JUDGMENT

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

PART C

CHAPTER IX

FINDINGS ON COUNTS OF THE INDICTMENT

CHAPTER X

VERDICTS

November 1948

Chapter IX Pages 1,137 - 1,144

Chapter X Pages 1,145 - 1,218

1,137

PAF.T C

CHAPTER IX

FINDINGS ON COUNTS OF THE INDICTMENT

In Count I of the Indictment it is charged that

all the defendants together nith other persons participated

in the formulation or execution of a common plan or con..

spiracy. The obj0ct of that common plan is alleged to

have been that Japan Should secure the military, naval,

political and economic domination of East Asia and of the

Pacific and Inrian Oceans, anc of all ~ountries and islands

therein or bor

Already prior to 1928 Okawa t one of the orlgin3 l.

i!efe.ndants, who has been disoherg:ed fr ore· this trial on

account of his present ~ental state, was publicly advocat

ing that Japan should extend her territory en the Contin

ent of Asia by the threat or, U' necoss

rttdmld1t ot tbcu object by 1'oroe.t rru'I those politicFns

,~ letterly those bureeucr,ts, who ,dvocetc~ JFpPn1s

f'~Jteion by !)£11ceM 11eu,u·u or r.t leut b7 r 1110re

d1,crert choice ot ~ occe~i~ns on whieb force 1hou1d

~e ·,11ro10ycd. This strur@i~· euJ.m1nFt~cl in the oonspirrtors obWning control ot the or1rns or fovernment ot Jrpr~

end prcper1ng enc ttflmentlnf the nrtion's mind rnc!

1nttrrirl resourCEs tor wrrs ot rgrrrssion C,t1!11(?led .to

ech1£ve the obj()ct ot the eonsp1recy. ln Cl'frrcor:llinr the opposition the. eonspirctors employct inrthO

1,140

Sftting up puppet governments on th€· ebove model, end

exploitinF Chine's economy end neturel resources to

terd the Jeprne:s£ m111tf'ry tnd civilirn nH-ds.

In ttie merntilllE." they hrd long been pltnninr

End -prtperinf e "'1n ot euressfon which they proposed

to leunch Ege.inst tlw u.s.s.R. The intention ,...rs to seize thet country's Eesttrn ttrritories when. e

tevourrble op~ortunity occurred. They hPd elso long

rrcol!'nizrd thFt thfir orploitrtion or Eest AslF end

th£ir ecsigns on tht· islFnds ·1n the Western end South

li'~ strrn Prcitie would brinf -them into e onnict d th

the Unitrcl Strtes of Amrrice, Brite.in, P'rf'nce !'nd th€

N£therlends who woulc defend their thrtFtcntd inttrests

end ttrritorics. They plenped Fnd prepercd fo~_wer

egeinst thtsc countries rlso.

The conspire tors brouyht rbout Jepen' s alli

ance .J1ith Ge:rl!lf'ny encl Itrly, whost policies were es

Pffressivc rs their own, rnd whose sup9ort they desired

both in th£ diplometic end militrry titles, tor thtir

rggressivc ections in ChirK> hPd drrwn on .fepen the

concemnFt:l.on ot the- Lerguf of Netions end .left her

frhnclles:i 'in the oouncils or the w9rld.

Their propostd rttrck on the u.s.s.R. wrs

postponid from time -to timt for verious rrrsons,

e~ong which _?ere (1) J~perr's preoccuprtion with the

W'Pl". in Chinr-, whit!h wr~ fbsorb1nt unexpectedly lr-rf€

11llitery resourcfs, rnd (2) Getmn1y' s prct of non.

'errrrssloh with the U.s.s.R. ·1n 1939, which for the

time frerd the u.s.s.R. from thteet ot Fttrck o~hEr Western frontier, rnd m1rht hne E'll0"!€d he;r to l'tvote

the bulk other strcnrth to the

1,141

Then in the ycrr 1940 crme Gerrnrny's greet

militrry successes on the continent of Europe. For

the timE being GrE:rt Britein, Frrnce rnd the Nether

lends wen powerlEss to rfford edequete protection

to their interests rna territories in the Fer Erst.

The militrry pre:prrrtions 0f the: United Strtcs WEre

in the initirl strgcs. It sermcd to the conspirptors

thrt nc- such frvourrble opportunity could rE:rd1ly

recur of rHlilling thrt prrt c-f their objective which

sought Jeprn's dcminrtion of South-~est Asir rnd the

islrnds in the '!!cstern ~nd South \''estcrn Prcific rnd

Indien Oc 0 rns. After prolonged negotietions with the

United Strtes of Americr., in which they refused to

disgorge rny substrntirl ,rrt of the fruits they hed

seized PS the result of their WPr of qrnrC'ssion rgrinst

Chine, on 7th Deeember 1941 the conspirrtors lrunched r

wrr of rggression rgrinst the United Strtes rnd the

British Common'l'1erlth. They hrd elreedy iss11ed orders

declering thrt r strte of wer existed between Jepen

end the Netherlrnds rs from.00.00 hours on 7th December

1941. They hrd previously secured e jumping-off plece

for their e ttrcks on the Philippines, 1f.eleye rnd the

Netherlrnds Eest Indies by forcing their troops into

French Indo-Chinr under thrert of m111trry rction if

this frcility wrs refused to them. Recognising the

existence of r stete of wrr rnd freed by the imminent

thre:rt of invesion of her Frr Eestern territories, whicn

the .conspirrtors hrd long plrnned rnd '1'1ere now ebout

to execute, the Nctherlrnds in self-defence declrred

wer on Jepen.

These frr-rerching plrhs for wrging vnrs of

rure:ssion, rnd the prolonged rnd intricrte preprretion

fer rnd weging of these wrrs of eggression were not the

http:from.00.00

1,142

work or one man. Thoy were the work of many leaders

acting in pursugnce of a common plan for the achieve

ment of a common o~ject. That co~mon object, that

they should secure Japan I s domination by preparing

and waging wars of aggression, was a criminal object,

Indeed no more grave crimes c~n be conceived of than

a conspiracy to wage a war or aggression or the w~g

ing or a war of aggression, for tho conspirPcy threatens

the security or the peoples of tho ~orld 1 and the

waging disrupts it. The probab~e result of such a

conspiracy, and the inevitable result of its execution

is that death and suffering will be inflicted on count

less human,beings.

The Tribunal does not find it necesssry to

consider whether there was a conspiracy to wage wars

in violation of the treaties, agreements and assurances

specified in the particulars annexed to Count I. The

conspiracy to wage wars of aggression was already criminal

in the highest degree.

The Tribunal finds that the existence of the

criminal conspiracy to wage wars of aggression es

alleged in Count I, with the limitation as to object

already mentioned, has been proved.

The question whether the defendants or any

of them participated in that conspiracy will be

considered when we deal with the individual cases,

The conspiracy existed for and its execution

occupied a period of many years, Not all of the con

spirators were parties to it at the beginning, and

so~e of those who were parties to it had ceased to be

active in its execution before the end. All of those

who at any ti~e w~re parties to the criminal conspiracy

or who at any time with guilty knowledge played a part

l,14,3

in its execution are guilty of the charge contained

in Count 1,

In view of our finding on Count I it i~

unnecessary to deal with Counts 2 and 3, which charge

the formulation or execution of conspiracies with

objects more limited than that which we have found

proved under Count I, or with Count 4 1 which charges

the same conspiracy as Count I but with more specification,

Count 5 charges a co~spiracy wider in extent

and with even more grandiose objects than that charged

in Count I, we are of opinion thet although sorre or the conspirators clearly desired the achivvement of these

grandiose objeets nevertheless there is not sufficient

evidenc~ to justify a finding that the conspiracr charged

in Count 5 has been proved,

For the reasons given in an earlier part of

this judgment we consider it unnecessary to make any

pronouncement on Counts 6 to 26 and 37 to 53, There

rema-in therefore only Counts 27 to 36 and 54 and 55,

in respect of which we now give our findings,

Counts 27 to 36 charge the crime of waging wars

of aggression and were in violation of international

law, treaties, agreements and assur9nces against the

countries named in those counts,

In tho statement cf fDcts just concluded we have

found that wars of aggression were waged against all

those countrie.s with the exception of the Commonwe91.tll

of the Philippirnis (Count 30) and the Kingdom of

Thailand (Count 34). With reference to the

Philippines, ~s We have heretofore stated, that Common

wea1th during the period of the war W9S not a completely

sovereign State and so tar es international relations were concerned it was• part ct the United States ot

America. We turther stated that it is beyond doubt that

a war of aggression was waged in the Philippines, but for

the sake of technical accuracy we consider the aggressive

war in the Philippines as being a part of the war ot

aggression waged against the United States of America,

Count 28 charges the waging of a war of aggression

against the Republic of China over a lesser period of

ti~e than that charged in .Count 27. Since we hold that

the fuller charge contained ±n Count 27 has been proved we shall make no pronouncement on Count 28.

Wars of aggrassion having been proved, it is

unnecessary to consider whether they were also wars other

wise in violation of international law or in violation of

treaties, agreements 9nd assurances. The Tribunal finds

therefore that it has been proved that wars .or aggression

were waged as alleged in Counts 27 1 29 1 31, 32, 33, 3S

and 36 •.

Count '4 charges ordering, authorising and permitting

the commission of Conventional War Crimes. Count,, charges

failure to take adequate steps to secure the observance

and prevent breaches of conventions and laws of war in

respect of prisoners of war and civilian internees, life

find that there have been ca·ses in which crimes under both

these Counts have been proved.

Consequent upon the foregoin1 findings, we propose

to consider the charges against individual defendants in

respect only of the following Counts: Numbe:rs 1, 27, 29,

31, 32, 33, 3,, 36, S4 and 55.

PART C

CHAPTER X

VERDICTS The Tribunal will now proceed to render its

verdict in the case of ench of' the accused.

Article 17 of the Charter requires that the ,judgment shall give the reasons on which it is

based. Those reasons o.re stated in the recital ot

fects nnd the statement of findihgs the rcacing ot

which has just been completc9. Therein the Tribunal

has examined minutely tho 1'.ctivitics of. ecch of the

accused concerned in relation to the matters in

issue. Consequently, the Tribunal docs not propose

in the verdicts now to be read to repeat the many

particulr.r findings on which the verdicts arc

based. It will give its reasons in general terms for

its findings in respect of coch accused, such· gvneral

reasons being bnsed on the particular statemcnts.!ll'ld

findings in the rcci tel already re10rrod .to.

ARAKI I Sadeo

The defendant ARAY.I, Sadao is charged

under Count l with conspiracy to wage aggressive

wars and wars in violation of international law,

treaties, agre!)ments and assurances. He is charged

also under Counts 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 35' and 36 with

•acing such wars. Under Counts 5'4 and 55 he is I

charged with responsibility for war cri~es committed

1n China. At all material times he was a Military

orricer or high ran~. He became a Lieutenant-General

in 1927 and a General in 1933. Throughout he was

prominent in the hierarchy of' the Army.

He was an energetic proponent of' the Army

policy or political domination at home and of military

aggression abroad. He•was in fact and was recognised

11 being one of the prominent leaders of that Ar~y

movement. As a member of different Cabinets he

advanced the Army policy to prepare for wars o'f aggression

by stimulating the werlike spirit of the young men of

Japan, by mobilizing Japan's material resources for

war and by speeches and by control of the press

inciting and preparing the Japanese people for war.

Both in end out of political office he helped to formulgte

and was a vigorous advocate of the policy of the military

part7 to enrich Japan at the expense 01 ner neighbours.

He both approved and actively supported the policies under.

taken by the Japanese Army in Manchuria and Jehol to separ

ate that territory politically from.China, to. create•

Japanese-controlled government and to place its economy

· under the domination or Japan. The Tribunal

l,147

f1nda him to have betn On4 bf the leadera or the

conspiracy aet out in Count I and he 11 edll,•dged ,uUty

under that Count.

ARAYI assumed office as Minister or War in

December 1931 after the aggressive war against the

Republic of China in Manchuria had commenced. He

continued as Minister of War until January 1934•

T~roughO\lt that period he took a prominent part_in

the development and the carrying out of the military

and political policies pursued in Manchuria and Jehol.

He gave all possible support to the successive militar,,

steps taken for the occupation or that portion or tht territories or China. ARAKI from l~ay 1938 until

August 1939 was Minister of Education, in which

capacity he approved and collaborated in military

operations in other parts of China. ~e have found

that the war in China was _from 1931 onwards a war of.

aggression and we find that this defendant participated

in the waging of that war. Accordingly we find him

guilty under Count 27.

There is no evidence that he took an,.acttve

part in the wars referred to in Counts 29, 31', !2,, 33, 35 and 36, on all of' w~ich we find him not· guilty~ . Aa to war crimes there· is no evidence ot his respond• ·

bility for such crimes and we find him not.guilty,

under Counts 54 and 5,.

DOHIHARA, XenJl '.l'he defendant OORIHARA 1 Kenji 1s charJcd

under Counts 1, 27, 291 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 54 and 55.

At the commencement ot the period under

review DOHIHARA w~s a Colonel in the Japanese ar1117

and by April 1941 had attained the rank of General.

Before the Manchurian Affair he bed 'been in Chinn

tar about eighteen years and had come to be negarded

1n the Army as a specialist on China. He was

intiMtely involved 1n the initiation and development

ot the war of aggression waged against China 1n

Kanohuria and in the subsequent establishment of the

Japanese-dominated state of Manchukuo. As. the agrr~as1ve

policy of the Japanese m111tary party was pursued 1n

other areas in China DOHIHJ.RA took r. proci1nent part

1n lta development by pol1t1cal intrigue, by threat

ot torce and by tt.e use of force.

DOHIHARA acted 1p close association w1 th

other leaders of the m111tary faction -in the development,

preparation, and ~Jeecut1on of their plans to bring

Eaat and South Eaat Asia imder Japanese domination.

When his special knowledge of China end his

capacity tor int1'igue there were no longer required

he ire~ ·employed as a General Officer ln the f isl~ in

·pur,uit ot the aims for which he had conspired, He

took part in the waging of aggressive war not only

acdmt China but also against the u. s.s.R. and egainst those OOQlltrlea against whom also Japan wa~d aggressive

war from 1941 unti;.1941 excepting the· Republic of Prence,

http:DOHIHJ.RA

1,149

As to the ,.,ara waged ag!inst the u.s.S.R. in 1938

an~ 1939, DOHIJLUU w~s a Lieutenant General on the

Generel Stett -.h1ch had ov.0rhead control or tno

Itll.e Khassan fighting. At Nor::onhan elerneni.s ot the

Arley' he commandod took part in thet fighting.

Js to the waging of war ag~inst the Republlc

of France (Count 33) the decision to wage this war

was mec'e by the Suprer•e Council for the Direction or

1Jrar in Febru,.ry 1945. The accusec. was not !l party

to that c1ecision and the evidence .eoes net establish

that ho took part in the waging or th!!t war.

we fine' him to be guilty of ccnspir&cy to

ffage aggressive war und.,r Count I and 0of waging

•cgressive wars as chorgecl unc'er Counts 27, 29, 31,

32, 35 and 36. ·He is not guilty uncer•Count 33.

DCHilfaRA comm~ nc1ee the -7th Arc:a i.rrr>:y from

April 1944 until April 1945. This corrr:;and include'd

l::'rlaya, Suma tr~, Java anc' for a time Borneo. The

evic'enca as to the extent of his resronsibility;

for protecting priscnars of w~~ within the area of

his comr.and fror:. murder and torture is conflicting.

At least he was responsible for their surplies or

tc~d Pnd ·coc'icine. The evidence is clear that they

were grossly 111-treeted 1n respect of these su~plies.

Pr11oner1 \7ore atarvec'. &nd deaths from malnutrition

ane. food deficiency c.iseases occurred at an appalling

ra~e. !hose con~1t1ons appliec1 only to prisoners or

war ,ind di~ not occur an:ong their captors. It was

urged in defence tru:t the ~eterioration of Jaren•a

war position 1n tht,ae areas lm

surplios for ~risonors. Tho evi

HASHIMOTO, Kingoro

H,,SHIMOTO is indicted unc',cr Counts l, 27 1

29 1 31 1 32, 54 and 55.

He was on Arny officer and early joinec

tho conspire cy. H3 thoroa ftor 1·urthcroc'. tho

achioTooont of its objects by all tho means in

his rc~1or. Ncn0 of the conspirators neld !:'.Oro

oxtrc.r.o viel'IS than he, c'.ic:l; none .was Ti'.oro outspolrnn

in his statement of these views. In the beginning

he advocated tho expansion of Jaran through tho

seizure, of Manchuria by force of arr:,s. hS tin:o

we1,1; on he ac'.vocat0d tho use of force against all

Japan 1 s neighbours for tho accoP.plisht1ent of the

aims of tho conspirators.

Ho ,ms an orc'.ent ac\r.1irer of govornr.1ent

by rilitary

dcoocracy and opposed tho policies or the conspir1tor1,

His publications 'lnd tho activities of the societ1e1

he founded or supported were largely devoted to the

dcstructlon of democracy and tho establish~ent or 1

faro of government ~ore favourable to the use or war

for achieving the expansion of Jaran,

Ho played sore part in pl9nning the occurrence

r.f tho J.!ukden Incident so a!:' to give the Arrry a

j'.retext for seizing Manchuria, He clait1od sor.,e of tho

credit for tho seizure of Manchuria .:ind for Japan

leaving the LeJgue of Nations,

After its only years 1t was o:iinly as a

propagandist that no figuroc in the execution of the

couspirccy, H9 was a prolific publicist and contributed

to the success of tho conspiracy by inciting the

appetite of tho Japrnesc people for the possessions

of Japan's neighbours, by inflaring Japanese opinion

fer war to secure those pu~sessions, by his advocacy

of an allinnco with Gorr,wny anc'. Italy '11hich we;ro

bent on sioilar schones of expansion, by his denunciation

of treaties by which Japan haa bounc herself to refrain

fror tho schct1cs of aggr'lndiseront which were the air::s

cf tho conspir~cy, and by his fervent support of the

agitation fer a groat increase in the armanents of

Japan so that she right secure those aims by force or

the throat of force,

He was a principal in tho foroation

of the ccnspiracy and ~cntributod l:irgely to its

exccuticn,

:1s tc Count 27, h:iving first plotted tho

seizure of r.:ench.uria by force of arms he there

:iftcr playGd sor,e port in the pl:mning of tho lluk-'on

Incident so that it might serve as a pretext for

the seizure of Manchuria. Being thus fully

apprised that the war against China was a war

of aggression and bein~ one of thos& who had

conspired to bring about that war he did everything

within his power to secure its suc~ess. For a

time he was, in fact, a military commander in the

field. He thereby waged a war of aggression

against China as charged in Count 2?.

There is no evidence directly connecting

HASHillOTO with any of the crimes charged in Counts

29, 31, 32, 54 or 55. The Tribunal finds him not

guilty on these Counts.

The Tribunal finds HASHIMOTO guilty on Counts

lend 27.

HATA, Shunroko

HATA is charged under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 35,

36, 54, end 55.

On the forma.tion of the .AbE: CPbinet in August 1939

HAT.A assumed the post of War Minister which he held

continuously until July 1940 when the Yonai Cabinet fell.

Though holding Cabinet rank for less then one year HATA

con+ributed substantially to the formulation end execution

of the agrressive plans • .As War 141nister he exerted

considerable influence on Government policy. The war in

China was wageG with renewed vigor; thf Wang Ching Wei

Gov£rnment was esteblished at Nanking; the plPns for

control of French Indo-Ch~na were developed and the

negotiations with the Netherlands in relation to matters

concerning the NetherlEnds East Indies were ccnaucted.

HAT.A favored Japanese comination of East Asia end the

areas to the South. To achieve this object he, for example,

Ppproved. the abolition of political parties to be replaced

by the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, end in

collaboration with Pnd eft(r consulting other high military

authorities he precipitated the fell of the Yonai CPbinet,

thereby making way for the fulL alliance with Germany end

the establishment of a virtual totalitarian state in

Japan.

Thereafter from KarGb 1941 es Commender-in-Chief of

the expeditionary forces in China he continued to wage

war in that country until November 1944.

He continued to ~ege war eg&inst China and the

West£rn Powers as Inspector General of Military Education,

one of the highest active military posts in the Jap~nese

Army.

1,155

When the Lake ]Olassan host111 ties occurred HATA

was 1n Central China and at the time or the Nomonhan

Incident he was Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor, becoming

War Minister a little more than a week before the con

clusion of the.t Incident. The Tribunal 1s of the opinion

tba t HATA did not part1c1pate 1n the waging of e1 ther

of these wars.

War Crimes

In 1938 am again from 1941 to 1944 when HATA was

1n command of expeditionary forces 1n China atrocittes

-re committed on a large scale by the troops under his command and were spread ?ver a long period of time.

Either HATA knew of these things and took no steps to

prevent their occurrence, or he was 1nd1frerent and

11111.de no provision for learning whether orders for the

humane treablent of prisoners of war and c1v111an11

were obeyed. In e1 ther case be was 1n breach of his

duty as charged urrler Count 55.

The Tribunal finds HATA gu1lty under Counts 1, Z7,

29, 31, 32, and 55. He 111 not guilty under Counts 35, 36

and 54.

http:11111.de

HIRAN1JlrfA, K11ch1ro

.HIRANUMA is indicted under Counts 1 1 27; 29 1 31,

32, .33, .35, 36, 54 and 55. Be became a member of the

c~~spiraey if not at the beginning,.shortly afterwards

He Was a member and from 1936 President of the Privy

Council until 1939,when he became Prime Minister; later

he served in succession as Minister Without Portfolio

an~ Home Minister in the second and third Konoye Cabinets.

During the period when he was a member of the

Privy Council he supported the various measures coming

before that body which involved the carrying out of the

ag~ressive plans of the militarists. As Pr!~~ Minister

an~ as Minister he continued to support these plans.

From 17 October 1941 until 19 April 1945, the

aceused was one of the Senior Statesmen, At th9 meeting

ar Senior Statesmen held on 29 Nove~ber 1941 to ~dvise the Emperor on the question of peace or war with the West

ern Powers, the accused accepted the opinle>n that war

wao inevitable and advised the strengthening of public

opinion agal~st the possibility of a long war.

At the meeting of the ~enior st~tesman held on 5

April 1945 the -accused strongly opposed any overtures for

peace and advocated that Japan should fight to the end.

At all times covered by the Indictment HIRANUMA

was not only a supporter of the policy of the domination

of Japan in East Asia end the South Seas by forco when

necess3ry 1 but he was one cf the leaders of the con

spiracy and an active participant in furthering it~ rolicy.

In carrying out that policy he WJged war against China,

the Unitad States of Amorico, the British Commo~~ealth

or Nations, the Netherlands, and in 1939 against the u.s.s.R.

The Tribunal finds the occused HIRANIDV. guilty

on Counts 1, 27, 29, 31,32 rnd 36.

Thero is no evidence directly connccting·him with

·the crimes chorged in Counts·33, 35, 54 ond 55, we, thcrffore, find him not guilty on these counts.

!jIROTA; Koki HIROTA is indicted under Counts lt 2?, 29,

31, 32, 33, 35, 54, E.nd 5~.

HIROTA wes F'll'cign Minister trnm 1933 until.

l.'!orch 1936 when he became Prime Minister. Fr'>m the

fall or his Cabinet in February 1937 for four months

he held -n'l public ~ffice. He was F'll'eign Minister

ogain in the First Konoye Cebinet until May 1938.

Fr'lm that time forward his relation with public

affairs we.s limited to attending m~ctings '>f the

Senior S_tatesmen (Jushin) trnm timo to· time t_o ad

vise 'ln the app.,intment ~f Prime Ministers ond on

othe:r important questions submitted.

Frnm.1933 to 1938, when HIROTA held these

high offices, too Japr.nesc gr.ins 1n Monchurio were

being consolidated end turned to tho odvontoge ot

Jopon ond too p'lliticol end econ?mic llfe of North

China vms being "guided" in order to separate it traa

the rest 'lf China in preparation for the dociinati'>n

by Japr.n of the Chinese politicnl ond economic lite·.

In 1936 his cobinet formuleted rnd od,,ptcd th

government eomineted by Japan.

In early 1938 the plan end legisletion for

mobilization of man oower, industrial potential 1 enc natural resourcei:: was adopted. This olen with

little change in essentiels wes the besis on v,hich

the i:,reparetions to continue the Chine We'r enc' for

weging further aggressive wars were cerried out

curing the succeeding yeers, All these plens end

activities were fully known to enc' supported by

HIROTA.

Thus during'his tenure of office HIROTA,

apparently.a very eble men e,nd a forceful leader,

111es at times the originator and et other times a

supporter of the agrress_ive plans adopted end executed

by the military enc' thl' various Cabinets,

On his behalf Counsel· in final argument

urge" the Tribunal to c onsic'er HIROTA I s consistent

advocacy of peace end peaceful or diplometic nego

tiation of cisputed questions, It is true thet

HIROTA, faithfUl to his diplomatic training, consis

tently eovocated attempting firstly to settle c'isputes

through diplomatic.channels. However, it is abundantly

cleer thFt in so c'oing he wes never willing to sacri

fice any of the gains or ex,ectec' gains mece or

ex~ecte~ to be mace st the expense of Jaoen 1 s neigh

bours snt'I. he consistently egreed to the use of force

if oiplomatic negotiations failed to obtain fulfilment

of the Jspenese demands, The Tribunal therefore can

not accept es exculpating this accused the c'efense

offered on this point,

The Tribunal.consequently fine's thet at

leai:t from 1933 HIROTA p-ertici peted in the- col"I"on plan

or conspirac.y to Voefe sgrressiVE wars, As Fort:ign

.Ninister he also perticipated in the waging of war

against China.

As to Counts 29, 31 and 32 HIROTA 1 a attitude

and a•vice as one of the Senior Statesmen 1n 1941 is

quite consistent with his being opposed to the opening

of hostilities again_st the Western Powers. He held no

public office after 1938 :ind played no part in the

direction of the wars referred to 1n these Counts. The

Tribunal holds that the evidence offered does not

establish his guilt on these Counts.

As to Counts 33 and 35, there is no proof of HIROTA 1s participation in or support of the militar7

operations at Lake !Chassan, or in French Indo-Cbina in

1945.

With regard to 111ar Crimes there is no evidence

of HIROTA 1 s having ordered, authorized, or permitted

the commission of the CTimes as alleged in Count 54.

As to Counb 55 the only e~idence relating him to such crimes denls with the at~ocities at Nanking in

December 1937 and Januar7·and February 1938. As Foreign

Minister he received reports of these atrocities

immediately after the entry of the Jap&nese forces into

Nanking. According to the Defence evidence eredence

was given to these reports and the matter was taken up

with the war Ministry. Assurances were accepted from

the ~er Kinistry that the atrocities would be stopped.

After these as11urances !wd been given reports of atrocitiee·

continued to come in for at least a month. The Tribunal

is or opinion that HIROTA was derelict in his duty in not

insisting before the Cabinet that immediate action be taken

to put.an end to the atroc~ties, failing any other action

open to him to bring about the same result. He was eontent

to rely on assurances which he knew were not being imple

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mcntcd while hundreds of murders, violations '">f w">mcn,

and ')ther atr'">citics were being committed daily. His

in"ction am')untcd to criminal m.gligcncc.

Tru: Tribunal finds HIROTA guilty under

Counts 1, 27 and 55. He is n0t guilty under

C')'.lllts 29, 31, 32, 33, 35, and 54.

· I!O§Hlli9, IfP0 M

HO.BHINO 1s charged undo~ Counh 1;

27, 29,. 31, 32, ~3, .3St 54. and· ,5..

. Until the accused HOGilINO went. t.o · ·

Manchuria in 1932 he ,wu empl~ed 1n the ,7$pal:le ae

. Department ".It Fine.nee•. He was sen~J;o, Vancb:urta

by- his Government to become a Sejlio,. ott1da1 ct,

the Konchulru.o Finance _Kinietrr 'rillll ;o,f tile 11anchukuo. General Affairs Bureau... By .1936 he had ;:beco111e

Vice Chiet '>! the Finance IUnistry. o~ lloncbu!No. end Chiet o! the General Affairs Soctirm' ~t,.tbe·

Neti'>nal Affairs B_:1ard nt Menchukuo;.. , In these

p:,sitions he was able to exercise a· profQ\Uld ·

influence up·on the CC'.>nomy f'Jt Menchuk~o and· t in.name,:

. hc was 11 fUnct1onary of that Army ~h'>se eoon·'>1111Q

policy was directed to meking the resources or . Manchukuo serve the warlike purposcs,o:r Japan.

Although he was nominrlly:a servant

'.'J!. the Governce:nt of Manchukuo and bed .been sn tor

~ ight years ho was recalled to Japan in. l 940 to

become a Minister without Portfolio and President of tho_Planning Board•. In-this position he was the

leader 1n' the 9J:Ccial · steps. then being taken to

equip Japan tor, the cant1nu,at1on·or the aggressive

war then being waged in Ch~ ond tor wars .or

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aggression then cjntclllPla~cd against otb)r

countries with possessi~s in East Asia,

From April 19411 when ho left tho

Cabinet, his ofticial runct1tnlLin ~nnection

with warlike·proparations were reduce~ but not

entirely abandoned.

Up-m the eocossion of the accused TOJO

as Prime.Minister in October 1941 HOSHINO became

the Chier Secretary ,,rt he Cabinet and so~n after

a Councillor 'lf the Planning B0ard. From this time

he wos in close associati:m· with tll the prepatetions

for the aggressive '!ar 3).l'()edy dd~rmined up~ and

now sh'>rtly _t'l be, waged again:;t those countries

attacked by Jepan 1h l)oC€~b

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ITl.GMI, Seish1ro 'The accused is eharged under C".lunts

1, 27 1 2', 3;1. 1 32, 33, 35, 36, 54 end 55.

By the year 1931 ITAGAKI, then a

Colonel on the Staff of the Kwantung Army, hed

joined the conspiracy the illll'!lediate object of

which then was that Jnpe.n should seize Manchuria

by force of arms. He fanned the agitation 1n

support ".lf th1s aim: he· helped t0 engineer the

so-called 11!:lukdcn Incident" as a pretext for

military action: he suppressed several attempts

to prevent thct military acti ".ln: he autn-irised

and directed that militr,ry e.ction.

He next played a principr,l part in

the intrigues which f-,stcrec the sham m'.lvement

for the incependencc of 1.:anchuria ,am which

r0sulte:d in the: establishment -,f the puppet

state of Me.nchukuo.

He became VicE-Chief 'Jf Staff 'Jf the

Kwantung i:.rmy in December 1934 end thcruifter was

active in setting-up puppet regimes in Inner

!:ongolia md N".Jrth Chinn. He wished to extend

Japen 1s military occupation into Outer ~~ng0lia

t? serve ns a threat t".J the tcrrit'Jries of the

u.s.s.R,. He wrs -ne of the coiners of the phrl'se 11.a.nti-C'Jmmunism" to serve E'S a prctcxt for Jrpanese

aggression 1n North China.

When fighting broke out at !Ierco Polo

Brid?e 1n July 1937 he was s£nt from Japan to

China where he to".Jk part in the f.l.~ht1ng as a

Divisional Commander. He fav'.)urcd the expansion

of the crea of agpression there.

He becamo Minister of ~ar in the Konoye

Cabinet in May 1938. Under him the a.ttacks ..,n

China were intcnsified end extendE.cl. Ho was a

party to the impor,tant mini stcrial c">nferences

which decided to attempt to destroy the Natinnal

G'.)vernment of China end to set up a puppet regime

in its stead. He then was largely responsible for

the preliminary arrangements which JOS'Jl tcd in the

set ting-up '.)f the puppet regime of ':rang Ching-YTei.

He took part in the arrangeaents for the exploitation

of the: occupied areas -if China for the bcnefi t

of Jrpan.

As Minister ')f 1/far in the HIBtJflJMA

Cabinet he was r.gain responsible f'.)r the prosecuti">n

of 'the war against China, and for the expansion of

Jap:m I s £1.rmeoi:nts. In the Cabin€. t he was a strong

cdvacate of an unrestricted m1l1,tcry alliimce a1!1"ng

Japan, Gerc-~ny md Italy.

As ~'.ar Minister he tried by a trick

to '.)btain the c">nsent ot the E"peror to the use of

force against the u.s.s.R. at Lake Khassan. SubsequEntly at a Five Ministers C'lnfcrence he

'.)bta1ned euth'.)rity t0 use such force. He was still

~ar Minister during the fightin~ et Noo0nhan.

He WRS v. str'.)ng supporter of the

d£clarati">n of Jqian 1 s so-called "New Order" in

Last Asia r.nd the S,uth Seas. He rec0gnised thrt

the ette~pt t'.) set UD the New Order oust lead to

war with the u.s.s.R., France and Great Britain who would defend their poss€ssions in these arcaa.

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Fr,~ September 1939 ta July 1941 he

carried on the war against China as Chief of Staff

of the China rxpeditionary J.rmy.

Fr0m July 1941 to April 1945 he was

Comcander-in-Chief of the Army in Korea.

Fr,m April 1945 to the date of the

Surrender he commonded the 7th Area Army with Head

quarters in Singapore. His subordinate armies

defended Java, SUt:ietra, !~alaya, the And::unan and

Nicobar Islands, and Bcirneo.

Having conspired to wage wars of

aggression against Chine, the United States of

Atlerica, the British Commonwealth, tll:l Ncthulands,

and the u.s.s.R., he took an active and important pert in waging these wars V.'hich he knew were wars

?f aggression.

The Tribunal finds ITJ-.GAKI guilty ?n

C,unts 1, 27, 29, 3I, 32, 35 and 36, He is not guilty under Count 33.

War Crirr,es

The area which ITAGAKI coclfianded from

April 1,45 ta the Surrender included Java, Sumatra,

lialay, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, end Borneo,

Me.ny thousands of prisoners of war and internees

were held in camps in these areas during the above

peri:,d.

According to the evidence which he

adduced these camps, save th'>sc in Singapore, were

n'>t under his direct cocu'snd but he was responsiblti

for the supply of food, oedicines and hospital

facilities to theo.

During this period the conditions in

these camps were 'Unspeakcbly bnd. The supply of

f'1'Xl, medicines and hospitel facilities was gr'1ssly

inadequ2te. Deficiency diseases were rempr.,nt and

as a result !!',any persons died every day. Those

who survived to the date or the Surrender were

in a pitic.ble condition. When the camps were

visited after the Surrender no such C"nditions

prevailed among tho guards.·

ITAGAKI 1 s excuse tor this atrocious

trentMent 0f the prisoners and internees is that

th( attacks or the Allies on Jnpanose shipping had

riade the transportation '1f supplies to these arees

very difficult 1.1nd that he did the best he could

with the supplies he had. After the Surrender,

however, supplies '>f rood and ~edicinc were oade

r.va1lable by ITI.GAKI' s Army to the c ocrps in

Singapore, Borneo, Java and Sul!'~tra. The

explraiation tcnderc·d in evidence end ergul!',ent for

ITAG/JCI is that the J3pancse were expecting n long

wor and were c'1nserving supplies. This amounts to

a contention thot IThGAKI was justified under the

prevailing circumstances.in treating the prisoners

and internees with gross inhumanity. The Tribunal

hes no hesitati'>n in rejecting the defense. If

ITAGAKI, being responsible for sup?lies to many

thous,.nds of prisoners end internees, found himself

unable to maintain them for the future, his duty

under the Laws "f '."er wcs to distribute such

supplies as be had and me2ntir:;e to inf.orm his

superiors that nrrnngcoents must be made, if

necessery with the Allies, fo:-- the support of the

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prisoners and inter.,2es in the future. By the

p0l1cy i-ihich he ad'lpted he is responsible for the

deaths ,r sufferings of th0usnnds 0f people who.te

adequate maintenanc~ was his duty.

The Tribunal finds ITAGAKI guilty ,n

Count 54. As in the cnse ,f DOHIHARA, the Tribunal

makes no finding ,n Count 55.

KAY.A, Okinori

The accusec KAY.A 1S·charged unc'or Counts 1 1

27; 29, 31, 32 1 54 and 55. KAJA w~s a civilian.

In 1936 he was appointc,d 3 Councillor or

the.Manchurian Affairs Buro3u grta in Fobriwry 1937

ho becar::o Vice Hinistcr of Fin~ncc. In June 1937

ho was appcintod Fingnco Mjnister in tho first Konoye

Cabinet, which position he. ht-ld until !fay 193e. In

July 1938 ho becar.ir, Adviser to the Finsnce Ministry.

In July 1939 he was appr-.int_ed a r::omber of the Asia

Development Comrr.ittec, an~ in August of th,?.t yoDr

President of the North Chine Dovelopr::on~ Company, in

which position he r&l!'ainec' until October 1941 1 when

he bEcac:o Fintinco Utnister in the TOJO Cabinet. Ho

redgnod as Fi:nanco Ministe:r in February 1944 1 but again bocamo Adviser to the Fin,~ncci m nistry.

In ·thcao positions he took part in·tho

formulaticn of the aggressive policies of Japan

and i_n ,the financial, eccnol:lic ond inc'ustria 1

preparation 1:£ Jepe n for the execution of tho so

pcl1cies,

Thro1.1ghout this period, prrticululy as

Fi~ance Minister in tho first Konoye and TOJO Cabinets,

and as President of tho North China Development Coc:

pany, ho was actively ongaguc in tho preparat1cn

tor and the carrying out of aggrossivo wars in China

an~ against the vrestern Fo·,~.,rs. Ho ;,as an active

rombcr or the, conspiracy alleged in Count lend is adjudgi;d guilty uncur that Count.

In tho various positions hole by hie KAYA took

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a principal part in the waging of aggressive wgrs

as alleged in Counts 27, 29, 31 and 32 or tho

Indictrent. He is, therefore, adjuoged guilty l.lllder

those Counts.

Tho evidence does not aiscloso KAYA 1s

responsibility fer war crioes and accorc1.ingly he is

founc1 not guilty under Counts ?4 and,,.

KIDO, Ko1eh1

The accused KIDO, Koichi is cherged under

Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 54 end 55. From 1930 until 1936 KIDO was a mem~r or the

Emperor's household in the position or Chief Secretery

to the Lord Keeper of the Frivy Se~. Durinf this

~er1oc he wes awere or the true neture or the military

end p_oliticel ventur.es in llenchurie. At· this tiMe,

however, he was not essocieted with the conspiracy

which· heel .been instituted by the m11.1tary end their

supporters.

In 1937 KIDO Jofoed 1;he first Konoye Cabinet

~s !auc&t1on 141n1ster end for a period vies Welfare.

~iriieter. On the acce~sion of HIRI.NUMA es Prime

_Minister in ·1939 KIDO continued es s member or' the.

Cebinet until Aufust 1939 'l'ith the portfolio or Home

Atfeirs. In this perioe from 1937 to 1939 KIDO eaopted

th• •1ews or the conspirstors·end c'evote~ himself

who1eheertedly to their policy. The w~r in China

hed·entered into its second phase. KIDO was zeelous

in the pursuit or. thet wsr, even resistinf the efforts

of the General Sterr to shorten the war bt ~~kinf terms

with Chirie. Hewes intent on the comolete military

end political c'ominetion of China.

Not only did KIDD thus sup~ort the ~lens of

the consoiretors in Chine .but es Educ~tion llinister

he ep~lied himself. to the c'evelopment or a st~onr.wer

like spirit in Jepan.

Between Aurust 1939 enc' June 1940 ~hen he becsme

Lorder Keeper ef the Privy Seel, KIDO wes active with

Kono:re in the ~evelopment of e scheme to replace the

existinr politicel parties bye sin~le ~erty of which

Konoye wes to be Fresieent ene KIDO Vice Fresieent.

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1,172

This one party system was e:xpected tq give Japan a

totalitarian system and thus remove political resistance to

the plans of the conspirators.

As Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal KIDO was 1n

a specially advantageous position to advance the

conspiracy. His principal duty was to advise th~

Emperor, He kept in close b::>uch with political events

and was on terms of intimate political and pe~sonal

relationship with those most concerned. His position

was one of great influence. He used that inrluence,

not only with tb8 Emperor but also by political in

trigue so as to further the aims of the conspiracy.

He shared those aims which involved the domination of

China anl the whole of East Asia as well as the areas

to tm south.

As the time approached for the commencement of

war against the western Powers KIDO displayed some degree

of hesitation because doubts of complete success were

entertained within the Navy. Even in this state of

timidity KIDO was determined to pursue the aggressive

war against China and lent himself, although now with

less confidence, to the projected_ war against Great

Britain and the Netherlands and in case of need against

the United States of America, ,vb.en the doubts of the

Navy had been overcome KID0 1 s doubts seem also to have

been removed. He resumed his pursuit of the full

purposes of the conspiracy. He was largely instrumental

1n securing the office of Prime Minister for TOJO ilho

until now had been a determined advo.cate of bunediate

war with the ~estern Powers, In other ways he used

his position in support of sue~ a war or purposely re

frained from action which might have prevented it. He

refrained from advising the Emperor to take any stand

i,173

ag!)inst war either at the lnst or ecrli£:r when lt

might have been morE) effective.•

The Prosecution hns tendered no evidence

pointing to guilt in KIDO for the wars referred to

1n Counts 33, 35 and'J6.

As to wor crimes KIDO was a member of the

Cl".binet when the atrocities were committed at Nonk1~.

Th£: evidence is not sufficient to attach him with

responsibility for failure to prevent them.. Dur1ng·

the war ag3inst the Western Powers in ~941 anc1 there...

efter KID0 1 s position was such th~t he cannot be held

ro spons i ble for the a troc1 ti~ s comm!t ted..

KIIXJ-ts found guilty ot tho charges 1n Counts

1, 27, 29, 31 and'32, and not guilty under Counts 33, 35,

36, 54 nnd 55.

KI?IURA, Heitaro

!CIMURA is inc'.icted under Counts, 1, 27, 29,

31, 32, 5'4 and 5'5.

KillURA, ~n ermy officer, during the greater

part or tho period under consideration ~as engaged

in administrative work in the V'a~ Ministry, cul~inating

in his becol:ling Vice Minister or War in April 1941.

Later he was appointed Councillr,r or the Planning Board

·~nd Councillo~ ot the Total W31' Research Institute. In March 1943 ho was relie'Vod or the post of Vice War

Minister enc'. in ,iugust 1944 he became Comr:onder-in

Chiet of the Burt:a Ares /rty which post he held. until

the 1urrender of Jopcn in,1945.

-Ouring his service as Vice 11/ar !!inister·in

olr.iost caily contact with the war Minister and otrer

Ml.nj stars, Vice m.nist0rs , and Bureau Chiefs he wu

1n a position to loarn and was kept fully in.foroed of

all· governoont d0cisions end acti~n during the crucial

negotiations with th!l u.s~A. He hod run knowledge or

the plans a·nd preparations for the Pacific ¥'or and the

hostilities in China. Throuchcut, he. collaborated and

cooperated with tho War Minister and tho other Yini~tries

troo tit1e to tire giving advice based on his wide

experience, wholeheartedly supporting the aagresshe plans.

Though not a le?dar, he took part 1n the tormUla

·tion end develcpment or policies which were either

initiated by hirr.seli' pr proposod by_''the 1len,ral start

or .other bodies 3nd 3pproved and supported bi hie. In

. this way- he was a· valuable collaborator or accomplice

in the conspiracy to wage aggressive war~.

Concurrently with his activities as one of the

conspirators as Cotl!Ulnd~r or a divis1on~n 1939 and 1940,

then as Chief or Staff of the Kwantung .trey ~nd later

as Vice war Minister he pleyed a protlinent part in

the crmduct of the war in China and in the Pacific

War. Possessed with full knowledge of the illegality

of tho Pacific War, 1n Augu~t 1944 ho took co!Illl1and

of tho BurN Atoa Arcy and so continued until the

Surronc'.er.

In a positive way he was s party to breaches

of the Rules of ~ar in thet ha approved the acploymcnt

cf prisoners in t:Dny inst:mces 1'n work prohibited by

the Rules :me'. in work unc'.er ccnditions resulting in

the greatest h:lrdshir and tho de9ths pf thous9nds of

prisoners. An oxor.iple of th(; latter CDSe is tho

ecplcyric;nt of prisoners .in the construction of tho

Burr:a-Siom Railw~y, the orc'ers fer which w~ro approve~

:ma p:?ssed on by KIMUR;,.

Furtherrr.oro with knmvL.1r' ge of the extent

of tho atrocities CO!!'L1itted by Japanese trc~ps in

all theDters of war, in Aur,ust 1944 KD.!URA tock OV(;r

corr.oJnd cf the Burno Area Arey, Fror. tho c'oto of his

arrival at his Rangoon Ho3c'quarters nn~ 13ter when

his heac.quortors wis t:ov'"c to Moulrr.oin the atrocities

continued to be cor::r:ittoc. '.10 an undininished scale.

Ha tock no disciplinary neasures or other steps to

prevent tho crit1riissicn of atrocities by tho troops

under his cor.~anc,

It h::is boon urecc. in KH!URJ\ 1 s c'ofence that

when he arrived in Burm ho issuec'. :irc'ors to his tr:inps

tc conduct thccsclves in 1 prcpor soldierly o~nner

and to refrain free ill-treating priscners. In view of

the nature cnc1. extent r,f the ill-treatc6nt of priscners 1 in rony cases one large scale within a few ciles of

his headquarters, the Tribunal finds thet Kil!URA was

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1,176

negligent in his du~y to enforce th~ rules of war.

The duty of an arwy conw.:mder· in s.uch circun,stances

is not discharged by tho more issue of routine orders,

if indeed such orders were issued. His duty is to

take such steps and issue such orcers as will prevent

thereafter the commissibn of war crir.es and to satisfy

hi~self that such orders are being carried out. This

he did not do. Thus he deliberately disregarced his

legal cuty tn take adequate steps to prevent breaches

of the 1a·¥S of war.

The. Tribunal fines KI!.!URA guilty unc.er Counts

1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 5,4 and'55.

KOIS0 1 Kunicki

KOISO is charged under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32,

36, 54~ one.' ;;•.

He joined tho conspiracy in 1931 by port1cipnting

1s one !'if the leec1ers of the lfo.rch Incident the purpose

or which was to overthrow the Homar:uchi Government and

put in office a g~vc,rnncnt fnvourable to the occu~ntion

or Manchuria. Therenftcr he r.layed a leering role in the develo~ment of the Joranese plans for expansion from

Aurust 1932 when he was ap:,ointed Chief-of-Stoff' of the

Kwantung J.:rr:iy.

/,s Chief-of-Staff of too Kwontung :.rmy from

August 1932 to Mnrch 1934 he prepare(]· .or concurred in

proposnls end plans submitted to the Governr:icnt through

the Viar Ministry for the political mil economi~ orrnn

ization of' Hanchukuo according to the policy of the con

srir!ltors os adopted by tho JP!'Onesc Government. It is

urred in his defence thnt in forwarding proposals and

:,lans to Tokye he cid so merely as Chief-of-Stoff rnd

that such action did not im;,ort his personal opi:_"l'ovel.

In view of his knowledge of the ngrressive plnns of

Ji>r,an the Tr1bun1o1l cannot nccert this :,lea. He went

beyon~ the scope of the norr:inl c'utic s of a Chief-of'•

Staff in advising 011 political nnd ccononic matters t•

further these plans.

'!'lhile he was Chief-of-Staff there also Occurred

the military invo.s1on of' Jehol anc1 renewed fighting in

t!.nnchuria.

· tater as 1'verscas Uiriistcr in tho H1rnnume and

Yonai Cabinets KOISO. supportc~- P.nq_ took pnrt in the

direction of tho war 1n Ch!na, the beginning of the

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occupation or French !ndo-China and the negotiations in

tended to obtain concessions from end eventual economic

deminetion of the Netherlands East Indies, ·

D1:tring the same period he advocated the plan for

Japan to advance "in all directions".

In July 1944 KOISO. was recalled from his post or

Governor or Korea to become ·Prime Minister. !n that

C!!Pecity he 'urged end directed the waging of the war

against the Western Powers, He retired as Prime Minister

to make way for the S\lruki Cabinet in April 1945 when it

became clear that the •ar was lost for Japan,

There is no evidence that. he played any p1;1rt in the

hostilities at Nomohhan either by organizing.or directing them,

\llar cr1mu Vlhen KOISO became Prime Minister in 1944 atrocities

and other war crimes being ~ommitted by the Japanese

troops in every theater or war had become ~o notorious that it is improbable that a man in KOIS0 1 s position

would not have been well-informed either by reason of

their notoriety or from inter-departmental communications,

The matter is put beyond doubt by the feet that in

October 1944 the Foreign Minister reported to a meeting

of the· Supreme Council for the Direction of War, which

KOISt attended, that according to recent information

from er.emy sources it was reported that the Japanese

treatment or prisoners of war "left much to be desired",

He further stated that this was a matter of importance

from the point or view of Japan's international reputa

tior; and future relations, He asked that directions be

issued to the competent authorities so that the Matters

might be fully discussed, Thereafter KOISO remained

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1,179

Prime Minister for six months during which the Japanese

treatment of prisoners ond internees showed•no improve

m~nt whntevcr. This amounted too deliberate disregard

of his euty.

The Tribunal finds KOISO guilty under Counts 1,

27, 29, 31, 32 nnd 55', He is not guilty under Counts

36 ond 5'4,

f.ATSUI I Iwan&

The accused MATStTI is charged under Counts 1, 27,

29, 31, 32, 35, 36, 54 and 55. l!ATSUI was a senior Officer in the Japanese Army

and attained the rank of General in 1933. He had a

wide experience in the Army, including service in thJ

Kwantung Army and in the General Starr. Although his

close association with those who conceived and carried

out the conspiracy suggest.s that he must have been aware

or the purposes and policies or the conspirators, .the

evidence before the1 Tribunal doe.s not justify a finding

'that he was a conspirator.

His military service in China inJ937 and 1938

cannot be regarded, or itself, as the waging or an

aggressive war. To justify a conviction under Count. 27

it·was the duty of the prosecution to tender evidence ....

which would justify an inference that he had knowledge

of the criminal character of t?ujt war. This has not been

done.

In. 1935' 1/ATSUI was placed on the retired list but

in 1937 he was recalled to active duty to command. the

Shanghai Expeditionary Force. He was then appointed ··,

Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Area Army, which

included the Shanghai Expeditionary Force and the Tenth

Army. With these troops he captured the city or Nanking

on 13th ·oacember 1937.

Before the fall of Nanking ,the Chine·se forces

withdrew and the occupation_was of.a defenceless city.

Then followed a long succession of most horrible

atrocities committed by the Japanese Ar'!DY upon the help

less citizens. Wholesale massacres, individual murders,

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rape, looting and arson we.re committed by Japanese sol•

diers. Although the extent or the ·atrocities wee denied

by Japanese witnesses the contrary evidence of neutral·

witnesses or different nationalities end undoubted

responsibility is overwhelming. This orgy of crime

started with the capture of the City on the 13th

Decenber 1937 and did not cease until early in February

1938. .In this period or six or seven weeks thot•sands or

women were raped, upwards or 1001000 people were killed

end untold property was stolen and burned. At .the height

of these dreadful happenings, on 17th December~ VATSUl_

made a triumphal entry into,the City and remained there

from five to seven days. From his own·observst"iona and

from the reports or his steff he must have been aware or

what was happening. He admits he _was told ot some de ..

gree of misbehaviour of his Army by the Kempeitai and

by Consular Officials. Daily reports or these atrocities

were made to Japsnese diplol'latic representatives .in.

Nanking who in turn reported them to Tokyo. The Tri•

bunal is satisfied thst MATSUI knew whet wss happening.

He.did nothing, or nothing effective to abate these

horrors. He did issue orders betore·,the csptura ot the

City enjoining propriety or conduct upon his-troops ftnd

lster he issued further orders to. the same purport. These

orders were or no effect as is now.known and. as he must

have known. It was pleaded_in his behalf that at this

time he was 111. His illness was.not sufficient to pre~

vent his conducting the m1litar1 operations or his com

mand nor to prevent his visiting the _City for days while

these atrocities were occurring•.. He was. in command of

the Army responsible tor these happen1n1rs~ He knew or . them. He had the power as _he had t_he dut'y to control

his troops and to protect the unfortunate citizens of

Nanking. He must be held criminally responsible for his

failure te discharge this duty.

The Tribunal holds the accused 1:'.ATSUI guilty under

Count 55 and not guilty under Counts 11 27, 29 1 31 1 32 1 35, 36 and 54.

1HNAlfI 1 Jiro

MIRAMI is c~arged under Counts 1, 27, 29, ·31, 32,

54 and 55.

Ih the year 1931 ].'INAMI was a General and from

April to December he was Minister of War, Prior to the

Mukden Incident he had already associated hiPlsel_f l11ith

the conspirators in their.advocacy of militarism, of the

expansion of Japan, and of :Manchuria as "the lifeline

''of Japan". He was forewarned.of the likelihood of

the incident occurring. He was ordered to prevent it.

He took no adequate steps to prevent it. i''hen the in

cident happened he described the action of the Army as

"righteous self-defence". The Cabinet at once decided

tbat the incident must not be expanded and l'INAl'I agreed

to put the policy of the Cabinet into effect, bnt day

after day the area of the operations expanded and NINAPI

took no adequate steps to restrain the Axmy. In the

Cabinet he supported the steps taken by the Army. He

eerly advocated Japan's withdrawal from the League of

Nations, if that body should oppose the actions Japan

had taken in China. The Cabinet decided that there should

be no occupation of 1'.anchuria and no military adminis

tration. MINA!'.! knew that the Army was taking steps to

carry both those measures into effect but did nothing

to stop it, His failure to support the Premier and

Foreign J,'.inister by taking steps to control the Army led

to the downfall of the Cabinet. Thereafter he advocated

that Japan should take over the defence of !'anchuria

and Mongolia. He had already advocated that a new

state must be founded in Manchuria.

http:forewarned.of

From December 1934 to ~arch 1936 he was Commander

in-Chief" of the Kwantung Army, completed the conquest

of Manchuria, and aided in the exploitation of that part

of China for the benefit of Japan, He ~as responsible

for setting-up puppet governmen~s 1ll }'orth China and

Inner rongolia under the threllt of military action,

He was in part responsible for the development

of !'.anchuria as a base for an attack on the u.s·.s.R, and for plans f9r such an attack,

ue became Governor-General of Korea in 1936 and i~

1938 supported the prosecution or·the war afainst China 1 which he called "the Holy War", and the destruction

of the Nat1onal Govertll'lent of China,

The Tribunal finds MI~AMI guilty on Counts 1 and

27, He is not guilty ,of the charges contained in Counts

29 1 31, 32, 54 1 and 55,

imo. M1t1

The accused is indicted under Counts 1, 27, 29,

31, 32, 33, 36, 54 and 55.

He was a soldier and prior to holding the important

post of Chief of the Uilitary Affairs Bureau of the

l'inistry of War he held no appointment which involved

the making of high policy. Further, there is no evidence

that in this earlier period he, alone or with others,

tried to affect the making of high policy.

When he became Chief of the ¥ilitary Affairs Bureau

he joined the consoiracy. Concurrently with this post

he held a 111\lltiplicity of other posts from September

1939 to April 1942. During this period plannine:, pre

paring and waging wars of agression on the part of the

conspirators was at its height. He played the part ot

a principal in all these activities.

When ho became Chief of the l'.ilitary Affairs Bureau

the fighting at Nomonhan was over. He had no pert in

the waging, of this war.

~e was Chief-of-Staff in the Philippines when Japan

attacked France in French Indo-China in !:arch 1945. He

had no part in the waging of this war.

·The Tribunal finds L1TTO guilty on Counts 1, 27, ·29,

31 and 32. He is not guilty on Counts 33 and 36.

War Crimes

l'.UTO was an officer on the Staff of YATSPI from

~ove~ber 1937 to July 1938. It was during this period

that shocking atrocities were committed by the Arrrt.7 ot

)'..ATSUI in and about Nanking. We have no doubt that l'TJTO

knew, as l'ATSUI knew, that these atrocities \"are being

oClllll!itted over a period of many weeks •. His superior

took no adequate steps to stop them. In our opinion

1,186

MUTO, in his subordinate position, could take no steps

to stop them. MUTO is not responsible for this dread

ful affair.

From April 1942 to October 1944 MUTO comnanded the

Secom Imperial Guards Divislon in Northern Sumatra.

During this period 1n the area occupied by his troops

widespread atrocities were committed for which MUTO

shares responsibility. Prisoners of war end civilian

internees were starved, neglected, tortured ani murdered,

and civilians were massacred.

In October 1944 MUTO became Chief-of-Staff to

Yamashita 1n the Philippines. He held that post until

the Surrender. His position was now very different

from that which he held during the so-called "Rape of

"Nanking". He was now in a position to influence

policy. During his tenure of office as such Chiet

of-Staff a campaign of massacre, torture and other atro

cities was waged by the Japanese troops on the c1 vilian

population,·arn prisoners of war an:l. civilian internees

were starved, tortured and murdered. KUTO shares

responsibility for these gross breaches of the taws or

war. We reject his defence that he knew nothing of

these occurrences. It is wholly incredible. The Tri

bunal finis KUTO guilty on counts 54 and 55.

OKA, Taira sµm1

OICA is charged in Counts 1 1 27 1 29, 31, 32 1 ,4,

and,, ot the Indictment.

OICA was an officer in the Japanese Navy. In

October 1940 he was promoted to Rear Admiral and

became Chief or the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy

Ministry.

OICA was an active member of the conspiracy during

his terrure of office as Chief of the Naval Affairs

Bureau from October 1940 to July 1944. In this office

he was an influential member of the Liaison Conference

at which the policy of Japan was largely decided. He

participated in the formation and execution of the policy

to wage aggressive war against China and the Western

Powers.

War Crimes

There is some evidence tending to show that OYA

knew or ought to have known that war crimes were being

committed by naval personnel against prisoners of war

with lihose welfare his department wes concerned but it

falls short of the standard of proof which justifies

a conviction in criminal cases.

The Tribunal finds OKA not guilty on Counts ,4

and ,5, and guilty on Count~ 1 1 27, 29, 31 and 32.

osg. Hiroshi

OSHDiA is indicted under Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32,

$4 rnd 55. OSHDU., en Army

OSHIKA was one or the principal conspirators and

consistently supported and promoted the aims of the

main conspiracy.

He took no part in the direction of the war in

China or the Pacific War and at no time held any post

involving duties or responsibility in respect of

prisoners.

OSHil'A•s special defence is that in connection

with his activities in Germany he is protected by

diplomatic immunity and is exempt from prosecution.

Diplomatic privilege does not import immunity from

legal liability, bt>t only exemption from trial by the

Courts of the State to which an Ambassador is accredited.

In any event this immunity has no relation to crimes

against international law charged before a tribunal

having jurisdiction. The Tribunal rejects this special

defence.

The Tribunal finds OSHU'A guilty under Count 1.

He is not guilty under Counts 27. 29, 31, 32, 54 ·and 55.

suo. tenryq

The accused SATO, Kenryo 1 is charged under C01111ta ·

l, 2?, 29 1 31 1 32, 54 and 55. In 193? SATO, then a member of the Military Afta1ra

Bureau, wAs promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

In that year he was appointed an Investigator. of the

Planning Board. Thereafter in addition to his du~ies in

the Military Affairs Bureau he had other duties, not

only with the Planning Eoard 1 of which for a time he

was Secretary, but also with other bodies in greater or

less degree connected with Japan's war in Chi~a and its

contemplated wars with other countries.

The Konoye Cabinet presented the General l'obilba•

tion Law to the Diet in February 1938. SATO wes e~ployed

as an "explainer" and made a speech before the Diet in

support 0f the measure.

In February 1941 SATO was appointed Chief ,f the

Military Affairs Section of the. Military Affairs Bureau.

He was promoted to Major G.eneral in October 19410 · In

Aprii 1942 he became Chief of the V111tary Artair,

Bureau, a position of considerable importance in the

Japanese Army. This position he held until 1944~ Con•

currently he held a variety of other appointments mostly

concerned with other departments or state whose activi

ties he linked with the Ministry or War.

It was thus n,t until 1941 that SATO attained a

position which by itself enabled him to influence the

making of policy, and no evidence has been adduced that

prior to that date he had indulged in plottin, to

influence the making of policy, The crucial queatioa

is whether by that date he had become aware that Japan'•

de1igna were criminal, for thereafter he turtherod the

deTelopment and execution of theeo desfgns so fer as tw

••• able.

The ·matter h put beyond reasonable doubt by a

speech which ·sATO del~verad'in AuFUst 1938• He states

the Army point of ~iew on the war Jn China. He shows

complete !am111ar1t.Y with the detailed terms, never

revealed to Ch.in/.!, U'POn which Japan was prepared to

Mttle the war against China. These on the face or them plainly involved the abolition or the legitimate

l()"IOrnment or China, recognition-or the puppet state or

Manehulruo whose resources ~ad been by this time largely

!)XJ)lo1ted for Japan• s benefit, regimentation or tho

ec0nan7 or China tor Japan's benefit, and the stationing

of Japanese tl'oops in China to ensur.e that these illicit

gain• would not be lost. ·He states that North Chine

.would be put completely under Japan's control and its

resources-developed for national defence,,i.e. to aid

. in Japan• s military preparations. Ho predicts that

Ja.pan will go to war. with the u.s.s.R., but s!!ys she ••111 select a chance when her armaments and production

.hen Ileen eJCpanded.

This spoech. shows th11t SATO did not believe that

· Japan's actions 1n China had been dictated by the wish

to secure protection tor Japan's legitimate interests 1n

China as the.Defence·would have us believe. On the con•

tr-ery he knew that the motive tor her att11cks on China

••~ to seize the ~ealth or her neighbour. We aro of

opinion that SATO, having that guilty kno~ledge, was

clearly a member or the conspiracy from 1941 onwards.

'l'beruarter in importan~ pos~s 1n the Goverment

and as an Array CoI!llllander ha waged tiers or aggression as

charged 1n CCIIUlte 27, 29, 31, and 32.

war cr1mes There is no doubt that SATO knew of the many

protests against the behaviour or Japan's troops, tor

these protests came to his Bureau and they were dis

cussed at the bi-weekly meetings of Bureau Chiefs

in the War Ministry. TOJO presided at these meetings

and he it was who decided that action or inaction

should be taken in regard to the protests. SATO,

his subordinate, could not initiate preventive action

against the decision of his chief.

The Tribunal finds SATO guilty on Counts 1,

27, 29, 31, and 32. He is not guilty on Counts

~~~

1,193

The rccuscd is chrrrcd unecr Ccunts 1, 27, 29, 31,

12, 33, 35, 54, me' 55.

J:s tc Count 1, his rcticns rrr chrllcnge:d when he

;,rs Ministe:r tQ Chinr in 1931, rnc' 1932; when he wrs

Ccunc1llor c,f the BC'£' rd cf Mrnchurirn Affrirs; 'l'hcn he

wrs Arnbessr.drr t0 the u.s.s.R. frcn 1936 tr 1'?38; when he wrs ll'!brssrdcr tc Grert Brite.in frcM 1038 tc 1941; rnd

whe:n he wr s Anbr ssrdc,r tc Chinr during the years 1942

rnd 1943. There is n0 e:viccnce th,t he plrye:d rny ~rrt

in the !'!rking cf.pclicy rs C0unciller cf the Borrd of

14-nchurien J.ffrirs. For the: re:st ~c find thrt SHIGEMITSU,

es Minister end £nbrssrdrr, ne:ver exceeded the functirns

prc,cr tc thesr c,fficcs. During the: ycrrs l:'l:-rve n,nticned

he WPS n0t cne rf thE' censpirrt0rs. Indeed he rioerte:dly

grve rdvice to the Foreign Office v1hich l'!rs 0ppcscd to

the pelicies cf the cc,nspirrtors.

By the ye,r 1943, ~hfn he beer!"€ Foreifn Ministe:r,

the pc,licy cf the c~nspirrtors to wege certrin wrrs cf

rggressirn hrc' been settled rnd \"rs in ccurse of' execu

tion. Thererfter there WP§ nc, further fcrl'l\llrtirn ncr

develClJMent c,f thrt prlicy.

The Tribunr.l finds SHIGEMITSU n0t ruilty rn Ccunt 1.

In 1943 his ccuntry wrs engrgcd in the ~rr in the

Frcific. He wrs fUlly rwrre thrt sc frr rs JrpPn ?rs

C"ncerncd thrt wtr wr.s e wrr c,f rrfressicn, fc,r he !{new

cf the policies -:-f the crnspirrtors which hrd crused the

wrr rnd indeed hrd rften r c'viscd thrt they shc,uld net

be put intc effect. Nevertheless he nc,w plryed r prin

ciprl pert in ~rging thrt wrr until he resifnfd en 13th

l.prU, 1945.

http:Brite.in

The Tribunal finds SrlIGEMITSU guilty on Counts

27 1 29 1 31 1 32, and 33. He is not guilty on Count 37.

War Crimes

During the period from April 1943 to April 19471

when SHIGEMITSU was Fore.ign Minister, the Protecting

Powers transmitted to the Japanese Foreign Office pro

test after protest which it had received from the Allies.

These were grave protests forwarded to the Protecting

Powers by responsible a~encies of state and in ~any

cases accompanied by a wealth of detail. The matters

of protest were (1) inhumane treatment of prisoners, (2)

refusal to permit the Protecting Powers to inspect all

save a few prisoners' camps, (3) refusal to permit the

representatives of the Protecting Powers to interview

prisoners without the presence or a Japanese witness,

and (4) failure to provide information as to the names

and location of prisoners. The protests were dealt

with in the Foreign Ministry in the first place. V'here

necessary they were passed to-other ministries with re

quests for information to enable the Foreign Minister

to reply to them.

One cannot read the long correspondence between

the Japanese Foreign Office and the Protecting Powers

without suspecting that there was a sinister reason for

the failure of the Japanese military to supply their For

eirn Office with satisfactory answers to these protests,

or at the least that there was a case for an independent

inquiry by an agency other than the military, whose con

duct was in question. Protest after protest went un

answered or was only answered after months of unexplained

delay. Reminder after reminder by the Protecting Powers

went unnoticed. Those protests which were answered were

rn£t with0ut €XCeption bye deniel thrt there 1"fS Dnything

tc cr!'lplPin cf.

Now it wrs thE highest c:1erru u11l1k€ly thrt every cne

c,f the- crrn~lrints Ml"Ce by responsible pe0ple rnd ec

cr!"prnied by circuMstrnce t-nc:1 c:1eteil wrs crl'lpletely un

justified. Moreover the refusel 0f the nilitt-ry tc ~Errnit

inspectirn cf crmis, their rE.fusrl tr pe:rr;it the:

representetive:s 0f the: Protecting Pc,.•ers to interview

pri.s0ners wi thcut the. presence of e Jrpenesf wi tne:-ss, r>nd

thdr fr ilurE tC1 provide c:1etdls rf the prisnners in their

hrnc:1s gr.VE rise tc thE suspicion thrt they het'I s0rnething

t0 hiee.

ViE do no injust1c£ to SHIGI MITSU when we hrld thrt

the circUMstrnce~, es he knew theo,nrde him suspicious

thrt the trcEtment 0f the prisoners wes net rs it shculd

hrve be en, Indeed r witness fFVe evid

his CC'untry wr s e.H!llY ,invclvcc in e wrr which wr>uld

vitrlly effect its future; .rnd in the ~rtter C'f wrr

crfrc s thr t tht nilitrry ccnryl_e tdy crntrr>llec J F Plln

~hile ht ~rs Fcreign. Vinist,r sc thrt it ~rule hrve

reouirec grert rcsrlutirn fC'r rny Je~Pnese tC' CC'ndcr.n

then.

1,;197

SHIMADA I Shigetaro

Thi:; accused is chorr,cc'. unc'c,r c-,unts l, 27,

29 1 31, 32 1 ,4 ond ,,. Until Octcbi:;r 1941 SHI!JADA pleyed nothing but

tho rnlo ')f a naval officer c:irrying out his c'.uties

os such one until th~t cote ha

Wnr Cr.ir.cs

S,r:c r:ost c'isg!'aceful r.assacrcs anc' nurc'ers

of priscncrs were corTittec'. by rrcr.bcrs of the Japam"se

Novy in the isl3nds of the Pacific Oce~n 3n? ~n the

survivors of torpcc'be

SH!RATCJRI, T-,shio

The accused is indicted under Counts 1, 27, 29 1 31 1

and 32.

He entered the Japanese diplomatic service in 1914.

He first comes int~ prominence as Chief of the Infnrnati-,n

Bureau of the Foreign Office I which p-,st he held froc

October 1930 to June 1933. In that position he justified

Jap::in 1 s seizure of Manchuria to the Press -,f the world.

No doubt it was dictated to hie that he should do so, but

it is characteristic ··f the accused I s activities then and

thereafter th:it he was not cc·ntent to perf..,rn whatever

night be his duties at the t:ioment. Thus early he was ex

pressing vievis on t:iatters '."lf pclicy 1 vieHs which re11eived

consideration in high quarters. He early advccated that

Japan should withdraw from the League :if Natinns. He

supported the setting-up of a puppet governt:ient in Man

churia. From this period dates his supp-,rt of the aims

of the e"nspirocy 1 a support which he crntinued to aff0rd

for many years and by all the aeans in hls power.

He was Minister to Sweden froc June 1933 to April

1,37. Certain letters of; his show his views at this tioe.

In hi·s opinion Ru.~sian influence· should be expelled from

the Far Last by force, if necessary, and before she became

too strong to be attacked. He was further of opinion that

such foreign influences as might ·be thought to be harc:ful

to Japanese interests should be excluded from China, and

that JapaneS

!'hen the neg'ltiati'ln.s f:ir an alliance am0ng Jopan, had

Germany and ltdly/comrocnced he was epp'lintcd Ambassa

d:ir to Rome ip Septeciber 1938. In these neg'ltiations ho

collaborated with.the accused OSHIMA, then Ambassador to

Berlin, in support of the c">nspirators,, who insisted on

a genePal military alliance among those countries. He

went so far as to refuse to cc~ply with the 1nstruct1:,ns

of the Foreign 141n1ster, who wished a more limited a111~ncc

only. He and OSHIMA threatened to resign if the wishes of

the C'lnspirators were n'lt mlt.

When Japan delayed t')o long and Gcr1:1ony signed a

non-aggression pact w1 th the u. s. S. R. the negotilltions

brnkc down, for Japanese opinion C"mm0nly regarded this ai,

a breach 'lf the Anti-C'.lmintern 'pact. SHIRATCIRI returned

t" Japim v,here he carried on propaganda designed to excuse

Germany!s ncti'ln and to prepare the way f'lr -the general

military nllionce with Germany and Italy which he still.

tt.ought necessary to support Japcnesc exprmsionist nims.

In his properanda at one t 1me or another he ad vacated a 11

the objects of the conspirat,:,rs1 that Japan should

attack China, that Japon should attack Russia, that Japnn

should ally herself with Gcr1:1any and Italy, that she s},.ould

take determined acti"'n against tho '."cs.tern Powers, that

she should establtsh the "N'ew Order11 1 that she should

seize the chnncq 0ffered by the Eur'lpean '.11flr to odv1mce

t:i the South, that· she sh~uld attack Singapore, ~nd so

on. This propaganda was C'lntinued while he wes advisor

to the Foreign Offfce fr')m August 1940 t0 July 1941.

He b0ccmc ill in April 1941 and re~igned the posi ti.on

of advisor to the Foreign Office' in July of that ycE>r.

Thereafter he plays no iciportant part 1n events. The

Tribunal finds SHIRATORI-guilty on Count· l.

H~ n~vcr occupied such~· posit1Qn os W')l,lld justify

i:. finding thnt he wogcd !lflY m1r ,,f oggrcs;;ion. The

Tr1buruil finds SP.IRATCllI n~t guilty ·n c~unts 2?, 29, 31

nnd 32.

1,202

SUZUKI, Tc 11chi·, is chr,rged in CC'unts l, 27, 29, _31,

32, 35', 36, 5'4 and 5'5' 0f the Inaictr.itnt. SUZUKI wos it soldier.: A-s e Lieutenant CC'l

Gebinct rn 19 July 1944.

As Frcside:nt c::f the: Plenning Brcrc end Minister

Viithrut PcrtfC'lic, SUZ'UKI re-fulerly rttcndcd the:

rne:ctinrs C'f th, LieisC'n GC'nfcrcncc, the virturl prlicy

nekinf brc1y fer Jppen, SUZUKI v,rs i,rcs(nt et nest cf

th, in~rrtent crnfcrcnccs lcrdinf te the initiEtinf rnd

wr.fing rf er.rrc ~sivc l"rrs efeinst the l.llicd Pcwcrs.

At thesE crnfcrrnccs he rctivEly suaryertce thr crn~pirPcy.

There is nr rvieencc thrt the rccuscd VE~ rcsarnsiblo

frr th, cr~rissien cf etrrcitics.

We: fina 5UZUKI fuilty E~ chrrgrc in Grunts l, 27,

29, 31, rnd 3~, enc nrt fUilty rf Grunts 35, 36, 54 end

55,

Thr accusce TOCO is incictcc und.Er lrunts 1, 27, 29,

31, 32, 36, 54 rnc' 55,

TOGO's principrl es~rciEtirn with the crires chrrrcd

rgrir.st hiM wrs rs Frrcign Ministrr in the TOJO Ci:llinrt

frrn Octrbcr 1941 until Scptcribcr 1942 v1hen he resigned

End lrtcr in the Suzuki Cebinct rf 194~ in which h€ else

ectcd rs Frrrign Minister, During ~he intcrvrl between

his re S1fnrt1rn Encl rer::,~rintmcnt, he ::,l!'yec." nr J)E'rt in

public life,

Frcn the eftc rf his first ep:9rintrncnt until the

rutbrcek cf the Pecific 1'1er he perticipetE e in the pl!.'n

r.ing end prcperinr frr thE: 111rr, He e.ttcnc."ca Cebinct

meetings end crnf(r€nccs end crncurrcd in ell c."ecisirns

eerptrd,

As Fcrcign Ministl r he :9lrycd e. le.eel ing rclc in the

ncrctietirns viith the United StE'to ir,.r.uliFtcly i:lrE

CE:t"ing the rutbrcr.k cf the v•rr end lent hinsclf to the

plrns cf the prrpcncnts rf wer. Thr c."uplicity ,nplrycd in

thrsc nqirtietirns hes bun t'ult '\"?1th crrlicr,

.After the. rutbrcek rf the Fr.cific Wer hE 1r-lli:b,..rFtcd

with rthcr ncnbcrs rf the C1:binct in its crnduct rs wrll

ee in the v1r ging rf the VJrr in .C'lina,

In rdditirn tr the ecffncc crmrn tr rll the r.c

cuscd cf cncircltnrnt rnd ccrncnic strrngulrtirn rf

Jrpen, which hes 'been dc!'lt v1ith elsewhere, Te'JO "lfeds

spccirlly thrt he jcincd the TOJO Crbinct en the assur

rnce thet every effrrt wrule be Mrac tr brinr the nrgr

tirticns with the United Strtcs tc F successful crn

clusirn, He strt(s !'Urthcr thet frrn thr drtc rf his

trkinr rffic. he rppr1cd the Army end wu successful in

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rbtrininf frrr, thcr-, crnccss1rns ·:,h1ch enebleC b.11!! te>

keep the nerotiEtions rl1ve, However, when the nero

t1rt1ons feiled pn~ ~er becrre inevitrble, rrther thon

r£~ifn in ~retest he continuec in office end supnorted

the wrr. To do rnythinf els£ he srid woulc h,VE' been

cov-1rrdly, However hb lrter 2ct1on coM,iletely nullifies

this pler, In SepteMber 1942 he resirnee over r dispute

in the C!'binet rs to the trertMent of occuryied countries,

Werre c:'isposea to judge his ection rna sincerity in the

one crse by the srre considerrtions ,sin the other.

There is no proof of eny cririnrl rct on TOGO's prrt

es rllerea in Count 36, His only nrrt in relrtion to

thr t count V'F s to sifn the post we r rrz:eeMent between the

u,s.s.R. rnc Jq:,rn settlinf the bounarry between lfrnchurie rnd Outer Mongolie.

Wc;r CriMq

Up to his resignetion in 19A2 TOCO rooerrs to hrve

enc'ervored to sE:e to th£ observrnce of the Rulfls of WEr,

He prssec' on such protests rs crMe to hir for investi

frtion rnd in svvercl instPnces rrMec:'irl Mersurcs were

t"ken. £t thf tire of his resifnrtion ctrocities coM

r-·i tted by the Jap:mese trco'.ls hrc' not become so notorious

rs to ~ermit knowlec're to be imnuted to hiffi,

In the sprinf of 1945 ,•hen he returnee rs Foreifn

Mir.istrr there wrs ther. rn Pccur:ulrtion of protest~ ••hich

he prsscd on to the proper euthor1t€s, ThE Tribuncl is

of o~inion thrt th,re is not sufficient proof of TOC-O's

nerlect of futy in conn~ct1on ~1th ~Pr crires,

The Tribunal fin0s TOC-0 ru1.lty on Counts 1, 27, 29,

31, rnd 32, He is not Euilty on Counts 36, 54 1 rnc' ~5.

http:trco'.ls

TOJO, Hideki

The accused is charged under Counts 1,27, 29, 31,

32 1 33 1 36, 54 and 55. TOJ') becane Cbie!-ot-Staff of the Kwantung Army in

June 1937 and thereafter was associated with the con

spirators as a principal in almost all of their activities.

He planned and prepared for an attack on the

U,S,S,R,j he recommended a further onset on China in order

to free the Japanese Army from anxiety about its reaT in

the projected attack on the u,s.s,B.s he helped to organize Manc~uria as a base for that attack; never at any time

thereafter did he abandon the intention to launch such an

attack if a favourable chance should ocpur.

In May 1938 he was recalled from the field to

become Vice-Minister of War-. In addition to that office

he held a great number of appointments so that he played

ari important part in almost all aspects of the mobilisation

of the Japanese people and economy for war, At this time

he opposed suggestions for a peace of compromise with

China,

He became Minister of War in July 1940 and there

after his history is largely the history of the successive

steps by which the conspirators planned and waged wars of

aggression agoinst Japants neighbours, for he was a

principal in the making of the plans and in the waging or

the wars, He advocP.ted and furthered the aims of the

conspiracy with ability, resolution and persistency.

He became Prime Minister 1n October 1941 and

continued in that office until July 1944.

As war Minister and Premier he consistentl7 supporte•

the policy of cong_uering the Nationa 1 Government of China,..

1,207

of devEloping the resources of Chine in Jepen 1 s bEhrlf,

end of reteining JrpenesE troops in Chine to spfegurrd

for Jepen the rEsults of the wer egeinst China,

In the nq,otietions which "Oreced€d the ettEcks of

7th t€CEJ'1ber 1941 hi·s resolut€ ettitude virs thrt Jepesn

rust secure terms which woulc:' !)1'€serve for her the fruits

of her aggression egeinst Chinr md which would cc,nduce

to th€ est,blishrnent of Jepan 1 s domin?tion of Eest f.sie

end th€ Southern Arees, All his grEEt influence wes