin County, published by Nationwide Children’s Hospital and the Ohio Better Birth

1


Outcomes (OBBO) initiative. See Exhibit AC1-B2, page 43 of the Appendix. The stagnant

statistics over the years is one of several indicators that show how Ohio’s Infant Mortality Crisis

is far from declining.

2. In 2013, media coverage of the Infant Mortality Crisis in the State intensified, and a

number of news stories surfaced, including interviews with and quotes from local experts.

“Infant Mortality rate near University Circle exceeds that of some third world countries", and

"that is an embarrassment and cannot be allowed to continue." were some of the statements

made by expert Dr. Michele Walsh, Division Chief of Neonatology at Rainbow Babies &

Children's Hospital, during a public radio interview in WCPN, Sound of Ideas, in April 2013.

Shortly after, her assertions were researched, verified and published by Politifact.com, an

independent fact-checking journalism website aimed at bringing the truth in politics, and

winner of the Pulitzer Prize in 2009 for its fact-checking of the presidential election. This story,

published on April 12th, 2013, and its sources have been

reproduced in Exhibit AC-B3, pages 45–49 of the Appendix.

3. Also in the same year, the Fault Lines investigative

reporting TV show covered America's Infant Mortality Crisis in a

special series which made Cleveland, OH, "America’s Infant

Mortality Capital", their focal point. The episode first aired on September 20th, 2013 in AJAM

Cable News Network. Exhibit AC1-B4, pages 50–51 of the Appendix.

Figure 1 - Babyland section of Cleveland Cemetery

2


OHIO’S YOUNGEST CITIZENS VICTIMS OF UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION

4. Admittedly, disparities in infant mortality rates by Race and Ethnicity are not unique

to Ohio; they exist at a national level. "When it comes to life-threatening pregnancy

complications, infant mortality is one of three issues * * * that are more likely to threaten the

lives of African American, Hispanic, and Native American children than white babies." Sheree

Crute, Every Child Counts: Stopping Infant Loss; the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Nov. 13,

2014. Exhibit AC1-C1, pages 52–54 of the Consolidated Appendix of Exhibits.

5. Although the disparities in infant mortality rates for Hispanic babies are not

substantial compared to the disparity between African-American and white babies in Ohio,

statistics show that the Infant Mortality rates for Hispanics in the State have also increased over

the years. See Infant Mortality Trends reproduced by Nationwide Children Hospital, and posted

in their web portal as of February 2015. Exhibit AC1-C2, page 56 of the Appendix.

6. Despite being found at a national level, the disparities in infant mortality rates by

race and ethnicity in Ohio are some of the worst in the country, and which set new records in

racial disparities of health outcomes.

Ohio’s African American Infant Mortality Rate In 2011 Was 15.8, double that for the state as a whole and on par with rates for Thailand (15.9), Colombia (15.9) The Gaza Strip (16.5) And Mexico (16.7).

2013 Franklin County Children’s Report, by Champion of Children – United Way of Central Ohio.

7. Also the fact remains undisputed that one of several underlying causes of the racial

disparities in infant mortality rates is intentional and unintentional discrimination based on race

and ethnicity—at the individual and institutional level, and throughout different segments of

3


our community, public and private. Ohio Infant Mortality Task Force Report, November 2009.

“The chronic stress of racism can become embedded in the body, taking a heavy toll on African

American families and on children even before they leave the womb.” All Babies Matter:

Understanding the Impact of Racism on Infant Mortality, presentation by Columbus Public

Health, May 24, 2011; Exhibit AC1-C3, page 61 of the Consolidated Appendix of Exhibits.

8. The source of these racial disparities in health outcomes has also been explained by

Dr. Camara Phyllis Jones—one of the leading authorities on the subject and senior researcher at

the U.S. Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)—as the stress that is caused by a

lifetime of facing racial prejudice. The work of Dr. Phyllis Jones has been referenced and relied

upon by Ohio Department of Health, the Ohio Infant Mortality Task Force, and by multiple

state-wide initiatives on the subject.

9. Dr. Phyllis Jones has advanced the understanding of this phenomenon by elaborating

clear definitions of these specific experiences: (i) “institutionalized racism is often evident as

inaction in the face of need. Institutionalized racism manifests itself both in material conditions

and in access to power.” Levels of Racism: A Theoretic Framework and a Gardener’s Tale,

Camara Phyllis Jones, MD, MPH, PhD, American Journal of Public Health, August 2000. Exhibit

AC1-C5, page 69 of the Appendix; (ii) Racism is defined as “a system of structuring opportunity

and assigning value based on the social interpretation of how we look”. Health Disparities

Research at the Intersection of Race, Ethnicity, and Disability, Dr. Camara Phyllis Jones, A

National Conference – Keynote Address, Washington DC, April 26, 2013. Exhibit AC1-C6, page

75 of the Appendix.

4


10. The upward trends of Infant deaths, attributed to poverty and racism, has become an

alarming fact in some of the local communities, especially in Franklin County and Columbus,

Ohio. The Columbus Dispatch covered the local crisis in a special report made public in 2014.

The story focused on the fact that “much of infant death is tied to race and place”.

It is a family’s horror and our community’s shame.

Babies born in some parts of this city die at rates the nation as a whole hasn’t seen in 50 years. And black babies in Ohio are more likely to die before their first birthdays than anywhere else in the nation. * * *

You also will find a legacy of racist policies, poverty and a lack of investment in the neighborhoods, said Jason Reece, the [OSU] Kirwan Institute’s director of research. Infant mortality is 'really one of the premier civil-rights issues that we still are dealing with in our country today,' he said.

(Emphasis Added.) Alarming Losses: Columbus Works To

Reverse Trends in Infant Deaths, Misti Crane on a Special

Report, the Columbus Dispatch, Sunday September 14,

2014; Exhibit AC1-C4, pages 64–66 of the Consolidated

Appendix of Exhibits.

ENFORCEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS WITHIN OHIO’S

SELF-REGULATED LEGAL PROFESSION, SELF-GOVERNING JUDICIARY, AND THEIR PRESIDING BODY HINDERED BY THE INHERENT

LACK OF CHECK AND BALANCES

11. For at least two decades, Ohio’s Attorney Disciplinary System has failed to equally

protect all of its citizens during the exercise of its authority and duties to assist the Supreme

Court of Ohio, “the High Court”, in meeting its constitutional responsibility to oversee the

practice of law, the governing of the bar, and conduct of the judiciary in the state. In the

Figure 2 - Newly Covered Grave of an Infant in Ohio

5


process, Ohio’s Disciplinary System has further marginalized minorities and other protected

classes, while prescribing and enforcing rules and regulations that facilitate the unlawful

discrimination and retaliation against its beneficiaries and grievants. When a subset of its

employees and officials choose to treat grievants differently because of their color, race,

national origin or sex, they not only abuse their authority with the pretext of exercising

judgment but do so in defiance of reason and the prohibitions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964 (“Title VI”), while denying grievants their rights and protections granted by the U.S.

Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.

12. Each year on average, Ohio’s Disciplinary System substantiates between 110–150

grievances and complaints for various types of ethical misconduct against judges and

attorneys—through two of his offices, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and Board of

Professional Conduct—that reach the State’s High Court for final adjudication. Only in rare

instances, the grievant who initiated the investigation process in those substantiated

complaints is Black or Hispanic. In fact, since the implementation of DR 1-102(B) in 1994—the

state rule of professional conduct that deals specifically with unlawful discrimination as

attorney misconduct which was later replaced by Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(g)— the first and last case

that has been brought upon the High Court to apply such rule was submitted in April 11, 2000

under the caption Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Young, 89 Ohio St.3d 306, 2000-Ohio-160, for claims of

sexual harassment. Exhibit AC1-A1, page 12 of the Consolidated Appendix of Exhibits.

13. Given the existence of only one published case of unlawful discrimination

substantiated by the Disciplinary System in the last twenty years that has appeared in front of

6


the state’s High Court, reform and enforcement of constitutional and statutory protections by

this Federal Court is patently needed. This is especially true considering that this type of

failures of the state’s Judiciary Branch and Disciplinary System have important downstream

implications, namely the substantial impairment of our family and child welfare systems.

THIS CASE EXPOSES THE NEXUS BETWEEN THE INFANT MORTALITY

CRISIS IN OHIO, THE SHORTCOMINGS OF OHIO’S ATTORNEY

DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM AND THE INSTITUTIONAL RELUCTANCE OF THE

OHIO SUPREME COURT

14. The complete absence of substantiated cases of unlawful discrimination based on

race, color, ethnicity or national origin within the legal profession and the judiciary is, of course,

not an indication that licensed attorneys, court officers and judges do not discriminate or that

racism has been eradicated. On the contrary, it has been long-established in practice and by

prominent legal scholars that racism and unlawful discrimination is a tangible reality

throughout the state’s justice system, in family courts and especially within the Guardian Ad

Litem system.

* * * As part of the machinery for administering the child welfare system, the juvenile court disproportionately facilitates the removal of poor and minority children from their families.

* * * [Guardians] exert extraordinary power over the direction of the case. [Racial] Bias may also lead guardians to assume a more adversarial posture with respect to parents.

(Emphasis Added.) Katherine Hunt Federle & Danielle Gadomski, The Curious Case of the

Guardian Ad Litem, University of Dayton Law Review (Vol. 36:3, 2011); Exhibit AC1-D1, pages

88–90 of the Consolidated Appendix of Exhibits.

7


15. In view of the fact that the Guardian Ad Litem system, the family law industry and

Domestic and Juvenile Courts are key components of our family and child welfare systems, it

can be reasoned that this infrastructure of public and social services—along with the racism

and discrimination permeating it—has been detrimental to the health and well-being of

minority families and children in Franklin County and throughout the State of Ohio. Ultimately,

a strong inference can be made that the discrimination observed in the GAL system and the

Courts is exacerbating, or causing in part, the current Infant Mortality Crisis and its racial

disparities in Ohio.

16. With these factors established, the implications of unlawful discrimination within

Ohio’s Disciplinary System and the Judiciary Branch—or even their mere indifference—cannot

be ignored, given their role of governing body to these key components of the state’s social

services infrastructure. The events and facts being proven in this case make clearer the central

synergy of these failures and the causal association between the phenomenon of racial

disparities in Infant Mortality rates with its resulting crisis in Ohio, the shortcomings of the

Disciplinary System, and the reluctance of the Ohio Supreme Court in addressing unlawful

discrimination in the legal profession.

17. In light of these facts, their implications, and the additional findings being

corroborated through this action, the substance of this case is clearly of great public interest.

RELEVANCY OF THE CLAIMS IN THIS CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION

18. Although this case is—we must hope—an extraordinary example of premeditated

disparate treatment on the basis of race, sex, color or national origin, discrimination in family

8


courts and child welfare system is not an unusual occurrence. Refer to section VI.B - “Racism by

Guardians Ad Litem a Real Problem in Ohio and Franklin County” below for additional

information.

19. The evidence in this case also helps rule out “underreporting” of unlawful

discrimination in the legal profession or judiciary as a plausible explanation for the solitariness

of the Young case.

20. In addition, the evidence and events surrounding this case help establish both the

feasibility and the likelihood that the phenomena taking place in Ohio and causing a health

crisis based the racial and ethnic disparities of Infant Mortality rates is more than institutional

and unintentional racism. First, this case shows how multiple state laws, rules, official practices

or statutes are unconstitutional, conflict with federal rights and protections, or allow

constitutional abuses by state officials acting under the color of law—or as referred to by

Plaintiffs: the lack of check and balances. To address the likelihood of premeditated or

intentional racism as being the culprit for this phenomena, Plaintiffs demonstrate through this

action how cases of public corruption—which typically involve economic incentive or personal

gain as their main motive—can also be driven solely by racial and ethnic repugnance. This case

also proves that being White American or Caucasian is not a prerequisite for a public official to

join a criminal enterprise motivated mainly by aversion to minority groups.

21. The events and extraordinary facts of the underlying case giving rise to this instant

action started like a textbook example of a hostile and conflictive Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”)

that was driven solely by her racial and ethnic bias. But from merely resembling a published

9


anecdote, it quickly crossed all boundaries of conscience and reached an extreme when other

parties began engaging in wanton misconduct in complicity with the Guardian Ad Litem. Their

collective and coordinated unlawful acts of Defendants progressed to systematically

discriminate, interfere and willfully deprive Plaintiffs, Father and Son, of their rights—even the

most basic ones—and have continued to this day because of Plaintiff Jurado’s place of birth,

Hispanic speech accent and dusky complexion, as well as his son’s ethnicity.

22. Because the deprivation or interference with rights started when Plaintiff N.G. was

only a four month old infant—and during a time he was in need of intervention by the public

health and welfare system—he became a prime example of the harmful effects that

institutional and individual discrimination can have to a child’s well-being. In some instances,

the detriment to minor N.G.’s health and safety was significant and noticeable as a resulting

side effect of the premeditated discrimination aimed against his father, Plaintiff Jurado; As

defendants’ interests and significance of the harm they would inflict upon Jurado grew, their

concern with upholding their duties of care and protection of the child’s best interests

diminished, to the point of becoming acts of child neglect and endangerment.

23. As soon as Plaintiff Jurado made his first attempts to publicly denounce the

institutional and individual discrimination by the Courts and GAL respectively, acts of retaliation

began against him and vindictive conduct could be consistently observed by the primary co-

conspirators. Ultimately, a smaller scale instance of collusion transformed into a wider

conspiracy consisting of several subsidiary schemes, all sharing common motivators and goal:

racial and ethnic aversion, retaliation, concealment and maintaining the status quo.

10


24. The enduring discrimination by race and ethnicity that persevere in some areas of the

community, including private sectors, further deepens the detrimental effects of racism that

the child welfare system has to the well-being of minority children. In the case at hand, there

have been two entire episodes of collusion between the Guardians Ad Litem, the juvenile court

and two distinct daycare facilities—whose administrators and staff shared the same racist

values—that voluntarily participated and continue to participate in the conspiracy. Both

facilities perpetrated overt acts to conceal information pertinent to the well-being of the child,

and to unlawfully interfere with Jurado’s Civil Rights, ultimately exposing plaintiff minor N.G. to

health risks and threats of serious injury.

25. The resulting harm of Defendants’ concerted action has been factual, severe and

evident: medical care for the infant child withheld Hindrance of Plaintiff Jurado during his

attempts to feed his own infant son as he cried incessantly because of hunger, even after minor

N.G. went hungry almost daily during his first six months of life and was showing signs or at risk

of experiencing Failure to Thrive interfered with the child’s daycare placement that twice

caused the infant’s permanent disenrollment from two different child care facilities, during his

first two and a half years of life the accumulated emotional distress that resulted in Father

and Son being picked up from the side of the freeway by EMS personnel and taken to the

Emergency Room, after months of exposure to deliberate and pervasive torment and

harassment by the perpetrators, and a recent re-experience of the same health crisis triggered

by the same factors in February 2015 the open declaration by Defendant Judge Jamison that

Jurado was an adversary of the Court, only because he raised constitutional claims, bias and

other concerns about the Guardian Ad Litem, Defendant Bethel

11


26. In December 2015, and after being harassed and tormented for 18 months, the

Juvenile Court Defendants authorized and carried out the harassment of Plaintiff Jurado,

Plaintiff N.G. and his elderly grandparents at their home with unnecessary unannounced visits

to frighten, cause panic, and inflict substantial distress, compelling them to call for emergency

help and to consider the immediate relocation to an undisclosed safe location Plaintiff

Jurado was censured in open court for having in his living room a Civil Rights Magazine with

Dr. Martin Luther King on the cover In retaliation for bringing suit against Judge Jamison in

the State’s High Court and learning about Jurado’s intentions to seek relief in federal court, the

Juvenile Court summarily found Plaintiff Jurado in Contempt and sentenced him to jail time

without affording him any of his constitutional rights At the next hearing, Judge Jamison

denied Plaintiff Jurado his constitutional right to Appeal and unlawfully detained him

27. Two of the goals of the conspiracy were achieved when Plaintiff Jurado was driven to

poverty and was denied access to the courts, while being compelled to litigate four concurrent

cases in four different courts at once and without assistance of private or appointed counsel,

and the number of concurrent cases being litigated increasing to seven in the two months

following the institution of this action, showing escalated retaliation. As a result, he has been

depending on charitable assistance and the financial help of family and friends to make ends

meet, all while being responsible for half of the care and expenses related to the child As

another adverse reaction to Jurado’s effort to seek relief under Title VI, Defendants combined

their efforts to completely severe Plaintiffs’ father-son bond and relationship as punishment

and to deprive the child of contact with someone with whom he has a strong attachment

abruptly and inappropriately, from being able to go home, sleep in his own bed, and from the

12


care and company of his Dad Jurado, for close to one hundred (100) consecutive days and

counting, as of the filing of this instant first amended complaint. Defendants concerted action

in retaliation was swift and effective with this abrupt punishment of the indefinite suspension

of Jurado’s parenting time using the pretext of a staged act of contempt, knowingly harming

both Plaintiffs given that little N.G. had spent all of his life together with his father except for

separations of no longer than 2 days at a time on average.

28. Most recently, as of March 2015, the owner, director and some teachers of the

daycare facility where N.G. attends, increase their participation in the conspiracy by overtly

engaging in unlawful conduct—including perjury, falsification of documents and other fraud,

premeditated disparate treatment of Jurado and N.G., and their segregation on account of their

race and ethnicity while in the premises—concluding with their successful plot to stage a unsafe

area for framing Jurado with exposing the child to safety risks and with the infliction of injuries

to the child, and in the alternative, to intimidate and demoralize Plaintiff Jurado. These

defendants were also successful at denying Jurado access to the facility and his equal

enjoyment of their services. In collaboration with Defendant Judge Jamison, they reinforced

their premeditated discrimination against Jurado by having the Judge issue an Order to restrict

Jurado even further during his visits to the facility and to spend time with his son.

I.B. NATURE OF ACTION AND RELIEF SOUGHT

Plaintiffs, Aristides Jurado, acting Pro Se and N.G., a minor child, through his father and next

best friend Aristides Jurado, submit their Complaint and Jury Demand as follows:

13


I.B.1. FOR PREEMPTION BY FEDERAL LAW, SEEKING INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF

29. Plaintiffs bring this action to invalidate specific rules and regulations for the

Government of the Bar of Ohio containing provisions that stand as obstacles to reach the

objectives of Congress in respect to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. This conflict gives

rise to forward-looking relief sought by Plaintiffs against Defendants Scott J. Drexel and Amy

Stone, as officials and representatives of Ohio’s Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC), to

permanently enjoin them and preclude them from enforcing the preempted state rules as they

are currently written. These state rules have consistently resulted in adverse disparate impact

on minorities, and at times, in disparate treatment of members of protected groups.

I.B.2. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO STATE LAWS, RULES, OFFICIAL PRACTICES, SEEKING PRELIMINARY AND PERMANENT INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF

30. In addition to the invalid rules and regulations for the Government of the Bar that are

in conflict with federal law, several other state laws that are unconstitutional have allowed the

civil rights conspiracy and its damaging power to proliferate freely. Of those, Plaintiffs are

limiting their constitutional challenges to only two of them for fear of causing delays in the

granting by this court of the immediate temporary relief requested.

31. For the reasons being explained, Plaintiffs give notice of additional claims and

constitutional challenges to other statutes that may be brought up during the course of this

action if this court would allow it—in addition to the ones listed below—including a challenge

to ORC 2701.03, as well as the request for a three-judge court.

14


I.B.2(a) ORC 4112.05(H) AND RELATED OFFICIAL PRACTICES BY DEFENDANTS OHIO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION AND OHIO OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

UNCONSTITUTIONAL

32. Through this action, Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of a statute enacted by

Ohio’s legislature, ORC 4112.05(H), that defines one of the many procedures and duties of the

Ohio Civil Rights Commission, but which hinder the consistent availability of remedies for

appealing decisions and orders by the Commission, mainly the judicial review available under

ORC 4112.06.

33. The unconstitutionality of the statute or its interpretation and application by the

state courts and by the Commission, as applied to Plaintiff Jurado, have allowed the intentional

discrimination, misconduct and other unlawful acts to be perpetrated by the Commission and

some of its officials against Jurado, while foreclosing any adequate remedy for judicial review or

appeal of the Commission’s orders, decisions and conduct, in further violation of Jurado’s

constitutional and statutory rights and protections.

34. To rectify the defects and avoid a recurrence, Plaintiff Jurado seeks a permanent

declaration that ORC 4112.05(H) violates the rights and protections of the Fourteenth

Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and a permanent injunction against Defendants OCRC,

Dunn, Garcia, OOAG and Gutowski to preclude them from continuing to engage in the current

official practice of issuing “findings of fact” that consist of a basic conclusory statement, and

which renders the appellate review available under ORC 4112.06 useless for complainants

aggrieved by the Commission’s final determination of “no probable cause”.

15


I.B.2(b) ORC §§2505.09, 2505.12 AND 2505.16, AND RELATED STATE COURT RULES, PROCEEDINGS AND PRACTICES UNCONSTITUTIONAL

35. The third state law consisting of a set of statutes, court rules, proceedings and

practices that have facilitated the persistence of the conspiracy against Plaintiffs, and the

accomplishment of one or more objectives of the conspiracy, are all related to the requirement

of giving supersedeas bond as a pre-requisite to granting a Stay to Appellant Contemnors under

a specific set of circumstances.

36. When Appellant Contemnors seek relief in the form of a Stay while facing the risk of

incarceration or while under threat of being deprived of substantial rights that produce

irreparable harm, and their relief sought is denied by the trial court or the Court of Appeals—

even when the Appellant cannot afford to cover the requirement of giving supersedeas bond,

or despite the knowledge that the underlying order being subject of the Contempt is not for the

payment of money or any type of financial obligation—it results in the deprivation of the

Appellant’s right to a Fair Proceeding or Trial as required by the Due Process Clause. This

constitutional deprivation was established by the US Supreme Court in Turner v. Rogers, __ U.S.

__, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 180 L.Ed.2d 452 (2011), and the Ohio Supreme Court in Liming v. Damos, 133

Ohio St.3d 509, 2012-Ohio-4783, as long as the following additional factors or conditions exist: (i)

No Court-Appointed counsel provided at civil contempt proceeding for those unable to retain

counsel and no other “alternative procedural safeguards” provided by the State, including (ii)

No adequate notice of the hearing date, (iii) No opportunity to defend against the contempt

charges at the initial contempt hearing, (iv) No opportunity to appeal from the finding of

contempt and any purge conditions.

16


37. Given that the statutes being challenged as unconstitutional allow the trial court and

the appeals court the “discretion” to grant or deny a Stay being sought by the Appellant, the

trial court and the appeals court are in effect able to deny a person the opportunity to appeal

even when all the other factors above exist; this is especially true given that the denial of a stay

is a terminal ruling because the purge proceeding, incarceration or other substantial

deprivation is carried out long before the appeal is decided on the merits.

38. Plaintiff Jurado seeks a preliminary and expedited injunction to stay three judgments

being appealed and their related purge proceedings which will produce substantial irreparable

harm, given that there has been multiple instances in which a Stay has been denied to Jurado

by both courts (the Juvenile Court and the Appeals Court) and he currently faces the real and

imminent risk of loss of personal liberty by imprisonment based on erroneous or unlawful

decisions by the juvenile court in two different judgments, motivated by unlawful

discrimination or retaliation; and a third instance in which a stay was also denied by both courts

in which Jurado is deprived of substantial constitutional rights. He also seeks a permanent

declaration that the statutes, rules and court practices that allow limitless discretion to state

courts to deny a Stay sought by an applicant are unconstitutional under the circumstances

identified above, and a permanent injunction to prevent the Juvenile Court from denying

Jurado another Stay under similar circumstances in the future.

17


I.B.3. FOR SYSTEMATICAL VIOLATIONS OF THE PROHIBITIONS OF TITLE II OF THE

CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 AND OF STATE DISCRIMINATION LAWS, SEEKING

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

39. This action includes requests for remedies on claims of intentional discrimination in

child day care facilities, under the two scenarios in which the acts of discrimination were

perpetrated as independent action by the daycare facilities, their staff and administration, and

as part of the concerted action among conspirators within the facility and third party private

actors and state actors. The unlawful discrimination involved the disparate treatment of

Plaintiffs as compared to similarly situated parents and children, and the deprivation of

Plaintiffs’ right to the full and equal enjoyment of the facilities and services provided—all on

account of their race, national origin or ethnicity, in violation of the prohibitions under 42 U.S.C.

§2000a, and ORC §§4112.02 and 4112.99.

40. These claims also include violations against the prohibitions of 42 U.S.C. §2000a–1,

which gives all persons the right to be free from discrimination at any establishment or place on

the ground of color, race or national origin if it is or purports to be required by any law, rule or

order of a State or its agencies. In this case, the discrimination experienced by Plaintiffs at the

daycare facilities was exacerbated with orders issued by Defendants the Juvenile Court and

Defendant Terri Jamison knowingly ratifying the ongoing unlawful discrimination against

Plaintiffs under the disguise of their authority under the color of state law.

41. Plaintiffs also seek immediate temporary injunction to halt the current and ongoing

harm, and permanent relief for the ongoing violations of the prohibitions under

42 U.S.C. §2000a–2, including prohibitions against intimidation, threats, coercion in order to

18


interfere with Plaintiffs’ rights to be free of discrimination in daycare facilities, and the

prohibition against punishment of Plaintiffs and retaliation against them for their exercise or

attempts to exercise their rights under Title II of The Civil Rights Act of 1964. Presently,

Plaintiffs have and continue to endure intimidation, threats, punishment and retaliation by

Defendants within the daycare facilities in joint action with private parties defendants and state

actors defendants, who collectively are inflicting severe and irreparable harm to little N.G. and

his father Jurado.

42. Plaintiffs also seek compensatory and exemplary damages against defendants for

restitution of the injuries caused by their vicious acts.

I.B.4. FOR SYSTEMATICAL AND RANDOM VIOLATIONS OF THE PROHIBITIONS OF TITLE VI OF

THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, SEEKING DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

43. Through this action, Plaintiffs hope to redress the wrongs done to them by the

premeditated unlawful discrimination of recipients of federal funds, including state government

executive branch agencies, judicial entities and institutions, as well as non-governmental sub-

recipient of federal funds, such as the Goddard School-Hilliard II.

44. The disparate treatment of Plaintiffs in account of their race, national origin and

ethnicity by programs and activities recipient of federal funds has been overt; and the state

officials under those programs have engaged in conduct that is indefensible. Therefore,

Plaintiffs seek damages against Defendants and demand for jury trial.

19


I.B.5. FOR CIVIL AND CRIMINAL OFFENSES AGAINST CHILDREN, THE FAMILY AND THE

COMMUNITY ACCORDING TO STATE AND COMMON LAW AND FEDERAL STATUTES, SEEKING PREVENTIVE RELIEF, PERMANENT EQUITABLE RELIEF, DAMAGES, OTHER

TYPES OF RELIEF, DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL, AND JUDICIAL REFERRAL

TO APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES

45. Plaintiffs bring this action to remedy the collective acts to perpetrate felony offenses

related to interference with custody, pursuant to ORC 2919.23(A)(1)—for which civil liability is

authorized by ORC 2307.50 in parallel with ORC 3109.051(K)—through restitution by the award

of compensatory and punitive damages. Because the injuries being inflicted are present,

ongoing and steadily increasing in severity, Plaintiffs seek a preliminary and expedited

injunction to discontinue the harmful interference with custody, abrupt deprivation of contact

between Plaintiffs, and the severance of little N.G.’s primary attachment.

46. Plaintiffs also seek a preliminary declaration that Plaintiff N.G. is a victim of crime

under this statute and that the defendants prima facie committed the crime through private

conduct, in collusion with state actors abusing their authority under the color of law to mask

their criminal acts as lawful. Compensatory parenting time is also sought under this cause of

action.

47. Also Plaintiffs seek preliminary and expedited injunctive relief as preventive safety

measure and declaration that minor N.G. has been a neglected or abused child as defined and

authorized by ORC 2151.031, divisions (B), (C), (D) and (E), as a limited remedy for Defendants’

voluntary agreement and participation in a criminal partnership to perpetrate acts of child

endangerment, and other premeditated offenses of child neglect and abuse in violation of

ORC §§2919.22(A), 2919.22(B), 2151.011 et seq., and 2151.421.

20


48. Plaintiffs also seek compensatory and exemplary damages for violations of

ORC 2151.421, for which liability is authorized under ORC 2151.421(M).

49. Because the criminal enterprise that targeted Plaintiff Minor N.G. by carrying out

premeditated acts of child endangerment, and targeted both Plaintiffs by attempting to injure,

intimidate and interfere with their participation in federal protected activities, was primarily

motivated by racial and ethnic aversion—resulting in the unlawful deprivation of Plaintiffs

rights under the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause, in accordance with 18 U.S.C.

§§241–242 and violation of the prohibitions of 18 U.S.C. §245—Plaintiffs pray for a Judicial

Referral to the United States Attorney for investigation and possible prosecution of these

spiteful criminal acts by Private Defendants who have conspired with State Actors engaging in

official misconduct and abuses under the color of law. Any involvement of state and local

government agencies in investigations deriving from this action will not serve the interests of

justice, given the reasonable presumption that the integrity of their operations has already

been compromised or will likely be compromised by the mechanism of the ongoing conspiracy;

incontrovertible evidence shows that significant interference with multiple government

agencies have been achieved by the conspiracy during the past two years.

50. Similarly, Plaintiffs will seek the intervention in this action by the Attorney General

for civil enforcement in the name of the United States, as authorized by 42 U.S.C. §§2000a–

3(a), 2000a–5, 2000b(a), and 2000h–2; this serves as notice of such intent by Plaintiffs.

21


I.B.6. FOR UNLAWFUL ACTS, FRAUD, AND OTHER STATE-LAW AND COMMON-LAW TORTS, INCLUDING CIVIL CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT THESE ACTS, SEEKING DAMAGES AND

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

51. By instituting this action, Plaintiffs seek restitution for the damages caused by the

unlawful acts of Defendants acting independently and jointly to purposely cause harm to

Plaintiffs in violation of prohibitions under common law and state laws, including tortious

interference with business relationships, common law fraud, defamation, intentional infliction

of emotional distress and other torts.

I.B.7. FOR PREMEDITATED DEPRIVATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS

UNDER SEC. 1983 AND SEC. 1985, AND RESULTING INJURIES, SEEKING PRELIMINARY

AND PERMANENT EQUITABLE RELIEF, DAMAGES, AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

52. Plaintiffs bring this action to stop the present and ongoing harm inflicted upon them,

to prevent additional irreparable harm resulting from the intentional disparate treatment

because of plaintiffs’ ethnicity, color and sex, and from the gross misconduct, and unlawful

conspiratorial conduct engaged by defendants to interfere with and to deprive Plaintiffs of their

rights, and to seek redress for the past injuries suffered by Plaintiffs, which were caused by

Defendants’ wrongdoings and their retaliation.

53. This case emanates from the initial malignant discrimination and misconduct by

Defendant Bethel, motivated by her racial and ethnical bias. When Plaintiff Jurado started

challenging her and sought help and redress because of the harm she was causing him and his

son, Defendant Bethel escalated her misconduct and evolved to conspire with others in order

to interfere and deprive plaintiffs of their rights and protections of the law. While defendant

Bethel’s deceit and other offenses were initially motivated solely by both private financial

22


gain—as apparent from the racket scheme engaged by her and the custody evaluator—as well

as conscious racial/ethnical bias, the two main motives throughout the case have been (a)

retaliation and (b) their view and conviction that blacks, Hispanics and other minorities are

inferior and do not stand equal before the law and the constitution. The results have been

disastrous, and have caused substantial detriment to minor child Plaintiff N.G.’s welfare,

including the withholding of medical care and the complete abandonment of the best interest

of the child.

54. One example of many instances of harm caused by defendants can be observed on

separate incidents in which two distinct and unrelated daycare facilities permanently expelled

the toddler at the hand of defendants McCash and Bethel. For over a year and a half,

defendant Bethel co-conspired with attorney Erika Smitherman, minor N.G.’s mother and

others to commit fraud, tamper with witnesses, and abuse their positions and authority with

the goal of depriving Plaintiffs of equal protection, procedural due process, substantive due

process, and other constitutional rights, resulting in extensive harm to Plaintiff Jurado and

Plaintiff N.G.

55. Due to their sharing of common values and views about race, the sentiment that

Jurado’s posture of denouncing discrimination against Bethel and the Juvenile Court is “him vs.

us”, and Bethel’s already influential power and connections with the courts and the SCO,

several state actors joined the conspiracy as allies of Bethel, from both the judicial and

executive branch of Ohio’s state government.

23


56. The adversity endured by the Plaintiffs was aggravated by Defendants Stone, the ODC

and Jamison when they denied Plaintiffs of any relief or protection. Instead, in March 2014,

Defendant Stone revealed Father’s grievance and his identity to Bethel—an act that fueled

more retaliation by Bethel followed by Jamison. What’s more, the ODC-SCO defendants shared

with Bethel all the supporting documentation and evidence that Jurado had submitted to them,

in violation of ethical rules, common sense and the prohibitions of Title VI. Immediately after,

hostility by Bethel reached unprecedented levels and Defendant Jamison openly proclaimed

Plaintiff Jurado an adversary of the court, driven by her already-noticeable intolerance to his

accent, by her bias and by retaliation.

57. From that point forward, the offensive acts being carried out by Defendant Jamison

and others within the Judiciary Branch under the color of law, in concert with the named

Defendants, have been pervasive, continuous and consistently escalating—respect to

magnitude and severity of the injuries—in direct proportion to Plaintiff Jurado’s efforts to seek

redress and end the harm. The ultimate and resulting effect of the judiciary branch participants

translates into the complete absence of an adequate state forum for Jurado to pursue

adjudication of his constitutional claims, enforcement of federally protected rights and redress

of wrongs. These extreme adverse circumstances are substantiated with hard evidence of pre-

arranged or pre-determined outcomes of Jurado’s actions or complaints long before the

controversies are ripe for adjudication.

58. After twenty two months of seeking the help and protection of state and local

authorities, and petitioning the state government and judiciary for redress of the wrongdoings

24


being committed against Plaintiffs, all they have to show for is their avoidance, indifference and

participation in the concealment efforts of the conspiracy. Their posture left Plaintiffs with no

adequate remedies left, other than the filing of a civil rights action in Federal Court.

59. Most importantly, the overwhelming and overt acts of retaliation against Plaintiffs

create the necessity of timely intervention by this court, especially when irreparable harm is

being inflicted and the heightened threat of more irreparable harm is present and imminent.

II. JURISDICTION

60. This action arises under federal laws, the Constitution of the United States, and

Constitution of the State of Ohio.

61. The United States District Court has original jurisdiction over the subject matters of

this action as conferred under 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1343, and 42 U.S.C. §§2000a–6(a) and

2000d–7. The United States District Court also has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367.

62. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§1981, 1983, 1985,

1986 and 1988, 28 U.S.C. §1367, 28 U.S.C. §§2201-2202, the All-Writs Act (AWA), 28 U.S.C.

§1651(a), 42 U.S.C. §§2000a, et seq., and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended,

42 U.S.C. §§2000d, et seq. (“Title VI”).

III. VENUE

63. Venue is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. §1391 because it is the district in which

the defendants reside or are located, and were the unlawful acts have been committed.

25


IV. PARTIES

IV.A. PLAINTIFFS

64. Plaintiff Aristides Jurado (“Jurado”), and adult citizen of the United States born in

Panama, is and has been at all relevant times resident of Franklin County, Ohio, and within the

Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division. Because of his ancestry, he has a dusky complexion

and also a Hispanic speech accent—even after more than 25 years of living in the States—due

the effect of living in Miami, FL for fifteen years. Plaintiff Jurado is also the father of Plaintiff

N.G., who is two and a half years old and the subject of a child custody dispute between his

parents. The unusually high number of irregularities and infringements in the child custody

case has resulted in collateral litigation spanning over a total of NINE court cases/petitions

across five different courts and jurisdictions, including this one. Of those, Plaintiff Jurado was

the relator party in disposed case 2014-1225 and petitioner in disposed petition 2015-AP-005

both of the Supreme Court of Ohio. He is also being forced to litigate concurrently these

SEVEN active cases Pro Se as (a) Defendant in the main child custody dispute under case

number 12-JU-014479 of the Franklin County Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relations Division

and Juvenile Branch (b) defendant-appellant in pending cases 14-AP-872, 15-AP-0026 and

15-AP-0080 of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, (c) Relator in pending case 2015-0240 of the

Supreme Court of Ohio (d) defendant in pending case 13-CV-011378 of the Franklin County

Common Pleas Court, General Division, and (d) plaintiff in pending case 15-cv-0074 of the US

District Court SD Ohio (this one).

26


65. Plaintiff N.G. is a minor child (“Plaintiff N.G.”, “the Child” or “Minor Child”) and has

been at all times resident of Franklin County, Ohio, and within the Southern District of Ohio,

Eastern Division. He is a party to this civil action through his father and next best friend

Aristides Jurado. Plaintiff N.G. is the subject of the custody dispute between the child’s mother,

Defendant Kathrine Jo Hernandez Lambert (“Lambert”), and Plaintiff Jurado.

IV.B. DEFENDANTS

IV.B.1. JUDICIARY BRANCH DEFENDANTS

IV.B.1(a) BLYTHE BETHEL, ESQ.

66. Defendant Blythe Bethel (“Bethel” or “former-GAL”), a white American of Caucasian

descent, is a family law attorney licensed to practice in Ohio and appointed by the Defendant

the Juvenile Court, to act as an arm of the court, and as the Guardian Ad Litem for the child

being the subject of the custody dispute between Plaintiff Jurado and his son’s mother

Lambert, until her recent involuntary discharge. Defendant Bethel is being sued in her official

capacity, delegated capacity, and individual personal capacity for acts performed outside the

normal functions of a GAL. The Ohio Revised Code and Ohio Superintendence Rule 48 sets

guidelines for the duties and rights of Guardians Ad Litem (“GAL”), and in Ohio’s common law,

GALs are considered a quasi-judicial officer of the court and they are afforded absolute quasi-

judicial immunity. See, e.g., Penn v. McMonagle (1990), 60 Ohio App.3d 149. The rights and

duties of GALs extend beyond their period of appointment by the Juvenile Court. Her principal

office is in Columbus, Ohio.

27


IV.B.1(b) JUDGE TERRI JAMISON

67. Defendant Terri Jamison (“Jamison” or “Judge Jamison”) is a duly elected Judge for

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, Juvenile Branch, (“CPC”

or “The Juvenile Court”) who is presiding over the custody case numbered 12JU-11-14479 for

the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities (“custody”) over Plaintiff Minor Child N.G.

Defendant Judge Jamison is being sued in her official capacity and her individual personal

capacity for acts performed outside of normal functions of a judicial officer.

IV.B.1(c) THOMAS MCCASH, ESQ.

68. Defendant Thomas McCash (“GAL McCash” or “current GAL”) is a family law attorney

licensed to practice in Ohio and recently appointed by the Defendant the Juvenile Court to act

as an arm of the Court and as the Guardian Ad Litem for the child being the subject of the

custody dispute, and in replacement of former-GAL Defendant Blythe Bethel. His principal

office is in Columbus, Ohio. Defendant GAL McCash is being sued in his official capacity, in his

delegated capacity, and in his individual personal capacity for acts performed outside the

normal functions of a GAL.

IV.B.1(d) AMY C. STONE, ESQ.

69. Defendant Amy C. Stone (“Stone”) is an Assistant Disciplinary Counsel for Ohio’s

Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”). Defendant Stone is being sued in her official capacity

and her individual personal capacity. Her principal office is in Columbus, Ohio.

28


IV.B.1(e) SCOTT J. DREXEL, ESQ.

70. Defendant Scott J. Drexel, (“Drexel”) is the duly appointed Disciplinary Counsel of the

Supreme Court of Ohio. Defendant Drexel is being sued in his official capacity. His principal

office is in Columbus, Ohio.

IV.B.1(f) OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL & OHIO SUPREME COURT

71. Defendant Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) is part of the administrative

structure of the institution known as the Supreme Court of Ohio (“SCO”) and one of three

offices that make up the Disciplinary System, which governs the ethics and conduct of the legal

profession and the state’s judiciary. Named and unnamed defendants Stone, ODC & SCO, John

Doe, and Jane Doe III collectively referred to herein as “ODC–SCO Defendants”. (SCO not

considered a separate defendant but, instead, is defined as same defendant as ODC)

72. In any context but particularly in the context of civil rights and federal constitutional

enforcement, the self-governance apparatus of Ohio’s Disciplinary System and legal profession

as a whole is of significance because its inherent lack of check and balances.

73. During relevant times to this action, the SCO has been a recipient of federal funds

through the following grant programs totaling in excess of $1M in 2013 alone: (a) CFDA 16.803,

Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grants Program (JAG) (e.g., sub-grant number 2013-

JG-D01-6890); (b) CFDA 16.013, OVW’s Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) Court Training

and Improvement Grants Program; (c) CFDA 16.588, STOP VAWA Formula Grants Program (

e.g., sub-grant number 2013-WF-VA1-8855); (d) State Justice Institute Grant number SJI-13-N-

29


141; (e) CFDA 93.643, Children's Justice Grants to States; (f) CFDA 93.586, State Court

Improvement Program and (g) CFDA 93.669, Child Abuse and Neglect State Grants.

74. Under the statutory and regulatory definitions of “program or activity”, prohibitions

under Title VI apply to the entire SCO institution including all of its judicial and administrative

offices and divisions, such as the Office of Disciplinary Counsel. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a(1).

The SCO and ODC, collectively (“the Disciplinary System”)—independently from their status of

program recipient of federal funds and because of their constitutionally delegated duties—act

as an outside agent to multiple “federal-funds-recipient programs” throughout the state, with

full authority to govern them and with control to minimize or prevent unlawful discrimination.

IV.B.1(g) FRANKLIN COUNTY COMMON PLEAS COURT, DIVISION OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS & JUVENILE BRANCH

75. Defendant the Juvenile Court (“the Juvenile Court”) is a branch of the Common Pleas

Court of Franklin County, Division of Domestic Relations. The Juvenile Court, as a program or

activity, has been a recipient of federal funds during relevant times of this action through

discretionary, block and formula grant programs, such as (a) CFDA 16.745, Criminal and Juvenile

Justice and Mental Health Collaboration Program, (b) CFDA 16.738, Byrne JAG Program (e.g.

sub-grant number 2011-JG-C01-6928 - Franklin County Family Drug Court with period ending in

2013); (c) CFDA 16.523, Juvenile Accountability Block Grants (e.g. Federal award ID

2010JBFX0043, Subgrant 2010-JB-RPU-0801 for Drug Courts with end date of 12-31-2013); (d)

CFDA 16.525, Drug Court Discretionary Grant Program, and others.

30


76. Just like any other court in the state of Ohio, the Juvenile Court is expected to

conduct its proceedings in accordance to statewide rules and laws, as well as its local rules

defined under the guidance of the Rules of Superintendence set forth by the Ohio Supreme

Court.

IV.B.2. EXECUTIVE BRANCH DEFENDANTS

IV.B.2(a) OHIO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION

77. Defendant The Ohio Civil Rights Commission (“OCRC” or “The Commission”) is an

independent state government agency established in 1959 with statutory duties designated

under Section 4112 of the Ohio Revised Code, and modeled after its federal counterpart the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). OCRC’s core mission is the enforcement

of state discrimination laws, and the prescription and enforcement of related rules and

regulations.

78. The Commission derives its independent status from its autonomy within the state

government’s executive branch: The Commission is not under direct control of The Governor

or The Governor’s Cabinet. In practice, such autonomy is only a fiction due to Ohio Office of

the Attorney General’s conflicting authority and control over all aspects of the Commission’s

litigation and legal representation.

79. The decisions, determinations and orders of the Commission are subject to judiciary

review under ORC 4112.06. But no such remedy exists in the particular scenario of a

complainant aggrieved by the Commission’s final determination of “no probable cause”,

because of the state courts’ current application of ORC 4112.05(H), which requires OCRC to

31


issue “findings of facts”. In Ohio, a finding of facts under ORC 4112.05(H) consisting of a basic

conclusory statement is considered “adequate” under Ohio common law, resulting in

inadequate judiciary review due to a state court’s limited permissible scope of appellate review.

80. OCRC, as a program or activity, has been a recipient of federal funds during relevant

times of this action through federal agency contracts and project grants, such as CFDA 30.002

and CFDA 14.401, respectively, and with totals of $2,299,771 for FY 2012, $2,102,462 for

FY 2013 and $2,010,122 for FY 2014. These totals do not include additional federal funding

received under CFDA 14.195.

IV.B.2(b) RICHARD T. GARCIA

81. Defendant Richard T. Garcia (“OCRC Investigator” or “Garcia”) is an employee of the

Ohio Civil Rights Commission. Defendant Garcia’s job title is Investigator and his responsibility

includes the investigation of discrimination charges for the Commission’s Columbus Branch. His

principal office is in Columbus, Ohio. Defendant OCRC Investigator Garcia is being sued in his

official capacity, and in his individual personal capacity. Defendant Garcia handled the

investigation of Jurado’s complaint to the OCRC against Brooksedge Daycare for discrimination.

IV.B.2(c) BRADLEY S. S. DUNN

82. Defendant Bradley S. S. Dunn (“OCRC Reconsideration Supervisor” or “Dunn”) is an

employee of the Ohio Civil Rights Commission. Defendant Dunn’s job title is Reconsideration

Supervisor and his responsibility includes re-examining information gathered during a

Commission’s original investigation, review any additional information provided by the parties,

and make a final recommendation for the commissioners. His principal office is in Akron, Ohio,

32


but works on reconsideration cases for the Columbus Branch. Defendant OCRC

Reconsideration Supervisor Dunn is being sued in his official capacity, and in his individual

personal capacity. Defendant Dunn handled Jurado’s Reconsideration petition of his two

dismissed complaints against Brooksedge Daycare for discrimination and retaliation.

IV.B.2(d) OHIO OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

83. Defendant Ohio Office of the Attorney General (“OOAG”) is one of several

departments that make up the executive branch of Ohio’s state government. The OOAG is

headed by the Ohio Attorney General, who serves a term of 4-years in elected office. The

Attorney General is entrusted by statute to function in the broad role of the state’s chief legal

officer, which includes a number of distinct duties that at times may conflict with each other.

For example, the attorney general acts as the state’s top law enforcement official for protecting

Ohio families and its citizens through different programs and by supporting the investigative

efforts of other state and local law enforcement agencies. At the same time, the Attorney

General and the OOAG act as the state’s top prosecutor for fighting crime, while also

functioning in the capacity of chief counsel for the state, whose duties include providing legal

advice and representation to state government agencies and state officials in all legal matters.

84. OOAG is made up of almost 30 divisions or sections, such as the Bureau of Criminal

Investigation (“BCI”) and the Civil Rights section among others. Even when only some of

OOAG’s sections are recipients of federal funds, the prohibitions under Title VI apply equally to

all its sections, given that the OOAG is defined as the overarching program or activity. During

33


relevant times to this action, the OOAG has been a recipient of federal funds totaling in excess

of $26M in 2013 alone.

85. The $26M+ in federal funds were disbursed to Defendant OOAG by federal agencies

through block, formula, project and discretionary type grants, as well as cooperative

agreements, including: (a) CFDA 16.803, Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grants

Program (JAG) Sub-grants 2012-JG-A02-6251, 2013-JG-A02-6251, 2011-JG-A02-T1292 (through

12/31/13), (b) CFDA 16.742 Coverdell National Forensic Science Improvement Grants Program,

awards S2014-CD-BX-0057, 2013-CD-BX-0047, (c) CFDA 16.741 DNA Capacity Enhancement and

Backlog Reduction Program 2013-DN-BX-0088, 2014-DN-BX-0062; (d) CFDA 16.554 National

Criminal History Improvement Program (NCHIP) 2012MUMUK008, (e) CFDA 20.600 State and

Community Highway Safety Officer Training 18X9204020OH13; (f) CFDA 16.575 Crime Victim

Assistance 2013VAGX0027; (g) CFDA 16.576 Crime Victim Compensation 2013VCGX0030; (h)

CFDA 16.750 Support for Adam Walsh Act Implementation Grant Program 2013AWBX0010; (i)

CFDA 16.560, National Institute of Justice Research, Evaluation, and Development Project

Grants; (j) CFDA 16.590, Grants to Encourage Arrest Policies and Enforcement of Protection

Orders Program; (k) CFDA 16.746, Capital Case Litigation; (l) CFDA 93.775 State Medicaid Fraud

Control Units, among others.

IV.B.2(e) CAROLYN E. GUTOWSKI, ESQ.

86. Defendant Carolyn E. Gutowski (“Gutowski” or “Assistant AG”), a white American

female of Caucasian descent, is an Assistant Attorney General under the Civil Rights Section of

the OOAG. The Civil Rights section of the OOAG provides legal representation services to the

34


Ohio Civil Rights Commission in discrimination cases. The section receives some of the federal

funds from OCRC that are collected from the reimbursement payment programs. Her principal

office is in Columbus, Ohio. Defendant Gutowski is being sued in her official capacity and her

individual personal capacity. Defendant Gutowski had an active role and involvement in the

investigative stage of the process and final determination by OCRC of Jurado’s two complaints

against Brooksedge Daycare for Discrimination and Retaliation, and their reconsideration by the

Commission.

IV.B.3. PRIVATE CORPORATE-TYPE DEFENDANTS

IV.B.3(a) PETROFF LAW OFFICES

87. Defendant Petroff Law Offices, LLC (“Petroff” or “Petroff Law Firm”) is a law firm

engaged exclusively in the private practice of domestic relations law and is an Ohio-registered

domestic limited liability company with entity number 1697694. The law firm’s two partners,

Erika Smitherman and Ron Petroff, have been representing Defendant Kathrine Jo Hernandez

(Lambert) since November 2012 in the child custody case. They both have been working in

tandem as opposing counsel to Plaintiff Jurado in the child custody litigation, in which he is the

respondent.

IV.B.3(b) A.S. LECLAIR COMPANY, INC. D/B/A BROOKSEDGE DAYCARE

88. Defendant A.S. LeClair Company is a privately owned child care center doing business

under the trade name of Brooksedge Daycare in Hilliard, OH (“Brooksedge” or “Brooksedge

Daycare”). Defendant Brooksedge is a type of state regulated “child day care” that can only

operate if licensed by the state through Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (“ODJFS”).

35


Regulated child day care centers are inspected by ODJFS prior to and after receiving a license to

verify compliance with state and federal requirements. They are also inspected or

“investigated” when a complaint is filed with ODJFS.

89. Defendant Brooksedge Daycare is owned and operated by Amy LeClair since its

incorporation in 2007 as an Ohio corporation-for-profit company, with entity number 1720645.

Since October 2012, Brooksedge Daycare has been managed by Amy LeClair and Jessica Jividen,

both as Co-Directors. Plaintiff N.G. was enrolled in Brooksedge in September 2012 at 3 months

of age, and was cared for by Brooksedge’s caretakers continuously until October 9, 2013 when,

at the age of 15 months, Plaintiff N.G. was permanently dismissed from the facility by the

daycare directors.

90. Defendant Brooksedge Daycare was the subject of complaints filed with ODJFS, and

was the Respondent in an administrative complaint investigated by OCRC for discrimination and

retaliation—both filed by Plaintiff Jurado in July 2013 as the result of licensing violations and

Brooksedge’s participation in a scheme to commit fraud upon the court, both motivated by

ethnic bias.

91. Defendant Brooksedge Daycare is the Plaintiff in the civil case 13-CV-011378, which

was filed in October 2013 as a civil lawsuit against Jurado in the General Division of the

Common Pleas Court of Franklin County. The case is currently pending and its discovery phase

active.

36


IV.B.3(c) EAGLE SCHOOL OF HILLIARD, INC. D/B/A THE GODDARD SCHOOL – HILLIARD II

92. Defendant Eagle School of Hilliard is a privately owned child care center doing

business under the trade name of The Goddard School – Hilliard II in Hilliard, OH (“Goddard

School” or “GS Hilliard Daycare”). Defendant The Goddard School – Hilliard is owned by Wilson

“Bill” Eagle and Defendant Kimberly “Kim” Eagle. Mr. and Mrs. Eagle’s Corporation-for-Profit

has been registered in Ohio since 2001 with entity number 1283344, for the management and

operations of two distinct daycare facilities in Hilliard, OH—both franchisees of the national

chain The Goddard Systems, Inc. based out of King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. The Goddard

Systems, Inc. is not a named defendant in this action.

93. Just like Defendant Brooksedge, Defendant The Goddard School of Hilliard II is a type

of state regulated “child day care” that can only operate if licensed by the state through Ohio

Department of Job and Family Services (“ODJFS”), and subject to licensing compliance

inspections and investigations upon receipt of complaints.

94. Defendant The Goddard School’s caretakers have been providing out-of-home care

for Plaintiff N.G. on a full-time basis since October 17, 2013—two days after he was enrolled by

Defendant Lambert. Defendant The Goddard School’s caretakers provided care for Plaintiff

N.G. on a limited part-time basis between mid-January 2014 and January 2015, because he was

dual-enrolled in a second Goddard School facility in Westerville, OH operated and managed by

owners other than Mr. and Mrs. Eagle. Defendant The Goddard School of Hilliard resumed the

care of the child on a full-time basis in 2015 after the disenrollment of the child from the

37


Westerville facility—the 2nd forced dismissal by daycare providers within his first 2.5 years of

life.

95. Defendant the Goddard School serves children covered by publicly funded child care

subsidies, and therefore is a program or activity recipient of federal funds under Title VI, and

subject to its prohibitions and regulations.

IV.B.4. PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS

IV.B.4(a) ERIKA SMITHERMAN, ESQ.

96. Defendant Erika Smitherman (“Smitherman”), a white American of Caucasian

descent, is a licensed attorney and partner at the Petroff Law Firm and co-counsel for

Defendant Lambert in the child custody case. Before private practice, she worked as staff

attorney for Judge Elizabeth Gill, who is the Lead Juvenile Judge for the Franklin County

Common Pleas Court, Division of Domestic Relations & Juvenile Branch. Defendant

Smitherman also worked as an Assistant Attorney General for Defendant OOAG under two

different sections prior to working in private practice.

IV.B.4(b) KATHRINE JO HERNANDEZ (LAMBERT)

97. Defendant Kathrine “Kathy” Jo Hernandez (“Lambert”) is the mother of Plaintiff N.G.

and petitioner in the custody case currently being litigated with Jurado as the respondent.

Defendant Lambert, who uses the last name Hernandez since adopting her first husband’s last

name, is a non-Hispanic white American of Caucasian descent, and a friendly key witness for

Defendant Brooksedge in the lawsuit filed against Jurado.

38


98. Defendant Lambert works as an executive for Express, Inc., currently holding the

position of Human Resources Director. Plaintiff Jurado and defendant Lambert have known

each other since 2010, when both worked together for the fashion retailer (Express Fashion

Operation).

99. Defendant Lambert is the main link between Jurado’s court cases, including the

custody litigation and this civil rights action, and Defendants Brooksedge, the Goddard School

of Hilliard, Amy LeClair, Gretchen Wilson and Kim Eagle.

IV.B.4(c) AMY LECLAIR

100. Defendant Amy LeClair (“LeClair”) is the owner and co-Director of Brooksedge

Daycare, and a white American of Caucasian descent. Plaintiff Jurado has known Defendant

LeClair since September 2012, when his son Plaintiff N.G. was first enrolled at the Brooksedge

Daycare.

101. Defendant LeClair was the only witness for Defendant Brooksedge during the

investigation by OCRC of Jurado’s discrimination complaint. Defendant LeClair was also a

friendly key witness for Defendant Lambert and was expected to present testimony during the

first part of the trial in January 2015. Defendant LeClair was never called as a witness by

Defendants Smitherman and Lambert when they changed their strategy at the 11th hour, just as

new evidence emerged in January 2015 that linked Defendants the Goddard School and

Brooksedge to the same scheme of collusion with Defendant Lambert.

39


IV.B.4(d) ANGELA ALEXANDER SAVINO, ESQ.

102. Defendant Angela Alexander Savino (“Attorney Savino” or “Alexander-Savino”) is a

licensed attorney that works for the law firm Perez & Morris, LLC. Attorney Savino and her

employer are counsel for Defendant Brooksedge Daycare, providing representation in the civil

lawsuit against Jurado and provided representation during the OCRC investigative and

adjudicative process against Brooksedge. The law firm Perez & Morris, LLC is not a named

defendant in this action.

IV.B.4(e) GRETCHEN WILSON

103. Defendant Gretchen Wilson (“Wilson” or “Ms. Gretchen”) is a female white American

of Caucasian descent and the director of Defendant the Goddard School – Hilliard II, and

oversees classroom aspects of the daycare operations, including curriculum and supervision of

lead teachers and caretakers. Plaintiff Jurado has known Defendant Wilson since October 2013,

after his son, Plaintiff N.G. started attending the center as a replacement for Brooksedge

Daycare.

104. Defendant Wilson is a key witness for Defendant Lambert in the child custody case.

Defendant Wilson already provided witness testimony during the first part of trial proceedings

conducted in January 2015. Her testimony itself is key evidence supporting the allegations in

this action.

IV.B.4(f) KIMBERLY “KIM” EAGLE

105. Defendant Kimberly Eagle (“Eagle” or “Kim Eagle”) is a female white American of

Caucasian descent and the owner of Defendant the Goddard School – Hilliard II, and oversees

40


the financial and back-office operations of the company’s two daycare facilities, including the

overseeing of the school’s Director and Assistant Director Functions. Plaintiff Jurado has known

Defendant Kim Eagle since October 2013, after his son, Plaintiff N.G. started attending the

center as a replacement for Brooksedge Daycare. Most recently, Defendant Eagle testified as a

witness during the March 17, 2015 proceeding in the Juvenile court for restricting Jurado’s

access to their facility.

41


IV.C. CO-CONSPIRATORS

IV.C.1. STATE ACTORS

(a) Blythe Bethel

(b) Terri Jamison

(c) Thomas McCash

(d) Franklin County Common Pleas Court, Division of Domestic Relations & Juvenile Branch

(e) Amy Stone, ODC-SCO

(f) John Doe, SCO

(g) Jane Doe III, SCO

(h) Office of Disciplinary Counsel, Ohio Supreme Court

(i) Richard Garcia, OCRC

(j) Bradley Dunn, OCRC

(k) Ohio Civil Rights Commission

(l) Carolyn E. Gutowski, OOAG

(m) Jane Doe, OOAG

(n) John Doe II, OOAG

(o) Ohio’s Office of the Attorney General

IV.C.2. PRIVATE ACTORS

(p) Kathy Hernandez (“Lambert”)

(q) Erika Smitherman

(r) Petroff Law Offices

(s) Amy LeClair

(t) Brooksedge Daycare

(u) Angela Savino

(v) Gretchen Wilson

(w) Goddard School Hilliard II

(x) Kim Eagle

(y) Jane Doe II

IV.C.3. OTHER UNNAMED CONSPIRATORS OR NAMED CONSPIRATORS

NOT NAMED AS DEFENDANTS

106. Various Persons and Entities who are known and unknown to Plaintiffs, and not

named as defendants in this Civil Rights action, have all participated as co-conspirators with

42


named Defendants in the offenses alleged herein, have engaged in concerted action, and have

made statements in furtherance of the conspiracy.

107. The conspirators not named as defendants include, and are not limited to: The

attorney retained by Defendant attorney Bethel to boost the harassment against Jurado,

Bradley Frick, Esq. The psychologist and Bethel’s long-established partner she recommended

to the Juvenile court to perform evaluations of the parties, Dr. Jeffrey Smalldon The OCRC

investigator assigned to Jurado’s second complaint for retaliation against Brooksedge, Beyan H.

Asoba Defendant Lambert’s long-time friend and licensed counselor, Bethany Dwinnell

Non-elected officers from reviewing state courts, such as Doug W. Eaton, Court Administrator

for Ohio’s Tenth District Court of Appeals Molly Stevens and other caretakers from the

Goddard School–Hilliard II Defendant Lambert’s long-time friend and pediatrician

Mark Muresan, M.D. Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (ODJFS) and some of its

agents

V. SUMMARY OF CHRONOLOGICAL FACTS, EVENTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

V.A. PRE-CUSTODY DISPUTE

108. Summer 2010 - Plaintiff Jurado and Defendant Lambert started a romantic

relationship, and learn about each other’s goals: Jurado was looking for a family and children of

his own, but Lambert had different goals set for her.

109. In November 2011, Lambert and Jurado agreed to equally co-parent their unborn

child, independently of their relationship status—both unmarried at the time.

43


V.A.1(a) MARCH-JUNE 2012 - THE CHILD’S LIFE AT RISK BEFORE IT BEGAN

110. In March 2012, Jurado raised concerns to Lambert’s regular OBGYN about Lambert’s

low iron levels and her non-compliance with treatment, amid the multi-factor high-risk

pregnancy condition. Lambert, in her second trimester of pregnancy at the time, assured her

doctor that there was nothing to be worried about.

111. In June 2012 and within weeks of her due date, Lambert was hospitalized on an

emergency basis on orders by her high-risk pregnancy OBGYN specialist, due to a severe life-

threatening anemia that jeopardized the lives of the unborn baby and of Lambert. The

condition was easily preventable.

V.A.1(b) JULY-SEPTEMBER 2012 - JURADO AND LAMBERT SUCCESSFUL AT CO-PARENTING

THEIR NEWBORN AT FIRST, WHILE THEIR RELATIONSHIP DETERIORATED

112. In June 2012, Jurado started a temporary contract work in Chicago, IL that required

him to travel on a weekly basis.

113. In July 2012, Jurado became a first-time father. Lambert delivered her second child

without major complications 15 years after her first child was born. At birth, their newborn was

exactly in the 50th percentile for weight in the WHO Growth Charts.

114. In September 2012, Jurado and Lambert agreed to enroll their newborn at

Brooksedge Daycare for out-of-home care while they were at work. Both parents were present

on their son’s first day of attendance on September 24, 2012. Lambert was also dealing with

breast milk production issues throughout this period.

44


115. In October 2012, Jurado started voicing concerns about the health of the child.

Simultaneously, their relationship deteriorated significantly.

116. On November 2, 2012, Jurado and Lambert engaged in a heated argument originating

from Jurado’s decision to pick-up their infant an hour earlier from daycare than the usual 5pm

pick up time, together with safety concerns Jurado had brought up the prior week.

V.B. NOVEMBER 2012 - CUSTODY LITIGATION BEGAN

117. On November 5, 2012, Lambert filed a complaint in Juvenile Court seeking full

custody and a parenting schedule that included time for Jurado to be at the minimum required

by law and supervised until the child would turn 18.

V.B.1. NOVEMBER 2012 - THE START OF THE CONSPIRACY - BROOKSEDGE AND LAMBERT

ENTERED INTO FIRST AGREEMENT AND UNLAWFUL ACT IN FURTHERANCE OF THE

CONSPIRACY – ACCESS DENIALS PROHIBITED BY ORC 5104.039(A)

118. On November 5, 2012, the same day of Lambert’s filing of the custody case,

Brooksedge Daycare allowed Lambert to remove Jurado’s name as the natural father of the

child from all the official forms. After this day, Jurado’s name did not even appear as an

Emergency Contact. In the case of an emergency, he would have been the last person to find

out. Without his name in forms, he was not allowed into the facility to see his son, except with

authorization by Lambert, even when Lambert, the Brooksedge staff and administrators knew it

was against their written policy, licensing rules and Ohio statute.

45


V.B.2. NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2012 - LAMBERT EXERCISED AND ABUSED HER RIGHTS UNDER ORC 3109.042

119. Between November 5, 2012 and Mid-January 2013, Lambert set strict and limited

time schedules and provided them on a piecemeal fashion for Jurado and his family to see the

child and only under her supervision. Lambert knew that she could not exert that much control

without colluding with Brooksedge to unlawfully deny Jurado access to see his son at daycare.

V.B.3. NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2012 - CHILD’S WEIGHT-GAIN AND NUTRITIONAL

PROBLEMS ALARMING FOR JURADO, HIS FAMILY AND FRIENDS

120. Between November-December 2012, the low weight and wasting appearance of the

child continued to increase to an alarming point. Both Lambert and the Pediatrician agreed

that “it is just his size and nothing to worry about”. By the end of the year, the weight rate was

still near 0.28% in the Growth Charts.

121. In early January 2013, Jurado learned that the daycare was prohibited by law to deny

him access. He discussed it with daycare owner, LeClair, and she conceded that he would be

allowed in based on the current state licensing rules and the law.

122. Sometime after his access to the daycare was restored, he inquired with the child’s

caretakers regarding his own observations of cues that the infant was left hungry on a daily

basis. The caretakers at Brooksedge confirmed that the child cried right after finishing his

breast milk bottles but that “he eventually stopped [crying]”.

123. In January-February 2013, Jurado made an attempt to have their son evaluated by a

nutritionist but Lambert opposed his decision. The appointment got cancelled.

46


V.C. JANUARY 2013 - EQUAL SHARED PARENTING AND UNSUPERVISED

PARENTING TIME WITH OVERNIGHTS ORDERED BY THE JUVENILE COURT

124. On January 23, 2013, Jurado and Lambert made their first appearance in court, and

the first temporary order was issued with “shared parenting” (co-custody), and unsupervised

parenting time for Jurado with gradual increases over the following 3-4 months, as well as

overnights starting after six weeks from this date.

V.C.1. JANUARY 2013 - JURADO NO LONGER RESTRAINED FROM FEEDING INFANT WHEN

HUNGRY, RESULTING IN CHILD’S RAPID WEIGHT GAIN TO NORMAL LEVELS

125. Between January and April 2013, solid foods were introduced to the child as

secondary sources of nutrients, followed by formula supplementation by Jurado and over

Lambert’s objections. Their son finally started gaining weight at a normal pace, eventually

reaching again the 50th percentile in the growth charts.

V.C.2. FEBRUARY 2013 - INTRUSION WITH JURADO’S PARENTING TIME BEGAN

126. By mid-February 2013, not long after Jurado started exercising his court-approved

parenting time, he started raising concerns with his attorney about intrusion by Lambert.

V.D. MARCH 2013 - DEFENDANT BETHEL APPOINTED AS GUARDIAN AD LITEM

127. In March 2013, Defendant Blythe Bethel was named Guardian Ad Litem for the child,

whose appointment by the court was prompted specifically by the unresolved disagreement

between the parents Jurado and Lambert regarding health-related concerns about the child.

47


V.D.1. MARCH 2013 - JURADO’S FIRST PEDIATRIC EXPERT WITNESS TO ADDRESS INFANT’S

HEALTH ISSUES

128. In late-March 2013, the second-opinion pediatrician, Dr. Mastruserio, confirmed that

the child had experienced weight-gain issues during the first six months of life, and explained

the steps that she would have taken had she been the child’s pediatrician. She explained to

both parents that, given the circumstances and Lambert’s challenges producing breast milk,

supplementing with formula would be recommended because the benefits outweighed any

drawbacks. The pediatrician suggested a referral to a specialist to answer some of the

questions she was unable to answer, including any long-term effects of the nutritional

deficiency the child experienced during the first six months of his life. The information was

later shared with the attorneys and Bethel.

129. Between late-March and early-April 2013, Lambert breastfed the infant in Jurado’s

presence for the last time. He again noticed as he had before that Lambert flickered and

slapped the infant’s face as a method of “teaching the infant” not to pull or bite her nipples,

even when he had yet to grow teeth.

130. In April 2013, after numerous requests and insistence from Jurado, Lambert finally

agreed to (officially) increase the number of ounces of milk per feeding.

131. Sometime between April and May 2013, Dr. Mastruserio asserted with conviction

that “we cannot discard the possibility that N.G. experienced Failure to Thrive” (FTT) during his

first six months of life.

48


V.D.2. APRIL 2013-COURT PROCEEDING BOTCHED BY BETHEL’S PREMEDITATED SCHEDULE CONFLICT

132. On April 17, 2013, the parties attended a court hearing, but the proceeding was never

conducted, given that Defendant Bethel had participation in an ongoing trial she had scheduled

for the same day and time in the same floor in the Juvenile Court building. It became evident

that Bethel had chosen this date for the proceeding, knowing that she had a schedule conflict

with an ongoing trial as a tactic to delay the enforcement of her initial recommendation of the

50/50 parenting schedule for Lambert and Jurado.

133. As established extensively in this action, all of Bethel’s initial recommendations given

before she found out the true ethnicity and national origin of Lambert and Jurado were

reversed instantly after she learned that “Hernandez v. Jurado” was not a custody case

between two Hispanic parents, but instead, between a white-Caucasian mother and a Hispanic

father. The only recommendation she did not reverse right away was the 50/50 parenting

schedule recommendation because it would have been extremely obvious and would have

exposed her racial/ethnic bias. Instead, Bethel colluded with Lambert and Smitherman to the

delay of the enforcement of the 50/50 parenting schedule as much as possible.

V.D.3. APRIL 2013 - CONFLICT ESCALATED UNDER BETHEL’S WATCH

134. In early-April 2013, Jurado offered to relinquish his portion of parenting time with

overnight visitation as a result of the harassment and duress he was being subjected to.

135. During negotiations while waiting for Bethel to start the April 17, 2013 court

proceeding, Jurado and Lambert reached an agreement—through counsel and in Bethel’s

49


absence—for an interim parenting schedule covering three specific weeks during which Jurado

would have an irregular travel schedule for work. During the same negotiations, Lambert

disclosed Bethel’s position, for the very first time, regarding mandatory daycare attendance for

the child. Also, the topic of psychological evaluations was brought up for the first time after

Jurado presented evidence of stalking and harassment during his parenting time, including over

80 text messages sent by Lambert during a period of a few hours.

136. Starting on April 18, 2013, Jurado started the regular practice of turning all of his

phones off, including cell phone and landline, during his parenting time. It was the only

recourse left for him to be left alone and in peace during his time with his son.

137. Starting April 25, 2013, hostility, high-conflict and antagonism between Bethel,

Lambert, Jurado, and even between the parties’ opposing counsel quickly turned into the rule

and not the exception. The agreement reached for the interim parenting schedule was

sabotaged by Bethel. Rifts between attorneys soared.

V.D.4. APRIL 2013 - GAL BETHEL REFUSED PEDIATRICIAN’S REQUEST TO DISCUSS

CONCERNS

138. On April 25, 2013, Dr. Mastruserio asked to speak with the Guardian Ad Litem, Blythe

Bethel. She wanted to explain directly to the GAL her recommendation for a new pediatrician

for the child (other than herself). On April 29, 2013, Bethel refused to talk to Dr. Mastruserio,

or perform any investigation on the grounds of staying impartial.

50


V.D.5. LATE APRIL 2013 - THE HARASSMENT, OPPRESSION AND MISCONDUCT STARTED

TAKING A TOLL

139. By late-April 2013, Lambert and Jurado still had a moderate level of communication,

despite their differences. Albeit some history of passive-aggressiveness, they both treated the

other with basic civility—with exceptions that were far and few between— even during their

frequent arguments and conflict, and welcomed each other in their homes. But after this point,

the civility and communication dwindled.

V.D.6. MAY 2013 - FIRST VISIBLE PHYSICAL INJURY TO THE CHILD WITHOUT NORMAL

EXPLANATION; ALL CONSPIRATORS PARTICIPATED IN THE CONCEALMENT OF CHILD

ABUSE & NEGLECT

140. In Early-May 2013, Lambert dropped off the infant at Brooksedge with a highly visible

black-eye. Lambert explained to the Brooksedge caretakers that the child had hurt himself with

a Sippy cup. The recording from October 8, 2013 provides evidence that Brooksedge should

have reported the black eye, as it captured the emergency room doctor at Nationwide

Children’s Hospital discussing with Lambert his concerns about the black eye. As Lambert tried

to conceal the cause of the infant’s black eye by downplaying the severity of the injury, the

doctor firmly maintained his position by telling Lambert “* * * A ten month old with a black

eye, I don't have a choice! Like that is a mandate. I would be breaking the law if I didn't

report that!” (Emphasis Added.) Tr. NCH ER, Oct. 8, 2013 Part-II, page 1 (See Exhibit ).

Defendant Bethel also helped covered up the seriousness of the black eye by dismissing it as “it

happened several months ago”.

51


V.D.7. MAY 2013 – LAW ENFORCEMENT INVOLVED AFTER A DAY OF AGGRAVATION AND

STALKING

141. Friday May 10, 2013, one of Jurado’s parenting days he had looked forward to after

returning from another business trip, became another major turning point in the case. Jurado

was pressured into staying confined at his home with the child during his two days of parenting

time as the result of Lambert and Bethel’s harmful tactics. This turned out to be the last time

that either parent entered the other parent’s home, and the boundary set by Jurado is still in

effect to this day. It was a rational decision and course of action to call non-emergency

Columbus Police after seeing Lambert circling his apartment building on her car for almost an

hour. But before he called the cops, he made sure he had tried everything, including requests

to Mom pleading for her to vacate the vicinity.

V.E. MAY 2013 – MENTAL AND PHYSIOLOGICAL HARM PRODUCED BY

EXTREME DISTRESS LANDED JURADO IN THE HOSPITAL

142. On Saturday May 11, 2013, Jurado and his son were picked up from the freeway by

EMS personnel and taken to the Emergency Room, as they were headed to meet Lambert for a

scheduled exchange of the child. Because of the symptoms, Jurado was first evaluated, tested

and treated for a possible heart failure, during his eight (plus) hour-stay at the hospital.

V.E.1. MAY 2013 - BETHEL UNDERMINED EFFORTS TO DIFFUSE CONFLICT

143. In May 2013, Jurado’s Licensed Counselor requested to speak with Bethel after the

May 11, 2013 incident, especially since she had been monitoring the developments in the case

for several months. Bethel at first agreed to talk to Jurado’s counselor, but refused to answer

calls and emails the counselor sent her in May and June of 2013.

52


144. On June 11, 2013, Bethel sent an e-mail with feedback regarding Jurado’s suggestion

of using the “Parallel Parenting” approach that is recommended by experts as a way to keep

conflictive parents disengaged and to minimize conflict. Parallel Parenting is also

recommended in the Ohio’s official Parenting Guide published by the Supreme Court of Ohio,

as well as the Parenting Guide of the State of Arizona. Defendant Bethel disparaged the Parallel

Parenting approach by using an intentional fallacy, and without offering any other suggestion to

alleviate the high-conflict atmosphere.

V.F. MAY 2013 - JURADO’S FIRST ATTEMPTS TO SEEK HELP AND REDRESS

WRONGS

V.F.1(a) MAY-JUNE 2013 - JURADO’S COUNSEL WAS PUT ON NOTICE

145. In late-May early-June 2013, Jurado started confronting his attorney for her failure to

address the conduct of Bethel, and the evident conflict of interest, given their friendship which

was beyond the average professional relationship. Although his attorney did advocate and

maintained her stance on the main pressing issues, even when they were contrary to GAL

Bethel’s recommendations---which yielded absurd or illogical results for the most past—the

attorney was in denial regarding any bias or misconduct from Bethel.

146. During the last face-to-face meeting they had to sort things out in June 2013, Jurado’s

attorney finally conceded that there was something more behind Bethel’s behavior, attitude,

and conduct. She referred to it as a “society thing” to avoid calling it gender or racial bias. The

meeting, which took place a few weeks before the infamous July 8, 2013 court proceeding,

53


concluded with their understanding that they were giving the attorney-client relationship one

more chance.

V.F.1(b) MAY-JUNE 2013 - JURADO CONDUCTED HIS OWN INVESTIGATION

147. Jurado looked into previous cases involving Bethel as GAL, and found witnesses that

described her nature, attitude and conduct. At least two witnesses described Bethel’s history

of engaging in what could be defined as racket schemes with Dr. Smalldon.

V.F.1(c) JUNE-JULY 2013 - CONSULTATIONS WITH MULTIPLE FAMILY LAW ATTORNEYS

148. Jurado consulted with more than half dozen local attorneys. They all arrived to the

same conclusion: Don’t waste time attempting to remove Bethel as GAL. Many of them

confirmed that the process just doesn’t work; some explained her influence with the courts

would make it impossible even if the system worked, and some showed alliance.

V.F.1(d) JULY 2013 - FIRST CONTACT WITH THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

149. On July 1, 2013, Jurado visited the Moyer Judicial Center, and discussed his

challenges regarding Bethel with representatives of the Children and Families Section, without

much result. They directed Jurado to file a grievance with ODC regarding his concerns of

misconduct by the GAL, Defendant Bethel.

150. The visit was followed up several weeks later with a call from Mr. Steve Hanson,

then-manager of the Children, Families and courts Program of the SCO, and subsequent email

correspondence regarding the oversight process for GALs, including the effectiveness of

Superintendence Rule 48 as it applied to these specific circumstances. Their overall feedback,

54


in short, explained that (1) each court had the authority to set forth their own rules in regards

to the duties and role of GALs, (2) Sup.R. 48 was meant to set guidelines for the lower courts in

respect to GALs but nothing more, (3) they were unable to determine if the new

rules/guidelines were ineffective or not since Sup.R. 48 first went into effect in 2009, and (4)

complaints about ethical violations and misconduct by GALs should be directed to ODC.

V.G. JULY 2013 – FIRST MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENT OF CONSPIRACY —CONCERTED EFFORT TO COMMIT FRAUD UPON THE COURT WITH THE

FABRICATION OF THE OVERINVOLVED FATHER BY DEFENDANTS BETHEL, SMITHERMAN, PETROFF LAW, LECLAIR, BROOKSEDGE AND LAMBERT

V.G.1. JULY 2013 - BROOKSEDGE SECOND SIGNIFICANT INVOLVEMENT PERFECTLY TIMED –

DAILY REPORT FALSIFIED THE WEEK BEFORE COURT HEARING

151. On July 3, 2013, Jurado uncover what would become a pattern of collusion between

Lambert and daycare providers. He uncovered a falsified daily report sheet that had been

written by a caretaker from Brooksedge during the time Defendant Lambert and the co-

Director Jessica Jividen were on the premises in the afternoon of July 2, 2013.

V.G.2. JULY 2013 - CONSPIRATORS HEADED BY BETHEL COMMITTED ONE OF THE MOST

OVERT ACTS IN FURTHERANCE OF CONSPIRACY TO DATE WHEN MADE FRAUDULENT

MISREPRESENTATIONS TO THE COURT WITH THE GOAL OF DEPRIVING JURADO OF

ACCESS TO FACILITIES OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION AND REDUCE HIS PARENTING

TIME

152. On July 8, 2013, during a status conference with Magistrate Matthews, Bethel

informed the Court—in the presence of Smitherman and Petroff—that Jurado was visiting his

son at Brooksedge twice a day, five days a week when they all knew that Jurado was spending

3-4 weekdays every week in Chicago during the previous 12 months.

55


153. Due to the fraudulent misrepresentations made in Court, Jurado was unfairly labeled

“Overinvolved Dad” by the court and by conspirators, resulting in his ban to visit his son at

daycare.

V.H. JULY 2013 - JURADO’S SECOND ROUND OF ATTEMPTS SEEKING HELP

V.H.1(a) JULY 2013 - JURADO REACHED OUT TO OOAG AND OTHER ENTITIES SEEKING HELP

154. In July 2013, Jurado made contact with representatives from multiple sections of the

OOAG seeking help regarding the misconduct and abuses without success.

V.H.1(b) JULY 2013 – JURADO RECEIVED SUPPORT FROM OHIO HISPANIC COALITION

(OHC)

155. After reviewing Jurado’s evidence and learned about the facts, OHC made a direct

referral to OCRC.

V.H.1(c) JULY 2013 – JURADO CONSULTED WITH EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION EXPERT

WHO REFERRED HIM TO ODJFS

156. On July 3-4, 2013, after uncovering the falsified report by Brooksedge and in

anticipation of Defendants’ engaging in misconduct at the upcoming hearing on July 8, 2013,

Jurado sought the guidance and input from a professional with extensive experience with

daycare providers and licensing rules, who is also the owner of a language school specializing in

early childhood education. She explained how some of the actions and conduct of Brooksedge

were licensing violations that are taken seriously by regulators and that ODJFS were setup to

receive and investigate those type of complaints.

56


V.I. JULY 2013 - SCOPE OF THE CONFLICT SUDDENLY EXPANDED – ODJFS

AND OCRC AS FIRST STATE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES INVOLVED DUE TO

BROOKSEDGE CONDUCT

157. Jurado filed charges of discrimination against Brooksedge with OCRC, and complaints

of licensing violations with ODJFS, given the apparent collusion of Brooksedge with Bethel and

Lambert, and the non-compliance identified by those Jurado consulted with.

V.I.1. JULY 2013 - LICENSING VIOLATION COMPLAINTS FILED WITH ODJFS

158. On July 5, 2013, Jurado bypassed ODJFS’ standard process of a telephone hotline for

reporting licensing complaints against daycare facilities, and instead sought direct contact with

senior staff and leadership. He was able to engage ODJFS officials who appeared receptive, and

capture all the details he presented. He offered evidence but they explained that he would be

contacted by the licensing agent(s) if necessary during their investigation in order to get

additional information or evidence from him.

V.I.2. JULY 2013 – DISCRIMINATION CHARGE FILED WITH OCRC

159. Around July 9, Defendant Garcia met in person with Jurado to go over the complaint

process after receiving the referral directly from the Ohio Hispanic Coalition. Jurado shared his

concerned about retaliation by Brooksedge after learning of the discrimination charges, but

Garcia explained that Jurado would be protected from Retaliation and that OCRC also

investigates and prosecutes retaliation given that Jurado was engaging in a protected activity.

57


V.I.3. JULY-AUGUST 2013 - DEFENDANTS TAMPERED WITH JURADO’S KEY PEDIATRIC

EXPERT WITNESS

160. Around July and August 2013, Defendants Bethel and Lambert—with the

participation of Dr. Muresan, corruptly exerted undue influence upon Jurado’s Key Expert

Witness Dr. Mastruserio, resulting in her recantation of her earlier assertions and broke

communications with Jurado.

V.I.4. SEPTEMBER 2013 – STATEMENTS MADE IN FURTHERANCE OF THE CONSPIRACY: DEFENDANT LECLAIR ACCUSED BETHEL OF MAKING MISREPRESENTATIONS AND

FRAUD UPON THE COURT AND IMPLICATED BETHEL AND LAMBERT ON A SCHEME

THAT RESULTED IN COMPLAINTS FILED WITH STATE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

161. On September 6, 2013 a video recorded meeting was held between Jurado and the

daycare owner, LeClair, during which the owner made specific statements implicating Bethel

and Lambert in the premeditated action of misleading the court and accused Bethel of

deceptive conduct. Specifically, she asserted that almost every statement and information

Defendant Bethel provided to the Magistrate on July 8, 2013 that reportedly came from LeClair

were not simple misunderstandings but outright fabrications. LeClair contended that the

collusion between Bethel and Lambert, along with Bethel’s deceptive conduct were the reasons

for Jurado being banned from visiting his son at daycare and were accountable for the

involvement of State Government Agencies investigating the complaints filed against her

daycare.

58


V.I.5. SEPTEMBER 2013 - BROOKSEDGE CONTINUED COLLABORATING WITH LAMBERT IN

INTERFERING WITH JURADO’S PARENTING TIME – WHILE OTHER CHILDREN PAID A

HIGH PRICE BY BEING EXPOSED TO HEALTH RISKS AND PLAINTIFF N.G. DEPRIVED OF

PROPER CARE

162. On September 12, 2013, Plaintiff N.G. was sent home along with other children that

showed similar symptoms of fever and diarrhea. It turned out to be a severe condition that

lasted 7 days. At the end of her parenting period after a day and a half, Lambert dropped him

off at Brooksedge the morning of September 16, 2013 claiming that the child’s diarrhea and

other symptoms were completely gone. Brooksedge colluded with Lambert to prevent Jurado

from caring for the child on that day by misreporting his condition, but also exposed other

children to a communicable disease. Ultimately, Plaintiff N.G. was precluded from being cared

for by his father, Plaintiff Jurado.

V.J. AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 2013 - DEFENDANTS ENTERED INTO NEW

AGREEMENT TO CARRY OUT THE LAWSUIT SUBSIDIARY SCHEME –

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF INJURIES TO THE CHILD TO FRAME JURADO

FOR INVOLVING CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL AND AUTHORITIES WHICH

FORMED BASIS FOR LAWSUIT

V.J.1. AUGUST 2013 – JOHN DOE II AND JANE DOE II ENTERED INTO AN AGREEMENT WITH

BETHEL AND SMITHERMAN TO INTERFERE WITH ODJFS INVESTIGATIONS, AND TO

OBTAIN THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE LAWSUIT SUB-SCHEME

163. In mid-August 2013, ODJFS concluded its investigation and issued its report after the

meeting Jurado had with department officials in early July. The handling of the investigation

and resulting report had evident irregularities and ODJFS eventually conceded about the

59


mishandling of their investigation during a second meeting in September 2013. Present factors

and indicators ruled out the irregularities as random events.

V.J.2. AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 2013 – BETHEL’S LONG-ESTABLISHED PARTNER IN RACKET

SCHEMES DR. SMALLDON BEGAN HIS KEY PARTICIPATION IN THE MASTER

CONSPIRACY AND ASSUMED STRATEGIC ROLE IN LAWSUIT SUB-SCHEME; BETHEL

ENGAGED IN CONCEALED COMMUNICATIONS WITH LECLAIR, SMITHERMAN, ALEXANDER-SAVINO AND DR. SMALLDON FOR THE PLANNING OF THE LAWSUIT

SCHEME

164. Between August and September of 2013, Defendants Bethel, LeClair, Smitherman,

Alexander-Savino and Dr. Smalldon established ongoing secret communications by phone and

e-mail in regards to the complaints Jurado had filed and in the plotting of a lawsuit, as e-mails

uncovered between November 2014 and January 2015 show.

165. These secret communications, in which Bethel was the intermediary between Dr.

Smalldon and the other Defendants, were in clear contradiction of ethical rules set by the state

psychology board for the proper conduct of forensic experts, as well as the rules of

superintendence that prohibit Guardians Ad Litem to divulge any information about their case.

In addition, Dr. Smalldon, who was already half-way through the evaluation of Lambert and

Jurado, had a unique and powerful role in the plan given that he was strategically positioned to

know Plaintiff Jurado’s susceptibilities and thus had the ability to arrange different factors and

events to obtain a precise outcome for framing Jurado.

60


V.J.3. SEPTEMBER 2013 – ODJFS RECEIVED FEEDBACK ABOUT IRREGULARITIES WITH THEIR

HANDLING OF THE INVESTIGATION AND INVITED JURADO TO MEET WITH NEW SET OF

DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS; ODFJS CONCEDED THE MISHANDLING OF THEIR

INVESTIGATION, COMMITTED TO CORRECT THE FAILURES; SECOND ROUND PRODUCED

EVEN MORE SIGNIFICANT IRREGULARITIES

166. In mid-September 2013, Jurado is invited to a meeting at the ODJFS offices after

receiving his feedback about their poor handling of their first investigation of Brooksedge

licensing violations. Contrasting Brooksedge claims in their lawsuit alleging that Jurado filed

more complaints against them with ODJFS; Jurado only identified short-comings with ODJFS

handling of the process. During this meeting, ODJFS admitted that that their handling of the

investigation had some flaws that were the result of restructuring their internal organizational

hierarchy, and made the commitment to redo the investigation a second time. A month or so

later, their second report showed even more significant inconsistencies and results that

contradicted information exchanged during the last meeting.

167. On September 9, 2013, to confirm his doubts, Jurado met with representatives from

Action for Children, who confirmed Jurado’s concerns about the violations committed that

should have been substantiated with the evidence available. It was clear that ODJFS inspection

report and investigation were not affected by simple errors, but by irregularities that were

intentional.

V.J.4. SEPTEMBER 2013 - CHILD’S UNUSUALLY FREQUENT HEAD INJURIES RAISED

EYEBROWS IN THE COMMUNITY; JURADO’S UNRESOLVED CONCERNS REVIVED

168. From late August through October 2013, the child suffered injuries while at

Brooksedge that at first did not raise any red flags, until they started to occur with more

61


frequency and severity. Jurado started to get concerned, along with the child’s paternal

grandparents, other relatives, family friends, and parishioners.

V.J.5. SEPTEMBER 2013 - JURADO AND HIS ATTORNEY PURSUED THE EVALUATION OF

ALTERNATIVE HIGHER-QUALITY DAYCARE PROVIDERS

169. In September 2013, Jurado explained to his attorney that selecting a daycare for a

child was not much different than choosing the better school district among different ones that

parents may consider separately. At that point Jurado, believed the increasingly frequent head

injuries experienced by Plaintiff N.G. were the result of poor quality of care by Brooksedge and

were not necessarily done intentionally. They approached Defendant Bethel, who as GAL, was

seemingly receptive to the idea and asked Jurado and his attorney to provide her with any

recommendations for other daycares that may offer higher quality of care.

V.J.6. LATE SEPTEMBER-EARLY OCTOBER 2013 – LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, WITHOUT

JURISDICTION, ENCOURAGED JURADO TO GET FORMAL INVOLVEMENT OF LAW

ENFORCEMENT AS WELL AS CHILDREN SERVICES

170. Around late-September 2013, fellow parishioners who shared Jurado’s concerns

regarding the frequent head injuries of the child referred him to the juvenile team of a local

police station that was nearby. An officer who was on duty at the time reviewed information

and at least one recording provided by Jurado and, after clarifying that his department did not

have any jurisdiction in the case, prompted Jurado to get law enforcement involved, as well as

children services given the seriousness of the situation.

62


V.J.7. OCTOBER 2013 - CHILD TAKEN TO EMERGENCY ROOM AFTER SUSTAINING MORE

SEVERE HEAD INJURY, FOLLOWED BY INVOLVEMENT OF CHILDREN PROTECTIVE

SERVICES, AND CULMINATED IN BROOKSEDGE’S PERMANENT DISMISSAL OF CHILD

AND FILING OF LAWSUIT AGAINST JURADO

171. On Monday October 7, 2013, only two days after Jurado had completed and sent his

attorney a write up of his recommendations for a new daycare provider, including detailed

documentation of the incidents that had been taking place at Brooksedge, Jurado was informed

that the child had just sustained another head injury. The new injury closely followed two

incidents that had occurred the previous week that also resulted in other injuries. As Jurado,

told his attorney by e-mail on that same day, he was even more alarm given the fact that

Jurado had never been called in the middle of the day for any of the previous injuries. He

would always find out at the end of the day when picking up the child. When he received the

call from Brooksedge, he was also told that the injury was more serious than all of his previous

ones. At the time and for most of the time between then and the present, Jurado did not have

any reason to not think the last injury was another random accident but with shorter

frequency. But after the recent finding set of secret e-mails among Defendants surfaced, there

is good indication that, knowing how Jurado was going to react, they induced the injuries the

child had suffered to frame Jurado.

172. On October 8, 2013, due to the child’s demeanor the previous evening, Jurado

decided that morning on his way to daycare drop off to instead take the child to the Emergency

Room. The ER doctor, who learned about the frequent injuries to the child from Jurado’s write

up to his attorney he had completed two day earlier, gave his medical recommendation for the

child to be evaluated, but Lambert refused to let the child be evaluated. The ER doctor then

63


recommended the involvement of a social worker. The two of them concluded that the

involvement of Children Services was needed.

V.J.8. OCTOBER 2013 – DEFENDANT BETHEL’S OVERT ACT IN FURTHERANCE OF THE

CONSPIRACY – UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH FRANKLIN COUNTY CHILDREN

SERVICES

173. The same day on October 8, 2013, shortly after the disclosure of the ER doctor and

social worker that a referral was being made to Children Services, Lambert contacted

Defendant Bethel as well as Brooksedge to warn them about an impending investigation.

Almost immediately, Defendant Bethel contacted the Children Services agency to interfere with

their investigation by corruptly exerting undue influence and to suggest that Jurado had

maliciously instigated the agency’s involvement. Bethel’s time log utilized for her itemized

billing serves as evidence of her unexpected contact with the agency. considering that GALs are

expected to contact the agency after an investigation has been completed. Also, the recording

from October 28, 2013 serves as evidence of Bethel’s interference.

V.J.9. OCTOBER 2013 – BROOKSEDGE PERMANENTLY DISMISSED THE CHILD FROM THE

FACILITY AND FILES LAWSUIT AGAINST JURADO AS SEEMING REACTION TO THE

TRIGGERING EVENTS OF THE EMERGENCY ROOM VISIT AND INVESTIGATION BY

CHILDREN SERVICES

174. Around October 9, 2013, Lambert announced that Plaintiff N.G. was no longer

allowed back at Brooksedge, and Defendants Bethel, Lambert, Brooksedge and LeClair created

the appearance that the trip to the ER and involvement of FCCS is what triggered the decision

to expel the child and file the lawsuit against Jurado, as e-mails from Bethel to Jurado and all

the parties in the case show, as well as Brooksedge complaint in the civil lawsuit. But the secret

64


e-mails from at least a month earlier between Bethel, LeClair and the other Defendants

clearly show the lawsuit was planned weeks before the last head injury and the visit to the

ER, establishing the premeditated infliction of the child’s injuries with the goal of framing

Jurado into taking the child to the Emergency Room and cause a downstream effect.

V.K. OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 2013 - OOAG AND OCRC JOINED THE LAWSUIT

SUB-SCHEME AND THE MASTER CONSPIRACY’S SUBSIDIARY PLAN FOR

CAUSING FINANCIAL HARM TO JURADO

V.K.1. LATE OCTOBER 2013 - OOAG INTIMIDATED JURADO TO CAUSE A CHILLING EFFECT

ON THE EXERCISE OF HIS FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS

175. On October 22, 2013, a state official from within the OOAG organization intimidated

Jurado over the phone, and installed fear in him to further advance the objectives of the

conspiracy. As Jurado tried to defend himself and show that he was not the offender and that

he had plenty of evidence to prove it, the state official cut him off as he said to Jurado “I don’t

want to hear of what you have to say” and made threats of criminal prosecution against Jurado

if he would continue to pursue the matters.

V.K.2. OCTOBER 2013 - OOAG’S DEPRIVED JURADO OF HIS CIVIL RIGHTS, COLLUDED WITH

OCRC, AND ENCOURAGED OCRC INVESTIGATORS SUCH AS DEFENDANT GARCIA TO

ENGAGE IN MISCONDUCT, AS OVERT ACTS IN FURTHERANCE OF THE CONSPIRACY

SUB-SCHEME OF THE LAWSUIT

176. Around mid-October 2013, Jurado started experiencing a degree of animosity from

Defendant Garcia as Garcia was getting ready to start his investigation of the discrimination

charges against Brooksedge. For the next several weeks, Garcia engaged in misconduct

including his attempts to access ADR confidential information that he was unauthorized to

65


access, among other acts, including Garcia’s e-mail messages to Jurado indicating that Jurado

was not welcomed in the Rhodes State Office Tower, and discouraged him from coming back

to the OCRC offices or to use the free service for notarization of complaints that OCRC offers to

any grievant.

V.K.3. OCTOBER-NOVEMBER - 2013 - JURADO REPORTED IRREGULARITIES WITH OCRC’S

HANDLING OF INVESTIGATION OF THE SAME NATURE EXPERIENCED WITH ODJFS

177. On October 24, 2013, Jurado contacted the office of constituent services at the

central offices of OCRC, and explained the irregularities he was experiencing, including

misconduct by Defendant Garcia.

178. On November 21, 2013, the office of constituent services acknowledged that Jurado

had been the target of misconduct. Unfortunately, that did not stop OCRC Defendants from

continuing to abuse and deprive Jurado of his constitutional rights.

V.K.4. NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2013 - EVIDENCE SURFACED OF OOAG INTERFERENCE WITH

STATE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES RESULTING IN DENIAL OF JURADO’S ACCESS TO

PUBLIC GOVERNMENT FACILITIES AND SERVICES, ADJUDICATION OF COMPLAINTS

BEFORE THEY WERE FILED, AND DETERMINATIONS OF PENDING CASES BEFORE

INVESTIGATIONS HAD STARTED

179. Around late-November, early-December 2013, Jurado discovered documents and e-

mail communications between Defendants Gutowski and Garcia showing their agreement to

decide the outcome of Jurado’s complaints in favor of Brooksedge before the investigation

started. It also shows their agreement to issue a No Probable Cause (NPC) for Jurado’s

retaliation claim before he even filed it.

66


V.K.5. NOVEMBER 2013 – MARCH 2014 – CONCERTED ACTION BY DEFENDANTS OOAG , GUTOWSKI, OCRC, DUNN, LECLAIR AND ALEXANDER-SAVINO CONTINUED TO HARM

JURADO AND FURTHERED THE GOALS OF THE CONSPIRACY

V.K.5(a) OOAG AND OCRC TOOK COURSE OF ACTION KNOWING THAT THE RESULT WOULD

FACILITATE AND EVEN REINFORCE RETALIATION EFFORTS BY BROOKSEDGE

180. At the point of the collusion between OCRC and OOAG to deprive Jurado of his right

to Due Process and Equal Protection, Defendants Gutowski and Garcia knew that Jurado’s

intentions to file a new charge of retaliation against Brooksedge was due to the lawsuit they

had filed against him. And they also knew the repercussions of a determination of NPC for both

charges of discrimination and retaliation: Their prejudging and predetermined decision to find

in favor of Brooksedge would strengthen the lawsuit, or even worse, it would help a frivolous

lawsuit survive a Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment.

V.K.5(b) DEFENDANT OCRC, IN CONNIVANCE WITH DEFENDANTS ALEXANDER-SAVINO AND

BROOKSEDGE, FABRICATED AN ADDITIONAL CHARGE WITH THE EEOC TO FRAME

JURADO FOR FILING FALSE CLAIMS

181. On December 27, 2013, Defendant Alexander-Savino filed the First Amended

Complaint on behalf of Brooksedge in their civil lawsuit against Jurado, in which he is accused of

making a “dual filing with the OCRC and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission” while

being aware that “he was never an applicant for employment with Brooksedge nor employed

by Brooksedge”. Brooksedge First Amended Complaint, Dec. 27, 2013 pages 7-8.

182. As soon as he read the allegations, Jurado made a number of inquiries until he found

that the origin of the allegation against him in regards to charges filed with EEOC was a set of

documents OCRC provided to Alexander-Savino that falsely indicated that Jurado had

67


submitted a dual charge with OCRC and EEOC. When Jurado confronted OCRC officials, they

claimed “it was just a mistake”. The set of documents and forms indicating that Jurado had

filed charges with the EEOC were signed by OCRC Director Aman Mehra.

183. Several indicators were identified that strongly support one inference over any other

possible inferences: (i) after the document with false information was identified; it took Jurado

multiple attempts to get OCRC to admit to the “error” in writing. Such serious mishap should

not require a grievant to invest significant efforts to seek out OCRC to remedy the harmful

conduct of the Columbus branch. Finally after Jurado escalated the challenges with the central

office, Investigator Beyan Asoba wrote an e-mail to Alexander-Savino explaining that the forms

indicating a charge with the EEOC were due to a “clerical error”. E-mail by Beyan Asoba, Jan. 8,

2014; (ii) the actual forms received by Alexander-Savino are only used for OCRC internal

purposes. Their first error of creating a charge with the EEOC that did not come from Jurado,

was compounded with the second error of sending out to a respondent forms that are only

used between OCRC and EEOC; (iii) Even after receiving official confirmation that the EEOC

charges were not filed by Jurado, Defendants Alexander-Savino, Brooksedge and LeClair have

insisted in maintaining their allegation against Jurado in the Complaint after 15 months since

their knowledge that he never filed a charge with the EEOC; (iv) the production of the set of

documents falsely indicating that Jurado had filed a charge with the EEOC was not an isolated

incident as already established throughout this complaint and supported by incontrovertible

evidence.

68


V.K.5(c) DEFENDANT DUNN WITHHELD KEY EVIDENCE DURING HEARING IN FRONT OF THE

COMMISSIONERS AND MADE MISLEADING STATEMENTS

184. On March 13, 2014, Plaintiff Jurado and Defendants Alexander-Savino and LeClair

made a personal appearance in front of the Commissioners for a last chance to address them

directly before the adjudication of their case. A personal appearance during the administrative

hearing in front of the Commissioners consist of 5 minutes given to each side to make a final

argument on their favor, but after the Commissioners hear the case as presented by the

assigned investigator or reconsideration supervisor, such as Defendant Dunn.

185. Defendant Dunn, performing in an impartial role when presenting a case, doesn’t get

a time limit imposed to his presentation of the case and of (his version) of the facts. In this

instance, Defendant Dunn performed instead as an advocate for Brooksedge, by merely

repeating verbatim the same conclusory allegations and defenses originally provided by

Brooksedge—as if the allegations had been substantiated as his own findings of fact—even

when Alexander-Savino and Brooksedge did not provide any evidence supporting those claims

and defenses. At the same time, Defendant Dunn withheld from the Commissioners key

evidence that had been provided by Jurado that substantiated his allegations of discrimination

and retaliation.

186. For example, Defendant Dunn had been in possession of many of the recordings

described in this complaint as evidence of the conspiracy, such as the statements made by the

Emergency Room doctors, the judgment entry from the court declaring the injuries sustained

by the child as “concerning”, and even LeClair’s statements confirming the misconduct aimed at

Jurado and unlawful acts by Bethel. In fact, Defendant Dunn knowingly used statements made

69


by Defendant Bethel against Jurado, even when he knew that LeClair had made allegations

against her and Jurado had also made allegations of discrimination against Bethel.

187. Defendant Dunn also made misleading statements to the Commissioners when he

referred to an email sent by Jurado to LeClair and manipulated the meaning and context of

Jurado’s comments in the letter, even when he knew of the exact meaning based on a

recording of Jurado and LeClair discussing the same topic early on. All the actions taken and

statements made by Dunn on March 13, 2014 were in furtherance of the conspiracy without a

doubt.

V.K.6. 2014-2015 - DEFENDANTS ALEXANDER-SAVINO, BROOKSEDGE AND LECLAIR

SWIFTLY REAPED THE RESULTS OBTAINED BY UNLAWFUL MEANS OF OCRC AND

OOAG DEFENDANTS TO KEEP THE LAWSUIT ALIVE FOR THE LONG-TERM PERVASIVE

HARM BEING INFLICTED TO JURADO IN FURTHERANCE OF THE CONSPIRACY

188. Defendants LeClair and Alexander-Savino were cognizant of the evidence withheld by

Dunn, his misleading statements and the interference and collusion between OOAG and OCRC

to alter the outcome of the investigation, and have deliberately used OCRC and OOAG’s

unlawful conduct to boost their lawsuit and inflict more harm upon Jurado and for longer,

including financial harm and the accumulation of debt by Jurado depriving him of any chance

for legal representation.

70


V.L. OCTOBER 2013 – CONSPIRACY SUB-SCHEME TO CAUSE FINANCIAL

HARM AND UNDUE HARDSHIP STARTED

V.L.1. OCTOBER 2013 - AFTER FOUR MONTHS OF UNEMPLOYMENT, JURADO SOUGHT

ECONOMIC RELIEF

V.L.1(a) JURADO SOUGHT RELIEF WITH THE JUVENILE COURT BY ASKING TO MODIFY HIS

CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION – NO ACTION TAKEN

189. In July 2013, Jurado’s contract for the project in Chicago reached its intended end

date, and Jurado became unemployed for the next several months. With the sharing of all the

child’s expenses by half with Lambert, the excessive child support monthly obligation of

$1,200.00, and the inflated cost of Litigation due to Bethel’s successful High-Conflict stratagem,

Jurado quickly started living under precarious conditions that required the assistance of family

and friends constantly and every month until the present time.

V.L.1(b) DEFENDANTS BETHEL, SMITHERMAN, PETROFF AND LAMBERT IMPOSED

MANDATORY DAYCARE ATTENDANCE FOR THE CHILD DURING THE TIME JURADO

WAS UNEMPLOYED AND ABLE TO CARE FOR THE CHILD

190. Between July 2013 and December 2013, even when Defendants were aware of

Jurado’s financial condition, they purposely created the additional burden for Jurado to have to

pay daycare tuition, during the time he was living off his credit cards and financial assistance

from his relatives and friends, and when he could have cared for the child and saved closed to

$800/month on daycare tuition and driving back and forth.

71


V.L.1(c) JURADO SOUGHT RELIEF WITH THE JUVENILE COURT BY ASKING TO MODIFY HIS

CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION – NO ACTION TAKEN

191. On October 2013, Jurado filed a Motion with the Juvenile Court to modify the

amount of child support he was paying, given that Lambert had been making close to 6 figures a

year, on top of bonuses and other perks. The Juvenile Court refused to hear Jurado’s motion

for many months. Finally in 2014, only after Jurado filed his Original Action in Mandamus and

Prohibition with the SCO, Judge Jamison addressed his Motion but ill-intentioned. Without

reasonable excuse of justification, Defendant Jamison dismissed Jurado’s motion and hearing

only a few minutes after it had gotten started on August 4, 2014.

V.L.2. OCTOBER 2013 - COMMUNICATED WITH DEFENDANT LAMBERT AND THE CHILD

SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (CSEA) TO OFFER A PLAN THAT INVOLVED ONLY

TWO MONTH OF PARTIAL PAYMENTS, FOLLOWED BY RESUMED PAYMENTS IN FULL IN

ADDITION TO BACK PAY

192. In late-October 2013, Jurado notified in writing Defendants Lambert her counsel that

he would not be able to pay his child support obligation in full for a short period of time.

Specifically, he indicated that he would be making partial payments for only the TWO months of

November and December 2013 and would resume the full payments in January 2014 along with

the payment of arrears.

V.L.3. OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 2013 - DEFENDANTS LAMBERT AND SMITHERMAN FILED

CONTEMPT SHOW CAUSE MOTION IN BAD FAITH

193. Defendants Lambert and Smitherman did not respond to Jurado’s communication

and instead filed a Motion for Contempt with the court asking “for Jurado to be punished”. No

other explanation besides bad faith and intimidation could explain their conduct especially

72


when Lambert received an $11,000 bonus around the same time, while Jurado struggled

financially, and especially because until that point, he always took financial responsibility for his

son seriously and never missed a payment. In fact, he voluntarily paid thousands of dollars

before the custody action was filed.

V.L.4. DECEMBER 2013-FEBRUARY 2015 - JURADO STARTED THE NOW TOO-COMMON

MONTHLY RECURRING EFFORTS TO RAISE FUNDS AMONG FAMILY AND FRIENDS TO

SUPPORT HIMSELF AND HIS SON

194. Starting in 2014, Jurado sought economic help from friends and family on a regular

basis, even when he had secured a full-time job. Because the hardship endured and debt

accumulated could not be reversed having still overinflated litigation costs, excessive child

support, and high monthly medical expenses as a direct result of the effects of the conspiracy

and their intentional infliction of emotional distress.

195. By mid-year in 2014, Jurado had successfully obtained charity contributions from one

of the catholic organizations in Central Ohio. Although it was a significant relief, Jurado had

officially turned into a beggar among acquaintances and relatives and friends.

V.L.5. OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 2013 - NEW DAYCARE SELECTION PROCESS EXPOSED

COLLUSION, PREMEDITATION, DECEIT AND ABSURD RESULTS

V.L.5(a) DEFENDANT BETHEL GAVE DAYCARE SELECTION INCENTIVE FOR BECOMING

ANTAGONISTIC AND ADVERSARIAL PROCESS

196. Defendants’ armament aimed at Plaintiff, such as persecuting Jurado with the threat

of Contempt, imposing on him unnecessary daycare tuition, enforcing excessive child support

obligations, imposing the extra financial burden of litigation due to the lawsuit, and causing

73


Jurado to incur in excessive attorney fees in the custody case due to Bethel’s free advocacy for

Lambert and her high conflict environment that forced Jurado’s attorney to over-engage, were

apparently not causing enough damage to Jurado based on their standards. As a result, during

the execution of the initial stages of Lawsuit sub-scheme, Defendants devised a new plot as a

functioning extension of Brooksedge premeditated dismissal of the child.

197. The new extension to Brooksedge-sponsored scheme consisted of the selection of

the new daycare facility for the child that met two requirements: (1) that it would be located as

far away as possible from Jurado’s residence to create additional time and financial burden on

him, (2) that the administrators of the daycare facility would be suitable candidates for

participating in the ongoing and ever expanding master conspiracy aimed at Jurado. The result

was the unilateral and forced election of Defendant Goddard School as the new facility. Their

specific location added the burden of driving 100 miles for Jurado during his parenting days.

198. Evidence of this extension plan to the Brooksedge scheme can be seen with the

conduct of Defendants Smitherman, Lambert and Bethel during the daycare selection process,

which was marred with dishonesty, concealment, and more unlawful acts in furtherance of the

conspiracy. Even more proof can be seen in the transcript of the hearing from December 20,

2013, during which the daycare selection process was discussed and Defendants Smitherman,

Bethel and Lambert gave perjured testimony when addressing the court as witnesses.

74


V.L.5(b) THE SHORT TIMEFRAME IMPOSED BY BETHEL FOR SUBMITTING RECOMMENDATIONS

AND THE ULTIMATE RESULT DEMONSTRATED GODDARD SCHOOL WAS CHOSEN

BEFORE BROOKSEDGE PERMANENT DISMISSAL OF THE CHILD

199. The existence of dozens of other daycare facilities equidistant from Lambert’s

residence and her recommendation of the farthest located facility from Jurado’s home after

barely one day of searching shows evidence that Goddard School of Hilliard had been selected

before the child was expelled by Brooksedge.

V.L.5(c) THE OUTCOME IS ABSURD IF IT RESULTS IN THE DETRIMENT OF THE BEST INTEREST OF

THE CHILD

200. Defendants Bethel and Lambert had created so much hype and emphasis on the

importance of consistency for the child. Yet, the disruption caused by the location of the new

facility interfered with the child’s sleeping routine and even dinner times. Defendants

acknowledged this fact during the December 20, 2013 hearing but at the same time were

indifferent to the negative consequences for the child.

V.M. OCTOBER 2013 - JURADO BEGAN INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION OF

SUSPECTED CONSPIRACY AND BEGAN TAKEN PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES

V.M.1. PROFESSIONALS CONSULTED BY JURADO SHARED CONCERNS OF COLLUSION BETWEEN

BETHEL AND PSYCHOLOGIST, STARTED TAKING PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES

201. Between May 2013 and January 2014, Jurado engaged two respected forensic

experts (psychologists) in preparation for what was anticipated to be the result of Dr.

Smalldon’s evaluation—when framed within his long established practice of employing racket

schemes with Defendant Bethel in custody cases—and given his participation in the conspiracy.

His collusion with Bethel, now confirmed by the recent uncovered email communications that

75


were kept in secret throughout the case, was so evident that one of the forensic experts

encouraged Jurado to undergo an independent evaluation, which Jurado completed when Dr.

Smalldon was still half way through his.

V.M.2. OTHER MEASURES TAKEN INCLUDED INCREASED USE OF RECORDER AND

INDEPENDENT VALIDATION OF ASSERTIONS AND CLAIMS MADE BY OTHERS

202. The common thread identified in the collusion among Defendants included Deceit,

Concealment and Fraud. As a result, a large amount of document and multi-media evidence

was amassed during the last two and a half years.

V.N. NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2013 - CONSPIRACY SUB-SCHEME TO FRAME

JURADO FOR NEGLECTING AND CAUSING CHILD INJURIES RESUMED

V.N.1. DECEMBER 2013 - LAMBERT’S JOINT ACTION WITH GODDARD SCHOOL DAYCARE

PERFECTLY TIMED – INCIDENT REPORT FALSIFIED WEEKS BEFORE START OF TRIAL

203. On December 10, 2013, within weeks of the start of the trial in the custody case,

Jurado discovered a falsified incident report that contained fabricated injuries that the child

allegedly showed when Jurado dropped him off one morning. Luckily, Jurado was scheduled to

pick up his son at the end of that same day, and successfully contested the fabricated injuries.

The daycare owner and assistant Director confirmed that the injuries noted were non-existent

and simply suggested it was an error.

204. On December 11, 2013, the daycare director Defendant Wilson explained to the

daycare owners, Mr. and Ms. Eagle, and to Jurado that the reason for the “wrong” information

to be written by the teachers is due to Lambert’s insistence that the report had to describe

those injuries and the teachers complied to appeased her. Defendant Wilson’s explanation and

76


her implication of Lambert in the falsified report was recorded by Jurado without Wilson’s

knowledge.

V.N.2. DECEMBER 2013 - CHILD’S SAFETY AT RISK WHEN DEFENDANTS COLLABORATIVE

ACTION SUCCEEDED IN COERCING JURADO TO DRIVE CHILD ACROSS FRANKLIN

COUNTY DURING SNOW STORM TO COMPLY WITH THEIR MANDATORY DAYCARE

ATTENDANCE

205. On December 6, 2013, Jurado was compelled to drive Plaintiff N.G. across town

through a snow storm in order to appease Bethel and Lambert given their ongoing harassment

aimed at enforcing the mandatory daycare attendance for the child. Given their pattern clearly

established of their fervor of keeping the child away from Jurado even on his parenting days,

their treatment of Jurado as a second-class citizen is constantly putting the well-being of the

child at risk. Using his phone as a mounted video camera, Jurado video recorded Plaintiffs’

hazardous commute back home at the end of the day during the storm. The video also includes

multiple snippets of newscasts broadcasted by stations from coast to coast announcing the

storm going through Central Ohio, and reminding residents to stay off the road unless

absolutely necessary.

77


V.O. DECEMBER 2013-JANUARY 2014 – BEGINNING OF NEW SUBSIDIARY

SCHEME TO COVER UP BETHEL’S UNLAWFUL CONDUCT AND TO

RETALIATE - JUDICIARY BRANCH DEFENDANTS ENTERED THE AGREEMENT

V.O.1. DECEMBER 2013 - FIRST COURT PROCEEDING PRESIDED BY DEFENDANT JUDGE

JAMISON – COMPLETELY DEVOID OF OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD, PRESENT EVIDENCE

AND WITNESSES;

206. The December 20, 2013 proceeding conducted by Jamison for the first time, is also

the first clear example of differential treatment of Jurado by Judge Jamison. Lambert had the

opportunity to be heard, and Bethel did also but twice, and for the convenience of Smitherman,

the court went into recess until the following year. As part of their scheme to commit fraud

upon the court, Bethel, Smitherman, Petroff and Lambert managed to preclude Jurado from

ever giving his testimony and present his evidence that most of the testimony provided by

Defendants Bethel and Lambert were perjured.

V.O.2. DECEMBER 2013-JANUARY 2014 - DEFENDANTS LAMBERT, BETHEL, SMITHERMAN

AND PETROFF ENTERED INTO AN AGREEMENT TO COMMIT FRAUD UPON THE COURT

AND COMBINED EFFORTS TO COMMIT OVERT ACTS RELATED TO THE TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING ORDER TO FORCE GODDARD SCHOOL OF HILLIARD AS THE SOLE OUT OF

HOME CARE PROVIDER IN FURTHERANCE OF THE CONSPIRACY

V.O.2(a) DECEMBER 2015 – EMERGENCY EX-PARTE PROCEEDING AND TRO ISSUED AS A

RESULT OF DECEIT

207. On December 13, 2013, Defendants Smitherman and Bethel filed an Emergency Ex-

Parte Motion for Restraining Order, initiated an Ex-Parte Court Proceeding without complying

with several rules of procedure.

78


V.O.2(b) DECEMBER 2013 – MISCONDUCT DURING EX-PARTE HEARING

208. On December 13, 2013, Smitherman and Bethel engaged in misconduct during the

ex-parte hearing: (1) Used irrelevant facts and information solely to prejudice Jurado, including

the lawsuit against Jurado instigated by themselves and was instituted as a sub-scheme to

target Jurado; (2) Misleading the Court about the whereabouts of Jurado’s Counsel, (3)

Withheld from the Court key information about the daycare selection process, (4) among other

acts in furtherance of the conspiracy

V.O.2(c) DECEMBER 2013 – MULTIPLE INSTANCES OF DECEPTIVE CONDUCT AND

FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATIONS DURING TRO FOLLOW UP PROCEEDING

209. the Transcript of the December 20, 2013 hearing shows several examples of

deceptive conduct and other concerted action by Smitherman, Lambert and Bethel

V.O.2(d) JANUARY 2014 - INTENTIONAL FILING OF UNAUTHORIZED CIV.R. 41(A)

VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL TO PREJUDICE JURADO AND COMMIT FRAUD UPON DE

COURT

210. On January 7, 2014, less than 24 hours before the court proceeding was scheduled to

start, the hearing that was continued to January 8 got dismissed without an agreement by all

parties or order of the court. Defendants filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, which contain

references to Ohio Civil Rule 41(A), to withdraw their Ex-Parte Motion for Restraining Order.

Their invalid and unlawful withdrawal was a joint act with malevolent intentions, such as

precluding Jurado from exposing their deceit, depriving him of his right to due process, causing

prejudice with the court

79


V.O.3. JANUARY 2014 - FILING OF GRIEVANCE AGAINST ATTORNEY BETHEL WITH OFFICE OF

DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL – OHIO SUPREME COURT

211. On January 6, 2014, Jurado filed a formal Grievance with ODC against the attorney-

GAL Blythe Bethel for misconduct, RACIAL BIAS, deceptive and unethical acts, fraud,

misrepresentations to the court, and other unlawful conduct. In addition to the standard

grievance form Jurado completed, he included a 10-page supplementary statement of fact

document, and 400+ pages of exhibits along with more than half-dozen audio/video recordings.

V.O.4. JANUARY 2014 - JURADO FORCED TO DISMISS HIS LAST ATTORNEY AMIDST

MOUNTING DEBT AND HIGH UNPAID BALANCE FOR ATTORNEY FEES, SUB-SCHEME

TO INFLICT FINANCIAL HARM AND UNDUE HARDSHIP SUCCESSFUL

V.O.4(a) JURADO IMMEDIATELY UNABLE TO KEEP UP WITH CASE SCHEDULE AND ORDERS

212.

V.O.4(b) JAN 2014 – JAN 2015 - JURADO FORCED TO CHOOSE BETWEEN PRESERVING HIS

RIGHTS TO APPEAL AND SEEK REDRESS OR STAY COMPLIANT WITH CASE

213.

80


V.O.5. JANUARY 2014 – 2ND COURT PROCEEDING PRESIDED BY JUDGE JAMISON –

EMERGENCY HEARING ON HEALTH AND SAFETY CONCERNS FOR THE CHILD, WITH

LIMITED OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD

V.O.5(a) DEFENDANT BETHEL MADE MISREPRESENTATIONS TO THE COURT

V.O.5(b) DEFENDANT JUDGE JAMISON DID NOT ALLOW JURADO TO PRESENT ALL CLAIMS IN

HIS EMERGENCY MOTION

V.O.6. DECEMBER 2013-MAY 2014 - DEFENDANTS BETHEL, LAMBERT AND SMITHERMAN

OVERWHELMED JURADO WITH MORE FILINGS FOR SANCTIONS, CONTEMPT AND

OTHER PUNISHMENT

214. By January 2014, Jurado had Motions for Contempt and two Motions for Sanctions

filed by Bethel, Smitherman and Lambert. They asked the Court “to punish” Jurado in several

ways, including but not limited to preclusion of evidence and witnesses during trial.

V.O.7. JANUARY 2014 - JURADO DUAL-ENROLLED CHILD IN SECOND CHILD CARE PROGRAM

WITH ULTIMATE AUTHORIZATION BY THE COURT

V.O.7(a) DEFENDANTS BETHEL, LAMBERT AND SMITHERMAN COLLUDED IN THE

HARASSMENT OF THE OWNER FOR DAYCARE FACILITY CHOSEN BY JURADO

V.O.8. MARCH 2014 - ODC SUMMARILY DISMISSED GRIEVANCE FILED BY JURADO AGAINST

BETHEL

215. On March 3, 2014, Defendants ODC and Stone issued a determination letter claiming

that they are not authorized to investigate Jurado’s complaints against Bethel, under the

pretext that she was acting as a Guardian Ad Litem. In their letter—which was also sent to

Bethel—they directed me to raise any issues, concerns or complaints with the Court that

appointed Bethel as GAL. Also, the determination letter gave no option for reconsideration.

81


V.O.9. MARCH 2014 - THIRD COURT PROCEEDING PRESIDED BY JAMISON – EVIDENCE THAT

JAMISON JOINED THE CONSPIRACY IN FULL

V.O.9(a) JUDGE JAMISON DECLARED JURADO AN ADVERSARY OF THE COURT

216.

V.O.9(b) JURADO UNSUCCESSFUL REQUESTS FOR COURT APPOINTED COUNSEL OR HYBRID-REPRESENTATION AS ALTERNATIVE

217.

V.O.9(c) MAGISTRATE ORDERED AFFIDAVITS WITH SUPPLEMENTATION BY EXHIBITS BE FILED

FOR THE ADJUDICATION OF ALL PENDING MATTERS

218.

V.O.10. APRIL 2014 - JURADO’S EARLY DISCLOSURE OF INTENT TO FILE ORIGINAL ACTION IN

MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION WITH OHIO SUPREME COURT

V.O.11. MARCH-MAY 2014 - JURADO SOUGHT EVALUATION BY PEDIATRIC SPECIALIST

WITHOUT DISCLOSING TO DEFENDANT BETHEL OR LAMBERT AS THE ONLY RECOURSE

LEFT

V.O.12. MAY 2014 - SMITHERMAN, BETHEL AND LAMBERT COLLUDED IN FILING FALSE

POLICE REPORT OVER LONG HOLIDAY WEEKEND TO INTERFERE WITH JURADO’S

PARENTING TIME

V.O.13. JULY 2014 - AFTER FOUR MONTHS, JURADO HAD FINALLY RAISED ENOUGH FUNDS

TO FILE HIS ORIGINAL ACTION IN MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION WITH THE OHIO

SUPREME COURT

219. On July 18, 2014, Jurado was able to file an Original Action for Writs of Mandamus

and Prohibition with the SCO, to compel ODC to perform their duty of investigating his

grievance against the GAL-Attorney; Jurado also named the Juvenile Court as a second

82


Respondent, given that they also had been refusing to investigate, address or even hear

Jurado’s Motion to Remove the GAL, in violation of court rules and state law.

V.O.13(a) NUMEROUS CAUSES OF ACTIONS IDENTIFIED IN COMPLAINT, SOME OF WHICH WERE

FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS.

220. In his original action in Mandamus and Prohibition, Jurado took the opportunity to

include a handful of constitutional claims resulting from the arbitrary and unreasonable

attitude assumed by the Juvenile Court and defendant Judge Jamison, which had been

increasing gradually as their adversarial tone became more overt in response to Jurado’s

intensified efforts to remove Bethel as the GAL in the case.

V.O.13(b) JURADO SOUGHT EMERGENCY STAY WITH THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

221. Concurrently with the filing of his complaint with the SCO, Jurado also sought a Stay

on an emergency basis; his motion remained pending for a few days and allowed Defendant

Judge Jamison to take a certain course of action, to undermine the effectiveness of Jurado’s

filings.

V.O.14. JULY-AUGUST 2014 - JUDGE JAMISON TOOK COURSE OF ACTION TO RENDER MOOT

EACH OF JURADO’S CLAIMS AND RELIEF SOUGHT WITH THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

BY MEANS OF DECEIT

V.O.14(a) JUDGE JAMISON FIRST SUA SPONTE ISSUED GENERAL STAY

222. On July 23, 2014, the Juvenile Court, on its own cognition ordered a general Stay in

the custody case, given that Jurado had file a Motion for Emergency Stay with the SCO the day

before, July 22, 2014. That measure by Judge Jamison rendered Jurado’s Motion for Stay moot

immediately.

83


V.O.14(b) WITHIN DAYS AFTER JURADO WITHDREW HIS EMERGENCY MOTION FOR STAY WITH

THE SCO, JAMISON LIFTED HER STAY

223. With the latest move by Judge Jamison, Jurado withdrew his Emergency Motion to

Stay the Juvenile Court proceedings. A few days later, Judge Jamison lifted her Stay knowing

that Jurado no longer had a pending Motion to Stay with the SCO. The initial Stay that went

into effect by order of Judge Jamison was a staged procedural maneuver to induce Jurado to

withdraw his Motion, which resulted in the resuming of Judge Jamison’s control over her case.

V.O.14(c) AUGUST 2014 - JUDGE JAMISON CONDUCTED PROCEEDING FOR MODIFICATION OF

CHILD SUPPORT WITHOUT INTENTION TO REACH THE MERITS OF JURADO’S MOTION

FOR RELIEF

224. On August 4, 2014, the Court conducted a hearing for Jurado’s Motion of

Modification of Child Support, during which misconduct by opposing counsel was allowed, and

the Judge summarily dismissed his Motion for allegedly not coming prepared to the hearing.

Most importantly, during the proceeding, he introduced 70+ pages of evidence, all of which

were given to the court and a 2nd set of copies were also given to opposing counsel /opposing

party.

V.O.14(d) AUGUST 2014 - JUDGE JAMISON CONDUCTED PROCEEDING FOR REMOVAL OF

BETHEL, AS APPOINTED-GAL, WITHOUT INTENTIONS TO COMPLETE HEARING.

225.

V.O.14(e) FIRST PART OF HEARING TO REMOVE BETHEL EXPOSED SIGNIFICANT MISCONDUCT; SECOND PART SET FOR CONTINUANCE TO AUGUST 27, 2014

226.

84


V.O.15. AUGUST 2014 - JUDICIAL TRANSGRESSIONS MORE OVERT AFTER THE FILING OF

ORIGINAL ACTION IN MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION AGAINST DEFENDANTS JUDGE

JAMISON AND ODC; CARTE BLANCHE GIVEN TO JUDGE JAMISON BY THE ODC-SCO

DEFENDANTS

227. Sometime in late-July 2014 or August 2014, after Jurado filed his Original Action in

Mandamus and Prohibition against Judge Jamison and ODC, with the underlying theme of

Bethel’s misconduct and unlawful discrimination, Defendants John Doe, Jane Doe III and

ODC/SCO gave Defendant Jamison Carte Blanche to use whatever means necessary to

“handle her Juvenile case”, to rein in Jurado in order to stop the embarrassment caused by a

Hispanic citizen, and to offer Bethel all of the Court’s protection against a Hispanic complainant.

V.O.15(a) AUGUST 2014 – CONCERTED ACTION BY DEFENDANTS LAMBERT, BETHEL AND

SMITHERMAN TO COLLUDE IN OPEN COURT AND ENGAGE IN WITNESS TAMPERING

IN FURTHERANCE OF THE CONSPIRACY; JUDGE JAMISON’S PARTICIPATION IN COVER

UP

228. On August 1, 2014, during the proceeding to hear Jurado’s Motion for the Removal of

Bethel from the case as GAL, Bethel and Smitherman engaged in concealed texting using their

phones with participation of Lambert while Bethel was in the witness stand, in what can be

characterized as beyond simple misconduct: Collusion and witness tampering in open court.

229. The irony of this incident is that the main goal of the court proceeding being

conducted—in which the unlawful acts were committed by Bethel, Smitherman and Lambert—

was to stop or to remedy the ongoing misconduct by Bethel and her allies.

230. Judge Jamison’s participation in covering up the unlawful acts by Smitherman, Bethel

and Lambert became obvious when Jurado brought up the incident to the attention of the

85


court. After a couple of questions by the court, Bethel admitted to using her phone but denied

having communications with Smitherman. Judge Jamison contained the controversy within the

context of Bethel’s witness credibility but refrained from making any further inquiries, as any

other tribunal would have done. Jurado has documented similar cases and on each one, the

Judge had made further inquiries, allowed the text messages to be discoverable or have

confiscated the phones involved in the acts of witness tampering and witness coaching.

Ironically, courtroom 65 has a signed at its entrance that warns about phone usage inside the

courtroom being unlawful and specifies that confiscation of the phone would result from the

disobedience of the rule. Additional evidence of Judge Jamison’s full and conscious

participation in the concealment of the Defendants’ unlawful acts in this instance include her

inaction for months at a time after Jurado file a motion to disqualify Smitherman, based on this

incident of witness tampering along with other incidents. The motion was supported by two

sworn affidavits of eyewitnesses that observed the conduct and acts of witness tampering on

August 1, 2014. When Judge Jamison finally allowed Jurado’s Motion to be heard, she

restricted his prosecution to the extent that he was unable to call Smitherman as witness, make

specific inquiries or even read aloud certain portions of the rules of professional conduct.

V.O.15(b) AUGUST 2014 - JUDGE JAMISON ENGAGED IN SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE AND

FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATIONS

231. Even when the transcript of the proceeding conducted on Aug. 4, 2014 (to hear

Jurado’s request to modify his child support obligation amount) shows that there was mention

of “the documents” that were given to the court, they were all “misplaced” after the hearing

and have never been found since. In her Entry filed a day or two later, the Judge claimed that

86


Jurado only presented the Court with one spreadsheet (as in one page) as evidence of his

income. Her Entry also contradicts other facts observed on the hearing transcript. Judge

Jamison then utilized the fraudulent entry as an exhibit for her Motion to Dismissed filed with

the SCO on August 8, 2014.

232. Several court employees, including the Judge’s bailiff who made two set of copies of

those documents during the short hearing, remembers the numerous documents and pages he

had to copy for the court and for opposing counsel while the court had taken a short recess.

Judge Jamison herself acknowledged in open court on January 2015 that her bailiff had made

copies of all the documents supporting Jurado’s income and expenses during the previous

proceeding to modify child support.

V.O.16. AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 2014 - ODC, SCO DEFENDANTS AND JUDGE JAMISON

ESCALATED THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE COVER UP & RETALIATION SUB-SCHEME

V.O.16(a) FIRST STEPS TO THE DISMISSAL OF THE ORIGINAL ACTION IN MANDAMUS AND

PROHIBITION AGAINST DEFENDANTS JUDGE JAMISON, ODC AND STONE

233. On August 8, 2014, the Juvenile Court filed a Motion to Dismiss, for the dismissal of

Jurado’s entire action filed with the SCO. The respondent, the Juvenile Court and Judge

Jamison, included as an exhibit the Entry issued previous week containing the judgment related

to the hearing for modification of Child Support. As established in the previous paragraphs, the

Entry was defective and contained misrepresentations. And as such, it is difficult not to suspect

the purposeful intent to create prejudice.

234. On August 12, 2014, Defendant ODC filed a Motion to Dismiss, for the dismissal of

Jurado’s action in Mandamus and Prohibition, asserting that:

87


a. Jurado does not have a right to petition a Writ of Mandamus against them, and

b. They don’t have a duty to investigate Jurado’s grievance against attorney-GAL

Bethel

c. "the Rules do not mandate or define the scope, breadth, or form of an

investigation conducted by ODC”

d. “The Rules do not require ODC to share the details of an investigation with the

grievant”.

e. Jurado had an available remedy at law which was an existing procedure for

addressing concerns and complaints about GALs with the Juvenile Court, per

Local Court rules.

f. If the Juvenile Court would identify any unethical acts or misconduct, they had

the duty to report the violations to ODC—implying that only then, they would

investigate Jurado’s complaints of misconduct and discrimination (RACIAL BIAS).

V.O.16(b) NEW ALLEGATIONS OF JUDICIAL TRANSGRESSIONS AND IMPROPRIETIES FILED IN THE

ORIGINAL ACTION IN THE OHIO SUPREME COURT

235. On August 25, 2014, Jurado filed a miscellaneous motion with the SCO that included

additional claims of improprieties and possible retaliation by Judge Jamison, as it was evident in

her Motion to Dismiss filed on August 8, 2014, which leveraged the Court Entry from the August

4, 2014 hearing that was marred with inconsistencies, inaccuracies and prejudicial remarks and

statements.

88


V.O.16(c) AUGUST 27 HEARING NOT CONDUCTED BY INSTRUCTIONS OF ODC, SCO

DEFENDANTS, PRETEXT TO SET CONTINUANCE TO SEPTEMBER 24, 2014 – A STRATEGIC DATE

236. On August 27, 2014, John Doe Instructed Defendant the Juvenile Court to Not

Conduct the 2nd Part of Hearing Scheduled for that afternoon to Remove GAL Bethel, and

Instead to set a second Continuance for 9/24/14, the day SCO would rule on Jurado’s Original

Action in Mandamus and Prohibition against Judge Jamison.

237. Covert meeting conducted between Defendants ODC–SCO, John Doe and Jamison to

elaborate on their Scheme for execution on Sept 24, 2014—which they anticipated with

certainty that it would be the date when Jurado’s Original Action would be dismissed by the

SCO.

238. Evidence of the covert meeting includes the continuance form issued by the Court

that indicated the reason for the hearing not being held on that day, Aug. 27, 2014. The form

specified that because of an ongoing trial proceeding being held by Judge Jamison would take

precedence over Jurado’s hearing to remove Bethel. However, no trial took place on August

27, 2014 after 1pm, which is when the hearing was scheduled and when the continuance was

issued. In fact, Judge Jamison courtroom was empty that afternoon, given that she had left the

courthouse building sometime after 1pm.

239. Other evidence of their agreement among these co-conspirators is the fact that the

SCO did dismiss Jurado’s Action the morning of September 24, 2014 and Judge Jamison

engaged in conduct and decisions that afternoon that she had never done before, such as

89


summoning Jurado to a backroom away from recording devices to prevent any type of

transcript of proceedings from being available.

V.O.17. BROOKSEDGE LAWSUIT CONTINUED IMPOSING UNDUE BURDEN AND HARDSHIP ON

JURADO

240. Discovery and production of documents became time consuming and attorney fee’s

accumulate into high balance of debt.

V.P. SEPTEMBER 2014 - RETALIATION SOARED AS DIRECT RESULT OF THE

REVEALING OF JURADO’S INTENTION TO SEEK FEDERAL RELIEF, AND THE

DISMISSAL OF ORIGINAL ACTION IN MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION BY

SCO AS REINFORCEMENT OF THE CARTE BLANCHE GIVEN TO DEFENDANT

JUDGE JAMISON

V.P.1. SEPTEMBER 24, 2014 – KEY DATE: SCO DISMISSED JURADO’S ORIGINAL ACTION

241. Consistent with the instructions Judge Jamison received on August 27, 2014 from

Defendants John Doe, Jane Doe III and ODC–SCO, Jurado’s Original Action in Mandamus and

Prohibition against Judge Jamison was dismissed by the Higher Court just in time for the

proceeding scheduled for that same day in the afternoon to conclude the hearing on Jurado’s

Motion to Remove Bethel.

242. The timing of the dismissal of Jurado’s case in the Ohio Supreme Court was

reinforcement of the Carte Blanche given to Defendant Jamison back in July 2014 and of the

Plan conceived on August 27, 2014. Such reinforcement gave Judge Jamison confidence to

continue with the overt abuses of authority and of Jurado’s Civil and Constitutional Rights

90


during the two proceedings held that afternoon of September 24, 2014, and to continue the

ever-increasing unlawful acts against Jurado since then through the present day.

V.P.2. SEPTEMBER 24, 2014 – JUDGE JAMISON UNLAWFULLY CONDUCTED PROCEEDING IN

CHAMBERS WITHOUT RECORDING

243. In the afternoon of September 24, 2014, as the scheduled hearing was about to start

to resume the proceedings to Remove Bethel as GAL, Judge Jamison summoned Plaintiff Jurado

(along with her co-conspirators Smitherman and Bethel) into a back room away from the court

room and without any option to record the proceeding, in order to further deprive Plaintiff of

his rights without leaving any evidence of the abuses or ability to produce a transcript.

V.P.3. SEPTEMBER 24, 2014 – JUDGE JAMISON RETALIATED AGAINST JURADO BY

CONDUCTING IMPROMPTU CONTEMPT HEARING TO GUARANTEE HIS UNLAWFUL

INCARCERATION

244. After the conclusion of the unrecorded proceeding in Chambers, Judge Jamison

proceeding to hold an impromptu hearing of Contempt, consistent with her threats against

Jurado while in Chambers. Defendant Jamison’s Claim in her Motion to Dismiss filed with the

SCO in August 2014 that the contempt hearing “had been vacated” and thus was “a moot

issue” is an important consideration because the so-called vacated action was re-instituted

only hours after the dismissal of Jurado’s case by the SCO, all consistent with the plot devised

on August 27, 2014, among co-conspirators.

91


V.P.4. NOVEMBER 20, 2014 – JUDGE JAMISON WILLFULLY DEPRIVED JURADO OF HIS

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS AND ORDERED

HIS IMMEDIATE UNLAWFUL INCARCERATION

245. A few minutes after the hearing had started, Jurado was instantly taken from the

court room to an adjacent area by deputy sheriffs, stripped off his personal belongings,

searched and padded, handcuffed for the first time in his 44 years of life, and locked in a

holding cell with other inmates in uniform.

V.Q. DECEMBER 2014 – MCCASH AS DEFENDANT JAMISON’S ENFORCER AND

THE CONSPIRACY’S CATALYTIC AGENT

V.Q.1. DECEMBER 2014 – DEFENDANT MCCASH HARASSED DAYCARE UTILIZED BY JURADO

AND QUICKLY ACHIEVED THE NEXT OBJECTIVE OF THE CONSPIRACY: PLAINTIFF N.G. EXPELLED PERMANENTLY

246. In furtherance of the scheme that had started the year before by Bethel, Lambert,

Smitherman and Petroff of keeping the child in a daycare that (1) would be willing to participate

in the conspiracy, and (2) that would be located as far as possible from Jurado to further cause

undue burden, McCash became hostile and initiated an e-mail altercation with the owner of the

daycare utilized by Jurado. That combined with other actions by Defendant Lambert, the

daycare immediately severed the agreement with Jurado and permanently dismissed the child

from the facility. The owner had been complaining about harassment from Lambert for the

past 11 months, and McCash expected that outcome.

247. After the incident, McCash intensely pursued the mandatory attendance of the child

in the Goddard School of Hilliard 5 days a week even on Jurado’s parenting days, and while

knowing that Jurado was able to care for the child, that Jurado was unable to pay for daycare at

92


that point, and while knowing that such long drive was in the detriment of the best interest of

the child because of the interference with his habitual schedule.

V.Q.2. DECEMBER 2014 – DEFENDANT MCCASH CONSPIRED WITH LAMBERT, SMITHERMAN

AND JUDGE JAMISON TO TORMENT, INTIMIDATE AND CAUSE PANIC AT JURADO’S

HOME, WITH JAMISON’S GUIDANCE AND STEP-BY-STEP PARTICIPATION BY PHONE

248. On December 5, 2014, McCash, in close coordination with Lambert, Smitherman and

Judge Jamison, intruded in Jurado’s life and home to cause panic, torment, and intimidate

Jurado and his family during the incursion into their home. The ultimate goal of their

conspiratorial incursion was to corruptly influence Jurado and his family as witnesses in the

upcoming civil rights action by causing fear and intimidation, and to discourage Plaintiff Jurado

from the pursuit of instituting this action in Federal Court, as he had given notice to them

multiple times. The multiple hostile unannounced visits and intimidating presence of McCash

inflicted substantial mental distress upon Jurado, on the 2 ½ year old Plaintiff N.G., and upon

N.G.’s elderly grandparents, who took turns to call 911, given the alarming nature of the

situation.

93


V.Q.3. DECEMBER 2014 – COURT PROCEEDING AS A CONDUIT TO COVER UP, AND FOR

CARRYING OUT THE NEXT PHASE OF THE SCHEME

V.Q.3(a) COURT PROCEEDING TO BURY THE CONSPIRATORIAL ATTACK AGAINST OWNER OF

DAYCARE UTILIZED BY JURADO

V.Q.3(b) COURT PROCEEDING TO CONCEAL AND PERPETUATE THE INCURSION INTO

JURADO’S HOME AND INTRUSION IN HIS LIFE AND PARENTING TIME

V.Q.3(c) COURT PROCEEDING TO CARRY OUT THE START OF THE NEXT PHASE OF THE

CONSPIRACY FOR THE SEVERANCE OF JURADO’S BONDING AND RELATIONSHIP WITH

HIS SON AND THE LONG-TERM ALIENATION OF JURADO FROM PLAINTIFF N.G.

249. The Court Proceeding conducted on December 18, 2014 served as a platform for

Defendants to carry out multiple acts in furtherance of the conspiracy as the transcript of the

proceeding shows. For details of the allegations, refer to section VII.J.5 below.

V.R. DECEMBER 2014 –MARCH 2015 - DEFENDANTS GODDARD SCHOOL, GRETCHEN WILSON, KIMBERLY EAGLE ESCALATED THEIR PARTICIPATION

WITH SMITHERMAN, LAMBERT AND MCCASH IN MULTIPLE OVERT ACTS

IN FURTHERANCE OF THE CONSPIRACY

V.R.1. DECEMBER 2014 –JANUARY 2015 - DEFENDANTS GODDARD SCHOOL AND

GRETCHEN WILSON SECOND OVERT ACT TO INTERFERE WITH PLAINTIFFS RIGHTS –

INTERFERED WITH COURT INVESTIGATION AND MADE FRAUDULENT

MISREPRESENTATIONS TO COURT OFFICER

250. For details of these allegations, refer to section VII.F.4below.

V.R.2. JANUARY 2015 - DEFENDANTS GODDARD SCHOOL’S AND GRETCHEN WILSON’S

THIRD OVERT ACT IN FURTHERANCE OF THE CONSPIRACY – MULTIPLE INSTANCES OF

PERJURED TESTIMONY AS LAMBERT WITNESS DURING FIRST PART OF TRIAL

251. For details of these allegations, refer to section VII.F.4(c)below

94


V.R.3. FEBRUARY-MARCH 2015 - DEFENDANTS GODDARD SCHOOL’S AND GRETCHEN

WILSON ATTEMPTED TO FRAME JURADO BY ATTEMPTING AGAINST THE CHILD’S LIFE

AND SAFETY; INSTILLED FEAR IN JURADO

252. For details of these allegations, refer to section VII.F.4(f)below

V.R.4. DEFENDANTS GODDARD SCHOOL’S AND GRETCHEN WILSON’S MOST RECENT OVERT

ACT IN FURTHERANCE OF THE CONSPIRACY – UNPROVOKED DENIAL OF ACCESS TO

FACILITY BY INTIMIDATION WITH UNPROVOKED VERBAL ABUSE, HUMILIATION AND

EXPOSURE OF CHILD TO THOSE ATTACKS, RESULTING IN OBVIOUS EMOTIONAL

DISTRESS TO THE CHILD

253. For details of these allegations, refer to sections VII.F.4(d), VII.F.4(e), and VII.F.4(g)

below.

V.S. MARCH 2015 - JUVENILE COURT’S REINFORCEMENT OF MALEVOLENT

CONSPIRATORIAL CONDUCT BY GODDARD SCHOOL DEFENDANTS AND

OTHER COLOR OF LAW ABUSES

V.S.1. MARCH 2015 –DEFENDANTS MCCASH AND JUDGE JAMISON ACTED UNDER THE

COLOR OF LAW TO COVER UP WILLFUL ACTS OF CHILD ENDANGERMENT BY

PERPETRATORS THE GODDARD SCHOOL, EAGLE AND WILSON IN CLOSE

COORDINATION WITH CO-CONSPIRATORS LAMBERT AND SMITHERMAN—AS OVERT

ACTS TO REACH THE GOALS OF THE CONSPIRACY

254. The March 17, 2015 Hearing served as Conduit for Defendants McCash and Judge

Jamison to Overtly Cover Up Acts of Child Endangerment by Defendants the Goddard School,

Eagle and Wilson in Close Coordination with Co-Conspirators Lambert and Smitherman;

95


V.S.2. MARCH 2015 – DEFENDANT JUDGE JAMISON ABUSED HER AUTHORITY WITHOUT

RESTRAIN WHEN PROTECTING DEFENDANTS THE GODDARD SCHOOL AND EAGLE; JUDICIAL TRANSGRESSIONS INCLUDED COACHING THE WITNESS DURING DIRECT AND

CROSS EXAMINATION AND UNLAWFUL PRECLUSION OF INDISPENSABLE MATERIAL

EVIDENCE

V.S.3. DEFENDANT JUDGE JAMISON WILLFULLY DEPRIVED AND CONSPIRED TO DEPRIVE

PLAINTIFFS’ FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS; OFFICIAL RATIFICATION OF

INCREASED ALIENATION OF PARENT AND CHILD THAT HAD BEEN INTENSELY PURSUED

BY DEFENDANTS LAMBERT, SMITHERMAN, GODDARD SCHOOL, WILSON, EAGLE AND

MCCASH;

255.

V.S.4. JAMISON’S ULTIMATE OVERT ACT IN FURTHERANCE OF THE CONSPIRACY’S

SUBSIDIARY PLOT THAT STARTED OVER 2 YEARS AGO TO DEPRIVE JURADO OF EQUAL

PROTECTION [OF THE LAW] IN RESPECT TO ACCESSING THE DAYCARE FACILITIES TO

VISIT HIS SON

256. Judge Jamison latest judgment entry depriving Jurado of his right to use the Open

Door policy and restricting his access and visits to his son to 1 hour a week establishes a pattern

and consistent theme throughout the life of the conspiracy to discriminate and denied Jurado

access to daycare facilities and to his son.

VI. SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS – INTENTIONAL UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION

VI.A. FIRST SIGNS OF UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION BY DEFENDANT

BROOKSEDGE

257. Between November 2012 and January 2013, Defendant Brooksedge engaged in a

practice that other daycares similarly situated would not have. It allowed Jurado’s name to be

96


removed from initial enrollment documents and the administration proceeded to deny him

access to the facility to see or visit his child in violation of ORC 5104.039(A). Brooksedge

deliberately failed to comply with the law for the only reason of causing detriment to Jurado on

account of his ethnicity and skin color, and favoring the wishes of Lambert, who is a white-

American female, like everyone that was working at Brooksedge at the time, including the

owner LeClair and the Co-Director. After two years since this incident, there has been no

plausible explanation given by Defendants to prove otherwise. Brooksedge and LeClair first

denied the incident, then admitted to the denial of access under the pretext that Lambert was

the custodial parent and thus had the right to mandate the restriction, and then they blamed

their “licensing agent” from Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (ODJFS) who allegedly

gave Brooksedge orders to deny Jurado the access. Between February 2013 and June 2013

there were other minor incidents that would have been considered subtle, except for the

failure to report suspected abuse or neglect in one or two occasions, and the constant

monitoring of Jurado to report details of his visits back to Lambert.

VI.B. RACISM BY GUARDIANS AD LITEM A REAL PROBLEM IN OHIO AND

FRANKLIN COUNTY

258. The racially/ethic-motivated misconduct experienced by Jurado with Bethel is not

only plausible, but highly probable, not only because of the irrefutable evidence and material

facts of this case, but because it is a frequent occurrence experienced by many African

American and Hispanic famillies. This is not to say that all Guardians Ad Litem (GAL) are biased

or mischievous. There are excellent GALs that perform their duties with integrity. But it only

takes a few to bring the system in disarray and cause harm to the vulnerable populations and to

97


the reputation of those GALs that are honest and hardworking and truly care about the

children.

259. It is also true that in every contested custody case, there is a winner and a loser, and

some losers will become disgruntled parents that will lodge complaints against GALs. Clearly,

this is not one of those cases, as Jurado started raising his concerns since early on during the

pendency of the case, as demonstrated throughout this complaint.

VI.B.1. LEGAL SCHOLAR’S VIEW OF RACIAL BIAS IN GAL PROGRAM

260. In the summer of 2013 and sometime after the events of July 8, 2013, Jurado learned

that the challenges he was enduring as a result of Bethel’s misconduct were not unheard of or

uncommon. At the time, he came across a treatise titled The Curious Case of the Guardian Ad

Litem co-authored by Professor Katherine H. Federle, Professor of Law and Program Director at

Moritz College of Law of the Ohio State University. In her writing, she exposes the phenomena

experienced with GALs and the current system that allows conflict between race, class and the

best interest standards.

Attorneys are not prepared either by legal training or experience to determine what will be best for any particular child. It should not be surprising that guardians ad litem may resort to “self-referential, unprincipled determinations about what is the best course for the child and the weight of risks and benefits attendant to any course of action.” This leaves considerable room for [racial] bias—personal and social, conscious and unconscious. * * * Because guardians ad litem are predominately white and middle class, what they know and value * * * is neither accessible to everyone nor necessarily the optimal way to rear children.

98


Indeterminacy is particularly disturbing in a system that historically has disadvantaged poor and minority families. As part of the machinery for administering the child welfare system, the juvenile court disproportionately facilitates the removal of poor and minority children from their families.

* * * [Guardians] exert extraordinary power over the direction of the case. [Racial] Bias may also lead guardians to assume a more adversarial posture with respect to parents.

(Emphasis Added.) Katherine Hunt Federle & Danielle Gadomski, The Curious Case of the

Guardian Ad Litem, University of Dayton Law Review (Vol. 36:3, 2011); Exhibit AC1-D1, pages [ ]

of the Consolidated Appendix of Exhibits.

VI.B.2. PRO SE COMPLAINANTS SEEKING HELP IN DEALING WITH GAL ISSUES ALMOST AN

EVERY-DAY OCCURRENCE AT CAPITAL UNIVERSITY-SPONSORED SELF REPRESENTED

RESOURCE CENTER IN FRANKLIN COUNTY COMMON PLEAS COURT BUILDING

261. Anyone that sits for three hours on any given day (Mon-Thu) at the Capital University

Law School-Sponsored Self Represented Resource Center, located within the courthouse

building for the Franklin County Common Pleas Court, Division of Domestic Relations and

Juvenile Branch, will likely get a first-row view of one or more parents, most likely African

American or Hispanic, asking for procedural help with the removal of their appointed Guardian

Ad Litem; many of them visibly overwhelmed with frustration and helplessness as they describe

very similar experiences: “the judge does not even want to hear about it”, followed by

depictions of incidents and conduct that share the same common denominator: hostility and

bias. After witnessing several of those parents while using the Center, Jurado asked the staff

how often they hear these complaints about GALs, and the answer was a markedly “all the

time”.

99


VI.C. DEFENDANT BETHEL’S CONSCIOUS RACIAL-ETHNIC BIAS

262. The first five months of litigation in juvenile court were like any other ordinary

custody case with its share of conflict but still below average as compared to many other

custody cases. Despite their disagreements and problems, both parents generally maintained

varying degrees of cooperation and communication while exercising equal parenting rights that

had been granted by The Juvenile Court during the very first hearing in the case (shared

parenting is still in effect as of the filing of this case).

263. The unresolved disagreement between the parents regarding health-related concerns

about the child prompted the magistrate—that at the time presided over the case—to appoint

Defendant Bethel as the GAL for the infant child on or around March 15, 2013.

264. A few weeks into her appointment, Defendant Bethel’s prejudice and passionate

advocacy for Lambert became obvious as she purposely sparked discord between the parents

and even between the parties’ counsel, while instituting any possible option to interfere with

Jurado’s parenting time and his constitutional rights. It was not long before the entire case and

Plaintiffs lives started taking a toll due to the Bethel’s covert aggression and harmful

misconduct, which was driven by racism. In less than three months after her appointment,

Defendant Bethel had turned the custody dispute into a high conflict case, now to a point of no

return.

100


VI.C.1. NORMALCY AND IMPARTIALITY BEFORE LEARNING THE COLOR AND NATIONAL ORIGIN

OF THE PARENTS; FIRST NEUTRAL RECOMMENDATIONS

265. The mother of the child (“Lambert”) has always tried to restrict, limit and control

Plaintiff Jurado time with his son, including the time that their son is at daycare. In fact, the

restrictions started long before the custody case was filed or the first GAL was appointed. For

example, on their son’s very first day at daycare on 9/24/2012, Lambert tried to control for how

long Jurado could stay in his first tour of the facility. The deterioration of their relationship

motivated Lambert, due to her vindictive nature, to further limit and control Jurado’s time and

relationship with his son as reprisal.

266. Soon after being appointed as GAL to the case, Defendant Bethel learned all the facts

of the case through counsel from both sides. Almost immediately, and using her extensive 20+

years of experience, she gave the following objective recommendations and opinions in the

case of “Hernandez vs Jurado”—two seeming Hispanic parents:

a. The issue of Lambert intruding in Jurado's parenting time due to her alleged

breast milk production limitations should be resolved with formula

supplementation.

b. The idea of Mom that the infant child is better off spending time at daycare than

with Jurado for maintaining a routine or consistency or whatever other reason

“is non-sense”.

c. This is a case of 50/50 parenting schedule and shared parenting for allocation of

rights and responsibilities (decision making).

101


267. A day or two later, the GAL met for the first time with each parent and separately:

The initial interview with Jurado, during which the GAL was still consistent with her initial

recommendations was positive and in a friendly atmosphere. During that initial interview, the

GAL learned about new facts, and was reminded about Jurado’s main concern: The health of

the infant and his current pediatrician. Some of the facts and supporting evidence shared with

the GAL, Defendant Bethel, included:

a. Pictures of the infant child: The GAL was surprised and even alarmed to see the

infant child’s thin, bony and “wasting” appearance.

b. Concerns that the child showed signs of hunger after feeding, whether via

bottled breast milk or direct nursing. The GAL agreed with Jurado that perhaps it

was best to start supplementing with formula.

c. Past history of stalking by Mom, as she reviewed phone longs and text messages

initiated by Mom that were excessive and irrational over short periods of time.

d. Instances in which Mom had put the baby’s life in danger, or had dismissed

common sense judgment driven by her antagonism and desire to contradict

Jurado during prenatal, neonatal period, and when the child was an older infant.

e. The period of time in which Mom discontinued providing pumped breast milk

bottles to Jurado, while continuing to provide the same to the daycare facility, all

to justify her intrusion during Jurado’s bonding time with the child; and during

102


which she also imposed very limited and “supervised” parenting time, all in

retribution as soon as their relationship deteriorated.

f. The continued efforts by Mom to intrude in Jurado’s parenting time with his son,

even after the Court had granted him with a gradually-increasing parenting

schedule without restrictions/unsupervised and overnights, which started with

limited hours each week. At that point, the GAL had found reasonable those

attempts by Jurado to limit the number of disruptions or bottle drop offs that

Mom would make at Jurado’s place during his limited parenting/bonding time

with his son—especially considering the concerns with the infant’s weight gain,

Mom’s difficulties with breast-milk production, Jurado and GAL’s opinion that

the child needed nutritional supplementation or formula, and the fact that

Jurado only had about 15% a week of parenting time at that point in time.

g. Despite his significant and valid concerns, Jurado still believed in Shared

Parenting and felt strongly that their child needed both Mom and Jurado equally;

But his concerns still needed attention.

VI.C.2. DRASTIC REVERSAL OF OPINIONS WHEN LEARNED THAT “HERNANDEZ V. JURADO”

WAS NOT A DISPUTE BETWEEN TWO HISPANIC PARENTS – MOTHER-FATHER

EQUALITY PROVISION UNDER ORC 3109.042(A) IS ONLY APPLICABLE BETWEEN

PARENTS OF SAME RACE, COLOR AND ETHNICITY

268. One or two days later, Defendant Bethel met with Lambert for the first time and—

exactly within minutes after the initial interview with her ended—abruptly changed all previous

recommendations and became adversarial towards Jurado without any reasonable explanation

103


or justification. The only possible inference is that Defendant Bethel had learned who the

parties really were: Jurado is a Hispanic parent, of Panamanian national origin, with dark skin

and pronounced spoken accent and Defendant Lambert is a Caucasian, White-American mother

without any Hispanic/Latino heritage (Hernandez is her previous husband's last name).

a. Regarding the intrusion in Jurado's parenting time, the GAL suddenly dictated

that Jurado is to allow Mom as many bottle drop offs as she desired and Jurado

should “just deal with it”. The GAL contradicted her previous position about

using baby formula and intrusion with Jurado-son bonding time, while ignoring

all obvious signs that the infant child needed nutritional supplementation and

that the limited amount of breast milk Mom was able to produce was not

enough, given all the signs that the infant was still hungry after feedings and

other symptoms. Also, the GAL’s newly-adopted posture disregarded Jurado’s

efforts to be flexible and accommodate the nursing and feeding needs of Mom

and infant. As important is the fact that both Mom’s and GAL’s posture was

against the recommendation given in the Parenting Guide published by The

Supreme Court of Ohio. For example, knowing that Mom would make bottle

drop-offs as often as she pleased, Jurado was unable to make any plans, leave

the house, or take the child anywhere—effectively confining him at his home as

if under house arrest.

b. The 50/50 parenting schedule recommendation by the GAL was not retracted at

that point because it would have been too obvious. Instead, the GAL began to

104


downplay her own recommendation of the 50/50 schedule by rationalizing that

she couldn’t order anyone to do anything. That the only ones that could make

that happen wear a black robe, referring to the magistrate and/or judge, and

that Mom simply is not ready for such schedule.

c. The GAL started putting substantial pressure to enforce her new

recommendation for the infant son to spend each weekday at daycare (at least

for 7 hours a day), even if Jurado was available to stay home with the child and

even if it was against the current court order. Her recommendation—all in

support of mom’s wishes— produced absurd results, and was against reason,

common sense and contradicting substantive evidence (see next subsection

below).

VI.C.3. ALIGNED WITH LAMBERT’S GOALS THAT PRODUCED ABSURD RESULTS, AGAINST

REASON AND AVAILABLE EVIDENCE AS SIGN OF INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION AND

CONSPIRACY – MANDATORY & STRICT DAYCARE ATTENDANCE & FORCED

CONFINEMENT OF THE INFANT CHILD

269. The newly stated recommendation from the GAL as of April 2013 that the child

should stay in daycare instead of with his father, in defiance of the Court Order in place, was

first rationalized by her alleged concerns that the child’s nap routine should not be disturbed.

270. Another aggravating factor is that the GAL was aware of Jurado’s intense and

constant travel that his job demanded and that his time in Columbus was limited. Still, the GAL

referred to Jurado’s attempts to see his son during weekdays as much as he could as “Parenting

and convenience do not always go hand in hand”.

105


271. Bethel then used the high-conflict nature of the case, which she had sparked herself,

as a new rationale for imposing mandatory daycare attendance, after Jurado provided

documentation proving that the nap routine and child schedule was not really an issue.

VI.C.4. DIRECT EVIDENCE OF RACIALLY-MOTIVATED, ETHNIC-DRIVEN HOSTILITY: BETHEL’S RACIALLY CHARGED AND DEROGATORY LANGUAGE

272. July 8, 2013 was a day that marked the most important turning point of the case. The

first half of the day was spent at the courthouse by all the parties, attorneys and GAL. On this

date, the collusion between Defendants Lambert, Bethel, Smitherman, LeClair, Brooksedge and

Petroff escalated and reached new levels. They collectively misled the Juvenile Court and made

misrepresentations to Magistrate Matthews (see section below) in regards to the frequency

of Jurado’s visits to see his son at Brooksedge and his interactions with the staff, which resulted

in complaints filed in multiple state agencies against the daycare provider. On this date, Dr.

Smalldon—who had been recommended by Bethel—was appointed by the court to perform

psychological evaluations over Jurado’s objections, which resulted in Jurado’s dismissal of his

attorney right outside the courtroom. It was also the day that Jurado heard the ethnic slur

verbalized by Defendant Bethel.

273. Earlier that day while at the courthouse, Jurado was engaged in a conversation with

his attorneys, when Defendant Bethel interrupted them for a second time, and asked Jurado’s

attorneys to accompany her to a different area on the same floor, but by themselves. As Bethel

turned around and started walking away, she uttered “damn wetback immigrants!” Jurado

was caught off-guard but was not really surprised. By that point, Jurado had already been

informed by his attorney that Bethel and LeClair were in a phone conference early that same

106


morning, during which LeClair allegedly made several complaints about him. Also, it was not

only the hostility he had experienced since Bethel’s appointment as Guardian Ad Litem a few

months back, but that day in particular she acted with the upmost disdain toward Jurado: Did

not greet him when she saw him for the first time, did not say a word to him when she

interrupted Jurado’s meeting with his attorneys twice, and avoided eye contact altogether.

Defendant Bethel finally took everyone away for “negotiations” leaving Jurado alone outside

the courtroom for the next two to three hours while she, Lambert, Jurado’s attorneys and

Lambert’s attorneys went to an undisclosed conference room. An hour and forty five minutes

later, Jurado started looking for them unsuccessfully at the point he decided to dismiss his

attorney before the start of the proceeding, given that she had already made it clear of her

refusal to object to the appointment of Dr. Smalldon.

VI.C.5. TORMENT, OPPRESSION AND PERSECUTION BY BETHEL BECAME A NORMAL PART OF JURADO’S DAILY LIFE

274. The ongoing and frequent instigation and harassment by Bethel was observed on

day-to-day activities, over the smallest and most irrelevant matters such as the writing of e-

mails. For example, the e-mail communications from 11/15/2013 shows Bethel nitpicking at

Jurado because of her opinion of his writing style. It is even more concerning the fact that the

specific issue(s) she was raising was caused by her own oversight and failure to read the entire

e-mail thread. A few hundred e-mails sent by Bethel during her 18 months serving as GAL for

Plaintiff N.G., have been collected as evidence of the ongoing aggression and pursuit of Jurado

as a target.

107


VI.C.6. BETHEL - FROM GAL TO LAMBERT’S DE FACTO ADVOCATE

275. The following are just some of the many examples of evidence that prove the lack of

impartiality, extreme adversarial posture against Jurado and passionate advocacy for Lambert’s

interests, while recklessly neglecting the best interests of the child and showing criminal

indifference to incidents and events in which the health and safety of the child was exposed to

risks. The differential treatment of Jurado on the basis on his national origin and color of his sin

can be established by her use of double standards, contradictions that consistently produced

adverse results for Jurado, and her intentional fallacies to support conclusory allegations she

repeated verbatim from Lambert even when they were all unsubstantiated.

VI.C.6(a) BETHEL’S MARKEDLY UNBALANCED AVAILABILITY AND ACCESSIBILITY OFFERED TO LAMBERT AND TO JURADO; DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT FOR JURADO AS

WELL AS JURADO’S ENTIRE FAMILY

276. On numerous occasions, Defendant Bethel proved to be readily accessible for

Defendant Lambert, while making herself available sparingly for Plaintiff Jurado. For all 18

months of her appointment as GAL, her communications and availability between Lambert and

Jurado was markedly unbalanced.

277. For example, between April and May 2013, Defendant Bethel was uncooperative or

non-responsive to Jurado’s emails requesting permission to exercise his rights and privileges by

spending time with his infant son at home as allowed by the existing court order at the time.

278. In another instance, Defendant Bethel became completely inaccessible to Jurado and

openly available for Lambert during incidents or events occurred in June 2013. During

negotiations for an interim schedule deviation from the Temporary Orders for the then-

108


upcoming Summer time of 2013 and visiting grandparents, Bethel provided Lambert the

opportunity to make her case for restricting parenting time for the child’s paternal

Grandparents while they visited from outside the U.S., after receiving Lambert’s request to

discuss with her the interim schedule before she would issue her recommendation.

279. As predicted by Jurado when he shared his concerns with his then-attorney about not

being afforded the same opportunity to speak with Bethel, Jurado’s request to Bethel for an

opportunity to discuss and/or refute Lambert’s proposals/concerns was ignored. Not

surprisingly, the Bethel’s recommendation turned out to be completely in favor of Lambert by

siding with her on all the issues around the interim schedule and denied Jurado and his parents

the opportunity to spend time with their grandson during weekdays, even when the Temporary

Orders allowed him to have his son during the week without any daycare restrictions.

Defendant Bethel was well aware that, although hers was a recommendation, it would tip the

scale one way or the other making her recommendation effectively binding—especially

considering that by the time this issue would be brought up to the court, summer time would

be more than half way over, and the child’s grandparents visit would be over.

VI.C.6(b) USING SKYPE DURING PARENTING TIME: DAMN IF HE DOES, DAMN IF HE DOESN’T

280. Even on smaller issues such as the use of Skype during parenting time, Bethel showed

double standards. In June 2013, Bethel sided with Lambert on her request for using Skype to

keep in contact with a One Year Old infant during the uninterrupted week of vacation of the

other parent. Interestingly enough, during an earlier phone conference between the GAL and

109


Jurado, she criticized him for voluntarily allowing Lambert to Skype with the child during his

parenting time earlier in the case.

VI.C.6(c) PARENTS’ FLEXIBLE WORK SCHEDULE

281. The email from 5/28/2013 sent by the GAL includes “Kathy does not have as flexible a

work schedule as you”. The GAL’s advocacy for Lambert in every granular aspect became

predictable after only two months since her appointment. In this case, her advocacy for

Lambert alleged “inflexible” work schedule did not have any basis. In reality, Lambert’s position

with her employer enjoyed a high-level of flexibility. The rigid nature of Jurado’s job and

schedule was documented and discussed many times between the parties during parenting

schedule negotiations. An “irregular” schedule is not synonym for “flexible” schedule.

VI.C.6(d) INDIFFERENCE TO THE NUMEROUS MEDICAL APPOINTMENTS MADE BY LAMBERT

WHILE APPREHENSIVE ABOUT TWO APPOINTMENTS MADE BY JURADO

282. On the same email from 05/28/2013, Bethel censured a referral that was made by Dr.

Mastruserio, a 2nd opinion pediatrician that both parents consulted with and that Bethel had

not objected to, even when she was made aware of that referral by the pediatrician a few

months before. Bethel also wrote “I hope that these appointments are medically necessary.

* * * I am getting somewhat concerned about what we are putting [name redacted] through if

these appointments are not required” as she repeated verbatim the exact words from emails

she received from Lambert in the two occasions in which Jurado attempted to seek medical

care for the child on his own initiative, but turned out unsuccessful due to interference by

Bethel and Lambert.

110


283. In this example, the Bethel was reaching to conclusions and insinuating that the

appointments made by Jurado were too many and unnecessary without having any evidence of

either claim, and while refusing to talk to the 2nd pediatrician, or without even asking how many

times Lambert had made non-routine appointments and if those were necessary. Meanwhile,

Lambert had made 9 last-minute and unexpected medical appointments over the first 5 months

of the year, not including regular checkups.

VI.C.6(e) BETHEL’S I-HAVE-SEEN-MUCH-WORSE DOUBLE-STANDARD

284. In May 2013, Lambert took away from Jurado the full-featured stroller that they

purchased together and that they had been sharing for the benefit of their son since July 2012.

Lambert then provided Jurado with a mini-stroller that did not have any of the safety features

of the original one, forcing him to purchase a new one when he was not prepared to incur in

such expense. GAL Bethel’s opinion regarding the mini-stroller and Lambert’s behavior:

No big deal given that she has seen “things that are so much worse”.

285. On the other hand, during a court hearing on Dec 20, 2013, Bethel testified in front of

Judge Jamison about Jurado’s apartment and that it was just too small for the child when in

fact, it was a 1,400 sq. ft. apartment with 3BR/2BA, as the transcript of this proceeding shows.

When asserting a non-favorable opinion about any aspect of Jurado’s parenting, Defendant

Bethel never applied the “I have seen much worse” standard.

111


VI.C.6(f) UNWARRANTED E-MAIL ATTACKS BY DEFENDANT BETHEL INITIATED BY LAMBERT’S ALLEGATIONS

286. On Martin Luther King Holiday (2014), Defendant Bethel engaged in an e-mail

altercation against Jurado for “painting Kathy in a negative light”. Not only that Bethel, as GAL,

consistently advocated for Lambert instead of the best interest of the child, but even censured

Jurado for simply encouraging Mom to spend the day with their son, instead of leaving him at

the daycare facility.

VI.C.6(g) GAL BETHEL PROTECTED COMMUNICATIONS WITH LAMBERT AS IN ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

287. Since Defendant Bethel’s appointment as GAL in March 2013, she has written and

transmitted several hundred emails addressed to all parties in the case, none of which included

by quoting, as attachment or forwarding, any of the numerous communications she had ex-

parte with Lambert and/or her attorneys. In contrast, she forwarded (openly or in secrecy) to

all parties the few ex-parte communications that took place between her and Jurado.

288. A memorable example is the e-mail communications that took place on 1/2/2014.

Defendant Bethel’s email started with the phrase, “I was contacted by Kathy”. In a response by

Jurado’s then-attorney to the GAL, he referred to the GAL’s conduct and frequent emails as

“utter absolute absurdity”.

289. So far in 2014, there have been 4 attempts to subpoena the GAL file and so far they

all have failed for a variety of reasons: Due to GAL’s Motions to Quash granted by the Court,

the Court not holding hearings in retaliation against Jurado, among other reasons. As of

October 5, 2014, there is a pending Motion to Quash by the former GAL, as a result of the latest

112


attempt to Discovery by Jurado after the GAL was removed from the case by the Court sua

sponte. The GAL’s Motion to Quash is based mainly on 2 claims: (1) Subpoena is a fishing

expedition; (2) Undue burden because Jurado asked to “review the whole file”. Those claims

were made just days after Judge Jamison instructed Jurado, in front of Defendant Bethel, to

simply make an appointment with Defendant Bethel’s office to review the file. When Jurado

attempted to make the appointment with the GAL’s office the day after the Judge gave those

instructions on 9/24, he was denied based of the assertion that because Defendant Bethel had

just been removed as GAL, Jurado was no longer entitled to a review of the file. And instead, a

Deposition of her would be necessary because it was the only proper way to review an Expert

Witness underlying file, referring to statements made by the Judge that Defendant Bethel

would be allowed to return to the case as an Expert Witness (for Mom as the only possibility) as

she expressed the Court’s decision to remove the GAL from the case sua sponte without giving

Jurado his opportunity to completely address all of his concerns and constitutional claims

against the GAL. Defendant Bethel was quick to indicate the hourly rate that she would charge

knowing that Jurado would not be able to afford it. Instead of trying to work it out with Jurado,

Defendant Bethel simply imposed a new financial challenge to Jurado when indicated her

$285/hr rate for her deposition as an expert witness. As of the filing of this instant first

amended complaint, Bethel is still attacking Jurado’s attempts to subpoena her records.

VI.C.7. BETHEL AS JURADO’S MAIN ADVERSARY IN THE CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS, PERSECUTED HIM AS HE PLACED THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD FIRST

290. In July 2013, while negotiating the summer vacation schedule with Lambert through

her attorneys, as well as the new temporary orders dealing with a variety of stipulations of all

113


aspects of parenting, the care of the child and parenting time in particular, Jurado was

successful at proposing a rotating parenting time scheduled to be implemented on a regular

basis. Although the new parenting plan consistent on a parenting time schedule different than

the one recommended by Bethel, as the appointed GAL, and significantly different the one first

proposed by Lambert, it was clearly in the best interest of the child and disregarded any

convenience for the parents. Despite the existing high-conflict, lack of cooperation,

antagonistic atmosphere, and increasing disagreements between the two parents in general,

Lambert agreed with Jurado’s proposed 2-day/2-day rotating schedule that did not vary over

week days or weekends, because it was unmistakably in the best interest of the child. It

allowed both parents to have frequent contact with the toddler and neither parent would go

too many days without seeing the child. This rotating schedule was one of several schedules

recommended by the official Parenting Guides of the states of Arizona and Ohio, both

published by their corresponding State’s Supreme Courts and developed by similarly appointed

task forces.

291. When Jurado made reference to the Official Ohio’s Parenting Guide, it was obvious

that none of the parties, attorneys or Bethel, as the appointed GAL, knew about its existence.

In fact Defendant Bethel had already censured one or more recommendations made in the

Guide which originated from the expertise of Child Development Professionals, researchers and

carefully-selected authorities in the field. When Bethel learned that Lambert and Jurado had

agreed on Jurado’s proposed 2/2 schedule, she commented that she thought it would be very

inconvenient for the parents to be able to plan their weekends, etc. None of her feedback was

every truly about the best interest of the child.

114


292. As part of the same negotiations between Lambert and Jurado, Jurado suggested that

they interpose a window of time every other day during each parent’s “uninterrupted” vacation

week with the toddler, to allow the other parent to have high-quality time with the non-

vacationing parent. One more time, both parents agreed without an issue on this new

stipulation because it was in the best interest of the child. However, because they were

running out of time due to Bethel’s imposed deadline for coming up with a mutually agreed

temporary orders, Jurado was unable to propose additional changes or stipulations that were in

the best interest of the child. For example, although the two non-consecutive vacation weeks

for each parent in the summer were equal between them, Lambert truly did not believe the

toddler was ready to spend so many days away from her. Jurado was also of the opinion that

the child was still too young to be away from each parent for an entire week (and thus his last-

minute suggestion on the time window every other day for the other parent to spend time with

the child). But they ran out of time to freely discuss the matter prior to reaching the deadline.

293. The only reason for the summer vacation to be part of the parenting plan was the

result of the continuous denial of Bethel, Lambert and her attorneys for the child to spend time

with Jurado and the child’s paternal grandparents during weekdays while they were visiting

from Panama, even when the court order in effect at the time designated about 2-3 weekdays

as Jurado’s parenting time without any restrictions. Instead, Bethel imposed that the only time

the child should be out of daycare is if the parents incorporate the uninterrupted summer

weeks of vacation that is included in the Local Rules for parents to use as the minimal standards

for all children regardless of age.

115


294. Right after the temporary orders were signed and approved by the court, Jurado took

his first vacation week with his son, given that the visit of the child’s grandparents in Columbus

OH was soon coming to an end. The vacation week started without any issues as both Jurado

and his son were having high-quality bonding time. Still, as he watched his God-sent one year

old son sound sleep in his crib the first night, Jurado reflected on the difficult time his son

would have at the end of the week re-adapting to his other home, bedroom and crib, and vice-

versa after spending 7 days/7 nights away from Lambert’s home. That same night, he sent an

e-mail to Lambert explaining his concern and recommending that they convert the 3-hour

window “for the other non-vacationing parent” to an overnight every other day, resulting in

little disruption to the child’s evening and sleeping routine, while each parent could still enjoy

their vacation week with the child within daytime hours. Lambert did not take well Jurado’s

email. The next morning, she sent her first response e-mail with a negative tone, which

indicated that she thought “something had happened with their child”.

295. When the e-mail exchanges came to Bethel’s attention, Bethel immediately started

hounding Jurado with hostile e-mails and censuring him for attempting to change the recently

approved temporary orders. When he demonstrated to Bethel that he even offered Lambert to

take the overnights every other day with no strings attached and no expectation of

reciprocity—given that his suggestion intended to keep the best interest of the child above

everything else was now used to create a new instance of quarrel—Bethel accused him of

acting disingenuous while “trying to appear as the better parent”. In the end, Lambert took the

overnight Jurado had offered and for the benefit of the child, and did not reciprocate during her

week of vacation with the child, as expected.

116


VI.C.8. BETHEL’S RACIALLY MOTIVATED MISCONDUCT RAMPED UP: BECAME INTEGRAL

FIGURE IN THE OVERARCHING CONSPIRACY AGAINST JURADO

296. As established in section VI.E below, Defendant Bethel was the originator of one of

the conspiracy agreements to create High Conflict, and effectively used the results in

furtherance of the conspiracy to pursue the enforcement of her mandatory daycare attendance

for the child, and to inflict undue hardship on Jurado, among other goals, solely driven by her

racial and ethnic hatred.

297. Defendant Bethel also played a key role instigating and carrying out the conspiracy

sub-scheme of the Civil Lawsuit filed by Brooksedge against Jurado.

VI.C.9. BETHEL’S RACISM DROVE HER TO ENGAGE IN PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL CONDUCT AND

ACTS OF FRAUD UPON THE COURT AGAINST HER OWN INTERESTS

298. Most of Bethel’s unlawful conduct and acts were centered on fraud, perjury and

premediated misrepresentations in court. The fact that her constant deception became a

pattern of unlawful conduct engaged against her own interests, establishes unlawful

discrimination, agreement and participation in the conspiracy. Refer to section VII.D.5 below

for specific facts and allegations of instances of fraudulent misrepresentations to the court.

VI.D. DISPARATE TREATMENT BY DEFENDANTS ODC AND STONE ON THE BASIS

OF RACE AND ETHNICITY

VI.D.1. SIMILARLY SITUATED GRIEVANTS

299. On 11/8/2014, a new cooperating witness, Heidi K. Lancaster (Oyler), confirmed that

the grievance she filed with ODC against the GAL in her custody case was investigated and did

not get summarily dismissed as the one Jurado had filed. Although her claims were not

117


substantiated after the investigation (no findings of fact were issued either), ODC did more than

just a review of her complaint/grievance and did not use a pretext not to investigate, such as

passing the responsibility of GAL oversight to the juvenile court. In Oyler v. Oyler, 2011-Ohio-

4390, there is a reference to Ms. Lancaster filing a complaint with the Office of Disciplinary

Counsel against attorney Susan Hulit-Burns. This fact should be easily substantiated by

obtaining a copy of the determination letter from either Ms. Lancaster, or the ODC.

VI.E. UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION IN THIS CASE NOT ONLY TARGETS

PLAINTIFFS BUT ALL PATERNAL FAMILY MEMBERS BECAUSE OF THEIR

PANAMANIAN ANCESTRY

VI.E.1. DISPARATE TREATMENT OF MINOR N.G.’S PANAMANIAN GRANDPARENTS BY

DEFENDANTS BROOKSEDGE, LECLAIR, LAMBERT AND PETROFF LAW FIRM

300. Between December 2012 and July 2013, the child’s paternal grandparents were

treated differently by Defendants only because of their Hispanic ethnicity as described in the

sworn Affidavit of Milka Licona. Exhibit AC1-D2, pages 91-93 of the Consolidated Appendix of

Exhibits.

301. E-mails from attorney Petroff from January 2013 show Defendants’ intention to allow

the grandparents access to the daycare facility but only guarded or escorted, and after denying

them access to the center for the entire length of their 6-week stay in Columbus, even when

their son Jurado was listed as a parent of the child in the enrollment forms.

302. The affidavit of Milka Licona also details her accounts of the incident report with

Brooksedge, because she is the one that prepared the items that Jurado brought with him on

July 2, 2013.

118


VI.E.2. OVERT COLLABORATION BETWEEN DEFENDANTS SMITHERMAN, MCCASH, LAMBERT, JUDGE JAMISON AND THE GODDARD SCHOOL TO INTENTIONALLY DISRUPT AND SEVER

THE FAMILIAL BOND AND RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PLAINTIFF MINOR N.G. AND HIS

ENTIRE PATERNAL PANAMANIAN FAMILY

303. Even when Defendants do not have a valid reason to deny contact between the child

and his paternal family, and Panamanian relatives, they still deprive the child and Jurado's

family from that vital contact and familial ties, even when it is in the detriment of the child.

304. In this case, the child's Aunt and her family, including N.G.'s toddler cousin, traveled

all the way from Norway to visit and especially spend time with little N.G., along with the

grandparents that arrived from Panama. But the e-mails in this exhibit show that McCash, as

the GAL, is indifferent to the best interest of the child if the situation does not favor Lambert,

consistent with his previous conduct and acts, as well as that of the other participants in the

conspiracy, including Judge Jamison and Smitherman.

305. Refer to section VII.A.1(t) below for additional information about the overt acts of

Defendants to deny Jurado’s family access to the child. Also see Exhibit AC1-D3 with copies of

these emails; pages 94–97 of the Appendix.

306. The treatment of Jurado's family as second class citizens was compounded by Judge

Jamison's latest overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, when she restricted Skype time

between the child and his paternal family to 15 minutes a week.

119


VII. SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS – THE CONSPIRACY

VII.A. THE AGREEMENTS ENTERED BY DEFENDANTS FORMING THE MASTER CONSPIRACY

VII.A.1. TO INTERFERE WITH CUSTODY AND PARENTING TIME BETWEEN PLAINTIFF JURADO

AND PLAINTIFF N.G., JURADO’S MINOR SON

307. One of the several agreements entered by the defendants that formed the initial

conspiracy, now the master conspiracy, is to interfere with Jurado and his minor son’s

relationship, in order to hinder the forming of a strong bond between them, and strain any

already successfully nurtured father-son relationship between Plaintiffs—and also between

N.G. and his paternal grandparents, aunt and relatives with Panamanian ancestry

VII.A.1(a) LAMBERT’S INITIAL REVELATION OF HER STANCE THAT DAYCARE COMES BEFORE

THE CHILD’S FATHER AND THAT JURADO’S PRESENCE AT THE FACILITY WAS NOT A

GOOD IDEA

308. Sometime before the filing of the custody case in November 2012, Defendant

Lambert overtly revealed her stance when Jurado explained (in the context of his intended

finalization of his engagement in Chicago planned for December 1, 2012) that his intentions

were to spend as much time with his son as he could between contract engagements/work

projects to build a good father-son bond, similar to the opportunity Lambert had during her

maternity leave, for which Jurado provided financial support. She elaborated on her

explanation behind her belief that daycare attendance provided a number of benefits for

children, and that any attendance disruption should be done on an exceptional basis. She was

adamant to allow the child to be out of daycare for days or weeks at a time.

120


309. On a different occasion also captured by recording, she tried to articulate her

rationale for thinking that Jurado’s presence at the daycare facility was not a good idea. Some

of her explanations included (i) “the daycare staff and other parents do not need to find out

about our problems”, (ii) “Other parents are going to start complaining when they see you

around without running a background check on you”, (iii) “the daycare staff will not feel

comfortable with you at the facility”. At the time, both parents were co-parenting equally.

310. These early revelations—along with the text messages sent by Lambert during the

child’s first day of attendance asking Jurado “don’t stay too long” referring to his first time visit

and tour on the facility during Plaintiff N.G.’s first day of attendance in September 2012, and

comments made by LeClair to Jurado in April-May 2013 referring to Lambert’s exact concerns

about Jurado’s presence at the facility—are evidence of agreement between Lambert and her

co-conspirators throughout the mortality

VII.A.1(b) LAMBERT AND BROOKSEDGE ENTERED INTO FIRST AGREEMENT TO JOINTLY CARRY

OUT UNLAWFUL ACT FOR DENYING JURADO ACCESS TO THE FACILITY

311. Between November 2, 2012 and November 5, 2012, Lambert contacted one of the

co-directors and explained that she was filing for full custody of her son without giving Jurado

any notice. Lambert asked for her and Brooksedge’s help in precluding Plaintiff Jurado from

seeing his son or even talking to his son’s caretakers about the infant’s weight-gain issues.

Brooksedge suggested to Lambert that she could fill out a new enrollment form without

including him as a parent or authorized person to see or pick up the child; and even when

pursuant to ORC 5104.039(A) they were prohibited by law from denying custodial or non-

custodial access to parents unless they were provided with a court order stating otherwise,

121


they would simply play along and will not mention the rule if Jurado wouldn’t ask. They all

knew that he was also never provided a copy of the Parent Handbook. The only motive

Brooksedge had for breaking licensing rules and favor Lambert while creating undue

interference between Jurado and his son is Jurado’s national origin and the darker tone of his

skin.

312. Almost simultaneously as attorney Petroff was filing Lambert’s complaint for full

custody in the Juvenile Court in the morning of November 5, 2012, Lambert was crossing out

Jurado’s name from the initial enrollment form and filling out a new form as suggested by

Brooksedge. They also collaborated in developing procedures if Jurado would try to see his son.

313. Between November 9, 2012 and early-January 2013, Lambert knowingly misled

Jurado by making him believe he would get into trouble if he would even attempt to see his son

at daycare because he was no longer “allowed”. Their actions also would result, in case of an

emergency, for Jurado to be the last person to find out, since he was not even listed as an

emergency contact in the facility attended by his son.

314. During the period ruled by ORC 3109.042, which gave Lambert “natural” custody of

the child until their first appearance in court, she set strict time schedules and provided them

on a piecemeal fashion for Jurado and his family from Panama to see the child and only under

her supervision. She abused her authority to exert obsessive control and used the child as a

manipulative tool against Jurado.

122


315. On November 15, 2012 and half way through an extended stay in Chicago, IL, Jurado

traveled to Columbus for less than 12 hours for the exclusive reason to see and spend a few

hours with his son. Lambert only allowed him 15 minutes with their son early in the morning

before daycare drop-off, even after he begged her to let him spend more time with his son.

Once more, Lambert restated that Jurado was not “allowed” at daycare and Brooksedge

confirmed by email that they would deny Jurado access to the facility without verbal or written

permission by Lambert.

316. After investigating the rules and the center’s written policies, Jurado brought up with

Defendant LeClair, owner and co-Director of the facility, that the Ohio statute, ODJFS licensing

rules and their own policy should allow him access to the facility and to his son. LeClair finally

conceded that all he had to do was to provide them with a copy of the child’s birth certificate or

other legal document showing that Jurado was the child’s parent. Although Brooksedge

stopped denying Jurado’s access during the first half of January 2013, he continued following

Lambert’s “orders” due to her intimidating threats. He knew things would change after their

first appearance in Court less than two weeks away.

VII.A.1(c) AFTER SHARED PARENTING WITH UNSUPERVISED PARENTING SCHEDULE IS IN

EFFECT BY COURT ORDER, LAMBERT USES BREASTFEEDING, AND OTHER PRETEXTS

TO CONSTANTLY INTERFERE WITH JURADO’S BONDING TIME WITH THE INFANT

317. Several dozen e-mails generated between January 2013-April 2013 show evidence

that Lambert, while able to pump and provide Brooksedge with enough supply of breastmilk for

the infant to last the entire day, used her alleged inability to produce enough breastmilk as a

123


pretext for not letting Jurado exercise his parenting time free of interference, intrusion and

conflict.

318. In one instance, Jurado offered Lambert the opportunity to facilitate her pumping

and production of breastmilk by keeping their son just blocks from her place of employment at

Jurado’s home, but she declined without giving a reasonable explanation. Defendant Lambert

preferred to drive 50 miles round-trip in the middle of the day to nurse the infant, than to

relinquish a few hours of her parenting time to allow the child to be cared for by Jurado instead

of the Brooksedge care takers.

VII.A.1(d) LAMBERT’S INTERFERENCE WITH JURADO’S PARENTING TIME ESCALATE TO

HARASSMENT AND STALKING

319. As described in detail in section , Defendant Lambert’s obsession for intruding into

Jurado’s time and hindering the forming of the bond between father and son reached absurd

levels of conflict, between March 2013 and May 2013, requiring Jurado to have to keep all of

his phones turned off, and window curtains closed during his parenting time with his son, given

Lambert’s continued harassment through phone and SMS calls, and attempts to intrude by her

unannounced presence.

320. During a botched court proceeding scheduled for April 17, 2013, Jurado brought

evidence of the excessive text messages and phone calls by Lambert during Jurado’s time with

their infant son. In that instance, Jurado produced the content of 80+ SMS messages

generated by Lambert during a single overnight stay of their child with Jurado.

124


321. In April 2013, Jurado gave in to the duress he was being subjected to, and resorted to

offering to relinquish his overnight parenting time in an attempt to minimize the tormenting

and joint persecution between Lambert and Bethel, as he knew they were also aiming at

injuring Jurado by inflicting extreme mental distress. As established throughout this complaint,

Defendants eventually achieved their goal and cause Jurado to be taken to the Emergency

Room, first in May of 2013 and more recently in February 2015.

VII.A.1(e) DEFENDANT BETHEL JOINED THE CONSPIRACY – MOTHER-FATHER EQUALITY

PROVISION UNDER ORC 3109.042(A) FOR THE DETERMINATION OF PARENTAL

RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IS ONLY APPLICABLE TO PARENTS OF SAME RACE, COLOR AND ETHNICITY

322. Upon her appointment as GAL for Plaintiff N.G. in the custody case in mid-March

2013, Bethel learned all relevant facts, background and history of the case through each party’s

counsel. Bethel immediately issued her preliminary recommendations that clearly showed she

was applying the father-mother equality provision under ORC 3109.042(A) for the

determination of parental rights and responsibilities. One of those recommendations included

the 50/50 parenting schedule for Lambert and Jurado, rejection of mandatory daycare

attendance, and disapproval of Lambert’s use of breastfeeding as pretext for constantly

intruding in Jurado’s parenting time, all (opinions) of which were given before Bethel found out

the true ethnicity and national origin of Lambert and Jurado.

323. After Defendant Bethel learned that “Hernandez v. Jurado” was not a custody case

between two Hispanic parents, but instead, between a white-Caucasian mother and a

Hispanic father, all of her initial recommendations were abruptly reversed, and became

125


adverse to Jurado’s exercise of his parenting time with his son. Since that point in time going

forward, it became evident that for Bethel, the equality provision for Father and Mother

under ORC 3109.042(A) no longer applied. The only recommendation she did not reverse right

away was the 50/50 parenting schedule recommendation because it would have been

extremely obvious and would have exposed her racial/ethnic bias. Instead, Bethel colluded

with Lambert and Smitherman to delay the enforcement of her own recommendation for the

50/50 parenting schedule as much as possible.

VII.A.1(f) START OF CONCERTED EFFORTS BETWEEN BETHEL AND LAMBERT TO LIMIT

JURADO’S PARENTING TIME: MANDATORY DAYCARE ATTENDANCE JUSTIFIED BY

INFANT NEED FOR REGULAR NAP SCHEDULE AND CONSISTENCY

324. Before Defendant Bethel Joined the conspiracy around April of 2013, and even before

she started her differential treatment of Jurado, Bethel heard Lambert’s constant pursuit for

the child to stay in daycare even when Plaintiff Jurado was able to care for him. The feedback

Bethel shared during her first interview with Jurado in April 2013 was “NON-SENSE” the fact

that Lambert alleged that the infant child was better off spending time at the daycare than with

Jurado, rationalized as an approach for maintaining a routine or consistency for the child and

for his napping routine not to be disturbed.

325. A day or two later, Lambert met for the first time with Bethel, who immediately

figured out that Lambert’s adopted last name “Hernandez” was just that and that she was

white-American. Immediately, her racial bias started to show when Bethel changed her

opinions abruptly and started the intense pursuit alongside with Lambert for enforcing

126


mandatory daycare attendance against the best interest of the child, the interests of Jurado

and in favor of Lambert’s posture.

VII.A.1(g) DEFENDANT BETHEL COLLUDED WITH LAMBERT AND SMITHERMAN TO DELAY THE

ENFORCEMENT OF HER OWN 50/50 PARENTING SCHEDULE RECOMMENDATION

326. In mid-April 2013, Defendants successfully conspired to botch the April 17, 2013

court proceeding that would have resulted in the enforcement of the 50/50 parenting schedule.

On that day, Lambert, Jurado and their attorneys all attended and were present at the

courthouse only to find out that Defendant Bethel had participation in an ongoing trial she had

scheduled for the same day and time in the same floor in the Juvenile Court building. It became

evident that Bethel had chosen this date for the proceeding, knowing that she had a schedule

conflict with an ongoing trial as a tactic to delay the enforcement of her initial recommendation

of the 50/50 parenting schedule for Lambert and Jurado.

VII.A.1(h) BETHEL’S OVERT ACT IN FURTHERANCE OF INTERFERENCE WITH JURADO’S

PARENTING TIME: MANDATORY DAYCARE ATTENDANCE BECAUSE OF HIGH-CONFLICT NATURE OF THE CASE

327. The newly stated recommendation from the Bethel since the botched April 17, 2013

court proceeding that the child should stay in daycare instead of with his father, in defiance of

the Court Order in place, was first rationalized by her alleged concerns that the child’s nap

routine should not be disturbed.

328. To further decrease the amount of Jurado’s parenting time despite the court order in

effect at the time, Bethel colluded with Lambert, Petroff and Smitherman, by imposing strict

daycare drop off and pick up times for all five weekdays with no exceptions, and declared

127


Jurado’s attempts to see his son during weekdays as much as he could or as soon as he was

available after work as “Parenting and convenience do not always go hand in hand”.

329. The malevolent purpose of Bethel’s conduct regarding these restrictions is evident in

the transcript of the Aug. 1, 2014 proceedings conducted for Bethel’s removal as GAL. During

cross-examination by Jurado, Bethel admitted being well aware of Jurado’s job demands

requiring intense weekly travel. Bethel also admitted for the record to knowingly purport

Jurado’s involuntary out-of-state employment and travel situation, and the difficulties in seen

his son as mere “Dad’s convenience” and a bad parenting trait that was not in the child’s best

interest.

330. Between April and May 2013, Jurado provided documentation proving that the nap

routine and child schedule was not really an issue and that under Jurado’s care, Plaintiff’s N.G.

nap routine could even be enhanced. But Bethel was indifferent and kept silent about the new

information. Instead, in May 2013, she moved to a new and second rationale for imposing

restrictions and mandatory daycare attendance for Plaintiff N.G.: “this is an extremely high

conflict case and keeping the child in daycare would be in his best interest”. The conspirators

had reaped on their agreement to carry out the sub-scheme of creating a High Conflict

environment, achieved mainly with Bethel’s tactics to spark high conflict (see ).

VII.A.1(i) DEFENDANTS COORDINATED EFFORTS TO MINIMIZE THE TIME PLAINTIFF N.G. SPENT WITH HIS PATERNAL PANAMANIAN GRANDPARENTS IN THE SUMMER OF

2013 AND DURING THEIR OTHER VISITS

331. In June 2013, Defendant Bethel became completely inaccessible to Jurado and openly

available for Lambert during negotiations for an interim schedule deviation from the Temporary

128


Orders for the then-upcoming Summer time of 2013 and Plaintiff N.G.’s paternal grandparents

visit from Panama. Bethel provided Lambert the opportunity to make her case for restricting

parenting time for the child’s paternal grandparents during their stay in Columbus, after

receiving Lambert’s request to discuss with her the interim schedule before Bethel would issue

her recommendation.

332. As predicted by Jurado when he shared his concerns with his then-attorney about not

being afforded the same opportunity to speak with Bethel, Jurado’s request to Bethel for an

opportunity to discuss and/or refute Lambert’s proposals/concerns was ignored, as proven

through a series of e-mails which were sent between Bethel, Lambert, Jurado and his attorney

Massucci, all available as evidence in this action.

333. Not surprisingly due to her perpetual deceptive conduct, Lambert came up with the

pretense that her parents were also visiting from out of town at the same time as Jurado’s

parents were. However, Bethel and Lambert knew that Lambert’s parents had only been in

town two times since Jurado met Lambert in 2010, and both times were always around the

Thanksgiving holidays and never for more than 2-3 days. There had not been any instance of

Lambert’s parents coming to visit during summer times, in contrast with the visits from N.G.’s

Panamanian grandparents that lasted six weeks on average and were consistently during the

summer season and over the winter holidays.

334. Not surprisingly, Bethel’s recommendation for the 2013 Summer schedule turned out

to be completely in favor of Lambert by siding with her on all the issues around the interim

schedule and denied Jurado and his visiting parents the opportunity to spend time with their

129


grandson during weekdays, even when the Temporary Orders issue by the court allowed him to

have his son during the week without any daycare restrictions.

335. There is no logical explanation or reasonable justification for depriving Jurado and

his visiting grandparents from Panama of precious time with Plaintiff N.G., and for expecting

them to sit at home and wait until the end of the day to then pick up Plaintiff N.G. from daycare

after being cared for by strangers all day long.

336. These series of events in the summer of 2013 were not the first indication that

Jurado’s entire family was also the target of the conspiracy. During the first instance of

conspiracy between Lambert and Brooksedge Daycare between November 2012-January 2013,

all the restriction imposed by unlawful means on Jurado were also imposed on Jurado’s family

as well. In one instance, Brooksedge and Lambert granted Plaintiff N.G. grandparents’ request

to visit the Brooksedge facility for the first time and to meet his caretakers. But they granted

their request with absurd conditions, such as for Lambert to be present and for the Panamanian

grandparents to be “escorted” by Lambert and Brooksedge administrators at all times, as if they

were dealing with dangerous visitors. In reality, they were treating Plaintiff N.G.’s Panamanian

grandparents as second-class citizens given the common motive among all conspirators in their

conviction that Jurado and his Panamanian family and relatives are all deserving of limited

rights and mistreatment.

337. Subsequent visits of Jurado’s parents and relatives between 2013 and 2015 have

resulted in the same outcome even when the defendants committing the overt acts to keep

them away from Plaintiff N.G. would vary from time to time.

130


338. The last instance of unlawful discrimination against Jurado’s entire family, and

example of this specific agreement of the master conspiracy to sever their relationship with

Plaintiff N.G., took place between December 2014 and March 2015 during a series of overt acts

carried out in furtherance and for the escalation of the ongoing conspiracy. Given Lambert,

McCash and Smitherman’s knowledge that Plaintiff N.G.’s Panamanian grandparents come visit

him from Panama for the entire month of December, they included—as one of the objectives of

the planned incursion to Jurado’s home on December 5, 2014—the interference with and

intrusion into the bonding time between Plaintiff N.G. and his Panamanian grandparents. The

transcript of the Dec. 18, 2014 proceeding also shows Defendant Judge Jamison discussing the

fact that Jurado and his parents, who were in town not just for December but indefinitely,

would be caring for the child given that McCash had caused the forced disenrollment of the

child from the daycare facility utilized by Jurado. Therefore, each overt act and concerted

action carried out between December 18, 2014 and March 2015 to keep the child away from

Jurado was anticipated by the conspirators to also have an effect with the time and relationship

between Plaintiff N.G. and his Panamanian family. For example, (i) imposing the local rule for

Holidays to keep the child away from Jurado for 11 straight days during the 2014 winter

holidays also kept him away from his grandparents for 11 straight days, (ii) the indefinite

suspension of Jurado’s parenting time that was maliciously premediated and prematurely

enforced by conspirators and that is still in effect as of the filing of this instant amended

complaint has also severed the relationship between grandparents and child,

(iii) The court order issued by Defendant Judge Jamison on March 17, 2015 to limit the time

131


the child spends in Skype with his Panamanian family to 15 minutes a week is another perfect

example.

339. Around February and March 2015, Jurado sent e-mails to Lambert followed by SMS

messages to confirm the delivery of the e-mails, inquiring if she would allow minor N.G.’s

Panamanian grandparents, or Aunt that was visiting from Norway with N.G.’s toddler cousin, to

see the child outside of the daycare facility, given that there was no court order in place

preventing Lambert from doing so. Lambert chose to ignore Jurado’s requests and showed

indifference toward the damage being done to the child’s relationship with his Panamanian side

of the family.

VII.A.1(j) BETHEL, LECLAIR, BROOKSEDGE, SMITHERMAN, PETROFF AND LAMBERT

COMBINED EFFORTS TO PRECLUDE JURADO FROM VISITING HIS SON AT DAYCARE

– THE FABRICATION OF THE OVERINVOLVED FATHER

340. After Smitherman, Petroff, Bethel and Lambert were successful at imposing

mandatory daycare attendance with strict drop off and pick up times to limit Jurado’s parenting

time during the first half of 2013, they moved to the second phase of this sub-plot: to keep

Jurado from visiting Plaintiff N.G. at daycare to guarantee the diminishing of Plaintiffs bonding

time and hinder their father-son relationship. Their first devised method involved perjured

testimony and fraudulent misrepresentations in court, along with staging conflict between

Jurado and the daycare staff, in order to fabricate “the overinvolved dad” as a profile that

would fallaciously fit Jurado.

132


341. The staged conflict was carried out with a falsified daily sheet written by a

Brooksedge caretaker in collusion with Lambert and Jessica Jividen less than a week before a

scheduled court hearing, which Jurado uncovered right away.

342. On July 8, 2013, during a court proceeding, Bethel alleged that she had a

conversation with Defendant LeClair, about the incident from the previous week regarding the

falsified report. In front of Magistrate Matthews, Defendant Bethel made premeditated

misrepresentations in court that Plaintiff Jurado was visiting the daycare facility 2 times a

day/5 days a week; that the workers felt intimidated and described him as aggressive; that

other parents had been complaining about Jurado, and that his visits were stressful to

Plaintiff N.G. Defendants Petroff and Smitherman were present during Bethel’s misconduct in

court, and were also aware of the fraudulent nature of Bethel’s statements. Neither Petroff nor

Smitherman made any effort or statements to aid the court in maintaining fairness and

decorum in the court room because they were also part of the plot and have participated in the

cover up efforts since then.

343. Based on the fraudulent allegations of Defendant Bethel, which were made in

furtherance of the conspiracy, both Ms. Bethel and the Magistrate labeled Jurado an

“overinvolved father”, and sought to have his access to the daycare restricted to only drop-offs

and pick-ups. Defendant Bethel’s allegations of the frequent visits of 5 days a week

contradicted her sound knowledge that Jurado had a job that required him to travel out of

town every week during the preceding 12 months, just like Defendants Lambert, Smitherman

and Petroff were also aware. Two months later, Defendant LeClair made convincing statements

133


during a recorded meeting with Jurado accusing Bethel of perjury and of fabricating facts that

were fraudulently presented in court. See sections .

VII.A.1(k) LAMBERT, BROOKSEDGE AND LECLAIR ENTERED INTO AN AGREEMENT TO PREVENT

JURADO FROM CARING FOR HIS SON WHEN SICK ON HIS COURT-APPROVED

PARENTING DAY, AND PRECLUDED MINOR N.G. FROM BEING CARED FOR BY HIS

PARENT AND FROM RECEIVING UNDIVIDED ATTENTION WHILE SUFFERING SEVERE

SYMPTOMS OF COMMUNICABLE DISEASE

344. On September 12, 2013, Plaintiff N.G. was sent home along with other children that

showed similar symptoms of fever and diarrhea. It turned out to be a severe condition that

lasted 7 days. Plaintiff Jurado cared for the child during the first two days, and closely followed

the instruction of the child’s pediatrician and nurse, but noticed very little improvement in his

condition during his two days of parenting time. Jurado reported this information to Lambert

on the afternoon of the third day, when it was Lambert’s turn to care for the child. As if it was a

competition, Lambert reported almost full improvement while Plaintiff N.G. was under her

care, when in reality the child was still sick.

345. At the end of her parenting period after a day and a half, she dropped him off at

daycare the morning of September 16, 2013 claiming that the child’s diarrhea and other

symptoms were completely gone. Even when knowing that sick children have to be symptom-

free for 24 hours prior to returning to their daycare facility, Lambert did not want to report his

true condition for two reasons: To create the perception that she is better able to care for the

child than Jurado, and also to prevent Jurado from caring for the child and for them to spend

another day together peacefully at home. Lambert knew that if she would disclose the child’s

134


true condition, Jurado would have stayed home with the child giving him his full attention, since

it was his parenting day again.

346. Suspecting that his son was still sick, he called Brooksedge that Monday morning to

see how he was doing. Co-Director Jessica Jividen reported to Jurado that the child was doing

OK and that he did not have any symptoms. To confirm, Jurado sent LeClair an email around

mid-morning asking about his son, but LeClair, did not get back to Jurado until after 1:30pm to

let him know that his son was indeed sick and had been having “frequent diarrhea” since his

arrival in the morning. The licensing rules dictate that child daycare facilities must follow

certain protocols to monitor children that are sick since their arrival in the morning, but by the

time he was picked up, Plaintiff N.G. had already spent from 8:30am through 3pm at the facility

having symptoms and Brooksedge was exposing other children to a communicable disease in

violation of statewide rules. In addition, N.G. was precluded from being cared for by his

father, Plaintiff Jurado. Later that day, Jurado and Lambert took the child to his doctor, and

Lambert started debating with the pediatrician whether the child truly had diarrhea or not. The

debate was memorialized via the recording of the visit.

347. The next day, Lambert and LeClair collaborated to make it appear as if Jurado was

not properly communicating with anyone about the whereabouts or condition of the child.

They both send him e-mails at different times on Tuesday September 17, 2013, pretending that

they did not know why the child was not at the Brooksedge facility and that they had not heard

from Jurado, even when LeClair had stated to Jurado several times that “ODJFS licensing rules

require a child to be out of daycare if they have 3 or more diarrhea within a 24 hour period.

135


The child cannot return to daycare * * *” LeClair e-mail to Jurado, Sep. 17, 2013 8:18am. At

that point, Jurado realized that Lambert and Brooksedge were not taking the child’s illness or

the required public health protocols seriously and decided to contact Ohio Department of

Health (ODH) to inform himself about all the rules regarding sick children and the protocols

daycare providers should follow.

348. During his contacts with ODH, Jurado learned that Brooksedge practices were non-

compliant with the rules listed in the “communicable diseases poster” derived from licensing

rules and statewide public health policies. Concurrently, Jurado learned that either ODJFS

practices were also non-compliant with Public Health standards, or that ODJFS was being non-

compliant with those standards only in the instance involving Brooksedge, LeClair and Jurado.

VII.A.1(l) BETHEL AND LAMBERT PRECLUDED PLAINTIFFS JURADO AND TODDLER N.G. FROM

STAYING HOME SAFELY ON HIS PARENTING TIME DURING SNOW STORM

349. On December 6, 2013, Jurado was compelled to drive his son, Plaintiff N.G. across

town through a snow storm in order to appease Bethel and Lambert given their ongoing

harassment aimed at enforcing the mandatory daycare attendance for the child. Defendants

Bethel and Lambert interfered with Jurado’s and N.G.’s parenting time by precluding Jurado

from caring for his son safely at home on a snow day, something a similarly situated parent and

child would have been able to do. The distance to be driven was approximately 100 miles

between Easton/New Albany to the west-most point of Franklin County on the west city limits

of Hilliard, OH, with two roundtrips on the same day. For more details about the Dec. 6, 2013

incident, which was captured by video recording, refer to section .

136


VII.A.1(m) DEFENDANT LAMBERT PRESSURED NEW DAYCARE FACILITY CHOSEN BY JURADO TO

STRICTLY ENFORCE NO OPEN DOOR POLICY/VISITS FOR JURADO WITH THE

INVOLVEMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT

350. Between January and March 2014, the owner of The Goddard School-Westerville

(Executive Parkway), Jennifer Chambers, was harassed by Defendant Lambert given Lambert’s

disapproval of the daycare chosen by Jurado for the care of N.G. during his parenting days. Her

disapproval was based on the fact that Jurado was not being imposed undue burden with the

driving on his son 100 miles away to Hilliard, and because having other caretakers and daycare

facilities involved in the care of Plaintiff N.G. would make a lot more difficult the job of

Defendants Wilson, Eagle and The Goddard School Hilliard-II in their role of co-conspirators.

351. During minor N.G.’s first week of attendance at the Westerville daycare facility,

Lambert pressured Ms. Chambers to the point that she had to contact her private attorney,

counsel for the Goddard School franchise headquarters and even contact Defendant Eagle, due

to Lambert’s pursuit of the strict enforcement of the restrictions in the court order, which is

also evidence that the restrictions existed only because of her self-serving interests.

352. Jennifer Chambers was compelled to enforce the order by the involvement of law

enforcement, in case for example, that Jurado wanted to come in and use the open door policy

to have lunch with his son. In such instance, Chambers instituted procedures for calling the

police if Jurado were to attempt to do such act, but only due to the coercion of Lambert.

137


VII.A.1(n) BETHEL AND SMITHERMAN ENCOURAGED LAMBERT IN HER FILING OF A FALSE

POLICE REPORT TO HARASS AND INTERFERE WITH PLAINTIFFS LONG HOLIDAY

WEEKEND TOGETHER

353. During Memorial Day weekend in 2014, Jurado experienced acts of intimidation and

harassment by defendant Lambert as another attempt by conspirators to intrude and interfere

with Jurado’s parenting time with his son Plaintiff N.G. Numerous emails sent the weekend of

May 23, 2014 show Lambert intimidating Jurado with threats if he did not follow her version of

the parenting schedule to be followed during the long weekend. Defendants Smitherman and

Bethel were included as recipients in those emails, in which Lambert claimed that Bethel and

Smitherman had confirmed her version of the parenting schedule, which was not consistent

with the agreed order that was in effect at the time.

354. Despite Jurado’s explanations of why her version of the schedule did not apply, she

threaten and insisted in taking “whatever steps I am able to from there”, referring to involving

law enforcement to intrude in Jurado’s home and parenting time as she had done in the past.

During the entire exchange of emails, Lambert never offered any logical explanation of why the

court order was not enforceable, other than references to information “the GAL said” or that “I

was told”.

355. The next day, Lambert followed through on her threats and attempted to get the

police involved by filing a police report falsely accusing Jurado of “unlawful interference with

custody”. Lambert’s actions were consistent with her pattern of conduct driven by ill-will and

goal to sever the relationship between father and son.

138


VII.A.1(o) DEFENDANT MCCASH CENSURED DAYCARE FACILITY UTILIZED BY JURADO FOR

ALLOWING HIM TO PICK UP HIS SON EARLY THE DAY BEFORE THANKSGIVING LIKE

MOST PARENTS DID WITH THEIR CHILDREN, AND FOR NOT CALLING THE POLICE TO

ENFORCE THE “MANDATORY PICK UP TIMES”

356. Defendant McCash, consistent with his conduct and actions in furtherance of this

sub-scheme, censured Ms. Chambers for allowing Jurado to pick up minor N.G. before 4pm on

November 26, 2014, the day before Thanksgiving. Ms. Chambers had made an announcement

the previous day that most parents would be picking up their children sometime after 12 noon

the next day due to the beginning of the long Thanksgiving weekend. Jurado did not think

twice and also picked up his son early that Wednesday for two reasons: Jurado wanted to

spend as much time with his son given that they were not spending Thanksgiving Day and

weekend together, and also because Jurado did not want minor N.G. to be one of the few

children left behind at daycare for hours at a time, while most other children had gone home

to spend time with their parents and family.

357. In the previous 12 months, there were numerous instances in which the child was

one of the few attending daycare due to intense pursuit of Lambert, Bethel and Smitherman to

enforcing the strict mandatory daycare attendance, ultimately serving as undeserving

punishment for the child. Because this outcome clearly did not serve in the best interest of the

child, it becomes a PLUS FACTOR for establishing Conspiracy and agreement between the

Defendants.

358. In this instance, McCash position that was consistent with his co-conspirators, for

wanting the child to suffer by being left behind at the daycare facility without the company of

139


his parents or family, shows agreement with Defendants Lambert, Smitherman and others.

This is especially true given that the result of their position, opinion and actions results in

absurdity. The email dated Dec. 4, 2014 from Defendant McCash serves as evidence of his

position and the agreement between McCash and his co-conspirators.

VII.A.1(p) DEFENDANTS JAMISON, LAMBERT, SMITHERMAN AND MCCASH PLANNED AND

CARRIED OUT A DAY OF INTRUSION, INTIMIDATION AND PERSECUTION DURING

JURADO’S PARENTING TIME IN EARLY-DECEMBER 2014

359. Throughout the afternoon of December 5, 2014, Defendant McCash made multiple

attempts of incursion into Plaintiffs home in an aggressive and intimidating matter to ultimately

deprive Plaintiffs of quality time, to cause distress and harass. This day marked the one single

instance of an act in furtherance of the conspiracy that has caused the most harm to Plaintiffs

and to Jurado’s family.

360. The multiple hostile unannounced visits and intimidating presence of McCash



situation.

VII.A.1(q) DEFENDANTS JAMISON, LAMBERT, SMITHERMAN AND MCCASH CONSPIRED TO

KEEP PLAINTIFFS APART FOR ELEVEN (11) CONSECUTIVE DAYS DURING THE 2014

HOLIDAYS, AS A FIRST IN THE 2.5 YEARS OF LIFE OF THE CHILD

361. During the court proceeding conducted by Judge Jamison on December 18, 2015,

Defendants put into effect the first step of their most recent and ultimate plot to interfere with

Jurado’s custody and parenting time. In fact, the acts that have been engaged by Defendants in

140


this latest coordinated effort went beyond furthering of the conspiracy. They escalated the

objectives to be achieved from interference and intrusion to complete severance of father-

son relationship and the start of a long-term parental alienation effort.

362. This first step of the latest coordinated effort consisted of the abuse of Jamison and

McCash authority under the color of law to impose the enforcement of a local rule for holiday

parenting schedule that Lambert and Jurado have never followed because—in one of the few

subjects they both agreed on—they have always known that young children like Plaintiff N.G.

requires constant and frequent contact with both parents, which the local rule does not do.

363. Imposing the local rule on Lambert and Jurado by Judge Jamison and McCash was

done without giving a rational explanation, as the evidence shows (see ). For example,

McCash made reference to having them follow the local rule “for the purpose of consistency”,

yet, the local rule introduced the opposite effect. The premeditated concerted action for

ulterior motives became evident because it gave them a pretext to start the permanent

separation of Plaintiffs by justifying eleven consecutive days over the holidays that Jurado and

minor N.G. were to be separated. This by itself represented a drastic impact to Plaintiffs bond

and relationship given that they had never been separated for that long—not even half of that

length of time.

141


VII.A.1(r) DEFENDANTS JAMISON, LAMBERT, SMITHERMAN AND MCCASH CONSPIRED TO

EXTEND PLAINTIFFS TIME APART INDEFINITELY AFTER THE INITIAL PERIOD OF

SEPARATION DURING THE 2014 HOLIDAYS, IN EFFECT CAUSING TOTAL SEVERANCE

OF FATHER-SON BOND AND RELATIONSHIP NOW EXCEEDING 100 DAYS

364. During the same court proceeding conducted on December 18, 2014, Defendants

implemented the second step in their latest coordinated effort to sever the relationship

between Plaintiffs. It consisted of McCash staging a reason for Judge Jamison to issue an

unconstitutional standing order that would summarily punish Jurado by suspending his

parenting time, and the enforcement of the

summary punishment would be triggered by the

filing of a Motion by McCash before affording

Jurado his constitutional right to due process.

365. The transcript of the December 18,

2014 proceeding shows McCash and Judge

Jamison engaging in a topic that was outside the

scope of the hearing regarding HIPPA forms that

Jurado was asked to submit. Pursuing the HIPPA

forms within this latest scheme served two

purposes for the furtherance of the conspiracy: (i)

to help tie lose ends by providing the conspirators

with the names of potential witnesses that Jurado would be using in his looming Civil Rights

action, in order to perpetrate witness tampering as it had already been done successfully

multiple times; (ii) to provide conspirators with a malleable method of staging Jurado’s non-

Figure 3 - Plaintiffs Jurado and N.G. before the unlawful separation of father and son in Dec. 2014

142


compliance with court orders and guarantee the triggering of his summary punishment in the

new standing order. In other words, when Judge Jamison issued her standing order for

summary punishment condition upon Jurado’s completion of HIPPA forms, their intention was

for McCash to file a Motion for Contempt alleging Jurado’s failure to follow the order,

regardless of whether Jurado actually complied with the order or not.

366. The evidence is substantial that shows Jurado’s compliance and authentic efforts to

follow the standing court order to prevent the suspension of his parenting time. The evidence

shows McCash insincere communications and deceitful conduct at different times, including at

the Contempt hearing held in January 2015. The Malevolent and Dark Conspiratorial Nature of

the Standing Order, the suspension of Jurado’s parenting time and related proceedings is

evident with Judge Jamison ruling resulting from the Contempt hearing in January 2015:

Finding Jurado guilty of Contempt against the manifest weight of evidence provided by Jurado.

But most importantly, Judge Jamison’s arbitrary and unreasonable decision to sentence Jurado

to jail and intentionally defer the controversial suspension of Jurado’s parenting time for after

the trial. Judge Jamison’s unwarranted decision to simply continue the summary punishment

indefinitely shows that the HIPPA forms required to avoid the suspension were only a pretext,

and the suspension of Jurado’s parenting time was expected to happen one way or another.

367. The result of defendants coordinated efforts to interfere with Jurado’s custody and

parenting time is the uninterrupted separation of Jurado and his son since December 25, 2014

until the present day, and the deprivation of Plaintiff N.G.’s right to return to his home, sleep

on his own bed and to the company and care of his father.

143


VII.A.1(s) DEFENDANTS ENGAGED IN A REINFORCEMENT SCHEME TO RESTRICT BEYOND

REASON AND OPPRESS JURADO DURING HIS TWO HOURS A WEEK VISITS, CONSISTING OF SETTING UP TRAPS TO STAGE A SAFETY RELATED INCIDENT AND

FRAMING JURADO FOR ANY INJURIES SUFFERED BY THE CHILD, AS WELL AS A

PREMEDITATED AND STAGED VERBAL ASSAULT, WITH PASSIVE AND ACTIVE

AGGRESSION, AND HUMILIATION OF JURADO IN FRONT OF HIS OWN SON AND THE

OTHER CHILDREN IN THE CLASSROOM

368. Between February 2015 and March 2015, defendants Lambert, Wilson, Eagle, Judge

Jamison, McCash and the Goddard School-Hilliard-II engaged in a reinforcement scheme to

restrict beyond reason, and to further oppress, intimidate, discriminate, and punish Jurado

during his already-limited visits to Plaintiff N.G. at the facility—which consisted of three hours a

week of supervised and restrictive contact with N.G.—culminating in outburst of verbal attacks,

passive and active aggression and humiliation of Jurado in front of his own son and the other

children in the classroom on February 24, 2015.

369. It has been well established that Defendants Goddard School, Wilson, Eagle,

Lambert, Jamison and McCash share a common intention of harming Jurado by forcing his

separation from his son. In the case of Jamison and McCash, their participation is driven by

ethnic discrimination and retaliation; in the case of Lambert is discrimination, retribution for

the failed relationship exacerbated by her vindictive nature; and the Goddard School, Wilson

and Eagle’s dislike of Hispanics and their intentions to deny Jurado of access to their facility, to

minimize his presence there and to treat him as a second class citizen.

370. The first evidence showing active participation in the conspiracy by Defendants

Wilson, Eagle and the Goddard School was the falsified incident report containing fabricated

144


injuries that the child allegedly suffered on December 10, 2013 at the hands of Jurado. The

recordings of the events occurred in Dec. 10 and 11, 2013 and statements made by these

Defendants in furtherance of the conspiracy offer additional support. The recordings captured

their acknowledgment that the injuries in the report never existed and their allegations that

Lambert was responsible for the false information written in the report. The second evidence

or set of evidence include the recorded statements from Defendants admitting that they had

provided McCash with false information (allegedly unintentional), and Wilson’s perjured

testimony during the first part of the January 2015 trial.

371. During two consecutive visits by Jurado to the facility to see his son, Defendants

Goddard School, Wilson and Eagle coordinated the staging of a “safety trap” by persistently

enticing Jurado to take Plaintiff N.G. into the kitchen to Skype, ignoring their own safety rules

and the big sign in the kitchen door prohibiting children from going inside the area, where they

had arranged for the condition of the kitchen to cause an accident which most likely would

have inflicted injuries on Jurado’s son, minor N.G. Evidence is substantial that shows and

supports these facts and allegations including recordings of Jurado’s entire visits, letters and

emails between Jurado and Defendants, and their conduct and reaction.

372. After their first plan failed, Defendants carried out a different plot to stage a situation

of conflict and aggression and to falsely accuse Jurado of disrupting the classroom. The

incident, which took place on February 24, 2015 involved teachers from other classrooms

coming to minor N.G.’s classroom to help his teachers with the purpose of getting all the

children in their cots for nap time earlier than usual, almost by 30 minutes. That course of

145


action facilitated their staging that Jurado was engaging in conduct with his son that was

disruptive to the children’s nap routine. This second plot also involved the enforcement of a

rule created and enforced specifically for Jurado that prohibited him from lying in the floor for

15 or 20 minutes while he put his son to sleep. Defendant Eagle intentionally created confusion

about the rule by first creating an exception and authorizing Jurado to lie down with his son for

no more than 15 minutes, then pretending that the information was not communicated to the

school.

373. The combination of the staged disruption of the classroom and enforcement of the

rule against not lying down gave the lead teacher ammunition to start a spiteful verbal

unprovoked attack against Jurado by the lead teacher of the classroom. She called Jurado

“stupid” among other things while making allegations indicating that his mere presence was not

welcomed in the room and asked him to leave the room in the most hostile and demeaning

manner. The recording of the incident shows Jurado never raising his voice and simply being in

shock, while at the same time, little N.G. can be heard crying and distressed by the teacher’s

attack against his father, and his sudden separation from him during a time that was sacred for

father and son.

374. Despite his skepticism, Jurado immediately reported the incident to Director Wilson,

who could be heard in the recording giving excuses on behalf of the teacher, and said “I will talk

to her”. Jurado left the facility right away after his visit was cut short, lasting only less than 30

minutes. Due to fear of the escalation of conflict or another attempt against the well-being of

his son by the setup of other safety traps, Jurado avoided the facility altogether until he would

146


see indications that a recurrence would be unlikely. Hoping to hear from Wilson, Eagle or the

Goddard School, he waited patiently for two weeks until he realized that the combined efforts

of Defendants to treat him differently—or to engage in total discrimination against Jurado in

the basis of his national origin—included the unequal application of the center’s policies and

procedures, especially the one regarding standard procedures to follow for parents to address

issues and concerns with the school and vice versa. The standard procedures describe step by

step the levels of escalation for issues or concerns to get addressed or considered. The inaction

and indifference by The Goddard School, Wilson and Eagle regarding the last incident was an

overt act of discrimination and evidence that they were not applying the existing policy equally.

375. After this realization, Jurado wrote a comprehensive and detailed letter describing

the last incident, as well as the previous incidents and events involving the safety traps and

addressed the letter to Wilson, the Goddard School and Eagle. However, no response was

received by Jurado after several days and while Jurado had been deprived of access to the

facility and to see his son for over two weeks. But as reinforcement to Jurado’s allegations that

all the incidents had been carefully planned and staged with malevolent premeditation by the

conspirators, which included Lambert, McCash, Smitherman and Judge Jamison, and their

efforts to collectively discriminate against him, Jurado learned that Defendants Wilson, Eagle

and the Goddard School-Hilliard II chose to share the letter with Lambert, Smitherman and

McCash instead of trying to resolve the issues with Jurado.

376. Because the Goddard School, Wilson and Eagle, albeit voluntarily, were engaging in

unlawful acts under the authority and protection of McCash and Jamison, it made sense that

147


their reaction to the letter would be to ask McCash and Judge Jamison to enforce their pledged

protection and authority by preventing Jurado from making allegations or taking other actions

somehow. Evidence showing this interaction and their plot is substantial, and can also be

strongly inferred with the fact that none of the defendants showed any concern or even

curiosity in regards to the serious allegations Jurado made in his letter, and the possibility

that that the safety and welfare of the child was being put at risk—not N.G.’s own mother, not

McCash as N.G.’s appointed Guardian Ad Litem in charge of looking out for the best interest of

the child, nor Judge Jamison whose main statutory duty is to act in the best interest of the child

and on behalf of the child, which are the same duties under the parens patriae doctrine.

377. Soon after The Goddard School shared Jurado’s letter with Lambert, McCash and

Smitherman, McCash filed a motion “for Emergency Review of the January 23, 2014” order,

indicating their concern that if Jurado continues to visit his son at the facility with the existing

controversies, the Goddard School had threaten with the disenrollment of the child. In short,

Defendants’ main and only concern was whether Jurado was supposed to be visiting his son at

the Goddard School and finding a way to keep Jurado away from the facility and from his son.

Subsequently, the hearing was conducted on March 17, 2015 by Judge Jamison, who had

predetermined the outcome of the hearing. The collusion between Defendants Eagle—who

was called as a friendly witness and without giving Jurado proper notice in advance—

Smitherman, Lambert, McCash and Judge Jamison was evident and overt before and during the

court proceeding. For example, Defendant Eagle had been pre-coached by Smitherman and

McCash, Judge Jamison engaged in substantial judicial misconduct, including the coaching of

the witness, setting unreasonable and unfair limits to Jurado’s cross examination, did not

148


allow Jurado to present key evidence such as the recordings, and allow hearsay, which was

the main content of Defendant Eagle’s testimony.

378. Furthermore, Judge Jamison abruptly ended the hearing without giving Jurado an

opportunity to give his testimony as a witness and denied Jurado’s oral motion for emergency

matters, as Jurado tried to have the court address the real issues and concerns about the safety

of the child, as stated in his letter. In the end, Judge Jamison or anyone else in the courtroom

show any concerns for the Jurado’s allegations in his letter, and instead, the conspirators while

in the courtroom engaged in wanton criminal indifference of the risks the child had been

exposed to, or at least the possibility of such. As Defendant Jamison quickly concluded the

hearing, she ruled—based only on hearsay—that Jurado was indeed disrupting the daycare

staff and routines and ordered his access to the Open Door Policy revoked except for one hour

a week that Jamison allowed Jurado to see his son, framed by a number of restrictions set by

the Goddard School. The conspirators’ common goal of keeping Jurado away from the facility

and from his son had been achieved.

VII.A.1(t) OVERT COLLABORATION BETWEEN DEFENDANTS TO INTENTIONALLY DISRUPT AND

SEVER THE FAMILIAL BOND AND RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PLAINTIFF MINOR N.G. AND HIS ENTIRE PATERNAL PANAMANIAN FAMILY

379. Even when Defendants do not have a valid reason to deny contact between the child

and his paternal family, and Panamanian relatives, they still deprive the child and Jurado's

family from that vital contact and familial ties, even when it is in the detriment of the child.

380. In this case, the child's Aunt and her family, including N.G.'s toddler cousin, traveled

all the way from Norway to visit and especially spend time with little N.G., along with the

149


grandparents that arrived from Panama. But the e-mails in this exhibit show that McCash, as

the GAL, is indifferent to the best interest of the child if the situation does not favor Lambert,

consistent with his previous conduct and acts, as well as that of the other participants in the

conspiracy, including Judge Jamison and Smitherman.

381. Although there is no court order or legal impediment for Lambert to voluntarily allow

Jurado to spend a few hours with the child on the weekends, she refuses to allow any contact

between Jurado, his family and the child. The first email shown dated 3/8/2015 was ignored by

Lambert. The follow up email dated April 1, 2015 was then ignored by Smitherman and

McCash. And finally, the emails dated April 3, 2015 that Jurado sent concerning the Easter

holiday, were answered but unfavorably. In a condescending response, Lambert offered

Jurado's family the ability to see the child via Skype during their stay in Columbus, something

that obviously they can do when

they are back at home in Norway

and Panama. See Exhibit AC1-D3

with copies of these emails; pages

94–97 of the Appendix.

382. The treatment of Jurado's

family as second class citizens was compounded by Judge Jamison's latest overt act in

furtherance of the conspiracy, when she restricted Skype time between the child and his

paternal family to 15 minutes a week.

Figure 4 - Panamanian relatives of Plaintiffs visiting from Norway in 2014

150


VII.A.2. TO CREATE AND MAINTAIN A HIGH-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT – HIGH-CONFLICT AS A

SUB-SCHEME OF THE MASTER CONSPIRACY

383. Except for Defendant Drexel, who is the only named defendant not listed as a

conspirator, all defendants and co-conspirators listed under section IV.C above entered this

agreement and contributed with direct participation at some point in time during the ongoing

conspiracy.

VII.A.2(a) OBVIOUS MOTIVES FOR DEFENDANTS’ AGREEMENT TO CREATE AND MAINTAIN HIGH CONFLICT

384. Defendants’ motives for creating intense conflict were several. (i) The first one was

to have the perfect pretext to maintain Jurado’s son away from him and confined to a daycare

center as evident in Bethel’s actions to align with Lambert’s interests when she used “high

conflict” as a pretext to pursue the mandatory daycare attendance for the child. (ii) Another

motive that became evident for sparking conflict was to over-inflate Jurado’s cost of litigation

and attorney fees in the context of the custody case, given that Lambert did not require much

help from her attorneys because of the dedicated advocacy offered by Defendant Bethel; and

other staging of conflict outside the custody case would also harm Jurado financially, such as

the Lawsuit by Brooksedge, all which ultimately contributed to the other overlapping

agreement of the conspiracy to cause Jurado’s undue hardship; (iii) With the knowledge that

Jurado doesn’t thrive in high conflict environments, the premeditated instigation of high

conflict was also aimed to inflict substantial mental distress upon Jurado. This is evident in

dozen of recordings showing Lambert purposely engaging in aggressive and hostile behavior

151


during most exchanges with the child and in other occasions, without any provocation or

rational explanation.

VII.A.2(b) DEFENDANT BETHEL DELIBERATELY STIMULATED THE OVER-ENGAGING BETWEEN

PARENTS DURING CONFLICT AND BREACHED THEIR PERSONAL BOUNDARIES, IN

COLLABORATION WITH LAMBERT

385. By ignoring basic personal and physical boundaries requested by Jurado—as he or

anyone is entitled to—and by enabling and encouraging Lambert to over-engage in parenting

affairs with Jurado, Defendant Bethel, as court-appointed GAL, created an antagonistic

atmosphere. When she facilitated Lambert’s intrusion in Jurado’s parenting time and personal

space, she intentionally instigated increasing levels of aggression and provided the case with

the universal ingredient for sparking conflict, as demonstrated in the numerous emails included

in exhibits filed in the grievance with ODC, in the Original Action for Writs with SCO, and in the

Juvenile Court. In the specific incident that occurred on March 28 and 29 of 2013, Jurado was

only trying to set some limits on the number of disruptions of his parenting time while still

being flexible, given the history of concessions he had made, which ended up being abused.

Yet, Bethel simply discounted those concerns and gave Lambert the green light to disrupt as

often as she saw fit Plaintiffs’ time together, while contradicting her previous position that the

infant was in need to supplement with formula.

386. Given the history of harassment and annoyance by Lambert as she lacked self-control

at times and would call and send text messages incessantly during Jurado’s parenting time or

forced her presence under varied pretexts, Jurado was now forced to spend his parenting time

in hiding by turning off his phones, and keeping windows and blinds closed at all times—after it

152


became clear that Bethel was using her position of power, as an officer of the court, to

encourage and facilitate the behavior. Thus, the full support of the Bethel that allowed Lambert

to stop as often as she pleased with the pretext of bottle drop-offs, not only invaded Jurado’s

personal space, but forced him to always stay home with the child. Yet, Lambert was able to

make plans, take the child places or visit friends given that Jurado never intruded in her

parenting time in any way or force any type of restrictions on her time with the child.

387. Several Domestic Relations professionals monitoring the case agreed that attorney

Bethel’s conduct was not appropriate for a GAL, and was likely the cause, or part, of the

problem. But Jurado’s attorney, as well as several other attorneys consulted, agreed that there

was not much Jurado could do to address his concerns or remove Bethel from the case.

VII.A.2(c) SABOTAGED NEWLY REACHED AGREEMENT AND CREATED RIFT BETWEEN PARTIES’ COUNSEL

388. On April 17, 2013, the parties attended a scheduled status conference in front of

Magistrate Matthews, who presided on the case at the time. This day was chosen by Bethel

intentionally so that it had to be set for continuance: She was not able to attend due to a trial

she had scheduled at the same time. It was in Lambert’s best interest for the status conference

not to be conducted as it was expected to result in increased parenting time for Jurado.

389. While in court, the parties and their counsel fervently discussed temporary changes

to the parenting schedule for a 3-week period during which Jurado’s out-of-town work

schedule would require him to work on weekends and extended hours. The exact work

153


schedule was shared in a color printed document and the parties agreed to a modified

parenting schedule.

390. A week later, as the parties were ready to sign off on the interim order containing the

modified parenting schedule to start the next day, Bethel—supposedly without having any

knowledge of what transpired during negotiations between the parties and counsel—provided

last-minute comments and recommendations regarding the terms of the temporary order,

which caused havoc and enabled Lambert to request new self-serving modifications to the

agreement previously reached while in court. The last minute interference delayed the sign-off

of the temporary order, immediately affecting Plaintiffs time together by the loss of parenting

days within the three-week schedule in question.

391. In addition,, because the recommendations from Bethel and modifications requested

by Lambert defeated the purpose of having the modified parenting schedule, it resulting in a

minimal amount of time Plaintiffs spent time together during Jurado’s limited amount of free

time for the 3-week period.

392. The entire episode increased tension significantly between the parents and the

attorneys. It triggered the most adversarial posture between attorneys after the failure of

Smitherman, Petroff and Lambert to honor the original agreement.

393. There is a high probability that the parties would have settled the case in April 2013

without this incident. A previously scheduled 3-way settlement conference was cancelled due

to the new levels of high conflict and adversarial atmosphere that had been ignited by the

154


Bethel, who proceeded to use the high-conflict in furtherance of the conspiracy that was

racially motivated, even when her personal financial gain was also a factor.

VII.A.2(d) BETHEL’S AND LAMBERT’S AGREEMENT TO EXERT HARMFUL AGGRESSION, INTIMIDATION AND HARASSMENT – ANOTHER OBJECTIVE OF THE CONSPIRACY

REACHED

394. Between April and June 2013, the intrusions escalated to significant bullying,

intimidation and aggression to the point that it became unbearable. As Bethel’s and Lambert’s

joint pursuit was near successful, Jurado was forced to offer to relinquish his overnights with his

son due to the harm being inflicted—something that he had fought so hard to get. He had

come to the conclusion that making such significant sacrifice was the only temporary solution

for the concerted persecution and oppression to stop. Because Jurado’s attorney convinced

him to not relinquish the overnights as other solutions were put in motion, the failure of those

solutions led to new levels of intrusion, aggravation and bullying causing emotional distress and

anguish. The harm became so severe to the point that Jurado had to be taken to the

Emergency Room by EMS in one occasion in May 2013.

395. The GAL’s main tactic for sparking conflict and promoting antagonism was through

contradiction. This scheme became evident during the week of May 7-10, 2013: On her e-mail

to Jurado on May 7, 2013, Bethel encouraged him to pursue the nutritional supplementation

for the child with Formula by stating:

155


I do not understand is why she [Lambert] does not give you extra milk when you get Noah. That should help you not having to call her at every feeding time to ask for more. And, if Kathy cannot produce enough milk to give you extra, then I think that we have answered the question here. She is simply not able to produce enough for the child and formula needs to be introduced.

(Emphasis Added.) Bethel’s email to Jurado dated 5/7/2013 10:25am. But two days later,

Bethel sent another email to both parents and their attorneys stating the opposite, including,

Ari, while I appreciate your idea of Kathy bringing more milk to you in the morning to last you all day. However if she cannot produce enough for [redacted]'s entire stay with you at that time Then I do not believe it is unreasonable for her to be able to drop off milk later in the day. And, if she is just dropping the milk off on your porch, it is not like you are being put out in any way.

(Emphasis Added.) Attorney B. Bethel’s email to all parties dated 5/9/2013 2:37pm. The

premeditated contradiction was evident in this instance. In addition, the controversy was not

whether Lambert could or not provide additional breast milk later in the day, because Jurado

was not against it; it was about putting a limit on those drop offs to prevent abuse, as it turned

out to be the case. The product of Bethel’s contradictions and the email she sent on 5/9/2013

is what took place the next day as described next.

396. Jurado’s parenting experience reached a turning point on Friday, May 10 2013. As

feared, the already ongoing harassment by Lambert escalated when she felt entitled to stop by

as frequent as wished to drop off pump breast milk for each half-ounce she produced to

intrude in Jurado’s space as she walked in front of his all-glass front entrance/wall to leave

bottles, followed by text messaging. Considering that Jurado had spent the first part of the

week out of town for work and that Friday was his first day again with his son, he simply

156


wanted peace, quiet and quality time for both Plaintiffs’ time together. But instead, Jurado and

infant N.G. would have to spend two days with all his blinds closed and confined inside their

home. Initially, during the child’s drop off at Jurado’s place, an argument ensued because

Lambert’s conviction of not allowing formula supplementation and their different

interpretations of Bethel’s emails. She proceeded to look inside Jurado’s fridge and through his

kitchen cabinets. This turned out to be the last time that either parent entered the other

parent’s home, and the boundary set by Jurado is still in effect to this day. Jurado conclude

that the only course of action left was to call non-emergency Columbus Police after seeing

Lambert circling his apartment building on her car for almost an hour. But before he called the

cops, he made sure he had tried everything, including messages pleading for her to vacate the

vicinity.

397. On that same Friday, May 10, 2013 throughout the day, Lambert stopped an

excessive number of times to deliver single half-ounces of breast-milk and would leave them

right outside his entrance door, as she was still trying to prove that she did not need formula

supplementation to keep their child healthy. He noticed, as he had done a few other times in

the past, that the liquid in some of the containers where much lighter than the rest. He

proceeded to freeze two samples for lab testing at a later time, as he had suspected that

Lambert was watering down her breast-milk supply in order to meet the demand—the true

cause of the child’s earlier unthriving condition. By the end of the afternoon, Jurado had to call

for help, given that he noticed Lambert circling his home in her car between drop offs. Lambert

finally drove home after being asked by the police to do so.

157


398. The next day, as Jurado was driving his son to the exchange with Lambert, he started

feeling chest pains and difficulty breathing. Given that his infant son of 10 months of age was in

the back seat of the car, he felt frightened and pulled on the side of the freeway before calling

911. EMS personnel found him and his son on the side of I-670 and drove them to the nearest

hospital/ER. What his doctors and therapist concluded at a later time is that severe anguish

and emotional harm was done and that would explain those symptoms and the reason

Jurado—not known as a sufferer of anxiety/panic attacks—had to be taken to the emergency

room and heart center and Grant hospital in downtown.

399. It has been obvious that the tactics used in the conspiracy—to inflict mental anguish

and emotional harm—were carefully calculated. In this example, both defendants knew that

from Sunday nights to Thursdays, Jurado worked up to 80 hours in a fast-paced, highly stressful

environment in Chicago.

400. When Defendant Bethel learned about the events of that weekend, she proceeded to

censor and denigrate Jurado. First, she questioned his ability to care for his son given his

“medical condition”. Then she proceeded to criticize the involvement of police by Jurado.

From that point forward, she applied duress and intimidation that discouraged him from

involving law enforcement again.

401. Soon after Jurado’s therapist learned about the recent events, questioned the

motives and decisions of the GAL and requested to speak with her. Ms. Sigl-Davis attempts to

contact and communicate with Bethel went unanswered.

158


402. Several Family Services professionals monitoring the case from a distance agreed that

Defendant Bethel’s conduct was not appropriate for a GAL, and was likely the cause, or part, of

the problem. But Jurado’s attorney, as well as several other family law professionals consulted,

agreed that there was not much he could do to address his concerns or remove the GAL from

the case, because of the court’s history of protecting its GALs and due to the prominence and

influence Defendant Bethel had with the court, among other factors.

VII.A.2(e) AGREEMENT AND PARTICIPATION BY ODJFS AND SOME OF ITS AGENTS

403. The handling of Jurado’s referral and complaint regarding Brooksedge licensing rules

violations that he filed directly with ODFJS’ senior management and staff, not only shows

unlawful interference with their functions of the same order as the interference OOAG’s carried

out with OCRC’s investigation, but it also shows direct participation of ODJFS in both, the high-

conflict agreement of the conspiracy and the subordinate scheme of the Lawsuit against

Jurado.

404. For example, on July 5, 2013, when Jurado first met with ODJFS officials at their

facilities to discuss the issues and concerns regarding Brooksedge, Jurado discussed one

incident that had occurred two or three months back but that was already reported. He also

explained that the caretaker involved in that incident happened to be one of the few

Brooksedge employees that Jurado still trusted, and the incident and set of circumstances

demonstrated that most of the issues and concerns were derived from their quality of services

and perhaps lack of training opportunities Brooksedge offered to their employees and

caretakers, among other reasons. Jurado also discussed several other incidents that were more

159


significant and that had not been reported before. To Jurado’s surprise, when the investigation

was concluded and their inspection/investigation report issued, it did not mention many of the

issues Jurado had brought up to their attention, and the one incident Jurado had clarified that it

had been reported earlier was listed in their report as one of the complaints filed by Jurado that

they investigated. There were many other irregularities with the report, the investigation and

the overall handling of the complaints.

405. Jurado wrote a detailed letter to ODJFS Leadership including the senior officials he

had initially met with, describing his concerns with the handling of the investigation. ODJFS

responded with an invitation to their facilities again to discuss those concerns and Jurado’s

initial complaints about Brooksedge licensing violations. The second meeting was hosted by a

different team of managers than the first time. Just as the first meeting, the second meeting

seemed to have been productive. The meeting participants and Jurado carefully reviewed each

item in his letter, including his inquiry about the incident that he did not report as needing an

investigation but that was included as such.

406. About a month later, ODJFS released a new report with the outcome of their second

inspection/investigation into the allegations against Brooksedge. The second report and the

handling of the second investigation were marred with more irregularities than the first one.

And remarkably, the controversial incident that Jurado raised concerns because he did not

reported as a complaint needing investigation but was included in the first report and

investigated, it also appeared in the second report and emphasized, with the corresponding

investigation. A reasonable mind can only infer one possible scenario: that such course of

160


action by ODFJS was done on purpose to create discord between Jurado and the few

employees from Brooksedge that Jurado had been able to trust and that didn’t appear to be

participating in any collusion with Lambert or others at the facility.

VII.A.2(f) BETHEL’S HARASSMENT, PERSECUTION AND OTHER ACTS IN FURTHERANCE OF THE

AGREEMENT BETWEEN CO-CONSPIRATORS TO CREATE HIGH-CONFLICT CONTINUE

AFTER BEING REMOVED AS GUARDIAN AD LITEM FROM THE CUSTODY CASE

407. Since the May 2013 incident until the end of 2014, the hostility and instigation of

conflict by Defendant Bethel steadily continued even after her removal from the case on

September 24, 2014, in close coordination with Lambert, Smitherman and her other

confederates.

408. In Late November 2014, not long after Bethel’s removal from the custody case, a

prominent local attorney—also known for his specialty in the realm of legal ethics and

professionalism—formally entered his appearance in the custody case to represent Bethel in

several pending matters, including her efforts to refuse Jurado’s access to the records

pertaining to her work as GAL. When Jurado was served with the notice of appearance of

Bethel’s attorney (the attorney of attorney Bethel), he found enclosed a letter of introduction

from attorney Bradley Frick that contained threats and implied accusations that Jurado had

been unethically working with one or more attorneys. Jurado was not surprised given that

Bethel had aggressively accused him—while in court and captured in transcripts—of engaging

the services of ghostwriters. Jurado’s filings in the multiple cases he has had have never been

the product of ghostwriting while he was Pro Se, even when he had been aware that unbundled

services are legal in Ohio. Jurado was also aware that ghostwriting has always been a

161


controversial issue, even to this day (in some jurisdictions more than others) because it can lead

to “misconduct through pleadings” with potential for impunity—something that Jurado has

never done. On the contrary, as Jurado demonstrates in this case, one of the common threads

of the conspiracy is attorney and judicial misconduct by frivolous pleadings and fraudulent

misrepresentations in court filings.

VII.A.2(g) BETHEL’S SUB-SCHEME OF THE CONSPIRACY TO MAINTAIN HIGH CONFLICT FOR

HARMING PLAINTIFFS REMAINS IN EFFECT AS HER LEGACY AFTER BEING REMOVED: DEFENDANTS JUDGE JAMISON AND MCCASH PICKED UP WHERE BETHEL LEFT OFF

409. As described later in this complaint and substantiated in the 4000+ pages of exhibits

and evidence accumulated over the pendency of the custody case, Defendant Bethel was

successful at engaging the participation of others in her conspiracy with Lambert to interfere

with Jurado’s parenting rights and other fundamental and civil rights, and to inflict financial,

physiological and emotional harm. Those participants include Defendant Jamison, attorney

Erika Smitherman as Lambert’s counsel and Defendant Thomas McCash, among other state

actors, private individuals and non-parties to the case, as established throughout this

complaint. The currently pending lawsuit filed by Defendants Brooksedge and LeClair with

participation of attorney Alexander-Savino is just another of the many examples.

410. From the point that Jurado start utilizing formal procedures for removing Bethel

from the case, the Juvenile Court position and role changed. The differential treatment

received by Jurado as compared to Lambert, was elevated to hostility by the Court and acts in

furtherance of the High-Conflict Sub-Scheme. For example, Defendant Jamison, in open court,

declared Jurado an adversary of the Court in retaliation after he raised his concerns and

162


constitutional claims against the GAL, Defendant Bethel, in March 2014 and tried to remove her

from the case. This drastic change occurred only days after Defendant ODC had dismissed

Jurado’s grievance against Bethel. Since then, the Court has consistently acted hostile against

Jurado to this day. Therefore, the aggression was not only in furtherance of the High Conflict

scheme, but was also in retaliation against Jurado.

411. Several months later, while under pressure due to Jurado’s filing of an Action for

Writs with the Supreme Court of Ohio, Defendant Jamison removed Defendant Bethel as GAL

and immediately appointed Thomas McCash as her successor, who had been hand-picked by a

subset of the conspirators sometime before Bethel’s removal.

412. Not by simple chance and within two months after his appointment, Defendant

McCash went unannounced to Jurado’s home without probable cause or justification and

started harassing and intimidating Jurado and his elderly parents, causing alarm and distress to

them, to their grandson Plaintiff N.G. who was at home at the time, and to Plaintiff Jurado.

After he had been fully aware and in possession of extensive evidence of the past incidents,

Defendant McCash performed an enhanced reenactment of the previous incident when

Lambert harassed Jurado at his home, to the point that Jurado and his parents were

compelled to call law enforcement to ensure their safety and peace of mind.

VII.A.2(h) DEFENDANT MCCASH DELIBERATELY ENGAGED IN HOSTILE CONDUCT AGAINST THE

OWNER OF THE DAYCARE USED BY JURADO IN FURTHERANCE OF THE HIGH-CONFLICT SUB-SCHEME

413. Defendant McCash engaged in acts of intimidation and harassment against the

daycare owner used by Plaintiff Jurado, resulting in the immediate severance of the child’s

163


enrollment and agreement with Plaintiff Jurado. It has been well established through court

filings, proceedings and incidents outside the courtroom that having the child removed from

that facility was an objective intensely pursued for almost 12 months by Defendants Bethel,

Smitherman, Petroff Law and Lambert. Such sudden disruption caused havoc in Jurado’s

already overwhelmed daily life, and inflicted harm to both Plaintiffs by adding 100 miles of

driving on Jurado’s parenting days, which resulted in the undue burden of time, transportation

and the re-adjusting of the child’s schedule, not to mention the effect to Jurado’s work

schedule—given that defendants McCash, Lambert and Smitherman immediately pursued the

mandatory daycare attendance of the child at the Goddard School in Hilliard on a full-time

basis.

VII.A.2(i) DEFENDANTS GODDARD SCHOOL-HILLIARD II, WILSON AND EAGLE’S AGREEMENT

TO JOIN AND PARTICIPATE WITH OVERT ACTS IN FURTHERANCE OF THE

HIGH-CONFLICT & HOSTILITY CONSPIRACY SUB-SCHEME

414. One example of an overt acts in furtherance of Defendants’ agreement to create and

maintain high-conflict is the incidents that took place collectively at the Goddard School-Hilliard

II in February 2015, when Defendants Wilson, the Goddard School-Hilliard II and Eagle carried

out a scheme to intimidate and injure Plaintiffs by the staging of “safety traps” in their kitchen

and coercing Jurado into taking little N.G. into the kitchen, despite the rules and warning signs

in the kitchen door reading that children were not allowed, followed by intimidations as a

coordinated effort when Jurado was verbally attacked, tormented and humiliated in the

presence of his son and all the children in the class. The teacher’s aggressive and abusive

remarks calling Jurado “STUPID” and her threats that he would not be allowed to see his son

164


again also caused substantial emotional distress on Plaintiff N.G., as the recording of the

incident shows.

VII.A.3. TO DOWNPLAY, COVER-UP, OR DENY ANY EXISTENCE OF HEALTH AND SAFETY ISSUES IF RAISED BY THE NON-WHITE PARENT JURADO

VII.A.3(a) THE PRE-BIRTH INCIDENT

415. In March 2012, Jurado raised concerns to Lambert’s regular OBGYN about Lambert’s

low iron levels and her non-compliance with treatment, amid the multi-factor high-risk

pregnancy condition. Lambert, in her second trimester of pregnancy at the time, assured her

doctor that there was nothing to be worried about.

416. In June 2012 and within weeks of her due date, Lambert was hospitalized on an

emergency basis on orders by her high-risk pregnancy OBGYN specialist, due to a severe life-

threatening anemia that jeopardized the lives of the unborn baby and of Lambert. Lambert and

baby experienced critical complications during their 3-day stay at hospital. Several pints of

blood from the blood bank were used for transfusion. The condition was easily preventable.

VII.A.3(b) CHILD STRUGGLED OR AT RISK FOR FAILURE TO THRIVE DURING FIRST 6 MONTHS

417. At birth, Plaintiff N.G.’s weight was exactly in the 50th percentile for weight in the

WHO Growth Charts.

165


418. Between November-December 2012, the low weight and wasting appearance of the

child continued to increase to an alarming point. Jurado, his family and friends, all shared the

same concerns given the obvious low-weight appearance of the child. By 4-months of age,

Plaintiff N.G.’s weight had plunged below the 1st percentile for weight in the WHO Growth

Charts. On November 16, 2012, the measurement was exactly 0.26% in the growth charts.

That same day, Lambert relayed Jurado’s concerns to the doctor. Both Lambert and her friend-

pediatrician Dr. Muresan agreed to

report no concerns and adopted the

intentional fallacy that “it is just his

size and nothing to worry about”.

By the end of the year, the weight

rate was still near 0.28%.

419. Sometime after his access

to Brooksedge daycare was restored, Jurado inquired with the child’s caretakers regarding his

own observations of cues that the infant was left hungry on a daily basis. The caretakers at

Brooksedge confirmed that the child cried right after finishing his breast milk bottles but that

“he eventually stopped [crying]”.

420. In January-February 2013, Jurado made an attempt to have their son evaluated by a

nutritionist but Lambert opposed his decision. The appointment got cancelled.

421. Between January and April 2013, solid foods were introduced to the child as

secondary sources of nutrients, followed by formula supplementation by Jurado and over

166


Lambert’s objections. Their son finally started gaining weight at a normal pace, eventually

reaching again the 50th percentile in the growth charts.

422. In late-March 2013, Jurado was finally able to take his son for an evaluation and

second opinion with Lambert’s attendance. Bethel was invited to participate but she declined.

The second-opinion pediatrician, Dr. Mastruserio, confirmed that the child had experienced

weight-gain issues during the first six months of life, and explained the steps that she would

have taken had she been the child’s pediatrician. She explained to both parents that, given the

circumstances and Lambert’s challenges producing breast milk, supplementing with formula

would be recommended because the benefits outweighed any drawbacks.

423. The pediatrician--whose affiliation to Nationwide Children’s Hospital started since she

was appointed on 11/19/1996 and has been the recipient of awards and honors—suggested a

referral to a specialist to answer some of the questions she was unable to answer, including any

long-term effects of the nutritional deficiency the child experienced during the first six months

of his life. The information was later shared with the attorneys and Bethel.

424. By April 1, 2013, Jurado had already started to make a case to change the child’s

pediatrician, a change that Lambert adamantly opposed.

425. Between late-March and early-April 2013, Lambert breastfed the infant in Jurado’s

presence for the last time. He again noticed as he had before that Lambert flickered and

slapped the infant’s face as a method of “teaching the infant” not to pull or bite her nipples,

even when he had yet to grow teeth.

167


426. On April 12, 2013, Jurado informed Lambert that he was taking their child to the

Emergency Room on instructions given by the doctor’s office as far as reaching a threshold

temperature of high fever. Lambert arrived first. Both parents wore security name tags with

“Baby Hernandez” name, the name under which the child had been registered.

427. In April 2013, after numerous requests and insistence from Jurado, Lambert finally

agreed to (officially) increase the number of ounces of milk per feeding. Jurado had been

observing for the past 7 months that his son consistently showed signs of being hungry even

right after his feedings. Previously, he had inquired with the caretakers from Brooksedge and

they confirmed that the infant would consistently cry after finishing his bottles, but “he would

eventually stop [crying]”. Almost simultaneously, Lambert started making a case that Jurado

was “overfeeding” the infant.

428. In April 2013, Dr. Mastruserio asked to speak with the Guardian Ad Litem, Blythe

Bethel. She wanted to explain directly to the GAL her recommendation for a new pediatrician

for the child (other than herself).

429. On April 29, 2013, Defendant Bethel sent an email to the parties and their attorneys

refusing to talk to Dr. Mastruserio, to perform any investigation, or to request a court hearing

to address existing health concerns about the child on the grounds of staying impartial.

430. Between July and August 2013, Defendants Bethel and Lambert—with the

participation of Dr. Muresan, a pediatrician-friend of Lambert—corruptly exerted undue

168


influence upon Jurado’s Key Expert Witness Dr. Mastruserio. As a result, Dr. Mastruserio

recanted some of her earlier assertions and broke communications with Jurado.

431. At least three other pediatricians or pediatric specialists that have evaluated the child

or reviewed his records have agreed with Dr. Mastruserio that his weight and size

measurements during Plaintiff N.G.’s first six months of life don’t look good.

VII.A.3(c) FIRST SIGN OF CHILD MALTREATMENT – THE BLACK EYE

432. In Early-May 2013, Lambert dropped off the infant at Brooksedge with a highly

visible black-eye. Lambert explained to the Brooksedge caretakers that the child had hurt

himself with a Sippy cup. This was exactly the period of time that the child had gotten new

teeth and started a habit of biting adults.

433. Nursing mothers usually make the decision to stop direct-breast feeding when their

infants enter this stage and instead continue to breast-pump only, because typically their

infants would injure them inadvertently. Despite the risk, Lambert forced a situation and

continued to direct-breastfeed until at least September 2013, even when there was already a

history of the child hurting her breast earlier in the year before he had grown teeth.

434. Brooksedge failed to make a referral or report, even when they were trained to

identify the difference between self-inflicted injuries and other types of injuries not self-

inflicted, according to the strength limitations of an infant based on age, size, etc. The

recording from October 8, 2013 provides evidence that Brooksedge should have reported the

black eye, as it captured the emergency room doctor at Nationwide Children’s Hospital

169


discussing with Lambert his concerns about the black eye. As Lambert tried to conceal the

cause of the infant’s black eye by downplaying the severity of the injury, the doctor firmly

maintained his position by telling Lambert “* * * A ten month old with a black eye, I don't

have a choice! Like that is a mandate. I would be breaking the law if I didn't report that!”

(Emphasis Added.) Tr. NCH ER, Oct. 8, 2013 Part-II, page 1 (See Exhibit ). Defendant Bethel

also helped covered up the seriousness of the black eye by dismissing it as “it happened several

months ago”.

435. The unlawful interference with ODJFS resulted in the complete indifference regarding

the licensing violation by Brooksedge and decided not to investigate. The psychologist brought

in by Bethel, Dr. Smalldon, also concealed the incident by leaving it out of his evaluation and

report. Defendants McCash, Judge Jamison, Petroff and Smitherman also chose to look the

other way. Defendants OOAG, Gutowski, OCRC, Garcia and Dunn were in possession of the

October 8, 2013 video, but ignored it and withheld the information on their reports and from

the Commissioners during the March 2014 hearing. Even Defendant Wilson made misleading

statements under oath to help cover up the black eye incident while giving her witness

testimony during trial in January 2015.

VII.A.3(d) DEVELOPMENTAL AND BEHAVIORAL CONCERNS

436. Between the summer and fall of 2013, Lambert reported to the child’s pediatrician

overstated information about the developmental milestones of the child during several visits.

For example, Lambert would report that the child could speak 20 words when evidence shows

from the recordings that the child’s caretakers from Brooksedge, and the Goddard School-

170


Hilliard II, reported that he only spoke two words or four at the most, consistent with the

observations of other adults that had significant interaction with the child, including Jurado,

that knew the child had a mild to medium delay in his speech development.

437. Jurado had also raised concerns regarding some unique behavioral patterns that the

child was presenting, and that was supported by reports from his caretakers at daycare, but

Lambert and Dr. Muresan showed indifference and skepticism with their denial of the factors

and characteristics the child was presenting at the time.

438. When Jurado finally found an opportunity to get the child evaluated without the

interference of Lambert and Bethel in 2014, the head Behavioral and Developmental Pediatric

Expert at the Cleveland Clinic confirmed some of Jurado’s concerns and also found a correlation

between the different symptoms and characteristics Jurado had observed. For example,

Plaintiff N.G.’s inability to communicate at the same rate of other children his age contributed

to his spikes of aggressiveness or temper tantrums which were cause by his frustration for

being unable to communicate.

439. Although Jurado did not report any concerns with the child’s hearing, the pediatric

expert at the Cleveland Clinic ordered routine tests that uncovered temporary hearing loss the

child was suffering from frequent allergies and colds. The frequent allergies and colds was

another concern raised by Jurado in the past and ignored by Lambert. According to the

Cleveland Clinic expert, the temporary but recurring hearing loss was likely the explanation for

the child’s speech delay, a condition minor N.G. was quickly overcoming.

171


VII.A.3(e) COMMUNICABLE DISEASE - DEFENDANTS IN DENIAL REGARDING THE CHILD’S

SEVERE DIARRHEA AS PRETEXT TO ENFORCE MANDATORY DAYCARE ATTENDANCE

440. As described in section , Lambert entered an agreement with Brooksedge to

conceal the child’s true condition of experiencing frequent diarrhea with the sole purpose of

preventing Jurado from caring for the child at his home, but unnecessarily exposed other

children to communicable diseases.

VII.A.3(f) THE FREQUENT INJURIES

441.

VII.A.3(g) DRIVING THROUGH SNOW STORM

442.

VII.A.3(h) LOW HEMOGLOBIN LEVELS & OTHER NON LIFE-THREATNING ISSUES

443.

VII.A.3(i) PEDOPHILE IN MATERNAL FAMILY CIRCLE

444.

VII.A.4. TO FABRICATE OR STAGE HEALTH AND SAFETY ISSUES RAISED BY LAMBERT OR HER

CO-CONSPIRATORS AS THE BASIS FOR ENGAGING IN A SCAPEGOAT MECHANISM

AGAINST JURADO, REGARDLESS IF THE FABRICATION IS SOLELY FICTION BASED ON

FRAUD AND PERJURY, OR IF THE FRAMING WOULD RESULT IN ACTUAL INJURIES TO

THE CHILD

VII.A.4(a) FINDING FAULT IN THE WALKER USED BY JURADO

445. As the recording of the visits to the pediatrician show, Lambert in tandem with her

friend Dr. Muresan focused their energies in constant censuring of trivial parenting

172


disagreement against Jurado, like his use of a “walker” for the child. Without knowing the

measures he was taking, the fact that Jurado has no stairs at his house, and that he would use

the walker in a wide open area in front of his home-as the video recording shows—Lambert and

the pediatrician lectured, nitpick and censured Jurado for any issues they could find.

VII.A.4(b) THE INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF HEAD INJURIES

446. The frequent head injuries sustained by the child between August and October 2013

while under the care of Brooksedge seemed to be simple accidents, although preventable,

especially the last one and more severe that trigger the visit to the Emergency Room on

October 8, 2013—as Jurado felt necessary to make sure the frequent injuries were superficial

and were of normal causation. Jurado also believed what the conspirators wanted everyone to

believe: that the sudden disenrollment of the child from Brooksedge and ensuing lawsuit filed

against Jurado were the result and the triggered reaction of Brooksedge and LeClair of the

events that took place at Nationwide Children’s Hospital and the consequential involvement of

Children Services to investigate possible child abuse or neglect by Brooksedge.

447. However, with the new evidence uncovered between November 2014 and February

2015 consisting of covert communications and e-mails between Bethel, Dr. Smalldon, LeClair,

Smitherman and other co-conspirators that took place as early as August 2013, discussing their

desire and plans to file a lawsuit against Jurado, it is evident that defendants staged the

circumstances that led to the Emergency Room visit and investigation by Children Services,

including the intentional infliction of the child’s injuries, in order to create the appearance that

Jurado’s actions on October 8, 2013 of taking the child to the hospital and discussing with the

173


doctors his concerns about the frequent injuries the child had been sustaining for the previous

two months.

VII.A.4(c) THE KITCHEN SAFETY TRAPS

448. In February 2015, Defendants Wilson the Goddard School and Eagle carried out a

scheme, organized by Lambert and Smitherman, to frame and injure Jurado and N.G.—or at

least intimidate Jurado—by the utilization of “safety traps” in their kitchen and the coercion of

Jurado into taking little N.G. into the kitchen with him, despite safety rules against it and

warning signs in the kitchen door reading that children were not allowed. This happened in

during two different visits in which each instance involved the participation of different

conspirators within the Goddard School-Hilliard II.

VII.A.5. TO HARM PLAINTIFF JURADO AND DEPRIVE HIM OF A FAIR CHANCE IN THE CUSTODY CASE

VII.A.5(a) UNDUE HARDSHIP CREATED BY CONSPIRATORS TO ENSURE JURADO’S DEPRIVATION

OF RIGHT TO RETAIN PRIVATE COUNSEL COUPLED WITH JUDGE JAMISON’S REFUSAL

TO PROVIDE HIM WITH COURT APPOINTED ATTORNEY

449. Using delaying tactics and procedural maneuvers to avoid granting Jurado with the

economic relief he sought for months by the modification of child support, Defendants Judge

Jamison, Lambert and Smitherman created an additional burden for Jurado given that 100% of

his child support obligation had been in overage. While Lambert enjoyed a salary of six figures

as an executive of a retailer, more than the income earned by Jurado, he had to pay around

$1,300/month to her, in addition to the unnecessary child care tuition fees of $800.00 imposed

by defendants, the insurance premiums for insurance coverage of both Plaintiffs, about

174


$500/month in out of pocket medical expenses, and over $1,000/month in interest for the high

credit card balances accumulated due to the over-inflation of Jurado’s attorney fees and

litigation costs resulting from Bethel’s sub-scheme of high conflict.

450. The immediate result of Jurado’s financial crisis was his inability to keep his counsel

as the unpaid balance of attorney fees was exceeding $8,000.00 by January 2014. Once Jurado

began litigating the case Pro Se, the downstream ramifications were substantial, reducing his

chances to keep up with litigation, for compliance with court orders, procedures and impact to

his day-to-day life.

VII.A.5(b) CONTINUOUS DEPRIVATION OF JURADO’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS BY JUDGE

JAMISON COUPLED WITH DEFENDANTS’ FRAUDULENT CONDUCT ALL CARRIED OUT

IN CONCERT

451. With maybe one exception, every court proceeding involved the deprivation of

Jurado’s right to present evidence, of his right to be heard, or to receive proper notice of the

proceeding as the evidence shows. The ongoing fraudulent conduct by Smitherman, Bethel,

McCash and Lambert during court proceedings and on their filings and pleadings also deprived

Jurado of a fair chance during the course of the case.

175


VII.A.6. TO PRE-ARRANGE OR PRE-DETERMINE EACH ONE OF JURADO’S ACTIONS, CASES, ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS OR GRIEVANCES TO DISFAVOR HIM AND PRECLUDE

THE DETERMINATION OF HIS CLAIMS ON THE MERITS

VII.A.6(a) DEFENDANTS STONE AND ODC DISMISSED JURADO’S GRIEVANCE WITH

PREMEDITATION TO AVOID ADDRESSING THE MERITS OF HIS CLAIMS AGAINST

BETHEL

452. As it is argued in detail in Jurado’s Title VI Complaint filed with the U.S. DOJ, ODC

deviated from customary procedures and the regular practices of meeting their statutory duties

of investigating grievances. In the case of Jurado, they simply dismissed his case. See ODC’s

Determination Letter in Exhibit AC1-H2, pages 170–172 of the Appendix. Each one of their

arguments defending their conduct that were included in their Motion to Dismiss of Jurado’s

Original Action in Mandamus and Prohibition were pretextual as Jurado established in his Title

VI complaint. More information about the voluntary participation of ODC-SCO Defendants in

the coordinated efforts to retaliate against Jurado is provided in section VII.A.9(a) below. Also a

partial reproduction of Jurado’s Title VI complaint is included in Exhibit AC1-A2, pages 24–32 of

the Appendix.

VII.A.6(b) DEFENDANTS OOAG, OCRC, GUTOWSKI, GARCIA AND DUNN PARTICIPATING IN

THE PRE-ARRANGED DECISIONS OF JURADO’S COMPLAINTS AGAINST BROOKSEDGE

BEFORE THEIR INVESTIGATION HAD STARTED

453. There is substantial evidence proving without a doubt that these Defendants jointly

pre-determined Jurado’s complaints of discrimination and retaliation against Brooksedge

Daycare before reaching a conclusion based on the merits of his complaints. These defendants

also conspired to conceal from Jurado that his cases had been already pre-determined, as

described in more detail in sections VII.F.2, VII.G.1 and VII.G.2 below. The e-mails between

176


these Defendants and notes handwritten by Garcia showing the prearrangement of the

outcome of Jurado’s cases have been included in Exhibit AC1-J1, pages 188–195 of the

Consolidated Appendix of Exhibits, including their agreement to find “NPC” or no-probable

cause on Jurado’s claim of retaliation before he filed his case.

VII.A.6(c) CONCERTED ACTION BETWEEN SMITHERMAN, JUDGE JAMISON, AND UNNAMED

DEFENDANTS FROM THE TENTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS, INCLUDING THE

COURT ADMINISTRATOR, DOUG EATON.

454. The full participation of Mr. Eaton and others from the Tenth District Court of

Appeals of Ohio in the plot to avoid each one of Jurado’s appellate cases reaching a decision on

the merits is evident considering the facts and the evidence available. In each of the three

Appeals Jurado filed and that are still pending, the Appeals Court denied Jurado from the relief

he was seeking of a Stay, even when he demonstrated that granting him the stay was a matter

of rights and a matter of law. In a few instances, their Judgment entry did not have any

explanation for the denials, and in other instances the reasons were obviously pretextual. In

each of these instances, denying Jurado his Motions for Stay had as a purpose to render the

appeal moot, given that the orders been appealed would have been a moot issue by the time

the briefings would be filed and decided. By denying Jurado of a Stay in matters related to

Contempt, for which Jurado faces jail time, these state actors were committing an overt act in

furtherance of the conspiracy, specifically to enable the retaliation against Jurado.

455. The January 16, 2015 recording of their phone conversation along with e-mails sent

between Jurado and Mr. Eaton show that the Denial of Jurado’s Motion for a Stay of the Order

suspending his parenting time was pre-arranged before Jurado had even completed his filings.

177


The recording of the phone call, which was made more than one hour before Jurado’s

emergency brief was filed, captured the Administrator explaining to Jurado how he had “only”

submitted the judgment entry (denying his Motion) in draft mode in the e-filing system because

he was not sure if he would find other judges later in the afternoon to sign the order. Eaton’s

tone of frustration came about due to the confusion created by another Judgment entry that

had been issued on the same day for another one of Jurado’s Motions to Stay. Emails and the

recording show how Eaton later tried to rationalize the disclosed information after he

determined that the second denial was the source of confusion. Nevertheless, he never denied

that the Order he had referred to earlier that day was indeed filed by him in draft mode with

the signature of a panel of three judges, while they pretended to seem like they were waiting

for Jurado’s brief before reaching a decision.

456. In another instance, Jurado’s Motion to Stay was denied under unusual

circumstances. The filings and emails from Feb. 11, 2015 show Mr. Easton having knowledge

that the filings by McCash in opposition to Jurado’s Motion to Stay had not been served.

Nevertheless, he conspired to have the Judgment entry issue without giving Jurado a chance to

respond. After Jurado filed a Motion for reconsideration with new arguments and pointing out

the irregularities around the first entry, the Appeals Court denied his motion in their Entry filed

on February 18, 2015. The entry included an explanation by the court that in itself constitutes a

substantial irregularity. For instance, Jurado’s arguments in his initial motion were completely

different than his reconsideration. In fact, comparing the two side by side is nearly impossible

to find the same information or arguments between the two. Yet, the Judgment Entry stated

178


that “appellant simply re-presents the same arguments he made in support of his motion for

stay * * *”.

457. In the most recent over act in furtherance of the conspiracy, these state actors are

clearly collaborating with Judge Jamison to guarantee Jurado’s incarceration from the first

Contempt order he appealed in November 2014. The first Motion to stay denied under that

appeal had as a goal to allow Judge Jamison to enforce the sentence and had Jurado serve jail

time while depriving him of his right to appeal. After several months have passed and the

matter has been fully briefed and ripe for adjudication, the Court schedules the matter for Oral

Hearing to occur in May. The fact that there is no apparent reason or need for oral arguments,

and that no party requested it shows that this was a premeditated act to allow Judge Jamison

extra time to enforce the jail time, especially given that the Tenth District denies many requests

for oral hearings from parties, and now without the need, they sua sponte scheduled one. Also

the fact that Mr. Easton had denied multiple times Jurado’s request for oral hearing when

dealing with emergency motions, having unnecessary oral arguments allows one to infer an

ulterior motive. To make their participation in the conspiracy more evident, Judge Jamison sua

sponte issued an order in mid-March 2015 (a few weeks ago) granting Jurado a motion for stay

that he initially filed back in November 2014 but with a cash bond of $5, 279.23—an amount

Judge Jamison knows Jurado is far from being able to pay. This Order is directly related to the

Appeal that was recently set for Oral hearing, effectively delaying its adjudication. By looking at

the Appellee’s Brief filed in that appeal and comparing it to Jurado’s brief, the conclusion any

reasonable mind would reach is that Jurado should prevail.

179


VII.A.6(d) IRREGULARITIES IN CONNECTION WITH JURADO’S AFFIDAVIT OF DISQUALIFICATION, REQUESTING THE CHIEF JUSTICE (SCO) TO REMOVE JUDGE JAMISON FROM THE

CASE

458. Jurado filed an affidavit of disqualification against Judge Jamison in late-January

2015, after studying several other past cases that were successful and others that were not. To

his surprise, the handling of his petition deviated from standard practices and previous rulings

of the same court and Chief Justice. Jurado’s filing consisted of a 25+ page affidavit supported

with almost 400 pages of exhibits. Judge Jamison’s response was under 10 pages and had one

exhibit. In perhaps the fastest turnaround time possible, the Chief Justice issued an opinion

that appeared to have relied only on the assertions of the Judge and without reading Jurado’s

affidavit. It is evident because of the “main example” she referred to in the judgment entry was

very different than the main example in Jurado’s filing. The fact that the Entry included

mention of different dates in the affidavit but missed the most important date in Jurado’s

affidavit related to his main example, which was also the most recent event.

459. The opinion in the Judgment entry denying Jurado’s affidavit for disqualification of

Judge Jamison is tantamount of declaring that “a Judge does not demonstrate bias or

prejudice when tells a litigant before the start of trial that, if he/she was ran-over by a car the

week before, it is because he or she deserved it”.

460. The fact that the judgment entry was issued within one business day after Judge

Jamison filed her response indicate a deviation from the norms. It is well known that most

Motions and requests for Emergency Relief do not get adjudicated in a timely manner or as fast

as the Movant would expect the higher court to do so. Rarely the higher court has ruled on an

180


Emergency Motion within hours or a day after filing. But in this case, all the usual and

important affairs were put aside to deal with the affidavit as if it was a matter of emergency.

Similar to the conclusions one can infer by Mr. Eaton’s and the appeals court’s actions, the

expedited consideration of the Affidavit was done with the sole purpose of denying Jurado of a

remedy available to others under the same circumstances. Namely, the statute provides that

the timely filing of an affidavit has a similar effect of a stay in the underlying case. Therefore, if

Jurado’s affidavit would have been dealt with over a 2-month period as it is typical for other

affidavits of disqualification with similar characteristics, the proceedings with Judge Jamison

would have been stayed automatically. But a fast turnaround within the 7-day window prior to

the next proceeding scheduled would offset the staying of the proceeding. In the example at

hand, the proceeding that the affidavit was expected to stay or delay was for Jurado’s

incarceration. Therefore, the goal of incarcerating Jurado at any cost continues to appear as

one of the central themes in the conspiracy.

181


VII.A.7. CONCEALMENT

VII.A.7(a) COVER UP MISTAKES, WRONGDOING, BEHAVIORS AND ACTS BY MAIN CONSPIRATOR

LAMBERT, INCLUDING ANY UNINTENTIONAL OR INTENTIONAL NEGLECT AND HARM

TO THE CHILD.

VII.A.7(b) COVER UP BETHEL’S MISCONDUCT AND DENY THE EXISTENCE OF ANY FORM OF

RACISM OR DISCRIMINATION BY BETHEL OR ANYONE ELSE DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY

CONNECTED TO THIS CASE.

VII.A.8. INTERFERE WITH STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS

VII.A.8(a) ODJFS

VII.A.8(b) OCRC

VII.A.8(c) FCCS

VII.A.8(d) ODC

VII.A.9. RETALIATION

461. The first significant overt act of retaliation since the conspiracy began was the filing

of the civil lawsuit against Jurado in October 2013. Although the lawsuit is in itself an act of

retaliation, it was instituted as a subsidiary scheme under the overarching conspiracy and

retaliation is just one of several objectives of the sub-scheme, as detailed in section VII.A.9(d)

below.

VII.A.9(a) ODC-SCO DEFENDANTS ENTERED AGREEMENT WITH JAMISON , BETHEL AND

OTHERS TO RETALIATE, CONCEAL AND PROTECT BETHEL

462. On January 6, 2014, Jurado filed a formal Grievance with ODC against the attorney-

GAL Blythe Bethel for misconduct, RACIAL BIAS, deceptive and unethical acts, fraud,

misrepresentations to the court, and other unlawful conduct. In addition to the standard

182


grievance form Jurado completed, he included a 10-page supplementary statement of fact

document, and 400+ pages of exhibits along with more than half-dozen audio/video recordings.

463. At the time of the filing, ODC confirmed that the filing could be amended at a later

time, because Jurado had inquired as he intended to do so. They also stated that, until the

Custody Case was over, an investigation could not start. Hearing that feedback, Jurado shared

his ease given his concerns of retaliation by Bethel once she would find out about the

grievance.

464. To his surprise, on March 3, 2014, Defendants ODC and Stone issued a determination

letter claiming that they are not authorized to investigate Jurado’s complaints against Bethel,

under the pretext that she was acting as a Guardian Ad Litem. In their letter—which was also

sent to Bethel—they directed me to raise any issues, concerns or complaints with the Court

that appointed Bethel as GAL. Also, the determination letter gave no option for

reconsideration; therefore, it failed to comply with the Rules for the Government of the Bar.

See ODC’s Determination Letter in Exhibit AC1-H2, pages 170–172 of the Appendix.

465. Two days later, in answering Jurado's inquiries based on ODC’s assertions in their

determination letter, described what Jurado already knew: the local rule for the oversight of

Guardians Ad Litem, including the process of accepting and reviewing comments and

complaints regarding a GAL’s performance, exists for the exclusive purpose of keeping or

removing a GAL from the appointment list. Understandably, Magistrate Palmer stated that she

is not Disciplinary Counsel and that the scope of her duties does not permit any impact to the

ongoing case, implying that her role and the scope of that process does not include dealing with

183


misconduct allegations. See e-mail from Hon. Gina Palmer, Legal Director of the Juvenile Court.

Exhibit AC1-H3, pages 173–174 of the Appendix.

466. Pages 72 and 73 of the transcript of the court proceedings from March 26, 2014,

which was conducted two weeks after ODC's dismissal of Jurado's grievance against Bethel,

show defendant Bethel admitting to having received or having knowledge of all the

information, exhibits and other evidence Jurado submitted to the Disciplinary Counsel in

support of his grievance.

467. The simple act of issuing the determination letter before the custody case had been

finalized would evidently have an adverse effect on the grievant, and will instigate retaliation.

In this case, Jurado was assured by ODC that it would not happen. They also had confirmed with

Jurado that when issuing a dismissal of a grievance, they do not share all the supporting

information filed in the case with respondent.

468. Each one of ODC’s and Stone’s arguments defending their conduct that were

included in their Motion to Dismiss of Jurado’s Original Action in Mandamus and Prohibition

were pretextual as Jurado established in his Title VI complaint. Exhibit AC1-A2, pages 24–32 of

the Appendix.

469. Bethel's statements in open court, when she asked for the court to limit the number

of pages in the affidavits that were going to be submitted, including "this court is going to be

inundated with thousands and thousands of pages of stuff * * * I know what has been

submitted to the [ODC] Supreme Court." (Emphasis Added.) Tr., Mar. 26, 2014, 72:15–73:5.

184


The Partial transcript is included in exhibit AC1-H4, pages 175–183 of the Consolidated

Appendix of Exhibits.

470. While the court went into a short recess, pages 79–81 of the transcript shows

Defendant Bethel talking down to Plaintiff Jurado with repugnance toward him, and harassing

him with unfounded accusations of recording the proceedings, of engaging in ghostwriting, etc.

471. If Bethel already had ethnic antipathy since her appointment as GAL for the

preceding twelve months, the premeditated actions by ODC-SCO Defendants clearly

intensified the hatred.

VII.A.9(b) JUDGE JAMISON OPENLY PROCLAIMED JURADO AS ADVERSARY OF THE COURT, A

WEEK AFTER ODC’S DISMISSAL OF JURADO’S GRIEVANCE AGAINST BETHEL

472. Starting in January of 2014, Defendants the Juvenile Court and Judge Jamison started

adopting an arbitrary and unreasonable attitude with lack of impartiality, which appeared to

increase in proportion to Jurado’s efforts to address his claims of constitutional violations by

the GAL and his efforts to remove her and align with the timing of Jurado’s filings with the ODC.

473. On Mach 13, 2014, Defendant Jamison declared Jurado an adversary of the court, as

memorialized in the official court transcripts.

474. Some of acts and omissions by the Court include depriving Jurado of the opportunity

to be heard, not hearing his motions (either by prohibiting him from fling them, by setting

continuances, after continuances, or other means), and conducting proceedings that ignored

185


court rules and statutory rights and duties, always in favor of the other party or the GAL, while

ignoring their misconduct inside the court room.

VII.A.9(c) RETALIATION BY JUDGE JAMISON INTENSIFIED WITH THE SUPPORT AND BLESSING OF

ODC-SCO DEFENDANTS AFTER JURADO’S FILING OF HIS ORIGINAL ACTION IN

MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION

475. Between August 2014 and January 2015, the retaliation and conspiracy reached new

levels and peaked by the end of 2014, while the aggression and abuses against Plaintiff Jurado

became overt and more severe. Two weeks after Jurado’s filing of his action for writs with the

SCO, their differential treatment of Jurado by the Court became more obvious and the

retaliation more pronounced. Their acts and omissions escalated to the point of permanently

misplacing evidence, issuing court judgments with incorrect information in orders and journal

entries.

476. After the partial hearing to remove Bethel was conducted on August 1, 2014, the

participation and collusion of ODC-SCO defendants with the Juvenile Court increased, given that

Bethel’s misconduct and unlawful acts were starting to get uncovered. This became evident at

the scheduled hearing on August 27, 2014 to conclude the removal of Bethel. At the very last

minute, Judge Jamison issued an order of continuance to Sept. 24, 2014.

477. This seemingly harmless course of action in fact was the result of collaboration with

the Judiciary because: (a) the order shows that the Court requested the continuance using an

"ongoing trial" causing a conflict of schedule. When the order was signed and issued, it was

around 1pm on August 27, 2014. However, no proceeding was conducted that afternoon after

1pm. (b) The hearing scheduled for August 27, 2014 at 1pm for the removal of Bethel was not

186


conducted at the request/order of ODC–SCO Defendants, who provided the Juvenile Court and

Judge Jamison with the key date of September 24, 2014 for setting the new date to conduct the

hearing. They were the only ones that could anticipate what was to occur on that date: The

High Court would issue a judgment entry granting the dismissal of Jurado’s action. (c) Instead

of the "ongoing trial", Defendants conducted a private meeting to plan the next steps for the

effective concealment of Bethel's unlawful conduct, the protection of her reputation, and the

acts of retaliation to be carried out against Jurado. (d) ODC–SCO Defendants underscored to

Judge Jamison the reach of the carte blanche they had granted, authorizing her to use whatever

means necessary to handle her Juvenile case and rein in Plaintiff Jurado. See exhibit AC1-H5,

page 185 of the Appendix.

478. The retaliation culminated with the complete deprivation of Jurado’s rights to

substantive and procedural due process, which took place on the same day that the SCO

dismissed his complaint: (a) against the rules of Juvenile Procedure, the Court held a proceeding

in Chambers and without an option to record the 2 hour proceeding, in order to avoid review

by Appeal and to prevent Jurado from raising additional constitutional claims, (b) Defendant

Jamison ordered Jurado to sign a Withdrawal of Motion form after being intimidated, as

opposed to Sua Sponte dismissing the action to remove the GAL, (c) with no notice, or service

effected prior to the proceeding, an impromptu Show Cause hearing was held on this same day

without giving him the opportunity to prepare and over Jurado’s repeated objections. As the

court precluded him to introduce evidence relevant to his defense and against statutory

provisions that require the court to do so, the court found him in contempt and sentenced him

187


to jail time. The court chose a date explicitly for the purpose of the sentence to be served over

the Thanksgiving Holidays.

479. It is undisputable that the severe violations and offenses being committed in the last

four months of 2014 have been the direct consequence of Plaintiff Jurado’s filing of his action in

the Supreme Court of Ohio and his disclosure of his initiatives involving Title VI relief. As soon

as he warned and gave formal notice of this impending action at different points in time

between September and December 2014, defendant Jamison started conducting proceedings

that delivered vengeance instead of justice. Indeed, Defendants the Juvenile Court and Jamison

devised a strategy to first engage in the most effective and ultimate retaliatory acts and to

make Plaintiff Jurado pay retribution, and also to protect both the Court and Defendant Bethel

from embarrassment and liability.

480. The plan involved toning down the existing complaints against Defendants Bethel and

Jamison, preventing additional cross-examination of Bethel as a witness, and discrediting

Plaintiff Jurado and his claims, all while maximizing injuries to the Plaintiffs. The Juvenile Court

swiftly put this plan into motion on or before September 24, 2014. The plan became obvious

when Plaintiff Jurado was coerced and forced to sign a Withdraw of Motion form to halt the full

evidentiary hearing against (to remove) Defendant Bethel half way through cross-examination.

Defendant Jamison then “sua sponte” removed Defendant Bethel as appointed Guardian Ad

Litem in order to protect her from further prosecution within the case, and allowed her to

return to the case right away as a private expert witness for the opposing party, who has also

been at the center of the conspiracy. That same day, Defendant Jamison deprived Plaintiff

188


Jurado of his right to due process and equal protection, and summarily found him in Contempt

and sentenced him to jail time, with explicit instructions to be served over the Thanksgiving

Holidays.

481. The key piece of the new plan was the new incumbent for the Guardian Ad Litem role

that would replace Bethel. Given the weaknesses of the Guardian Ad Litem system and yet

powerful reach as an arm of the court, the new GAL appointee would be the best one

positioned to execute the rest of the plan.

482. Within hours of Bethel’s removal, Defendant Tom McCash was appointed as the new

Guardian Ad Litem. By 9am the morning of September 25, 2014, the order of appointment had

been filed with the clerk’s office. It is clear that at the point Defendant Jamison removed

Defendant Bethel on September 24, 2014, Defendant Tom McCash had already been hand-

picked, briefed, engaged for the role of GAL and committed to such important assignment:

Every objective identified by Defendant Jamison and her co-conspirators, including and

especially those that Defendant Bethel had been trying to achieve but could not complete,

would be coordinated and Defendant McCash would finish them all and fast—and so he did.

483. Roughly two months after his appointment, Defendant McCash successfully (i)

advocated for the opposing party, maintained and protected communication between him, the

child’s mother and her attorney using pretextual attorney-client privilege (ii) built a case

against Father, (iii) created undue burden for Father and worsened his hardship, (iv) deprived

father of as many fundamental, constitutional and statutory rights as possible while inflicting

the most harm , (v) ensured that the child spent the least amount of time with Father, (vi)

189


forced the child out of Father’s daycare permanently and confined him 5 full days a week—no

exceptions, even on Father’s parenting days, and even if he is the only child left at the facility—

to Mother’s daycare located at the west most point of the county and as far from Plaintiff

Jurado as possible, (vii) used whatever means necessary, even forcefully, to prevent Plaintiff

Jurado from caring for Plaintiff N.G. during weekdays and from spending quality time with the

child, (viii) maximized the torment and intimidation that Father had already been enduring, (ix)

interfered with the time the child could spent with his Hispanic paternal grandparents, (x)

harassed, intimidated and tampered with potential witnesses that father could use in the

custody case and in this Title VI action, (xi) found a suitable pretext to justify each of his

actions, if not immediately, at least by the start of trial.

484. Three months after his appointment, Defendant Tom McCash, in a concerted effort

with his co-conspirators, already had accomplished successfully all of their objectives and even

exceeded them after 12+ months of their pursuit, ultimately to punish Plaintiff Jurado and

inflict as much harm: (a) complete interference with his parenting rights, his bond and his

relationship with the child N.G., and zero parenting time between Father and Son, (b) intrusion

into Plaintiff Jurado’s home without valid reason in violation of his right to privacy and privacy

of beliefs under the First and Fourth Amendments, (c) unlawful detention of Plaintiff Jurado, (d)

interference with and deprivation of Jurado’s right to Appeal and his right of access to the

courts, under the Ohio Constitution and the US Constitution (e) infliction of humiliation and

distress, (f) tamper and intimidation of yet another key potential witness, (g) successful

concerted efforts inside the courtroom to humiliate and deprive Plaintiff Jurado of the

opportunity to be heard, or a fair proceeding, and of procedural due process during each of the

190


proceedings conducted in the last three months of the year, causing more harm that during

previous abuses in other previous proceedings throughout year, (h) prevented and ensured

that Plaintiff Jurado is unable to have legal representation, either private or public.

485. The evidence showing that Defendant Jamison appointed Defendant McCash as her

co-conspirator agent for the purposes of all malignant acts to be carried out is substantial.

486. The evidence in this case also establishes the existence of a pattern and practice

engaged by Defendant Bethel and Dr. Smalldon, a forensic psychologist, involving a planned

scheme of concerted acts that employ coercion against their target to accomplish a

predetermined result based on unlawful motives, and using unlawful methods. Ultimately, this

racket scheme has been used in furtherance of the conspiracies claimed by Plaintiffs under

Section 1983 and Section 1985.

VII.A.9(d) EXAMPLES OF THE ESCALATING PATTERN OF ABUSE OF DISCRETION MOTIVATED BY

RETALIATION

487. On 8/27/14, the Juvenile Court at the very last minute decided to not hold the 2nd

part of the Hearing for Removal of GAL and set another continuance for the afternoon of 9/24.

488. On 9/24/14, the SCO granted Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss (both ODC’s and the

Juvenile Court’s), effectively denying me any and all means to address my complaints of

misconduct and discrimination prohibited by law (because of race, color, religion, age, gender,

191


sexual orientation, national origin, marital status, or disability) committed by the attorney-GAL-

Court Officer. At that point, I deemed all my available remedies at law as being exhausted.1

489. Whether by chance or not, the hearing for Removing the GAL was scheduled to

resume with the Juvenile Court the same day that the SCO dismissed the Original Action case.

The events that took place that afternoon of 9/24 in Courtroom 65 and in Chambers was

indisputably a wanton display of retaliation by the Judge presiding over the custody case, which

culminated with the Court depriving me of my right to personal liberty by incarceration. The

Judge explicitly set the sentence to be carried out/served over the Thanksgiving Holidays.

490. On 10/6/14, in my ultimate attempt to exhaust the very last available local remedy, I

filed a Motion for Reconsideration in my case with the SCO, and included new allegations of full

blown Retaliation by the Juvenile Court. In addition, I respectfully reminded the high court of

the required compliance with Title VI statutes and administrative rules and regulations by both

respondents2.

VII.A.9(e) IN FURTHERANCE OF ONGOING CONSPIRACY

491. The next day after removing Defendant Bethel, the Juvenile Court hand-picked and

appointed Defendant McCash as the new GAL. It was obvious that Defendant Jamison felt

cornered and forced to remove Defendant Bethel, given all of the previous efforts by the court

to protect her and cover up her wrongdoings. In fact, not allowing Jurado to resume the

hearing that had started on 8/1/2014 to remove the GAL provides sufficient evident to infer

2 Refer to SCO 2014-10-06 Filing - Motion for Reconsideration, supra. Also see PDF with SCO Case 2014-1225 Docket item 4.

2 Refer to SCO 2014-10-06 Filing - Motion for Reconsideration, supra. Also see PDF with SCO Case 2014-1225 Docket item 4.

192


that removing the GAL sua sponte only helped Defendant Bethel not to have to be confronted

by Jurado for her misconduct. It is now clear that Defendant Jamison chose Defendant McCash

with the main purpose of act in furtherance of the Defendant Bethel’s conspiracy against

Jurado.

VII.A.10. TO MAINTAIN A LAWSUIT AND A ONE-SIDED WAR OF ATTRITION AGAINST JURADO –

THE LAWSUIT AS A SUBSIDIARY SCHEME TO THE MASTER CONSPIRACY

492. Conspirators planned several sub-schemes for the punishment of Jurado for

attempting to exercise his rights under sections 2000a and 2000a-1. The first punishment by

Defendants Brooksedge, Alexander-Savino and LeClair, was the lawsuit that is currently active

and pending in the general division of the Franklin County Common Pleas Court.

493. Between August and September of 2013, Defendants Bethel, LeClair, Smitherman,

Alexander-Savino, Lambert and Dr. Smalldon established ongoing secret communications by

phone and e-mail in regards to the complaints Jurado had filed and in the plotting of a lawsuit,

as e-mails uncovered between November 2014 and January 2015 show.

494. These secret communications, in which Bethel was the intermediary between Dr.

Smalldon and the other Defendants, were in clear contradiction of ethical rules set by the state

psychology board for the proper conduct of forensic experts, as well as the rules of

superintendence that prohibit Guardians Ad Litem to divulge any information about their case.

In addition, Dr. Smalldon, who was already half-way through the evaluation of Lambert and

Jurado, had a unique and powerful role in the plan given that he was strategically positioned to

193


know Plaintiff Jurado’s susceptibilities and thus had the ability to arrange different factors and

events to obtain a precise outcome for framing Jurado.

VII.A.10(a) BETHEL AS THE INITIAL AND MAIN INSTIGATOR OF THE LAWSUIT AGAINST JURADO

BY THE DAYCARE FACILITY

495. In early July 2013, Defendant Bethel and Mom first created a wedge between Jurado

and the daycare facility where his son was enrolled by involving the owner of the Brooksedge

daycare facility in their deceptive efforts to have the court issue a restriction to prevent Jurado

from visiting the daycare.

496. The deceptive efforts by Ms. Bethel and Mom resulted in complaints filed by Jurado

in multiple state agencies against the daycare.

497. Ms. LeClair, the owner of Brooksedge daycare, confirmed during a meeting with

Jurado on 9/6/13 that the GAL “made up” the statements that were reported to the Magistrate

on 7/8/13 by Ms. Bethel. Ms. LeClair conceded that the animosity and friction arising from the

multiple complaints filed by Jurado were in fact the responsibility of the GAL and Mom given

their actions and misconduct.

498. After the 9/6 meeting between Ms. LeClair and Jurado, their relationship was

restored. No more than a month had passed by when Mom and Ms. Bethel colluded again to

erode the harmony that had just been renewed.

194


499. In late September 2013 and early October, Jurado’s attorney accomplished what was

perceived as the GAL’s willingness to consider other options for higher quality out-of-home care

for the child.

500. On October 8, 2013, Jurado took his son to the Emergency Room for the latest of a

series of head injuries. By a quirk of fate, Jurado had sent an email to his attorney only 2 days

before the more serious head injury happened on 10/7/2013. In the email to his attorney,

Jurado shared his concerns regarding the recent injuries the child had suffered while at

daycare. Jurado explained his concerns to the Children’s Hospital ER doctor that, due to the

frequency and not necessarily severity of the head injuries, significant trauma may have been

inflicted that is not visible to the naked eye. Naturally, Jurado explained that they were going

through a process of proposing new daycares to the court since Jurado was not satisfied with

the quality of care of the current facility, without making accusations of purposeful abuse by

the facility or by Mom.

501. The ER doctor recommended the involvement of a social worker and specific tests for

the child to identify any unknown past injuries. After witnessing Mom behavior of hostility and

defensiveness against Jurado while being protective of the daycare facility, both the social

worker and the ER doctor were more inclined to report/make a referral to Franklin County

Children Services (FCCS).

502. Having the GAL on speed dial, Mom immediately contacted Ms. Bethel as well as the

daycare facility to give them a heads up that FCCS had been called and would be soon on their

way to the facility. Immediately and in abuse of her role as officer of the court, Ms. Bethel

195


(inappropriately) contacted FCCS the very same day that the child was at the ER, with the

purpose of interfering, creating prejudice and to damage Jurado’s credibility with them.

503. During the initial interview with the FCCS case worker assigned to the case, Jurado

shared his position that he didn’t believe child abuse had been committed by anyone at the

facility and was uncomfortable hearing the word “perpetrators”. Jurado conceded that he had

issues with the quality of care at the center but that they amounted to not enough training for

employees and teachers as well as deficient oversight by the administration.

504. One more time, Defendant Bethel—acting as an officer of the court in the role of

GAL—did not demonstrate any concerns regarding the child's condition and overall well-being.

Instead, her focus was directed at finding any flaws or faults in Jurado's actions, while

advocating for Mom' interests. Mom' intentions, as shown in the recordings/transcripts from

the 10/08 ER visit, were to discredit Jurado's opinions and concerns while opening a new front

of aggression: Creating the perception that the Daycare staff and administrators had been

victimized. Both Mom and the GAL spread rumors and false allegations that Jurado had made

explicit child abuse accusations against the child’s teachers at the facility.

505. As Ms. Bethel took advantage of the credibility inherited by her role of GAL, she

abused the powers entrusted in her, continued her misleading conduct, and exhorted undue

influence in the opinions of the ER doctor, ER social worker, FCCS case worker and supervisor.

196


506. Two days after the day at the ER, the daycare facility permanently expelled the child,

and proceeded to file a civil lawsuit against Jurado as a result of the instigation of Defendant

Bethel and Lambert.

507. Although the lawsuit filed against Jurado a week after the ER visit intentionally

created the perception that the involvement of FCCS as part of the ER visit is what triggered the

civil action by the daycare, it became obvious that the lawsuit was part of the premeditated and

systematic conspiracy being committed by attorney Smitherman, Defendant Bethel, Lambert

and some of the daycare staff/administrators to cause an additional hardship for Jurado,

emotional distress, and as a pretext to help Lambert gain full custody of the child. For example,

(a) it was discovered at a later time that the GAL had been in contact with Defendant

Alexander-Savino days before and after the ER incident, for the close coordination of the

lawsuit sub-scheme and prepare for the filing of the civil lawsuit against Jurado; (b) the exact

day when the lawsuit was filed, Lambert notarized an affidavit in support of her upcoming

Motion to Modify the Temporary Orders (to take away time and custody rights from Jurado).

The content of her Motion resembled the allegations made in the civil lawsuit filed against

Jurado, all a good indication that the conspirators had been working closely together in framing

Jurado to be the target of the civil lawsuit.

197


VII.A.11. TAMPER WITH ADVERSE KEY WITNESSES

VII.A.12. FABRICATE ALLEGATIONS, INCIDENTS AND EVENTS TO PUT HIM IN A NEGATIVE LIGHT

VII.B. OBJECTIVES AND GOALS OF THE CONSPIRACY

VII.B.1. DEPRIVE PLAINTIFF OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW

VII.B.2. DEPRIVE PLAINTIFF OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS

VII.B.3. CREATE CHILLING EFFECT ON PLAINTIFF'S EXERCISE OF HIS 1ST AMENDMENT RIGHTS

VII.B.4. CAUSE ECONOMICAL HARM

VII.B.5. INTENTIONALLY INFLICT EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

VII.B.6. INTERFERE WITH PLAINTIFF’S MOST IMPORTANT ASPECT OF HIS LIFE: PARENTHOOD

AND HIS SON

VII.B.7. DISCREDIT AND PREJUDICE BY DEFAMATION

VII.B.8. INTERFERE WITH ABILITY TO ACCESS COURT, PRESENT DEFENSES, PROSECUTE CLAIMS, AND HAVE LEGAL REPRESENTATION

VII.C. BACKGROUND OF THE CONSPIRACY AND THE FAMILY LAW INDUSTRY

VII.C.1. BACKGROUND

508. The underlying case of two unmarried parents makes up the backdrop of this case.

Plaintiff Jurado and Defendant Lambert met at work in early 2010. Later that year, they

became romantically involved and maintained a relationship that began strained and short-

lived. Because their mutual communication and openness, they quickly found out that they

had different goals in a relationship and were at different points in their lives. Jurado was

looking for a serious and long-term commitment, to build a family and have children. In fact,

having a child of his own was something Jurado had been longing for a while—a life purpose

198


he knew he was missing then in his late thirties. Lambert was not looking for a committed

relationship, neither wanted a new family, nor more children. She already had a teenage son,

product of a marriage of many years that had dissolved a few years back—but that still

functioned like a family, with the two households only a few blocks from each other—and

neither parent, together since high school sweethearts, had been successful at moving on with

their lives. But Jurado and Lambert decided to give it a try anyway. Jurado did not hold back.

He got her a spare set of keys to his place, introduce her to his friends and talk to his family

about her. Lambert was not reciprocal, but Jurado thought it was simply a matter of patience.

She even convinced him to keep their relationship a secret at work.

509. Just after four months into the relationship, it all came to a halt after Jurado found

out that Lambert was dating other people during the time she reportedly was at home with his

teenage son. Jurado knew right then and there that, given the recent developments and

emotional baggage from her past, they did not have a future together. So, he severed the

relationship with no reservations, but it was not as simple as he thought. She immediately

began pursuing him intensively—marking the start of a rollercoaster that went on for eight

more months. Because they not only worked in the same offices but also worked on special

projects together, he was unable to avoid her altogether, and feared that any clashes would

jeopardize his career. As part of her pursuit, Lambert suddenly offered him everything she

knew he had been looking for: a family, a baby, a long-term commitment. After a few months

and with skepticism, he succumbed to her persuasion, and gave it another chance—only to find

out that Lambert had a hard time letting go of her old ways. After seven months since the first

break up, Lambert knew she was running out of options. So she tried a different recourse: She

199


convinced Jurado to undergo therapy sessions with her friend and psycho-therapist of several

years. He naively gave in one more time. By late spring in 2011, he found himself in a therapy

session trying to be convinced by a licensed counselor that having other partners or “friends”

was ok in a relationship, as long as Jurado learned to accept it and accept Lambert for who she

was. That gave finality to the rollercoaster. By summer 2011, Jurado and Lambert were no

longer trying, or so he thought. They had reached a mutual agreement to stay as friends and

co-workers.

510. During the summer of 2011, Jurado did his best to move on. He made new friends,

went on dates, and continued keeping a distance from Lambert. However, Lambert continued

a subtle pursuit of Jurado and in a handful of occasions, under the guise of friendship, turned

up at social events that Jurado attended and eventually at his place. Lambert offered Jurado

for them to stay in a “casual” relationship but without seeing others. The second time she

brought it up, he conceded that, not only the casual relationship would not work, but for them

to stay in contact as friends was not a good idea. Lambert finally went along. For most of the

fall of 2011, they kept their plan and maintained good boundaries, engaging in limited

communications outside of work and mainly by email. In late fall, Jurado had fallen ill due to

the excessive number of hours his job demanded—to the point that he had been contemplating

resigning. Knowing that Jurado lived by himself and without any family in town, Lambert

showed up at his place purportedly to help him and keep an eye on him. The next day after

spending the night, he gently reminded her that it was not a good idea to do what she had

done. That was the last time they spoke or saw each other until several weeks later.

200


511. It was Sunday morning in late fall 2011 when Jurado received a text message from

Lambert asking to meet to discuss an urgent matter. Later that same day, he found out that

they had conceived a new life during her last stay at his place—several months after their

relationship had officially ended, and the day before his resignation letter was to be filed at

work. Within days, they entered into an agreement to raise their then-unborn child together

and equally—even as unmarried parents.

512. For the next eight months, Plaintiff Jurado was equally involved and committed to his

unborn child as Lambert was, throughout the pregnancy and in every sense—financially and

otherwise. Even though he remained unemployed for most of that period, he dispensed of his

savings to help cover the overall costs of being expecting parents and to make all the necessary

purchases, including a crib, stroller and what was necessary for the arrival of their son, in both

households.

513. At the same time, they both worked on trying to restore their relationship, but

unfortunately, without much success. Compartmentalization helped them continue working in

cooperation in regards to parenthood, and the particularities and special care of her high-risk

pregnancy.

514. By the time the child was 4 months old, Plaintiff Jurado’s commitment to the child

had not changed; and if anything, it had increased. Within the context of parenting, both had

been successful at working together, without encountering any challenge with each other’s

parenting skills. In fact, they agreed in most decisions regarding their newborn, except for some

201


concerns Jurado was starting to raise about the health of his son and one or two instances of

safety concerns.

515. Those mutual decisions included the enrollment of the child at the Brooksedge

facility owned by Defendant LeClair in September 2012. As part of the enrollment process,

Jurado was officially listed as the father of the child in any and all appropriate forms and

documents. Subsequently, he became known by the Brooksedge staff and administrators as a

parent of the child who was equally involved, starting with his visit to the facility during the

“trial run” or very first day of the child’s attendance, on September 24, 2012. After that first

day, he routinely picked up the child from daycare about twice a week. He was unable to pick

him more frequently because he travel weekly out of state for a consulting project he had

secured a few weeks before the child was born.

516. By mid-October 2012, Lambert—still unmarried and convinced that their

deteriorating relationship was beyond repair—started exerting control and imposing unilateral

rules regarding Jurado’s parenting time. They included restrictions around daycare pick up

times, even when Jurado had very limited time in town, given his business travel schedule.

517. Suddenly, without warning, and in the midst of health issues of the unthriving child,

Lambert filed a custody action in the Juvenile Court on November 5, 2012. She also dishonored

the previous shared parenting agreement reached between her and Jurado a year earlier, and

took full control of the custody and parenting time of the child for the next two and a half

months. In her court filing, Lambert sought full custody of the child, the minimum non-

202


residential parenting time allowed by law for Defendant Jurado, and also asked for all

visitations to be “supervised” until the child would reach 18 years of age.

518. During that period of 10 weeks, that included the 2012-2013 Holiday season, and

until the parties were able to make their first appearance in court, she used the child to

manipulate and exert control over Jurado and his contact with the child, and also with Jurado’s

family, who are all natives of the Republic of Panama—in effect abusing her rights under ORC

3109.042. One example of the obsessive control was in December ’12 - January ’13 period—

during the Jurado’s family 6-week visit and Plaintiff Jurado’s break from work—they were only

allowed to see the child on certain days and times that were dictated by Lambert in a piecemeal

fashion, with no much advance notice. A second example of the obsessive control exerted

occurred on Thanksgiving Day 2012. Lambert allowed Jurado to spend a portion of the day with

the baby at her house but supervised. In that instance, Lambert ordered Jurado not to make

certain noises while playing with his son, like whistling and smacking—the sound of a

resounding kiss.

203


VII.C.2. FAMILY LAW INDUSTRY HIGHLY PROFITABLE AND SUSCEPTIBLE TO WRONGDOING – A

NATIONAL PROBLEM

VII.C.3. GUARDIAN AD LITEM SYSTEM, EQUALLY POWERFUL AND DEFICIENT IN BOTH PRIVATE

CUSTODY CASES, AND THOSE INVOLVING THE STATE AS A PARTY.

VII.C.4. THE LOCAL BAR IN CENTRAL OHIO AND COLUMBUS IS VERY SMALL AND DIVERSITY IS

VIRTUALLY NON-EXISTENT.

VII.C.5. THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN COLUMBUS, BEING THE HUB AND CAPITAL OF OHIO, IS

SHAPED BY THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

VII.C.6. ALL THREE BRANCHES OF STATE GOVERNMENT ARE PERMEATED, AND SUSCEPTIBLE, BY

THE POWER OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION—THE BAR

VII.D. UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES AND ACTS PERPETRATED BY CONSPIRATORS

DEFENDANTS

VII.D.1. UNLAWFUL ACTS BY OOAG

VII.D.1(a) INTIMIDATION OF JURADO WITH THE INTENTION TO CAUSE A CHILLING EFFECT IN

THE EXERCISE OF JURADO’S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND TO PREVENT HIM

FROM FURTHER PURSUING HIS CLAIMS

519. For specifics in regards to the October 22, 2013 phone call between the OOAG state

official and Plaintiff Jurado, refer to Section VII.F.1(a) “Recording from October 22, 2013

Showing State Official Representing Defendant OOAG Intimidating Jurado over the Phone and

Instilling Fear” below.

VII.D.1(b) OOAG’S WILLFUL NEGLECT AND BREACH OF DUTY TO PROTECT ITS CITIZENS, WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF EQUAL PROTECTION AND AS STANDALONE DUTY, WITHOUT REASONABLE EXCUSE OR JUSTIFICATION

520. In addition to OOAG’s intimidating acts against Jurado, OOAG failed in his duty to

protect Jurado as he sought assistance to stop the continuous violations against him and his

204


son, and the ongoing harm being caused to Plaintiffs, and for Intentional or Unintentional Child

Neglect. See Smith v. Wade 461 U.S. 30 (1983).

VII.D.1(c) OOAG DEFENDANTS’ OVERT INTERFERENCE WITH OCRC INVESTIGATION AND

ENCOURAGEMENT OF MISCONDUCT BY OCRC DEFENDANTS

521. Defendants Garcia, Dunn and OCRC started engaging in misconduct and actions to

intentionally deprive Jurado of his rights. The unlawful conduct started at the same time

concealed communications took place showing criminal conspiratorial agreement between

Defendant Gutowski and Defendant Garcia.

522. See Section VII.F.2 “Recordings involving Defendants OCRC, Dunn and Garcia” and

section Error! Reference source not found. “Error! Reference source not found.“ below.

VII.D.1(d) MISCONDUCT IN PUBLIC OFFICE AND ABUSE OF PUBLIC TRUST

523. See Section VII.F.2 “Recordings involving Defendants OCRC, Dunn and Garcia” below.

VII.D.1(e) OOAG’S INTERFERENCE WITH ODJFS AND UNDERMINING OF GOVERNMENT

FUNCTIONS

524. See Section V.I “July 2013 - Scope of the Conflict Suddenly Expanded – ODJFS and

OCRC as First State Government Agencies Involved Due to Brooksedge Conduct” above.

205


VII.D.2. UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES AND CONDUCT BY DEFENDANTS OCRC, DUNN AND GARCIA

VII.D.2(a) DEPRIVED JURADO OF DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW WHEN

DECIDED HIS CASES BEFORE THE INVESTIGATION EVEN STARTED AND EVEN BEFORE

HE FILE HIS CHARGE AGAINST BROOKSEDGE

525. The E-mails and handwritten notes uncovered by Jurado around November-

December 2013 show OOAG’s and OCRC’s agreement to decide the outcome of Jurado’s

complaints in favor of Brooksedge before the investigation started. It also shows their

agreement to issue a No Probable Cause (NPC) for Jurado’s retaliation claim before he even

filed it.

526. After the covert communications between Garcia and Gutowski, Defendant Garcia

engaged in wanton misconduct to harm Jurado and to deprive him of his civil rights, as many of

his emails show. The recording from November 21, 2013 shows the reaction of shock endured

by the liaison of the Commission’s constituent services, when she read the e-mail sent by Garcia

to Jurado in his attempts to segregate him and treat him differently than other complainants

because of his national origin.

VII.D.2(b) DISHONESTY AND CORRUPTION

527. On March 13, 2014, Defendant Dunn, encouraged by the acts of OOAG, engaged in

fraudulent misrepresentations and wanton misconduct as shown in the recording of the public

proceedings in front of the OCRC Commissioners, all in detriment of Jurado’s case against

Brooksedge.

206


VII.D.2(c) OCRC DEFENDANTS ENGAGED IN MISCONDUCT, INCLUDING DENYING JURADO OF

EQUAL ENJOYMENT OF PUBLIC GOVERNMENT FACILITIES, AND WITHHOLDING OF KEY

INFORMATION DURING ADJUDICATION PROCEEDING

528. The conduct of OCRC employees while conspiring with OOAG shows the

premeditated agreement to deprive Jurado of his rights to Equal Protection of the Law and right

to be free from Retaliation.

VII.D.3. ODC-SCO DEFENDANTS UNLAWFUL ACTS AND PRACTICES

VII.D.3(a) DEFENDANTS’ DEPRIVATION OF JURADO’S RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE

LAW AND BREACH OF DUTY

529. Defendant ODC’s dismissal of the grievance Jurado file against Bethel in January 2014

constitutes intentional unlawful discrimination because similarly situated grievants that are

white received a different response from ODC defendants, which included an investigation of

their grievances—regardless of the outcome of their investigation.

530. In addition, all the arguments ODC made in support of their conduct included in their

Motion to Dismiss filed with the Supreme Court of Ohio in case 2014-1225, were all pretextual,

as Jurado’s detail report shows in his complaint filed with the Office for Civil Rights for the

Office of Justice Programs under the US Department of Justice.

VII.D.3(b) ODC-SCO DEFENDANTS’ PARTICIPATION IN SCHEME TO RETALIATE AGAINST

JURADO

531. The act of disclosing Jurado’s grievance to Defendant Bethel before the conclusion of

the custody case, and their alleged unethical sharing of Jurado’s provided materials and exhibits

207


with Defendant Bethel is just part of the substantial evidence showing ODC-SCO Defendants’

participation in the retaliation scheme with Judge Jamison and Bethel.

532. The events from August 27, 2014 and September 24, 2014 include a number of PLUS

FACTORS that show the parallel behavior of ODC, SCO and Judge Jamison unlikely is a result

from chance or coincidence. These events are detailed in section V.O.15 “August 2014 -

Judicial Transgressions More Overt after the Filing of Original Action in Mandamus and

Prohibition against Defendants Judge Jamison and ODC; Carte Blanche given to Judge

Jamison by the ODC-SCO Defendants

533. Sometime in late-July 2014 or August 2014, after Jurado filed his Original Action in

Mandamus and Prohibition against Judge Jamison and ODC, with the underlying theme of

Bethel’s misconduct and unlawful discrimination, Defendants John Doe, Jane Doe III and

ODC/SCO gave Defendant Jamison Carte Blanche to use whatever means necessary to

“handle her Juvenile case”, to rein in Jurado in order to stop the embarrassment caused by a

Hispanic citizen, and to offer Bethel all of the Court’s protection against a Hispanic complainant.

VII.D.3(c) AUGUST 2014 – CONCERTED ACTION BY DEFENDANTS LAMBERT, BETHEL AND

SMITHERMAN TO COLLUDE IN OPEN COURT AND ENGAGE IN WITNESS TAMPERING

IN FURTHERANCE OF THE CONSPIRACY; JUDGE JAMISON’S PARTICIPATION IN COVER

UP





208


535. The irony of this incident is that the main goal of the court proceeding being

conducted—in which the unlawful acts were committed by Bethel, Smitherman and Lambert—

was to stop or to remedy the ongoing misconduct by Bethel and her allies.

536. Judge Jamison’s participation in covering up the unlawful acts by Smitherman, Bethel

and Lambert became obvious when Jurado brought up the incident to the attention of the

court. After a couple of questions by the court, Bethel admitted to using her phone but denied

having communications with Smitherman. Judge Jamison contained the controversy within the

context of Bethel’s witness credibility but refrained from making any further inquiries, as any

other tribunal would have done. Jurado has documented similar cases and on each one, the

Judge had made further inquiries, allowed the text messages to be discoverable or have

confiscated the phones involved in the acts of witness tampering and witness coaching.

Ironically, courtroom 65 has a signed at its entrance that warns about phone usage inside the

courtroom being unlawful and specifies that confiscation of the phone would result from the

disobedience of the rule. Additional evidence of Judge Jamison’s full and conscious

participation in the concealment of the Defendants’ unlawful acts in this instance include her

inaction for months at a time after Jurado file a motion to disqualify Smitherman, based on this

incident of witness tampering along with other incidents. The motion was supported by two

sworn affidavits of eyewitnesses that observed the conduct and acts of witness tampering on

August 1, 2014. When Judge Jamison finally allowed Jurado’s Motion to be heard, she

restricted his prosecution to the extent that he was unable to call Smitherman as witness, make

specific inquiries or even read aloud certain portions of the rules of professional conduct.

209


VII.D.3(d) AUGUST 2014 - JUDGE JAMISON ENGAGED IN SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE AND

FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATIONS

537. Even when the transcript of the proceeding conducted on Aug. 4, 2014 (to hear

Jurado’s request to modify his child support obligation amount) shows that there was mention

of “the documents” that were given to the court, they were all “misplaced” after the hearing

and have never been found since. In her Entry filed a day or two later, the Judge claimed that

Jurado only presented the Court with one spreadsheet (as in one page) as evidence of his

income. Her Entry also contradicts other facts observed on the hearing transcript. Judge

Jamison then utilized the fraudulent entry as an exhibit for her Motion to Dismissed filed with

the SCO on August 8, 2014.

538. Several court employees, including the Judge’s bailiff who made two set of copies of

those documents during the short hearing, remembers the numerous documents and pages he

had to copy for the court and for opposing counsel while the court had taken a short recess.

Judge Jamison herself acknowledged in open court on January 2015 that her bailiff had made

copies of all the documents supporting Jurado’s income and expenses during the previous

proceeding to modify child support.

539. August-September 2014 - ODC, SCO Defendants and Judge Jamison escalated their

participation in the Cover Up & Retaliation Sub-Scheme” above and section V.P “September

2014 - Retaliation Soared as Direct Result of the Revealing of Jurado’s Intention to Seek

Federal Relief, and the Dismissal of Original Action in Mandamus and Prohibition by SCO as

Reinforcement of the Carte Blanche given to Defendant Judge Jamison” above.

210


VII.D.3(e) ODC-SCO DEFENDANTS’ PARTICIPATION IS SCHEME TO COVER UP BETHEL’S

UNLAWFUL CONDUCT AND CONCEAL THE CONCERTED ACTION BY CO-CONSPIRATORS

540. Beyond the refusal to investigate Jurado’s initial grievance, ODC and SCO has come in

contact with information in Jurado’s pleadings and exhibits in his actions with the SCO that

raise eyebrows, and there is no sign that they have attempted to investigate even when Jurado

has made allegations of retaliation and misconduct by other attorneys besides Bethel.

VII.D.4. UNLAWFUL ACTS AND CONDUCT BY JUDGE JAMISON

VII.D.4(a) DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF JURADO ON ACCOUNT OF HIS NATIONAL ORIGIN; COVER UP OF BETHEL’S MISCONDUCT AND THE COURT’S OWN OPINION ABOUT

BETHEL DURING THE DEC. 20, 2013 HEARING; JUDGE JAMISON WILLFUL

PARTICIPATION IN DEFENDANTS’ DEC 2013-JAN 2014 PLOT TO COMMIT FRAUD

UPON THE COURT AND TO DEPRIVE JURADO OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS

541. Defendant Jamison’s first opportunity to conduct a full evidentiary hearing in Jurado’s

and Lambert’s custody case came about on December 20, 2013. By then, Defendant Jamison

had shown some degree of differential treatment against Jurado a week earlier when she

knowingly issued an Emergency TRO that was non-compliant with court rules, allowed

defendants Bethel and Smitherman to skirt multiple court rules during the TRO proceedings in

detriment of Jurado, and also deprived Jurado from the opportunity to present his testimony as

his own witness during the December 20, 2013 hearing. Still, the transcript of the proceeding

shows that Judge Jamison was still not part of the conspiracy at that point, as it is evident

throughout the transcript that her questions, comments and opinions were focused on the best

interest of the child, and as a consequence, Judge Jamison was at odds with the conduct of

Defendants Smitherman and Bethel, their actions and opinions in reference to the daycare

211


situation, including the recent selection process of the new daycare and the mandatory daycare

attendance that did not allow Jurado to care for his own child. The content of that proceeding

and transcript is material evidence of Bethel’s misconduct, fraud and willful neglect of the

welfare of the child. For details, refer to section VII.D.6(a) “Defendants Agreed to Give Perjured

Testimony During the December 20, 2013 Court Proceeding” below.

542. Sometime between December 20, 2013 and the Emergency Hearing requested by

Jurado on January 22, 2014, the first successful attempt by the conspirators to corruptly

influence and interfere with the tribunal took place. The transcript of the January 22, 2014

proceeding shows an increase on the differential treatment of Jurado—as his first time acting

pro se and Jamison’s evident aversion to his speech accent—and Defendant Jamison’s

attempt to bury and obscure the proceeding from December 20, 2013 and its content. As

Jurado attempted to impeach attorney Bethel’s testimony as GAL by referring to statements

she made during the December 20, 2013 hearing and expose her fraudulent

misrepresentations, Judge Jamison cut off his argument by ruling that any information from the

Dec. 20, 2013 was off-limits given that the court lacked jurisdiction after Lambert’s voluntary

dismissal of her Motion that was being heard at the time, even when Jurado insisted and

objected.

543. Clear evidence exists that proves Judge Jamison’s actions to prevent Jurado from

using the Dec. 20, 2013 testimony against Bethel to be pretextual: (1) In Ohio, a Court’s lack of

Jurisdiction over a matter or action dismissed does not prevent the Court or limit its ability to

use evidence, testimony or any other information or aspect of the dismissed action or

212


proceeding for “collateral matters”, such as Contempt and Misconduct; (2) the Voluntary

Dismissal of Lambert’s Motion filed on January 7, 2014 was invalid and unauthorized by law; (3)

the Voluntary Dismissal of Lambert’s Motion filed on Jan. 7, 2014 was part of a plot to commit

Fraud upon the court. For details, refer to section VII.D.6(b) “Concerted Action to Perpetrate

Fraud Upon the Court and to Deprive Jurado of his Right to Due Process with the Filing of an

Invalid and Unauthorized Voluntary Dismissal on January 2014 based on Precedent Set by State

ex rel. Engelhart v. Russo, 2011-Ohio-2410” below.

544. In fact, Judge Jamison’s knowledge of the lack of validity of the dismissal became

more obvious in two other distinct occasions when Jurado made references to the text under

Ohio’s Civ. R. 41(A) subdivisions (1) and (2)—which allows Voluntary Dismissals by the Movant

without an order from the court or agreement from the other parties as long as the proceeding

has not started—when he made similar attempts to refer to the testimony from Dec. 20, 2013

and was prevented by Judge Jamison. There is no reasonable excuse or justification for Judge

Jamison’s adamant stance to prevent Jurado from using her own opinion about Bethel’s actions

and Bethel’s perjured testimony from the Dec. 20, 2013 proceeding.

VII.D.4(b) RETALIATION, COVER UP AND PREMEDITATED DEPRIVATION OF JURADO’S

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS DURING THE MARCH 13, 2014

PROCEEDING

545. From the point that Jurado start utilizing formal procedures for removing Bethel from

the case and filing grievances against her starting in January 2014, the Juvenile Court’s position

and role changed. The differential treatment received by Jurado as compared to Lambert,

was elevated to hostility by the Court and overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. For

213


example, Defendant Jamison, in open court, declared Jurado an adversary of the Court in

retaliation after he raised his concerns and constitutional claims against the GAL, Defendant

Bethel, and tried to remove her from the case. This drastic change occurred only days after

ODC had dismissed Jurado’s grievance against Bethel. Since then, Judge Jamison has

consistently acted hostile against Jurado to this day. Therefore, the aggression was not only in

furtherance of the High Conflict scheme, but was also in retaliation against Jurado

546. The transcript of the March 13, 2014 captured Defendant Judge Jamison allowing

attorney Petroff to present arguments for several minutes uninterrupted. “Mr. Petroff, that

was a wonderful dissertation” was Judge Jamison’s interpolation before her attack against

Jurado started. The transcript also shows how she preceded to overtly declared Jurado an

adversary of the court without letting him talk. The transcript shows Jurado trying to present

his argument and Judge Jamison cutting him off after every 2 or 3 words. As this treatment

became a pattern from that point forward until the present day, Defendant Jamison would find

an obvious pretext or an absurd explanation given that her actions do not have a reasonable

excuse or justification. In this instance of the proceeding from March 13, 2014, Judge Jamison

used the pretext that “the guardian must be paid in full for you to proceed. I think I was quite

clear”.

547. Her excuse is marred with holes: (1) The previous order she issued on January 23,

2014 specifically stated that “The Court further ORDERS Defendant to begin payments to the

Guardian Ad Litem immediately” and did not specify that Jurado had to pay the owed balance

in full and did not specify any condition for Jurado to access the court, (2) in regards to making

214


the payment to Bethel a condition for Jurado to file or schedule any Motions, state law and the

US Constitution doesn’t allow a court to deny a party access to the court for failure to pay a

financial obligation, (3) Jurado was not even allowed to explain that he had made 3 payments

to Bethel totaling more than $2,300 since she issued the Entry in January 2014, even when he

did not have enough to make ends meet, (4) Judge Jamison was required to investigate the

reason for Jurado’s failure to make payments, if she truly made that order of having to pay

Bethel in full, before enforcing summary punishment on Jurado, (5) Judge Jamison was required

by the US Constitution and by state law to give proper notice with specific language if she was

going to address any type of Contempt or Show Cause proceeding in regards to failure to pay

the GAL. Given these facts, it is indisputable that Judge Jamison was retaliating because she

did not have a reasonable excuse or justification. Most importantly, Judge Jamison was not

only harming Plaintiff Jurado, but also harmed Plaintiff N.G., given that the two Motions

scheduled for March 13, 2013 that she refused to hear, contained serious and substantial

allegations of conduct by Bethel or the other Defendants that were in detriment of the child’s

Best Interest and welfare—all for putting the interest of Defendant Bethel first and the

objectives of the Conspiracy that included the protection of the co-conspirators including

Bethel and the concealment of her unlawful conduct.

VII.D.4(c) DECEPTIVE CONDUCT AND OTHER JUDICIAL TRANSGRESSIONS DURING THE

MANIPULATION OF JURADO’S ORIGINAL ACTION FILED WITH SCO AGAINST JUDGE JAMISON

548. As soon as Plaintiff Jurado filed an Emergency Motion to Stay with the SCO,

Defendant Jamison issued a voluntary stay of proceedings to make Jurado’s Motion moot. As

215


soon as the Motion for Stay was voluntarily dismissed for mootness, Defendant Jamison lifted

the stay and continued with abuses and deprivation of rights, as described below.

549. On August 1 and 4, 2014, Jamison engaged additional manipulation of plaintiff action

and claims in his complaint with the SCO, in order to render those claims moot by unlawful

means. To moot Jurado’s claim regarding Child Support, Defendant Jamison held a hearing not

giving Plaintiff enough time to prepare, and dismissed his Motion to Modify Child Support

within minutes after the proceeding had started for pretextual reasons, such as lack of

cooperation with opposing party in discovery, even though that was a separate matter and

there was no evidence to support that finding other than Defendant Smitherman’s testimony.

In fact, the allegations were set to be heard on a separate hearing at a later date.

550. Judge Jamison conducted the hearing for the removal of the GAL on August 1, 2014.

Even with the disadvantage of (1) having no legal training or (2) experience representing

himself in a full evidentiary hearing, and (3) not enough notice to properly prepare due to lack

of service, Jurado was still able to prove misconduct by the GAL because of the overwhelming

evidence and obvious facts: Through cross-examination of the GAL as a witness, it was set for

the record that she didn’t have any defense for misleading the court in past proceedings, or for

ignoring a Pediatrician that had asked to talk to the GAL on Jurado’s behalf about concerns with

the infant child’s health. The court took a recess and set a continuance for August 27, 2014,

even though Judge Jamison never intended to conclude the hearing as a form of participation

in the scheme to protect Bethel’s unlawful conduct.

216


551. During the same hearing to remove the GAL, an incident took place involving witness

tampering and collusion in the courtroom between Defendants Lambert, Bethel and

Smitherman. The matter remained pending until January 2015, when Defendant Judge

Jamison participated in the cover up and protection of Bethel and Smitherman by restricting

Jurado’s prosecution to the point that rendered him ineffective.

552. Judge Jamison lack of Candor and intentional misrepresentation is evident in

statements to the SCO regarding “Vacated Motion” in her Motion to Dismiss filed with the

Supreme Court of Ohio, case 2014-1225 filed in August 2014. In a dishonest manner, Judge

Jamison misrepresented her intentions by stating that she had vacated the Motion for

Contempt against Jurado. Then she acted in contradiction of her statement by holding the

hearing of Contempt against Jurado in an impromptu manner the very same day the SCO

granted her request for dismissal on September 24, 2014.

VII.D.4(d) SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE CONNECTED TO THE PROCEEDING TO HEAR MOTION TO

MODIFY CHILD SUPPORT AND PLEADINGS FILED CONTAINING FRAUDULENT

MISREPRESENTATIONS

553. On August 4, 2014, Judge Jamison conducted a hearing for Jurado’s Motion to Modify

Child Support, one that she never intended to hold or to complete. Judge Jamison felt

compelled to do so only because of the Original Action Jurado had filed with the Ohio Supreme

Court a few weeks earlier.

554. During the first minutes of the hearing, Judge Jamison learned that Jurado had

brought a set of exhibits for the hearing and took a short recess to allow her bailiff to make

copies. Even though the Bailiff has a copier machine right inside the courtroom, he decided to

217


use another machine in the back offices because of the amount of pages that needed to be

copied: More than 70 pages needed to be copied and from both sides. When he returned, he

handed the set of copies to opposing counsel; and as he was returning the originals, Jurado

asked if he had made copies for the court. The Bailiff responded “oh” and left the courtroom

again to make a second set of copies. He then finally return and gave the original set to Jurado

and the second set of copies to the court.

555. Judge Jamison resumed the proceeding and had Jurado on the witness stand with his

exhibits. As Jurado was answering some questions while making arguments too as a Pro Se

party, he realized that the documents were not in the right order and began to shuffle through

the exhibits to find the ones he wanted to introduce at the moment.

556. Judge Jamison appeared impatient since her return from recess and immediately

faulted Jurado for “not being organized as she had told him to be”. She then proceeded to

summarily dismiss the hearing and Jurado’s motion, even when Jurado objected and asked

repeatedly for a continuance for the following week. She just kept saying No, knowing that

Jurado had been desperately waiting for at least 10 months for his motion to be heard. He

had also made significant claims in his filings with the SCO supported by evidence, that he had

been in a precarious situation and experiencing undue hardship created by Defendants and the

litigation itself, while at the time having to pay $1,300 for child support each month to Lambert.

557. Judge Jamison knew that Lambert enjoyed a six figure salary, and had been receiving

free advocacy from the GAL, defendant Bethel. She also knew that if Jurado was struggling

218


financially, it was also affecting the child in one way or another given that the parents had

50/50 parenting time and shared custody.

558. Knowing that she and the Juvenile Court were about to file their Motion to Dismiss in

Jurado’s action with the Ohio Supreme Court, Judge Jamison issued a Judgment Entry in the

Juvenile Court docket on August 6, 2014, containing the Dismissal of Jurado’s Motion to Modify

Child Support and further stated that “he produced only a spreadsheet, that he had prepared,

as evidence of his income. He testified to business expenses” along with other misleading

statements to prejudice to Jurado. The very next day, their Motion to Dismiss was filed for the

dismissal of Jurado’s case in the SCO against the Judge, which contained only one exhibit:

Judge Jamison’s fraudulent Judgment Entry that she willfully issued to deprive Jurado of his

right to due process.

559. During the next 3 days, Jurado inquired and interviewed several Court employees in

trying to find the exhibits that were provided to the court on Aug. 4, 2014, but they

“appeared to have been misplaced”. Nevertheless, several of those employees made clear

statements that they did remember the set of documents that were copied and given to

opposing counsel and to the court and that “were certainly more than just a handful” and that

the last time they were seeing is when the bailiff put them in the bench for the judge during the

Aug. 4, 2014 hearing.

560. During the first part of the trial on January 2015, Defendant Lambert testified that

she did receive a copy of Jurado’s exhibits on August 4, 2014, and even Judge Jamison during

the same trial proceeding addressed the topic of the exhibits in support of Jurado’s income and

219


expenses and acknowledged that her bailiff had made several copies of Jurado’s documents

during the hearing for the modification of child support.

VII.D.4(e) FULL PARTICIPATION OF DEFENDANT JAMISON IN THE CONCEALMENT OF WITNESS

TAMPERING AND COLLUSION IN OPEN COURT BETWEEN DEFENDANTS

SMITHERMAN, BETHEL AND LAMBERT





For details, refer to section VII.D.6(d) “Fraud Upon the Court by Witness Tampering and

Collusion in Open Court by Defendants Smitherman, Bethel and Lambert with the Protection of

Judge Jamison” below.

562. Although the usage of phones inside the courtroom is prohibited by statute and local

court rules, Judge Jamison did not attempt to investigate any further or confiscated Bethel’s

phone to enforce the law or to confirm if Bethel’s assertions were true, especially given that the

subject matter of the hearing was to address Bethel’s misconduct, as the transcript shows.

563. Jurado filed two motions between September and November 2014 with details of the

incident, legal arguments and evidence including notarized affidavits by witnesses that

observed the unlawful conduct in the courtroom, but Jamison continued to be indifferent.

564. Jamison’s overt act to cover up and protect Defendants and their unlawful conduct

can be seen in the proceeding held in January 2015, during which Judge Jamison was hostile

220


against Jurado as he tried to make his case to address the incident of unlawful conduct from

August 1, 2014, and consistently acted in favor of Smitherman. Judge Jamison restricted Jurado

to such extreme that he was not allowed to call Smitherman as a witness, or make references

to the text in the Rules of Conduct issued by the SCO. The transcript of the proceeding will

show that Judge Jamison did not ask a single question or make any efforts to investigate the

misconduct that occurred in her courtroom, unlike her aggressive advocacy against Jurado

during proceedings implemented by Smitherman, Bethel, McCash and/or Lambert for

Contempt or other actions against Jurado, during which Judge Jamison passionately questions

Jurado and takes the role of prosecutor.

VII.D.4(f) FIRST OVERT ACT OF RETALIATION BY DEFENDANT JAMISON – JURADO SUMMONED TO

BACKROOM AWAY FROM ANY METHOD OF RECORDING THE PROCEEDING TO FACILITATE

JUDICIAL TRANSGRESSIONS AND ABUSE OF AUTHORITY AND OF JURADO’S CIVIL RIGHTS

565. After Plaintiff Jurado’s constitutional claims were made public through his filings with

the SCO—including his deprivation of right to be heard at virtually every proceeding in front of

Defendant Jamison (i.e. in contrast with the proceedings in front of Magistrate Matthews)—

Jamison ordered Plaintiff into a back room away from the court room and without any option

to record the proceeding, in order to further deprive Plaintiff of his rights without leaving

evidence. The September 24, 2014 unrecorded proceeding in Chambers became a major

controversy, given that Jamison intimidated and coerced Jurado and engaged in several other

forms of abuse. This happened to be the only instance of an unrecorded proceeding in

Chambers during the two years of the pendency of the case.

221


VII.D.4(g) PLAINTIFF JURADO IS INTIMIDATED AND COERCED BY JUDGE JAMISON WHILE IN

“CHAMBERS” AND ULTIMATELY FORCED TO SIGN A WITHDRAWAL OF MOTION

FORM

566. On September 24, 2014, during the unlawful proceeding in Chambers, Judge Jamison

coerced Jurado into signing a form to give the appearance as if he voluntarily withdrew his

motion to remove Bethel.

VII.D.4(h) SECOND OVERT ACT OF RETALIATION BY DEFENDANT JAMISON – IMPROMPTU

CONTEMPT HEARING CONDUCTED WITH NO NOTICE AND WITHOUT AN

OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE OR A DEFENSE; JUDGE JAMISON IN THE ROLE

OF PROSECUTOR AGAINST JURADO

567. Her acknowledgement that Contempt Show Cause hearing being conducted was not

previously scheduled or service effected, Journal Entries confirming proceedings taking place in

Chambers and without an option for recording with the intention to avoid review given

Plaintiff’s previous constitutional due process claims. It resulted in a finding of Contempt and

sentence of Jail time in a matter prohibited by court rules, state law and in violation of

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

VII.D.4(i) THIRD OVERT ACT OF RETALIATION BY DEFENDANT JAMISON – JURADO IS DENIED

A STAY HE SOUGHT AS A MATTER OF RIGHT AND LAW; JUDGE JAMISON’S

WILLFULLY DEPRIVED JURADO OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL

PROTECTION OF THE LAW AND DUE PROCESS AND ORDERED HIS IMMEDIATE

UNLAWFUL INCARCERATION

568. During the Contempt Compliance (purge) Hearing conducted on November 20, 2014,

Jurado learned that Blythe Bethel had retained counsel to represent her in the juvenile case in

matters that were still pending after her dismissal by the court as the appointed GAL, such as

222


Jurado’s attempts to access the GAL file and the records of her investigations, her work and her

communications throughout her appointment. In other words, an attorney hired another

attorney to keep Jurado, who had been acting in a Pro Se capacity, at bay. Both were present

and making up an audience to Jurado’s unlawful incarceration by Defendant Judge Jamison.

569. Judge Jamison first addressed Jurado’s Emergency Motion to Stay and summarily

denied it over Jurado’s objections and arguments based on case law and related statutes. In

the meantime, Defendant Smitherman while sitting next to Defendant Lambert, instigated the

already existing hostility of Defendant Jamison toward Jurado by making fraudulent

misrepresentations in regards to the payment of Bethel that the Judge had order the parties to

make during the last September 24, 2014 proceeding. Smitherman willfully made a false

assertion that Jurado had not paid Bethel and thus failed to comply with the court’s orders.

Judge Jamison did not hesitate to play along and started questioning Jurado, as if taken the role

of prosecutor, regarding the payment she ordered the parties to make to Bethel.

570. Jurado raised two objections: (a) the issue of Bethel’s payment was irrelevant to the

hearing being conducted for contempt purge in regards to the payments allegedly owed to

Lambert for the cost of the (manipulated) evaluation by Dr. Smalldon. (b) He was not required

to prove his innocence about an accusation made without presenting any evidence in support

of Smitherman’s allegations against Jurado. (c) Because the hearing was supposed to be only

about the purge of the contempt finding for failure to make payments related to Dr. Smalldon’s

evaluation, Jurado had not brought any proof or had come prepared to defend against the new

223


accusations. As expected, Judge Jamison overruled Jurado’s objections and continued her

hostile interrogative about the payments she ordered to be made to Bethel.

571. Finally Jurado decided to address Defendant Bethel who was sitting in the back of the

courtroom between the audience, to ask her to confirm that he did pay her. Although Judge

Jamison admonished Jurado for addressing a person not sitting on the witness stand, she

allowed Bethel’s counsel to make an oral appearance, followed by his confirmation that Jurado

had indeed paid Bethel. Nevertheless, Smitherman’s continued fraudulent and unlawful

conduct had gone too far, even when Jurado had two pending motions to disqualify her, in

which he documented in detail her fraudulent acts. But Jamison was clearly indifferent to

Jurado’s motions and claims as her role in the conspiracy was, and has been, to protect all co-

conspirators and cover up their unlawful acts.

572. Soon after the topic of the payment to Bethel was addressed, Judge Jamison ordered

Jurado to serve 5 days in jail and set the release bond amount to double the amount subject to

the Contempt finding and purge hearing, knowing that he did not have the means to pay.

Defendant Jamison then directed the deputy sheriff that was present in the courtroom to

immediately detain Jurado and prepare him for booking. Jurado was instantly taken from the

court room to an adjacent area, stripped off his personal belongings, searched and padded,

handcuffed for the first time in his 44 years of life, and locked in a holding cell with other

inmates in uniform. Defendants Lambert, Smitherman and Bethel watched with pleasure as

they had finally seen the realization of their efforts to put Jurado behind bars by unlawful

224


means, since their attempts to unjustly incarcerate him—for the sole purpose of inflicting harm

and driven by racial hatred—started in November 2013, exactly a year earlier.

573. Later the same day, Judge Jamison recalled Jurado back to the courtroom and

explained that the court had vacated its orders for lack of jurisdiction and he was free to go.

Fortunately for Jurado, he had anticipated the outcome of the hearing and had filed an

Emergency Motion for Stay with the Tenth District Court of Appeals, given that he had already

filed his notice of appeal for Contempt finding and Purge proceeding.

574. Although the Stay sought by Jurado was also denied by the Appeals Court, the Court

has not held the hearing again awaiting the result of the appeal of those orders, which are still

pending adjudication.

VII.D.4(j) DEFENDANT JAMISON’S COVERT PARTICIPATION AS LEAD IN CONSPIRATORIAL

INCURSION INTO PLAINTIFFS’ HOME THROUGH CRIMINAL CONDUCT WITH

PREMEDITATED ABUSE OF AUTHORITY UNDER THE COLOR OF LAW FOR THE

PURPOSE OF WILLFULLY DEPRIVING PLAINTIFFS OF THEIR CIVIL AND

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, WHICH RESULTED IN SUBSTANTIAL DISTRESS TO THE

CHILD, AND DISTURBED AND ALARMED JURADO AND HIS ELDERLY PARENTS

575. On December 5, 2014, Judge Jamison fully engaged in joint action—through

concealed telephone communications—with co-conspirators McCash, Lambert and

Smitherman to cause panic, intrude, torment, intimidate and demoralize plaintiffs Jurado, N.G.

and N.G.’s elderly grandparents during the incursion into their home. Most importantly, the

ultimate goal of their conspiratorial incursion was to corruptly influence Jurado and his family

as witnesses in the upcoming civil rights action by causing fear and intimidation, and to

225


discourage Plaintiff Jurado from the pursuit of instituting this action in Federal Court, as he

had given notice to them multiple times.

576. Defendants Jamison’s premeditated abuse of authority under the color of law was

part of the agreement entered with the Defendants named above to deprive Jurado’s family of

their right to access the courts and to petition the government to remedy wrongs, their right to

privacy in their home, their right to privacy of religion, plaintiffs’ right to the pursuit of

happiness and Jurado’s fundamental right to parent his son

577. During the December 18, 2014 court proceeding, Judge Jamison stated in open court,

and captured in the court transcript, that Plaintiff Jurado does not have the right to Privacy in

his home during the pendency of the case—unlike other parents similarly situated. The

absurdity of Judge Jamison order is evident considering that the case has been pending for

almost 2.5 years with a GAL appointed during most of it; and for that length of time, a parent

has to surrender his fundamental right to privacy and right to be left alone, especially in the

situation when the parent did not institute the custody action.

578. Jurado’s parents that had come from Panama to visit and offer their help to Jurado

for an extended period of at least 10 to 12 weeks decided to cut their visit short and flee town

in fear after experiencing the incident from December 5, 2014 and after attending the court

proceeding on December 18, 2014 that made it evident that Judge Jamison was not going to

prevent more abuses, but on the contrary, was going to act in furtherance of the abuses.

226


579. Defendant Jamison’s well-coordinated efforts with co-conspirators to ensure that

Plaintiffs N.G. would be away from home, and away from his Dad, and to ultimately render her

December 2014 entry clarifying the court’s position on the daycare issue ineffective and

useless.

580. Defendant McCash itemized billing statement dated Dec. 31 2014 shows as evidence

the extensive ex-parte communications between him and Defendant Jamison the day of the

incursion—December 5, 2014. The conduct and statements made by the conspirators during

the December 18, 2014 hearing also serves as evidence of their collusion to commit unlawful

acts against Jurado’s family on December 5, 2014.

VII.D.4(k) JUDGE JAMISON’S OVERT ACTS DURING THE DEC. 18, 2014 COURT PROCEEDING

TO CONCEAL THE UNLAWFUL AND CONSPIRATORIAL CONDUCT OF MCCASH, LAMBERT AND SMITHERMAN AND TO PROTECT DEFENDANTS FROM BEING

PROSECUTED BY JURADO

581. Judge Jamison’s overt acts and conduct and during the December 18, 2014

proceeding to cover up the unlawful conduct of defendants McCash, Smitherman and Lambert,

to conceal her own participation in the December 5, 2014 unlawful incursion and to protect

them from any form of prosecution—all in furtherance of the conspiracy—are evident

throughout the court transcript of the proceeding that show statements and conduct that only

yield absurd results or don’t have a reasonable explanation. For details, refer to section VII.J.5

“Juvenile Court Entry dated Dec. 26, 2014, Drafted by McCash with Decisions Endorsed by

Judge Jamison and Orders issued on Dec. 18, 2014

227


582. The entry issued by Judge Jamison on December 26, 2014 shows substantial

evidence of agreement and collusion between Defendants McCash, Lambert, Smitherman and

Judge Jamison, for the reasons outlined below.

VII.D.4(l) FIRST LAMBERT UNILATERALLY DETERMINES GENERAL RULES AND GUIDELINES TO

BE FOLLOWED BY BOTH PARENTS, THEN ADOPTS AND ENFORCES THEM; SMITHERMAN AND LAMBERT PROCEED TO BADGER JURADO IF HE DOESN’T

FOLLOW LAMBERT’S STANDARDS AS DE FACTO RULES; MCCASH FOLLOWS BY

DRAFTING AND FILING A PROPOSE ORDER CONTAINING LAMBERT’S STANDARDS

AND PRACTICES AS IF MANDATED BY THE COURT; JUDGE JAMISON ISSUES THE

ORDER AS HERS WITHOUT HESITATION OR WITHOUT QUESTIONING THE REASONS

583.

VII.D.4(m) FORMALIZED JUDGE JAMISON’S RULING THAT JURADO DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT

TO PRIVACY AND THAT MCCASH HAS THE AUTHORITY TO MAKE UNANNOUNCED

VISITS EVEN AFTER HE HAS COMPLETED HIS HOME VISITS/INVESTIGATION OR

UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES THAT DEVIATE FROM THE NORM

584.

VII.D.4(n) SHOWS THE INEXPLICABLE ORDER FOR JURADO AND LAMBERT TO FOLLOW THE

LOCAL RULE FOR PARENTING TIME DURING THE HOLIDAY SEASON

585.

VII.D.4(o) SHOWS THE PUZZLING DECISION TO MANDATE THAT THE NON-POSSESSORY

PARENT WILL DETERMINE THE SCHEDULE FOR THE PARENTING HAVING THE CHILD

TO FOLLOW DURING THEIR BREAK OR VACATION

586.

228


587. Transcript Of Dec. 18, 2014 Court Proceeding With Judge Jamison Shows Multiple

Overt Acts By Jamison and McCash In Furtherance Of The Conspiracy” below.

588. For example, when Jurado was close to establishing that the conduct of McCash was

not in the best interest of the child—in regards to the harassment of the owner of the daycare

utilized by Jurado, and his pursuit of the mandatory attendance of the child in Goddard School

Hilliard miles away from Jurado, and even the enforcement of the mandatory attendance by

the involvement of law enforcement in one instance in which most parents picked up their

children early before a Holiday weekend, and Jurado did the same, which resulted in non-

compliance with the (invalid and unconstitutional) order—Judge Jamison prevented Jurado

from continuing by stating “we are not at the best interests yet”.

589. Another example is when Judge Jamison realized that Jurado’s parents were in court

to present their testimony as witnesses of the Dec. 5, 2014 incident, she ruled that “this is not

an evidentiary hearing”.

VII.D.4(p) CONCERTED ACTION ESCALATED BY DEFENDANTS JUDGE JAMISON, MCCASH, SMITHERMAN AND LAMBERT DURING THE DECEMBER 18, 2014 PROCEEDING TO

PURPOSELY DEPRIVE JURADO OF PARENTING TIME, SEVER HIS BOND AND

RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS SON AND CAUSE LONG-TERM PARENTAL ALIENATION

590. Prior to the end of the Dec. 18, 2014 proceeding, McCash and Judge Jamison made

the decision to impose the local rule for parenting schedule during the Holidays, without a valid

reason, given that the parents had never followed the local rule. The only explanation was that

such course of action would separate Plaintiff Jurado from Plaintiff N.G. for 11 straight days

229


during the holidays, when they have never been separated for even have of that length of time

since the child was born.

591. In addition, Judge Jamison issued a standing order at the end of the proceeding to

“enforce summary punishment by the suspension of his parenting time” if Jurado would fail to

turn in HIPPA forms, effective from the moment McCash would file a Motion for Contempt. As

expected, McCash denied getting all the forms and because Jurado allegedly missed 2 of the

forms, his parenting time was suspended indefinitely and still is to the present day.

592. The combination of the 11 days of Holidays away and the unconstitutional order for

summary punishment guaranteed the complete severance of the bond of parent and child

bond and relationship.

VII.D.4(q) DEFENDANT JAMISON FIRST CONDONED FRAUD UPON THE COURT THAT HAD BEEN

CAUSING SUBSTANTIAL HARM TO BOTH PLAINTIFFS, THEN ENGAGED IN UNLAWFUL

COVER UP OF SMITHERMAN’S MISCONDUCT AND ABUSED HER AUTHORITY UNDER

THE COLOR OF LAW TO PROTECT SMITHERMAN FROM FURTHER PROSECUTION FOR

HER UNLAWFUL ACTS

593. On the Dec. 18, 2014 hearing, she stated “I don’t think you get to disqualify her

attorney * * * I think you are trying to reach out into things that are totally irrelevant”.

VII.D.4(r) IN RESPECT TO DEFENDANT JAMISON’S ACTS AND UNJUSTIFIED CONDUCT HARMFUL

AND ADVERSE TO PLAINTIFF MINOR N.G.

594. Defendant Jamison precludes Plaintiff from providing testimony and evidence during

an Emergency hearing to address allegations that co-conspirators Lambert and Bethel were

withholding medical care for the child, for an entire year.

230


595. Defendant Jamison ignores imminent threat and refuses to hear Motion for

Protective Order: In order to protect the identity and confidentiality of juvenile records,

Plaintiff filed a Motion for a Protective Order, given that co-conspirator Amy LeClair and

Lambert were and are still trying restlessly to use the juvenile court records, which are

confidential, to re-litigate the custody dispute under the disguise of the Civil law suit filed in the

General Division of Franklin County Common Pleas Court—all in furtherance of the conspiracy.

596. Defendant Jamison engaged in deliberate indifference to the best interests of N.G. by

refusing to provide relief to Plaintiff Jurado in respect to the Modification of Child Support.

Dismissing the action and hearing, without finding out the impact of Plaintiff Jurado’s hardship

on the child and the substantial disparity between the increased quality of living being enjoyed

by Lambert compared to the reduced and strained quality of living imposed on Plaintiff Jurado,

due to the excessive and overage payments above his child support obligation by law and the

financial harm directly caused by the conspiracy. In furtherance of this deliberate indifference

to the best interests of N.G., Jamison engaged in spoliation of evidence in regards to Plaintiff

Jurado financial condition and income and to ultimately cause prejudice in his Action with the

Supreme Court of Ohio.

597. The refusal by Defendant Jamison to include in an Entry the Court’s position in

regards to the daycare restrictions and the confining of the child in a daycare facility without

exceptions caused harm to the child for a year. On the transcript of the Dec. 18, 2014 court

hearing, Defendant Jamison admitted that the issue was covered, discussed and clarified with

the parties over and over (since December 2013). Yet, she deliberately waited a year to issue

231


the opinion in an official entry, even when knowing that it continued to be a significant point of

contention.

598. Defendant Jamison, again, engaged in deliberate indifference to the detriment of the

child’s welfare and best interests by refusing to address the concerns and claims in Plaintiff

Jurado’s Motion for Removal of GAL (Defendant Bethel). In furtherance of her deliberate

indifference—as she placed last the interests of minor N.G., who has a Hispanic ancestry, while

putting first the interests of Defendant Bethel and Defendant Lambert—she forces the

disruption of the cross-examination of Bethel to protect her from being completely exposed as

to her offenses. This deliberate act by Jamison in concert with the rest of the co-conspirators

was not justified given the information, findings and facts revealed during the first portion of

Bethel’s cross-examination and the fact that only 10% of the cross-examination was covered.

Jamison knew of the potential damage to the conspiracy if the cross-examination would have

been completed.

VII.D.5. UNLAWFUL CONDUCT AND ACTS BY DEFENDANT BETHEL

599. With few exceptions, most of Bethel’s unlawful conduct and acts were centered on

fraud, perjury and premediated misrepresentations in court. The fact that her constant

deception became a pattern of unlawful conduct engaged against her own interests,

establishes unlawful discrimination, agreement and participation in the conspiracy.

232


VII.D.5(a) COLLUSION TO COMMIT FRAUD UPON THE COURT FOR THE FABRICATION OF THE

“OVERINVOLVED DAD” WHO SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO VISIT HIS SON AT BROOKSEDGE DAYCARE

600. Between September 2012 and January 2013 and prior to their first court appearance,

Lambert successfully restricted Jurado’s access to the daycare facility to visit his son by unlawful

means. During that time, she also claimed that the daycare staff and parents would have a

problem with a parent spending time with his child while at the facility, even if it was just to

feed the child his/her lunch. During that same period and prior to their first court appearance,

Lambert successfully prevented Jurado from spending a full day with his son based on her

rationale that it is more important for the child to follow the routine and scheduled offered at a

daycare facility than for father-son to form a bond by spending uninterrupted quality time

together. This occurred long before Defendant Bethel’s appointment as GAL in the custody

case.

601. After his parenting rights were reinstated by the court on January 23rd, 2013, Jurado

had normal interactions with the Brooksedge daycare staff and administrators. For the next 5

months, he continued picking up and dropping off his son at the daycare facility and visited his

infant son during lunch/feeding times 2 times a week on average, during the few days that he

was not working in Chicago, IL.

602. During the 5 months preceding the July 8 2013 hearing, there was not a single

incident, event, dispute, argument or the like between Jurado and the daycare workers.

However, he felt uncomfortable due to the fact that at least a couple of the workers were

233


constantly communicating with Lambert to report Jurado’s activities that were being

monitored.

603. Just days after her appointment as Guardian Ad Litem (GAL), Defendant Bethel

assumed an adversarial position, showed unrestrained bias mainly motivated by racial/ethnical

prejudice, and became an active advocate of Lambert and her interests.

604. During Bethel’s first 4 months in the case between March–June 2013, she established

a set of rules for the child not to be with his father Defendant Jurado during the week, in

support of Lambert’s efforts to limit Jurado’s time with his son.

605. Bethel’s restrictions affecting Jurado’s parenting time were intensely sought by her

and by Lambert, despite the fact that Defendant Bethel was aware of Jurado’s amount of time

out of state.

606. Much more than just being aware of Jurado’s weekly travel to/from Columbus and

Chicago, Defendant Bethel interfered with and sabotaged the almost-successful negotiations of

an interim parenting schedule change needed for Jurado to meet his obligations with his

demanding work schedule in Chicago.

607. On July 8, 2013, during a court proceeding, Bethel alleged that she had a

conversation with Defendant LeClair, Brooksedge owner, that same morning. Defendant

Bethel reported to Magistrate Matthews that Plaintiff Jurado was visiting the daycare facility

2 times a day/5 days a week; that the workers felt intimidated and described Dad as

234


aggressive; that other parents had been complaining about Dad, and that his visits were

stressful to his son.

608. Based on the allegations of Ms. Bethel, both Ms. Bethel and the Magistrate labeled

Jurado as an overinvolved father, and sought to have his access to the daycare restricted to

only drop-offs and pick-ups. The GAL’s allegations of the frequent visits of 5 days a week

contradicted her sound knowledge that Jurado had a job that required him to travel out of

town every week for the previous 12 months.

609. Because the transcript of the Jul. 8, 2013 proceeding was not available to Jurado for

several months, a day after the hearing Jurado obtained from Bethel, a written explanation of

what was discussed in court regarding the topic of his visits to the daycare.

610. During a meeting that took place on September 6, 2013 between Jurado and

Defendant LeClair at the daycare facility, the daycare owner made specific statements not only

implicating but also accusing Bethel of deceptive conduct and of making premeditated

misrepresentations in court. Specifically, she asserted that almost every statement and

information the Bethel provided to the Magistrate during the July 8, 2013 proceeding that

reportedly came from LeClair were not simple misunderstandings but outright fabrications.

The video recording of the meeting between Jurado and LeClair, shows LeClair convincingly

stating “LECLAIR: I never... No, I don’t think she misheard it. I think she made it up. I never used

those words to describe you.” (Emphasis Sic.), referring to the alleged misrepresentations

attorney Bethel made to the court, as she read the e-mail authored by Bethel to Jurado sent on

July 10, 2013.

235


611. If, only if, the declaration of the daycare facility owner casts some doubts, it is now

incontrovertible the fact that the Bethel’s allegations of Jurado’s frequent visits of 2 times a

day, 5 days a week contradicted her sound knowledge of his constant travel and time in Chicago

for business every week for the past 12 months, as revealed by the transcript of the August 1,

2014 court proceeding conducted to hear Jurado’s motion to remove Defendant Bethel. In that

instance, defendant Bethel’s fraudulent misrepresentations and other misconduct was exposed

during Jurado’s cross-examination of Bethel. The official court transcript of the Aug. 1, 2014

proceeding memorialized her testimony under oath as she answered questions by Jurado:

a. “You talked to me a lot about that” was attorney Bethel’s answer in regarding to

her knowledge of Jurado’s work arrangement out of town.

b. “I knew you flew back and forth between Chicago” was also her feedback when

asked to review Jurado’s frequent flyer report issued by United Airlines.

c. “I stated what I felt by those words that I just read to the Court. * * * I was not

misleading, no.” was attorney Bethel’s answer to Jurado’s question about her

statement “I am being told, coming twice a day, five days a week. It’s disruptive

* * *” made in court during the July 8, 2013 proceeding, even when having full

knowledge of Jurado being in Chicago 3-4 days a week, each week for preceding

twelve months.

612. Finally, attorney Bethel was exposed as she tried to deceive the court one last time

when she manipulated her answers to falsely indicate that the source of her testimony was

236


personal knowledge or firsthand experience or observation. But as the court quickly learned,

she was attempting to conceal the true source of her information, because it was mere

inadmissible hearsay. But even if, arguendo, hearsay was admissible but the credibility of the

daycare owner was in question, one should consider the details of LeClair’s accounts as she

articulated them to Jurado during the taped meeting that occurred in September 2013. Any

reasonable person that watches the video recording of the Sep. 6, 2013 meeting would be

convinced that Defendant Bethel indeed fabricated the information and accusations she made

against Jurado, given her knowledge of Jurado’s constant travel to Chicago.

Q (Jurado). Why did you not share with the Court that you knew that whoever told you that I'm going to daycare twice a day, five days a week might not be completely truthful because you knew I spend a lot of time in Chicago? Is there a reason why you didn't share that with the Court?

A (Bethel). I knew that you were also spending a lot of time going to the daycare and an unusually - - a lot amount of time, Ari.

Q (Jurado). You knew or you heard? Question - - yes or no. Did you know or did you hear?

A (Bethel). I believe what the daycare director told me.

(JUDGE JAMISON): So, the answer to the question is you heard.

A (Bethel). Yes.

(Emphasis Added.) Transcript of Court Proceeding – Hearing for Emergency Motion to Remove

GAL, Aug. 1, 2014, at 88:11-25, 89:1-3.

613. Defendant Bethel made those highly accusatory statements to the court, even with

full knowledge that they could not be true, as she was well aware of Jurado’s intense travel

schedule to Chicago. However, she chose to withhold this key piece of information from the

237


Court. As important is the fact that attorney Bethel was not acting alone. For example, the

official transcript of the July 8, 2013 Court Proceeding reveals that both of Lambert’s counsel—

attorney Smitherman and attorney Petroff—did not correct attorney Bethel or offered the

whole truth to the court. In fact, Defendants Smitherman and Petroff representing Lambert

reinforced Bethel’s deception and took part of the effort to misinform the court, with the

ultimate goal of restricting Jurado’s parenting time and interfering with his rights.

VII.D.5(b) MISLEADS THE COURT ON HER INVOLVEMENT WITH SETTING DAYCARE

RESTRICTIONS

614. Numerous emails from the Bethel, dating from April 2013 through July 2013, clearly

show her directives and intent to set restrictions around daycare: Strict drop-off and pick-up

times and No options for parents to stay home with the child even when they have a day off

from work. Defendant Bethel made sure that any interim orders that were issued during this

time included such stipulations. Since the July 8, 2013 hearing, Bethel made emphasis multiple

times on her recommendation to restrict access/visits to the daycare.

615. During the December 20th 2013 hearing, when Judge Jamison asked whether the

9am-4pm restrictions were based on Bethel’s own recommendations as GAL or if that was

mutually agreed upon by the parties, Defendant Bethel misled the court by stating “I really was

not actually involved in the negotiation of the temporary order.”

238


VII.D.5(c) GAL DECEIVED THE COURT WHEN QUESTIONED REGARDING THE REPLACEMENT

DAYCARE SELECTION PROCESS AND EXISTENCE OF OPTION WITHIN REASONABLE

DISTANCE OF BOTH PARENTS

616. During the December 20th 2013 hearing, when Judge Jamison asked the Bethel if the

parties had looked at other options near interstate 270, Defendant Bethel misled the court by

stating “none were provided”.

617. Defendant Bethel was well aware that the 2nd daycare proposed by Jurado was near

270 and within 9 minutes of Mom’s work location, as his proposal had explicit references to the

advantages of this location for both parents.

618. Defendant Bethel also did not disclose to the Court that she had decided for the

geographical location to be in the Hilliard vicinity, in support of Lambert’s recommendation for

the location of the proposed new daycare, especially for reasons that were not valid.

619. Defendant Bethel had good reasons to withhold information from the court: the

daycare selection process, which took place in October 2013 after the infant child was

permanently expelled by the Brooksedge facility, is still to-date one of the best examples of GAL

BIAS, deprivation of Jurado’s constitutional due process rights and parental rights, as well as

complete disregard for the best interest of the child. In this instance, Bethel and Lambert

conspired to choose a daycare location that was as far as possible from Jurado, in the west-

most point of Franklin County, and at the start of winter season which meant Jurado would

have to drive 100 miles total each day through snow on his parenting days with his son.

239


620. In furtherance of the conspiracy spearheaded by Defendant Bethel and Lambert,

Defendant McCash, through harassment and intimidation, managed to have the daycare facility

utilized by Jurado suddenly sever their agreement with Jurado, leaving the child without

daycare during Jurado’s parenting days. It only took Defendant McCash two months since his

appointment as GAL to accomplish what Defendant Bethel and Lambert fervorously sought

after for an entire year. Immediately after the child was expelled, Defendant McCash

proceeded to advocate for the child to be confined to the facility in the west-most point of

Franklin County, which was chosen by Lambert and Defendant Bethel a year earlier, even when

there was plenty of evidence that such recommendation was not in the best interest of the

child. Maintaining the child at the daycare facility chosen by Lambert 5 days a week would

implicate that the child’s routine and daily schedule would be significantly disrupted due to the

amount of miles required to commute between Father’s home and the daycare facility.

VII.D.5(d) WILLFUL NEGLECT AND BREACH OF DUTY OF CARE AND PROTECTION OF PLAINTIFF

N.G.’S WELFARE AND BEST INTERESTS, FAILURE TO REPORT POSSIBLE CHILD

MALTREATMENT, AND DISPARATE TREATMENT OF PLAINTIFF N.G.

621. There is substantial evidence, including recordings and dozens of e-mails showing

Bethel’s criminal indifference to the risks minor N.G. was being exposed to, and the intentional

or unintentional neglect by Lambert. Every act and conduct engaged by Bethel in furtherance

of the conspiracy against Jurado and for discriminating against him had an adverse effect of

Plaintiff N.G. also, and Bethel knowingly continue her conduct of neglecting and being

indifferent to his well-being.

240


VII.D.5(e) INTENTIONAL AND MALEVOLENT UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST JURADO ON

THE BASIS OF HIS SKIN COLOR AND NATIONAL ORIGIN

622. There is abundant evidence that cannot be disputed regarding Bethel’s racism and

ethnic bias, and her hostile and harmful conduct against Jurado. For specific facts and detailed

allegations, refer to section VI.C above dedicated to demonstrating Bethel’s unlawful conduct

and racial discrimination against Jurado.

VII.D.6. UNLAWFUL ACTS PERPETRATED JOINTLY BY DEFENDANTS LAMBERT, BETHEL, PETROFF AND SMITHERMAN

VII.D.6(a) DEFENDANTS AGREED TO GIVE PERJURED TESTIMONY DURING THE DECEMBER 20, 2013 COURT PROCEEDING

623. During the December 2013 Hearing, Bethel gave misleading statements and

perpetrated perjury when (1) Judge Jamison asked whether the imposed 9am-4pm daycare

restrictions [and mandatory daycare attendance] were based on the GAL's recommendations or

if that was mutually agreed upon by the parties and Bethel answered “I really was not much

involved in the negotiation of the temporary order”, even though she knew she had a

substantial involvement and influence on the negotiations and agreement regarding the July

2013 Temporary Orders. Both Petroff and Smitherman re-enforced Bethel’s perjured testimony

by making statements such as “I think it was Massucci, Jurado’s counsel at the time, who

negotiated the temporary orders”. Dozens of e-mails prove that, in close coordination with her

co-conspirators, Bethel intensely pursued her directive of mandatory daycare attendance, even

reaching an extreme when Bethel and Lambert pressured Jurado to drive with Plaintiff N.G.

across down during a snow storm solely for the purpose of complying with the mandatory

daycare attendance, even when government officials had declared December 6, 2013 a snow

241


day and closed all schools in central Ohio. It remains undisputed that the true reasons for the

pursuit and enforcement of mandatory daycare attendance have been to keep Jurado from

spending time with Plaintiff N.G. and to deprive both Plaintiffs of their fundamental and

constitutional rights; (2) Judge Jamison asked, within the context of the daycare selection

process that the parties underwent six weeks earlier, if the parties had “looked at other options

near 270 and Bethel answered “none were provided” while being well aware that both daycare

facilities proposed by Jurado were either near I-270 or almost adjacent to I-270 and within nine

(9) minutes of Lambert place of employment, which were reasonable options presented by

Jurado, unlike the one imposed by Lambert and Bethel. Bethel also withheld key facts, such as

her recommendation and decision to stay within the Hilliard vicinity consistent with her

absolute support and advocacy of Lambert’s interests throughout the case. Bethel knew that

choosing Hilliard as a geographical boundary leg to absurd results in respect to the daycare

selection and to the best interests of the child. Defendants Lambert, Smitherman and Petroff

also made similar statements in unison with Bethel’s dishonesty; (3) Bethel made accusations

about Jurado’s conduct in direct relation to the Brooksedge lawsuit that were untrue and based

on hearsay, while giving the appearance that she had first-hand experience about those facts.

VII.D.6(b) CONCERTED ACTION TO PERPETRATE FRAUD UPON THE COURT AND TO DEPRIVE

JURADO OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WITH THE FILING OF AN INVALID AND

UNAUTHORIZED VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL ON JANUARY 2014 BASED ON PRECEDENT

SET BY STATE EX REL. ENGELHART V. RUSSO, 2011-OHIO-2410

624. On December 13, 2013, Smitherman and Bethel engaged in misconduct during the

ex-parte hearing: (1) Used irrelevant facts and information solely to prejudice Jurado, including

the lawsuit against Jurado instigated by themselves and that was instituted as a sub-scheme to

242


target Jurado; (2) Mislead the Court about the whereabouts of Jurado’s Counsel, and the fact

that this date chosen for the proceeding was premeditated, as they knew attorney Keith

Golden, Jurado’s counsel, was on a one-day trip out of town and while being aware that the

circumstances would have allowed the Ex-Parte Hearing to occur the following Monday without

posing any risks for the child, (3) Withheld from the Court key information about the daycare

selection process, (4) did not issue service of the pleadings or included a Certificate of Service,

(5) No notice was given to attorney Golden, (6) No logic or reason existed to support the notion

that a given daycare placement for a child’s out-of-home care should be considered an

emergency, especially if it is a state-licensed facility, (7) No review hearing was set or scheduled

as court rules require, (8) Did not disclose to the court that it was Defendant Bethel’s idea to

approach the court on an emergency basis, even when attorney Smitherman is the one that

filed the emergency motion, (9) Misrepresented the reasons for Jurado’s attempts to enroll the

child in a second concurrent daycare facility.

625. On December 20, 2013 during the TRO Follow Up hearing, defendants engaged in

substantial misconduct, made fraudulent misrepresentations and gave perjured testimony, all

with the goal of prevailing in the matter of extending the TRO and obtaining a permanent order

to force Plaintiff N.G. to attend Goddard School of Hilliard II and to prevent Jurado from

changing or dual enrolling the child in another daycare facility. Defendants’ interest in

achieving these specific objectives was significant given that defendant The Goddard School of

Hilliard II had and still have an important role within the Master Conspiracy and in one or more

of the subsidiary schemes, and given that the mere location of the facility imposed undue

243


burden upon Jurado and compounded the harm they were already inflicting on him in

numerous other ways.

626. Prior to going into recess for the December 20, 2013 proceeding, the court set a

condition for the recess and for having Jurado agree to keep the status quo until the proceeding

would resume on January 8, 2014: That both parents had to research and come up with

proposals for a new daycare to be chosen somewhere between both parents geographical

areas, given that “this is a Shared Parenting situation”, as stated by Judge Jamison at the time.

Defendants Bethel, Lambert and Smitherman agreed to—or pretended to agree to—the

conditions set by the Court because they knew that such course of action would allow them to

continue imposing undue burden on Jurado, and would interfere with Jurado’s ability to earn

for a living (as it was already established that the driving from/to Goddard School in Hilliard

precluded him from accepting more hours of work his client was requesting of him), even when

their intentions were to never complete the hearing.

627. Less than 24 hours later, during an exchange period where parents transfer care and

responsibility of the child for their assigned parenting time, Lambert made a comment to

Jurado about the Court’s “unilateral decision” to recommend a new daycare center equally

accessible by both parents.

628. On December 31, 2013 and with full knowledge by both of her attorneys and Bethel,

Lambert acted in denial that the Court had issued an order with an assignment for both

parents, which confirmed that neither Lambert nor Bethel or Smitherman had any intentions to

obey it. Even attorney Bethel, as the GAL then, had shared her dissatisfaction with the outcome

244


of the December 20, 2013, which was close to its conclusion, except for Jurado’s testimony that

was pending. On her e-mail from 12/31/2013 to Jurado, Lambert stated “It is not my

understanding that there are any deliverables for court.”

629. On January 7, 2014, less than 24 hours before the Dec. 20, 2013 proceeding was

scheduled to resume from recess, the hearing and Lambert’s Motion got dismissed without an

agreement by all parties or order of the court. Lambert, Smitherman and Petroff filed a Notice

of Voluntary Dismissal, which contain references to Ohio Civil Rule 41(A), to withdraw their Ex-

Parte Motion for Restraining Order. The fact that Lambert, Bethel, and attorneys Smitherman

and Petroff knew of the circumstances and Jurado’s financial situation, combined with a

preponderance of evidence that Defendants chose the Goddard School of Hilliard II daycare

only because of its location being the most distant point west from Jurado in Franklin County,

and because of the conscious participation and acceptance of a key role of Defendants the

Goddard School of Hilliiard-II and Wilson in the Master Conspiracy, one can only conclude that

their delay in filing the invalid Civ.R. 14(A) withdrawal—that took place as late as the day before

the hearing was scheduled to resume—and the actual unlawful Dismissal of the Motion and

Hearing were premeditated tactics to cause as much harm to Jurado as possible. For example,

between December 13, 2013 and January 8, 2014, Jurado was restrained by the conditional

court order from enrolling the child in a second daycare, resulting in his inability to accept and

work more billable hours for his client.

245


630. The premeditated course of action was also intended to prevent Jurado from taking

the stand and to avert the court from making an unfavorable ruling for Lambert in regards to

the controversy of the daycare selection.

631. As a result, Jurado lost the opportunity to (i) be heard, (ii) rebut the false accusations

made by Bethel and opposing party, (iii) impeach Bethel’s testimony, (iv) make the court aware

of instances of intrinsic and extrinsic fraud, misrepresentation and other misconduct by

Defendants. These assertions could have been easily proven with the evidence Jurado had

brought to court, including a binder containing several hundred pages of exhibits, visual aids,

and video/audio recordings that were ready to be presented or played in either the initial

December 20, 2013 proceeding or Part II of the hearing scheduled for January 8, 2014 that

never took place.

632. The immediate result was not only the violation of Jurado’s due process rights, but

also created substantial prejudice against him with the court, as it became evident during the

next proceedings, given this court’s attitude toward him.

633. During the scheduled Status Conference in front of the Magistrate that same Tuesday

January 8, 2014, which took place after the invalid dismissal of the full hearing, Petroff asked

the Magistrate with Bethel and Smitherman’s support—in open court and with insistence—to

sua sponte grant Lambert a Restraining Order to prevent Jurado from enrolling the child on a

different or second daycare. The magistrate—being fully aware of the opinion that the Court

had reached during the December 20, 2013 hearing, and considering the objections made by

246


Jurado’s attorney, Keith Golden—denied the oral motion by Defendants. In essence,

Defendants engaged in the practice of “Judge shopping” in furtherance of the conspiracy.

634. During the January 22, 2014 hearing for Jurado’s Motion for Emergency Custody,

Judge Jamison learned from Jurado about the oral motion that was made by Defendants to

Magistrate Matthews on 1/8/14, and did not take it well. However, Petroff’s explanation that

he made such move to please his client, Lambert, who had asked him to try that approach,

seemed to have justified that behavior to Judge Jamison’s Satisfaction. In reality, Judge

Jamison had already been contacted and influenced by unnamed defendants to reprimand the

Judge for her censure of Bethel’s actions and opinions and for the purpose of protecting Bethel

from any claims arising out of her testimony during the December 20, 2014 hearing as well as

any future action against Bethel.

VII.D.6(c) DEFENDANTS AGREED TO INTERFERE WITH JURADO’S PARENTING DURING 2014

MEMORIAL DAY WEEKEND THROUGH UNLAWFUL MEANS, SUCH AS THE FILING OF

A FALSE POLICE REPORT

635. On May 24, 2014, Defendant Lambert, with full support and guidance from her co-

conspirators, filed a false police report with the intent to disturb, disrupt and intrude in Jurado’s

Parenting Time with Plaintiff N.G. The false police report claimed that Jurado was interfering

with her parenting schedule and that he was keeping the child from her, even when Lambert

was well aware of the stipulations of the orders that were in effect at the time, since they had

been following them for a year.

247


VII.D.6(d) FRAUD UPON THE COURT BY WITNESS TAMPERING AND COLLUSION IN OPEN

COURT BY DEFENDANTS SMITHERMAN, BETHEL AND LAMBERT WITH THE

PROTECTION OF JUDGE JAMISON

636. On August 1, 2014, during the proceeding to hear Jurado’s Motion to Remove Bethel

as the GAL, defendants Bethel and Smitherman with the participation of Lambert engaged in

concealed communications via phone SMS messages (“texting”) while attorney Bethel was still

on the witness stand.

637. The official transcript of the August 1, 2014 proceeding shows Jurado asking Bethel

about her usage of her phone during the brief court recess in the middle of Bethel’s testimony

as a witness. The transcript shows Jurado asking questions about the unlawful communications

between Bethel and Smitherman and also telling Judge Jamison about the incident. The

transcript also shows Defendant Bethel admitting that she was using her phone but to

communicate with her husband.

638. Although the usage of phones inside the courtroom is prohibited by statute and local

court rules, Judge Jamison did not attempt to investigate any further or confiscated her phone

to enforce the law or to confirm if Bethel’s assertions were true as the transcript shows,

especially given that the subject matter of the hearing was to address Bethel’s misconduct.

639. Following the hearing, Jurado obtained two sworn affidavits notarized by a U.S. State

Department officer of those present in the courtroom that witness the unlawful misconduct by

Bethel, Smitherman and Lambert and filed them with the Juvenile Court along with a Motion to

Disqualify Counsel filed on September 25, 2014 and a supplemental Motion to Disqualify

Counsel filed on November 18, 2014. In his filings, Jurado documented in detail the evidence

248


and accounts of the incident from August 1, 2014, and also included case law that established

the expected action of the court in cases of texting with the witnesses while on the stand. But

Judge Jamison continued to be indifferent to his claims and allowed Smitherman to continue

making fraudulent statements and unfounded accusations against Jurado in every single court

proceeding after August 1, 2014.

640. On January 2015, Jurado was finally allowed to have a hearing on his Motions. But

consistent with Judge Jamison’s conduct throughout the case, he restricted Jurado to an

extreme—including the preclusion of cross-examination of Smitherman as the main witness,

and her refusal to allow him to read and make references to text in the Rules of Conduct of the

State—that rendered Jurado ineffective. Jurado realized that his efforts were in vain and

declined to continue the prosecution of his motion. The transcript of the proceeding from

January 2015 will show that Defendant Jamison did not make any effort to question

Smitherman or Lambert in connection to the incident from August 1, 2014, even when court

rules allow it, and even when Judge Jamison engages in intense questioning of Jurado on every

proceeding brought against him by Smitherman, Bethel or Lambert, such as the two contempt

proceedings to date.

VII.D.7. UNLAWFUL ACTS BY DEFENDANT MCCASH

VII.D.7(a) DEFENDANT MCCASH MALICIOUS AND COORDINATED “UNANNOUNCED VISITS” TO CORRUPTLY

INFLUENCE JURADO AND HIS FAMILY AS WITNESSES IN THE UPCOMING FEDERAL ACTION BY

INTIMIDATION

641. Throughout the afternoon of December 5, 2014, Defendant McCash made multiple

attempts of incursion into Plaintiffs home in an aggressive and intimidating matter to ultimately

249


deprive Plaintiffs of quality time, to cause distress and harass. In fact, the intrusion into

Plaintiffs’ private life was a way to retaliate for Plaintiff Jurado’s failure to follow his absurd

mandate that Plaintiff Jurado had to drive 100 miles in one day just to keep his son confined to

a daycare facility that was as far as possible from their home, which was the goal of getting the

child expelled from the Westerville daycare center and one of the main objectives of the

conspiracy.

642. December 5, 2014 was probably the instance with the most harm inflicted for a single

day since the discrimination and conspiracy started, with McCash as the primary actor: McCash

caused great distress for all four, from the 2 ½ year old child, to the almost-70 year old

grandparents and Plaintiff Jurado as well. He specially alarmed N.G.’s elderly grandparents,

who took turns to call the emergency line. In addition, all three adults had started their Holy

Rosary while the child finished his nap, and McCash both interrupted them and stared at their

rosaries when he finally forced them to open the door. During the few moments Plaintiff

Jurado opened the door to confront him, he quickly scanned the living room, kitchen and as far

as he could see. On this day, Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to privacy, against unreasonable

and unauthorized searches and to privacy of beliefs were all violated among other rights. In the

recently issued Guardian Ad Litem’s report that Defendant McCash filed with the court on

January 7, 2015, he found noteworthy a “religious candle”.

VII.D.7(b) Malevolent And Intentional Acts Of Unlawful Discrimination By DEfendant McCash

250


643. Defendant McCash censured Plaintiff Jurado for having in his living room a Time

magazine’s edition of the Civil Rights movement issued in early 2014 with Dr. Martin Luther

King in the cover. As seen in the illustration below, the

heading on the magazine’s cover reads “Civil Rights in

America, The Road to Equality and the Dream today”.

McCash censured Plaintiff Jurado twice, for having this

magazine at his home. First during the court hearing on

December 18, 2014, and also in his recently issued Guardian

Ad Litem report. He used it in the context of discrimination

(or against it); especially after Plaintiff Jurado filed in the

Juvenile Court his Notice of Filing for Relief under Title VI in

Federal Court. Defendant McCash has established through his conduct in the short time period

of his assignment that he does not believe in the Civil Rights Movement, any such thing as

discrimination and claims emerging for related wrongs should never be taking seriously.

644. Defendant Jamison concerted unjustified action to take child away from Father for

weeks at a time: McCash choose to enforce the local rule for parents to follow regarding

parenting time during Holidays. This occurred toward the end of the December 18, 2014

hearing and against reason or common sense, especially given the fact that the parents have

never followed such schedule because it was one of the few things they could agree on since

case turned high conflict. It was obvious that such last minute recommendation was solely

because mother Lambert would end up having the child 11 days straight over the holiday

Figure 5 - Scanned cover of the "Civil Rights Magazine" found by Defendant McCash at Plaintiffs home, and later used against Plaintiff in Guardian report and to censure him in open court.

251


break—when the child is away from either parent only 2 days at a time, and with a few

exceptions 4 days at a time

645. Sworn affidavits of witnesses who describe the collusion and witness tampering that

took place in open court between Defendant Bethel and opposing counsel, video recorded

statements of a key witness accusing Defendant Bethel of deceptive conduct, fabricating

information and making premeditated misrepresentations to the court, and a more recent

transcripts of proceedings that memorialized the cross-examination of Defendant Bethel during

which key facts were settled, such as Defendant Bethel not having a valid reason for ignoring a

Pediatrician that had asked to talk to her on behalf of Plaintiffs about concerns with the infant

child’s health, and not having a defense for misleading the court in past proceedings.

Concurrent with the misconduct engaged by Defendant Bethel, the Court and Defendant Judge

Jamison started adopting an arbitrary and unreasonable attitude with lack of impartiality, which

appeared to increase in proportion to Plaintiff Jurado’s efforts to address his constitutional

claims against the Guardian Ad Litem and to remove her. The court’s posture—in clear display

of favoritism for three white-American females, Defendant Bethel, attorney Erika Smitherman,

and the child’s mother, and antagonism against a Hispanic father—intensified rapidly until it

reached a full scale retaliation scheme which included the denial of Plaintiff Jurado’s rights to

defend himself, present evidence, to retain private counsel, and to get a court-appointed

counsel. After twelve months of causing mental anguish to Plaintiff Jurado due to the imminent

threat of being incarcerated unjustly and for retaliation, Defendants Judge Jamison and

attorney Bethel, in collusion with third parties, finally succeeded in part when they deprived

252


Plaintiff Jurado with the oldest and most protected liberty interest: His recent unlawful

detention and incarceration.

646. Given that the unlawful incarceration was short-lived due to the surfacing of an

Emergency Motion to Stay filed with the Tenth District Court of Appeals, the court escalated

their aggression and retaliation by having Defendant McCash engage in acts of intimidation and

harassment against the daycare owner used by Plaintiff Jurado, resulting in the immediate

severance of their service agreement with Plaintiff Jurado. It has been well established through

court filings, proceedings and incidents outside the courtroom that having the child removed

from that facility was an objective intensely pursued for almost 12 months by Defendant Bethel

along with third parties. A few days after the child was expelled from the daycare facility,

Defendant McCash proceeded to intimidate and harass Plaintiff Jurado at his home, causing

distress to the child, his elderly grandparents, and to Plaintiff. The alarming effects of

Defendant McCash may be observed in the recorded 911 calls made by Plaintiff and his parents

after Defendant McCash came to their home multiple times, and intensely banged on glass

doors and windows, appearing as if he wanted to force his way in. Despite successful contact

with Plaintiff over the phone, and the continued requests by Plaintiff’ parents for Defendant

McCash to explain his presence (without opening the door), McCash finally desisted when

Plaintiff was compelled to open the door allowing McCash to see who was inside their home.

Plaintiff asked McCash to leave the premises and don’t come back because the police had been

called.

253


VII.D.8. UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES, CONDUCT AND ACTS BY DEFENDANTS BROOKSEDGE, LECLAIR, ALEXANDER-SAVINO, GODDARD-SCHOOL OF HILLIARD II, WILSON AND EAGLE

VII.D.8(a) MISREPRESENTATION RELATING TO PROVISION OF CHILD CARE IN VIOLATION OF

PROHIBITIONS PURSUANT TO ORC 2919.244

647. Both child care providers, Brooksedge Daycare and the Goddard School of Hilliard-II,

their employees, administrators, legal representatives and owners, including Defendants

Wilson, Eagle, Alexander-Savino, and LeClair, have knowingly misrepresented facts and

information that relates to the provision of child care, substantially affecting the health and

safety of children under their care, against the prohibitions under ORC 2919.224, a

misdemeanor of the first degree.

648. As the evidence show, day care defendants have engaged in these unlawful and

criminal acts multiple times during the time period of their participation in the conspiracy.

649.

VII.E. ONGOING CONSPIRACY SUCCESSFUL SO FAR

650. These account of the recent events are only an example of the systematic

oppression, intimidation and harassment that Plaintiff Aristides Jurado has been subjected to

for the past 21 months, inflicting emotional distress and other types of injuries and has resulted

in two trips to the Emergency Room, has created an extreme hardship for Plaintiffs that has

driving them to poverty requiring the financial assistance of friends, family and a not-for-profit

charitable organization.

254


651. Defendant Blythe Bethel, a licensed family law attorney, has been at the center of

the conspiracy to interfere with and against Plaintiff Jurado’s rights since her appointment as

Guardian Ad Litem by the Juvenile Branch of Franklin County Common Pleas Court, Domestic

Division. The conspiracy has been successful for the most part due to (a) Defendant Bethel’s

abuse of the powers inherent as a court-appointed officer, (b) the long-standing pattern and

practice of recipient programs (Defendants) to discriminate when providing services to their

beneficiaries based on their sex, but mainly on their race and ethnicity, (c) the active

participation of key actors, including the court-appointed custody evaluator, the petitioner in

the custody case (the child’s mother), counsel for the petitioner, Defendant Judge Jamison, and

other parties that have had a peripheral influence on the custody case but that are non-parties

to the case, (d) the financial constraints of Plaintiff Jurado, which have been exacerbated by the

acts and omissions of Defendants, (e) a common motivating factor among all co-conspirators

based on their conviction that Hispanics do not stand on equal ground with the rest of the

population in terms of constitutional and statutory rights and that Mothers have more

entitlements than fathers in matters of child custody and family law, (f) and the pre-existing

scheme developed and perfected by Defendant Blythe Bethel and Dr. Jeffrey Smalldon over the

years to pre-determine and secure the outcome of custody cases in favor of the party of their

choosing based on unlawful criteria or self-serving objectives, such as financial gain or

intentional unlawful discrimination.

652. As of the filing of this first amended complaint, Plaintiffs have been separated for

more than three months, and Jurado has been denied his right to the use of Open Door policy

255


at daycare facilities that is available to all parents in the state. Currently he is only allowed to

see his son while at daycare ONE HOUR A WEEK, on the day and time of the daycare’s choosing.

VII.F. EVIDENCE SHOWING CONSPIRACY IS SUBSTANTIAL— HUNDREDS OF

AUDIO AND VIDEO RECORDINGS

653. Only about two dozen of the hundreds of recordings available have been reviewed

and used so far for evidence showing unlawful conduct. The rest are still to be reviewed and

transcribed. Below are just some examples of the recordings reviewed that substantiate the

allegations in this action.

VII.F.1. RECORDINGS INVOLVING DEFENDANT OOAG

VII.F.1(a) RECORDING FROM OCTOBER 22, 2013 SHOWING STATE OFFICIAL REPRESENTING

DEFENDANT OOAG INTIMIDATING JURADO OVER THE PHONE AND INSTILLING FEAR

654. The recording from October 22, 2013 shows the participation of Defendant OOAG in

acts of discrimination as well as in overt acts in furthering the conspiracy, by capturing a state

official under Ohio’s Office of the Attorney General intimidating Jurado over the phone, and

instilling fear in him as part of achieving one of the objectives of the conspiracy to cause a

chilling effect on Jurado’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and ultimately preventing

Jurado from pursuing the filing of grievances and petitioning the state government and judiciary

for redress of the wrongdoings being committed by the conspirators. The recording captured

the state official telling Jurado “I don’t want to hear of what you have to say” and making

threats of criminal prosecution to Jurado if he would continue making accusations against the

conspirators for putting the child’s health and safety at risk. He stated that he is also a law

enforcement officer and he was doing Jurado “a favor” by warning him.

256


655. The background of the phone call started in June-July of 2013 during Jurado’s second

wave of attempts to reach out for help after he had enough information to show collusion

between defendants Bethel and Lambert and his concerns about the child. In one instance, he

reached out to defendant OOAG and spoke to several individuals in different sections of the

agency. One of the individuals was a member of the BCI section. At that time, the agent

explained that given the nature of Jurado’s concerns, he didn’t think BCI or OOAG could help.

656. Around September-October 2013 during his third wave of attempts to seek redress

and stop the misconduct, Jurado was referred to the juvenile team of the Westerville Police

department by a fellow parishioner, given the frequent visible head injuries the child had been

sustaining during that period. Jurado met with detective (then officer) Chris Davis, who was

very helpful even though the department did not have jurisdiction over any aspect of the case

or over Jurado’s claims about the health and safety of his son. After reviewing a few items of

the many Jurado had collected for evidence, Officer Davis urged Jurado to get Law Enforcement

involved and even Children Services. Jurado then proceeded to explain that his dilemma was

the fact that he was convinced that Defendant Bethel and others had been successful at

interfering with the state and local governments because of their influence and reach of their

network. Therefore Jurado was hesitant or uncertain as to which law enforcement agency to

engage that would be the least susceptible to external influence or unlawful interference.

Officer Davis was unable to recommend any specific agency but emphasized that given what he

had seen, law enforcement should be involved. Jurado felt that Officer Davis made a significant

contribution by giving Jurado reassurance that, as first time dad, he wasn’t overreacting to the

facts or the circumstances surrounding the incidents and injuries to the child.

257


657. After a few weeks, Jurado decided to give BCI a second try to at least obtain some

guidance in regards to which law enforcement agency to use and address his concerns of

unlawful interference. He then called and left a voice message on the week of October 14,

2013 for the same individual he had talked to a few months before within the BCI section. The

following week, on October 21, 2013, the BCI agent returned Jurado’s call just as Jurado was

headed to an important work meeting. Nevertheless, Jurado delayed his arrival to the meeting

by a few minutes and briefly explained to the BCI agent his concerns about the well-being of his

son, Defendant Bethel’s abuse of power and misconduct, and concerns of interference with any

possible law enforcement investigation. In such brief conversation, Jurado had no opportunity

to get into details. The BCI agent could not make much sense of it, but volunteered “to make

some calls”, and asked for a few of the names of those involved.

658. The follow up call the following day is the substance captured by the October 22,

2013 recording. Instead of being of any assistance to Jurado, the BCI agent treated him as the

offender and—using Bethel’s exact phrases verbatim—accused Jurado of making false

allegations against others without giving Jurado a fair opportunity to be heard or present his

evidence, unlike the opportunity and treatment extended to Jurado by Officer Chris Davis. It

was obvious that the BCI agent prejudged Jurado because of his speech accent combined with

his obvious name of Hispanic heritage. The BCI agent also allowed the conspirators to corruptly

influence him and interfere with his official duties, as Jurado had feared in the first place.

258


VII.F.2. RECORDINGS INVOLVING DEFENDANTS OCRC, DUNN AND GARCIA

659. There are about a dozen recordings involving Defendants OCRC, Dunn and Garcia.

Plaintiff Jurado herein offers three of them as the most significant ones: The recording from

October 24, 2013, November 21, 2013 and March 13, 2014.

VII.F.2(a) RECORDING FROM OCTOBER 24, 2013, SHOWING THAT JURADO CONTACTED

OCRC LEADERSHIP AT THE CENTRAL OFFICE AND WARNED THAT “SOMETHING

DOESN’T FEEL RIGHT”

660. The recording shows Jurado’s concerns and suspicion of the conspiracy, weeks before

he obtained hard evidence of interference in the OCRC investigations by OOAG. The recording

captured the phone call between Jurado and Ms. Sandra Aukeman, the most helpful person

inside OCRC and the only individual within the agency that Jurado feels certain that has taken

no part or participation in the conspiracy. During the call, Jurado explained his past

experiences of individuals interfering with ODJFS government functions and other agencies, and

he was fearful that what he was observing and experiencing with OCRC was a result of the

same interference.

661. Ms. Aukeman, who works directly with the Director of Enforcement & Compliance in

central office an also functions as the liaison for the agency’s constituent services, explained in

detail the history of the agency and their independent status unlike other “cabinet agencies”,

and that they “are a commission for a reason”. She added that the Commission is not political

and doesn’t allow those types of influences.

662. When Jurado gave the example of Defendant Garcia’s discouraging Jurado to come

into the office to use their notarization services, stopping short of overtly telling Jurado not to

259


access the public government building to deprive him of the enjoyment the services available to

the public, Ms. Aukeman was understandably skeptical because she did not see a reason for

such conduct from Investigator Garcia.

663. She gave Jurado some additional pointers for handling the retaliation claim given that

he had just been served with the complaint from Brooksedge lawsuit in retaliation for the OCRC

investigation. This recording shows evidence that Jurado anticipated the furtherance of the

conspiracy by interfering with OCRC functions. It also shows Ms. Aukeman trying in good faith

to give Jurado peace of mind in regards to the integrity of the institution.

VII.F.2(b) RECORDING FROM NOVEMBER 21, 2013, SHOWING THAT MS. AUKEMAN WAS NO

LONGER SKEPTICAL AFTER REVIEWING JURADO’S DOCUMENTATION OF GARCIA’S

MISCONDUCT

664. This recording also shows evidence that Jurado had a good reason to suspect OOAG

even before he obtained hard evidence of their interference with the OCRC investigation and

adjudication of the case. On this day, Jurado met in person with Ms. Aukeman in Central Office

right after the first determination of No Probable Cause by OCRC, in respect to the

discrimination charge. When she read the communications showing that Jurado was not

welcomed in the building and emails proving bias and other misconduct by Garcia, such as his

attempts to access confidential ADR records, Ms. Aukeman confirmed that Jurado’s experiences

with the Commission and Garcia were not typical. In one instance the recording captured Ms.

Aukeman’s reaction after reading one of the emails showing misconduct by Garcia and his

treatment of Jurado, as she uttered “Wowwww!”

260


665. Furthermore, the recording captured Jurado explaining to Ms. Aukeman why he

suspected the OOAG to be at the center of the interference with the multiple state

government agencies: because they are the only ones connected to all of them and have a

strategic position that allows their influence in all of their regular business. Also, referring to

the racial Bias from Bethel while performing her function of GAL, Jurado can be heard saying “it

[racism against him] is like a cancer—it has spread everywhere”. Ms. Aukeman spent a good

amount of time with Jurado and gave him pointers as to the reconsideration process.

666. Sometime after this meeting, Jurado obtained the full case file of the investigation of

his discrimination complaint. The file contained notes and emails between Defendant Garcia

and Defendant Gutowski reaching an agreement to rule in favor of Brooksedge even before

the discrimination investigation started; and the agreement also included the determination of

NPC (no probable cause) IF Jurado were to file a charge of retaliation. In other words, Jurado’s

complaint about Retaliation against Brooksedge was decided before it was filed. Jurado’s

discovery provided confirmation of his suspicions previously communicated to Ms. Aukeman

and captured in these recordings with almost perfect precision.

VII.F.2(c) RECORDING FROM MARCH 13, 2014 SHOWING MISCONDUCT BY DEFENDANT

DUNN WHEN HE INTENTIONALLY WITHHELD KEY EVIDENCE

667. During the public hearing in front of the Commissioners for the final determination of

Jurado’s request for reconsideration of his discrimination and retaliation charges against

Brooksedge, Mr. Dunn acted in the role of advocate for Brooksedge, and the recording covered

the entire hearing and his peculiar performance. Defendant Dunn repeated all the conclusory

allegations made by Brooksedge verbatim as if they were his findings of fact even when there

261


was no evidence to support them, other than an affidavit by Defendant LeClair. In addition,

Dunn did not offer any evidence of weight that Jurado had provided and intentionally withheld

factual evidence that would have resulted in a decision in favor of Jurado. The recording

proves that Dunn intentionally withheld key information and evidence in furtherance of the

master conspiracy and of the Lawsuit sub-scheme, including:

668. (i) the opinion and reaction of Nationwide Children’s hospital ER doctor and social

worker in regards to the injuries sustained by the child while under the care of Brooksedge and

their concerns and intention of making a referral to Children Services—all of it captured in a

video recording that was provided to Defendant Dunn and the original investigators,

669. (ii) an audio recording of statements made by representatives from Action for

Children on Sep. 9, 2013, in support of Jurado’s allegations that Brooksedge wrongly denied

him access to the facility—Action for Children is the official provider contracted by ODJFS to

provide training to all licensed daycare centers, along with other services that include helping

child care centers maintain their license and pass inspections from ODJFS.

670. (iii) The video recorded statement of Amy LeClair admitting that she found

reasonable Jurado’s actions of filing complaints against Brooksedge given the circumstances,

and LeClair’s allegations that the situation that resulted in those complaints was the result of

the actions of Defendants Bethel and Lambert, including accusations against Bethel of

fraudulent misrepresentations to the court. This video recording in the possession of

Defendant Dunn also included explanations by Jurado to LeClair of his true intentions and goal

for filing the complaints. Jurado can be heard assuring LeClair that he was not trying to hurt her

262


or her business, but instead he had hoped a proper investigation by the agencies would

uncover who within Brooksedge was colluding with Defendants Lambert and Bethel. At the

point that the video recording was taken, Jurado did not suspect LeClair to be involved in the

conspiracy, but he was convinced one or more of her employees were. In an email that Jurado

sent to LeClair after the meeting that was recorded, he again reiterated his earlier explanation

of his objective for getting the agencies involved and made emphasis that “hurting you or your

business is not my end-game” consistent with the discussion they had earlier that was video

recorded. The recording from March 13, 2014 captured Defendant Dunn making misleading

statements to the Commissioners when referring to Jurado’s email to LeClair. He took the e-

mail out of context and told the Commissioners that Jurado was admitting with the email that

his end-game was to file those complaints, including the charges investigated by OCRC, with the

sole purpose of gaining an advantage in his custody court case. Because Dunn was in

possession of the recording of Jurado’s meeting with LeClair, he knew the meaning of Jurado’s

email and what he was referring to with “his end-game”, but chose to withhold it from the

Commissioners and instead maliciously use the email by manipulating its content to give it a

different meaning.

671. (iv) The judgment entry issued by the juvenile court on Jan 23, 2014 that stated “The

Court reviewed Defendant’s exhibits of the various injuries to the child. The Court does find

that the number of injuries to the head, the black eye, and the unexplainable bruising to the

child’s legs troubling * * * It is unreasonable to expect that a concerned parent who has a child

in daycare and that child has experienced several incidents will not want to investigate the

cause of the injuries.” This judgment entry happens to be the last act committed by Defendant

263


Judge Jamison before she entered the conspiracy, and shows her focus on the best interest of

the child as expected. After this entry was issued, the best interest of the child is clearly

missing from every action, decision and conduct engaged by Defendant Jamison afterwards.

672. The four above are just a few examples of substantial amount of evidence in support

of Jurado’s allegations of discrimination and retaliation against Brooksedge, that even if not

enough to guarantee a finding of probable cause of discrimination, it would have certainly

resulted in probable cause and substantiation of retaliation as final determination by the

Commission. Furthermore, the recording captured when Defendant Dunn provided to the

Commissioners a statement made by Defendant Bethel censuring Jurado and in favor of

Brooksedge. Defendant Dunn’s misconduct can be further established with the fact that he was

aware that Jurado had also made allegations of racial bias against Bethel, in addition to LeClair’s

own allegations against Bethel of deceptive conduct and misleading the court. Dunn, despite

his knowledge of these factors, still chose to rely on information sourced from Bethel and

present it to the Commissioners in detriment of Jurado’s charges against Brooksedge.

673. Dunn took advantage of the weight of Bethel’s opinion in role as GAL, while at the

same time, he was in possession of the Jan 23, 2014 court order and videos described above

and chose to withhold them from the Commissioners simply because they would have cleared

any doubts that Jurado’s complaints against Brooksedge were legitimate. This recording—

along with the other recordings involving OCRC and the electronic correspondence showing

misconduct by Garcia—helps establish and support Jurado’s allegations that the interference

by OOAG not only affected the final outcome of the investigations but also encouraged OCRC

264


and its staff to engage in misconduct with the sole purpose of depriving Jurado of equal

protection of the law and his right to due process, in furtherance of the conspiracy.

VII.F.3. RECORDINGS INVOLVING DEFENDANTS THE JUVENILE COURT, JUDGE JAMISON AND

THOMAS MCCASH

VII.F.3(a) RECORDING FROM JULY 8, 2013 SHOWS THAT JURADO DID KNOW ABOUT BETHEL

AND DR. SMALLDON’S PATTERN AND PRACTICE OF ENGAGING IN RACKETS BEFORE

THE PSYCHOLOGIST APPOINTMENT TO THE CASE

674. This recording captured conversations with courtroom deputy outside in the hallway

before the start and during the July 8, 2013 status conference presided by the magistrate, when

Plaintiff Jurado asked the court to not conduct the proceeding because he was dismissing his

attorney, and wanted to do so before any decision or orders would be issued (in respect to the

appointment of the psychologist evaluator). The court failed to honor Jurado’s request.

675. The recording also includes Jurado’s discussion with his then-attorney right outside

the courtroom during which he dismissed her after she refused to enter an objection to the

appointment of the psychologist recommended by Defendant Bethel.

VII.F.3(b) RECORDING FROM SEPTEMBER 24, 2014 SHOWING THAT JURADO DID NOT

VOLUNTARILY SIGNED THE WITHDRAWAL OF HIS MOTION FOR REMOVAL OF GAL

676. This recording, which was taken in the back (outside) of the courtroom, shows that

Jurado did not willingly sign the Withdrawal of his Motion for the Removal of the GAL, which in

turn supports the allegations that Defendants Jamison and Smitherman have made

misrepresentations regarding the events from that day that led to the removal of Bethel as the

GAL.

265


677. This recording is not of significant value as compared to others because Jennifer

Gibson, Judge Jamison’s secretary, is a key witness that can provide testimony that she asked

Plaintiff Jurado to sign the Withdrawal form and Jurado refused in open court. She then

returned the form without the signature to Defendant Jamison, who proceeded to approach

Jurado at his table in the courtroom and vigorously ordered Jurado to sign the form. Other

evidence that proves Defendant Jamison engaging in fraudulent misrepresentations about

whether Jurado voluntarily signed the withdrawal of Motion for Removal of GAL and “asked for

a new Guardian” includes her response to the Chief Justice of the Ohio Supreme Court in case

2015-AP-005 regarding Jurado’s Affidavit of Disqualification. In her response, she stated that

she appointed Thomas McCash sua sponte as GAL.

VII.F.3(c) OFFICIAL RECORDINGS OF THE 911 CALLS MADE BY JURADO AND HIS FAMILY

DURING THE DECEMBER 5, 2014 CONSPIRATORIAL INCURSION TO JURADO’S

HOME TO TORMENT AND FRIGHTEN HIS FAMILY, AND INTRUDE IN JURADO’S

PRIVATE LIFE AND PARENTING TIME WITH PLAINTIFF N.G.

678. On December 5, 2014, Judge Jamison fully engaged in joint action—through

concealed telephone communications—with co-conspirators McCash, Lambert and

Smitherman to torment and demoralize plaintiff Jurado, while also to causing panic for N.G. and

N.G.’s elderly grandparents during the incursion into their home.

679. The multiple hostile unannounced visits and intimidating presence of McCash



266


situation. The recordings show the calls made by Jurado and his parents with a tone of

agitation and tension, given McCash’s apparent intentions to force his way into their home.

VII.F.4. RECORDINGS INVOLVING DEFENDANTS THE GODDARD SCHOOL-HILLIARD II, KIM

EAGLE AND GRETCHEN WILSON

VII.F.4(a) RECORDING FROM DECEMBER 10, 2013 SHOWS JURADO EXPOSING A FALSIFIED

INCIDENT REPORT CONTAINING FABRICATIONS OF INJURIES TO THE CHILD.

680. The falsified incident report was written by one of the child caretakers stating that

Jurado had dropped off the child in the morning that same day with “a busted lip and bump in

the forehead”. The recording includes his conversation with the daycare owner Kim Eagle and

the assistant director at the end of the day when Jurado picked up his son and read the report.

The recording included their conversation as they all proceeded to look at the child and

confirmed that he did not have any “bump”. He had a red patch of skin similar to the ones he

had in his back as he was being treated for eczema by the child’s pediatrician. Kim Eagle also

acknowledged that the child did not have a “busted lip”, so she changed the report by crossing

the previous statement and writing “chapped lips” to justify why the teacher wrote anything

about the lips. In other words, the recording shows that the child’s injuries written in the

report were a straight-forward fabrication, given the recorded acknowledgement of Kim Eagle

and the assistant Director.

681. This recording conclusively shows a pattern of collusion between Lambert and the

daycare providers she had chosen in two instances, because six months earlier the same type of

irregularity occurred with the Brooksedge teachers that wrote a false report. (Refer to

Recording from July 2, 2015 in Section VII.F.5(b) below.) The first incident with Brooksedge

267


took place days before a scheduled court hearing, and the second instance of fraud by the

falsification of an incident report by The Goddard School occurred only a few weeks before a

scheduled proceeding for the start of trial.

VII.F.4(b) RECORDING FROM DECEMBER 11, 2013 PROVES THE DIRECT INVOLVEMENT OF

DEFENDANTS GRETCHEN WILSON AND THE GODDARD SCHOOL-HILLIARD II AS CO-CONSPIRATORS WITH DEFENDANT LAMBERT

682. This recording covers a meeting Plaintiff Jurado had with Defendant Wilson and

Defendant the Goddard School Hilliard-II owners Kim and Bill Eagle the morning after the

falsified incident report was identified. During the meeting, Jurado—believing in their

innocence—was compelled to explain what had occurred with Brooksedge six months before in

July 2013 and how it turned into a lawsuit. Jurado also explained to them that he would go out

of his way to make sure he would stay away from trouble and the reason for his serious

concerns regarding the falsified report. This recording memorialized Defendant Wilson’s

explanation of how the false information made it to the report.

683. Although Wilson had already left the school when Jurado picked up his son the day

before in the afternoon and uncover the false incident report, she was at the facility when the

report was written in the morning. She explained that it all started when Defendant Lambert

called them after she received one of the pictures the daycare sends out frequently to parents.

Wilson then described to Jurado and both daycare owners how Lambert “insisted that the

picture showed a bump in the child’s forehead”. The recording captured Wilson’s assertion

that the child’s two caretakers “thought it was eczema” and that Wilson herself thought it was

eczema (or skin irritation/dryness). Wilson’s explanation concluded by saying that they wrote

268


“bump” and busted lip in the incident report to appease Lambert, but “it was a poor choice of

words”. She then apologized.

684. The significance of this recording increased five-fold twelve months later, when only

weeks away from the scheduled trial in January 2015, Defendant Wilson denied that she ever

implicated Lambert in the incident and Wilson’s misconduct went further than just denial.

When Plaintiff Jurado read the GAL report issued a week before trial in January 2015,

Defendant Wilson admitted that she had given Defendant McCash the following information

that appeared in his GAL’s report:

Ms. Wilson also discussed another incident report where there was a mark on [redacted] which was apparently determined to be eczema. According to Ms. Wilson, Father was making allegations that Mother had told the center to lie about the mark with the intent to deceive or hide the real reason for the mark from Father. A review of the incident report, there is a change in the word bump to red mark and busted to chapped relative to his lip.

(Emphasis Added.) Guardian Ad Litem Report, Jan. 7, 2015, page 8. A supplementary recording

was made on January 13, 2015, when Jurado asked Wilson about the GAL’s report, since he

was not sure where the inaccurate information had originated. Gretchen Wilson, with a

straight face, reaffirmed that she had provided the information that appeared in the GAL and

further explained that the information given is what she remembered because “it happened

like 2 years ago”.

685. The recording also shows that Jurado confronted Gretchen in a non-aggressive

manner about the falsehood of that statement, then he recited verbatim what she had said on

Dec. 11, 2013 and disclosed to Wilson the existence of the recording from that meeting in

269


which she implicated Lambert. She continued denying any wrongdoing. Both owners were

nearby and heard most of the conversation between Jurado and Wilson. The recording

captured Bill Eagle threatening Jurado that he would not allow him into the facility again to

see his son. Plaintiff Jurado simply responded “I am sorry, forget I said anything” and finished

asserting to them that he did not have the same rights as any other parent to make any

complaints.

686. Defendant Wilson has continued her denial of any wrongdoing even during her

testimony at trial a few days later. The transcript of the proceeding will show how she

attempted to cover up the lies with more deceit. Both Bill and Kim Eagle stand by Defendant

Wilson’s defenses and explanations that defy common sense.

VII.F.4(c) RECORDING FROM JANUARY 9, 2015 THAT SHOWS GRETCHEN WILSON GAVE

PERJURED TESTIMONY DURING TRIAL A FEW DAYS AFTER THIS RECORDING WAS

MADE

687. Defendant Wilson’s fraudulent misrepresentations in regards to this recording

involved two assertions: (1) that Wilson did not know why Plaintiff Jurado had asked her to call

the police on January 9, 2015, (2) that the police asked Jurado to leave the premises, as if being

expelled by the authorities as a delinquent. Kim Eagle was present in the courtroom during

Wilson’s testimony under oath.

688. The first part of the recording included Jurado’s conversation with Wilson at the point

he arrived at the center to visit his son on Jan. 9. Jurado explained Wilson the meaning of an

email he had sent a few minutes earlier to Defendants McCash, Lambert, Smitherman and

Wilson regarding his most recent court filing. He had filed an appeal of the order suspending

270


his parental rights, and he believed that with the filing of the appeal, the order would be

automatically stayed. Jurado also explained to her that he was not planning to create a difficult

situation on that day. Instead, he wanted someone to take responsibility for denying him of his

ability to take his son with him. He reminded her of what occurred with Brooksedge more than

a year earlier when they denied him access to the facility by just saying so in an email, but later

they did not want to take accountability because no one physically stopped him from entering

the daycare in that instance. Therefore, he just wanted either the GAL or Defendant

Smitherman to take responsibility if they disagree with Jurado’s assertions that the order was

stayed.

689. Apparently, neither defendant was willing to take that responsibility so they put it

back to the daycare to take ownership enforcing the order. Given that earlier that week, on

January 6, 2015, the daycare had denied Jurado the ability to take his son with him when he

could have because there was not a valid order in place, Jurado then insistent that someone

would have to take responsibility for enforcing the new order provided by McCash to deny

Jurado the ability to take home his own son. Both agreed that it simply meant they would have

to call the local police department to formally enforce the order. The entire process, although a

bit time-consuming, was a formality that Jurado thought it was the only way to place some

accountability, and therefore Wilson knew exactly the reason for Jurado to ask for police

involvement. The recording shows that the officers arrived and were in the facility for less

than 10 minutes. When everything was clarified, the senior officer said “I can let all of you go

now”, but asked the parents not to leave at the same time.

271


690. Defendant Wilson testified at the trial in Juvenile Court that the officers asked Jurado

to leave the premises as if Jurado was physically forced out by the officers. She insisted on her

account of the incident even when Jurado asked if she may mean that they simply asked the

parents to leave one first then the other. Because Jurado was precluded from introducing any

evidence by Defendant Jamison, even though this was a very recent event, Defendant Wilson

knew she could get away with fraudulent misrepresentations and perjured testimony with

the goal of causing detriment to Jurado’s case during litigation. That is the value of the

January 9 2015 recording.

VII.F.4(d) RECORDING FROM FEBRUARY 2, 2015 SHOWING THE CHILD, PLAINTIFF N.G. BEGGING HIS DAD TO TAKE HIM HOME DURING HIS VISIT AT LUNCH TIME

691. This recording shows the harmless nature of Jurado’s visits to his son, especially at

lunch time. The recording also shows how the daycare owner, Kim Eagle, developed rules

exclusively for Jurado to follow, as if he is different than anyone else, and the recording also

provides evidence of the agreements reached between Jurado and Defendant the Goddard

School that Defendants appear to deny after this recording was made, even when Jurado

documented the discussion and agreements in his letter dated February 3, 2015 to the daycare.

See Jurado’ Mar. 3, 2015 Letter, Exhibit LV-F, pages 003–004.

VII.F.4(e) SET OF RECORDINGS FROM FEB 5, FEB 6, FEB 9 AND FEB 12, 2015 THAT SHOW

HOW JURADO FOLLOWED THE RULES AND AGREEMENTS PREVIOUSLY REACHED

692. These recordings are evidence that Jurado spent on average 2 hours a week visiting

his son at The Goddard School-Hilliard II, and that many of the visits during those days were at

the end of the day and not at lunch time. The recordings prove that there were no incidents,

272


that Jurado did not cause disruptions to the class, that he was always polite with the children

and teacher. The recordings are evidence of how much Jurado’s son loves to spend time with

him and that Plaintiff N.G. misses his dad, Plaintiff Jurado., and that there is no reason for

such unjust and harmful punishment of separating father and son.

VII.F.4(f) SET OF RECORDINGS FROM FEBRUARY 18 AND 20, 2015 SHOW EVIDENCE OF

COLLABORATION BETWEEN DEFENDANTS WILSON, THE GODDARD SCHOOL’S

EMPLOYEES, OWNERS, AND LAMBERT

693. These two recordings show how far Defendants are willing to go to deny Jurado

access to the facility and fabricate reasons to take away the few hours a week Plaintiffs had to

spend time together. These recordings also prove that Defendants are willing to put the

child’s safety and life at risk (one more time), in order to accomplish their goals. Both

recordings were made during Jurado’s visits to his son, Plaintiff N.G. later in the afternoon and

are evidence that Defendants made an agreement to participate in a scheme around the usage

of Skype and the proper location for Plaintiff N.G. to talk to his paternal grandparents from

Panama, with the objective of framing Jurado for causing injuries that would be inflicted to

Plaintiff N.G. and ultimately having justification to ask the court to prohibit Jurado from visiting

the facility altogether.

694. The first factor to consider is the agreement reached between Jurado and Kim Eagle

on February 2, 2015 and Jurado’s email documenting the discussion. In Jurado’s letter dated

Feb. 3, 2015, he asked for the appropriate location to use for the child to Skype with his

grandparents, given that one of Kim Eagle’s rules was not to use Skype inside the classroom,

and that Skyping would be the only exception for taking the child outside of his classroom.

273


Interestingly enough, Kim Eagle never responded the letter and no one formally responed to

Jurado’s question in his letter asking Kim Eagle to identify the proper place for Plaintiffs to use

Skype. See Jurado’ Mar. 3, 2015 Letter, Exhibit LV-F, pages 003–004.

695. When Jurado visited his son in both dates of these recordings, he followed the rule

and did not Skype inside the classroom. On each occasion, the child’s “lead teacher”, Ms.

Melissa, said that she would not allow Jurado to take his son outside of the classroom unless

she would hear from her superiors, even when she was made aware of the authorization given

by Kim Eagle.

696. In the first instance on February 18, Jurado left the classroom and left his son behind

to go look for Defendant Wilson, but she was absent. In her absence, Ms. Molly, a lead teacher

from another classroom who was covering for Wilson, gave the authorization to Ms. Melissa to

allow Jurado to leave the room with the child. Then, Jurado asked Ms. Molly if he could use the

classroom in the back that was empty, she said Yes, and added “but you can use the kitchen”

and proceeded to insist on Jurado taking the child into the kitchen. When Jurado asked if

there was not a safety issue because of the large sign posted on the kitchen door that says

“For Safety Reasons, Children Should Not Accompany Parents or Teachers into the Kitchen”, Ms.

Molly said NO, that it would be fine. He then returned to the classroom and got his things and

his son and went into the kitchen. But fortunately, he did not go too far in. Jurado became

cautious because the light was off and was dark. He immediately noticed that the floor was

extremely slippery and wet—it reminded him of when water and oil get combined. He did not

274


think much of it at the time even when the kitchen would always be kept pristine and it was

unusual to see the floor slippery and wet.

697. Plaintiffs proceeded to the empty classroom to Skype with his grandparents from

Panama, and then returned to the classroom without any more incidents. The recording from

Feb. 18, 2015 captured everything, including Ms. Molly asking Jurado to take the child into the

kitchen against safety rules. See The Goddard School Kitchen Safety Sign, Exhibit LV-F, page

013.

698. Two days later, on February 20, Jurado went to

the same process during his visit to spend time with his son.

The teacher put Jurado in a position to have to ask each

time, so he went to Defendant Wilson’s office and she gave

the authorization without hesitation. But similar to the

request from the previous visit, Ms. Wilson said that she

“preferred” Jurado to use the kitchen instead of the empty

classroom for the child to Skype with his grandparents. Jurado mentioned his concerns that

taking the child into the kitchen would be unsafe and against the rules, but Ms. Wilson

insisted as if Jurado assertions were incorrect and that there was not a safety issue. They both

proceeded to the front of the kitchen that had the door closed and Jurado asked Defendant

Wilson to read the warning sign in the kitchen door. After reading it, Ms. Wilson said “oh!” as if

she did not know that it was unsafe for children or as if she had never seen the sign before,

even though it had always been there. See picture of The Goddard School Kitchen Door with

275


Safety Sign, Exhibit LV-F, page 014. The discussion ended at that point and Jurado went back to

the classroom to get his son to the other classroom to Skype with his grandparents.

699. Before he went to the back classroom, he stopped by the kitchen to peek inside. No

one was inside, and this time the lights were on and the floor was in similar condition as the

previous time. He assumed that a contractor was working on running wiring because he also

noticed hanging wires running down the wall and rolled up in the same area that was wet. No

other significant incident took place on this day, and the recording captured Jurado’s

experience including Defendant Wilson insistence that Jurado take his son, Plaintiff N.G. into

the kitchen.

VII.F.4(g) RECORDING FROM FEBRUARY 24, 2015 WAS THE LAST RECORDING CAPTURED

RELEVANT TO DEFENDANTS THE GODDARD SCHOOL-HILLIARD II AND WILSON.

700. This recording is a significant piece of evidence because it captured defendants’ next

scheme in their attempts to keep Jurado out of the facility and away from the child. The

recording covered a premeditated attack launched against Jurado and also shows the

emotional and psychological harm being inflicted upon the child. On that day, Jurado stopped

by during lunch time to visit his son. He was aware that lunch was already half-way underway,

but putting his son to sleep for his nap was the most important part of the visit for Jurado, for

several reasons, and the daycare knew about it. In addition Father and son had started a

tradition by routinely spend a few minutes before the nap praying.

701. Jurado ran into Defendant Wilson at the entrance and she seemed displeased with

his presence. He knew that one of the many new rules the facility put in place exclusively for

276


Jurado—about not lying down next to the child to help him fall asleep for his nap—truly

originated with Wilson’s intolerance of having a Hispanic lie down in the same room where her

daughter is, given that Wilson’s daughter and Plaintiff N.G. share the same classroom. Given

that Kim Eagle, as the owner of the facility, had reached an agreement with Jurado that

authorized him to lie down for no more than 15 minutes to put his son to sleep after lunch and

she also encouraged Jurado to visit his son during lunch time, he did not expect his visit on

February 24 to be a problem. But Defendants The Goddard School, Gretchen Wilson, Lambert,

McCash and Jamison put into execution their latest scheme to make sure that this would be the

last time they had to deal with his presence at the facility and the last time he visited his son.

702. The Feb. 24, 2015 recording shows Plaintiff N.G. greeting his dad Plaintiff Jurado with

excitement as usual, and covered the time Jurado sat with his son during the part of his lunch

time. Two of his son’s friends joined Plaintiffs, father and son, as they chatted and had lunch.

They asked Jurado to read them a book, and so he did. After a few minutes, Jurado asked the

children, including his son, to go with their teacher to get their diaper changed as this was the

usual routine between lunch and nap. This recording provides evidence that Defendant Wilson

sent a team of teachers from other classrooms to help Plaintiff N.G.’s teachers complete their

routines faster and get all children down for their nap faster and earlier than usual. Jurado

knew that this was an unusual and exceptional practice.

703. After his son completed the routine of restroom break and diaper changed, Jurado

skipped the usual short period of play time they would have after lunch, and took his son to his

cot. Most of the other children were already lying down, but two more children still need to

277


complete their restroom routine. A few minutes after Jurado lied down in the carpet next to

his son’s cot, the lead teacher, Ms. Melissa, approached them and said the rules did not allow

him to lie down, with a dry and short tone. Jurado immediately complied. The recording shows

father and son simply having a harmless conversation about angels and God (“papa Dios”)

during the time it would take the child to fall asleep, which was 20 minute on average with or

without his fathers’ presence. But Plaintiff N.G. sat up just as his father did to comply with the

teacher’s instructions. For the first time, the nap routine had been altered, and the child

became more conversational until Jurado finally convinced him to lie down.

704. The recording captured the child asking his Dad repeatedly and innocently to please

lie down with him. One can hear the 2.5 year old saying “lie down with me… lie down with

me”. Given the impact the father-son separation since December has had to both Plaintiffs,

Jurado proceeded to explain to the teacher that he was given authorization by Kim Eagle to lie

down for no more than 15 minutes. That is when the attack suddenly started: First the teach

said that Kim Eagle had told her that he was NOT allowed to lie down (contrary to the Feb 2

discussion and Jurado’s letter from Feb 3) and that he had to follow the rules because he was

“not above the law”. The recording captured the teacher saying that “it makes [for Jurado to lie

down] Ms. Gretchen uncomfortable” as well as the teacher’s aggressive and abusive remarks

calling Jurado “STUPID” and her threats that he would not be allowed to see his son again.

The recording captured the entire verbal attack, including the teacher mocking Jurado when

he reacted just by saying “wow” as well as the teacher’s hostility as she told Jurado that she

was tired of his presence in the room—referring to his presence as an interruption to her class.

278


705. The recording also captured the child getting agitated and distressed, as the

teacher accused Jurado of “letting him talk when he is supposed to be sleeping”. It became

obvious that the reason for Defendant Wilson to send the other teachers to help out was to

start nap time earlier and fabricate the appearance that Jurado was disrupting the child’s

routine and the classroom routine, and provide an excuse to the attack. After several minutes

of sustaining the attack, Jurado realized his presence was not welcomed in the room, no matter

what rules he would follow or not follow, and proceed to gather his belongings and leave the

room. The recording shows the degree of distress the child endured as he witnessed firsthand

the attack against his father. One could hear the child crying incessantly and Jurado

comforting him but only temporarily and finally the child yelling “Daddy! Daddy!” with a

painful tone of voice, as Jurado walked out of the room. This was the last time Plaintiffs saw

each other.

706. Jurado has not been able to return to the facility for more than two weeks now, for

fear of another attack, for fear that the incidents will escalate, and for fear that the hostility will

cause additional emotional harm to the child, as it appears that Wilson and The Goddard

School-Hilliard II owners condone the teacher’s abusive treatment and the school’s treatment

of Jurado as a second-class citizen. Defendant Wilson, as the school director, became aware of

the incident as Jurado walked out of the facility on February 24, 2015. Although she said she

would “talk to the teacher”, no one followed up with Jurado—not a single phone call has been

made to reach out to Jurado since the incident. This last event made Jurado realize the

significance of the events from Feb. 18 and 20. Their insistence for Jurado to take the child

279


inside an unsafe area, the slippery floor and even the wires hanging and rolled up on the floor.

It all had been carefully planned with one ultimate goal.

707. Jurado finally sent a letter on March 6, 2015 to Defendants Wilson and Bill and Kim

Eagle as the owners of the daycare. In the letter, Jurado described in detail all of the incidents

and events, explained his serious concerns and that their silence indicated their intentions of

denying Jurado access to the facility, and asked for the situation to be corrected. See Jurado’

Mar. 6, 2015 Letter, Exhibit LV-F, pages 005–012. Instead of addressing the problem with

Jurado, they shared the letter with co-conspirators Lambert and McCash, and have cut off all

types of communication with Jurado.

708. Neither the child’s mother, Defendant Lambert, the child’s Guardian Ad Litem,

Defendant McCash, or Defendant Judge Jamison appear to have any concerns about the safety

and well-being of the child. Instead, McCash filed a “Motion for Emergency Review of the

Court’s January 23, 2014 Order” on March 10, 2015. The filing is a clear indication that the only

concern Lambert or McCash have is Jurado’s presence at the facility, which supports Jurado’s

allegations that they all share the same goal and defendants entered an agreement to achieve

their goal of depriving Jurado access to a public place of accommodation, his right to use the

open door policy, and his fundamental parental rights. On March 11, 2015, Defendant Jamison

set the hearing of McCash’s Motion for six days later on March 17, 2015. This is also a clear

indication that Defendant Judge Jamison shares the same goals as the other co-conspirators,

and continue to neglect the best interest of the child. For example, she could have asked the

GAL or any of the parties to subpoena the daycare Director to appear at the hearing as

280


Defendants Jamison and Smitherman did to Jurado’s physician with two day notice only. The

outcome of the upcoming hearing can be easily predicted.

709. The purpose of the Motion is for Defendant Jamison to expand the current order

suspending Jurado’s parenting time and address the ambiguity in respect to the use of the

Open Policy for daycares that are available to all citizens of Ohio. The second purpose of the

Motion is to open the opportunity for Judge Jamison to help cover up the unlawful conduct as

she has consistently done, by simply alleging that the court did not find any misconduct or

anything wrong without elaborating in the findings of fact.

710. In conclusion, Defendants entered an agreement to frame Jurado for causing injuries

to the child had he blindly followed their instructions to take the child into the unsafe kitchen

area. When their first scheme failed, they entered into a second agreement to frame Jurado

for disrupting the classroom routine and to justify verbally abusing him to the point of

instilling fear or in the alternative, to provoke a reaction from Jurado that would escalate the

confrontation requiring the authorities to forcefully oust Jurado from the facility on a

permanent basis—all while neglecting to consider the harm being caused to the child, and

beyond neglect, intentionally exposing the child to imminent safety risks and putting his life

on the line—motivated only by their racial and ethnic bias, given Jurado’s place of origin.

281


VII.F.5. RECORDINGS INVOLVING DEFENDANT LECLAIR, BROOKSEDGE AND ALEXANDER-SAVINO

VII.F.5(a) RECORDING FROM APRIL 26, 2013 SHOWS THAT LAMBERT WAS ATTEMPTING TO

CORRUPTLY INFLUENCE LECLAIR BEFORE SHE AGREED TO JOIN THE CONSPIRACY. IT ALSO SHOWS THAT THE CHILD CARETAKERS CONFIRMED CUES ABOUT CHILD

UNDERFED

711. This recording captured a conversation between LeClair and Jurado. On one of his

visits to see his son at Brooksedge, LeClair approached Jurado quietly while he was holding his

son in the hallway, and without any solicitation, she stated what appeared to be a random

comment at the time “so you know we don’t care at what time you pick up [redacted] drop him

off, or how long you stay here” She also added that no parent has complained, is complaining

or will complain simply because of your presence here. The recording also captured another

short conversation they had at the point that Jurado was leaving. LeClair shared an anecdote

about a grandparent that would stop by every single day to visit his grandson after he his work

shift was over. It appeared as if LeClair was encouraging Jurado to stop by as much as he would

have like. Later that day, Jurado recapped the statements LeClair made and sent them to his

attorneys as well as to LeClair to use it as a future reference if necessary.

712. The fact that LeClair made those comments, which were similar but in negation to

claims Lambert had been making since 2012, and soon Bethel adopted, that parents would

complain due to Jurado’s presence at the facility and the rigid schedule for the child, was an

obvious indication that Lambert had approached LeClair to try to convince her to make those

claims in the negative.

282


713. The recording also covered the child’s caretaker confirming to Jurado that his son had

always cried when reaching the bottom of the milk bottle, but “he usually stops [crying] after a

few minutes”.

VII.F.5(b) RECORDING FROM JULY 2, 2013 THAT COVERED JURADO’S ENTIRE 18-MINUTE

VISIT SHOWS HOW BROOKSEDGE COMPLAINT IN THEIR LAWSUIT CONTAINS

MISREPRESENTATIONS AND SHOWS THAT THE DAILY REPORT SHEET WAS

COMPLETED WITH FABRICATED DETAILS

714. This recording captured every moment of Jurado’s visit and show the exaggerations

and inaccuracies contained in Brooksedge’s pleadings in the filings on the civil lawsuit against

Jurado, including information that Jessica Jividen provided to him when he stopped at the

front desk, and demonstrates that the child’s caretaker wrote details about what the child

was fed that did not occurred. Not surprisingly, the falsified Brooksedge report was identified

just days before a scheduled court hearing, in which the content of the report would have had

some significance had they gotten away with it. The almost identical tactic was used six months

later by Defendants Lambert, Wilson and The Goddard School on December 10, 2013 when

they falsified an incident report with fabricated injuries in their attempt to frame Jurado and

make him look like an inadequate or neglectful parent and use it to Lambert’s advantage in the

trial proceeding for the custody case that was scheduled a few weeks after the incident

ocurred. The recording serves as evidence of the subsidiary scheme of the conspiracy related

to covering up Lambert’s nutritional neglect of the child while creating the appearance that

Jurado has a distorted perception of the child’s health, resulting in his overfeeding of the child.

The recording is not of unique value given that (1) early childhood professionals have confirmed

that it is impossible for the child to have eaten what Brooksedge claimed he did in the 12

283


minutes Jurado was inside the classroom.(2) the child’s grandparents have provided sworn

testimony as to what they put in the bag that Jurado took to the daycare facility.

VII.F.5(c) SET OF MISCELLANEOUS RECORDINGS BETWEEN JUN-AUG 2013 SHOWING

BROOKSEDGE STAFF LACKING OF ADEQUATE TRAINING WHICH ULTIMATELY

IMPACTED THE QUALITY OF CARE THAT CHILDREN RECEIVED, INCLUDING PLAINTIFF

N.G.

715. In one instance for example, the recording of July 11, 2013, captured a child crying

unattended for several minutes non-stop, while the teacher moved from one shore to the next

without even looking at the child. When Jurado finally asked “what is wrong with him?”, she

responded: “he is just fuzzy all the time”. As Jurado learned soon enough, this was a clear

violation of ODFJS licensing rules. On another occasion, a classroom that required two teachers

with no exception would only have one when they would not wait for a roving caretaker to

cover for them if they had to leave the room for any reason. Jurado. Jurado would reasonably

think that his son could have been any of those children not been cared for properly.

VII.F.5(d) RECORDING OF SEPTEMBER 6, 2013 IS ONE OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ONES

BECAUSE IT SHOWS UNLAWFUL CONDUCT BY DEFENDANTS BETHEL AND LECLAIR. IT IS ONE OF THE BEST EXAMPLES OF COLLUSION AND STATEMENTS MADE IN

FURTHERANCE OF THE CONSPIRACY

716. This recording helps establish that the July 8, 2013 events and incident that let up to

it constituted one of the most significant overt acts engaged by the core conspirators in close

collaboration with each other, especially because it involved fraud upon the court and resulted

in immediate harm for plaintiffs given that the labeling of Jurado as “an overinvolved father”

and subsequent restrictions put in place to prohibit him from visiting his son was the direct

284


product of this set of concerted action. In this instance, there was direct participation of

Defendants Lambert, LeClair, Petroff, Smitherman and Bethel. The recording captured a

meeting that took place on September 6, 2013 between Jurado and the daycare owner, LeClair,

during which the owner made specific statements implicating Bethel and Lambert in the

premeditated action of misleading the court and accused her of deceptive conduct. Specifically,

she asserted that almost every statement and information Defendant Bethel provided to the

Magistrate on July 8, 2013 that reportedly came from LeClair were not simple

misunderstandings but outright fabrications, as shown in this video recording.

JURADO: Number two: you said to her [Bethel] something that I heard for the first time ever, that, um, that basically I come here too much.

LECLAIR: I never said that.

JURADO: OK, that, that other parents are complaining, that --

LECLAIR: Never said that.

JURADO: Uh-huh.

LECLAIR: No other parents have --

JURADO: That --

LECLAIR: -- ever complained, Ari.

JURADO: That... I understand. I’m --

LECLAIR: They haven’t. * * *

Certified Transcript LeClair-Jurado, Sep. 6, 2013 part-II pages 10. (See Exhibit LV-E1 page 078)

The video shows other relevant details of the conversation,

LECLAIR: -- and she took that, and she went with it. And so she is the one -- or maybe she... I don’t know, she and Kathy both. [The cause of all the trouble] * * *

285


JURADO: So what did she say about -- what about the – what about the parents being...? She [Bethel] said, “Oh, the parents are already complaining.”

LECLAIR: I never said -- we didn’t even talk about that.

JURADO: Well --

LECLAIR: She and I didn’t talk about that at all.

Certified Transcript LeClair-Jurado, Sep. 6, 2013 part-II pages 14. (See Exhibit LV-E1 page 082)

LECLAIR: And, I mean, I don’t... I -- but I can tell you that I would not call her, though. Because I feel like that was probably what got us in this. [Blythe Bethel] * * *

LECLAIR: I did not use the words “intimidating” and “aggressive.” Ever!

JURADO: So you think she misheard you?

LECLAIR: I never... No, I don’t think she misheard it. I think she made it up. I never used those words to describe you. (laughter) I wouldn’t call her again

Certified Transcript LeClair-Jurado, Sep. 6, 2013 part-II pages 18–19. (See Exhibit LV-E1 pages

086–087) And what Jurado and LeClair were referring to is the following misrepresentations

by Bethel made to the court on July 8, 2013:

ATTORNEY BETHEL: And I spoke with her [LeClair] this morning at length before coming into Court. - - - they have an open door policy like most daycares do * * * I do have a problem when we have a parent that is, I'm being told, coming twice a day, five days a week. It's disruptive to the daycare –

MAGISTRATE MATTHEWS: This is dad?

ATTORNEY BETHEL: Yes.

MAGISTRATE MATTHEWS: Uh-huh (affirmative response)

ATTORNEY BETHEL: it's - - - it's disturbing to some of the other parents. * * *

MAGISTRATE MATTHEWS: What's he - - - how long is he spending when he comes?

286


ATTORNEY BETHEL: It depends. “And sometimes he {Jurado] just sits and watches everybody and that's very - - - and the words "intimidating" and "aggressive" were used today in my conversation [with LeClair]”.

(Emphasis Added.) Tr. Court Proceeding, July 8, 2013, at 12:25–14:23.

717. Interestingly enough, Defendants Smitherman and Petroff were present and knew

that this information was fraudulent given that they were also well aware of Jurado’s amount

of time and travel out of the state—which made it an impossibility for him to be at the daycare

2/day, 5 times/week. But as accomplices, they chose to allow Bethel to continue her deceit to

mislead the court, given that they were part of the plan and all shared the same purpose with

Defendant Lambert, as the Transcript of the Jul. 22, 2014 court proceeding proves: “MR.

PETROFF: * * * our request to rein in father's parenting time, which has been argued ad

nauseam, should be completely shortened in the best interest of the child.” Tr. Ct Proceeding

Jul. 22, 2014, at 5:7–10. With “our request” he was referring to the pursuit of Defendants

Bethel, Lambert, Smitherman, and his own to get the Court to take away Jurado’s parenting

time, driven by their racism/ethnic bias.

718. Not long after the meeting held on Sep. 6, 2013 that was recorded, covert e-mails

uncovered recently show that Defendants LeClair, Bethel, Smitherman and the psychologist

continued concealed communications in contradiction to LeClair’s assertion in the recording

that “I wouldn’t call her again”.

719. Defendant Bethel continued to use deceit to cover up her misconduct from July 8,

2013 even throughout 2014. The proceeding conducted on August 1, 2014 for Jurado to

287


remove her as GAL is hard proof, as seen in the transcript of this proceeding that covered

Jurado’s cross-examination of Bethel:

a. “You talked to me a lot about that” was attorney Bethel’s answer in regarding to

her knowledge of Jurado’s work arrangement out of town. Transcript of court

proceeding to hear Jurado’s motion for emergency removal of Attorney-GAL

Bethel, page 61, lines 4-10, Aug. 1, 2014 (Exhibit )

b. “I knew you flew back and forth between Chicago”3 was also her answer under

oath when asked to review Jurado’s frequent flyer report issued by United

Airlines.

c. “I stated what I felt by those words that I just read to the Court. * * * I was not

misleading, no.”4 was Defendant Bethel’s answer to Jurado’s question about her

statement “I am being told, {Jurado] coming twice a day, five days a week. It’s

disruptive * * *”5 made in court during the July 8, 2013 proceeding, even when

having full knowledge of Jurado being in Chicago 3-4 days a week, each week for

the preceding twelve months.

Q (Jurado). Why did you not share with the Court that you knew that whoever told you that I'm going to daycare twice a day, five days a week might not be completely truthful because you knew I spend a lot of time in Chicago? Is there a reason why you didn't share that with the Court?

A (Bethel). I knew that you were also spending a lot of time going to the daycare and an unusually - - a lot amount of time, Ari.

3 GAL Tr. at 74:09-10 4 GAL Tr. at 85:13-19 5 GAL Tr. at 84:25–85:1-2

288


Q (Jurado). You knew or you heard? Question - - yes or no. Did you know or did you hear?

A (Bethel). I believe what the daycare director told me.

(JUDGE JAMISON): So, the answer to the question is you heard.

A (Bethel). Yes.

(Emphasis Added.) Transcript of Court Proceeding – Hearing for Emergency Motion to Remove

GAL, at 88:11-25, 89:1-3 (See Exhibit ).

VII.F.5(e) RECORDING FROM SEPTEMBER 9, 2013 MEETING WITH REPRESENTATIVES FROM

ACTION FOR CHILDREN

720. On September 9, 2013, to confirm his doubts about the integrity of the ODFJS

investigation regarding the misconduct by Brooksedge that was being concealed by ODJFS,

Jurado met with representatives from Action for Children, who confirmed Jurado’s concerns

about the violations committed that should have been substantiated with the evidence

available. It was clear that ODJFS inspection report and investigation were not affected by

simple errors, but by irregularities that were intentional.

721. This audio recording captured statements made by representatives from Action for

Children on Sep. 9, 2013, in support of Jurado’s allegations that Brooksedge wrongly denied

him access to the facility—Action for Children is the official provider contracted by ODJFS to

provide training to all licensed daycare centers in central Ohio, along with other services that

include helping child care centers maintain their license and pass inspections from ODJFS.

289


VII.F.5(f) RECORDING FROM OCTOBER 8, 2013 SHOWING ONE OF THE AGREEMENTS OF THE

CONSPIRACY BEING PUT INTO ACTION RELATING TO THE COVER UP OF EACH OTHER’S

MISCONDUCT EVEN WHEN RESULTED IN CHILD NEGLECT

722. Two separate recordings covering the events of October 8, 2013 constitute material

evidence that the Nationwide Children’s Hospital Emergency Room doctor and social worker

had concerns about the infant child’s injuries and subsequently made a referral to Children

Services (refer to recordings of statements by ER staff). The recording shows the doctor giving

his recommendation for treatment of the child, which Lambert summarily rejected. Then, the

ER doctor recommended the involvement of a social worker.

723. After witnessing Lambert’s behavior of hostility and defensiveness against Jurado,

while being over-protective of Defendant Brooksedge and showing lack of concerns and

disregard for the injuries sustained by the child, the social worker and the ER doctor were more

inclined to report/make a referral to Franklin County Children Services (FCCS). Having Bethel’s

number on speed dial, Lambert immediately contacted her as well as the daycare facility and

LeClair to give them a heads up that FCCS had been called and would be soon on their way to

the facility.

724. The recording shows how Lambert tried to downplay the child’s injuries sustained

while being cared for by Brooksedge, as well as the black eye he sustained during the time she

was breastfeeding knowing that the child’s new teeth could inadvertently hurt her. The doctor

can be heard rebutting Lambert’s illogical attitude:

Dr. Scherzer: So the only injury that concerns me is the black eye. * * *

290


Lambert: He hit himself with the Sippy cup. It wasn’t like the whole eye was black * * *

Dr. Scherzer: And what we do, this is law. This is state law. * * *

Dr. Scherzer: If a child has an injury that can't be readily explained by normal child […], we have to report that to Children Services. It has nothing to do with what my opinion is.

Dr. Scherzer: IF WE SEE A PICTURE OF A 10 MONTH OLD WITH A BLACK EYE, I DON'T HAVE A CHOICE! LIKE THAT'S A MANDATE. I WOULD BE BREAKING THE LAW IF I DIDN'T REPORT THAT. That is a mandate for physicians, and nurses and social workers.

(Emphasis Added.) Tr. NCH ER, Oct. 8, 2013 Part-II, page 1 (See Exhibit SCO-M, 2nd Video

Recording in DVD). Dr. Scherzer’s last statement also supports Jurado’s arguments that

Brooksedge failed to report the black eye in order to protect Lambert.

725. Neither Lambert nor Bethel showed any concerns about the feedback from the ER or

the child’s injuries. They focused on framing Jurado to make him appear as if his concerns

about the child were ill-intentioned and proceeded to instigate retaliation by Brooksedge.

Interestingly enough, at the time, the conspirators made it appear as if this was the triggering

event before the dismissal of the child and the filing of the lawsuit. But new concealed e-mail

communications uncovered recently prove that Defendants had been planning the lawsuit

and even the injuries to the child for at least a month prior to the incident with the purpose of

putting Jurado in the position in which he found himself at the ER.

291


VII.F.5(g) RECORDING FROM MARCH 13, 2014 SHOWING THAT LECLAIR AND ALEXANDER-SAVINO WERE AWARE OF THE EVIDENCE BEING WITHHELD BY DEFENDANT DUNN

WHILE ENGAGING IN OTHER MISCONDUCT DURING THE PUBLIC HEARING IN FRONT

OF THE OCRC COMMISSIONERS

726. Despite the fact that LeClair and Alexander-Savino were aware of the unlawful acts

committed by Dunn to favor Brooksedge, they

VII.F.6. RECORDINGS INVOLVING DEFENDANT LAMBERT

VII.F.6(a) SET OF RECORDINGS FROM NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER 2013 SHOWING

LAMBERT’S ABUSIVE CONDUCT, PROVING THAT THE MANDATORY DAYCARE

ATTENDANCE AND CONFINEMENT OF THE CHILD ORIGINATED FROM LAMBERT’S

SELF-SERVING INTERESTS

727. This set of recordings serve as evidence of unlawful conduct by Lambert when she

gave perjured testimony during trial in regards to events that occurred during this time and her

true reason for her compliance with the orders around forced daycare attendance.

VII.F.6(b) RECORDING FROM MARCH 4, 2013 THAT CAPTURE LAMBERT REFUSING TO ALLOW

DOCTOR TO MOVE UP A LAB TEST A WEEK EARLY

728. This recording, along with many others, shows Lambert obsession with control and

her tendency to withhold medical care for the child as a result of her antagonism and self-

serving contradictions to Jurado’s input or concerns.

VII.F.6(c) RECORDING FROM MARCH 28, 2013 WITH DR. MASTRUSERIO SHOWS THE

CONSISTENT DISREGARD FROM LAMBERT AND OTHER CO-CONSPIRATORS FOR THE

WELL-BEING AND BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD

729. The expert pediatrician can be heard explaining that only 2-3 months earlier the child

did suffer from weight gain problems contradicting Lambert’s and her friend-pediatrician’s

292


assertions that Plaintiff N.G. was just a small child. She also discussed the likelihood that the

culprit regarding the under-nutrition of the child was Lambert’s breast-milk production

limitations, as Jurado had suspected.

VII.F.6(d) SET OF RECORDINGS FROM JAN 18, 2013, APRIL 25, 2013 OCTOBER 2013 AND

OTHER DATES SHOWING THE INABILITY OF THE CHILD’S PEDIATRICIAN TO PROPERLY

CARE FOR THE CHILD AND LAMBERT’S DISREGARD FOR THE CHILD’S WELL BEING

730. The set of Recordings captured the pediatrician’s lack of objectivity as he enabled

and contributed to Lambert’s priority of disparaging Jurado while neglecting the well-being of

the child due to her antagonism. Just as Lambert did when the child was malnourished, and

she and the pediatrician’s main focus was in proving that she could successfully produce

enough breast milk in favor of Lambert’s ego, while ignoring the needs of the child, Lambert

engaged in similar conduct in concert with the pediatrician in respect to other aspects of the

child’s health.

731. For example, Jurado had gathered enough evidence from his caretakers to bring up

concerns about the normal cognitive development and behavior of the child between 12 and 18

months, and the recordings show Lambert and the pediatrician focused on contradicting Jurado

as opposed to investigating his concerns.

732. During a visit for urgent care to the child’s pediatrician recorded in October 2013,

the recording shows Lambert first arguing with the pediatrician regarding the definition of

diarrhea, as she tried to deny that the child had experienced diarrhea for a full week. When the

pediatrician learned that there was evidence that the child had been sick for all those days, but

at the same time Lambert was in denial and asserted that the child was healthy while under her

293


care for one full day—half-way through the week-long episode—the pediatrician then

proceeded to make excuses to cover up for her obvious denial of the condition of the child.

733. The pediatrician and Lambert have known each other for more than 15 years. This

example of Lambert’s denial of the child’s health condition in this instance support Defendant

Bethel’s opinion early in the case that Lambert suffered from “super mom syndrome”. Bethel

made the statement before entering the conspiracy.

VII.F.6(e) SET OF MULTIPLE RECORDINGS THROUGHOUT 2013 AND 2014 PROVING THAT

LAMBERT ENGAGED IN UNLAWFUL CONDUCT WHEN SHE PROVIDED PERJURED

TESTIMONY IN COURT

734. These recordings show that Lambert engaged in unlawful conduct when she provided

perjured testimony during several hearings and during trial, in respect to events, incidents and

the behavior and conduct of Jurado and Lambert toward each other.

VII.F.6(f) RECORDINGS FROM JULY 26, 2013 SHOWING LAMBERT’S COMPLETE DISREGARD

FOR THE WELL-BEING OF THE CHILD DURING HOSPITAL VISITS

735. The recordings captured Lambert consistently arguing with doctors and hospital

personnel in her efforts to downplay the reasons for Jurado to bring the child for medical care,

in the same manner shown in the October 8, 2013 recording.

VII.F.6(g) RECORDING FROM DECEMBER 6, 2013 SHOWS CONSPIRATORS AGAIN WILLING TO

PUT THE CHILD’S LIFE AND SAFETY AT RISK AS A PRICE TO PAY TO ACHIEVE THE GOALS

OF THE CONSPIRACY

736. This recording captured Jurado and the minor N.G.’s driving across town through a

snow storm to solely to appease and avoid harassment by Lambert and Bethel. Their fervor of

294


keeping the child from being cared by Jurado even on his parenting days, may explain why

Defendants pressured Jurado to drive the child during a snow storm across the city totaling

100 miles, with the pretext of mandatory daycare attendance in Hilliard, even when the day

had been declared snow day and all schools had been closed for the day. The video from Dec.

6, 2013 also contains multiple snippets of newscasts broadcasted by stations from coast to

coast announcing the storm going through Central Ohio in the eve and morning before it

arrived and also covering the storm as it passed showing accidents and the danger of being on

the roads unnecessarily.

VII.F.7. RECORDINGS INVOLVING DEFENDANT BETHEL

VII.F.7(a) RECORDING FROM APRIL 25, 2013 SHOWS EVIDENCE OF BETHEL’S EFFORT TO

COVER UP AND BURY ANY SUBSTANTIATION OF MEDICAL ISSUES REGARDING

PLAINTIFF N.G. TO PROTECT LAMBERT’S REPUTATION, AS WELL AS THE FIRST

ATTEMPT OF WITNESS TAMPERING BY CO-CONSPIRATORS

737. The recording captured Jurado’s pediatric expert requesting to speak with the

Guardian Ad Litem, Bethel, regarding Plaintiff N.G.’s health and medical care, but was shut out

by Bethel and her confederates, including Lambert. The recording also shows Dr. Mastruserio

explaining to Jurado why it was better to get a new pediatrician, other than herself, to replace

Lambert’s pediatrician-friend Dr. Muresan as Plaintiff N.G’s main health care provider. Jurado

can be heard confirming that they “could not discard the possibility of failure to thrive” as an

explanation for what the child endured for the first 6-7 months of his life. Dr. Mastruserio also

disclosed to Jurado the fact that the child’s pediatrician had called her earlier that morning out

of the blues. She first thought he was calling to discuss the child’s health, but quickly realized

that Lambert’s pediatrician-friend had called her to censure and discredit Jurado in regards to

295


his concerns about the health of the child, and the fact that he had been advocating for a new

pediatrician. Dr. Mastruserio can also be heard telling Jurado of her intentions to talk to the

Guardian Ad Litem, Bethel, about the child. It was evident that Jurado’s pediatric expert

represented a threat to the conspiracy.

VII.F.7(b) RECORDING FROM SEP. 6, 2013 OF THE MEETING BETWEEN LECLAIR AND JURADO

738. As established in detail in section VII.F.5(d) above, the meeting captured by this

recording servers as evidence of the fraudulent misrepresentations and other unlawful conduct

engaged by Bethel. It also shows that LeClair, Lambert and Bethel had been in agreement to

deprive Jurado from his right to the full and equal enjoyment of the daycare facility and

services, and from his right to parent his son and enjoy his court approved time with him.

VII.F.7(c) [OFFICIAL] COURT RECORDING OF PROCEEDING FROM MARCH 26, 2014

SHOWING BETHEL’S HOSTILITY AND HATRED TOWARDS JURADO

739. The court recording of this proceeding, presided by Magistrate Matthews, captured

Defendant Bethel’s attack against Jurado. Bethel—unaware that the court recording system

was left on by the Magistrate as she left the courtroom during a recess—can be heard scorning

Jurado with the most upmost hostile and harsh tone, first about he having his phone out even

when the Magistrate allowed him, then accused Jurado of using a “ghost writer” clandestinely.

296


VII.F.8. RECORDINGS INVOLVING CONSPIRATORS NOT NAMED AS DEFENDANTS

VII.F.8(a) SET OF RECORDINGS FROM INTERVIEWS WITH DR. SMALLDON DATED AUG. 2013–OCT. 2013, SHOWING FRAUD AND DECEIT IN FACTS AND EVENTS ALLEGED IN HIS

REPORT AND BY HIS TESTIMONY UNDER OATH

740. In addition to the misrepresentations made by Dr. Smalldon on his report and witness

testimony, regarding comments made by Jurado in his interviews, other substantial evidence is

available that shows his participation in the conspiracy, including witnesses used as collateral

sources.

VII.F.8(b) JAN. 16, 2015 RECORDING OF PHONE CONVERSATION WITH DOUG EATON, COURT ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE TENTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS WHERE HE

ADMITTED TO FILING IN “DRAFT” MODE THE JUDGMENT ENTRY DENYING JURADO

HIS MOTION FOR STAY

741. This recording along with e-mails sent between Jurado and Mr. Eaton show that the

Denial of Jurado’s Motion for Stay was pre-arranged before Jurado had even completed his

filings. The recording of the phone call, which was made more than one hour before Jurado’s

emergency brief was filed, captured the Administrator explaining to Jurado how he had “only”

submitted the judgment entry (denying his Motion) in draft mode in the e-filing system because

he was not sure if he would find other judges later in the afternoon to sign the order.

742. Eaton’s tone of frustration came about due to the confusion created by another

Judgment entry that had been issued on the same day for another one of Jurado’s Motions to

Stay. Emails and the recording show how Eaton later tried to rationalize the disclosed

information after he determined that the second denial was the source of confusion.

Nevertheless, he never denied that the Order he had referred to earlier that day was indeed

297


filed by him in draft mode with the signature of a panel of three judges, while they pretended

to seem like they were awaiting for Jurado’s brief before reaching a decision.

VII.G. EVIDENCE SHOWING CONSPIRACY IS SUBSTANTIAL— MISCELLANEOUS E-MAIL CORRESPONDENCE AND RELATED DOCUMENTATION

VII.G.1. E-MAILS AND HAND-WRITTEN NOTES BETWEEN DEFENDANTS GUTOWSKI AND

GARCIA PROVING AGREEMENT TO DEPRIVE JURADO OF HIS RIGHTS AND

PROTECTIONS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

743. Around concealed late-November, early-December 2013, Jurado discovered

documents and e-mail communications between Defendants Gutowski and Garcia showing the

agreement entered by OOAG and OCRC to decide the outcome of Jurado’s complaints in favor

of Brooksedge before the investigation started and before Jurado had any opportunity to

present his evidence. It also shows their agreement to issue a No Probable Cause (NPC) for

Jurado’s retaliation claim before he even filed it. The e-mails also identify other OCRC

participants in the agreement, such as Garcia’s supervisor and the Columbus Regional Director.

744. The handwritten notes and e-mails were all dated on or around October 15, 2014 and

line up with the timing of the misconduct engaged by Defendant Garcia, which began against

Jurado around the same time. Refer to Exhibit YM3-45 in pages [ ] of the Appendix of Exhibits.

VII.G.2. E-MAILS BETWEEN DEFENDANT GARCIA AND PLAINTIFF JURADO SHOWING GARCIA’S

MISCONDUCT, DISPARATE TREATMENT OF JURADO, AND INTENTIONAL ACTS TO DENY

JURADO HIS EQUAL UTILIZATION OF PUBLIC FACILITIES AND OF SERVICES OFFERED BY

THE STATE GOVERNMENT

745. More than half a dozen e-mails sent between October and November 2013 by

Defendant Garcia to Jurado clearly shows the disparate treatment against Jurado. His e-mail

298


messages, for instance, indicated Jurado that he was not welcomed in the Rhodes State Office

Tower, and discouraged him from coming back to the OCRC offices or to use the free service for

notarization of complaints that OCRC offers to all other grievant. Other e-mails show Garcia

trying to obtain access to information he was not authorized to obtain, such as ADR records,

and other e-mails asking Jurado in a demeaning manner to not send too much information

constituting evidence. The audio recording

VII.H. EVIDENCE SHOWING CONSPIRACY IS SUBSTANTIAL— CONCEALED E-MAIL

CORRESPONDENCE

746. Most of the concealed e-mails described herein were found or uncovered relatively

recent—between November 2014 and January 2015.

VII.H.1. E-MAIL DATED AUG. 1, 2013 FROM BETHEL, TO LAMBERT AND SMITHERMAN

DISPARAGING JURADO AND GIVING ADVICE TO LAMBERT ON THE EXACT TOPICS TO

BRING UP DURING INTERVIEWS WITH DR. SMALLDON

747. The e-mail sent by Defendant Bethel on August 1, 2013, while in the role of Guardian

Ad Litem, shows the close communication between her, Lambert and Smitherman in which she

disparaged Jurado behind his back and gives advice to Lambert on what to bring up or not

during her interviews for the psychological evaluation with Dr. Smalldon.

VII.H.2. E-MAILS SENT BETWEEN MAY 2013 AND FEBRUARY 2014 BY BETHEL TO JURADO

AND HIS COUNSEL PURPORTED TO BE CLOSE COMMUNICATIONS, BUT SECRETLY AND

UNETHICALLY “BLIND-COPIED” TO CO-CONSPIRATORS LAMBERT, SMITHERMAN AND

DR. SMALLDON

748. These e-mails serve as proof of Bethel’s alliance with Defendants, in contravention of

her impartial role of court officer, Guardian Ad Litem, and “arm of the court”. Not only that she

299


misled Jurado and his attorney in numerous occasions by letting them think they were engaging

in a one-on-one communication, but confirmed the concern of Jurado and his attorney that

Bethel was acting as Lambert’s advocate while protecting all of their communications as if they

had attorney-client privilege. Evidence that has recently surfaced shows that defendant Bethel

adopted the standard practice, during her 18 months of appointment as GAL, to blind copy all

e-mail correspondences between her, Jurado and his counsel to Lambert, Smitherman and Dr.

Smalldon, her long-established partner in the practice of “family law rackets”. On his e-mail

from November 2013, attorney Keith Golden addressed Bethel by posting the following

question: “Blythe, I have a procedural question ....why is it that you have opted only to publish

my and Ari's emails for everyone to see? Since the first day I have joined the case I have not

seen one (1) email from Kathy nor her counsel put out there for all to see? Please advise....”

749. On another e-mail from January 2014, attorney Golden addressed Bethel’s

predictable advocacy for Lambert: “I recommend that you not charge anyone for your time on

this”.

750. On his e-mail dated October 15, 2013, attorney Golden objected to Bethel’s conduct:

“you have become quite predictable and accordingly, Kathy acts in a uncooperative aggressive

manner towards Ari, knowing you will inevitably come down favorable to her and Ari acts in a

vacuum of hopelessness on every issue I again call your attention to your authority under GAL

S. Ct. Rule of Super 48.”

300


VII.H.3. SET OF COVERT E-MAILS SENT BETWEEN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER 2013 BETWEEN

DEFENDANTS BETHEL, LECLAIR, SMITHERMAN AND LAMBERT DISCUSSING THEIR PLAN

OF FILING A LAWSUIT AGAINST JURADO, AND INCLUDED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN

BETHEL AND HER ABETTOR DR. SMALLDON REGARDING THE LAWSUIT

751. These e-mails show Defendants’ agreement to execute a subsidiary scheme to the

master conspiracy involving a frivolous lawsuit against Jurado. Given that these

communications started as early as September, they are evidence that the triggering events

that led up to the forced dismissal of the child and the filing of the lawsuit against Jurado by

LeBlanc and Brooksedge did not happen by chance. These e-mails show that the increasingly

frequent head injuries to Plaintiff N.G. that prompted Jurado to take him to the Emergency

Room, which in turn resulted in the involvement of FCCS, were carefully planned and

intentionally inflicted by Defendants as part of their scheme to frame Jurado and to form their

basis for the lawsuit. This is especially evident with the involvement of Dr. Smalldon in those

secret communications, who was half-way through the psychological evaluation of the parties

and thus, positioned strategically to know Jurado’s susceptibilities, and to be able to anticipate

an outcome with the combination of predetermined factors and events. Dr. Smalldon’s

psychological report itself, issued in December 2013, support these claims, as well as his

testimony as an expert witness during the first part of the trial in the custody case in January

2015.

301


VII.H.4. EMAIL FROM OCT. 29, 2013 BETWEEN DEFENDANTS SHOWS CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATION COLLECTED DURING JURADO’S INTERVIEW WITH CHILDREN SERVICES AS

PART OF THEIR INVESTIGATION, BEING LEAKED BACK TO DEFENDANTS AS THE

PRODUCT OF BETHEL’S INTERFERENCE WITH AND UNDERMINING THE INTEGRITY OF

THE AGENCY’S OPERATIONS.

752. The effectiveness of the reach of the conspiracy can be seen with Bethel’s successful

interference with the operations of Franklin County Children Services (FCCS), after her initial

call to them during infant N.G. visit to the E.R. The e-mail from October 29, 2013 shows

confidential information that was obtained from Jurado during the FCCS standard probe

process being discussed by Defendants after being leaked by local government officials.

VII.H.5. EMAILS SENT BETWEEN OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER 2013 BY BETHEL TO ALL THE

PARTIES BLASTING JURADO FOR TAKING THE CHILD TO THE E.R., FOR THE RESULTING

INVOLVEMENT OF FCCS AND FOR THE DISENROLLMENT OF THE CHILD FROM

BROOKSEDGE, WERE ALSO SENT IN SECRECY TO DR. SMALLDON BY THE USE OF BLIND-CARBON-COPY (BCC)

753. The original hard-copies of these emails showing the inclusion of Bethel’s long-time

partner Dr. Smalldon in secrecy confirmed the allegations in the previous paragraph that the

series of events that led up to the filing of the lawsuit were carefully planned by the

conspirators, with the full participation of Dr. Smalldon. More evidence of this assertion can be

found during the cross-examination of Dr. Smalldon by Jurado during the first part of trial in

January 2015. When Jurado asked how often the final recommendation and findings in his

evaluation reports coincide with Defendant Bethel’s opinions, Dr. Smalldon answered “never

because I never know what the opinions of the GALs are during the pendency of the cases and

while the evaluation is underway… I just don’t talk to the Guardians to know that information”.

302


When Jurado presented to him the newly uncovered emails by Bethel that were sent to him

clandestinely, he answered “Oh, all Guardians do that… all the time”.

VII.I. EVIDENCE SHOWING CONSPIRACY IS SUBSTANTIAL— LAY WITNESSES, COURT EMPLOYEES AS WITNESSES AND OPINION TESTIMONY BY OTHER

WITNESSES

VII.I.1(a) COURT EMPLOYEES AS WITNESSES THAT PROVIDED STATEMENTS ON AUGUST 12, 2014 IN SUPPORT OF CLAIMS OF INTENTIONAL SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE

PERPETRATED BY JUDGE JAMISON

754. This recording captured confirmation from court employees (not recorded inside any

courtroom) that more than 70 pages of exhibits were provided by Plaintiff Jurado to opposing

party and to the court during the August 4, 2014 proceeding, in support of Plaintiffs’ claim of

Spoliation of Evidence by Defendant Jamison.

755. After Defendant Judge Jamison dismissed Jurado’s Motion for modification of Child

Support a few minutes into the proceeding, the 70+ pages of exhibits provided to the Court

were “lost”. Two days later, on August 6, 2014, Judge Jamison issued a Judgment Entry

misrepresenting facts from the August 4, 2014 hearing. In her Entry, she stated “He did not

have any W2s or 1099 forms; he produced only a spreadsheet, that he had prepared, as

evidence of his income. He testified to business expenses”. (See Entry dated August 6, 2014). A

few days later, the judicial transgression escalated when the fraudulent Entry was used as the

only exhibit attached to Judge Jamison’s Motion to Dismiss filed with the Supreme Court of

Ohio in case 2014-1225.

303


756. The purpose of Judge Jamison’s misconduct was to cause prejudice and to support

her assertion to the high court that one of Jurado’s claims in his Original Action was now

mooted, as one reason to dismiss the action. This recording memorializing confirmation by

court employees of the existence of the 70+ pages of exhibits supporting the allegation of

intentional spoliation of evidence by Defendant Jamison is not of significant value given that

the existence of the spoliated evidence can also be proven with the transcript of the Aug. 4,

2014 proceeding in which references to “the documents” were made.

757. The transcript from the January 12, 2015 proceeding also supports the existence of

the evidence that was spoliated, during which Judge Jamison convinced opposing counsel to

stop pursuing allegations that Jurado had not comply with discovery orders in regards to his

income and financial disclosures, because he indeed provided a good amount of documentation

when the bailiff made copies for the parties and the court on August 4, 2014. The testimony

from Defendant Lambert during the same proceeding confirmed the existence of the same

spoliated evidence.

304


VII.J. EVIDENCE SHOWING CONSPIRACY IS SUBSTANTIAL— TRANSCRIPTS OF

COURT PROCEEDINGS, DOCKET ENTRIES, OTHER FILINGS AND FORMAL

DOCUMENTATION

VII.J.1. TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDING FROM JULY 8, 2013 AS ONE THE MOST SIGNIFICANT

EVIDENCE OF CONCERTED ACTION IN FURTHERANCE OF THE CONSPIRACY, WHEN HE

WAS DECLARED “OVERINVOLVED DAD” AND NOT ALLOWED TO ACCESS THE DAYCARE

AND VISIT HIS SON, ALL THE RESULT OF FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATIONS BY

CONSPIRATORS

758. Jurado and LeClair discussed at length, as seen in the September 6, 2013 recording,

the events leading up to the hearing from July 8, 2013. The entire meeting was centered

around the topic of the misconduct by Bethel an Lambert that resulting in complaints filed with

multiple state government agencies. The transcript from July 8, 2013 shows Bethel engaging in

deceptive conduct when she made fraudulent misrepresentations to the court in close

coordination with Smitherman and Petroff. One of the many misrepresentations that Bethel

made to the court on July 8, 2013:

ATTORNEY BETHEL: And I spoke with her [LeClair] this morning at length before coming into Court. - - - they have an open door policy like most daycares do * * * I do have a problem when we have a parent that is, I'm being told, coming twice a day, five days a week. It's disruptive to the daycare –

MAGISTRATE MATTHEWS: This is dad?

ATTORNEY BETHEL: Yes.

MAGISTRATE MATTHEWS: Uh-huh (affirmative response)

ATTORNEY BETHEL: it's - - - it's disturbing to some of the other parents. * * *

MAGISTRATE MATTHEWS: What's he - - - how long is he spending when he comes?

305


ATTORNEY BETHEL: It depends. “And sometimes he {Jurado] just sits and watches everybody and that's very - - - and the words "intimidating" and "aggressive" were used today in my conversation [with LeClair]”.

(Emphasis Added.) Tr. Court Proceeding, July 8, 2013, at 12:25–14:23.

759. The Transcript from the court proceeding conducted on August 1, 2014 proves

without doubt the malevolent nature of the actions engaged by the conspirators on July 8,

2013.

VII.J.2. RECORD OF PHONE CALL MADE IN JULY 2013 SHOWING CONCERTED ACTION

BETWEEN LAMBERT AND BETHEL TO CORRUPTLY INFLUENCE AND TAMPER WITH

JURADO’S EXPERT WITNESS, DR. MASTRUSERIO

760. The phone call made by Lambert to Dr. Mastruserio in mid-July 2013 in agreement

with Bethel also shows that this was the last time anyone from the case had contact with the

pediatrician before she abruptly discontinue contact with Jurado and recanted some of her

previously made assertions and statements.

VII.J.3. ITEMIZED BILLS FROM BETHEL SHOWING EXTENSIVE COMMUNICATIONS PROVING

AGREEMENT BETWEEN HER, SMITHERMAN AND ALEXANDER-SAVINO IN

PREPARATION OF THE SUBSIDIARY SCHEME OF THE LAWSUIT PRIOR TO THE

TRIGGERING EVENT

761. As part of her greed, Bethel expected to be compensated by her victims for the time

she was spending engaging in unlawful conduct, without ever considering the possibility that

she would be named defendant in a Civil Rights conspiracy action. The exact same

phenomenon can be seen with Defendant McCash.

306


762. Bethel’s itemized bills for periods September and October 2013, especially the one

dated Nov. 1, 2013, include entries of phone calls made between her, Smitherman and

Alexander-Savino. This activity was carried out after Bethel’s review and assessment of the

daycare facility had been completed. Even if not, a Guardian Ad Litem has no business having

communications with other attorneys who are in the planning stages of filing a lawsuit against

one of the parents. Ironically, Defendant Bethel had refused to talk to two health care

professionals requesting to talk to her in Jurado’s behalf, and who were more closely related to

the best interest of the child than an attorney getting ready to cause harm to one of the

parents of her ward.

VII.J.4. ITEMIZED BILL FROM DEFENDANT MCCASH SUPPORTING EXTENSIVE UNLAWFUL, EX-PARTE COMMUNICATIONS WITH DEFENDANT JAMISON

763. McCash, showing consistent behavior as Defendant Bethel, allowed his greed to

expose his unlawful conduct when he included in his itemized bill, extensive ex-parte

communications with Defendant Judge Jamison. Ex-parte communications between GALs and

the court are prohibited by the rules of superintendence in Ohio as well as the local court rules,

especially if the nature of the communications involves a substantive matter relevant to the

case. In the one instance from December 5, 2014, the day of the incursion into Plaintiffs private

life and their home, he billed 5 hours for this day, during the time he harassed and intimidated

Jurado, the child and his elderly grandparents.

764. McCash appeared two or three times outside of Plaintiffs’ home—unannounced,

abruptly and with a hostile posture—in an attempt to get inside; and his premeditated acts of

307


intimidation and persecution did not last more than 10 or 15 minutes each. Yet, the 5 hours in

his billing statement were justified as,

Unannounced home visit to Defendant. TC with Defendant. TC with Plaintiffs’ counsel re Defendants work phone. Second unannounced home visit to Defendant. Review with Judge re Defendants refusal for home visit = 5.00 hours

GAL’s Itemized Bill by McCash, Dec. 31, 2014, page 2. This proves Plaintiffs allegations that

Defendants Thomas McCash and Judge Jamison participated in the intentional intrusion of

Jurado’s parenting time and in bad faith. Refer to Exhibit in pages [ ] of the Appendix of

Exhibits.

765. Jurado recalls McCash holding his phone while at the entrance of his home, as if he

had an active call in progress. If Judge Jamison was not only involved in the planning but also in

the step-by-step execution of the incursion by giving McCash instructions in real-time, it may

partially explain his allocation of 3 hours to “review with Judge”.

766. Evidence of wrongdoing and transgressions occurred on Dec. 5, 2014, related to the 5

hours billed for that day is Defendants Judge Jamison and GAL McCash during the December 18,

2014 hearing. They both pretended as if McCash was educating Judge Jamison on the Dec 5,

2014 incident for the first time, and never gave an indication that they had spoken prior to the

Dec. 18, 2014 hearing.

308


VII.J.5. JUVENILE COURT ENTRY DATED DEC. 26, 2014, DRAFTED BY MCCASH WITH

DECISIONS ENDORSED BY JUDGE JAMISON AND ORDERS ISSUED ON DEC. 18, 2014

767. The entry issued by Judge Jamison on December 26, 2014 shows substantial evidence

of agreement and collusion between Defendants McCash, Lambert, Smitherman and Judge

Jamison, for the reasons outlined below.

VII.J.5(a) FIRST LAMBERT UNILATERALLY DETERMINES GENERAL RULES AND GUIDELINES TO

BE FOLLOWED BY BOTH PARENTS, THEN ADOPTS AND ENFORCES THEM; SMITHERMAN AND LAMBERT PROCEED TO BADGER JURADO IF HE DOESN’T

FOLLOW LAMBERT’S STANDARDS AS DE FACTO RULES; MCCASH FOLLOWS BY

DRAFTING AND FILING A PROPOSE ORDER CONTAINING LAMBERT’S STANDARDS

AND PRACTICES AS IF MANDATED BY THE COURT; JUDGE JAMISON ISSUES THE

ORDER AS HERS WITHOUT HESITATION OR WITHOUT QUESTIONING THE REASONS

768.

VII.J.5(b) FORMALIZED JUDGE JAMISON’S RULING THAT JURADO DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT

TO PRIVACY AND THAT MCCASH HAS THE AUTHORITY TO MAKE UNANNOUNCED

VISITS EVEN AFTER HE HAS COMPLETED HIS HOME VISITS/INVESTIGATION OR

UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES THAT DEVIATE FROM THE NORM

769.

VII.J.5(c) SHOWS THE INEXPLICABLE ORDER FOR JURADO AND LAMBERT TO FOLLOW THE

LOCAL RULE FOR PARENTING TIME DURING THE HOLIDAY SEASON

770.

VII.J.5(d) SHOWS THE PUZZLING DECISION TO MANDATE THAT THE NON-POSSESSORY

PARENT WILL DETERMINE THE SCHEDULE FOR THE PARENTING HAVING THE CHILD

TO FOLLOW DURING THEIR BREAK OR VACATION

771.

309


VII.J.6. TRANSCRIPT OF DEC. 18, 2014 COURT PROCEEDING WITH JUDGE JAMISON SHOWS

MULTIPLE OVERT ACTS BY JAMISON AND MCCASH IN FURTHERANCE OF THE

CONSPIRACY

VII.J.6(a) THE COURT TRANSCRIPT SHOWS JUDGE JAMISON ATTEMPTING TO CONCEAL

MISCONDUCT BY MCCASH

772. One example of the concealment is Judge Jamison response to Jurado’s concerns and

allegations that specific actions and conduct of McCash were in detriment of the well-being and

best interest of the child: “we are not at the best interests yet”.

VII.J.6(b) THE COURT TRANSCRIPT SHOWS JUDGE JAMISON COVERING UP THEIR UNLAWFUL

CONDUCT AND CIVIL RIGHTS ABUSES FROM DEC. 5, 2014

773. The transcript includes Jurado’s attempts to address his claims and concerns of the

misconduct by McCash during the unlawful hostile intrusions two weeks earlier, and Judge

Jamison responding “this is not an evidentiary hearing” when a suggestion was presented that

Jurado would be calling witnesses that were already in the courthouse. However, Judge

Jamison made assertions, in her filing with the Chief Justice of the SCO responding to Jurado’s

Affidavit of Disqualification, that,

He exaggerates the height and weight of the Guardian ad !item to make it appear that he instilled fear when attempting to make contact with Mr. Jurado and observe his parenting of the minor child as required by Rule 48 of the Ohio Rule of Superintendence.

Judge Jamison Response filing with the SCO, page 2 (See Exhibit LV-E2, page 002). Defendant

Jamison made an unfounded accusation against Jurado without having evidence or without

being present during the incident, unless she is admitting that she was on the phone giving real

time instructions to McCash during the entire altercation.

310


VII.J.6(c) THE COURT TRANSCRIPT SHOWS DEFENDANT MCCASH GIVING PERJURED

TESTIMONY IN REGARDS TO THE DEC. 5, 2014 INCIDENT

774. His fraudulent misrepresentations during testimony can easily be proven with emails

exchanged between him and the parties. For example, he state that Jurado did not provide

information as to who would be caring for the child on Dec. 5. However, emails sent by Jurado

prove otherwise.

775. Almost every other statement given by McCash during the Dec 18, 2014 proceeding

constituted perjury, especially surrounding the controversial attack against the owner of the

daycare used by Jurado, which resulted in the permanent expulsion of Plaintiff N.G. and the

termination of the contract between the facility and Jurado.

VII.J.6(d) THE COURT TRANSCRIPT SHOWS DEFENDANT MCCASH CAUSING DEFAMATION TO

JURADO WHILE DEPRIVING HIM OF EQUAL PROTECTING, AND SHOWS DEFENDANT

JAMISON DEPRIVING JURADO OF DUE PROCESS

776. The transcript shows McCash fabricating parental deficiencies and flaws against

Jurado during his testimony under oath—such as the finding of the Civil Rights Magazine in his

Living Room with Dr. Martin Luther King in the cover—to harm Jurado’s case, credibility and

deprive him of Equal Protection. The transcript also memorialized Judge Jamison telling Jurado

“we are here just to clarify the order” in trying to making desist when he was presenting his

defense against McCash’ s claims against him and when he was close to proving the unlawful

conduct by McCash.

311


VII.J.6(e) THE COURT TRANSCRIPT SHOWS CONSPIRATORS CARRYING OUT THE FINAL STAGES

OF THE SUB-SCHEME TO FULLY DEPRIVE JURADO OF HIS PARENTAL RIGHTS BY

FORCING A COMPLETE SEPARATION OF FATHER AND SON AND TO DEPRIVE HIM OF

OTHER FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

777. The transcript shows how Defendants Jamison and McCash first imposed Lambert

and Jurado to follow a local rule for parenting schedule during Holidays that they never

followed before, and without justification. They knew that with such move, Jurado would be

deprive of contact with his son for eleven straight days for the first time since Plaintiff N.G. was

born. During the same proceeding, Judge Jamison issued an unlawful an unconstitutional entry

with a standing order authorizing the summary punishment of Jurado by suspending his

parenting rights before having the opportunity to present evidence or a defense. As a result,

Jurado has been deprived of parenting time with his son now exceeding three full months.

VII.J.7. CONTINUANCE OF HEARING ISSUED ON AUG. 27, 2014 FOR REMOVAL OF BETHEL

SHOWS COLLABORATION BETWEEN DEFENDANTS JAMISON, ODC, SCO AND JOHN

DOE IN THE SUB-SCHEME TO PROTECT BETHEL, COVER UP HER MISCONDUCT, AND

RETALIATE AGAINST JURADO

778. The continuance form issued by the Court—just as the Proceeding was getting ready

to start at 1pm on Aug. 27, for the second part of the Hearing for the Removal of Bethel as

GAL—stated that Judge Jamison was requesting the Continuance to be set to September 24,

2014 due to another ongoing trial being presided by the Judge on that day. However, the trial

proceeding was a pretext not to hold the hearing Jurado had been anxiously waiting for since

August 1, 2014 when it went on recess, after the first part of the cross-examination of Bethel by

Jurado.

312


779. An independent investigation found that the trial being referred to in the

Continuance form was only a pretext because it ended at 1pm, and Defendant Jamison was not

on the courthouse building after 1pm on that day. Judge Jamison first received a call from

John Doe instructing her to postpone the hearing and set a continuance specifically for

September 24, 2014. Judge Jamison was subsequently summoned for a meeting with other co-

conspirators to discuss how to handle the September 24, 2014 proceeding and avoid more

exposure of Bethel’s acts as the August 1, 2014 proceeding did.

780. John Doe, ODC and SCO were the only ones that knew the exact date the High Court

would be issuing a decision on Jurado’s Original Action for Writs in which Bethel, Jamison and

ODC were the subject matter. The discussion was focused on a detail plan that included

Jamison conducting the Sep. 24 proceeding in Chambers, the first and only time in the two

years of the pendency of the case, in order to prevent any type of recording or evidence of the

content of the proceeding. The plan also included the incarceration of Jurado in retaliation for

his public denouncing of unlawful discrimination by Bethel and by the Justice system.

VII.J.8. TRANSCRIPT OF SEP. 24, 2014 COURT PROCEEDING PROVES RETALIATION BY

JAMISON AND COMPLETE DEPRIVATION OF JURADO’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS; SHOWS JUDICIAL TRANSGRESSIONS AND INDICATION OF PARTICIPATION BY ODC AND

SCO

781. The transcript of the Sep. 24, 2014 proceeding shows how Judge Jamison followed

through on their previously devised plan to cover up Bethel’s misconduct, conceal Judge

Jamison’s handling of the matters, and the incarceration of Jurado for retaliation. The

transcript includes objections by Jurado that the Show Cause/Contempt hearing was not

313


previously scheduled, and Jamison not disputing the fact but still overruling his objections. It

shows Judge Jamison preventing Jurado from presenting evidence and his defense, and

includes statements by Jamison confirming that she had conducted an earlier proceeding in

Chambers during which she Sua Sponte removed Bethel, but “not because she did anything

wrong”. Although the transcript does not show other overt acts in furtherance of the

conspiracy that occurred on that day, plenty of evidence described in this complaint shows the

additional concerted action that took place on that day, including (a) Jamison’s approval for

Bethel to return to the case as a paid expert witness for Lambert (b) the coercion of Jurado and

forced signing of the withdrawal form for his Motion to Remove Bethel as GAL, (c) the hostile

treatment of Jurado in Chambers by Bethel, Smitherman and Jamison, and Jurado warnings

that he was seeking federal relief for their abuses an intentional deprivation of his civil rights.

VII.J.9. DEFENDANT JUDGE JAMISON’S RESPONSE FILING IN CASE 2015-AP-005 TO THE

CHIEF JUSTICE OF SCO SHOWING AT LEAST 10 INSTANCES OF INTENTIONAL

MISREPRESENTATIONS AND DECEPTIVE CONDUCT

782. In her response to Jurado’s Affidavit of Disqualification, which she wrote herself,

Defendant Jamison made numerous fraudulent misrepresentations, including

VII.J.9(a) MISLEADING STATEMENT REGARDING THE INCIDENT FROM DECEMBER 5, 2014

783. Her statement involved McCash harassing Jurado and his family at their home.

Defendant Jamison referred to Jurado as “He exaggerates the height and weight of the

Guardian ad !item to make it appear that he instilled fear when attempting to make contact

with Mr. Jurado and observe his parenting of the minor chi Id as required by Rule 48 of the Ohio

Rule of Superintendence.” (See Exhibit LV-E2, page 002). However, it is virtually impossible for

314


her to know what transpired on that day given that she was not there and there has not been

any evidentiary hearing on the matter. In fact, when the parties tried to address the incident

from December 5, 2014 and Jurado was going to call his parents as witnesses during the

December 18, 2014 court proceeding, Defendant Jamison said “NO. This is not an evidentiary

hearing” (See Exhibit LV-E1, page 198).

VII.J.9(b) DEFENDANT JAMISON MADE ANOTHER MISLEADING STATEMENT TO DENY

JURADO’S CLAIMS OF HER DEPRIVATION OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS DURING

THE SEP. 24, 2014 PROCEEDING.

784. In her written response she stated that

Mr. Jurado's claims that he did not have notice of the Motion for Contempt and was deprived of his due process rights are unfounded. Service was made upon Mr. Jurado by certified mail on July 1, 2014 and the return receipt was filed with the Court on July 7, 2014

Judge Jamison Response filing with the SCO, page 2 (See Exhibit LV-E2, page 002). Even though

those facts are true, she failed to mention that the service was made for the proceeding set for

hearing on July 2014, only. And after she stayed the custody case—and made another

misrepresentation to the high court of her filing in case 2014-1225 in which she stated that the

hearing and motion for show cause “was vacated” in order to falsely moot Jurado’s claims in

that action—she or anyone else filed a continuance for the hearing of the Motion for Show

Cause from Defendant Lambert.

785. By only stating that service was effected upon Jurado in July 2014 without addressing

whether the Show Cause/Contempt hearing was properly scheduled for September 24, 2014,

she is intentionally deceiving the Chief Justice. In addition to Plaintiff Jurado’s claim that there

315


is as no continuance or notification of such proceeding for Sep. 24, 2014, Jurado verified with

the Clerk’s office and assignment office and both confirmed that there was no continuances

filed between July 2014 and September 2014, except for Jurado’s Motion to Modify Child

Support and his Motion for Removal of GAL. The docket only shows one Motion set for hearing

on September 24, 2014. In support of Jurado’s allegation of this fraudulent misrepresentation

by Jamison, the Court Entry that she issued on August 6, 2014, confirmed any and all pending

matters set for hearing after that day: “This case is scheduled for further hearing on August 27,

2014, at 1:30 p.m., in front of Judge Jamison in Courtroom 65, on Defendant's Emergency

Motion to Remove the Guardian ad Litem.”

786. Also, the transcript of the Sep. 24, 2014 proceeding shows that Jurado objected to

the impromptu show cause because the court had not properly scheduled it and Defendant

Jamison did not deny it. Instead, she overruled his objections after she asked “If you would

have come tomorrow had you paid it? (See Exhibit LV-E1 pages 110-111).

787. Also during the proceeding in chambers earlier that afternoon of Sep. 24, 2014,

Defendant Jamison acknowledged that the Motion for Show Cause was not supposed to be

heard that day after Jurado brought up his concerns. Defendant Jamison responded, “the Court

can hear motions in any order it pleases”. After experiencing many abuses in the proceeding in

chambers, Jurado disclosed his intentions to pursue federal relief right before they moved back

to the court room.

316


VII.J.9(c) DEFENDANT JAMISON MISREPRESENTED JURADO’S TESTIMONY IN REGARDS TO HIS

INCOME FROM PRIOR YEARS

788. Judge Jamison made misleading statements justified her refusal to provide a court-

appointed counsel (see Exhibit LV-E2, page 002). As seen in the transcript of proceedings from

August 4, 2014, she did not allow Jurado to establish his income and instead, Judge Jamison

uses the few pieces of information she coerced from Jurado before she dismissed his Motion

and the hearing.

VII.J.9(d) DEFENDANT JAMISON ENGAGED IN DECEPTIVE CONDUCT WHEN IN HER WRITTEN

RESPONSE, SHE FALSELY STATED THAT “MANY ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO

ASSUAGE MR. JURADO'S FEELINGS OF PERSECUTION AND DEAL WITH HIS

ACCUSATIONS”

789. In page 2 of her response filing (Exhibit LV-E2 page 003) Judge Jamison made

assertions in reference to the Courts’ response to Defendants Lambert, Petroff, Smitherman

and Bethel scheme to commit fraud upon the court and unlawfully prejudice Plaintiff Jurado in

the events of December 2013/Jan 2014. First, Jamison referred to Defendant Lambert’s

dismissal of her Motion for TRO on January 7, 2014 as “pursuant to Ohio Civ. R. 4l(A)” when she

is well aware that such dismissal was unauthorized by the Ohio rules for civil procedure,

specifically Civ. R. 4l(A)(1).

790. Not only that she allowed Lambert’s claims against Jurado be voluntarily dismissed

after commencement of the proceeding, but she has engaged in the cover up and concealment

of the unlawful misconduct by Lambert, Petroff, Smitherman and Bethel. And by treating such

dismissal as a valid procedure, she is not only covering up and encouraging misconduct by the

co-conspirators, but she is preventing Jurado or anyone from making references to the

317


testimony provided and the Court’s opinions during the December 20, 2013 proceeding—given

that Jamison disparaged Bethel’s role as GAL, her absurd opinions, and unreasonable conduct

before she knew who Bethel really was and before Jamison joined the conspiracy.

791. Second, Jamison also made a misleading statement to create the appearance that her

Order issued on Jan. 23, 2014 to allow each parent to have their own daycare was mainly her

acquiescence to appease Jurado. “Mr. Jurado requested to use his own daycare center during

his parenting time. An order was issued stating that each party could use the daycare center of

their choice to alleviate conflict the parties had when using the same daycare center.” (Exhibit

LV-E2 page 003).

792. In reality, Judge Jamison had initially made the recommendation, during the Dec 20,

2013 proceeding, of the selection of a single daycare that was equidistant to both parents

because of their “shared parenting” status. Such recommendation is what was in the best

interest of the child, and Plaintiff Jurado agreed with that approach. Due to the refusal of

Defendants Bethel, Lambert, Smitherman and Petroff to accept Judge Jamison’s

recommendation of discontinuing the enrollment and attendance of Plaintiff N.G. at the facility

of Defendant The Goddard School of Hilliard II, Plaintiff Jurado was forced to use the only

option he had left: to use dual facilities for the child. The unauthorized dismissal of Lambert’s

action on January 7, 2013 regarding the daycare placement was part of the scheme to commit

fraud upon the court by Lambert and her co-conspirators.

793. For example, an almost-identical scheme to commit fraud upon the Court was

identified by the Ohio Eight District Court of Appeals in State ex rel. Engelhart v. Russo, 2011-

318


Ohio-2410, and later affirmed by the Ohio Supreme Court in State ex rel. Engelhart v. Russo,

131 Ohio St.3d 137, 2012-Ohio-47. Plaintiff Jurado documented extensively Defendants

scheme to commit fraud upon the court in their actions from December 2013 and January 2014

in his filing in the Juvenile court dated November 18, 2014 and titled “FATHER’S MOTION FOR

LEAVE TO SUPPLEMENT HIS MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL”, but Judge Jamison

went out of her way to help conceal the unlawful conduct of Defendants Petroff, Smitherman

and Lambert. (See Exhibit )

794. In short, the true reason for Judge Jamison to allow the utilization of two facilities

was simply to favor the co-conspirators in their fervor to keep the child in a facility located as

far as possible from Plaintiff Jurado. In fact, Judge Jamison has used her approval of the usage

of dual daycare facilities as a defense to Jurado’s allegations of her bias, because that is one of

the few instances in which she created the appearance to be acting neutral.

VII.J.9(e) DEFENDANT JAMISON’S RESPONSE CONTAINED ANOTHER DECEITFUL STATEMENT

REGARDING THE EXISTING MANDATORY ATTENDANCE AND FOR THE CHILD TO BE

CONFINED IN DAYCARE EVEN WHEN THE PARENTS WERE ABLE TO CARE FOR THE

CHILD

795. The forced mandatory daycare attendance was the result of Defendants Bethel’s,

Smitherman’s and Lambert’s intense pursuit to find ways to keep Plaintiffs father and son

separated. Defendant Jamison misled the Chief Justice when stated that “There was a previous

order that neither parent could talk the child early from the daycare center. This condition was

lifted and the decision to pick the child up or drop the child off was left up to each parent and

their work schedule”.

319


796. Since December 2013, Judge Jamison did explain the Court’s position during multiple

proceedings that the Court could not tell a parent that he or she could not pick up the child

from daycare if they could care for the child themselves. In other words, she initially did not

support such restriction but was adamant to include that opinion in an Entry knowing that

without making the court’s position formally in the record, the old restriction would continue to

be enforced. As a result, for exactly twelve months, the mandatory confinement of the child in

a daycare facility continued to be a major point of contention between the parties and the

GAL, and against the best interest of the child.

797. Finally on December 18, 2014, Defendant Judge Jamison reiterated the court’s

position and finally include it in a formal court entry, but only because she knew that it would

not have any effect for two reasons: Defendant McCash had successfully caused the child to be

expelled from Jurado’s daycare, AND the conspirators, which included Jamison, knew that

Jurado would never have the 50/50 parenting schedule again or be able to exercise his rights

under the shared parenting plan. On the same day that Judge Jamison officially lifted the

mandatory daycare attendance, their scheme to deprive Plaintiffs of their father-son

relationship was put into motion.

798. In short, Defendant Jamison really did not do anything to allow the parents—or

better said to allow Jurado, since Lambert did not case and was the initial instigator for the

child’s confinement—to be able to exercise their right to care for their own child over the rights

of strangers that were caring for them instead.

320


VII.J.9(f) DEFENDANT JAMISON’S RESPONSE TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE INCLUDED OUTRIGHT

DECEIT IN REGARDS TO THE APPOINTMENT OF A NEW GAL.

799. She stated “He requested a new Guardian Ad Litem, he got a new Guardian Ad

Litem”. Plaintiff Jurado never requested a new Guardian Ad Litem, and nowhere on the record

shows that he asked for a new Guardian. Wanting the current GAL removed is not synonym of

asking for a new GAL. It would be an absurd conclusion to even assume he wanted a new

Guardian Ad Litem after having such a negative experience with the first one and knowing that

the appointment of a GAL is not necessarily a requirement in those types of cases.

800. As important is the fact that, Plaintiff Jurado was not able to afford the cost of a GAL,

and Defendant Jamison was well aware. Furthermore, Jamison made contradictory statements

in that same response filing and other court entries that indicate Jurado did not ask for a new

GAL. “I did sua sponte appoint Thomas McCash as Guardian ad /item to conduct an

investigation” Judge Jamison response to the Chief Justice of the Ohio Supreme Court, Exhibit

LV-E2 page 004.

VII.J.9(g) JAMISON’S RESPONSE INCLUDED MISREPRESENTATIONS REGARDING THE CONDUCT

OF BLYTHE BETHEL AND HER PERFORMANCE AS GAL THAT LED TO HER REMOVAL.

801. (i) Her statement “The Court, however, felt to avoid any appearance of bias or

impropriety that a new Guardian ad Litem should be appointed over strong objection of

[Lambert] got a new guardian ad Litem” is fraudulent as Judge Jamison intentionally left out

the part in which she allowed Defendant Blythe Bethel, after her removal as GAL, to return to

the case as paid expert witness for Lambert (see Exhibit , showing e-mail from Blythe Bethel to

Jurado confirming Jurado’s allegation that Judge Jamison allowed her to return as an expert

321


witness). Given Jurado’s assertions that Bethel had been advocating for the interest of Lambert

since her appointment, it would render her statement made about “felt to avoid any

appearance of bias or impropriety” a complete absurdity.

802. (ii) Jamison created the false appearance that Plaintiff Jurado’s complaints about

Defendant Blythe Bethel were simply the result of his disagreements with her report and

recommendations.

…filed a report as required by Rule of Superintendent 48, and it is considered an extraordinary remedy when a party disagrees with the Guardian ad Litem’s recommendation.

Judge Jamison response to the Chief Justice of the Ohio Supreme Court, Exhibit LV-E2 page 004.

Defendant Bethel filed her report in March 2014, but Jurado filed his motion to remove her in

January 2014. In addition, most of the complaints are based on her conduct and not necessarily

on her recommendation. Also, Plaintiff Jurado demonstrates throughout the case that his

concerns about Defendant Bethel started almost a year earlier only a month after her

appointment. By May 2013, Jurado was already seeking different forms of relief, including

grievances.

803. (iii) Judge Jamison made fraudulent misrepresentations about the Court’s finding

regarding Defendant’s Bethel conduct and performance in her role of GAL. “The Court did not

find any bias or prejudice during Mr. Jurado's inquiry to Blythe Bethel during testimony. The

Court removed Ms. Bethel even though she had conducted a full investigation” Judge Jamison

response filing to the Chief Justice of the Ohio Supreme Court, Exhibit LV-E2 page 004. Those

assertions are false. First, Jurado’s inquiry during the August 1, 2014 proceeding only covered

322


10% or less of the evidence, exhibits and allegations he was making against Bethel, and Judge

Jamison has validated that the proceeding was never resumed on September 24, 2015. (See

Exhibit with Jurado’s Motion for Judicial Notice and Judge Jamison entry dated granting his

motion and agreeing with him). Therefore, Judge Jamison could not know one way or the other

how much investigating Bethel had done. Secondly, the transcript of the court proceeding from

August 1, 2014 clearly established that Blythe Bethel failed to conduct a full investigation by

refusing to talk to the pediatrician that had requested to talk to her, and also established that

she misled the court on July 8, 2013 when Bethel told Magistrate Matthews that Jurado was

visiting his son at daycare twice a day, 5 times a week, when she knew that he was spending

most of his time in Chicago, Illinois. (See Exhibit with Transcript of Proceeding from Aug. 1,

2014).

VII.J.9(h) JUDGE JAMISON OUTRIGHT LIED ABOUT NOT CONDUCTING ANY PROCEEDINGS

BETWEEN THE FILING OF JURADO’S ORIGINAL ACTION IN JULY 2014 AND THE

SEPTEMBER 24, 2014 HEARING.

804. “Once I became aware that Mr. Jurado had filed an Original Action for Extraordinary

Writs no other hearing was held until September 24, 2014.” Judge Jamison Response Filing,

SCO Petition Case 2015-AP-005, Exhibit LV-E2 pages 004–005. It is not difficult to prove the

falsehood of such statement. Exhibit LV-E5 pages 001–006 show Court Entries issued by

Defendant Jamison, including her order for a general stay of the case issued on July 23, 2014,

her subsequent entry issued on Aug 1, 2014 lifting the stay and her Judgment Entry issued on

August 6, 2014 regarding the proceeding conducted on August 4, 2014, and also the August 1,

2014 proceeding.

323


805. If her our court entries leave any doubts, Exhibit LV-E1 pages 294–330 contain a

certified copy of the (partial) transcript of proceedings held on August 1, 2014. Clearly Judge

Jamison statement about not conducting any hearings before September 24, 2014 is an

intentional fabrication.

VII.J.9(i) JUDGE JAMISON’S MISLEADING STATEMENT REGARDING JURADO’S ACTION AGAINST

HER IN FEDERAL COURT.

806. Defendant Jamison made reference to this instant Civil Rights action against her by

simply stating “I, Judge Jamison have not been served with a civil lawsuit that was filed in

Federal Court.” Her statement is misleading because she tries to create the perception that this

action against her would not cause bias simply because she has not been served, even though

she has received a copy of the complaint.

VII.J.10. THE MAR. 13, 2014 TRANSCRIPT SHOWS JAMISON’S RADICAL CHANGE OF POSTURE

AGAINST JURADO AS A SIGN OF ENTERING AGREEMENT WITH CO-CONSPIRATORS, AND TO RETALIATE AFTER RECENT DISMISSAL OF JURADO’S GRIEVANCE AGAINST

BETHEL BY ODC

807. The transcript shows one of the most significant overt acts by Defendant Jamison in

furtherance of the conspiracy when she declared Jurado an adversary of the court, and

deprived him of his right to due process, while protecting the interest of Bethel. For details,

refer to section VII.D.4(a) “Differential Treatment of Jurado on account of his National Origin;

Cover Up of Bethel’s Misconduct and the Court’s Own Opinion about Bethel During the Dec. 20,

2013 Hearing; Judge Jamison Willful Participation in Defendants’ Dec 2013-Jan 2014 Plot to

Commit Fraud Upon the Court and to Deprive Jurado of his Right to Due Process

324


808. Defendant Jamison’s first opportunity to conduct a full evidentiary hearing in Jurado’s

and Lambert’s custody case came about on December 20, 2013. By then, Defendant Jamison

had shown some degree of differential treatment against Jurado a week earlier when she

knowingly issued an Emergency TRO that was non-compliant with court rules, allowed

defendants Bethel and Smitherman to skirt multiple court rules during the TRO proceedings in

detriment of Jurado, and also deprived Jurado from the opportunity to present his testimony as

his own witness during the December 20, 2013 hearing. Still, the transcript of the proceeding

shows that Judge Jamison was still not part of the conspiracy at that point, as it is evident

throughout the transcript that her questions, comments and opinions were focused on the best

interest of the child, and as a consequence, Judge Jamison was at odds with the conduct of

Defendants Smitherman and Bethel, their actions and opinions in reference to the daycare

situation, including the recent selection process of the new daycare and the mandatory daycare

attendance that did not allow Jurado to care for his own child. The content of that proceeding

and transcript is material evidence of Bethel’s misconduct, fraud and willful neglect of the

welfare of the child. For details, refer to section VII.D.6(a) “Defendants Agreed to Give Perjured

Testimony During the December 20, 2013 Court Proceeding” below.

809. Sometime between December 20, 2013 and the Emergency Hearing requested by

Jurado on January 22, 2014, the first successful attempt by the conspirators to corruptly

influence and interfere with the tribunal took place. The transcript of the January 22, 2014

proceeding shows an increase on the differential treatment of Jurado—as his first time acting

pro se and Jamison’s evident aversion to his speech accent—and Defendant Jamison’s

attempt to bury and obscure the proceeding from December 20, 2013 and its content. As

325


Jurado attempted to impeach attorney Bethel’s testimony as GAL by referring to statements

she made during the December 20, 2013 hearing and expose her fraudulent

misrepresentations, Judge Jamison cut off his argument by ruling that any information from the

Dec. 20, 2013 was off-limits given that the court lacked jurisdiction after Lambert’s voluntary

dismissal of her Motion that was being heard at the time, even when Jurado insisted and

objected.

810. Clear evidence exists that proves Judge Jamison’s actions to prevent Jurado from

using the Dec. 20, 2013 testimony against Bethel to be pretextual: (1) In Ohio, a Court’s lack of

Jurisdiction over a matter or action dismissed does not prevent the Court or limit its ability to

use evidence, testimony or any other information or aspect of the dismissed action or

proceeding for “collateral matters”, such as Contempt and Misconduct; (2) the Voluntary

Dismissal of Lambert’s Motion filed on January 7, 2014 was invalid and unauthorized by law; (3)

the Voluntary Dismissal of Lambert’s Motion filed on Jan. 7, 2014 was part of a plot to commit

Fraud upon the court. For details, refer to section VII.D.6(b) “Concerted Action to Perpetrate

Fraud Upon the Court and to Deprive Jurado of his Right to Due Process with the Filing of an

Invalid and Unauthorized Voluntary Dismissal on January 2014 based on Precedent Set by State

ex rel. Engelhart v. Russo, 2011-Ohio-2410” below.

811. In fact, Judge Jamison’s knowledge of the lack of validity of the dismissal became

more obvious in two other distinct occasions when Jurado made references to the text under

Ohio’s Civ. R. 41(A) subdivisions (1) and (2)—which allows Voluntary Dismissals by the Movant

without an order from the court or agreement from the other parties as long as the proceeding

326


has not started—when he made similar attempts to refer to the testimony from Dec. 20, 2013

and was prevented by Judge Jamison. There is no reasonable excuse or justification for Judge

Jamison’s adamant stance to prevent Jurado from using her own opinion about Bethel’s actions

and Bethel’s perjured testimony from the Dec. 20, 2013 proceeding.

812. Retaliation, Cover Up and Premeditated Deprivation of Jurado’s Constitutional Right

to Due Process during the March 13, 2014 Proceeding” above.

VIII. ALL LOCAL REMEDIES EXHAUSTED & ABSENCE OF ADEQUATE STATE FORUM

813. After almost two years of unsuccessfully petition the state government for the

redress of wrongs committed by Defendants, and after more than a year seeking relief with the

Supreme Court of Ohio with the Ohio Court of Appeals, Plaintiffs have not been granted their

day in court.

814. In July 2013, Jurado sought the help and guidance of the administrative offices of the

Supreme Court of Ohio, and of multiple sections of the Ohio Office of the Attorney General, as

well as several other state and local law enforcement agencies without success.

815. Between July and August 2013, Jurado sought the help from state regulatory agencies

and departments but those attempts failed after the unlawful interference of the conspirators,

as well as their corrupt influence that resulted in the agencies’ participation in the conspiracy.

816. In September 2013, a local law enforcement agency, the Westerville Police

Department, was able to provide limited assistance and guidance to Jurado.

327


817. Between October-November 2013, during his second round of attempts to seek help

with Defendant OOAG, Jurado immediately felt the backlash of retaliatory and intimidating

actions of Defendant OOAG as it took an active part in the ongoing conspiracy against Plaintiffs,

which was extended to the full participation of the Ohio Civil Rights Commission and related

named Defendants in this action.

818. Between January and March 2013, Jurado sought the help of Ohio’s Attorney

Disciplinary System under the umbrella of the Supreme Court of Ohio concurrently as he sought

the intervention of the Juvenile court in addressing his grievances and seeking redress for the

wrongs of Defendants, but the result was more than reckless indifference and refusal to act. It

marked the beginning of an era of tightly synchronized acts of retaliation and concealment by

key actors within the Judiciary Branch, some but not all of them named defendants in this

action.

819. In April 2014, Jurado attempted to file an original action in mandamus and

prohibition with the SCO, as shown by his filings with the Juvenile Court, but the acts of the

conspirators to inflict undue hardship prevented him to access the courts on a timely and

effective basis. After Jurado was finally able to file his Original action with the Supreme Court

of Ohio in July 2014, the transgressions and dark conspiratorial conduct of Juvenile Court

defendants—including Judge Jamison—became overt and ever increasing, along with evidence

of plus factors showing agreement and concerted action between the Juvenile Court

Defendants, SCO Defendants and other conspirators within the Judiciary Branch, including the

328


events that took place in August 1, 4 and 27 of 2014, as well as the incidents and events of

September 2014.

820. In September 2014, the SCO granted Defendants Judge Jamison and ODC’s motion to

dismiss Jurado’s original action without reasonable excuse or justification and without affording

Jurado an opportunity to adjudicate his claims on the merits. The dismissal’s perfect timing

synchronized with actions by Judge Jamison represents another PLUS FACTOR in support of the

conspiracy.

821. In response to increasing acts of overt retaliation and abuse of her authority under

the color of state law by Judge Jamison, Jurado sought relief from the Tenth District Court of

Appeals between November 2015 and February 2015. In three separate instances, the court of

Appeals denied Jurado the relief he sought as well as his right to Appeal without a valid

explanation, reasonable excuse or justification, and without giving him a fair opportunity to

adjudicate his claim on the merits. Consistent with the evidence showing intentional

deprivation of rights committed by OOAG in concert with OCRC during the adjudication of

Jurado’s charges of discrimination and retaliation, Jurado obtained evidence in January 2015

that the Tenth District Court of Appeals was pre-determining the outcome of Jurado’s motions

and requests in violation of his constitutional rights to Equal Protection and Due Process under

the Fourteen Amendment.

822. As ultimate evidence of the participation of SCO in giving Judge Jamison carte blanche

to abuse her authority without restrain and in wanton disregard for the rights and protections

of the U.S. Constitution, Jurado filed a Petition & Affidavit of Disqualification of Judge Jamison

329


from the custody case in January 2015. The handling of the petition process, the turn-around

time, and the content of the Judgment entry all establish new precedent in the determination

of claims of bias against State Judges. As shown by the evidence and through the exhibits

provided, the standards for determining whether Judge Jamison was bias and impartial

deviated from the standards used for the adjudication of other grievants’ application for

disqualification of the judges presiding on their cases.

IX. CLAIMS & CAUSES OF ACTION

IX.A. PREEMPTION BY FEDERAL LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO

STATE LAWS, PROCEEDINGS, PRACTICES AND OFFICIAL CONDUCT

CLAIM I – PREEMPTION BY FEDERAL LAW 42 U.S.C. §2000D ET SEQ. (AS CODIFICATION OF TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964)

823. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations and facts contained in paragraphs 1-822 as if

fully set forth herein.

824. Ohio’s Gov. Bar R. Rule V, as well as its Section 11, Division (E) conflicts with Federal

Statutes 42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq., (Title VI, Sec. 601) and regulations promulgated by the

Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and by the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”)

under 42 U.S.C. 2000d-1 (Title VI, Sec. 602), for compliance with enforcement of Title VI laws by

recipients of Federal funds, as it significantly interferes with the methods by which the federal

statute was designed to reach the purposes and objective of Congress.

825. HHS and DOJ regulations promulgated under Title VI, Section 602, such as 45 C.F.R.

80.3 and 28 C.F.R. 42.104, respectively, forbids recipients from utilizing “methods of

330


administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their

race, color, or national origin, or have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing

accomplishment of the objectives of the program with respect to individuals of a particular

race, color, or national origin.” (Emphasis Added.) 45 C.F.R. 80.3(b)(2); 28 C.F.R. 42.104(b)(2). In

the instant case, Gov. Bar R. Rule V, permits SCO’s Disciplinary System, Disciplinary Counsel, and

the Board of Commissioners on Grievances & Discipline to under-enforce Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(g) as

compared to all other Rules of Conduct, resulting in Hispanics, Blacks, and other non-White

grievants from being denied grievance investigations and other services regarding misconduct

for unlawful discrimination by attorneys, court officers, and judges, in disproportion to White-

American grievants with claims of misconduct that are unrelated to unlawful discrimination.

As such, the state rule(s) result in non-compliance and conflict with these federal statutes and

regulations.

826. Pursuant to regulations promulgated by DOJ’s Office of Justice Programs and OMB

Circular A-102, “Standard Assurances” were developed by Ohio’s Office of Criminal Justice

Services (OMB 1121-0140) that all Grant applicants must pledge and adhere to after being

awarded. The Standard Assurances require recipients and sub-recipients to comply with

applicable Federal statutes, regulations, policies, guidelines, standards, recommendations and

requirements such as Title VI statutes and regulations, inter alia, and standards that promote

unbiased investigations. Those assurances also include the reporting by recipients and sub-

recipients of any complaints or lawsuits involving discrimination or civil rights claims by their

clients or beneficiaries. Furthermore, guidelines developed by both HHS and DOJ require

recipients and sub-recipients to develop a comprehensive policy for addressing discrimination

331


complaints, including effective discrimination complaints procedures. The Office of Civil Rights

under DOJ’s Office of Justice Programs have even made recommendations to State

Administrating Agencies (“SAAs”) for their States to promulgate state law that provides a

mechanism for handling discrimination complaints from subrecipients’ beneficiaries.

827. In contrast to the assurances, federal regulations and standards identified above,

Ohio’s Gov. Bar R. Rule V creates obstacles, contradicts and interferes with the adherence of

those assurances, and has allowed and continues to allow Defendant Ohio’s Disciplinary System

to be non-compliant with Federal laws and regulations. For example, HHS and DOJ regulations

45 C.F.R. 80.6 and 28 C.F.R. 42.106, respectively, require recipients to provide information to

beneficiaries and participants and make information available to them to apprise such persons

of the protections of discrimination under Title VI. In contrast Gov. Bar R. Rule V makes those

disclosures discretionary and evidence shows that beneficiaries are not provided with that

information. Likewise, Gov. Bar R. Rule V(11)(E) and other stipulations under Bar R. Rule V

require all proceedings and documents relating to review and investigation of grievances to be

private, and deliberations to be confidential. And such lack of transparency facilitates the

abuse of discretion and unlawful intentional discrimination with no available provision for a

meaningful review.

828. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 601 states that “No person in the

United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from

participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program

or activity receiving Federal financial assistance” 42 U.S. Code § 2000d. Also HHS and DOJ

332


regulations 45 C.F.R. 80.3(b)(1) and 28 C.F.R. 42.104(b)(1), respectively, prohibit specific

discriminatory actions on the ground of race, color or national origin, such as (i) denying an

individual of any disposition, service or benefits provided under the program, (ii) providing any

disposition, service or benefit to an individual that is different from that provided to others

under the program, (iii) subjecting an individual to segregation or separate treatment in any

manner related to his receipt of any disposition or benefit under the program, and (v) treating

an individual differently from others in determining whether he satisfies any requirement or

condition in order to be provided any disposition, service or benefit under the program. Also,

regulations 45 C.F.R. 80.3(b)(5) and 28 C.F.R. 42.104(b)(5) define the scope and forms of the

prohibited discrimination to not be limited to the specific forms enumerated in that section of

the regulations.

829. In the instance case in which Plaintiff Jurado filed a grievance against Defendant

Blythe Bethel for unlawful discrimination under Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(g), the Office of Disciplinary

Counsel did not comply with the federal law and regulations listed above, specifically Title VI of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 - Section 601, 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(1)(i) and 28 C.F.R. §

42.104(b)(1)(iii). The Disciplinary Counsel used as a defense—for summarily dismissing the

grievance—the duties, authority and rights (or lack thereof) set forth under Ohio’s Gov. Bar R.

Rule V, resulting in non-compliance and conflict with these federal statutes and regulations.

830. In the instance case in which Plaintiff Jurado filed a grievance against Defendant

Blythe Bethel for deceptive conduct and other misconduct as established by Ohio’s Rules of

Professional Conduct, the Disciplinary Counsel did not comply with the federal law and

333


regulations listed above, specifically Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 601, 28

C.F.R. 42.104(b)(1)(i), 28 C.F.R. 42.104(b)(1)(ii), 28 C.F.R. 42.104(b)(1)(iii) and 28 C.F.R.

42.104(b)(1)(v). In defending the differential treatment of Plaintiff Jurado, the Disciplinary

Counsel argued that the duties, (lack of) rights and authority to exercise discretion set forth

under Ohio’s Gov. Bar R. Rule V allowed such treatment and disposition of the grievance. Given

that ODC’s articulated reasons in their Motion to Dismiss (for Dismissal of Plaintiff Jurado’s

Original Action with the SCO) to not investigate the grievance against Defendant Blythe Bethel

were pretextual for the most part as supported by evidence and case law, and considering that

other similarly situated non-minority grievants were treated more favorably and their

grievances were investigated, intentional discrimination is established under McDonnell-

Douglas standards), and demonstrates that these state rules result in non-compliance and

conflict with these federal statutes and regulations.

831. Defendants Stone and ODC engaged in unlawful discrimination when they treated

Jurado and his grievance filed in January 2014 different than other grievances filed by similarly

situated grievants that are white American. Two examples have been identified in which white

American grievants have filed grievances against a Guardian Ad Litem for misconduct, with only

making a subset of the claims Jurado made, for which not much evidence was provided, unlike

the hundreds of exhibits, audio recordings and video submitted by Jurado. In those two

instances, the grievances were investigated against the Guardians without making pretextual

claims that ODC is not authorized to investigate grievances against GALs.

334


832. When Justice O’Neill of the Supreme Court of Ohio was the subject of a grievance

before he was elected Justice, the letter issued by ODC, following standard procedure, stated in

part: “Please be advised that the enclosed grievance has been filed against you by James

Trakas. Pursuant to Gov. Bar R. V, as referenced in Gov. Jud. R. II, the Disciplinary Counsel

is required to investigate any matter filed with him or that comes to his attention. Accordingly,

this office must obtain a response to such grievances, regardless of the form or ultimate

sufficiency thereof. In accordance with Gov. Bar R.V, this investigation will be confidential.”

(Emphasis Added.). In Jurado’s case the handling of his grievance did not follow standard

procedure.

833. In Jurado’s Original Action in Mandamus and Prohibition filed in July 2014 in the

Supreme Court of Ohio in regards to the refusal of the Office Disciplinary Counsel and Juvenile

Court to investigate claims of discrimination and misconduct against attorney Bethel,

Defendant ODC asserted multiple arguments in their Motion to Dismiss. As Jurado’s Complaint

filed with the U.S. Department of Justice for Title VI violations clearly shows, each of ODC’s

arguments for not investigating Jurado’s grievance are undoubtedly pretextual. (See )

834. A prima facie case of unlawful discrimination by Defendant ODC has been

established based on the McDonnell Douglas standard. Therefore, the disparate treatment

practices engaged by Defendants Stone and ODC meet both, the legal definition of unlawful

discrimination, and the scientific definition of unlawful discrimination, as outlined by the US

Center for Disease Control (CDC) and by Dr. Camara Jones. (See )

335


835. HHS and DOJ regulations 45 C.F.R. 80.7(e) and 28 C.F.R. 42.107(e), respectively,

promulgated under Title VI, Section 602, prohibit intimidatory or retaliatory acts and require

that the identity of grievants are kept confidential. Ohio’s Gov. Bar R. Rule V gives the

Disciplinary System authority to disclose the identity of the grievants, which leaves grievants

unprotected from retaliation. In the instance case, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel assured

Plaintiff Jurado, at the time he submitted his grievance, that the investigation would not start or

his identity revealed until the Juvenile case was over, in order for the case not to be affected.

The fact that ODC revealed Plaintiff Jurado’s identity to Defendant Blythe Bethel and allegedly

shared all submitted evidence by Jurado, indeed affecting the case by enabling and instigating

retaliation and intimidation by Defendants Bethel and Judge Jamison, supports the claim that

ODCs discrimination was deliberate and permitted by Ohio’s Gov. Bar R. Rule V, thus resulting

in non-compliance and conflict with Title VI statutes and regulations.

836. Ultimately, Gov. Bar R. Rule V and Gov. Bar R. Rule V(11)(E)—which create or enable

both adverse disparate impact and disparate treatment of minorities as opposed to prevent

them—undermine the hierarchy of The Federation and thus are preempted by 42 U.S.C. 2000d

et seq. and its implementing regulations, and are invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the

United States Constitution.

336


CLAIM II – UNEQUAL TREATMENT AND UNFAIR PROCEEDINGS IN

VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND DUE PROCESS

CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT BY OHIO STATUTE

ORC 4112.05(H) AND RELATED OFFICIAL PRACTICES BY DEFENDANTS

OCRC AND OOAG, ACCORDING TO 42 U.S.C. §1983



838. The statute enacted by Ohio’s legislature, ORC 4112.05(H), and related practices by

CLAIM III – UNEQUAL TREATMENT AND UNFAIR PROCEEDINGS IN

VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND DUE PROCESS

CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT BY OHIO STATUTES

ORC §§2505.09, 2505.12 AND 2505.16 AND RELATED COURT

RULES, PROCEEDINGS AND PRACTICES BY DEFENDANTS JUDGE JAMISON

AND JUVENILE COURT, ACCORDING TO 42 U.S.C. §1983



840.

337


IX.B. COLOR OF LAW DEPRIVATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND FEDERAL STATUTORY RIGHTS UNDER 42 U.S.C. §1983

CLAIM IV – INTENTIONAL UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION IN VIOLATION

OF TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000D ET SEQ., ACCORDING TO 42 U.S.C. §1983



842. Defendant Amy Stone, in her official capacity, has failed and continues to fail to

comply with the statutes and regulations under Title VI. She has engaged and continues to

engage in the disparate treatment of Blacks, Hispanics, other minorities, their infants and

children citizens of the State of Ohio, including Plaintiffs, because of their race, ethnicity,

national origin and color, resulting in their deprivation of Title VI rights, pursuant to Section

1983.

843. Defendant Amy Stone, in her personal capacity, has adopted a callous indifference to

violations of the federally protected rights under Title VI of Plaintiff Jurado and Plaintiff N.G.,

and the harm being inflicted upon them, pursuant to Section 1983.

CLAIM V – UNINTENTIONAL UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION IN

VIOLATION OF TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000D ET SEQ., ACCORDING TO 42 U.S.C. §1983



338


845. Defendant Scott J. Drexel, in his official capacity as Disciplinary Counsel, has failed

and continues to fail to comply with the statutes and regulations under Title VI. He and his

office have engaged in the practice that facilitates intentional and unintentional unlawful

discrimination and produces adverse disparate impact of minorities, their infants and children,

including Plaintiffs, resulting in the deprivation of their rights under Title VI, pursuant to Section

1983.

CLAIM VI – UNEQUAL TREATMENT IN VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT,

ACCORDING TO 42 U.S.C. §1983



847. Defendant Amy Stone, in her official capacity, has engaged and continues to engage

in the unequal treatment of Plaintiffs because of their ethnicity, national origin and color,

resulting in the deprivation of their constitutional rights of Equal Protection, pursuant to

Section 1983.

848. Defendant Amy Stone, in her individual and personal capacity, has adopted a callous

indifference to violations of the constitutional rights of Plaintiff Jurado and Plaintiff N.G.

because of their ethnicity, national origin and color, pursuant to Section 1983.

339


CLAIM VII – UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION IN VIOLATION OF TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964,

42 U.S.C. §2000D ET SEQ., ACCORDING TO 42 U.S.C. §1983



850. Defendant Terri Jamison, in her judicial official capacity and under the color of law,

and Blythe Bethel and Thomas McCash, in their official capacity and under the color of law as

court-officers appointed by Defendant Jamison to be “arms of the court”, have engaged and

continue to engage in intentional and premeditated differential treatment of Plaintiffs on the

basis of color, sex and national origin/ethnicity, resulting in Plaintiffs’ deprivation of their rights

be free from discrimination as granted by Title VI, pursuant to Section 1983.

851. Defendant Blythe Bethel and Thomas McCash, as private actors in their role of

Guardians Ad Litem and advocates of the child, but acting under the color of law by proxy due

to their exclusive power delegated by the state pursuant to statute, and with both overt

involvement of a state official and without overt involvement, have engaged and continue to

engage in intentional and premeditated differential treatment of Plaintiffs on the basis of color,

sex and national origin/ethnicity, resulting in Plaintiffs’ deprivation of their rights be free from

discrimination as granted by Title VI, pursuant to Section 1983.

852. Defendants Terri Jamison, Blythe Bethel and Thomas McCash, in their individual and

personal capacity when performing functions outside of their official or explicitly delegated

role, have adopted a criminal indifference to civil obligations and a reckless indifference to

340


(their own and by others) violations of the federally protected rights under Title VI of Plaintiff

Jurado and Plaintiff N.G., pursuant to Section 1983.


personal capacity when performing functions outside of their official or delegated role, have

engaged and continue to engage in intentional and premeditated differential treatment of

Plaintiffs on the basis of color, sex and national origin/ethnicity, resulting in the deprivation of

Plaintiff’s right to be free from discrimination as granted by Title VI codified into federal law,

pursuant to Section 1983.



conspired and continue to conspire to discriminate against Plaintiffs on the basis of color, sex

and national origin/ethnicity, resulting in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s right to be free from

discrimination as granted by Title VI codified into federal law, pursuant to Section 1983.

855. Examples of Defendant Judge Jamison’s undertakings, acts and actions outside of her

judicial role include but are not limited to, (i) having communications by telephone or in

person with co-conspirators such as the (concealed) communications with Defendant McCash

on December 5 during the incursion into Plaintiffs’ home and private life, to harass,

intimidate, coerce and inflict (additional) emotional distress during a 4-5 hour window, (ii)

taking Plaintiff Jurado to a conference room with no option to record, while engaging in actions

to intimidate, threaten and coerce Plaintiff Jurado on September 24, 2014, forcing him to sign

a Withdrawal of Motion form (iii) Ex-parte communications with Defendant Bethel, Defendant

341


McCash, and attorney Erika Smitherman, in furtherance of the conspiracy, such as on

November 20, 2014, and in matters that were not urgent, known to others, and not set in the

record and that Plaintiff Jurado only found out by accident, (iv) making misrepresentations as a

respondent in court filings with the Supreme Court of Ohio, (v) the fraudulent destruction of

evidence such as the 70+ pages of exhibits that the court received from Plaintiff Jurado during

the proceeding on August 4, 2014, (vi) Other actions and instances not documented here, to be

presented to this Court when appropriate or ordered.

856. Examples of Defendant Bethel’s undertakings, actions and acts outside of her role as

officer of the court or Guardian Ad Litem for the Child motivated by racial/ethical bias and

retaliation include, but are not limited to (i) disclosing information of the case to non-parties of

the case; (ii) interfering with government agencies and undermining their functions, such as

when Defendant Bethel made calls to Franklin County Children Services before their

investigation started to divulge false information, to exert undue influence, and corruptly

mislead and persuade them; (iii) when Defendant Bethel—beyond her refusal to investigate

Plaintiff Jurado’s concern with the child’s health and her rejection of experts and professionals

requesting to talk to her—actually engaged in acts to prevent, with premeditation, the Court

from becoming aware of key facts and receiving information about Plaintiff Jurado’s concerns

about the health of the child and in support of those concerns, like conspiring with the child’s

mother to engage in misleading conduct leading to witness tampering of Plaintiffs’ expert

witnesses and regular witnesses; (iv) Maintaining, protecting and defending client-attorney

privilege with the opposing party in the custody case, such as when refusing to disclose several

hundred emails, phone calls and text messages in total, between her and opposing party and

342


between her and opposing counsel, both private co-conspirators, during the course of the case

and during discovery in both the custody case and the civil lawsuit under the jurisdiction of two

different courts; (v) engaged in unauthorized communications with the custody psychological

evaluator Dr. Smalldon during the pendency of his investigation and evaluation—which they

attempted to conceal, but nevertheless a normal part of their pattern and practice of

conducting rackets in domestic cases—in furtherance of the conspiracy against Plaintiffs; (vi)

acting as an (biased) referee, micromanager and adjudicator between the two parents (vii)

advocating in and out of the courtroom consistently in favor of the personal interests of the

opposing party and against Plaintiff Jurado in matters that were not connected with the best

interest, and that sometimes resulted in adverse results for the child; in fact taking over the

role of opposing counsel in several instances in which attorney Erika Smitherman ended up not

participating or participating at minimum because there was no need to do so; (viii) always

making arguments not centered in the best interest of the child, but instead centered on

scorning and disparaging Plaintiff Jurado such as when, during a proceeding, Judge Jamison

asked Defendant Bethel why did they (attorneys Bethel, Smitherman, Petroff, and their client)

have so much fervor in taking away the parenting time of Plaintiff Jurado, and Defendant

Bethel answered “because he is a manipulator”; (ix) hiring private counsel to represent her in

the custody case—not long after her removal as Guardian Ad Litem, but while still dealing with

matters directly related to her function as GAL (discovery, etc.)— in furtherance of her

discrimination, retaliation and conspiracy against Plaintiffs, and to continue the harassment,

hostility and aggravation—but now through counsel—such as when Plaintiff Jurado received a

threatening letter from her attorney on the same day her attorney served Plaintiff Jurado with

343


notice of his appearance in the juvenile case; (x) after her removal as GAL, returning to the

child custody case as a private expert witness retained by the opposing party in the juvenile

case, or as a regular witness with the original intent to be the private expert witness for the

mother of the child.

CLAIM VIII – UNEQUAL TREATMENT IN VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL

PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, ACCORDING TO 42 U.S.C. §1983



858. Because Plaintiff minor N.G. and Plaintiff Jurado has not been afforded the same

rights, benefits, protections and opportunities solely on the basis of their ethnicity, as enjoyed

by white children and adults, respectively, in the custody proceedings and have been subjected

to tougher punishments and penalties, as compared to those that white citizens are subjected

to, defendants Bethel, McCash, and Judge Jamison in their personal, delegated and official

capacities have deprived and continue to deprive Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights under

the Equal Protection Clause—pursuant to Section 1983.






be free from unequal treatment under the Equal Protection clause, pursuant to Section 1983.

344








unequal treatment under the Equal Protection clause, pursuant to Section 1983.




(their own and by others) violations of Plaintiffs rights be free from unequal treatment under

the Equal Protection clause, pursuant to Section 1983.





Plaintiffs rights be free from unequal treatment under the Equal Protection clause, pursuant to

Section 1983.




345


and national origin/ethnicity, resulting in the deprivation of Plaintiffs rights be free from

unequal treatment under the Equal Protection clause, pursuant to Section 1983.

CLAIM IX – UNLAWFUL RETALIATION AND INTIMIDATION IN

VIOLATION OF TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000D ET SEQ., ACCORDING TO 42 U.S.C. §1983



865. Defendant Blythe Bethel, Thomas McCash, Terri Jamison in their personal, delegated

and official capacities, and the Juvenile Court, have engaged and continue to engage in

unjustified adverse actions and activities against Plaintiffs that amount to Retaliation and

Intimidating Acts—because of Plaintiffs’ filing of grievances and complaints for unlawful

discrimination and retaliation by Judge Jamison and Blythe Bethel, and because of Plaintiffs’

efforts to seek relief under Title VI—pursuant to Section 1983.

866. The aggression exhibited by Defendants Bethel and McCash and escalation of their

abuses and the violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, as established throughout this

complaint, have increased at the same rate and Plaintiff Jurado’s efforts to seek redress and

whenever he filed Motions, appeals or complaints. And so far, no justification has been

articulated for the actions in question, and the few times that they do, they provide absurd

reasons that have been proven to be pretextual.

867. The two most noticeable instances of the escalated retaliation and with the most

infliction of harm is the detention of Plaintiff Jurado in a manner unauthorized by law, and the

346


complete separation of father and child that has now gone for almost two weeks and appears

to be indefinite, producing irreparable harm to both Plaintiffs.

CLAIM X – UNLAWFUL RETALIATION AND INTIMIDATION IN VIOLATION OF THE PETITION CLAUSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT,









be free from retaliation, pursuant to Section 1983.







retaliation, pursuant to Section 1983.

347





(their own and by others) violations of Plaintiffs rights be free from retaliation, pursuant to

Section 1983.





Plaintiffs rights be free from retaliation, pursuant to Section 1983.




and national origin/ethnicity, resulting in the deprivation of Plaintiffs rights be free from

retaliation, pursuant to Section 1983.

CLAIM XI – OBSTRUCTION AND INTERFERENCE WITH RIGHT TO

ACCESS THE COURTS IN VIOLATION OF THE PETITION CLAUSE OF THE

FIRST AMENDMENT AND VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. §1981, ACCORDING TO 42 U.S.C. §1983



348


875. Defendants Bethel, McCash, Judge Jamison, in their personal, delegated and official

capacities, along with Defendant Smitherman, obstructed and interfered with Jurado’s right to

access the courts, and violated the Petition Clause of the First Amendment. By collectively and

jointly causing undue hardship to Jurado, then denying court appointed counsel, and required

Jurado to spend money he did not have submitting affidavits with exhibits for adjudication of

matters that could have been heard in the courtroom and minimizing the cost to the parties.

876. When unable to comply, Defendants pursued sanctions and penalties against Jurado,

for being non-compliant, even when they put him in the position of not being able to keep up

with litigation.

CLAIM XII – UNLAWFUL INTRUSION AND DEPRIVATION OF RIGHT TO

PRIVACY OF BELIEFS, IN VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT, ACCORDING TO 42 U.S.C. §1983



878. Defendants McCash and Judge Jamison in their personal, delegated and official

capacities, worked in tandem to deprive Plaintiffs and Jurado’s parents of their right to privacy

of beliefs as guaranteed by the First Amendment. On December 5, 2014, while completing

their Holy Rosaries, Plaintiff Jurado and his parents from Panama were suddenly being harassed

and tormented by the unannounced presence of Defendant McCash, who interrupted their

traditional time of prayer multiple times. McCash seemed to be satisfied when Jurado open the

door for a short moment to ask him to leave and McCash was able to visually scan the inside of

349


Jurado’s home even though he had already been there. He stared at the rosaries still in

Jurado’s and his parents’ hands.

879. During his GAL report issued at the beginning of January 2015, McCash was very

critical of Jurado’s customs and religious commitment. McCash made comments about the

candle he observed at Jurado’s home without serving much purpose. The candle was battery

operated.

CLAIM XIII – UNLAWFUL INTRUSION AND UNREASONABLE SEARCH IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT,




881. Defendants McCash and Judge Jamison in their personal, delegated and official

capacities, worked in unison to engage in acts to intentionally violate the prohibitions of the

Fourth Amendment, by unlawfully intruding and attempting to access Jurado’s residence

without probable cause or without a warrant on Dec. 5, 2014. Defendant McCash, guided step

by step by Judge Jamison while on the phone was successful at visually searching inside

Jurado’s home during the short moment that Jurado opened his entrance door.

CLAIM XIV – DENIAL OF UNALIENABLE RIGHTS IN VIOLATION OF THE

NINTH AMENDMENT, ACCORDING TO 42 U.S.C. §1983



350


883. Defendants Bethel, McCash, and Judge Jamison in their personal, delegated and

official capacities, premeditatedly denied Jurado of his unalienable right to the pursuit of

happiness by exerting oppression upon Jurado for over two years.

CLAIM XV – DEPRIVATION OF RIGHT TO A ZONE OF PRIVACY TO

RAISE AND CARE FOR OWN CHILD IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENT, ACCORDING TO 42 U.S.C. §1983



885. Defendants Bethel, Thomas McCash, and Judge Jamison in their personal, delegated

and official capacities, deprived with premeditation, Jurado’s right to a zone of privacy to raise

and care for his own son. The incident from December 5, 2014 is just one example of the

deprivation.

CLAIM XVI – DEPRIVATION OF RIGHT TO MAKE OWN DECISIONS AS

EDUCATORS AND PARENTS IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH




887. Defendants Blythe Bethel, Thomas McCash, and Terri Jamison in their Personal,

Delegated and Official Capacities, intentionally deprived Jurado of his right to make his own

decisions in regards to the out-of-home care of Plaintiff N.G. and to deprive Jurado from caring

for his child at home during his approved parenting time.

351


CLAIM XVII –INFLICTION OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT IN VIOLATION OF THE EIGHT AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS




889. Defendants Judge Jamison and McCash have violated the protections afforded by the

Eight and Fourteenth Amendments by imposing excessive, cruel and unusual punishment

against Jurado. First, the punishment of the dismissal of Jurado’s Motion for alleged lack or

organization of exhibits. Then the cruel and unusual pre-emptive summary punishment of

suspending Jurado’s parenting time for missing two pieces of paper. The excessive punishment

of incarceration for the same two missing pieces of paper, the second sentence of jail time

within three months, and the cruel and excessive punishment of setting bond to twice the

amount owed knowing that Jurado was unable to afford the initial amount, let alone the

doubled amount. The enhanced punishment on March 17 to limit his visit to the daycare to 1

hour a week.

890. Jurado’s excessive punishment of his preclusion of evidence and witnesses during

trial.

CLAIM XVIII – DEPRIVATION OF RIGHT TO FAIR PROCEEDINGS AND

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS

CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, ACCORDING TO 42 U.S.C. §1983



352


892. Defendants Blythe Bethel, Thomas McCash, Terri Jamison in their personal, delegated

and official capacities along with Defendant the Juvenile Court, have deprived Plaintiff Jurado of

the same rights to be parties, to give evidence, and protections in and outside the courtroom,

as enjoyed by white citizens.

893. Defendant Blythe Bethel, Thomas McCash, Terri Jamison and the Juvenile Court, Amy

Stone, and Ohio’s Disciplinary System have deprived Plaintiffs of the same rights to the full and

equal benefits of all laws, opportunities and proceedings, as enjoyed by white children and

adult citizens, especially when petitioning the state government and judiciary for redress of the

wrongdoings being committed against.—according to Section 1983.

CLAIM XIX – DEPRIVATION OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS IN

VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH




895. by Blythe Bethel, Thomas McCash, and Terri Jamison in their Personal, Delegated and

Official Capacities.

353


IX.C. VIOLATIONS OF THE PROHIBITIONS UNDER TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

CLAIM XX – UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION BY DEFENDANT ODC IN

VIOLATION OF TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000D ET SEQ., ACCORDING TO 42 U.S.C. §2000D –7



897. Defendants Stone and ODC engaged in unlawful discrimination when they treated

Jurado and his grievance filed in January 2014 different than other grievances filed by similarly

situated grievants that are white American. Two examples have been identified in which white

American grievants have filed grievances against a Guardian Ad Litem for misconduct, with only

making a subset of the claims Jurado made, for which not much evidence was provided, unlike

the hundreds of exhibits, audio recordings and video submitted by Jurado. In those two

instances, the grievances were investigated against the Guardians without making pretextual

claims that ODC is not authorized to investigate grievances against GALs.

898. When Justice O’Neill of the Supreme Court of Ohio was the subject of a grievance

before he was elected as Justice of the higher court, the letter issued by ODC, following

standard procedure, stated in part: “Please be advised that the enclosed grievance has been

filed against you by James Trakas. Pursuant to Gov. Bar R. V, as referenced in Gov. Jud. R. II, the

Disciplinary Counsel is required to investigate any matter filed with him or that comes to his

attention. Accordingly, this office must obtain a response to such grievances, regardless of the

form or ultimate sufficiency thereof. In accordance with Gov. Bar R.V, this investigation will be

354


confidential.” (Emphasis Added.). In Jurado’s case the handling of his grievance did not follow

standard procedure.

899. In Jurado’s Original Action in Mandamus and Prohibition filed in July 2014 in the

Supreme Court of Ohio in regards to the refusal of the Office Disciplinary Counsel and Juvenile

Court to investigate claims of discrimination and misconduct against attorney Bethel,

Defendant ODC asserted multiple arguments in their Motion to Dismiss. As Jurado’s Complaint

filed with the U.S. Department of Justice for Title VI violations clearly shows, each of ODCs

arguments for not investigating Jurado’s grievance are undoubtedly pretextual. (See )

900. A prima facie case of unlawful discrimination by Defendant ODC has been

established based on the McDonnell Douglas standard. Therefore, the disparate treatment

practices engaged by Defendants Stone and ODC meet both, the legal definition of unlawful

discrimination, and the scientific definition of unlawful discrimination, as outlined by the

U.S. Center for Disease Control (CDC) and Dr. Camara Jones. (See )

CLAIM XXI – UNLAWFUL INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION BY

DEFENDANT THE JUVENILE COURT IN VIOLATION OF TITLE VI OF THE

CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000D ET SEQ., ACCORDING TO 42 U.S.C. §2000D –7



902. Defendants Blythe Bethel, Thomas McCash, Judge Jamison and the Juvenile Court,

have engaged and continue to engage in intentional and premeditated unlawful discrimination

355


of Plaintiffs on the basis of color, sex and national origin/ethnicity—resulting in Plaintiffs’

deprivation of their rights be free from discrimination, under Title VI,—pursuant to Sections §

2000d and § 2000d–7. Jurado has been clearly treated differently than other white American

parents, on the opportunities to present a defense, to make arguments inside the courtroom,

in, lack of impartiality from Defendants. Another example of differential treatment based on

national origin is the fact that Defendants are acting in similar manner toward Jurado’s family

members too.

CLAIM XIX – UNLAWFUL INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION BY

DEFENDANTS OCRC AND OOAG THROUGH THEIR AGENTS IN

VIOLATION OF TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000D ET SEQ., ACCORDING TO 42 U.S.C. §2000D –7



904. Defendants Garcia, Dunn, Gutowski, the BCI agent, and other OCRC and OOAG

officials as unnamed defendants herein intentionally deprived Jurado of his right to be free

from discrimination on the basis of color, race or ethnicity. These Defendants engaged in

premediated disparate treatment of Jurado when deciding his cases or charges before

conducting their investigation or even before Jurado filed them, such as the instance of

Jurado’s charges of Retaliation against Brooksedge Daycare, unlike their treatment and

adjudication of charges filed by other similarly situated complainants that are not members of

Jurado’s protected class.

356


905. These Defendants also engaged in segregation and differential treatment when they

denied Jurado his right to full and equal enjoyment of a public facility and its services that is

owned by the state government and that is open to the general public. Defendant Garcia’s

conduct and treatment of Jurado during their interactions is different than the treatment

offered to other similarly situated complainants that are not Panamanians or of Hispanic

heritage, as confirmed by OCRC’s office of constituent services.

906. Any defense or denial—whether successful or not in defending this claim—of

disparate treatment on the basis of race, national origin or ethnicity by Defendant OOAG

should be taken as an admission of guilt for unlawfully engaging in a pattern or practice to

deprive complainants of their rights according to 42, U.S.C. §14141; this statute makes it

unlawful for state or local law enforcement to institute citizen complaint processes that treat

complainants as adversaries, just like Jurado was treated by the BCI-OOAG official as shown by

the evidence. See October 22, 2013 recording description under the section “Substantive

Allegations – The Conspiracy” above.

CLAIM XIX – UNLAWFUL INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION BY

DEFENDANT THE GODDARD SCHOOL-HILLIARD II IN VIOLATION OF TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964,

42 U.S.C. §2000D ET SEQ., ACCORDING TO 42 U.S.C. §2000D –7



908. Defendant the Goddard School-Hilliard II has engaged and continues to engage in the

differential treatment of Jurado, solely because of his skin color and national origin.

357


Defendants treat differently similarly situated persons that are not of Hispanic heritage. The

one example that both defendants consistently show differential treatment is how they apply

their written policies to other similarly situated individuals as opposed to how they apply them

to Plaintiffs. The standard, written process to address issues that should be applied

consistently for all parents was not followed only when dealing with Jurado. Other examples

include overt acts of humiliation, restrictions only applicable to Jurado, and the denial of the

open door policy available by statute to all parents in the state.

CLAIM XXII – UNLAWFUL RETALIATION AND INTIMIDATION BY

DEFENDANT THE GODDARD SCHOOL-HILLIARD II IN VIOLATION OF TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964,

42 U.S.C. §2000D ET SEQ., ACCORDING TO 42 U.S.C. §2000D –7



910. Defendants the Juvenile Court, OCRC, ODC/SCO, OOAG, and the Goddard School-

Hilliard II, as programs or activities that receive federal funds, have engaged and continue to

engage in unjustified adverse actions and activities against Plaintiffs that amount to Retaliation

and Intimidating Acts—because of Plaintiffs’ filing of grievances and complaints for unlawful

discrimination and retaliation against Defendants or because of Jurado’s disclosure of the

intentions for filing a Civil Rights Action against them.

911. In the first instance, the Retaliatory acts perpetrated by Judge Jamison and Blythe

Bethel, combined with Defendants ODC and Stone’s overt acts were the direct result of

Plaintiffs’ efforts to seek relief under Title VI—under Sections § 2000d, § 2000d-1 and § 2000d–

358


7, and the filing of discrimination in violation of the prohibitions of the State’s rules of

professional conduct.

912. The Goddard School-Hilliard II’s most overt act of intimidation came about in

February 2015 when Jurado was verbally assaulted, humiliated and tormented by the facility’s

teachers in close coordination with its Director and Owner. The incident was followed by overt

retaliation when they caused an emergency hearing to be held with their co-conspirator

Defendant Judge Jamison to further deprive Jurado of his right to equal protection of the law,

and to decrease the already-limited 3-hour a week visits he had with his son, now down to 1

hour a week as a result of their retaliatory actions

913. When Jurado raised his concerns of misconduct and differential treatment by the

OCRC investigator, in agreement with Defendant the assistant AG, with the central office of

OCRC, the misconduct and adverse actions by OCRC increased to the point of facilitating the

civil lawsuit by Brooksedge that was already in place as a scheme for retaliation.

914. The most recent retaliatory acts have been perpetrated by Defendant McCash and

Jamison in close coordination with Smitherman and other Defendants, including Jurado’s

unlawful detention and his two jail sentences, along with the indefinite suspension of his

parenting time and deprivation of his right to Open Door Policy of Daycare facilities.

359


IX.D. CONSPIRACY TO INTERFERE WITH OR TO DEPRIVE PLAINTIFFS’ CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY AND CIVIL RIGHTS ACCORDING TO

42 U.S.C. §§1983 AND 1985

CLAIM XXIII – CONSPIRACY TO DEPRIVE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND

FEDERAL STATUTORY RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AND PROTECTIONS PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. §1983



916. Conspiracy to deprive Plaintiffs of constitutional rights and protections by Defendants

Bethel, McCash, Jamison, Stone, Garcia, Dunn, and Gutowski while acting under the color of

law, in their personal, delegated and official capacities, jointly with Defendants ODC/SCO,

OOAG and OCRC, and private Defendants Smitherman, Lambert, Petroff Law Firm, LeClair,

Brooksedge Daycare, Alexander-Savino, Wilson, Eagle, the Goddard School-Hilliard II, also

acting under the color of law.

917. Conspiracy to deprive Plaintiffs of their federal statutory rights and protections—

including but not limited to the prohibitions against unlawful discrimination and retaliation

under Title VI, equal rights to sue or defend, equal benefits of all laws and proceedings, and

protection against private or official impairment under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981(a) and 1981(c),

prohibitions and protections for deprivation of rights under 42 U.S.C. §1983, by Defendants

Bethel, McCash, Jamison, Stone, Garcia, Dunn, and Gutowski while acting under the color of

law, in their personal, delegated and official capacities, jointly with Defendants ODC/SCO,

OOAG and OCRC, and private Defendants Smitherman, Lambert, Petroff Law Firm, LeClair,

360


Brooksedge Daycare, Alexander-Savino, Wilson, Eagle, the Goddard School-Hilliard II, also

acting under the color of law.

CLAIM XXIV – CONSPIRACY AGAINST RIGHTS OR TO INTERFERE WITH CIVIL RIGHTS, PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)



919. Conspiracy to commit unlawful acts, through joint private conduct combined with

state actors’ authority under the color of law, for interfering with Plaintiffs’ Civil Rights and

directly and indirectly depriving them of the equal protection of the laws and their

constitutional and federal statutory rights and protections, including the right to be free from

retaliation, by Defendants Bethel, McCash, Jamison, Stone, Garcia, Dunn, Gutowski in their

Personal, Delegated and Official Capacities, and Lambert, Smitherman, Petroff law Offices,

LeClair, Brooksedge Daycare, Alexander-Savino, Wilson, Goddard School of Hilliard II, Kim Eagle,

with the common intention to harm Jurado, only because of his skin color, and national origin,

and N.G.’s Latino ancestry. Plaintiffs were deprived of his constitutional right to Equal

Protection for most of 2013, 2014 and the first quarter of 2015.

CLAIM XXV – CONSPIRACY AGAINST RIGHTS AND TO ENGAGE IN

CONDUCT AND ACTS IN VIOLATION OF THE PROHIBITIONS UNDER

42 U.S.C. § 2000A–2, UNDER THE COLOR OF LAW PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1983



361


921. Conspiracy to engage in acts and conduct prohibited by 42 U.S.C. § 2000a–2, and

against rights by Defendants Bethel, McCash, Jamison, Stone, Garcia, Dunn, and Gutowski while

acting under the color of law, in their personal, delegated and official capacities, jointly with

Defendants ODC/SCO, OOAG and OCRC, and private Defendants Smitherman, Lambert, Petroff

Law Firm, LeClair, Brooksedge Daycare, Alexander-Savino, Wilson, Eagle, the Goddard School-

Hilliard II, also acting under the color of law.

922. Conspirators acted in close collaboration to deprive Plaintiffs of rights under sections

2000a, 2000a-1, as established with all documented events and incidents in the two daycare

facilities throughout the case.

923. Conspirators acted in unison to make threats against Jurado and engaged in acts of

intimidation for the purpose of interfering with his rights and privileges secured by sections

2000a and 2000a-1. One example of the acts of threats and intimidation is the collective

incidents that took place at the Goddard School-Hilliard II, when Defendants Wilson and Eagle

carried out a scheme to threaten Jurado by the utilization of “safety traps” in their kitchen and

coercing Jurado into taking Plaintiff N.G. into the kitchen, followed by intimidations as a

coordinated effort when Jurado was verbally attacked and humiliated in front of his son and all

the children in the class.

924. Conspirators planned several sub-schemes for the punishment of Jurado for

attempting to exercise his rights under sections 2000a and 2000a-1. The first punishment by

Defendants Brooksedge, Alexander-Savino and LeClair, was the lawsuit that is currently active

and pending in the general division of the Franklin County Common Pleas Court.

362


925. The most recent and sub-scheme carried out to punish Jurado consisted of

scheduling an emergency hearing to allow Defendant Judge Jamison to expand the summary

punishment order to add more restrictions to Plaintiff Jurado’s time with his son, Plaintiff N.G.,

and to his already limited 3 hours a week visits to see his son at the Goddard School. The

recent punishment enforces a one hour maximum a week for Jurado to see his son and visit him

at daycare at the day and time chosen by the Defendants the Goddard School, Eagle and

Wilson.

CLAIM XXVI – CONSPIRACY TO DETER, BY INTIMIDATION AND

THREAT, THE PARTICIPATION IN THIS US DISTRICT COURT OF

PLAINTIFFS AND WITNESSES & CONSPIRACY TO OBSTRUCT, HINDER

AND DEFEAT THE DUE COURSE OF JUSTICE, PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2)



927. Defendants Judge Jamison, McCash, Smitherman, Lambert, Alexander-Savino,

Wilson, Eagle, the Goddard School, and ODC/SCO agreed to perpetrate acts of intimidation and

harassment and threats and have engaged in concerted action to achieve one of the goals of

the master conspiracy of hindering the due course of justice and interfere with Jurado’s access

to this court—all with the ultimate purpose of preventing Jurado from instituting a Civil Rights

Action and from seeking remedies for stopping the harm being inflicted. These actions by

Defendants constitute over acts in furtherance of the ongoing conspiracy.

363


928. Jurado’s unlawful detention, two sentences of jail-time, the unfair, harmful and

unconstitutional order suspending his parenting time to punish him, and injure him by inflicting

emotional distress and demoralization, persecution of Jurado’s physician, incursion to Jurado’s

home, the tormenting of Jurado’s parents causing them to leave town, all took place right after

Jurado’s disclosure of his intentions to seek federal relief in this court and also after Jurado’s

filing of his initial complaint with this court. (see ).

929. Substantial evidence is available that shows the malevolent and dark conspiratorial

conduct between defendants that resulted in Jurado’s necessity to institute 4 new actions since

the initial filing of his Complaint in this court in January 2015, and his stay in the Emergency

Room of OSU Wexner Medical Center to treat Jurado for the harmful effects of Defendant’s

intentional infliction of mental distress and other criminal conduct. It is no coincidence that

these incidents and events have been a clear obstacle for Jurado’s proper prosecution of this

action and the securing of his key witnesses. Ultimately, Jurado filings, including this instant

Amended Complaint were delayed three months due to Defendants’ violation of

42 U.S.C. § 1985(2).

IX.E. UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION AND PUNISHMENT UNDER

42 U.S.C. §2000a et seq.

CLAIM XXVII –UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. §2000a ET SEQ.



364


931. Segregation and Discrimination on the basis of color and national origin by

Defendants Amy LeClair, Brooksedge Daycare, Angela Savino, Gretchen Wilson, Goddard School

of Hilliard II, Kim Eagle, at their daycare facilities, by depriving Plaintiffs the full enjoyment of

the establishment and their right to be treated equally compared to similarly situated parents

and children.

932. These Defendants have engaged in conduct and committed acts in violation of the

prohibitions of 42 U.S.C. §2000a–2. One example of the acts of threats and intimidation is the

incidents that took place at the Goddard School-Hilliard II collectively in February 2015, when

Defendants Wilson and Eagle carried out a scheme to intimidate and injure Plaintiffs by the

staging of “safety traps” in their kitchen and coercing Jurado into taking little N.G. into the

kitchen, despite the rules and warning signs in the kitchen door reading that children were not

allowed, followed by intimidations as a coordinated effort when Jurado was verbally attacked

and humiliated in the presence of his son and all the children in the class.

933. The first punishment of Jurado for attempting to exercise his rights under sections

2000a and 2000a-1 was carried out by Defendants Brooksedge, Alexander-Savino and LeClair,

when they filed the lawsuit against Jurado that is currently active and pending in the general

division of the Franklin County Common Pleas Court.

934. The most recent act of punishment against Jurado, in violation of the prohibitions of

42 U.S.C. §2000a–2, consisted in the joint effort of scheduling an emergency hearing to allow

Defendant Judge Jamison to expand the summary punishment order to add more restrictions to

Plaintiff Jurado’s time with his son, Plaintiff N.G., and to reduce his already limited 3 hours a

365


week visits to see his son at the Goddard School. The recent punishment enforces a one hour

maximum a week for Jurado to see his son and visit him at daycare at the day and time chosen

by the Defendants the Goddard School, Eagle and Wilson. Judge Jamison’s order also punishes

Plaintiff N.G.’s Panamanian grandparents and other relatives by limiting the child’s time to

Skype with them to 15 minutes a week.

IX.F. STATE LAW AND COMMON LAW CLAIMS

CLAIM XXVIII – VIOLATION OF STATE DISCRIMINATION STATUTES

AND THEIR PROHIBITIONS UNDER OHIO REVISED CODE §§4112.02 AND 4112.99



936. Unlawful Discrimination by Defendants LeClair, Wilson, Eagle, Brooksedge Daycare,

and the Goddard School-Hilliard II by depriving Plaintiffs from the full enjoyment of their

facilities and equal treatment with similarly situated children and parents.

CLAIM XXIX – TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH A BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP



938. Tortious Interference with Jurado’s Business Relationships by Defendants Lambert

and Smitherman by harassing, and creating undue burden for Jurado’s employer, physician,

clients and daycare provider.

366


CLAIM XXX – COMMON LAW FRAUD



940. Fraudulent Conduct and reckless misrepresentations of existing material facts by

Defendants Lambert and Smitherman, with the purpose of obtaining excessive and

unwarranted child support payments and court orders for reimbursements of fabricated

expenses.

CLAIM XXXI – DEFAMATION



942. Defamation by Defendants Lambert, Smitherman, LeClair, Wilson, Eagle, Alexander-

Savino, Brooksedge Daycare, the Goddard School-Hilliard II And Petroff Law Offices, with the

purpose of injuring Jurado, harm his reputation, affect his credibility, embarrass, humiliate,

demoralize, expose him to public hatred and ridicule, ultimately inflicting emotional harm and

adversely affecting his professional, personal and social relationships.

943. These Defendants intentionally, recklessly and negligently uttered or published with

malice to third parties false statements or false information concerning Plaintiff Jurado that are

defamatory to Plaintiff.

367


CLAIM XXXII – INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF PAIN, SUFFERING AND

MENTAL DISTRESS



945. “IIED” by Defendants Lambert, Smitherman, LeClair, Wilson, Eagle, Alexander-Savino,

Brooksedge Daycare, the Goddard School-Hilliard II And Petroff Law Offices, with the purpose

of harming Jurado through premeditated emotional abuse, harassment, humiliation and other

malevolent acts, with the goal of depriving Jurado of his rights to be left alone, to pursue

happiness, and to not be treated as a second-class citizen. The same defendants have caused,

and continue to cause, psychological harm, abuse and trauma on Plaintiff N.G. with the abrupt

separation and severance of his primary attachment figure, and ongoing psychological abuse

with the distress caused by the frequent separation from his father during the reduced and

restricted visitations, and psychological trauma from the incidents of verbal assaults against his

father in his presence.

CLAIM XXXIII – COMMON LAW CONSPIRACY TO INFLICT

EMOTIONAL DISTRESS



947. Common Law Conspiracy by Defendants Lambert, Smitherman, LeClair, Wilson, Eagle,

Alexander-Savino, Brooksedge Daycare, The Goddard School-Hilliard II And Petroff Law Offices,

who engaged in private conduct and formed a partnership to maliciously target Jurado for

nothing other than the color of his skin and his national place of origin, and intentionally cause

368


emotional harm, pain and suffering, by engaging in premeditated emotional abuse,

harassment, humiliation and other malevolent acts, with the goal of depriving Jurado of his

rights to be left alone, to pursue happiness, and to not be treated as a second-class citizen.

948. The same defendants have conspired to cause psychological harm, abuse and trauma

on Plaintiff N.G. with the abrupt separation and severance of his primary attachment figure,

and ongoing psychological abuse with the distress caused by the frequent separation from his

father during the reduced and restricted visitations, and psychological trauma from the

incidents of verbal assaults against his father in his presence.

CLAIM XXXIV – COMMON LAW CONSPIRACY TO DEFRAUD, DEFAME, AND INTERFERE IN BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS





who engaged in private conduct and formed a partnership to intentionally cause emotional

harm, pain and suffering, to harm by defamation in order to expose Jurado to public hatred and

ridicule, ultimately inflicting emotional harm and adversely affecting his professional, personal

and social relationships, and to interfere with business relationships.

951. These Defendants intentionally, recklessly and negligently conspired to utter or

publish with malice to third parties false statements or false information concerning Plaintiff

Jurado that are defamatory to Plaintiff.

369


952. These Defendants committed the same unlawful acts described above, but also while

acting under the color of law during their agreement with the State and its agents and while

engaging in concerted action with state officials to willfully commit unlawful acts against

Plaintiffs.

CLAIM XXXV – COMMON LAW CONSPIRACY TO ENGAGE IN

CRIMINAL INTERFERENCE WITH CUSTODY





in agreement with state officials to reach their common objective and intention of harming

Plaintiffs by interfering with Jurado’s custody of his son, minor child N.G., collectively acting

under color of state law and abusing such authority for the purpose of masking their criminal

acts as lawful, to ultimately perpetrate offenses pursuant to ORC 2919.23(A)(1), a felony of the

fourth degree, with civil liability under ORC 2307.50, all resulting in infliction of psychological

harm upon Plaintiff N.G. and Plaintiff Jurado.

CLAIM XXXVI – COMMON LAW CONSPIRACY TO DISCRIMINATE ON

THE BASIS OF NATIONAL ORIGIN



370




in agreement with state officials to reach their common objective of harming Plaintiffs by

segregating or depriving Plaintiffs of their right to be free from discrimination and disparate

treatment as defined under ORC 4112.02 and 4112.99.

CLAIM XXXVII – COMMON LAW CONSPIRACY TO PERPETRATE

CIVIL AND CRIMINAL OFFENSES AGAINST CHILDREN AND THE FAMILY IN ACCORDANCE WITH STATE LAW





in agreement with state officials to reach their common objective of harming Plaintiff N.G. by

their willful neglect and breach of their duty of care and protection, by intentionally failing to

report possible child maltreatment, abuse or neglect, by purposely inflicting physical injuries

and psychological harm, and by threatening to inflict more harm, pursuant to ORC

2919.23(A)(1)—with civil liability authorized by ORC 2307.50—ORC §§2151.031, divisions (B),

(C), (D) and (E), 2919.22(A), 2919.22(B), 2151.011 et seq., 2151.421, 2151.421(M), and

3109.051(K).

959. Defendants’ offenses in violation of state laws protecting children’s welfare were

supported by their criminal conspiracy to interfere with Plaintiffs’ constitutional and federal

statutory rights by injuring or attempting to injury, intimidate and by creating a risk of injury to

371


the minor solely driven by their racial and ethnic hatred pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§241, 242, and

245.

X. REQUEST FOR RELIEF

Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court grants the following relief:

X.A. RELIEF IN EQUITY

X.A.1. PRELIMINARY AND IMMEDIATE RELIEF

X.A.1(a) EXPEDITED PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION TO ENJOIN ALL SIX (6) PENDING CASES

INSTITUTED AGAINST JURADO OR BY JURADO IN STATE COURTS

960. Issue a preliminary injunction staying proceedings in all six pending cases that

originated from the custody case, including the custody case because (i) of the ongoing

intentional deprivations of rights and compounding harm, (ii) it is necessary in aid of this court’s

jurisdiction. The six pending cases in state courts to be enjoined and their proceedings stayed

are as follows:

a. Case number 12-JU-014479 of the Franklin County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile

Branch. The case is going to resume its proceedings on April 9, 2015, including

Contempt hearing, Modification of Child Support, and Final Trial, but it is prone

to setting last-minute hearings without much notice, such as the one held on

March 17, 2015 that was scheduled 6 days in advanced. The proceedings

conducted in this case serve as the platform where the majority of the abuses

under the color of law are taking place.

372


b. Case number 14-AP-872 of the Tenth District Court of Appeals. This appeal was

instituted by Jurado to prevent or slow down the abuses and unlawful conduct

by Judge Jamison and the Juvenile Court. It has already been briefed and it is

waiting adjudication. It is related to the Appeal of a Contempt order and purge

proceeding. Under this case, Jurado have already been denied temporary relief

he sought in the form of a Stay.

c. Case number 2015-0240 of the Supreme Court of Ohio, filed recently, in

February 2015, by Jurado as an Original Action in Mandamus and Prohibition,

seeking a remedy to the deprivations of his Constitutional and statutory rights of

a Stay by the Juvenile Court and the Tenth District Court of Appeals. Without a

Stay, Jurado faces retaliatory incarceration before he is able to exercise his right

to Appeal the decision of the Juvenile Court and Judge Jamison. This case with

the SCO is directly related to the Juvenile Court case 12-JU-014479 and Appeal

case 15-AP-0080.

d. Case number 15-AP-0026 of the Tenth District Court of Appeals. This appeal

was filed by Jurado in January 2015 to prevent or slow down the abuses and

unlawful retaliatory conduct by Judge Jamison and the Juvenile Court in respect

to the summary punishment enforced against Jurado before he was given an

opportunity to be heard. Jurado sought a Stay of the Order with both the

juvenile Court and the Appeals Court and both denied Jurado of the relief he was

seeking. Without a Stay, the issue will be moot by the time the Appeal is fully

373


briefed and adjudicated. Therefore their denial of a Stay constituted a

deprivation of Jurado’s right to access the Court and to Appeal. The order in

question is Judge Jamison standing (temporary) order suspending Jurado’s

parenting time, going on for over three months now, and the harm inflicted to

the young child, Plaintiff N.G., will be irreversible.

e. Case number 15-AP-0080 of the Tenth District Court of Appeals. This appeal was

filed by Jurado in February 2015 to prevent or slow down the abuses and

unlawful retaliatory conduct by Judge Jamison and the Juvenile Court in respect

to the second contempt finding against Jurado during a proceeding that was

instituted in furtherance of the conspiracy—to incarcerate Jurado in retaliation

for his public denouncing of unlawful discrimination by the GAL and the Judiciary

Branch and for seeking relief in this court.

f. Case number 13-CV-011378 of the General Division of the Franklin County

Common Pleas Court. This case has been thoroughly documented in this

complaint as one of the subsidiary schemes of the master conspiracy against

Plaintiffs. It was instituted on October 2013 by Brooksedge, LeClair and

Alexander-Savino with the joint efforts of Lambert, Smitherman, Bethel,

Dr. Smalldon, Petroff Law firm, OCRC Defendants and OOAG Defendants. It has

been a successful plot within the overarching conspiracy given that the injuries

caused have been consistent, pervasive and ongoing, and most of its objectives

have already been reached. Defendants Alexander-Savino and LeClair are

374


currently pursuing to cause additional undue burden to Jurado through the

discovery phase and are also intensely pursuing monetary sanctions in bad faith

and with malicious purposes.

961. There is a strong possibility that Jurado will remove case 13-CV-011378 from the

State Court under

X.A.1(b) EXPEDITED PRELIMINARY DECLARATION OR INJUNCTION TO ENJOIN TWO

TEMPORARY ORDERS ISSUED BY JUDGE JAMISON BETWEEN DECEMBER 2014 AND JANUARY 2015 TO SUSPEND JURADO’S PARENTING TIME IN UNLAWFUL

RETALIATION

962. Issue a preliminary injunction staying the two standing orders unlawfully issued by

Defendant Judge Jamison in the Juvenile Court to sever the father-son bond and relationship

and start the long-term parental alienation in furtherance of the conspiracy. In the alternative,

issue a declaration that the two orders are invalid or unenforceable until further order of this

court. Before these unconstitutional orders were issued, Jurado had exercised an equal-time

shared parenting schedule during most of the pendency of the case, which is nearly equivalent

to the age of Plaintiff N.G. The first Order or Entry was issued on December 18, 2014 and the

second one was issued on January 9, 2015. (See )

X.A.1(c) INJUNCTION TO STAY ORDERS OR DECLARATION THAT THE ORDERS ISSUED BY

DEFENDANT JAMISON SINCE JULY 2014 ARE INVALID OR UNCONSTITUTIONAL

963. Issue a preliminary injunction staying several of the unlawful orders or judgment

entries issued by Defendant Judge Jamisonretroactive since the judicial transgressions became

overt and without restrain, which is after Jurado’s filing of his Original Action in the Supreme

375


Court of Ohio in July 2014. Most of the orders are temporary orders, such as the dismissal of

Jurado’s Motion to Modify Child Support dismissed on August 4, 2014 (entry dated Aug. 6,

2014), and entry from September 26, 2014 modifying how Jurado and Lambert made medical

decisions for the child that was done without a hearing. There are also two final Judgment

entries related to the finding of Contempt that were part of the overt acts in retaliation and in

furtherance of the conspiracy issued on September 26, 2014 and January 22, 2015. Without

staying these orders, Jurado will face incarceration before this Court has an opportunity to

determine the merits of Plaintiff’s Constitutional and Civil Rights Claims.

X.A.1(d) TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AGAINST

DEFENDANTS JAMISON, BETHEL, SMITHERMAN AND MCCASH

964. Issue a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) to enjoin Defendants Jamison, Bethel,

Smitherman, McCash, Lambert and any agent or representative acting on their behalf to

preclude them from:

965. (i) Harassing, Contacting or corruptly influencing any of Jurado’s witnesses to this

federal action or any other neutral party that may not be acting in their favor or in the interest

of the conspiracy. For example, Jurado’s physician that was forced to appear in Court with

less than 48 hour notice—by joint effort of Judge Jamison and Smitherman—as an act of

intimidation because he issued a letter certifying Jurado’s incapacity and medical approval to

avoid factors or situations that would create another health crisis, such as [certain] court

proceedings. In February 12, 2015, Doctor Andrew Eilerman was compelled to drive from his

clinic to the court house at two different times in the same day as Smitherman’s premeditated

376


efforts—acting as an agent of the court—to impose undue burden, with the ultimate goal of

causing aversion for treating and assisting Jurado in any way in the future.

966. (ii) Approaching Jurado’s home with the pretext of conducting a court investigation,

especially when two home visits have been completed at Jurado’s home as well as Lambert’s

home. This restriction will ultimately prevent another recurrence of the incident from

December 5, 2014.

X.A.1(e) PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION OR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER TO PREVENT

MORE PHYSICAL HARM OR THREAT OF HARM BY DEFENDANTS, AND TO PREVENT

LAMBERT FROM MAKING ANY DECISIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF N.G. UNTIL

FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT

967. Issue a preliminary injunction or TRO, to prevent Defendant Lambert from making

decisions on behalf or in regards to Plaintiff N.G., for his safety and protection, if this Court

determines that Plaintiffs have established a prima fascia case of child endangerment, neglect,

abuse or maltreatment or violations of federal or state laws related to the protection of

children, including but not limited to 42 U.S. Code §13031. As of the filing of this first amended

complaint, Jurado is a co-custodial parent, also known as co-parenting or shared parenting

arrangement.

968. If this court determines that any parts or subsidiary schemes of the conspiracy, or

conspirators have unintentionally neglected the welfare of the child, or have engaged in

conspiratorial conduct and acts with the premeditated intention to put the child in harm’s

way—as a means to achieve the goals of the conspiracy or in furtherance thereof—or have

exposed the child to imminent risk of serious harm by the Defendants’ acts, or by their criminal

377


indifference and failure to act, according to ORC 2151.031, divisions (B), (C), (D) or (E), ORC §§

2919.22(A), 2919.22(B), 2151.011 et seq., and 2151.421, or 18 U.S.C. §§241, 242 or 245, then

issue a preliminary declaration that minor N.G. is the victim of crime, and a Temporary

Restraining Order or Order of Protection to prevent any of the conspirators from having

contact with the child or authority to affect any aspect of the care of the child until further

order of the court, in order to prevent additional physical and psychological harm to be

inflicted or threats of harm in retaliation, concealment or furtherance of the conspiracy. The

TRO should allow Lambert to have parenting time but only with professional supervision until

further order of the court.

X.A.1(f) PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION TO STAY ORDERS FOR THE PURPOSE OF GRANTING

PLAINTIFFS IMMEDIATE AND TEMPORARY ECONOMIC RELIEF

969. Issue a preliminary injunction to stay the current order setting the Child Support

Obligation that has been overdue for modification for over two years and have been used as a

tool in furtherance of the conspiracy to cause financial harm and undue hardship to Jurado. No

evidence will be found on the records of the custody case of a dispute over the facts regarding

Lambert’s income to be the same or higher than Jurado income. On the other hand, the record

will show how Defendants Smitherman and Lambert would make procedural maneuvers and

engage in deceptive conduct to prevent Jurado from changing the Child Support obligation

amount on the merits. The overage of child support payments made to Lambert is estimated

to be in excess of $45,000.00.

378


X.A.1(g) PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, RESTRAINING ORDER UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 2000a–3

970. Issue a preliminary injunction and restraining order against all conspirators

defendants, but specially Defendants Brooksedge Daycare, LeClair, Alexander-Savino, Kim

Eagle, Gretchen Wilson and The Goddard School-Hilliard II, to prevent them from continuing to

engage in acts, conduct and practices prohibited by 42 U.S.C. § 2000a–2, including (i)

deprivation of Jurado of rights under section 2000a, 2000a-1, (ii) threats and intimidation for

the purpose of interfering with his rights and privileges secured by sections 2000a and 2000a-1,

and (iii) punishment against Jurado for attempting to exercise his rights under sections 2000a

and 2000a-1. In the case of Brooksedge, Alexander-Savino and LeClair, their punishment is the

lawsuit current active and pending in the general division of the Franklin County Common Pleas

Court. In the case of the Goddard School-Hilliard II, Wilson and Eagle, they first threaten Jurado

by the utilization of “safety traps” in their kitchen and coercing Jurado into taking his child into

the kitchen, followed by intimidations as a coordinated effort when Jurado was verbally

attacked and humiliated in front of his son and all the children in the class, and ultimately

punished with the concerted action by defendants McCash, Lambert, Smitherman and Judge

Jamison. The punishment consisted of scheduling an emergency hearing to allow Defendant

Judge Jamison to expand the existing summary punishment order to add more restrictions to

Jurado’s time with his son and to his already limited 3 hours a week visits to see his son at the

Goddard School. The punishment currently enforces a one hour maximum a week for Jurado to

see his son and visit him at daycare and the choosing of the weekday and time by the Daycare

administrators.

379


X.A.2. PERMANENT RELIEF

X.A.2(a) PERMANENT DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF TO ENSURE FUTURE

COMPLIANCE OF FEDERAL LAWS AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS BY JUDICIARY

BRANCH DEFENDANTS

971. Issue permanent declaratory and injunctive relief as may be appropriate to enforce

the compliance of federal laws and constitutional protections by defendants the juvenile court,

Judge Jamison, Bethel, McCash and any other judiciary branch defendant and to preclude them

from continuing the same or any future acts of discrimination, conspiracy and retaliation

against Plaintiffs.

X.A.2(b) DECLARATORY RELIEF REGARDING THE CORRUPT CONSPIRATORIAL CONDUCT OF

DEFENDANTS JUDGE JAMISON AND ANY OTHER DEFENDANTS SHARING HER

IMMUNITY FROM §1983 DAMAGES, WITH THE PURPOSE OF EXPOSING THE

JUDICIARY TO PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY

972. Issue a permanent declaration regarding any substantiated unlawful or criminal

conduct of Defendants Judge Jamison and that of any other defendants enjoying immunity

from § 1983 damages, given that judicial immunity was not designated to insulate the judiciary

from all aspects of public accountability. The declaratory relief would also facilitate any

potential criminal prosecution just as other citizens are subject to the same actions, and would

facilitate the participation of the Judiciary in responding as parties to the action assuming they

will provide material information to this civil action against the rest of the conspirators

defendants.

380


X.A.2(c) DECLARATORY RELIEF REGARDING THE VALIDITY OF OHIO’S GOV. BAR RULE V AND

AN ORDER TO ENJOIN FUTURE CONDUCT AND PRACTICES THAT INTERFERE WITH

THE METHODS TO ENFORCE THE PROHIBITIONS OF TITLE VI.

973. Issue a declaration regarding the validity of the portions or subsections of Ohio’s Gov.

Bar Rule V which are found in conflict with federal statutes.

974. Issue an Order to preclude state officials and defendants Amy Stone, Scott j. Drexel

and ODC from continuing the existing practices or from conducting their investigations and

proceedings in a manner that interferes with the established methods to enforce the

prohibitions of Title VI against unlawful discrimination. For example, the secrecy and

confidentiality of grievances and their investigation interfere with the transparency and other

methods promoting impartiality that are used in the enforcement of Title VI.

X.A.2(d) PERMANENT INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF REGARDING

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORC 4112.05(H)

975. Issue a declaration regarding the constitutionality of Ohio Revised Code section

4112.05(H) as currently interpreted by OCRC Defendants, OOAG Defendants and State Courts

during judiciary review under ORC 4112.06, as the statute applies to complainants aggrieved

with a finding of No Probable Cause by the Commission.

976. Issue an Order to compel OCRC Defendants to issue Findings of Fact in a manner that

can allow proper review, consistent with the rights and protections guaranteed by the U.S.

Constitution including Equal Protection and Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

381


977. Issue an Order to preclude OOAG Defendants to hinder the establishment and

enforcement of new practices and conduct consistent with this Court’s opinions and

declarations.

X.A.2(e) PERMANENT INJUNCTIVE AND DECLARATORY RELIEF REGARDING

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ORC §§2505.09, 2505.12 AND 2505.16

978. Issue a declaration regarding the constitutionality of Ohio Revised Code sections

2505.09, 2505.12 and 2505.16 as it applies to Appellant Contemnors who face the risk of

incarceration and that either cannot afford to cover the requirement of giving supersedeas

bond or that the underlying order being the subject of the Contempt is not for the payment of

money.

979. Issue an Order to preclude Defendants the Juvenile Court and Terri Jamison from

using their authority to exercise discretion to apply these statutes in a manner inconsistent with

the rights and protections afforded by the U.S. Constitution or inconsistent with the orders and

declarations of this court.

X.A.2(f) PERMANENT DECLARATORY RELIEF REGARDING THE STATUS OF PLAINTIFF N.G. AS

VICTIM OF CRIME

980. Issue a preliminary and permanent declaration that Plaintiff N.G. has been a victim of

crime by Custody Interference pursuant to ORC 2307.50(C), and a victim of crime by child

endangerment according to ORC 2151.031(B) or status of abused child pursuant to

ORC 2151.031, divisions (C), (D) and (E). Such declarations and findings are authorized to be

issued by the court pursuant to each of the statutes specified above, and should serve the

interests of justice if the allegations herein are substantiated, including the exposure to

382


substantial risks of injury and attempts or successful acts to inflict physical and psychological

harm by defendants.

X.B. COMPENSATORY DAMAGES

X.B.1. COMPENSATORY DAMAGES FOR ECONOMIC LOSSES

X.B.1(a) COMPENSATORY DAMAGES FOR ECONOMIC LOSSES AGAINST DEFENDANTS STONE, JAMISON, BETHEL, MCCASH, GARCIA, DUNN AND GUTOWSKI IN THEIR PERSONAL

CAPACITY

981. Award of compensatory damages to Plaintiffs for all compensation lost, and

expenditures incurred as a result of the unlawful acts of defendants Stone, Jamison, Bethel,

McCash, Garcia, Dunn, and Gutowski while acting under the color of law and outside the

protection of their immunity.

X.B.1(b) COMPENSATORY DAMAGES FOR ECONOMIC LOSSES AGAINST DEFENDANTS STONE, JAMISON, BETHEL, MCCASH, GARCIA, DUNN, GUTOWSKI IN THEIR OFFICIAL AND

DELEGATED CAPACITIES, AND AGAINST THE JUVENILE COURT, OOAG, OCRC, AND

SCO DEFENDANTS


expenditures incurred as a result of the unlawful acts of defendants Stone, Jamison, Bethel,

McCash, Garcia, Dunn, Gutowski representing their state agencies OOAG, OCRC, AND SCO/ODC,

including unlawful discrimination and retaliation under Title VI.

383


X.B.1(c) COMPENSATORY DAMAGES FOR ECONOMIC LOSSES AGAINST PRIVATE DEFENDANTS

LAMBERT, SMITHERMAN, LECLAIR, WILSON, EAGLE, ALEXANDER-SAVINO, BROOKSEDGE DAYCARE, THE GODDARD SCHOOL-HILLIARD II AND PETROFF

983. Award of compensatory damages for all compensation lost, and expenditures

incurred as a result of the unlawful acts of defendants Lambert, Smitherman, LeClair, Wilson,

Eagle, Alexander-Savino, Brooksedge Daycare, The Goddard School-Hilliard II and Petroff Law

Firm, who engaged in private conduct and formed a partnership to interfere with Plaintiffs’ civil

rights, to intentionally inflict Emotional Distress, Pain and Suffering, to interfere with Plaintiffs

business relationships, and to harm Plaintiffs by defamation and loss of reputation.

X.B.1(d) COMPENSATORY DAMAGES FOR ECONOMIC LOSSES AGAINST PRIVATE DEFENDANTS

LAMBERT, SMITHERMAN, LECLAIR, WILSON, EAGLE, ALEXANDER-SAVINO, BROOKSEDGE DAYCARE, THE GODDARD SCHOOL-HILLIARD II AND PETROFF

ACTING UNDER THE COLOR OF LAW


expenditures incurred as a result of the unlawful acts of defendants Lambert, Smitherman,

LeClair, Wilson, Eagle, Alexander-Savino, Brooksedge Daycare, The Goddard School-Hilliard II

and Petroff Law Firm, while acting under the color of law during their agreement with the State

and its agents and while engaging in concerted action with state officials to willfully deprive

Plaintiffs of their rights.

384


X.B.2. COMPENSATORY DAMAGES FOR NON-ECONOMIC LOSES

X.B.2(a) COMPENSATORY DAMAGES FOR NON-ECONOMIC LOSSES AGAINST DEFENDANTS

STONE, JAMISON, BETHEL, MCCASH, GARCIA, DUNN AND GUTOWSKI IN THEIR

PERSONAL CAPACITY

985. Award of general damages suffered as a result of the unlawful acts of defendants

Stone, Jamison, Bethel, McCash, Garcia, Dunn, and Gutowski while acting under the color of law

and outside the protection of their immunity, for which money is only a rough substitute,

including but not limited to physical pain, humiliation and embarrassment, shock and mental

anguish, loss of reputation, emotional distress and suffering

986. For general damages suffered as a result of Defendants (listed above) State Actors’

intentional deprivation of Plaintiffs’ rights and protections under federal law and the U.S.

constitution.

X.B.2(b) COMPENSATORY DAMAGES FOR NON-ECONOMIC LOSSES AGAINST DEFENDANTS

STONE, JAMISON, BETHEL, MCCASH, GARCIA, DUNN, GUTOWSKI IN THEIR

OFFICIAL AND DELEGATED CAPACITIES, AND AGAINST THE JUVENILE COURT, OOAG, OCRC, AND SCO DEFENDANTS


Stone, Jamison, Bethel, McCash, Garcia, Dunn, Gutowski representing their state agencies

OOAG, OCRC, AND SCO/ODC, including unlawful discrimination and retaliation under Title VI,

for which money is only a rough substitute, including but not limited to physical pain,

humiliation and embarrassment, shock and mental anguish, loss of reputation, emotional

distress and suffering.

385


988. For the same general damages suffered but as a result of the deprivation of Plaintiffs’

rights and protections under federal law and the U.S. constitution.

X.B.2(c) COMPENSATORY DAMAGES FOR NON-ECONOMIC LOSSES AGAINST PRIVATE

DEFENDANTS LAMBERT, SMITHERMAN, LECLAIR, WILSON, EAGLE, ALEXANDER-SAVINO, BROOKSEDGE DAYCARE, THE GODDARD SCHOOL-HILLIARD II AND

PETROFF LAW FIRM


Lambert, Smitherman, LeClair, Wilson, Eagle, Alexander-Savino, Brooksedge Daycare, The

Goddard School-Hilliard II and Petroff Law Firm, who engaged in private conduct and formed a

partnership to interfere with Plaintiffs’ civil rights, to intentionally inflict Emotional Distress, to

interfere with Plaintiffs business relationships, and to harm Plaintiffs by defamation and loss of

reputation, for which money is only a rough substitute, including but not limited to physical

pain, humiliation and embarrassment, shock and mental anguish, loss of reputation, emotional

distress and suffering.

X.B.2(d) COMPENSATORY DAMAGES FOR NON-ECONOMIC LOSSES AGAINST PRIVATE

DEFENDANTS LAMBERT, SMITHERMAN, LECLAIR, WILSON, EAGLE, ALEXANDER-SAVINO, BROOKSEDGE DAYCARE, THE GODDARD SCHOOL-HILLIARD II AND

PETROFF LAW OFFICES WHILE ACTING UNDER THE COLOR OF LAW

990. Award of general damages suffered, for which money is only a rough substitute, as a

result of the unlawful acts of defendants Lambert, Smitherman, LeClair, Wilson, Eagle,

Alexander-Savino, Brooksedge Daycare, The Goddard School-Hilliard II and Petroff Law Firm,

while acting under the color of law during their agreement with the State and its agents and

while engaging in concerted action with state officials to willfully deprive Plaintiffs of their

386


rights, for conspiring to engage in unlawful acts under state law, including conspiracy to

unlawfully discriminate against Plaintiffs at the daycare facilities, to cause emotional harm, pain

and suffering, to harm by defamation, to interfere with business relationships, and to interfere

with Jurado’s custody of Plaintiff N.G.

X.B.2(e) COMPENSATORY DAMAGES FOR NON-ECONOMIC LOSSES AGAINST ALL

DEFENDANTS FOR MENTAL SUFFERING, ANGUISH, LOSS OF SOCIETY OF THE MINOR

RESULTING FROM THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE CONSPIRACY UNDER 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 AND 1985

991. Award of general compensatory damages suffered as a result of Defendants’

agreement to engage in unlawful acts and dark conspiratorial conduct to deprive Plaintiffs of

their rights in wanton disregard for the prohibitions and protections of the US Constitution and

Federal Statutes, which resulted in the interference with father and son relationship and with

the significant separation of Plaintiffs causing non-tangible substantial harm.

X.B.3. OTHER COMPENSATION FOR RECOVERY OF COSTS AND FEES

X.B.3(a) REASONABLE ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH STATE AND

COMMON LAW

992. Award of costs related to instituting this action and, in the case that Plaintiffs are able

to retain private counsel during the pendency of this action, award of reasonable attorney’s

fees, both under common law and pursuant to ORC 2307.50(B)(3) against defendants Lambert,

Smitherman, LeClair, Wilson, Eagle, Alexander-Savino, Brooksedge Daycare, the Goddard

School-Hilliard II and Petroff Law Firm.

387


X.B.3(b) COSTS RELATED TO INSTITUTING THIS ACTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH

42 U.S.C. § 1920

993. Award compensation for the recovery of Plaintiffs’ costs associated with the litigation

and instituting this action, in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 1920, against all defendants.

X.B.3(c) ATTORNEYS’ FEES IN ACCORDANCE WITH 42 U.S.C. § 1988 FOR ALL 42 U.S.C. § 1983 CLAIMS

994. In case Plaintiffs are able to retain private counsel during the pendency of this action,

award the recovery of attorneys’ fees, and expert fees if applicable, under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for

all 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against all defendants.

X.B.3(d) ATTORNEYS’ FEES IN ACCORDANCE WITH 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) FOR ALL 42 U.S.C. § 2000a ET SEQ. CLAIMS


award the recovery of plaintiffs’ cost and attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) for all

42 U.S.C. § 2000a claims against defendants LeClair, Brooksedge Daycare, Alexander-Savino,

Wilson, Goddard School of Hilliard II, and Eagle.

X.B.3(e) ATTORNEYS’ FEES IN ACCORDANCE WITH 42 U.S.C. § 2000d–7(a)(2) FOR ALL 42 U.S.C. § 2000d ET SEQ. CLAIMS


award the recovery of plaintiffs’ attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d–7(a)(2) for all 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000d et seq. claims against defendants Brooksedge Daycare, Goddard School of Hilliard II,

ODC, the Juvenile Court, OCRC and OOAG.

388


X.C. PUNITIVE DAMAGES

X.C.1. PUNITIVE DAMAGES AGAINST CONSPIRATORS ACTING UNDER THE COLOR OF LAW

X.C.1(a) PUNITIVE DAMAGES AGAINST DEFENDANTS STONE, JAMISON, BETHEL, MCCASH, GARCIA, DUNN, AND GUTOWSKI IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITY

997. Award of punitive damages to Plaintiffs against Defendants Stone, Jamison, Bethel,

McCash, Garcia, Dunn, and Gutowski, in their personal capacity, in an amount to be determined

at trial for the main purpose of deterring future occurrences of the same premeditated

unlawful and criminal conduct by Defendants and others in wanton abuse of their authority

when acting under the color of law and while outside the protection of their immunity. For

example, the result of the vicious misconduct by these defendants caused the separation and

interference with Plaintiffs custody, ultimately inflicting mental suffering, anguish, and loss of

society of the minor.

X.C.1(b) PUNITIVE DAMAGES AGAINST PRIVATE DEFENDANTS LAMBERT, SMITHERMAN, LECLAIR, WILSON, EAGLE, ALEXANDER-SAVINO, BROOKSEDGE DAYCARE, THE

GODDARD SCHOOL-HILLIARD II AND PETROFF LAW OFFICES WHILE ACTING UNDER

THE COLOR OF LAW

998. Award of punitive damages to Plaintiffs against Defendants Lambert, Smitherman,

LeClair, Wilson, Eagle, Alexander-Savino, Brooksedge Daycare, The Goddard School-Hilliard II

and Petroff Law Firm, while acting under the color of law during their agreement with the State

and its agents and while viciously engaging in concerted action with state officials to willfully

deprive Plaintiffs of their rights, for conspiring to engage in malevolent unlawful acts under

state law, including conspiracy to unlawfully discriminate against Plaintiffs at the daycare

facilities, to harm by defamation, to interfere with business relationships, and to interfere with

389


Jurado’s custody of Plaintiff N.G., ultimately causing mental suffering, anguish, and loss of

society of the minor. The amount of the damages is to be determined at trial for the main

purpose of deterring future occurrences of the same premeditated unlawful and criminal

conduct by Defendants and others.

X.C.2. PUNITIVE DAMAGES AGAINST CONSPIRATORS ENGAGING IN PRIVATE CONDUCT

X.C.2(a) PUNITIVE DAMAGES AGAINST PETROFF LAW OFFICES, BROOKSEDGE DAYCARE, GODDARD SCHOOL – HILLIARD II, SMITHERMAN, LAMBERT, LECLAIR, ALEXANDER-SAVINO, WILSON AND EAGLE

999. Award of punitive damages to Plaintiffs against Defendants, in an amount to be

determined at trial for their vicious, dark and malevolent conspiratorial conduct and their

engaging in unlawful acts under state law, including conspiracy to unlawfully discriminate

against Plaintiffs at the daycare facilities, to cause emotional harm, pain and suffering, to harm

by defamation, to interfere with business relationships, and to interfere with Jurado’s custody

of Plaintiff N.G, ultimately causing mental suffering, anguish, and loss of society of the minor.

The punitive damages are to be awarded for the main purpose of deterring future occurrences

of the same unlawful and criminal conduct by Defendants and others when premeditatedly and

maliciously collaborate to interfere with the civil rights of others and to engage in unlawful

discrimination under state and federal law.

390


X.D. OTHER RELIEF

X.D.1. DETERMINE IF THE STATE OF OHIO IS UNABLE TO OFFER PLAINTIFFS AN IMPARTIAL

TRIBUNAL FOR CONDUCTING CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS AND FOR ADJUDICATING

PARENTAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES BETWEEN THE PARENTS; IDENTIFY OR

SET UP AN ADEQUATE FORUM FOR THE SAME PURPOSE

1000. After this court adjudicates the claims in this action, and in the event that this court

determines that the constitutional and federal law violations alleged by Plaintiffs were not

indeed just random unauthorized acts of state officials, then this court may determine if the

State of Ohio is unable to offer an impartial tribunal to Plaintiffs for conducting custody

proceedings and for adjudicating parental rights and responsibilities between Lambert and

Jurado, and without neglecting the best interest of the child. If this court finds that under the

circumstances and after the history of the abuses against Jurado and his son over several years

the State of Ohio is unable to offer an impartial tribunal, this Court may appoint or may help

establish an adequate forum for the same purpose.

X.D.2. APPOINTMENT OF ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF N.G., UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 2000a–3

1001. Because of all Conspirators Defendants named in this action have engaged in acts,

conduct and practices prohibited by 42 U.S.C. § 2000a–2, including the segregation and

discrimination in the facilities operated by Brooksedge and The Goddard School-Hilliard II,

Plaintiffs hereby seek preventive relief authorized under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a–3 as well as the

appointment of attorneys for both Plaintiffs, or at least for Plaintiff N.G., given the economic

circumstances and hardship that Jurado has been enduring and that is fully described herein.

391


X.D.3. AWARD PLAINTIFF JURADO WITH COMPENSATORY PARENTING TIME THAT WAS LOST

BY THE CONCERTED ACTION OF DEFENDANTS FOR THE EXCLUSIVE BENEFIT OF

DEFENDANT LAMBERT AS ONE OF THE GOALS OF THE CONSPIRACY

1002. Award of Make Up parenting time that Jurado lost as a result of the unlawful

agreement of defendants to violate ORC 2919.23 and the provisions of ORC 3109.051 through

lawful and unlawful means, driven by their common intention to harm Jurado for not being

Caucasian. After defendants conspired to act under the color of law to mask their criminal acts

as lawful for more than two years, they successfully achieved the unlawful purpose of

interfering with Jurado’s custody of the child. Therefore, under the inherent authority of this

court and statutory authority under ORC 3109.051(K), compensatory parenting time should be

awarded to Plaintiff Jurado.

X.D.4. ISSUE OTHER RELIEF AS THIS COURT DEEMS APPROPRIATE AND JUST

1003. Any other relief that this court may deem appropriate and that serves the interests of

justice should be issued or awarded for the fair restitution to Plaintiffs, or for other reasons.

1004. An example of “Other Relief” may be request issued by this Court for the amicus

participation by the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, if it determines that such

participation will meet special federal interests or important public interests.

392


XI. CONCLUSION

Respectfully submitted,

Aristides (Ari) Jurado (305) 799-3323 [email protected]

393


Appendix of Exhibits A - Unlawful Discriminatory Practices by ODC & SCO

EXHIBIT AC1-A1 Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Young, SCO (2000) 224EXHIBIT AC1-A2 Title VI Complaint of A. Jurado against ODC (filed with USDOJ)

EXHIBIT AC1-B1 INFANT MORTALITY CRISIS IN OHIO Fact Sheets from Ohio Department of Health and Collaborative Organizations 33

Fact Sheet - Infant Mortality in Ohio (investinchildren) 34Fact Sheet - Infant Mortality - 2013 Summary (ODH) 35

EXHIBIT AC1-B2 2009 Report - NCH & OBBO - Preterm Births Crisis in Franklin County 37

Healthy Beginnings - OBBO 2009 Report Cover Page 38EXHIBIT AC1-B3 "Infant Mortality Rate Near University Circle Exceeds that of Some Third World Countries" 45EXHIBIT AC1-B4 Images Published as part of �the Media Coverage of the �Infant Mortality Crisis in Ohio 50

Appendix of Exhibits C - Racism & Racial Disparities in Infant Mortality Rates: Ohio's Youngest Citizens victims of Racial DiscriminationEXHIBIT AC1-C1 Every Child Counts: Stopping Infant Loss editorial by journalist Sheree Crute, contributor for the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation 52EXHIBIT AC1-C2 Infant Mortality Trends published by Nationwide Children’s Hospital, Columbus Ohio showing growth in rate of infant deaths for Hispanics between 2005 and 2008 55EXHIBIT AC1-C3 Impact of Racism on Infant Mortality by Columbus Public Health Department 57EXHIBIT AC1-C4 ALARMING LOSSES: Columbus Works to Reverse Trends in Infant Deaths 63EXHIBIT AC1-C5 Association between Racism and Health Outcomes by Dr. Phyllis-Jones, CDC 68

394

XII. CONSOLIDATED APPENDIX OF EXHIBITS - INDEX


73EXHIBIT AC1-C6 Health Disparities Research Presentation by Dr. Phyllis-Jones

EXHIBIT AC1-D1 Scholar's View of the Inherent Racially Motivated Bias in the Guardian Ad Litem 84EXHIBIT AC1-D2 Sworn affidavit of Milka Licona, grandmother of theinfant child N.G., with her testimony of the differential treatment she and her husband experienced by Brooksedge and Lambert with Support from GAL Bethel. 91EXHIBIT AC1-D3 E-mails showing collaboration Between Defendants Smitherman, McCash, and Lambert to intentionally discriminate against Jurado's entire Panamanian family 94

Appendix of Exhibits E - Evidence specific to Minor N.G.'s Health Condition(s)

EXHIBIT AC1-E1 Growth Chart: Weight-for-Age manually plotted by Dr. Mastruserio during the retrospective evaluation of N.G. Jurado on March 28, 2013

98EXHIBIT AC1-E2 SMS text messages between Lambert and Jurado 100EXHIBIT AC1-E3 Growth Chart: by WHO 102EXHIBIT AC1-E4 Response from Lambert and Dr. Muresan 105

Appendix of Exhibits F - Defendant Bethel with Dr. Smalldon, with their established pattern and practice of engaging in racket schemes, at the center of the conspiracy against plaintiffsEXHIBIT MA–10 Transcript of court proceeding, Juvenile Court, August 1, 2014

107EXHIBIT AC1–F1 Examples of e-mails sent between May 2013 and February 2014 by defendant Bethel to Jurado, while secretly including Dr. Smalldon in BCC: 145EXHIBIT AC1-F2 Media coverage of the murder trial of Juanita Johnson-Millender, who let her 17-month-old infant son starve to death. 149

Appendix of Exhibits G - Participation in Sec. 1983 conspiracy by new GAL McCash

EXHIBIT AC1-G3 E-mails exchanged between Jurado and McCash in December 2014 152

395


EXHIBIT AC1-G4 Notarized Affidavit of Milka Licona, Grandmother of minor N.G., Regarding the Dec. 5, 2014 events 159EXHIBIT AC1-G5 Itemized Statement from Defendant GAL McCash showing unlawful ex-parte communications 164EXHIBIT AC1-G6 Final Report of Guardian Ad Litem showing collusion with Defendants Wilson and Goddard School-Hilliard II 167

Appendix of Exhibits H - Participation in Sec. 1983 conspiracy by ODC–SCO

EXHIBIT AC1-H2 ODC's Determination Letter issued on March 3, 2014 regarding the grievance against Bethel 170EXHIBIT AC1-H3 E-mail correspondence from the Honorable Gina Palmer, Administrative Magistrate and Legal Director of the Juvenile Court, April 2, 2014 173

175

EXHIBIT AC1-H4 Partial transcript of March 26, 2014 court proceeding showing ODC–SCO defendants complicity to conceal Bethel's unlawful conduct, and Bethel's racial hatred toward Jurado maximizedEXHIBIT AC1-H5 Continuance of the Aug. 27, 2014 hearing for Motion to Remove GAL re-set for KEY DATE of Sep. 24, 2014 shows agreement and coordination between ODC-SCO Defendants, Judge Jamison and other co-conspirators 184

Appendix of Exhibits I - Participation in Sec. 1983 conspiracy by Juv. Ct. & Judge Jamison; transgressionsEXHIBIT AC1-I15 E-mail from Defendant Bethel showing her agreement with

186Judge Jamison allowing Bethel as a paid expert witness

EXHIBIT AC1-J1 E-mails exchanged between OOAG and OCRC 188

Appendix of Exhibits XJ - High Conflict and the Lawsuit as Subsidiary Schemes of the ConspiracyEXHIBIT XJ7-2 Covert E-Mails Sent Between Sep. and Oct. 2013 by Bethel to Co-Conspirators Showing Agreement to Institute a Lawsuit 196EXHIBIT XJ7-3 The Lawsuit subsidiary Scheme - Timing of almost-concurrent filings in Juv. Ct. & General Div. Ct. Shows Agreement 200

Appendix of Exhibits XM - Best Interest & Welfare Neglected

EXHIBIT XM5-28 MAP of Franklin County with Points of Interest in Custody Case 205

396


CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 8th day of April, 2015, a true and accurate copy of the foregoing

was served through the Court’s ECF System and by e-mail to the following:

Scott Sheets Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney 373 S. High Street, 13th Floor Columbus, Ohio 43215 [email protected] Counsel for Defendants Judge Terri Jamison & the Juvenile Court

Thomas McCash 55 South High Street Suite 210 Dublin, Ohio 43017 [email protected] Defendant

Blythe Bethel 495 South High Street Suite 220 Columbus, Ohio 43215 [email protected] Defendant

Ronald R. Petroff (0081267) Managing Partner 140 East Town Street, Ste. 1070 Columbus, Ohio 43215 [email protected] Counsel for [Prospect] Defendant Petroff Law Offices, LLC.

Erika Smitherman, Esq., Petroff Law Offices, LLC. 140 East Town Street, Ste. 1070 Columbus, Ohio 43215 [email protected] [Prospect] Defendant and Counsel for [Prospect] Defendant Kathy Hernandez (Lambert)

Judge Terri Jamison Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Rel., Juvenile Branch 373 S. High Street Columbus, Ohio 43215 [email protected] Defendant

Halli Brownfield Watson Ryan L. Richardson Assistant Attorneys General Constitutional Offices Section 30 East Broad Street, 16th Floor Columbus, Ohio 43215 [email protected] [email protected]

Counsel for Defendants [and prospects] Amy C. Stone, Scott J. Drexel, Office of Disciplinary Counsel & Ohio Supreme Court, Ohio Civil Rights Commission, Richard Garcia, Bradley Dunn, Carolyn Gutowski, and Office of Ohio Attorney General

1


Angela Alexander Savino, Esq. Perez & Morris, LLC., 8000 Ravine's Edge Ct., Suite 300 Columbus, Ohio 43235 [email protected] [Prospect] Defendant and Counsel for [Prospect] Defendants Amy LeClair, A.S. LeClair Company, Inc. D/B/A Brooksedge Day Care

Kimberly L. Eagle, Owner and Eagle School of Hilliard, Inc. d/b/a The Goddard School – Hilliard II (Crosgray) 7936 Morris Rd Hilliard, OH 43026 [email protected] [Prospect] Defendants Gretchen Wilson, Director The Goddard School – Hilliard II 6074 Parkmeadow Lane Hilliard, OH 43026 [email protected] [Prospect] Defendants

ARISTIDES JURADO, Plaintiff Pro Se 3963 Easton Way Columbus, OH 43219 [email protected]

2


mailto:[email protected]




Jurado v. Stone, First Amended Complaint

Documents

Transcript of Jurado v. Stone, First Amended Complaint