A.M. No. MTJ-11-1778               June 5, 2013(Formerly OCA IPI No. 08-1966-MTJ)

MARICOR L. GARADO, Complainant, vs.JUDGE LIZABETH GUTIERREZ-TORRES, Respondent.

Facts: Complainant alleges that she is the plaintiff in the aforesaid civil case for sum of money and damages. She complaints that the case is covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and only involves a claim for the payment of a loan amounting to P50,000 plus interest and a claim for damages amounting to P30,000, but the case has remained unresolved for more than 20 months from the time it was filed.

Timeline of Events:1. Complaint filed against Rose Virgie Estor (private respondent) August 22, 20052. Judge Torres denied motion to dismiss by Estor July 3, 20063. Estor filed an Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Extension of Time followed by a second motion to dismiss

November 16, 2006

4. Garado filed a motion to render judgment with an opposition to the second motion to dismiss

November 27, 2006

5. The two motions were submitted for resolution November 27, 2006 and January 15, 20076. Both motions remained unresolved as of the date of the filing of the administrative complaint

May 9, 2007

7. Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) submitted the 1st Indorsement which directed Judge Torres to file her Comment on the complaint within ten days

May 17, 2007

8. Judge Torres received the 1st Tracer against her July 24, 20079. Judge Torres failed to comply with the directive, so OCA again required for her to submit her Comment within 5 days from notice. 10. Respondent judge also received the 1st Indorsement on Tracer but still failed to comply

August 3, 2007

11. SC directed Judge Torres to show cause why she should not be held administratively liable because of her refusal to submit her Comment, and to file her Comment within 5 days, otherwise, an administrative case will be filed against her.

March 10, 2008

12. Respondent judge received a copy of the Resolution April 16, 200813. Because of failure to comply with the Resolution, the Court issued another Resolution imposing a fine of P1,000

July 14, 2008

Despite receipt of the Resolution, however, Judge Torres neither complied with the Resolution nor paid the fine.

In recommending the penalty of dismissal, the OCA noted that in five previous administrative cases,10 respondent was found liable for undue delay in rendering a decision, resolution or order, and sternly warned that the commission of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. The OCA also noted eight other pending administrative cases11 filed by different litigants against respondent judge involving offenses of similar nature. As well, the OCA noted the four instances under the present administrative case where respondent judge failed to comply with directives/orders issued by this Court.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Torres should be held administratively liable

Ruling: We agree with the OCA that respondent judge should be held administratively liable.

Respondent’s failure to submit her Comment and compliance as required by the OCA and this Court is tantamount to insubordination, inefficiency, and neglect of duty

Judges are oft-reminded of their duty to act promptly upon cases and matters pending before their courts. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct directs judges to "dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods." Canons 6 and 7 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics further exhort judges to be prompt and punctual in the disposition and resolution of cases and matters pending before their courts:

6. PROMPTNESS

He should be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him, remembering that justice delayed is often justice denied.

7. PUNCTUALITY

He should be punctual in the performance of his judicial duties, recognizing that the time of litigants, witnesses, and attorneys is of value and that if the judge is unpunctual in his habits, he sets a bad example to the bar and tends to create dissatisfaction with the administration of justice.

Accordingly, judges should be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of their obligation to administer justice promptly. In this case, respondent judge failed to live up to the exacting standards of duty and responsibility that her position required. Upon the failure of the defendant Estor to file her Answer in Civil Case No. 20129, respondent was then required under Section 6 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure to render judgment in Civil Case No. 20129 within 30 days. She failed to do so contrary to the rationale behind the said Rule, which was precisely adopted to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy disposition of cases.

Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, classifies undue delay in rendering a decision and violation of Supreme Court directives as less serious charges which are punishable with the penalty of suspension from office without salary and other benefits for one month to three months, or a fine of P10,000 to P20,000. Given that respondent had been previously dismissed from the service in Lugares v. Gutierrez-Torres, however, the penalty of suspension is already inapplicable.

WHEREFORE, respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres is found LIABLE of the less serious charges of undue delay in resolving Civil Case No. No. 20129 and violation or Supreme Court directives. She is FINED the amount or P20,000 for the first offense and another P10,000 for the second offense, both amounts to be deducted from her accrued leave credits. To effect the penalties imposed, the Employee's Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services-OCA, is DIRECTED to ascertain respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres's total earned leave credits. Thereafter, the Finance Division, Fiscal Management Office-OCA, is DIRECTED to compute the monetary value or respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres's total accrued leave credits and deduct therefrom the amount of the fines imposed, without prejudice to whatever penalty the Court may impose on other remaining and/or pending administrative cases against her, if any.

A.M. No. RTJ-10-2217               April 8, 2013

SONIA C. DECENA and REY C. DECENA, Petitioners, vs.JUDGE NILO A. MALANYAON, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 32, IN PILI, CAMARINES SUR, Respondent.

Doctrine: A judge may not involve himself in any activity that is an aspect of the private practice of law. His acceptance of an appointment to the Bench inhibits him from engaging in the private practice of law, regardless of the beneficiary of the activity being a member of his immediate family. He is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge otherwise.

Facts: Complainants averred that complainant Rey C. Decena had brought an administrative case in Regional Office No. V of the Civil Service Commission in Legaspi City, Albay against Judge Malanyaon’s wife, Dr. Amelita C. Malanyaon (Dr. Amelita), then the Assistant Provincial Health Officer of the Province of Camarines Sur; that during the hearing of the administrative case on May 4, 2006, Judge Malanyaon sat beside his daughter, Atty. Ma. Kristina C. Malanyaon, the counsel of Dr. Amelita in the case.

During the trial, Judge Malanyaon coached her daughter in making motions by scribbling on a piece of paper and giving it to his daughter. Judge Malanyaon also proudly introduced himself and manifested that he was the "counsel of the respondent’s counsel." When his propriety was questioned since he was a member of the judiciary, he demanded that he be shown that prohibited him from sitting at the lawyer’s bench. He insisted that he was merely "assisting" her daughter, who "just passed the bar", defend the respondent, and was likewise helping the latter defend herself.

The complainants averred that the actuations of Judge Malanyaon during the hearing of his wife’s administrative case in the Civil Service Commission constituted violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippines Judiciary.

Issue: Whether the actuations of Judge Malanyaon complained of constituted conduct unbecoming of a judge, and if so, what would be the proper sanction

Ruling: The following actuations of Judge Malanyaon constituted conduct unbecoming of a judge.

First was Judge Malanyaon’s occupying a seat beside his daughter that was reserved for the lawyers during the hearing

Being an incumbent RTC Judge, he always represented the Judiciary, and should have acted with greater circumspection and self-restraint, simply because the administrative hearing was unavoidably one in which he could not but be partisan. Simple prudence should have counselled him to avoid any form of suspicion of his motives, or to suppress any impression of impropriety on his part as an RTC judge by not going to the hearing himself.

Second was Judge Malanyaon’s admission that his presence in that hearing was to advise his daughter on what to do and say during the hearing, to the point of coaching his daughter.

Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibits sitting judges like Judge Malanyaon from engaging in the private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. Section 11, Canon 4 (Propriety), of the New Code of Judicial Conduct and Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct reiterate the prohibition from engaging in the private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. The prohibition is based on sound reasons of public policy, considering that the rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney are inherently incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a sitting judge.

Thus, an attorney who accepts an appointment to the Bench must accept that his right to practice law as a member of the Philippine Bar is thereby suspended, and it shall continue to be so suspended for the entire period of his incumbency as a judge. The term practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court or to participation in court proceedings, but extends to the preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a litigation, the giving of legal advice to clients or persons needing the same, the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured, and the preparation of papers incident to actions and special proceedings.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds and pronounces JUDGE NILO A. MALANYAON, Presiding Judge of Branch 32 of the Regional Trial Court in Pili, Camarines Sur, administratively liable for conduct unbecoming of a Judge, and penalizes him with a fine of P40,000.00.

A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 11-2438 MTJ)              February 27, 2013

ANONYMOUS, Complainant, vs.JUDGE RIO C. ACHAS, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Ozamiz City, Misamis Occidental,Respondent.

Facts: An anonymous letter was sent to the court which calls on the Court to look into the morality of respondent Judge Achas and alleges that: (1) it is of public knowledge in the city that Judge Achas is living scandalously with a woman who is not his wife; (2) he lives beyond his means; (3) he is involved with illegal activities through his connection with bad elements, the kuratongs; ( 4) he comes to court very untidy and dirty; (5) he decides his cases unfairly in exchange for material and monetary consideration; and (6) he is involved with cockfighting/gambling.

The matter went to OCA, where none of the alleged complaints were upheld due to lack of substantiation except with regards to the first matter. It was discovered that Judge Achas found for himself a suitable young lass whom he occasionally goes out with in public and such a fact is not a secret around town. However, Judge Achas denied any of the allegations against him. So, the case was docketed as a regular

Administrative case. An investigation was conducted by Judge Dungog. Two witnesses were presented by Judge Achas, but the anonymous complainant never appeared.

Judge Achas again denied all the charges but admitted that he was married and only separated de facto from his legal wife for 26 years, and that he reared game cocks for leisure and extra income, having inherited such from his forefathers. Judge Dungog found that "it is not commendable, proper or moral per Canons of Judicial Ethics to be perceived as going out with a woman not his wife," and for him to be involved in rearing game cocks.

In its Memorandum, dated December 17, 2012, the OCA recommended that Judge Achas be reprimanded as to the charge of immorality. It was further recommended that he be ordered to refrain from going to cockpits or avoid such places altogether, with a warning that the same or similar complaint in the future shall be dealt with more severely. The other charges were recommended to be dismissed for lack of merit.

Issue: Whether or not a judge may be complained of anonymously

Ruling: Yes.

Under Section 1 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, anonymous complaints may be filed against judges, but they must be supported by public records of indubitable integrity. Courts have acted in such instances needing no corroboration by evidence to be offered by the complainant. Thus, for anonymous complaints, the burden of proof in administrative proceedings which usually rests with the complainant, must be buttressed by indubitable public records and by what is sufficiently proven during the investigation. If the burden of proof is not overcome, the respondent is under no obligation to prove his defense.

In the present case, no evidence was attached to the letter-complaint. The complainant never appeared, and no public records were brought forth during the investigation. However, the court ruled on only the first and the fifth allegations.

The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary pertinently provides:

CANON 2INTEGRITY

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.

CANON 4PROPRIETY

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

Notwithstanding Judge Acha’s admission that he had been legally separated with his wife, the fact remains that he is still legally married. The Court, therefore, agrees with Judge Dungog in finding that it is not commendable, proper or moral for a judge to be perceived as going out with a woman not his wife. Such is a blemish to his integrity and propriety, as well as to that of the Judiciary. For going out in public with a woman not his wife, Judge Achas has clearly failed to abide by the above-cited Canons of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for Philippine Judiciary.

No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its occupant than does the judicial office. Judges in particular must be individuals of competence, honesty and probity, charged as they are with safeguarding the integrity of the court and its proceedings. He should behave at all times so as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, and avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities. His personal behaviour outside the court, and not only while

in the performance of his official duties, must be beyond reproach, for he is perceived to be the personification of law and justice. Thus, any demeaning act of a judge degrades the institution he represents.

Under Section 10 in relation to Section 11 C (1) of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, "unbecoming conduct" is classified as a light charge, punishable by any of the following sanctions: (1) a fine of not less than Pl,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; and/or (2) censure; (3) reprimand; ( 4) admonition with warning. The Court, thus, finds that the penalty of a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 and reprimand are proper under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, for violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, respondent Judge Rio Concepcion Achas is REPRlMANDED and FINED in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00), ADMONISHED not to socially mingle with cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors, and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC               February 8, 2011

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES OF PLAGIARISM, ETC., AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO.

Doctrine: The Court will not, consistent with established practice in the Philippines and elsewhere, dare permit the filing of actions to annul the decisions promulgated by its judges or expose them to charges of plagiarism for honest work done.

Facts: Justice Del Castillo was accused of lifting passages from works of foreign authors in penning a decision (Vinuya case) for the Court without citing the same, thus, committing plagiarism.

Issue: Whether or not judges, justices, as well as lawyers and counsels, are liable for plagiarism if there are no citations in their pleadings and decisions

Ruling: No. Mainly, petitioners claim that the Court has by its decision legalized or approved of the commission of plagiarism in the Philippines. This claim is absurd. The Court, like everyone else, condemns plagiarism as the world in general understands and uses the term.

Although not defined in statutes, plagiarism has been defined as to steal and pass off as one’s own the ideas or words of another. Stealing implies malicious taking. Thus, plagiarism does not embrace errors in attribution by mere accident or in good faith.

While the academic publishing model is based on the originality of the writer’s thesis, the judicial system is based on the doctrine of stare decisis, which encourages courts to cite historical legal data, precedents, and related studies in their decisions. The judge is not expected to produce original scholarship in every respect. The interest of society in written decisions is not that they are originally crafted but that they are fair and correct in the context of the particular disputes involved. Justice, not originality, form, and style, is the object of every decision of a court of law.

There is a basic reason for individual judges of whatever level of courts, including the Supreme Court, not to use original or unique language when reinstating the laws involved in the cases they decide. Their duty is to apply the laws as these are written. Once the Court has "laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same; regardless of whether the parties or property are the same."

The tendency to copy in law is readily explicable. In law accuracy of words is everything. Legal disputes often centre round the way in which obligations have been expressed in legal documents and how the facts of the real world fit the meaning of the words in which the obligation is contained.

A judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether trial or appellate, is exempted from a charge of plagiarism even if ideas, words or phrases from a law review article, novel thoughts published in a legal periodical or language from a party’s brief are used without giving attribution. Thus judges are free to use whatever sources they deem appropriate to resolve the matter before them, without fear of reprisal. This exemption applies to judicial writings intended to decide

cases for two reasons: the judge is not writing a literary work and, more importantly, the purpose of the writing is to resolve a dispute. As a result, judges adjudicating cases are not subject to a claim of legal plagiarism.

In Vinuya, Justice Del Castillo examined and summarized the facts as seen by the opposing sides in a way that no one has ever done. He identified and formulated the core of the issues that the parties raised. And when he had done this, he discussed the state of the law relevant to their resolution. It was here that he drew materials from various sources, including the three foreign authors cited in the charges against him. He compared the divergent views these present as they developed in history. He then explained why the Court must reject some views in light of the peculiar facts of the case and applied those that suit such facts. Finally, he drew from his discussions of the facts and the law the right solution to the dispute in the case. On the whole, his work was original. He had but done an honest work.

The converse point is that originality in the law is viewed with skepticism. It is only the arrogant fool or the truly gifted who will depart entirely from the established template and reformulate an existing idea in the belief that in doing so they will improve it. While over time incremental changes occur, the wholesale abandonment of established expression is generally considered foolhardy. ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES petitioners’ motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC               March 8, 2011

RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT"

Facts: The case stemmed from the Vinuya decision which was penned by Justice Del Castillo who allegedly copied from three international publications without proper citation. The UP Law faculty wrote several letters containing their dismay in the decision, how it breached the integrity and credibility of the SC, and how the acts of Justice Del Castillo were so reprehensible that he should resign. Letters were also given to the SC by the authors whose works were allegedly plagiarized claiming that they were not properly cited and that their works were misconstrued. The faculty members and the dean of the UP Law were then asked to show cause why there should not be held in violation of the CPR under Canons 1, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05.

Issues: Whether or not the UP Law faculty members should be held liable in violation of the CPR for questioning the integrity of the SC/ Whether or not lawyers can criticize SC decisions.

Ruling: Yes.

While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice.

It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an officer of the court, he cannot criticize the courts. That is his right as a citizen, and it is even his duty as an officer of the court to avail of such right. Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit.

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

.

Final Word: In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected to have monolithic views on any subject, be it a legal, political or social issue. Even as lawyers passionately and vigorously

propound their points of view they are bound by certain rules of conduct for the legal profession. This Court is certainly not claiming that it should be shielded from criticism. All the Court demands is the same respect and courtesy that one lawyer owes to another under established ethical standards. All lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees, professors or private practitioners, are officers of the Court and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an indispensable qualification for admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves with good fidelity towards the courts. There is no exemption from this sworn duty for law professors, regardless of their status in the academic community or the law school to which they belong.

WHEREFORE, this administrative matter is decided as follows:

(1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting his submission, the Court finds his Compliance to be satisfactory.

(2) The Common Compliance of 35 respondents, namely, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario, is found UNSATISFACTORY. These 35 respondent law professors are reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court and to refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on pending matters or to denigrate the Court and the administration of justice and warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

(3) The separate Compliance of Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10 is found UNSATISFACTORY. He is further ADMONISHED to be more mindful of his duty, as a member of the Bar, an officer of the Court, and a Dean and professor of law, to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court and warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

(4) Prof. Lynch, who is not a member of the Philippine bar, is excused from these proceedings. However, he is reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a Philippine law school he should strive to be a model of responsible and professional conduct to his students even without the threat of sanction from this Court.

(5) Finally, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are denied for lack of merit.

IPI No. 12-205-CA-J               December 10, 2013

RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF THOMAS S. MERDEGIA AGAINST HON. VICENTE S.E. VELOSO, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, RELATIVE TO CA G.R. SP No. 119461.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xA.C. No.: 10300

RE: RESOLUTION DATED OCTOBER 8, 2013 IN OCA IPI No. 12-205-CA-J AGAINST ATTY. HOMOBONO ADAZA II.

Facts: Atty. Adaza was the counsel for Thomas Merdegia for a case wherein Justice Veloso was the presiding justice. Atty. Adaza asserted that both he and his client observed Justice Veloso’s partiality during the oral arguments, but instead of immediately filing an administrative complaint against him, he counseled Merdegia to first file a Motion to Inhibit Justice Veloso from the case. However, upon finding that Justice Veloso refused to inhibit himself, Merdegia repeated his request to file an administrative complaint against Justice Veloso, to which Atty. Adaza acceded. Thus, Atty. Adaza pleaded that he should not be faulted for assisting his client, especially when he so believes in the merits of his client’s case.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Adaza can be held for contempt of court.

Ruling: Yes.

The resolution dismissing the motion for inhibition should have disposed of the issue of Justice Veloso’s bias. While we do not discount the fact that it was Justice Veloso who penned the resolution denying the motion for inhibition, we note that he was allowed to do this under the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals. Had Merdegia and Atty. Adaza doubted the legality of this resolution, the proper remedy would have been to file a petition for certiorari assailing the order denying the motion for inhibition. The settled rule is that administrative complaints against justices cannot and should not substitute for appeal and other judicial remedies against an assailed decision or ruling.

What tipped the balance against Atty. Adaza, in this case, is the totality of the facts of the case that, when read together with the administrative complaint he prepared, shows that his complaint is merely an attempt to malign the administration of justice. It has been noted that in several other occasions, Atty. Adaza had filed several motions for inhibition against judges for merely ruling negatively as to his clients’ causes.

In one case, we cited a litigant in indirect contempt of court for his predisposition to indiscriminately file administrative complaints against members of the Judiciary. We held that this conduct degrades the judicial office, interferes with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary, and thus constitutes indirect contempt of court. Applying this principle to the present case, we hold that Atty. Adaza’s acts constitute an improper conduct that tends to degrade the administration of justice, and is thus punishable for indirect contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

To our mind, imposing a disciplinary sanction against Atty. Adaza through a contempt proceeding violates the basic tenets of due process as a disciplinary action is independent and separate from a proceeding for contempt. A person charged of an offense, whether in an administrative or criminal proceeding, must be informed of the nature of the charge against him, and given ample opportunity to explain his side. While the two proceedings can proceed simultaneously with each other, a contempt proceeding cannot substitute for a disciplinary proceeding for erring lawyers, and vice versa. Jurisprudence describes a contempt proceeding as penal and summary in nature, while a disciplinary proceeding against an erring lawyer is sui generis in nature; it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal. Contempt proceedings and disciplinary actions are also governed by different procedures. Contempt of court is governed by the procedures under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary actions in the practice of law are governed by Rules138 and 139 thereof.

IN THESE LIGHTS, the Court finds Atty. Homobomo Adaza II GUILTY OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT for filing a frivolous suit against Court of Appeals Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, and hereby sentences him to pay, within the period of fifteen days from the promulgation of this judgment, a fine of P5,000.00. The respondent is also WARNED that further similar misbehavior on his part may be a ground for the institution of disciplinary proceedings against him.

A.M. No. MTJ-13-1834               October 2, 2013(Formerly OCA l.P.l. No. 12-2541)

JESUS D. CARBAJOSA, Complainant, vs.JUDGE HANNIBAL R. PATRICIO, Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, President Roxas, Capiz,Respondent.

Facts: The case stemmed from a case of grave coercion by Carbajosa against Dolores Bieles. Bieles was convicted and was ordered to pay Carbajosa. This became final and executory. Carbajosa thereafter filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment before the MCTC presided by herein respondent Judge Patricio. Bieles

opposed the motion stating that she sent a letter addressed to the Chief Justice, Honorable Reynato S. Puno asking for a review of her case on the merits, which was favorably acted upon.

Judge Patricio resolved the conflict by holding in abeyance the resolution of Carbajosa’s Motion for Execution of Judgment to await the result of the referral/endorsement made by the Chief Justice before a ruling on the propriety of the issuance of a writ of execution was made. Carbajosa did not agree with this, and thus insisted on the issuance of the writ of execution, but this was not headed.

These circumstances prompted Carbajosa to institute the herein administrative complaint imputing gross ignorance of the law, manifest partiality and evident bad faith against Judge Patricio in continuously deferring the issuance of a writ of execution for the final and executory judgment.

The case was brought to the OCA, where they found Judge Patricio guilty of gross ignorance of the law and recommended that he should be fined in the amount of P21,000.00.

Ruling: We agree with the OCA’s findings and recommendation.

Any delay in the full execution of a final and executory decision is repugnant to the ideal administration of justice. Hence the rule that once a judgment attains finality, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The enforcement of such judgment should not be hampered or evaded; for the immediate enforcement of the parties’ rights, confirmed by final judgment, is a major component of the ideal administration of justice. Our penal laws and rules of procedure, in particular, enjoin that when the judgment of conviction is already final and executory its execution is ministerial.

As correctly observed by the OCA, the Court’s Resolution affirming the conviction of Bieles and the Entry of Judgment dated evidently carried more legal and procedural significance and effect in the criminal case as against the endorsement referring the letter of Bieles to the Third Division for Agenda. The endorsement did not result in a definite action on the part of the Court as it did not even remotely suggest that the criminal case will be re-opened. Hence, there was absolutely no justifiable reason for Judge Patricio to rely on the latter and thereby thwart the basic rules on execution of judgment.

A judge is not given the discretion whether or not to implement the judgment. He is to effect execution without delay and supervise implementation strictly in accordance with the judgment. Judge Patricio’s actuations unmistakably exhibit gross ignorance of the law.

Canon 4 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics requires that the judge should be studious of the principles of law. Canon18 mandates that he should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law. Indeed, it has been said that when the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider a basic and elemental rule, a law or principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and the title he holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. While judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes or errors of judgments, it is highly imperative that they should be conversant with fundamental and basic legal principles in order to merit the confidence of the citizenry.

Under A.M. No. 01-8-1 0-SC or the Amendment to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court Re: Discipline of Justices and Judges, gross ignorance of the law is a serious charge, punishable by a fine of more than P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00, suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) months but not exceeding six ( 6) months, or dismissal from the service. Based on the attendant circumstances of this case, a fine of P21 ,000.00 is the appropriate penalty.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Judge Hannibal R. Patricio, Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, President Roxas-Pilar, President Roxas, Capiz is hereby FOUND GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and FINED in the amount of P21 ,000.00, with a stern WARNING that a repetition of the same will be dealt with more severely.