Rules for Hide and Seek in Iraq

By Gerry Higgins

Continued on page 6

In This Issue

1 Rules for Hide and Seek inIraq

1 Simulation for Skills Train-ing in Medicine

3 The Value of a CollaborativeLearning Science and Tech-nology Research andDevelopment Roadmap

7 Two New Senior ResearchAssociates Join the StrategicSecurity Program

8 Should We Recommend thatPeople Stay Indoors DuringSmoggy Days?

9 Academy Report AddressesCTBT Issues

11 Correspondence

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Board of DirectorsCHAIRMAN: Frank von HippelPRESIDENT: Henry KellyVICE-CHAIRMAN: Steven FetterSEC’Y-TREASURER: Harold A. Feiveson

MEMBERS:Ruth S. Adams Hazel O’LearyDavid Albright Jane OwenBruce Blair William RevelleHarold A. Feiveson Shankar SastryRichard Garwin Jonathan SilverMarvin L. Goldberger Gregory SimonKenneth N. Luongo Lynn R. SykesMichael Mann Gregory van der Vink

July/August 2002Volume 55, Number 4

Continued on page 2

Simulation for Skills Training in Medicine

Computer-based simulation hasbeen used extensively in the airlineindustry and in the military for effectivetraining of cognitive, perceptual andmotor skills.1 Medical simulators mayinclude both three-dimensional (3D)models of human anatomy displayed ona computer monitor coupled with a“haptics” device that conveys a sense oftouch to the user. Advances in com-puter technology now permit realisticmodeling of human anatomy andphysiology (See Box on p. 5). Computer-based simulations are now regularly usedfor training military medics in emer-gency and trauma skills.2 The AmericanCollege of Surgeons and other accredita-tion organizations are now encouragingthe use of virtual reality simulationtrainers for assessment of technicalproficiency in medicine.

Advantages of MedicalSimulations

A human patient simulator offersmedical and emergency responsepersonnel a hands-on opportunity tolearn how to use new equipment andpractice intricate procedures withoutendangering human life.␣ Other advan-tages include:

· Significant anatomical differencesin animals (and ethical consider-ations) are not encountered

· Problems associated with the costand limited supply of cadavers areavoided

· The ability to train anytime withoutwaiting for a patient to becomeavailable

· The opportunity to practice thesame procedure multiple times

A new round of UN weaponsinspections is about to begin in Iraq andno one seems to know what to expect.Some in the Administration argue thatthe inspections are nothing but an Iraqismoke screen and delaying tactic whileothers, most often among our allies,believe the inspections have somereasonable chance of either uncoveringIraqi weapons of mass destructionprograms, or even showing that Iraqis free of forbidden weapons.

Much of the discussion aboutinspections has focused on the difficultyof finding chemical and biologicalweapons, but nuclear weapons are ourgreatest concern. If we focus on deter-mining whether nuclear weapons arebeing built in Iraq, what rules would weneed for inspections, and what are thechances that inspections could besuccessful? To answer those questions,we need to understand how inspectors

By Ivan Oelrich

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FAS Public Interest Report | July/August 2002

Board Of Sponsors* Sidney Altman Biology

* Philip W. Anderson Physics

* Kenneth J. Arrow Economics

* Julius Axelrod Biochemistry

* David Baltimore Biochemistry

Paul Beeson Medicine

* Baruj Benacerraf Immunology

* Hans A. Bethe Physics

* J. Michael Bishop Biology

* Nicolaas Bloembergen Physics

* Norman Borlaug Agriculture

* Paul Boyer Chemistry

Anne Pitts Carter Economics

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Morris Cohen Engineering

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Mildred Cohn Biochemistry

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Paul B. Cornely Medicine

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Ann Druyan Writer/Producer

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George Field Astrophysics

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Jerome D. Frank Psychology

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John Kenneth Galbraith Economics

* Walter Gilbert Biochemistry

* Donald Glaser Physics-Biology

* Sheldon L. Glashow Physics

Marvin L. Goldberger Physics

* Joseph L. Goldstein Medicine

* Roger C. L. Guillemin Physiology

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Frank von Hippel Physics

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John P. Holdren Public Policy

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About FASThe Federation of American Scientists (FAS),founded October 31, 1945 as the Federation ofAtomic Scientists by Manhattan Project scientists,works to ensure that advances in science are usedto build a secure, rewarding, environmentallysustainable future for all people by conductingresearch and advocacy on science public policyissues. Current weapons nonproliferation issuesrange from nuclear disarmament to biological andchemical weapons control to monitoring conven-tional arms sales; related issues include drug policyand space policy. FAS also promotes learningtechnologies and limits on government secrecy. FASis a tax-exempt, tax-deductible 501(c)3 organization.

* Willis E. Lamb Physics

* Leon Lederman Physics

* Edward Lewis Medicine

* William N. Lipscomb Chemistry

Jessica T. Mathews Public Policy

Roy Menninger Psychiatry

Robert Merton Sociology

Matthew Meselson Biochemistry

Neal E. Miller Psychology

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Philip Morrison Physics

Stephen S. Morse Virology

* Joseph E. Murray Medicine

Franklin A. Neva Medicine

* Marshall Nirenberg Biochemistry

* Douglas D. Osheroff Physics

* Arno A. Penzias Astronomy

* Martin L. Perl Physics

Gerard Piel Publisher

Paul Portney Economics

Mark Ptashne Molecular Biology

George Rathjens Political Science

* Burton Richter Physics

David Riesman, Jr. Sociology

* Richard J. Roberts Biology

Vernon Ruttan Agriculture

Jeffrey Sachs Economics

* J. Robert Schrieffer Physics

Andrew M. Sessler Physics

* Phillip A. Sharp Biology

Stanley K. Sheinbaum Economics

George A. Silver Medicine

* Herbert A. Simon Psychology

* Richard E. Smalley Chemistry

Neil Smelser Sociology

* Robert M. Solow Economics

* Jack Steinberger Physics

* Henry Taube Chemistry

* Charles H. Townes Physics

Myron E. Wegman Medicine

Robert A. Weinberg Biology

* Steven Weinberg Physics

* Torsten N. Wiesel Medicine

Alfred Yankauer Medicine

Herbert F. York Physics

* Nobel Laureate

EDITOR: Henry KellyPresident

ASSISTANT EDITOR: Michelle Lucey-RoperSpecial Projects Coordinator

Editorial Staff

“Simulation” Continued from page 1

Continued on page 4

· Military medical personnel canpractice battlefield trauma careskills that they would havealmost no chance to do duringpeacetime

· The chance to experience treatingunusual diseases and practicerare procedures

· Groups can train together in thesame simulated virtual environ-ment for such events as terror-ism events involving weapons ofmass destruction

· Feedback is allowed by the abilityto replay the entire computer-based simulation at whateverlevel of detail and from whateverpoint of view desired

· Computer-based simulatorsprovide an ongoing assessmentof the performance of thetrainee, including metrics suchas judgment, timing, sequencingof procedural steps, spatialaccuracy, errors, etc.The usefulness of simulators

extent is beyond merely training newskills. Like playing a musical instru-ment or flying a plane, medicalprocedures involve both cognitiveand technical skills that demandfrequent rehearsal for proper execu-

tion. Unfortunately, skills such asCardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR)are easily forgotten (see Figure 1).Treating a patient in crisis with theadded burden imposed by dangeroussettings such as a mass casualty eventmay produce a stressful experience forthe medic. Crisis scenarios sometimeslead to faulty decisions and medicalerrors, and are not the ideal time forthe medic to try to recall underutilizedtraining. Simulators can be utilized bymedical and emergency personnel torefresh their skills without having topractice on real patients.

The Effectiveness of Simulation-based Training

Many studies have foundsimulation to be an extremely effec-tive training instrument. Theseinclude studies in which a meta-analysis of the simulation literaturehas been performed to provide a moresensitive measure of the benefits ofthis type of training, using “fieldeffects analysis” and other statisticalmethods.3

There are several ways in whichsimulation-training efficacy can be

Figure 1: The ‘Curve of Forgetting’. Decline in the number of soldiers able to perform

CPR at an adequate level without refresher training. Adapted from Hagman and Rose

(1983).

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FAS Public Interest Report | July/August 2002

In order to fully realize thepotential of information technologyand dramatically improve how we teachand learn, we must first address manychallenges. A key first step is to developa research plan or roadmap that outlinesa plan for progress – a well-articulatedplan for how we get from here to there.Previous hype and over-promising hasunderstandably resulted in muchskepticism regarding the value oftechnology-enabled education. Adetailed roadmap of the R&D needed toenable next generation learning systemscan help address this by identifying keyresearch questions and technicalrequirements and detailing a chronol-ogy of R&D activities over the next tenyears, along with short- and long-termbenchmarks with metrics for success.The process of developing the roadmapis essential. It will encourage discussionand debate throughout the communityand lead to a scientifically informedmap of research opportunities that canbe used as a guide for agenda-setting,budget planning and project selectionby government and industry.

Current research demonstratesthat a fundamental transformation ineducation and training is now possiblegiven recent advances in learningscience and information technology.Research results and numerous researchpilots have shown the potential ofsimulation-based microworlds, virtuallaboratories, collaboratories, sharedvirtual realities, and intelligent tutoringenvironments to greatly enhancelearning. These efforts provide strongevidence that the time is right for us totake action to enable affordable, routineuse of these types of learning environ-ments and to facilitate development ofeducation and training content. To dothis we need to develop of a wide rangeof interoperable, well-performing andextensible software tools that candecrease the cost of entry for educa-tional materials and systems. Thesetools and educational systems, whenevaluated and disseminated, will makepossible education technology solutions

The Value of a Collaborative Learning Science and TechnologyResearch and Development Roadmap

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By Kay Howell

that can scale in terms of users andeconomics.

Creating effective tools andtesting new learning technologies —and the instructional managementsystems needed to exploit them — willbe extraordinarily difficult. It willrequire significant and sustained R&Dinvestment spanning decades. Thescope of the effort will require a strongpartnership with government, industryand private foundations. Developmentof a technology roadmap is essential toenable such a partnership. Currentinvestments in learning science andtechnology are fragmented and oftendiscontinuous, both within and acrosspublic and private sectors. There aremany players in the learning technolo-gies space, including for-profit compa-nies (software, publishers, educationalcompanies), educational institutionssuch as universities, colleges andschools, government agencies, andnon-profit enterprises. There are nodominant companies or standards, andthe application markets are extremelydiverse and fragmented. The process ofdeveloping a technology roadmap willserve an important function to helpfocus this fragmented community. Theroadmap should serve to improvecommunications and common purposeand provide a guide to researchopportunities of value. The roadmapwill provide an invaluable guide todefine what progress is possible, thesize and scope of investment needed toachieve the desired outcomes, the typesof teams needed to undertake the R&D,the types of research programs requiredand metrics for evaluating progress.

The technology roadmap shouldattempt to answer the question “Whatadvances in technology and learningtheory are needed to ensure continuousprogress towards the long term goal ofincreasing the effectiveness, efficiency,and accessibility of life-long educationand training?” While the roadmapshould be designed to achieve ambi-tious long-term goals, it should be alsocrafted to ensure that the supported

research will continuously yield resultsthat can be converted readily into viableproducts and services. The outcome ofthe research should not be a specific,marketable course or product, per se, butrather pre-competitive concepts andtools that can be adapted to multiplecontexts.

Research topics to be exploredshould include:

• Learning Science and Technolo-gies – how to make the mosteffective use of technology-enabledapproaches to learning by combin-ing the tools of cognitive science,pedagogy, instructional design andinformation technology.

• Learning Tools – how to buildtechnically accurate virtualenvironments that permit explora-tion-based pedagogy; how toenable easy formation of teams andgroups; how to provide responsesto learners’ questions; how toenable easy to assemble coursebuilding tools and support instruc-tional designers in their selectionof learning tools and pedagogicalapproaches.

• Evaluation and Assessment – howto measure the impact of the newapproaches to learning services isessential for ensuring that realbenefits are being achieved (andthat a sound business case can bemade for shifting to a new form oflearning).

Inventing effective tools willrequire bringing an array of manage-ment tools to the innovation process inlearning that, while widely used in otherparts of the economy, are currentlyunknown in education. This includes anability to manage a complex andsystematic research enterprise capable ofdisassembling a large problem intocomponents, and assigning goals to eachcomponent endeavor. The roadmappingactivity should include a discussion ofthe management structures needed tomanage the research and innovationprocess.

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FAS Public Interest Report | July/August 2002

Table 1: Benefits Realized with Military Flight and Maintenance Simulators (Adapted from Orlansky et al, 1994)

Simulator TER Student Time Acquisition Operating Life-Cycle AmortizationSavings Savings Savings Cost

Flight 0.48 50% 30-65% 10% 65% 2 years

Maintenance 0.60 20-50% 20-60% 50% 40% 4 years

“Simulators” Continued from page 2

measured. The measure most com-monly used in aviation and themilitary for determination of simula-tion-based training efficacy is “trans-fer,” that is, how much studentperformance can be transferred fromthe simulator to actual, real worldprocedures. The performance of astudent trained only on a simulatorcan be compared to a control studenttrained with conventional methodsby testing both students on the samecriterion task. These data are evalu-ated using statistical tests designedspecifically to compare simulationperformance with actual performancein the real world. The results deter-mine transference.

For all military simulators thathave been examined for effectivenessand cost savings, training withsimulators has been shown to be aseffective as training on actualequipment. Many studies aimed atevaluating the effectiveness ofsimulation training have comparedthe amount of training time needed toperform a specific task in an airplaneafter training either only in an aircraftor following training in a simulator.This can be expressed as a quantitativevalue as the Transfer EffectivenessRatio (TER). For example, Table 1shows the median of 34 TERscompiled from 22 flight simulationstudies is 0.48, meaning that aboutone half hour is saved in the air forevery prior hour spent learning thesame task in a simulator. Although

this can be expressed as a transfereffectiveness ratio (TER), which hasbeen reported for a number of cases inthe literature,4 more recent studieshave not involved a formaldetermination of TER, but rather acombination of objective andsubjective measures.1,2,3,5

Data is also emerging on thetraining effectiveness of medicalsimulators. For example, an objectiveevaluation of surgical residentsrandomly separated into two groupsshowed that the group that practicedweekly using a laparoscopy simulatorand outperformed (statistically andclinically) the one that did not(laparoscopic surgery is a minimallyinvasive approach to commonsurgical problems in the abdomenaccomplished through small keyholeincisions).6 Also, the group thattrained on the simulator showed astrong positive association betweenthe number of their practice sessionand their performance.

ChallengesMore progress is needed in a

variety of areas before the full trainingbenefits of medical simulations arerealized. Examples include:

· Tissue models that respond inreal-time to trainee inputs

· Improved haptic interfaces thatprovide a realistic sense oftouching and manipulating in avirtual environment

· Graphics and visualizations thatbetter replicate the real workingenvironment of that medicaland emergency personnel

· Improved metrics for assessingskill transfer

· Establishment of open sourcearchitectures that will allowresearchers to read and modifythe source codes of simulationsoftware ensuring continuousimprovements.

Computer-based medicalsimulators will not replace traditionaltraining methods. Hands on experi-ence with real patients with thesupervision of an experienced instruc-tor can not be replaced but advancedmedical simulators can provide anideal environment to try new tech-niques and procedures (and refreshone’s skills) without risk to a patient.

References:1 Swezey and Andrews, Readings inTraining and Simulation: A 30-YearPerspective Contributor. Human Factors& Ergonomics Society (2000).2 Higgins, G.A. and Champion , H.R. TheMilitary Simulation Experience: Chartingthe Vision for Simulation Training inCombat Trauma, US Army MedicalResearch and Materiel Command, FortDetrick, MD DAMD17-99-9028 (2000).3 Carretta, T.R. and R.D. Dunlap.

Continued on page 5

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FAS Public Interest Report | July/August 2002

The Digital Human Project is an OpenSource Software Consortium using informa-tion technology tools to represent the body’sprocesses from DNA molecules and proteinsto cells, tissues, organs, and gross anatomy.

Medical research is providing volumes ofdigital information about the human body.The breadth and quantity of emerging datahas, however, made it difficult for researchers,students, teachers, patients, and clinicians tokeep pace. The specter of an enormous libraryof knowledge with no card catalogue, nosearch engine, and no way to link new vol-umes of data is a very real concern. Fortu-nately, as our library of knowledge is filledwith volumes of data about the human body,new computer tools are available to locateneeded information and to grasp this infor-mation quickly by modeling how the complexsystems of the body function and interact. Bybuilding a complete, functioning library ofinteractive views and simulations of humananatomy, physiology, pathology, histologyand genomics based on the most accuratecomputerized imaging and simulation tech-niques available, we would have the completeDigital Human.

The medical benefits of a digital humanwill be significant. A Digital Human willprovide a test platform to speed the develop-

ment of new drugs and therapies. Physicianswill be able to practice on simulated humans,reducing medical error and reducing the needto practice on patients. As medical knowledgeexpands, the model will keep pace allowingthe specific pathology and disease of anindividual to be displayed and customized forvery individualized therapies. These mayinclude surgery, drug interventions to modifyphysiological function, and tumor and cancerresections, with full knowledge of the exactspread of the problem and the margins of safeand effective therapy. Complex surgicalprocedures could be rehearsed in the virtualenvironment using the patient’s anatomyprior to the actual procedure.

As they are developed, portions of theDigital Human could be adapted for use ineducation from high school biology to thecertification of healthcare personnel andpracticing clinicians. They could be used toevaluate medical devices, drugs, and therapiesbefore they are tested on animal or humansubjects. The system could also be used toimprove the safety of automobiles, aircraft,and other vehicles, and for a variety of othercivilian and military purposes.

For more information: http://www.fas.org/dh/index.html

Transfer of Effectiveness in Flight Simulation: 1986 to 1997.U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory, NTIS ADA362818(1998); and Hagman, J.D. and A. M Rose. Retention ofMilitary Tasks: A Review. Human Factors 25:2 (1983), 199-213.4 Higgins and Champion, 2000.5 Issenberg, S.B., W.C. McGaghie, J.W. Mayer, J.M. Felner,

E.R. Petrusa, R.A. Waugh, D.D. Brown, R.R. Safford, I.H.Gessner, D.L. Gordon and G.A. Ewy, Simulation technologyfor health care professional skills training and assessment.JAMA. 282:9 (1999), pp. 861-6.6 Derossis AM, Bothwell J, Sigman HH, Fried GM, Theeffect of practice on performance in a laparoscopic simulator,Surg. Endosc. 12 (1998), 1117-1120. PIRPIRPIRPIRPIR

Digital Human

“Simulation” Continued from page 4

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FAS Public Interest Report | July/August 2002

“Iraq” Continued from page 1

would go about looking for nuclearweapons development.

The greatest challenge tomaking a nuclear bomb is getting thenuclear material, either plutonium orenriched uranium. The Iraqis havedemonstrated clearly that they arefollowing the uranium route anduranium enrichment will be a primaryfocus of UN inspections. Unlike produc-tion equipment used for chemical andbiological weapons, it has no commer-cial equivalents, so it can provideunambiguous evidence of efforts tobuild a bomb.

The Iraquis have seriouslypursued two enrichment technologies.They first investigated the use of largeelectromagnets. This approach is notvery efficient, but it did provide anadvantage to the Iraquis because theequipment could be produced indig-enously, which is important when tradein nuclear equipment is restricted. Theelectromagnets used for uraniumenrichment are distinctive but viewedfrom the outside a facility would notstand out from other industry. Theprocess does require substantialamounts of electricity, though, sofollowing the power distribution systemcould suggest possible inspection sites.

The Iraqis had problemsdeveloping the ion sources that wouldallow them to quickly produce enricheduranium using electromagnets, so theyturned to centrifuges. Enrichmentcentrifuges spin at tens of thousands ofrevolutions per minute to separate theslightly lighter fissionable uraniumfrom the slightly heavier, more com-mon form of uranium. The aluminumtubes Iraq was trying to import wereallegedly intended for use in these highspeed centrifuges. Unfortunately, gascentrifuges are like electromagnets inonly one regard: While the equipmentis also distinctive, from outside thebuilding housing a centrifuge facilitywould not stand out from other lightindustry.

Since nuclear weapons produc-tion requires distinctive equipment andprocesses, but most can be housedwithin otherwise ordinary-looking

industrial buildings, the trick is inknowing what roofs to look under.Given this, what are the chances thatUN inspectors will be able to findevidence of Iraq’s nuclear program?

If we had to start cold, the chanceswould be poor. But we are not startingcold. Previous inspections have taughtus a great deal about Iraq’s old nuclearprogram. We know their sites, we knowIraq’s preferred approaches, we knowtheir people, and we have it all welldocumented. The Iraqis could haveresumed activity at their old sites orstarted new construction, but eithercourse risks alerting Western intelli-gence. It is highly unlikely that Iraqwould abandon technologies that in1998 they judged to be most promising,so inspectors know they are looking firstfor centrifuge work and second forelectromagnetic separators.

Inspectors can interview thosewho were central to the weaponsprogram. These scientists and engineersshould be able to give coherent ac-counts of their professional activitiesover the last five years. Fabricationwould be difficult. Orchestrating aconsistent account of hundreds of liveswill be nearly impossible.

Previous inspectors also collectedprodigious numbers of documents —several hundred thousand pages worth— creating an audit trail that, althoughnow years old, is vast and will suggestmany likely inspection sites. Add to allthis hints from Western intelligence and

the odds are good that inspectors will beable to uncover some part of an Iraqiweapon’s program. And finding justpart is enough. The politicalenvironment has changed. Unlike the

last round of UN inspections, whichcombined inspection with disarmamentand needed, therefore, to be quitethorough, these inspections need notfind all of Iraq’s nuclear program, justenough to show that Iraq is still workingtoward a nuclear weapon.

Expecting to find somethingassumes, of course, that the inspectorsare allowed to inspect whatever theyneed to. A cascade of one or twohundred centrifuges could produceenough uranium for a bomb in a yearand would need only several thousandsquare feet of floor space. Unfortu-nately, this is small compared to what isavailable just within the presidential“palaces” that Saddam Hussein wants tokeep partly off limits. Other criticalcomponents, for example, the conven-tional explosive “lenses” that drivenuclear explosions, can be designed,built, and tested in much smaller spacesthan these sprawling restricted areas. Inother words, the entire nuclear develop-ment program could, in theory, fitwithin just one of the presidential“palaces,” so keeping them off limits

...the entire nuclear developmentprogram could, in theory, fit within justone of the presidential “palaces,” sokeeping them off limits would fatallyundermine the inspections’ integrity.

Continued on page 7

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FAS Public Interest Report | July/August 2002

Subrata Ghoshroy comes toFAS from the US General AccountingOffice, where he served as SeniorDefense Analyst and provided technicaladvice in the evaluation of weaponssystems such as Airborne Laser,Land Warrior, Joint Tactical Radio,and most recently, in the evaluationof allegations of fraud in the Na-tional Missile Defense testingprogram.

Before moving to the policyworld, Mr. Ghoshroy worked for 20years as an engineer. He holds BSfrom Jadavpur University inCalcutta, India, and an MS degreefrom Northeastern University, bothin electrical engineering. Mr.Ghoshroy also holds an MS in PublicPolicy from the University of Michi-gan. He began his professionalcareer at Princeton Plasma PhysicsLaboratory, followed by two years atBrookhaven National Laboratory. Hespent 12 years at Textron DefenseSystems, where he worked as aprogram manager for high-energylaser programs.

In 1996, Mr. Ghoshroy wasawarded a Congressional Science andEngineering Fellowship to work withthe House International RelationsCommittee. Before moving on to theGeneral Accounting Office, Mr.Ghoshroy spent two years as a Profes-sional Staff Member for the HouseArmed Services Committee, where hewas responsible for Science andTechnology programs and Departmentof Energy nuclear weapons programs.

At FAS, Mr. Ghoshroy’s work willfocus on the weaponization of spaceand non-proliferation in South Asia. Mr.Ghoshroy is also a Senior Associatewith the Science Technology andPublic Policy Program at the John F.Kennedy School of Government atHarvard University.

Ivan Oelrich comes to FASfrom the Institute of DefenseAnalyses (IDA), where he was aResearch Staff Member. Dr. Oelrichreceived his BS from the Universityof Chicago and a PhD from PrincetonUniversity, both in chemistry. Hecontinued with postdoctoral posi-tions at Lawrence Livermore Na-tional Laboratories and in thePhysics Department of the TechnicalUniversity of Munich in Germanywhere he continued his work innuclear physics.

Dr. Oelrich’s introduction tonational security began at the IDA,where he spent a total of 12 years.During his initial tenure, he evalu-ated new technologies for defenseapplications, including new sensorsand advanced propulsion systemsand aircraft, and supported theSTART and INF negotiations. Whenhe returned to IDA 5 years later, Dr.Oelrich focused on environmentalrestoration of lands belonging to theDepartments of Defense and Energy,new technologies for environmentaltesting and cleanup, and providedtechnical support to the land minearms control treaty negotiating team.

Dr. Oelrich has also held anumber of positions outside of IDA.He spent one year as a fellow at theCenter for Science and InternationalAffairs at Harvard University wherehe wrote on conventional armscontrol limits, followed by 4 years asa Senior Analyst at the Office ofTechnology Assessment studying thedefense industrial base. Dr. Oelrichalso spent one year at the DefenseThreat Reduction Agency, where hefocused on emerging nuclear threatsand supported GeneralShalikashvili’s review of the Compre-hensive Test Ban Treaty.

At FAS, Dr. Oelrich will workon issues related to nuclear testingand the testing moratorium as wellas sizing military forces in the post-Cold War world.

would fatally undermine the inspec-tions’ integrity.

Most recently, discussionconcerning Iraq has turned to whethersurprise inspections of the palaces willbe allowed; a crucial dissatisfaction iswhat constitutes “surprise.” Chemicaland biological munitions could bemoved with short notice, even stored ona truck, but uranium enrichmentequipment is bulky, permanently fixed,and thus much harder to move. If theIraqis get less than a couple days ofwarning, inspectors should expect tofind something. This knowledge shouldguide America and the U.N. in settingdemands for the timing of inspections.

Aggressive inspections, then,operating with unfettered access, shouldfind some evidence of a nuclear programif there is one there to find. But thequestion still remains: What should wedo if, after thorough searches, inspectorscome up with nothing? Indeed, there isa small risk that inspectors could comeup empty handed even while Saddam isaggressively developing nuclear weap-ons, or he could be seeking black marketenriched uranium, which would allowconstruction of a bomb with almost nochance of detection.

The real limitation of inspections,however, is not that they might fail tofind an ongoing Iraqi program. It is thateven perfect inspections will not revealSaddam’s long term intentions. Andwhile Saddam Hussein’s intentions maybe the Administration’s primaryconcern, they have tried to galvanizeAmerican support for action against Iraqby contending that Iraq not only wantsnuclear weapons, but that it is actuallydeveloping them. Inspections will neverresolve concerns about Iraq’s futureintent, but, conducted properly, theycan go a long way toward answeringquestions about the state of his nuclearprogram right now.

Two New Senior Reseach Associates Join theStrategic Security Program

“Iraq” Continued from page 6

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Should We Recommend that People Stay Indoors During SmoggyDays?

Public health officials and airquality management districtsfrequently recommend thatpeople stay indoors during airpollution episodes. Given therisks of indoor air pollution, is thisgood advice?

It has been well documentedthat the indoor concentrations ofmany air pollutants are normallymuch higher that outdoor concen-trations (e.g., Ott and Roberts1998, Wallace 2001). These el-evated indoor concentrationsoccur for pollutants emittedindoors, for example, from smok-ing, cooking, building materials,and consumer products, and forpollutants like radon that enterbuildings from the surroundingsoil.

People are advised to remainindoors primarily when outdoorair concentrations of ozone orparticles are several-fold higherthan typical concentrationsoutdoors. The health risks ofelevated outdoor ozone andparticle concentrations have beenwell documented, resulting inNational Ambient Air QualityStandards for these pollutants.Buildings do, in fact, providesignificant sheltering from ozoneand particles from the outdoor air,at least when windows and doorsare closed. The sheltering fromozone occurs because ozone reactswith indoor surfaces, reducingindoor concentrations belowthose outdoors. Ozone concentra-tions are almost always higheroutdoors than indoors, becausemost buildings have no significantozone sources. In homes, theindoor ozone concentrations arenormally less than 50% of out-door concentrations (Weschler2000). Hence, remaining indoors

will nearly always reduce ourexposures to ozone.

The benefits of remainingindoors to reduce particle expo-sures are less clear-cut, becausemany buildings have significantindoor sources of particles. Inresidences, indoor particle concen-trations are, on average, approxi-mately equal to outdoorconcentrations (e.g., Clayton et al.1993). However, if one just consid-ers the particles from outdoor air,the building provides shelteringbecause particles are removedindoors by deposition on surfacesand, in many buildings, also byparticle filtration. Thus, concen-trations of particles originatingoutdoors will be lower indoorsthan outdoors. The degree ofsheltering varies considerably withparticle size and building charac-teristics and can be intentionallyincreased, for example by usingefficient filters in a sealed build-ing. Despite the existence ofindoor sources of particles, re-maining indoors during episodesof high outdoor particle episodesmay still reduce total particleexposures. If indoor and outdoorparticle concentrations are nor-mally comparable, during periodsof highly elevated outdoor particleconcentrations, total indoorparticle concentrations willusually be lower than concentra-tions outdoors. Also, the adversehealth effects of outdoor-airparticles are, at present, moreclearly documented than thehealth effects of indoor-generatedparticles.

So, should we recommendthat people stay indoors duringoutdoor air pollution episodes?Staying indoors will increase ourexposures to the indoor-generated

pollutants, such as formaldehydeand many other volatile organiccompounds, allergens from pets,and tobacco smoke. We trade offone risk for another, and theserisks are not quantified withsufficient precision for a definitiveanswer. However, in my opinion,it is probably good advice ingeneral to recommend that peoplestay indoors during episodes ofunusually high outdoor air pollu-tion, unless the building hasparticularly strong indoor pollut-ant sources such as tobacco smok-ing.

References:

Clayton CA, Perritt RL, Pellizzari ED,Thomas KW, Whitmore RW, WallaceLA, Ozkaynak H, Spengler JD. Particletotal exposure assessment methodol-ogy (PTEAM) study: distributions ofaerosol and elemental concentrationsin personal, indoor, and outdoor airsamples in a southern Californiacommunity. Journal of ExposureAnalysis and Environmental Epidemiol-ogy 3:2 (1993), pp. 227-250.

Ott W and Roberts J. Everdayexpoure to toxic pollutants. ScientificAmerican 278:2 (1998), pp. 72-77.

Wallace LA. Assessing humanexposure to volatile organic com-pounds. Chapter 33 in Indoor AirQuality Handbook, Spengler JD,McCarthy JF, and Samet J (eds),McGraw Hill (2001).

Weschler CJ (2000) Ozone inindoor environments: concentrationsand chemistry. Indoor Air 10:4(2000), pp. 269 – 288.

By William Fisk

PIRPIRPIRPIRPIR

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Academy Report Addresses CTBT Issues: Where Do We Go From Here?By Lynn R. Sykes

In July the National Academy ofSciences issued its long-awaited report”Technical Issues Related to theComprehensive Nuclear Test BanTreaty.” This thorough, intelligentand easy to read study addresses threemain topics: the safety and reliabilityof US nuclear weapons under a testban, monitoring and verification, andthe potential impact of possibleforeign testing on US security interestsand concerns. This study, like theAcademy’s 2001 report on climatechange, is one of its most importantdocuments in several years; it deservesto be read and distributed widely. Thereport provides a strong rationale forthe Senate to hold thorough hearingson the test ban treaty, which werelargely lacking prior to its defeat of theCTBT in October 1999.

General John Shalikashvili (USArmy, ret.), a former Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff and then theSpecial Advisor to the President andthe Secretary of State for the CTBT,requested the Academy study in April2000. Committee members includedformer directors of the Los Alamos,Sandia, and Oak Ridge nationallaboratories; other experts on nuclear-weapon design, testing, andmaintenance; a leading expert onseismic verification of nuclearexplosions; and a former commanderin chief of US forces in the Pacific.Harvard professor John P. Holdren,who deserves much credit for seeingthe report finalized and published,chaired the committee. Studies of thistype require extensive security reviewsby several federal agencies before theyare released.

Verifying the CTBTThe study finds that verification

of the Treaty would be accomplishedthrough a combination of theInternational Monitoring System

(IMS) established under the treaty,openly available geophysical datacollected for other purposes, andinformation gathered by US militaryand intelligence agencies. To myknowledge the report represents thefirst summary of global and regionalcapabilities for the four types ofmonitoring systems employed by theIMS for all environments-theatmosphere, the oceans,underground, and outer space.Monitoring capability is described inthe report in two ways. First for testsconducted as in the past withoutevasion, the conclusion is that“nuclear explosions with a yield of 1kiloton (kt) or more can be detectedand identified with high confidencein all environments.” A kiloton isequivalent to 1,000 tons of chemicalhigh explosive. The weapons thatopened the nuclear age in 1945 hadyields of 13 to 25 kt; today’s strategicthermonuclear weapons are typically100 kt or more.

The report finds that verificationcapabilities are significantly betterthan has commonly been believedand extend down to a yield of 0.1 kt(100 tons) for undergroundexplosions in hard rock if they areconducted anywhere in Asia, Europe,North Africa, and North America.Second, accepting the possibility ofserious evasive efforts, the reportpoints out the many layers ofdifficulty in the two evasion scenariosthat need to be taken seriously, andconcludes “an underground nuclearexplosion cannot be confidentlyhidden if its yield is larger than 1 or 2kt.” Only highly experienced nuclear-weapon states such as the US, Russia,and China would be likely to succeedat concealment at smaller yields. Suchconstrained testing, however, wouldnot add significantly to the nuclearcapabilities those states already possess.

Maintaining Reliable Weaponsin U.S. Stockpile

The report concludes that the UShas the technical capabilities tomaintain confidence in the safety andreliability of the weapons in itsexisting nuclear stockpile withoutperiodic nuclear explosive tests,provided that adequate resources arefocused on the essential ingredients ofa strategy for achieving this. Thoseingredients include maintaining arigorous stockpile surveillanceprogram, maintaining the capacity toremanufacture aging nuclear weaponsto the original specifications,conducting rigorous reviews of anyproposed changes to thosespecifications, and attracting andretaining a high-quality work force inthe nuclear-weapons complex.

The report recommends periodicindependent reviews of “theacceptability of age-related changesrelative to original specifications andthe cumulative effect of individuallysmall modifications” in stockpiledweapons. The study concludes “Evenin the absence of constraints onnuclear testing, no need was everidentified for a program that wouldperiodically subject stockpile weaponsto nuclear tests. . . nuclear testingnever provided—and was neverintended to provide—a statistical basisfor confidence in the performance ofstockpiled weapons. . . Thus, nucleartesting in itself is intrinsically ill-suited to monitor the health of thestockpile.” It goes on to find“Stockpile stewardship by meansother than nuclear testing, then is nota new requirement imposed by theCTBT.” Finally, the committee statesthat the high costs of major newinitiatives at the weapons labs, such asthe National Ignition Facility, “shouldnot be allowed to crowd outexpenditures on the core stewardship

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The reportconcludes thatverificationcapabilities aresignificantly betterthan hascommonly beenbelieved...

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functions, including the capacity forweapons remanufacture. . .”

Potential Impact of ForeignTesting with and without aCTBT

I found that the chapter on“Potential Impact of Foreign Testing:U.S. Security Interests and Concerns”to be the most informative and newpart of the Report. It describes whatadditions to nuclear capabilities othercountries could achieve throughtesting at yields that might escapedetection, what they couldaccomplish if they adhered to theCTBT, and what they could do in theabsence of the Treaty. My review heredoes not do justice to the muchinformative and wise conclusions ofthis chapter. The committee admitsthat the chapter gives some attentionto items that are not wholly technicalin nature including related militaryand political questions of the impactof foreign testing on the securityinterests and freedom of action of theUnited States. While not strictly intheir charge, they conclude that thesemust be mentioned by way of contextfor the narrower questions they

address.Table 3-1 of the Report lists what

can be accomplished by testing in sixdifferent yield regimes for countries of1) little prior test experience and/ordesign sophistication and 2) thosewith greater experience in both areas.They summarize the possibilities forRussia and China, for India andPakistan (states with very limited testexperience), and for countries withoutnuclear test experience (North Korea,Iran and Iraq). What Russia andChina might achieve from clandestinetesting would not add significantly tothe nuclear threats they already poseto the US. The Report states thatconsiderable weapon-designexperience is required to achieve lowyields. Hence, other states are muchless likely to succeed in concealingsignificant tests.

Where Does the United States Gofrom Here?

The Executive Summary of theReport ends with a powerfulconclusion “The worst-case scenariounder a no-CTBT regime poses farbigger threats to U.S. security—sophisticated nuclear weapons in thehands of many more adversaries—than the worse-case scenario ofclandestine testing in a CTBT regime,within the constraints posed by themonitoring system.” A potentialindirect effect of a no-CTBT regime is a“breakdown of the Non-ProliferationTreaty, manifested in morewidespread testing (by such countriesas North Korea, Iraq, and Iran, forexample), which could lead in turn tonuclear weapons acquisition by Japan,South Korea, and many others.”

A report submitted by Gen.Shalikashvili to the President onJanuary 4, 2001 in his role as specialadvisor for the CTBT is well worthreading along with the Academy’sdocument. He states, “My discussionsover the last ten months have only

strengthened my view that the Treatyis a very important part of global non-proliferation efforts and is compatiblewith keeping a safe, reliable U.S.nuclear deterrent. I believe that anobjective and thorough netassessment shows convincingly thatU.S. interests, as well as those offriends and allies, will be served by theTreaty’s entry into force.” He urgesthat the Test Ban Treaty be re-evaluated ”as part of a bipartisaneffort to forge an integrated non-proliferation strategy for the newcentury.” He recommends severalmeasures to provide for increasedverifiability and stockpile reliability.He advocates a joint ten-yearExecutive-Legislative review of thefull range of issues bearing on theTreaty’s net value for national securityin response to concerns about theTreaty’s indefinite duration.

Clearly, Gen. Shalikashvili’srecommendations and the findings ofAcademy argue for thorough Senatehearings on the Treaty. PresidentBush has said that he does not intendto end the nuclear testingmoratorium that the United Stateshas observed since 1992, but also thathe opposes the treaty and does notintend to seek its ratification. Thesetwo reports represent an opportunityto rethink that position. TheWashington Post featured theAcademy study in its editorial for theAugust 6 anniversary of theHiroshima bombing stating, ”Nowthe substantive arguments [againstthe CTBT] have been addressed by acommittee of unquestioned expertsand have been found meritless. Thistreaty, once near-dead, ought to berevived.” Nevertheless, few othermedia covered the Academy Report.FAS and other NGOs need to take thelead in making it and Gen.Shalikashvili’s report better known.

The State Department issued

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As physicists with decades ofexperience in handling radioactivematerials, we question several aspectsof the article “Dirty Bombs: Responseto a Threat,” in the March/April 2002PIR.

First, missing are the sourceterms — isotope quantities, pulveriza-tion, dispersal parameters — andradiation consequences. And, despitethe statement that the analysis couldbe found on the (otherwise outstand-ing) FAS Web site, it was not posted.Subsequently, the PIR printed someminimal information, which actually

reinforced our original concerns,confirming that the assumptions (e.g.“complete dispersal”) were based on aworst-case analysis, not unlike thatwhich skewed Cold-War arms build-ups and still continues with exaggera-tion of the hazards from radiation.

Second, ignored are the carefullyconsidered findings of the HeathPhysics Society and the congression-ally mandated National Council onRadiation Protection and Measure-ments. The latter’s web site(www.ncrp.com) advises that there isa “need . . . to be attentive to the

psychosocial effects of terrorisminvolving the dispersal of radioactivematerial. The . . . release of a tentative‘worst case’ assessment may undulyalarm the public.” In other words,don’t resort to hyperbole. Inducingfear in a population plays into thehands of terrorists.

Third, the article fails to assessrealistically the likelihood thatterrorists could disperse radioactivematerial with the efficiency assumed.

Fourth, the FAS missed anopportunity to spotlight a dubious

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press guidance for August 6(Hiroshima Day)—what to say inresponse to the question “What doesthe State Department think of thestudy released by the NAS on CTBT?Answer: The committee that draftedthe study makes clear that it was notasked to make policy recommendationsand did not do so. This administrationreviewed issues related to nucleartesting, including those considered bythe National Academy, and concludedthat as a policy matter it did notconsider the CTBT to be in the interestof the United States. We have no plansto ask the Senate to reconsider theTreaty.” Clearly, those responsible forthis statement did not read even thelast sentence of the Academy’sExecutive Summary, which goes wellbeyond mere technical details.

The present U.S. moratorium, ofcourse, could be overturned at amoment’s notice. In the last 6months some DoD officials and right-wing Congressional Republicans havepushed for a renewal of U.S. nucleartesting, stating concerns in all threeareas covered by the Academy Report:decreased stockpile reliability asweapons age without testing; reputed

intelligence findings that Russia andChina are testing at low yields, andthe need for new more useable nuclearweapons to deal with post-Cold Warthreats.

One oft-stated perceived need isfor the development and testing of adeep-penetrating nuclear warhead toattack deep underground facilitiessuch as bunkers. The use of such aweapon, however, would result inmajor radioactive leakage to theatmosphere (and hence to thesurrounding territory) and to the lossof many lives if detonated in or near apopulated area (see Robert W. Nelson,PIR, vol. 54, #1, 2001). While theAcademy study finds that thestockpile of existing weapons can bereliably assured without testing, itnotes that new advanced nuclearweapons of any country cannot becounted on to work without testing.China and countries with little or notest experience have more to gain vis-à-vis the U.S. or Russia if nucleartesting restarts. The recent reports ofRussian and Chinese testing in themedia are non-specific as to evenapproximate dates. The claims ofRussian nuclear testing on two dates

in September 1999, however, werechallenged on the grounds that noseismic waves were detected from theRussian test site at any times on thosedates. The data for more recent claimsneed to be examined by independentscientists who hold appropriatesecurity clearances.

The road to U.S. ratification ofthe CTBT will not be an easy one sincethe divide among Senate Republicansover the Treaty is representative of adeep philosophical clash betweeninternationalist and unilateralistapproaches to foreign policy. Theinternationalists in the Party need tobe assured that the Treaty and anintegrated non-proliferation strategyas advocated by Gen. Shalikashvili arein the national interest.

About the author:

Lynn R. Sykes is the Higgins Professor ofEarth and Environmental Sciences at theLamont-Doherty Earth Observatory ofColumbia University, Palisades NY. He haspublished extensively on verification ofnuclear testing for more than 30 years. Hewas a member of the U.S. negotiating teamfor the Threshold Test Ban Treaty in 1974.

CorrespondenceDirty Bombs: An Exaggerated Threat

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FAS Public Interest Report | July/August 2002

supposition: It is misleading tounquestionably apply the “linear no-threshold” (LNT) model of radiationdamage, when it is an unsubstantiatedassumption that has been widely andcompetently challenged.

Fifth — LNT controversy aside —a more serious transgression is tounduly mislead and alarm the publicby invoking a hypothetical, fraction-of-a-percent increase in cancerprobability without putting it incontext.

The report would have benefitedfrom external review commensuratewith its technical parameters andsignificance to public policy. Al-though we disagree with the report’sanalysis and “Conclusions” regardingdirty bombs, we do concur with theFAS “Recommendations” on dealingwith credible radiation threats.

— A. DeVolpi and G. S. Stanford(long-time dedicated FAS membersand former members of the FASCouncil)

FAS responds:

Contrary to the writers’ claim,our results were not “worst case”—for

example, changes in depositionvelocity and atmospheric stabilityclass can increase the “contaminatedareas”.

We did not assess the difficultyof dispersing the materials out ofconcern over releasing too muchinformation. Statements in the pressthat a dirty bomb can be made simplyby wrapping radioactive materialswith dynamite are incorrect, butneither are assumptions that it isprohibitively difficult to release thematerials.

The purpose of our analysis wasnot to calculate fatalities, but toestimate what areas would fall withindecontamination guidelines; theguidelines are based on the linear, no-

In our continuing effort to provide FAS members with lively and timelyarticles in national security policy and other areas of science and technologypolicy, we are inviting members to submit proposals for articles in areas ofinterest to FAS members (maximum 1000 words). Selection of the articles isat the discretion of the Editor. Completed articles will be peer reviewed.

Proposals should be sent to the Editor, PIR, Federation of AmericanScientists, 1717 K St. NW, Suite 209, Washington, DC 20036, or to fas@fas.org.Please provide us with your full address including email in all correspon-dence.

ATTENTION FAS MEMBERS:

threshold model of radiation damage.In addition, we did place the numbersin context—that is why our mapswere labeled with percentage-cancerincreases rather than simply “EPAcontaminated area.” We also notedthat we felt the guidelines were toostrict.

The writers assume incorrectlythat the work did not undergo exter-nal review. In fact, our assumptionswere reviewed by individuals inacademia and government, includingat least one FAS board member, beforepublication. After publication theywere favorably reviewed by severalother experts experienced in radiationand weapons effects.— Michael Levi PIRPIRPIRPIRPIR

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