JS S BARRIS TERS RULES...fi˛˝˙fi˙ˆˇ˘ ˇ˝ ˇ ˘ 4 JS S BA RRIS TERS RULES Jensen Shawa...

ADVOCACY IS OUR BUSINESS

Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP

JSS BA RRI STERS RULES J U L Y 2 0 1 6

Volume 2 Issue 2

Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP is pleased to provide summaries of recent Court Decisions which consider the Alberta Rules of Court. Our website, www.jssbarristers.ca, also features a Cumulative Summary of Court Decisions which consider the Alberta Rules of Court. The Cumulative Summary is organized by the Rule considered.

Below is a list of the Rules (and corresponding decisions which apply or interpret those Rules) that are addressed in the case summaries that follow.

1.2 • AMIKOILFIELDEQUIPMENT&RENTALSINCVWHITECAPRESOURCESINC,2016ABQB192

• DECOREVDECORE,2016ABQB246

• STACKARDVHARRINGTON,2016ABQB357

• URSAVENTURESVEDMONTON(CITY),2016ABCA135

• XSTECHNOLOGIESINCVVERITASDGCLANDLTD,2016ABCA165

• DEMBVVALHALLAGROUPLTD,2016ABCA172

• NEPCANADAULCVMECOPLLC,2016ABCA201

1.3 • DECOREVDECORE,2016ABQB246

• BARDVCANADIANNATURALRESOURCES,2016ABQB267

1.4 • DORNAN(RE),2016ABQB259

3.2 • MDOFOPPORTUNITYNO17VGUN-SHYINVESTMENTSINC,2016ABQB244

• CONDOMINIUMCORPORATIONNO.0729313(TRAILSOFMILLCREEK)VSCHULTZ,2016ABQB338

3.42 • GAUTHIERVSTARR,2016ABQB213

3.56 • DECOREVDECORE,2016ABQB246


• HERCHAKVENBRIDGEPIPELINESINC,2016ABQB217


• MANJIVPRASAD,2016ABQB273

• MCMORRANVHOCKETT,2016ABQB279

• EASYLOANCORPORATIONVBASEMANAGEMENT&INVESTMENTSLTD,2016ABCA163

3.65 • HERCHAKVENBRIDGEPIPELINESINC,2016ABQB217

• BORDENLADNERGERVAISLLPVCBIINVESTMENTSLTD,2016ABQB220

• WOODBUFFALOHOUSING&DEVELOPMENTCORPORATIONVALVESCONSTRUCTIONLTD,

2016ABQB249



• EASYLOANCORPORATIONVBASEMANAGEMENT&INVESTMENTSLTD,2016ABCA163



3.68 • WAQUANVCANADA(ATTORNEYGENERAL),2016ABQB191

• STONEYNAKODANATIONSVCANADA,2016ABQB193

• GAUTHIERVSTARR,2016ABQB213


ADVOCACY IS OUR BUSINESS 2

JSS BARR IST E RS RULES


3.68 • ELLMARDEVELOPMENTSLTDVBEARSPAWDEVELOPMENTINC,2016ABQB221

• GRENONVCANADAREVENUEAGENCY,2016ABQB260


• CONDOMINIUMCORPORATIONNO0729313(TRAILSOFMILLCREEK)VSCHULTZ,2016ABQB338


• BORDENLADNERGERVAISLLPVCBIINVESTMENTSLTD,2016ABQB220

• HARTWELLVTAYLOR,2016ABQB289

4.1 • URSAVENTURESVEDMONTON(CITY),2016ABCA135






4.10 • IMPERIALOILVFLATIRONCONSTRUCTORS,2016ABQB310

4.22 • MCMORRANVHOCKETT,2016ABQB279

• MILAVSKYVMILAVSKYESTATE,2016ABQB333

4.24 • STEWARTESTATEVTAQANORTHLTD,2016ABCA144

4.29 • KITCHINGVDEVLIN,2016ABQB212

• MIKKELESENVTRUMANDEVELOPMENTCORPORATION,2016ABQB255

• PARKAVENUEFLOORINGINCVELLISDONCONSTRUCTIONSERVICESINC,2016ABQB332

4.31 • STACKARDVHARRINGTON,2016ABQB357

• RO-DARCONTRACTINGLTDVVERBEEKSAND&GRAVELINC,2016ABCA123






• WEAVERVCHERNIAWSKY,2016ABCA152



5.2 • BARDVCANADIANNATURALRESOURCES,2016ABQB267






• KOHANVKOHAN,2016ABCA125



5.10 • PARKAVENUEFLOORINGINCVELLISDONCONSTRUCTIONSERVICESINC,2016ABQB332


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5.22 • XSTECHNOLOGIESINCVVERITASDGCLANDLTD,2016ABCA165



5.31 • WEATHERFORDCANADAPARTNERSHIPVADDIE,2016ABQB188

• KITCHINGVDEVLIN,2016ABQB212



5.36 • KITCHINGVDEVLIN,2016ABQB212

• GEOPHYSICALSERVICEINCORPORATEDVENCANACORPORATION,2016ABQB230

6.3 • AMIKOILFIELDEQUIPMENT&RENTALSINCVWHITECAPRESOURCESINC,2016ABQB192

• IMPERIALOILVFLATIRONCONSTRUCTORS,2016ABQB310



6.14 • FELDMANVBENDLEGLASSCO(1975)LTD,2016ABQB219

• BUSINESSBLOSSOMSINCVBLOSSOMSFRESHFRUITARRANGEMENTSLTD,2016ABQB275

• LINDECANADALIMITEDVLUFFINDUSTRIESLTD,2016ABQB298

• FELDMANVBENDLEGLASSCO(1975)LTD,2016ABQB321

6.37 • ELKOWVSANA,2016ABQB235

7.1 • MDOFOPPORTUNITYNO17VGUN-SHYINVESTMENTSINC,2016ABQB244

• NEPCANADAULCVMECOPLLC,2016ABCA201


• 336239ALBERTALTD(DAVE’SDIESELREPAIR)VMELLA,2016ABQB190

• AMIKOILFIELDEQUIPMENT&RENTALSINCVWHITECAPRESOURCESINC,2016ABQB192

• STONEYNAKODANATIONSVCANADA,2016ABQB193


• ELLMARDEVELOPMENTSLTDVBEARSPAWDEVELOPMENTINC,2016ABQB221

• 1059028ALBERTALTDVCAPIOOILFIELDSERVICESLTD,2016ABQB234

• ELKOWVSANA,2016ABQB235

• MDOFOPPORTUNITYNO17VGUN-SHYINVESTMENTSINC,2016ABQB244


• WOODBUFFALOHOUSING&DEVELOPMENTCORPORATIONVALVESCONSTRUCTIONLTD,

2016ABQB249

• BUSINESSBLOSSOMSINCVBLOSSOMSFRESHFRUITARRANGEMENTSLTD,2016ABQB275

• ALBERTAVGRETER,2016ABQB293

• LINDECANADALIMITEDVLUFFINDUSTRIESLTD,2016ABQB298

• CONDOMINIUMCORPORATIONNO0729313(TRAILSOFMILLCREEK)VSCHULTZ,2016ABQB338

• CLEARHILLSDEVELOPMENTCORPORATIONVHORSEMAN,2016ABQB341






9.13 • WAQUANVCANADA(ATTORNEYGENERAL),2016ABQB280

9.15 • POLOMAINVESTMENTSLTDVYUEN,2016ABCA93

9.24 • 336239ALBERTALTD(DAVE’SDIESELREPAIR)VMELLA,2016ABQB190


• GEOPHYSICALSERVICEINCORPORATEDVENCANACORPORATION,2016ABQB229


• ETVROCKYMOUNTAINPLAYTHERAPYINSTITUTEINC,2016ABQB299

• VOISEYVCANADA(ATTORNEYGENERAL),2016ABQB316



• TURNERVBELLMOBILITYINC,2016ABCA188

10.31 • GEOPHYSICALSERVICEINCORPORATEDVENCANACORPORATION,2016ABQB229





• WAYMARKERMANAGEMENT(SILVERCREEK)INCVTIBU,2016ABCA118

• MAVCOYNE,2016ABCA119

• STEWARTESTATEVTAQANORTHLTD,2016ABCA144

10.32 • TURNERVBELLMOBILITYINC,2016ABCA188

10.33 • GEOPHYSICALSERVICEINCORPORATEDVENCANACORPORATION,2016ABQB229







10.41 • PARKAVENUEFLOORINGINCVELLISDONCONSTRUCTIONSERVICESINC,2016ABQB332

• MAVCOYNE,2016ABCA119

10.48 • MCMORRANVHOCKETT,2016ABQB279

10.52 • ROVDF,2016ABCA170


12.36 • MILAVSKYVMILAVSKYESTATE,2016ABQB333

13.4 • IBUVLAH,2016ABCA108



• GAUTHIERVSTARR,2016ABQB213



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13.18 • 1059028ALBERTALTDVCAPIOOILFIELDSERVICESLTD,2016ABQB234

• CONDOMINIUMCORPORATIONNO.0729313(TRAILSOFMILLCREEK)VSCHULTZ,2016ABQB338

• CLEARHILLSDEVELOPMENTCORPORATIONVHORSEMAN,2016ABQB341

14.2 • EASYLOANCORPORATIONVBASEMANAGEMENT&INVESTMENTSLTD,2016ABCA163


14.5 • KEVCSM,2016ABQB342

• SETTLEMENTLENDERSINCVBLICHARZ,2016ABCA109

• CONDOMINIUMCORPORATIONNO0311443VGOERTZ,2016ABCA167




14.15 • BARRYVINSTITUTEOFCHARTEREDACCOUNTANTSOFALBERTA(COMPLAINTSINQUIRY

COMMITTEE),2016ABCA89



• IBUVLAH,2016ABCA108








14.38 • CONDOMINIUMCORPORATIONNO0311443VGOERTZ,2016ABCA167

14.45 • PINTEAVJOHNS,2016ABCA99

• ROVDF,2016ABCA170









14.88 • MAVCOYNE,2016ABCA119


15.3 • WEAVERVCHERNIAWSKY,2016ABCA152






SCHEDULE C • MIKKELESENVTRUMANDEVELOPMENTCORPORATION,2016ABQB255



• VOISEYVCANADA(ATTORNEYGENERAL),2016ABQB316




AMIK OILFIELD EQUIPMENT & RENTALS INC V WHITECAP RESOURCES INC, 2016 ABQB 192 (MASTER MASON)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of these Rules), 6.3 (Applications Generally) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)

ThePlaintiffsoldandservicedoilfieldequipment.The

PlaintiffcommencedanActionagainsttheDefendant

afteritallegedlyrefusedtotakedeliveryof,andpayfor,

custombuiltequipmentwhichtheyorderedfromthe

Plaintiff.ThePlaintiffappliedforSummaryJudgment

forthepurchasepriceoftheequipment,plusinterest

andCosts.TheDefendantarguedthatanamendment

ApplicationshouldhavebeenbroughtpriortotheSummary

JudgmentApplicationinordertoincludeadditionalclaims

withrespecttoacontractbetweenthepartiesmadein

December2014.

MasterMasonstatedthatthisapproachisinconsistent

withRule1.2(3)(a)whichrequiresthepartiestoidentify

therealissuesindisputeandtofacilitatethequickest

meansofresolvingtheclaimattheleastexpense.Master

MasonobservedthattheDefendantsunderstoodtheclaims

broughtbythePlaintiff,andtheSummaryJudgment

ApplicationcompliedwithRule6.3(2).

MasterMasonnotedthatSummaryJudgmentisgoverned

byRule7.3,andthatAlbertahasalonghistoryoftaking

arobustapproachtoSummaryJudgment.TheCourtnoted

thatSummaryJudgmentisnolongerdeniedsolelyon

thebasisthattheevidencedisclosesatriableissue.The

Courtnowaskswhetherthereisanyissueofmeritthat

genuinelyrequiresaTrialor,conversely,whethertheclaim

ordefenceissocompellingthatthelikelihoodthatitwill

succeedisveryhighsuchthatitshouldbedetermined

summarily.TheCourtalsoshouldconsiderwhetheran

examinationoftheexistingrecordcanleadtoafairand

justdisposition.Thestandardforfairnessisnotwhether

theprocessisasexhaustiveasaTrial,butwhetheritgives

theJudgeconfidencethatthenecessaryfactscanbefound

andtherelevantlegalprinciplescanbeapplied.TheCourt

istopresumethebestevidencefrombothsidesisbefore

it,andthepartyfacedwithanApplicationforSummary

Judgmentmustputitsbestfootforward.Thekeyiswhether

thecircumstancesrequirevivavoceevidenceinorderto

properlyresolvethecase.

Followinganexaminationoftheevidenceontherecord,

MasterMasongrantedSummaryJudgmentinfavourofthe

Plaintiff.

DECORE V DECORE, 2016 ABQB 246 (MICHALYSHYN J)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules), 1.3 (General Authority of the Court to Provide Remedies), 3.56 (Right to Counterclaim), 7.3 (Summary Judgment) and 13.6 (Pleadings: General Requirements)

Thepartieswereinvolvedinacomplexdisputeovertheir

latemother’swillandestate.Followinglengthysurrogate

proceedings,thePlaintiffscommencedanActionagainst

theDefendants,andtheDefendantscounterclaimed.

ThepartiesthenfiledcompetingSummaryJudgment

Applicationsagainsteachother.

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Volume 2 Issue 2


MichalyshynJ.consideredtheSummaryJudgment

ApplicationsandobservedthatthelegaltestforSummary

Judgmentisnowsettled,andfollowedtheprinciplesset

outinHryniak v Mauldin,2014SCC7.JusticeMichalyshyn

referredtorecentauthorities,andheldthatthequestionis

whetherthereisanyissueofmeritthat“genuinelyrequires

atrial”or“whethertheclaimordefenceissocompelling

thatthelikelihooditwillsucceedisveryhigh”.Thetest

forSummaryJudgmentrequirestheCourttoexaminethe

availablefactsanddetermineifafairandjustdisposition

canbemadeontheexistingrecord.JusticeMichalyshyn

reviewedtheavailableevidenceandstatedthatitwasnot

sufficienttoallowtheCourttomakethenecessaryfindings

offacttosupportthePlaintiffs’case.ThePlaintiffs’

SummaryJudgmentApplicationwasdismissed.

BeforeexaminingtheDefendant’sCounterclaimand

SummaryJudgmentApplicationonthemerits,Michalyshyn

J.consideredtwothresholdissuesraisedbythePlaintiffs.

OneoftheCounter-Claimantswasnotnamedasa

DefendantintheStatementofClaim.ThePlaintiffsargued

that,basedonRule3.56(1),onlyanamedDefendantcan

advanceaCounterclaim.TheCourtagreedthatwhilethere

wasastrongappealtotheconceptofaddinganewPlaintiff

byCounterclaimtoensurethatallnecessarypartiesare

beforetheCourt,toallowaCounterclaimmadebyanon-

partywouldineffect“re-write”Rule3.56(1).

InordertoresolvewhetherthenewCounter-Claimant

couldbeadded,JusticeMichalyshynconsidereds.8of

theJudicature Act,RSA2000,cJ-2,andnotedthatthe

CourtshavebeenmindfulofthepurposeoftheRulesasset

outinRule1.2,whichistofacilitatethe“quickestmeans

ofresolvingaclaimattheleastexpense”,toprovide“an

effective,efficient,andcrediblesystemofremediesand

sanctions”and,mostimportantly,assetoutinRule1.2(1),

to“provideameansbywhichclaimscanbefairlyand

justlyresolved”.TheJudicature Act,ats.8,grantstheCourt

thepowertodeterminemattersindisputeandtoavoida

multiplicityofproceedings.Further,Rule1.3(1)allowsthe

CourttogiveanyreliefdescribedintheJudicature Actor

theRules.Rule1.3(2)specificallystatesthattheCourt

maygrantaremedywhetherornotitissoughtinanAction.

JusticeMichalyshynultimatelyagreedwiththePlaintiffs

thatthereachofs.8oftheJudicature Act“stopsshort

ofaffectinglegislatedrules”andthereforeRule3.56(1)

effectivelydisallowedaJudicature Actremedyinthiscase.

HisLordshipheldthatthepartieswereessentiallyengaged

inestatelitigation.Asaresult,theSurrogate RulesAlta

Reg130/1995alsoapplied.TheSurrogate Rules,at

s.2,preservestheCourt’sdiscretiontovaryanyRule

whereappropriate,andwhereitwouldservetheendsof

justice.HisLordshipheldthattheSummaryJudgment

Applicationsinthiscaseshouldhavebeenbroughtunder

theSurrogate Rules,andobservedthatRule3.56(1)

appliesspecificallytoCourtActions,Actionscommenced

bywayofaStatementofClaim,andCounterclaims.Asa

resultofthebroadapplicabilityoftheSurrogate Rules,it

wasunnecessarytoapplyaspecificprovisionoftheRules

ofCourt,suchasRule3.56(1).Therefore,thenewparty

couldbeaddedasaCounter-Claimant.

ThePlaintiffsarguedfurtherthattheCounterclaims

werebarredbytheLimitation Act,RSA200cL-11.The

Plaintiffsdidnotraisethisargumentuntiltheirwritten

submissionsbeforetheCourtandtheDefendantsargued

thatthePlaintiffsviolatedRule13.6(3)(q).Michalyshyn

J.statedthatthattheCounterclaimswerenecessaryand

desirableinthiscase,andallowedtheCounterclaimsto

stand.

Finally,JusticeMichalyshynconsideredthemeritsofthe

Defendants’SummaryJudgmentApplicationandheldthat

therewasinsufficientevidencebeforetheCourttofind

fortheDefendants.TheDefendants’SummaryJudgment

Applicationwasaccordinglydismissed.

STACKARD V HARRINGTON, 2016 ABQB 357 (BAST J)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules), 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay), 4.33 (Dismissal for Long Delay) and 4.34 (Stay of Proceedings on Transfer or Transmission of Interest)

ThePlaintiffsappealedfromaMaster’sdecisiondismissing

theirApplicationunderRule4.33.Themainissuebefore

theMasterandonappealwaswhethertheActionwas

significantlyadvancedsincetheDefendants’filingofits




StatementofDefenceonNovember29,2011.Oneof

thePlaintiffs,Stackard,hadpassedawayonDecember

31,2011;assuch,theActionwasautomaticallystayed

underRule4.34.Ms.Dorathwasappointedpersonal

representativeofthePlaintiff’sestate,andsheobtainedan

ex parteOrderendingtheStayandpermittingtheAction

tocontinueunderRule4.34(2).However,theOrderwas

onlyservedonpreviouscounselforthePlaintiffs.Justice

BastnotedthatRule4.34(3)requiressuchanOrdertobe

servedonallpartiesassoonasitisreceived.

TheDefendantsbroughtanApplicationunderRule4.33

onJuly15,2015,overthreeyearsandsevenmonthssince

thefilingoftheStatementofDefence.TheDefendants

wereservedwiththeex parteOrderendingtheStaya

monthafterfilingtheirRule4.33Application.TheMaster

dismissedtheRule4.33Applicationonthegroundsthat:

(1)Ms.DorathhadintendedtoservetheOrderuponall

parties;and(2)obtainingtheOrderwasa“requiredstep”

undertheRules,whichsignificantlyadvancedtheAction.

BastJ.,referringtopriorauthority,notedthataStay

pursuanttoRule4.34doesnotexpresslystoptherunning

oftheclockunderRule4.33.Further,thereferencetoRule

4.31pointstothefactthat,ifaStayremainsinplacewith

noOrdertocontinuetheAction,aDefendantmayapply

forreliefunderRule4.31notwithstandingtheStay.Bast

J.observedthatthelawwithrespecttoRule4.33had

changedrecently.PriorleadingCourtofAppealauthority

heldthatRule4.33requiresafunctionalapproachrather

thananoveremphasisonformalisticsteps,andthat

anything“requiredbytheRules”doesnotnecessarily

significantlyadvancetheAction.Further,thefunctional

approachisconsistentwithFoundationalRule1.2.

Consequently,BastJ.heldthatrelianceontheOrderas

beinga“mandatory”stepwhichthereforeadvancedthe

actionwasinerror.LiftingtheStaywasonlyrequiredifthe

PlaintiffEstatewishedtocontinuewiththelitigation;itwas

notamandatorystep.HerLadyshipalsonotedthatthestep

hadnotevenbeenproperlycompleted.TheAppealwas

grantedandthePlaintiff’sActionwasdismissed.

URSA VENTURES V EDMONTON (CITY), 2016 ABCA 135 (MARTIN, ROWBOTHAM AND WAKELING JJA)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules), 4.1 (Responsibilities of Parties to Manage Litigation), 4.3 (Categories of Court Action), 4.4 (Standard Case Obligations), 4.5 (Complex Case Obligations), 4.6 (Settling Disputes About Complex Case Litigation Plans), 4.8 (Court May Categorize Actions), 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay), 4.33 (Dismissal for Long Delay), 5.6 (Form and Contents of Affidavit of Records) and 5.15 (Admissions of Authenticity of Records)

TheApplicantappealedaDecisionwhichheldthatthe

Respondent’sAffidavitofRecordssignificantlyadvanced

theActionforthepurposesofRule4.33.RowbothamJ.A.,

forthemajority,discussedthepurposesofRule4.33and

observedthatapurposiveapproachshouldbetakenwhen

determiningapplicationsunderRule4.33,inkeepingwith

thefoundationalprinciplesunderlyingtheRulesofCourt,

particularlyinRule1.2.RowbothamJ.A.statedthatCourts

mustlookatwhetherornotthesubstanceofthesteptaken

advancestheAction,andthatthissameanalysisshouldbe

madewhetherornotthestepismandatedbytheRulesof

Court.JusticeRowbothamreviewedthedistinctionbetween

Rule4.31andRule4.33,statingthatRule4.31canbe

triggeredbyprejudicewhereasRule4.33actsasasortof

limitationsperiodandistheretoterminateActionsthat

have“trulydied”.TheCourtcautionedthatasteptaken

undertheRules,suchasservinganAffidavitofRecords,

willnotautomaticallysignificantlyadvanceactionsforthe

purposeofRule4.33.

RowbothamJ.A.heldthat,althoughmanyofthedocuments

producedintheAffidavitofRecordswererecordsthatthe

Applicantalreadyhadinitspossession,oneelementof

Rule5.6(2)(e)isthatapartymustcertifythatithasno

otherdocuments,whichconfirmsthattheopposingpartyis

awareoftheextentoftheparty’sproduction,andensures

thatthereareno“surprise”documentsthatariselaterin

thelitigation.Further,Rule5.5requiresthattheparties

makeadmissionsaboutthevalidityandauthenticityof

thedocumentsinanAffidavitofRecords.Whenaparty

includestheopposingparty’sdocumentsintheirAffidavit

ofRecords,itisadmittingtotheirauthenticity.

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Volume 2 Issue 2


TheAppealwasdismissedandtheCourtorderedthatthe

RespondentfileafurtherandbetterAffidavitofRecords,

andthattheyservetheApplicantwithaLitigationPlanin

accordancewithRule4.4(2).

Indissent,WakelingJ.A.notedthatthereisalinedividing

acceptableandunacceptabledelaybyaparty,andthat

theRespondent’sdelayinservingitsAffidavitofRecords

wasunacceptable.WakelingJ.A.statedthattheCourt

shouldnothavetoleranceforplaintiffswhodonotadvance

theiractionsinatimelyandconsistentmanner,andthat

Courtsshouldbecomeinvolvedwiththeseactionsby

wayofLitigationPlansinordertomoveactionsalong.

Toemphasizethis,WakelingJ.A.citedRule4.1,which

providesthatthepartiesareresponsibleformanaging

theirdisputeandplanningitsresolutioninatimelyand

cost-effectiveway;Rule4.3,whichcategorizestypesof

CourtActions;Rules4.4and4.5,whichdelineatebetween

standardcaseobligationsandcomplexcaseobligations;

Rule4.8,whichprovidesthataCourtmaydirecthowa

caseistobecategorized;andRule4.6,whichprovides

thataprudentPlaintiffmayasktheCourttograntanOrder

settlingdisputesaboutcomplexLitigationPlans.Wakeling

J.A.didnotfindtheRespondenttobeareasonablydiligent

PlaintiffandwouldhaveallowedtheAppeal.

XS TECHNOLOGIES INC V VERITAS DGC LAND LTD, 2016 ABCA 165 (PAPERNY, ROWBOTHAM AND MCDONALD JJA)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules), 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay), 4.33 (Dismissal for Long Delay), 5.22 (Questioning Options), 5.28 (Written Questions), 5.29 (Acknowledgment of Corporate Witness’s Evidence), 15.4 (Dismissal for Long Delay: Bridging Provisions) and 15.15 (Coming into Force)

TheActionwascommencedin2002.InMay2009,

theDefendantprovidedAnswerstoUndertakingsgiven

atQuestioning.InAugust2013,thePlaintiffsentthe

DefendantaNoticeofWrittenQuestioningandcopiesof

documentslistedintheAppellant’sAffidavitofRecords

inelectronicformat.OnAugust30,2013,thePlaintiff

servedaSupplementalAffidavitofRecords.OnNovember

4,2013,theDefendantfiledanApplicationtoDismissfor

LongDelay.TheChambersJudgefoundthatthelaststep

whichsignificantlyadvancedtheActionwastheResponse

toUndertakingsinMay2009.Accordingly,theActionwas

dismissedunderRule4.33.TheChambersJudgealsoheld

thatthedelayintheActionwasinordinateandinexcusable

suchthatsignificantprejudicecouldbepresumed,

warrantingdismissingtheActionunderRule4.31.The

Plaintiffappealed.

ThePlaintiffarguedthattheChambersJudgeerredin

applyingRule4.33ratherthanTransitionalRule15.4.

TheCourtofAppealheldthatbecauseRule4.33came

intoforcebeforetheDefendantbroughtitsApplication

toDismissforLongDelaythatRule4.33applied.The

CourtofAppealconsideredthePlaintiff’sargument

thattheChambersJudgemisappliedthetestforlong

delay,andheldthataChambersJudge’sconclusionwith

respecttowhetherastephassignificantlyadvancedan

Actionisentitledtodeference.TheCourtnotedthatthe

considerationofwhetherastepadvancesanActioninvolves

afunctionalanalysisastothenature,quality,genuineness,

timing,andoutcomeofthesteptaken.ThePlaintiffalso

assertedthattheDefendanthadfailedtoadvanceits

Counterclaim,andthisinactionnegatedthePlaintiff’s

failuretotakeanystepsinitsownAction.TheCourtof

Appealheldthat,notwithstandingRule1.2,aPlaintiff

bearstheultimateresponsibilityforprosecutingitsClaim.

TheDefendant’sfailuretomovethelitigationforwarddid

notexcusethePlaintiff’sinaction.

ThePlaintiffhadQuestionedanemployeeofthe

Respondentin2008.InAugust2013,thePlaintiff

servedaNoticeofWrittenQuestioningpursuantto

Rules5.22and5.29,appending258questionsand

theemployee’sanswers.TheNoticerequestedthatthe

Defendantacknowledgethattheevidenceoftheemployee

tothosequestionsformedsomeoftheinformationofthe

Respondent.TheChambersJudgeconcludedthatthe

NoticewassimilartoaNoticetoAdmitFacts,andwithout

anacknowledgement,itdidnotsignificantlyadvancethe

Action.Rule5.29statesthatevidencegivenbyacorporate

witnessmaynotbereadinasevidenceatTrialunlessa

corporaterepresentativeunderoathacknowledgesthat

theevidenceformstheinformationofthecorporation.A




corporationmayrefusetoacknowledgesomeorallofthe

evidencegivenbyawitnesspursuanttoRule5.29(2).Rule

5.29doesnotimposeatimelimitforacknowledgementor

theconsequencesforthefailuretoacknowledge.

Asaresult,theCourtofAppealheldthattheChambers

JudgedidnoterrinlikeningtheNoticeofWritten

Questioningandrequestforacknowledgementtoa

NoticetoAdmitFacts.ItisnottheNoticetoAdmitthat

significantlyadvancestheAction,itistheadmission,or

unreasonablerefusaltoadmit,oralapseoftimewithno

replywhichconstitutestheadvancementoftheAction.In

theresult,theAppealwasdismissed.

DEMB V VALHALLA GROUP LTD, 2016 ABCA 172 (ROWBOTHAM, MCDONALD AND SCHUTZ JJA)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules), 5.2 (When Something is Relevant and Material), 5.6 (Form and Contents of Affidavit of Records) and 10.52 (Declaration of Civil Contempt)

ThePlaintiffsobtainedanOrderwhichexplicitlyset

outthattheRespondentswereeachrequiredtoprepare

andswearafurtherandbetterAffidavitofRecords.

TheDefendantsproducedheavilyredacteddocuments,

andproducedaharddrivewithoutproperlylistingthe

documentsinthescheduletotheAffidavitofRecords.The

PlaintiffsappliedunsuccessfullybeforeaCaseManagement

JudgetoholdtheDefendantsinContempt,pursuantto

Rule10.52.TheCaseManagementJudgedismissedthe

ContemptApplicationonthebasisthatitwaspremature

andtheOrderdidnotgivetheDefendantsanultimatum

whichwouldreasonablyleadthemtobelievethatfailingto

complywouldresultinJudgmentagainstthem.Subsequent

totheseevents,oneoftheDefendantssworeanAffidavitin

supportofaSummaryDismissalApplicationwhichattached

asexhibitsanumberofinvoicesandothersupporting

documentationwhichhadnotbeenpreviouslyproduced.

ThePlaintiffsappliedasecondtimeforContempt,butthis

wasalsodismissedbytheCaseManagementJudge.The

PlaintiffsappealedthesecondOrder.

TheCourtofAppealheldthattheCaseManagementJudge

haderredindismissingtheApplicationforContemptand

grantedtheAppeal.ThesecondOrderwasgrantedinthe

contextofthepriorOrderwhichexplicitlysetoutthatthe

Respondents“shalleachprepareandswearafurtherand

betterAffidavitofRecords”.OnlyoneoftheDefendants

sworeanAffidavitofRecordsonbehalfofallthem.Further,

theDefendants’failuretopreviouslyproducerelevant

documents,asdeterminedbyRule5.2,thattheyrelied

onfortheirownSummaryDismissalApplication,wasin

clearbreachoftheOrderandtheirobligationstocomply

withRule5.6.TheRespondentswerethereforefoundin

contempt.TheCourtofAppealreferredtoFoundational

Rule1.2andstatedthattheRulesmustbeinterpretedand

appliedinamannerthatpromotesaccesstojusticeand

encouragesearlydisclosure.Thematterwasreturnedtothe

CaseManagementJudgetoimposetheappropriatepenalty

forthecontempt.

NEP CANADA ULC V MEC OP LLC, 2016 ABCA 201 (SLATTER, BIELBY AND O’FERRALL JJA)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules) and 7.1 (Application to Resolve Particular Questions or Issues)

ThepartieswereinvolvedintworelatedActions.Inone

oftheActions(the“MeritAction”)theCaseManagement

Judgeorderedthatasinglediscreteissuebetried

separatelyandinadvanceofthebalanceoftheTrialwith

thesecondAction(the“CarrAction”).TheDefendantsin

theMeritActionappealedtheOrderwhichseveredthe

issues(whichresultedintwoTrials)onthebasisthatthe

evidencedidnotmeettherequirementsunderRule7.1in

ordertopermittheTrialofadirectedissue.Theyargued

thatitwouldnotresultinthedispositionofallorpart

oftheclaim,wouldnotsubstantiallyshortenthelength

ofTrialfortheremainingissues,andwouldnotdefray

expense.

TheCourtofAppealnotedthattoordertheTrialofan

issue,aJudgemustbeconvincedthattheseveranceof

theissueislikelytoorhasagoodprobabilityofsatisfying

oneormoreoftherequirementsinRule7.1.TheCourtof

AppealreviewedwhethertheOrderunderAppealwould

resolveallorpartoftheClaim,shortentheTrialorsave

expense,andconsideredwhethertherewasanyprejudiceto

afairhearing.TheCourtagreedwiththeCaseManagement

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Volume 2 Issue 2


JudgethatRule7.1mustbeviewedthroughthelensof

FoundationalRule1.2,andthattheRulesareintendedto

beusedtofacilitatethequickestmeansofresolvingaclaim

attheleastexpense.

TheCourtofAppealconcludedthat,whileinsome

situationsafullTrialonallissuesisrequiredandis

proportionatetothereliefsought,theCaseManagement

Judgewasnotunreasonableinconcludingthatthiswas

notoneofthosecases.TheCourtofAppealstatedthat

“considerationofthequickestmeanstoresolveadispute

isentirelyconsistentwiththewordingofRule7.1”.The

Appealwasdismissed.

BARD V CANADIAN NATURAL RESOURCES, 2016 ABQB 267 (NIXON J)Rules 1.3 (General Authority of the Court to Provide Remedies), 3.62 (Amending Pleadings), 3.65 (Permission of Court to Amendment Before or After Close of Pleadings), 5.2 (When Something is Relevant and Material), 5.3 (Modification or Waiver of this Part), 5.5 (When Affidavit of Records Must be Served), 5.6 (Form and Contents of Affidavit of Records), 13.6 (Pleadings: General Requirements) and 13.7 (Pleadings: Other Requirements)

Inadisputerelatedtoanoilsandsproject,thePlaintiffs,

(“Devon”)appliedforpermissiontoamendtheirStatement

ofClaimandtocompeltheDefendants,(“CNRL”)to

producecertainrecords.

CNRLconsentedtosomeoftheamendmentssoughtby

DevonwhichwereallowedpursuanttoRule3.62.Nixon

J.consideredwhethertheremainderoftheamendments

couldbegrantedpursuanttoRule3.65,andnotedthat

thegeneralruleisthatanypleadingmaybeamended,no

matterhowcarelessorlate,subjecttofourexceptions:

(1)theamendmentwouldcauseseriousprejudicenot

compensableincosts;(2)theamendmentishopelessand

wouldhavebeenstruck;(3)theamendmentseekstoadd

apartyorcauseofactionoutsidealimitationperiod;and

(4)thereisanelementofbadfaithinthefailuretoplead

theamendmentinthefirstplace.NixonJ.notedthatthe

evidentiaryburdeninseekingtoamendislow,butthe

amendmentsmusthavesomefoundationinfact.Justice

Nixonconsideredeachamendment,andheldthatmost

couldbeallowedwiththeexceptionofseveralparagraphs

whichwerehopelessastheyallegedthatCNRL’sconduct

inthelitigationamountedtobadfaith.NixonJ.statedthat

thereisnofiduciarydutyowedbetweenpartiestolitigation,

noracontractualdutytoactingoodfaith.Misconduct

duringthelitigationgivesrisetoaremedyofCostsonly,not

punitivedamages.

Someoftheamendmentsallegedbadfaithinrespectof

CNRL’spre-litigationconduct.ThepartiesandtheCourt

agreedthatamendmentsallegingfraudorbadfaithwere

subjecttoahigherthresholdofproof.However,wherethe

amendmentsparticularizeanexistingcauseofaction,this

requirementisrelaxed.NixonJ.notedthatthisexception

wasconsistentwiththetechnicalrequirementsfor

PleadingsinRules13.6and13.7:partiesmustpleadthose

causesofactionwhichmaytaketheotherpartybysurprise.

Theamendmentsrelatedtobadfaithwereallowed.CNRL

objectedtootherproposedamendmentsonthegrounds

thattheyaddedremedieswhichwerenotinitiallypleaded.

NixonJ.allowedtheamendmentsonthebasisthatRule

1.3givestheCourtdiscretiontograntremedieswhether

pleadedornot,andthisdiscretionextendedtoallowing

amendmentstopleadnewremedies.JusticeNixonheld

thattheremainderoftheamendmentsdidnotcause

seriousprejudicewhichcouldnotbecompensatedwith

costs,werenotbarredbytheLimitations Act,RSA2000,

cL-12,andwerenothopelessorproposedinbadfaith.

TheseamendmentswereallowedpursuanttoRule3.65.

Devonalsosoughtproductionofanumberofelectronic

recordsrelatedtotheoilsandsproject.CNRLresisted

productiononthegroundsthat:(1)therecordswerenot

relevantandmaterial,(2)thattherecordshadalready

beenproducedinadifferentformat,(3)thattherecords

werenotreadilyavailableandarequesttoproduce

3,516nativespreadsheetswouldcauseanundueburden

disproportionatetotheprobativevalueoftherecords,and

(4)thatDevonhadenoughrecordstoaccomplishtheir

objectiveofreconstructingthejointaccountwithoutfurther

production.ThepartiesagreedthatRule5.2governed

relevanceandmateriality.NixonJ.notedthatthestarting

pointforassessmentsofrelevanceandmaterialitywas




aStatementofDefencewascommonlyextendedasa

courtesybetweencounsel.UnderRule5.12,thepenalty

forlateproductionofanAffidavitofRecordswasusually

amonetarysanction,butthissanctionwasnotabsolute

andcouldbeavoidedwith“sufficientcause”.TheCourt

notedseveralcaseswhereanextensionoftimewasgranted

forfilinganAffidavitofRecordsandconcludedthatthe

efficienciesoftimeandexpensesupportedgrantingaStay

inthisinstance.

MD OF OPPORTUNITY NO 17 V GUN-SHY INVESTMENTS INC, 2016 ABQB 244 (MASTER SCHLOSSER)Rules 3.2 (How to Start an Action), 7.1 (Application to Resolve Particular Questions or Issues) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)

TheApplicant,MunicipalDistrictofOpportunityNo.17,

broughtanOriginatingApplicationseekingthereturnof

landswhichhadbeenconveyedtotheRespondent,Gun-

ShyInvestmentsInc.,fordevelopmentinaccordancewith

adetailedcontractbetweentheparties(the“Agreement”).

TheAgreementcontainedanoptiontorepurchaseinthe

eventthattheRespondentdidnotmeetthecontractual

deadlinesorconditions.Bythefirstanniversaryofthe

Agreement,theRespondenthadnotcompletedanyofthe

stepsrequiredundertheAgreement,andtheApplicant

electedtorescindtheAgreementandtoexerciseitsoption

torepurchase.

TheRespondentbroughtaCross-ApplicationunderRule

3.2(6)seekingaconversionoftheOriginatingApplication

toanActionbroughtbyStatementofClaim,arguingthat

therewerefactsindisputewhichnecessitatedaTrial.

MasterSchlossernotedthatCourtsarewellabletodeal

withfactualissuesarisingonanOriginatingApplication.

MasterSchlossercommentedthattheOriginating

ApplicationprocedureissimilartoaSummaryJudgment

Application,exceptthatthestandardofproofishigheron

anApplicationforSummaryJudgment.MasterSchlosser

observedthatsomeCourtshaveputthestandardfor

SummaryJudgmentApplicationsat80%,whereasthe

thresholdonanOriginatingApplicationis51%.Assuch,an

OriginatingApplicationisanalogoustoanApplicationunder

Rule7.1.

theamendedPleadings.HerLadyshipnotedthatDevon’s

expertwitnesshadswornthattherequesteddocuments

werenecessaryforhisanalysis,andnoindependentwitness

hadsuggestedotherwise.Assuch,thetestunderRule5.2

wasmet,andtherecordswereproducible.

JusticeNixonalsofoundthatforverylargespreadsheets,

theTIFFformatwaseffectivelyunusable.Productionof

electronicrecordsinanunusableformatundermined

proceduralfairnessandfailedtomeetCNRL’sdisclosure

obligations.NixonJ.declinedtoexercisediscretion

underRule5.3torelievehardshiponCNRLinproducing

theserecords,andheldthat,whileproportionalityisa

considerationinproduction,thiscaseinvolveddamagesin

thehundredsofmillionsofdollarsandproportionalitydid

not“figureprominently”.NixonJ.orderedtheproductionof

allrequestedrecords.

DORNAN (RE), 2016 ABQB 259 (MASTER SCHLOSSER)Rules 1.4 (Procedural Orders), 5.3 (Modification or Waiver of this Part), 5.12 (Penalty for not Serving Affidavit of Records) and 13.5 (Variation of Time Periods)

ThepurposeofthisActionwastosetasideatransferof

assetsbyMr.Dornan,whohadaDivision1Bankruptcy

Proposalpending,ortoobtainJudgmentagainstMr.

Dornanforthedifferencebetweenthetransfervalueand

thefairmarketvalueofthetransferredassets.AnAppealof

theOrdergrantingpermissionfortheActionwasscheduled

tobeheardMay27,2016,butpriortothehearing,Mr.

Dornan’screditorsservedaStatementofClaimonMr.

Dornan.ThedeadlineforfilingtheStatementofDefence

wasApril21,2016andthecreditorsrefusedtograntan

extensionofthatdeadline.Mr.DornanappliedforaStayof

theproceduralstepsintheActionpendingtheAppealof

theRegistrar’sOrder.

MasterSchlosser,actingastheRegistrarinBankruptcy,

consideredthetestforgrantingaStayunderthe

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act,RSC1985,cB-3,and

notedthattheApplicantwasseekingaStayofupto

twoproceduralstepsintheAction.BothRules1.4and

13.5permittedtheCourttoextendproceduraldeadlines

andMasterSchlossernotedthatthetimeforserving

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OnthefactsbeforetheCourt,MasterSchlosserdetermined

thattheAgreementhadbeenbreachedandorderedthatthe

Applicantwasentitledtoexerciseitsrepurchaseoption.

CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION NO 072 9313 (TRAILS OF MILL CREEK) V SCHULTZ, 2016 ABQB 338 (MASTER SCHLOSSER)Rules 3.2 (How to Start an Action), 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies), 7.3 (Summary Judgment) and 13.18 (Types of Affidavit)

ThePlaintiffcommencedanActionbywayofOriginating

ApplicationinordertoevicttheRespondent’sson,a

minor,fromacondominiumunit.Thecondominiumunitin

questionwassoldbeforetheCourtrendereditsDecisionso

theevictionissuebecamemoot.

OneoftheremainingissuesbeforetheCourtwasin

relationtothenatureandsufficiencyoftheevidencegiven

intheOriginatingApplication.MasterSchlossernoted

thatpursuanttoRule3.2(2),theOriginatingApplication

procedureismeantforsituationsinwhichthereareno

factsindispute,orwhenadecisionisthesubjectof

JudicialReview.AnOriginatingApplicationisdecided

onabalanceofprobabilities,unlikeSummaryJudgment

ApplicationsunderRules7.3and3.68.Furthermore,

pursuanttoRule13.18(3),theevidencerequiredinthese

circumstancesmustbefirst-hand,direct,andpersonaland

cannotbehearsayastheApplicationmayfinallydisposeof

someoralloftheissues.MasterSchlosserconsideredthe

AffidavitevidencegivenbytheApplicantcondominium’s

propertymanager,andheldthatthekeyevidencegivenwas

second-hand,andthattheAffidavitwassilentaboutcertain

factsinquestion.

Thenatureandsufficiencyoftheevidencegiven,in

combinationwithotherremainingissuesbeforethe

Court,suggestedthatmorewasexpectedofthePlaintiff

condominium’sboard.MasterSchlosserheldthatthe

Plaintiff’sOriginatingApplicationforfinesandrecovery

ofCostswasdismissed,andtheRespondent’sCross-

Applicationwasallowed.Finally,thefinesissuedtothe

DefendantbythePlaintiffcondominiumcorporationwere

setaside.

GAUTHIER V STARR, 2016 ABQB 213 (ROOKE ACJ)Rules 3.42 (Limitation on When Judgment or Noting in Default May Occur), 3.62 (Amending Pleading), 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies), 10.29 (General Rule For Payment of Litigation Costs) and 13.6 (Pleadings: General Requirements)

ThePlaintiffsuedthreeindividualsfortrespass,but

theStatementofClaimwasextremelybriefanddid

notparticularizeanyclaimsagainsttwoofthethree

Defendants.AllthreeDefendantsappliedtohavetheAction

struckunderRule3.68.AssociateChiefJusticeRooke

notedthataStatementofClaimmustprovideaminimum

thresholdofinformationsotheDefendantscanprovide

ameaningfulresponse.Baldallegationsareinsufficient,

andaclaimintrespassrequiresmaterialfactssufficientto

demonstrateanintentionaltort.

AnAmendedStatementofClaimwasacceptedforfiling

justpriortothechambersApplication,pursuanttoRule

3.62,asthePleadingshadnotclosed.TheAmended

StatementofClaimwassimilartotheoriginalbutprovided

additionaldetailsaboutthedatesoftheallegedtrespasses

byeachDefendant.ThePlaintiffalsosoughttohavethe

Defendantsnotedindefault,butthisstepwasunavailable,

pursuanttoRule3.42(b),astheDefendantshadappliedto

striketheClaimunderRule3.68.TheDefendantsargued

thattheStatementofClaimfailedtoprovideanything

morethanbaldallegationsoftrespassanddidnotmeet

thecriteriaforpleadingsinRule13.6.RookeA.C.J.agreed

thattheStatementofClaimfailedtoprovidethenecessary

materialfactsfortheDefendantstomakeameaningful

response,andthereforestrucktheAction.

ThePlaintiffhadbeenwarnedinanotherActionthat

hemaybedeclaredavexatiouslitigantifhecontinued

tolitigateonthebasisofastrategywhichRookeA.C.J.

groupedasOrganizedPseudolegalCommercialArguments

(“OPCA”).ItwasapparentthattheOPCAtacticsexhibited

similaritiesinthePlaintiff’scurrentlitigation,andHis

LordshipheldthattheActionwasinfactOPCAlitigation.

RookeA.C.J.furtherheldthatthePlaintiffwasavexatious

litigant.




BecausetheDefendantsweresuccessfulintheir

Application,theywereeachawarded$500inlitigation

costs,pursuanttoRule10.29(1)foracontested

Applicationwithoutwrittenbriefs.RookeA.C.J.also

orderedthatthePlaintiffwasprohibitedfromanyfurther

CourtfilingsinrespectofthethreeDefendants.

HERCHAK V ENBRIDGE PIPELINES INC, 2016 ABQB 217 (TILLEMAN J)Rules 3.62 (Amending Pleading), 3.65 (Permission of Court to Amendment Before or After Close of Pleadings), 3.66 (Costs), 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies), 3.74 (Adding, Removing or Substituting Parties After Close of Pleadings), 5.32 (When Information May be Used), 5.33 (Confidentiality and Use of Information) and 13.6 (Pleadings: General Requirements)

ThePlaintiffwasaformeremployeeoftheDefendant,

Enbridge,andduringhisemploymentthePlaintiffhada

relationshipwiththeindividualDefendant,Scratch.When

therelationshipwasbroughttoEnbridge’sattention,the

Plaintiffwasdismissedforcause.ThePlaintiffcommenced

separateActionsagainstEnbridgeandScratchwhichwere

consolidatedbyconsent.ThePlaintiffappliedtofilean

AmendedStatementofClaimseeking,amongotherthings,

toaddScratch’spartnerHoldenasaDefendantonthe

basisthattheindividualDefendantsconspiredtohavehim

fired.HealsosoughtanOrderwaivingRules5.2and5.33.

ScratchandHoldenarguedthattheAmendedStatementof

ClaimcontainedimpermissibleevidenceinbreachofRule

5.33(impliedundertakings).Further,Scratcharguedthat,

iftheCourtallowedtheamendmentstotheStatementof

Claim,shewasentitledtoCostspursuanttoRule3.66.

Holdenarguedthattherewereinsufficientfactstoadd

himasaDefendantforconspiracy.Healsoarguedthat

theamendmentApplicationwasbroughtinbadfaithand

thatthecontentswerefrivolous,irrelevantanddesignedto

embarrass,contrarytoRule3.68(2).

JusticeTillemanreviewedtherelevantRulesandheldthat

theRuleagainstimpliedundertakingsinRule5.33isonly

infringedifinformationfrompre-Trialdiscoveryisused

beyondthescopeofthelitigationinwhichithasbeen

obtained.TheproductionrelieduponbythePlaintiffto

seektheadditionofHoldenasaDefendantwasnotbeyond

thescopeofthelitigationinwhichitwasdiscovered,and

wasthereforenotinviolationofRule5.33.TillemanJ.

alsoheldthattherewerecommunicationsthatmetthe

thresholdtoaddconspiracyasacauseofactionagainst

bothScratchandHolden,andthereforegrantedpermission

toaddHoldenasaDefendantunderRule3.74(2)(b).

JusticeTillemanobservedthattheAmendedStatement

ofClaimcontainedasignificantamountofcontentthat

wassuperfluous,salacious,orinbreachofRule13.6(2)

(a),whichprovidesthataPleadingmuststatethefacts

onwhichapartyreliesbutnottheevidencebywhichthe

factsaretobeproved.HisLordshiporderedtheremoval

ofirrelevant,salaciousandredundantinformationinthe

AmendedStatementofClaim.

MANJI V PRASAD, 2016 ABQB 273 (PENTELECHUK J)Rules 3.62 (Amending Pleading), 3.65 (Permission of Court to Amendment Before or After Close of Pleadings), 3.66 (Costs) and 13.6 (Pleadings: General Requirements)

Thepartieswereinvolvedinalong-standingdisputeover

thepurchaseofcertainrealestate.Shortlybeforethe

Trialwassettobeheard,theCourtwasinformedthatthe

Defendant,Prasad,intendedtomakeadditionalarguments

relatingtoaresultingtrustor,alternatively,thatthe

Applicantwasentitledtorelieffromforfeiture.Theparties

soughtdirectionsfromtheCourtastowhetherPrasad

wasrequiredtoamendhisDefencetopleadthesenew

argumentsand,ifso,whetherleavetoamendshouldbe

granted.

JusticePentelechukconsideredRule13.6andstatedthat

onlythefactualsituationthatdisclosesacauseofaction

needstobepleaded,notthecauseofactionitself.Inthis

case,noneoftheunderlyingfactshadchanged.Moreover,

relieffromforfeitureandresultingtrustwerenotcausesof

action,butratherdefencesorformsofrelief.Onaplain

readingofRule13.6(2),bothdefencesweremattersthat

coulddefeatorraiseadefencetothePlaintiff’sclaims,and

shouldbepleaded.Further,PentelechukJ.notedthatRule

13.6(3)statesthataPleadingmustinclude“anymatteron

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Volume 2 Issue 2


necessarytoallowsomeonetodefendtheirwords.Master

RobertsonheldthatthePlaintiffs’Pleadingslackedproper

clarityandhadconflictingparticulars.Intheresult,the

claimsrelatingtodefamationwerestruck.

MasterRobertsonalsoconsideredtheSecurityforCosts

Application.MasterRobertsonnotedthatthecorporate

PlaintiffdidnotcarryonbusinessinAlbertanordidthe

individualPlaintiffhaveanyexigibleassetsinAlberta.

Furthermore,bothofthePlaintiffsweresignificantly

indebtedtothecorporateDefendant.TheCanadaRevenue

Agencyalsohadawritofenforcementagainstthe

Plaintiff.MasterRobertsonheldthattheevidenceclearly

demonstratedthatthePlaintiffwouldverylikelynotbeable

topayanawardofCosts.Asaresult,MasterRobertson

orderedSecurityforCostsagainstthePlaintiffinthe

amountofdoubleColumn5ofScheduleC.

EASY LOAN CORPORATION V BASE MANAGEMENT & INVESTMENTS LTD, 2016 ABCA 163 (WAKELING JA)Rules 3.62 (Amending Pleading), 3.65 (Permission of Court to Amendment Before or After Close of Pleadings), 14.2 (Application of General Rules), 14.12 (Contents and Format of Notices of Appeal and Cross Appeal), 14.25 (Contents of Factums) and 14.37 (Single Appeal Judges)

TheAppellantsappliedtoamendtheirNoticeofAppealin

ordertoaddreliefthatwasnotpartoftheearlierNotice

ofAppeal,andtoappealonlypartoftheTrialDecision.

WakelingJ.A.consideredRules14.2(1),14.12(1)(2),

14.25(1)and14.37(1),andstatedthatRule14.12(2)

setsoutthepurposesofaNoticeofAppealandmandatory

elements.Rules14.25(1)(c)and(e)establishthatthe

argumentsinsupportoftheAppealareappropriately

placedintheAppellant’sfactumandoralargument,not

theNoticeofAppeal.WakelingJ.A.notedthatRule14.37

grantsasingleAppealJudgethejurisdictiontoamenda

NoticeofAppeal.Alternatively,thisjurisdictionisgranted

byRule14.2(1),whichmakestheotherRulesapplicable

wheretheAppealRulesdonotdealwithmattersdirectly.

Therefore,Rule14.2allowsapartytoamendtheNoticeof

AppealpursuanttotheRulesgoverningtheamendmentof

pleadings,namelyRules3.62and3.65.

whichapartyintendstorelythatmaytakeanotherpartyby

surprise”includingmatterslistedundertheRule.Although

neitherrelieffromforfeitureorresultingtrustarelisted,

JusticePentelechukstatedthatthelistisnotexhaustive,

andtheparamountfactoriswhetherthemattermaytake

anotherpartybysurprise.ThepurposeofRule13.6(3)is

consistentwiththeCourts’positionthatTrialbyambush

isnottolerated,andthatpartiesareentitledtoknowthe

casetheymustmeet.PentelechukJ.concludedthatthe

Respondentinthiscasecouldbecaughtbysurprise,

becausebothnewargumentswerenotsoroutinethat

theywouldbeanticipatedinanycontractualdispute.Her

Ladyshipconcludedthattheproposedamendmentsshould

beallowed.

JusticePentelechuknotedthat,pursuanttoRule3.66(2),

theCostsofacontestedApplicationtoamendapleading

areinthediscretionoftheCourt.Becausetherewasmixed

successontheApplication,eachpartywasorderedtobear

itsownCosts.

MCMORRAN V HOCKETT, 2016 ABQB 279 (MASTER ROBERTSON)Rules 3.62 (Amending Pleadings), 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies), 4.22 (Considerations for Security for Costs Order), 10.48 (Recovery of Goods and Services Tax), 13.6 (Pleadings: General Requirements) and 13.7 (Pleadings: Other Requirements) and Schedule C

ThePlaintiffssuedtheDefendantsfor,amongotherthings,

defamation.TheDefendantsappliedtostrikethePlaintiffs’

ClaimunderRule3.68.Inthealternative,theDefendants

alsoappliedforSecurityforCostsagainstthePlaintiffs.

MasterRobertsonconsideredRules13.6and13.7inorder

toassessifthePleadingsdisclosedacauseofaction.

MasterRobertsonconsideredthelawassetoutinAbrams

v Johnson,2009ABQB575regardingadefamation

Pleading,andnotedthataclaiminDefamationrequiresa

numberofparticulars.APleadingmustdiscloseaconcise

statementofthematerialfacts,thewordspublishedbythe

Defendant,referencestothePlaintiff,thetimeandplaceof

thepublication,themannerofpublicationandtowhomthe

publicationwasmade.Therequirementsarestrict,butare




JusticeWakelingheldthattheproposedamendmentsto

theNoticeofAppealdidnotpurporttoenlargethescope

oftheAppeal.TheamendmentsclarifiedtheAppellants’

intentionthattheynolongerwantedtoAppealagainstthe

wholedecision,onlyportionsofit.Assuch,theApplication

wasgranted.

BORDEN LADNER GERVAIS LLP V CBI INVESTMENTS LTD, 2016 ABQB 220 (MAHONEY J)Rules 3.65 (Permission of Court to Amendment Before or After Close of Pleadings) and 3.74 (Adding, Removing or Substituting Parties After Close of Pleadings)

ThePlaintifflawfirm(“BLG”)appealedaMaster’sDecision

whichdeniedBLG’srequesttoamenditsAmended

AmendedAppointmentforReviewofBLG’schargesand

retaineragreement,andtoaddindividualdirectorsand

shareholdersoftheDefendantcompany(“CBI”)asnamed

Respondentsintheirpersonalcapacities.

JusticeMahoneystatedthatRule3.65doesnotapplyto

anamendmenttoadd,remove,substituteorcorrectthe

nameofapartytowhichRule3.74applies.HisLordship

consideredRule3.74,whichprovidesfortheaddition,

removalorsubstitutionofpartiesafterthecloseof

Pleadings.MahoneyJ.heldthattheapplicablethresholdto

allowsuchanamendmentislow.Accordingtothe“classic

rule”assetoutinBalmv3512061CanadaLtd.,2003

ABCA98,“anypleadingcanbeamendednomatterhow

carelessorlateisthepartywhoisseekingtoamend”.The

“classicrule”issubjecttofourexceptions:

a) thattheamendmentwouldcauseseriousprejudice

totheopposingparty,notcompensableincosts;

b) theamendmentrequestedis“hopeless”;

c) unlesspermittedbystatute,theamendmentseeks

toaddanewpartyoranewcauseofactionafter

theexpiryofalimitationperiod;and,

d) thereisanelementofbadfaith.

TheMasterhadpreviouslyheldthatgrantingthe

amendmentwouldhaveresultedinprejudiceandharmto

theopposingparty,andthattheproposedamendmentwas

both“hopeless”andoutoftime.JusticeMahoneyagreed

withthisanalysis,anddeniedtheAppeal.

WOOD BUFFALO HOUSING & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION V ALVES CONSTRUCTION LTD, 2016 ABQB 249 (MASTER WACOWICH)Rules 3.65 (Amendments to Pleadings) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)

TheDefendants,DavidHamiltonArchitectLtd.and

DavidHamilton(the“Hamiltons”),appliedforSummary

JudgmenttodismissthePlaintiff’sclaim.ThePlaintiff

cross-appliedtoamendtheStatementofClaimtoinclude

particularsoftheallegationsagainsttheHamiltons.The

Actioninvolvedabuildingdeficiencyclaimrelatingtothe

restorationofacondominiumcomplexdamagedbyfire.

MasterWacowichnotedthatamendmentsaftertheclose

ofpleadingsaregovernedbyRule3.65,whichprovides

theCourtbroaddiscretiontoamend.Theclassicruleis

thatanamendmentshouldbeallowednomatterhow

carelessorlate,unlessthereisprejudicewhichcannotbe

compensatedbycosts.Thediscretiontoallowamendments

shouldbeexercisedgenerously,allowingamendmentsthat

raiseevendoubtfulpleas,solongasitisarguable.The

Courtshouldconsiderwhetheranamendmentisdisallowed

becauseitishopeless.MasterWacowichobservedthat,in

thiscase,theamendmentssoughtwouldbehopelessifthe

SummaryJudgmentApplicationwasgranted.

MasterWacowichstatedthatthekeypointstobe

consideredonanApplicationforSummaryJudgmentwere

setoutbytheCourtofAppealin776826 Alberta Ltd v

Ostrowercha,2015ABCA49.Procedurally,Summary

Judgmentshouldonlybegivenifadispositionthatisfair

andjusttobothpartiescanbemadeontheexistingrecord.

Substantively,SummaryJudgmentcanbegrantedwhere

thereisnomerittotheClaim.Nomeritmeansthat,even

assumingtheaccuracyofthepositionofthenon-moving

party,thenon-movingparty’spositionhasnomeritinlaw

orfact.Inorderforthenon-movingparty’scasetohave

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Volume 2 Issue 2


alsoheldthattheindividualPlaintiffshadnoauthorityto

bringaderivativeActiononbehalfofMCFN.Asaresult,

WittmannC.J.strucktheclaiminitsentiretyforfailingto

discloseacauseofaction.

STONEY NAKODA NATIONS V CANADA, 2016 ABQB 193 (JEFFREY J)Rules 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)

ThePlaintiff,StoneyNakodaNations(“SNN”),commenced

anActionfortrespassandconversionofpetroleum,natural

gas,andrelatedhydrocarbons(“PNG”)whichtheyclaimed

wereproperlytheirs.SNNarguedthatvarioustransfers

ofPNGtoCanadianPacificRailway(“CPR”)andCPR’s

whollyownedsubsidiary,whichisnowEncana,wereeither

invalidorforinadequateconsideration.TheDefendants,

EncanaandCPR,broughtanApplicationforSummary

Dismissal.Encanaarguedthattheclaimswerebrought

outoftime,thatitcannotbeatrespasseronitsown

property,andthatSNN’sclaimsfailbecauseofEncana’s

indefeasibilityoftitle.CPR’sApplicationforSummary

Dismissalwasonthesamegrounds,andanyinterestit

hadinthelandswaswhollytransferredtoEncana,and

thereforeCPRhadnointerestinanyofthePNGatissue

intheAction.Further,anyclaimfordamagesagainstCPR

wasoutoftimeandthusstatute-barred.SNNarguedthat

whatwasbeingsoughtbyCPRandEncanawas,ineffect,

anextinguishmentofAboriginalTreatyRights.Therefore

theApplicantsboretheonusofprovingthattherewasa

clearandplainintentbytheCrowntoextinguishSNN’s

AboriginalTreatyRightsinthePNG.

JeffreyJ.,inconsideringRule7.3,notedthatSummary

Judgmentcanbegrantedifthereisnomerittotheclaim.

“Nomerit”meansthat,evenassumingtheaccuracyof

thepositionofthenon-movingpartyastoanymaterial

orpotentiallydecisivematters,thenon-movingparty’s

positionhasnomeritinlaworinfact.JusticeJeffreynoted

thatanotherwaytoexplaintheconceptofmeritisthat,in

orderforthenon-movingparty’scasetohavemerit,there

mustbeagenuineissueorapotentiallydecisivematerial

factinthecasewhichcannotbesummarilyfoundagainst

theRespondentsontherecord.Themereassertionofa

merit,theremustbeagenuineissueofpotentiallydecisive

materialfactwhichcannotbesummarilyfoundagainstthe

non-movingpartyontheexistingrecord.Theassertionbya

non-movingpartythatsomethingwillturnupatTrialdoes

notsuffice.Thekeyiswhetherthecircumstancesrequire

viva voceevidenceinordertoproperlyresolvethecase.

OnthepresentApplication,MasterWacowichstatedthat

theonlydisputedissuesweremattersofbasiccontractlaw

concerningthelegalsignificanceofundisputedfacts.The

disputedissuescouldbedeterminedontheexistingrecord.

MasterWacowichheldthattherewereseveralelementsof

abindinglegalcontractmissing,andthereforenocontract.

Assuch,thePlaintiff’sclaimswerewithoutmeritand

weresummarilydismissed.Withtheclaimssummarily

dismissed,theproposedamendmentswereheldtobe

hopeless,andtheApplicationtoamendtheStatementof

Claimwasdismissed.

WAQUAN V CANADA (ATTORNEY GENERAL), 2016 ABQB 191 (WITTMANN CJ)Rule 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies)

ThePlaintiffs,membersoftheMikisewCreeFirstNation

(“MCFN”),broughtanActiontosetasidecertaintermsof

atreatysettlementagreementfromapriorActionbetween

MCFNandCanada.TheDefendant,theAttorneyGeneral,

appliedtostrikethePlaintiffs’Pleadingsforfailingto

discloseacauseofaction.WittmannC.J.notedthatRule

3.68governsthestrikingofclaims,andstatedthat:

Aclaimwillonlybestruckifitisplainandobvious,

assumingthefactspleadedtobetrue,thatthe

pleadingdisclosesnoreasonablecauseofaction...

Anotherwayofputtingthetestisthattheclaimhasno

reasonableprospectofsuccess.Whereareasonable

prospectofsuccessexists,themattershouldbe

allowedtoproceedtotrial.

ChiefJusticeWittmannheldthattheindividualPlaintiffs

hadnostandingtobringtheActiononbehalfoftheMCFN,

astherightssettledunderthetreatywerecollectiverights

belongingtoallmembersoftheMCFN.HisLordship




positionbytheRespondentinaPleadingorotherwise,or

themerehopeofthenon-movingpartythatsomethingwill

turnupatTrial,willnotsufficeforapositiontohavemerit.

ThisisdistinguishedfromthetestunderRule3.68,which

involvesdeciding“whetherthereisanyreasonableprospect

thattheclaimwillsucceed,erringonthesideofgenerosity

inpermittingnovelclaimstoproceed”.

BasedontherecordbeforetheCourt,JeffreyJ.dismissed

theclaimasagainstCPR.JeffreyJ.alsofoundthatSNN

hadactualknowledgethatcertainpartieshadclaimed

ownershipofthePNGinissueby1982atthelatest.As

such,theActionagainstCPRwassummarilydismissedas

itwasstatutebarredandwithoutmerit.

RegardingSNN’sclaimasagainstEncanafortherecovery

ofin situPNG,JeffreyJ.heldthatEncanahadnotmetits

burdentoshowthattheCrownhadintendedthealienation

ofthePNGatissuetoCPRsuchthatSNN’sAboriginal

Rightswereextinguished.Consequently,theissuecouldnot

bedecidedonasummarybasis,andEncana’sApplication

wasdenied.JeffreyJ.alsofoundthatSNNhadraised

sufficientdoubtastowhetherthetransferfromCPRto

Encana’spredecessorwasforsufficientconsiderationsuch

thatitwasnotbeyonddoubtthatthedefencehadmerit.

JeffreyJ.notedthatthedeterminationofindefeasibilityof

Encana’stitlecalledforacomplexdeterminationoflegal

issues,intertwinedwithvariousdegreesofsocial,historical,

legislativeandcorporatefacts.JusticeJeffreyconcluded

that,insuchcases,afullTrialisrequired.

ELLMAR DEVELOPMENTS LTD V BEARSPAW DEVELOPMENT INC, 2016 ABQB 221 (MASTER HANEBURY)Rules 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)

ThePlaintiffappliedforSummaryJudgmentagainstthe

Defendants,andtheDefendantscross-appliedforthe

claimsagainstthemtobestruckor,inthealternative,

SummaryDismissal.MasterHaneburyconsideredwhether

SummaryJudgmentcouldbegrantedwhentherewas

conflictingevidencebetweentheparties.MasterHanebury

notedthatSummaryJudgmentcouldnotbedeniedsolely

onthebasisthattheevidencedisclosedatriableissue,

butratherwhentherewasanissueofmeritthatgenuinely

requiredaTrial.Additionally,issuesofcredibilitycould

generallynotbedeterminedsummarily.MasterHanebury

concludedthat:

…conflictingevidenceonamaterialmatterusually

resultsinatrialunlessoneside’sevidenceis

completelynon-credible,i.e.itisdestroyedeither

byotherevidenceoroncross-examination,orisfound

tobebald,self-servingandunsupported.

Inthiscase,MasterHaneburyheldthatneitherparty’s

evidencewassufficientlybolsteredordestroyedtothe

degreenecessarytograntSummaryJudgment;therefore,a

Trialwasrequired.

RegardingtheDefendants’Applicationtostriketheclaims

againstthem,MasterHaneburynotedthatanApplication

underRule3.68(2)(b)tostrikeaclaimonthebasisthat

itdisclosednoreasonablecauseofactionmustbemade

withoutevidence.TheCourtassumedthattheallegations

offactfoundintheClaimweretrue.MasterHaneburyheld

thattheclaimdisclosedacauseofactionagainstboth

Defendants;therefore,theDefendants’Applicationsto

Strikeweredismissed.Additionally,asneitherDefendant

filedevidenceinsupportoftheirCross-Applicationsfor

SummaryDismissal,theCourtdismissedbothApplications

statingthat,iftheyweretosucceed,itwouldsetan

“unacceptableprecedent”.

GRENON V CANADA REVENUE AGENCY, 2016 ABQB 260 (DARIO J)Rule 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies)

TheDefendants,theCanadaRevenueAgencyandanumber

ofitsOfficers,appliedtostriketheStatementofClaimof

thePlaintiff,Grenon.TheActionhadarisenoutofatax

auditandreassessmentagainstGrenonandanumberof

corporationswhollyownedbyhim.Grenonprotestedthe

Defendants’conduct,includingnegligence,misfeasancein

publicoffice,interferencewithcontractualrelations,and

breachoffiduciaryduty.JusticeDarioconsideredwhether

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thefactsallegedinGrenon’sStatementofClaimwere

sufficienttosupportthecausesofaction.

DarioJ.reviewedpriorleadingauthorityonApplicationsto

strike,andsummarizedtheprinciplesas:

1.TheCourtmustassumethefactsallegedinthe

Pleadingaretrue,butthisassumptiondoes

notextendtobaldallegations,tolegalconclusions

ortospeculations,absurdities,highlyimplausible

statementsorstatementsincapableofproof.

2.Makingconclusorystatementswithoutevidenceis

anabuseofprocessandsuchstatementsshouldbe

struck.

3.Improperreferencetotermssuchas“maliciously”

and“recklessly”alsoconstitutesanabuseof

processandsuchtermsshouldbestruckunless

theyarerelevanttothecauseofaction

alleged.

4.Whereaplaintiff’sstatementofclaimincludes

contradictoryfactsthatcannotbothbetrue,such

contradictoryallegationsneednotbeacceptedby

theCourt.

5.TheCourtisnotobligatedtoassumethatan

allegedfactistruewherethatallegationiscontrary

toastatutorydirective.

DarioJ.notedthattheseprincipleswerenon-exhaustive

andaCourtmayconsiderotherbasesinrejectinga

Plaintiff’sallegations;further,whileaCourtshouldnot

bequicktodismissnovelclaims,theentirecontentsand

contextofaPleadingmustbeconsidered,andaline-by-

lineanalysismaynotbeappropriate.

DarioJ.notedthatthetestunderRule3.68forfailingto

discloseareasonablecauseofactioniswhethertheClaim

hasareasonableprospectofsuccess.Severalparagraphsin

Grenon’sStatementofClaimwerestruckbecausetheywere

foundtobeacollateralattackontheexclusivejurisdictions

oftheTaxCourtofCanadaandFederalCourtofCanada,

orbecausetheyfailedtodiscloseareasonablecauseof

action.Anumberoftermswerestruck,andsomewere

replaced.

HARTWELL V TAYLOR, 2016 ABQB 289 (WILSON J)Rule 3.74 (Adding, Removing or Substituting Parties After Close of Pleadings)

Followingafailedrealestatetransaction,thePlaintiff

commencedaClaimagainsttheDefendant,andthe

Defendantcounterclaimedtorecoverhisdeposit.During

QuestioningoftheDefendant,thePlaintiffbecameaware

ofinformationthatsuggestedthatnewpartiesmaybe

liable,andappliedtoamendtheStatementofClaim.The

DefendantopposedtheApplicationand,basedonthe

existenceofaparallelActioninvolvingthesameparties,

alsoappliedtohavethisActiondeclaredanabuseof

process.

ThePlaintiffsubmittedthatthematerialintheparties’

Affidavitsprovidedsufficientevidencetoconnectthenew

partiestotheissuesraisedintheAction.JusticeWilson

notedthat,pursuanttoRule3.74,threerequirementsmust

bemettoamendtheClaim:theApplicationtoAmend

mustbebroughtbyapartytotheAction;theCourthadto

besatisfiedthatanOrdershouldbemade;andtheremust

benoprejudiceifthePleadingwasamended.WilsonJ.

consideredwhethertheadditionofnewpartieswasmore

likelytoexpandthescopeandexpenseoftheAction.

JusticeWilsonnotedthat,generally,anypleadingcould

beamendednomatterhowcarelessorlatethepartywas

whenseekingtomaketheamendment,subjecttofour

exceptions.

WilsonJ.notedthattheDefendant’sobjectiontothe

amendmentswasbasedonthePlaintiff’slackofevidence.

JusticeWilsonreviewedwhatqualityandquantityof

evidencewasrequiredforanamendmentApplication.

HisLordshipnotedthatamodestdegreeofevidence

wasrequired,butinthiscasesuchevidenceincluded

hearsayevidence,evidenceofanuncertainconclusion,

andevidenceinAffidavitsbypartiesotherthantheparty

seekingtheamendment.Further,WilsonJ.observedthat

thelackofafactualbasiswasordinarilynotagroundfor




denyinganamendment,solongasitallegedfactswhich,

iftrue,gaverisetoacauseofAction.HisLordshipheld

thattherewasnothingbeforetheCourttosuggestthat

theexceptionstothegeneralruleapplied,andthere

wassufficientallowableevidenceuponwhichtobase

theamendments.Intheresult,WilsonJ.heldthatthe

Pleadingscouldbeamended.

IMPERIAL OIL V FLATIRON CONSTRUCTORS, 2016 ABQB 310 (GRAESSER J)Rules 4.10 (Assistance by the Court), 6.3 (Applications Generally), 7.5 (Application for Judgment by Way of Summary Trial) and 7.8 (Objection to Application for Judgment by Way of Summary Trial)

Altalink,theThirdPartyDefendant,appliedtohavethe

ThirdPartyClaimagainstthemdeterminedbywayof

SummaryTrialpursuanttoRule7.5.AlthoughthePlaintiffs

wouldnotbeinvolvedintheSummaryTrial,thePlaintiffs

objectedtoitsarguingthattheissuesweretoocomplex

andthusnotappropriatetoproceedbywayofSummary

Trial,andthattheywouldsufferprejudiceiftheThirdParty

ClaimwasdeterminedbywayofSummaryTrial.

TheDefendant,Flatiron,questionedwhetherthePlaintiffs

hadstandingtobringtheirApplication.JusticeGraesser

notedthatRule6.3requiresnoticesofApplicationstobe

servedon“allparties”.Suchisthecaseevenwherethe

Applicationhasnopotentialtoaffectaparty.TheCourt

statedthattheSummaryTrialwouldrequirenoticetothe

Plaintiffs,andthatitwaspreferableforthePlaintiffsto

bringthisApplication,insteadofwaitinguntilthedateof

theSummaryTrialtoobject.HisLordshipheldthatthe

PlaintiffshadstandingtobringtheApplication.

JusticeGraesserconsideredtheappropriatenessofsetting

thematterdownforSummaryTrial.Afterreviewingthe

amountsinvolved;thecomplexityofthematter;the

urgencyofthematter;anyprejudicelikelytoariseby

reasonofdelay;thecostoftakingtheissuesforwardtoa

conventionalTrialinrelationtotheamountinvolved;the

courseofproceedings;andissuesrelatingtowitnesses,

GraesserJ.heldthatSummaryTrialwasappropriate.The

Plaintiffs’Applicationwasdismissedaccordingly.

MILAVSKY V MILAVSKY ESTATE, 2016 ABQB 333 (TILLEMAN J)Rules 4.22 (Considerations for Security for Costs Order) and 12.36 (Advance Payment of Costs)

ThePlaintiff,Ms.Milavsky,commencedanActionfor

DivorceandDivisionofMatrimonialPropertyinJuneof

2009,whichwasexpandedinMay2010toincludea

ClaimofUnjustEnrichmentagainstthreetrustssettled

bytheDefendant,thelateMr.Milavsky.Thelitigationhad

anextensivehistory,andwasscheduledforan8week

Trial.Ms.MilavskyappliedfortheDefendantEstatetopay

$1,000,000inadvanceCostsinordertofundthecomplex

EstateandTrustlitigation.

Ms.MilavskycharacterizedtheActionasamatrimonial

propertyclaim,andarguedthattheActionagainstthe

trustswasancillaryand,therefore,thatRule12.36should

apply.TheEstatearguedthatRule12.36didnotapply.

TheRespondentTrustscharacterizedtheClaimagainstthem

assolelyacivilonetowhichthetestunderRule4.22applies.

JusticeTillmanheldthattheClaimagainsttheEstate

wasprimarilyamatrimonialpropertyActiontowhich

Rule12.36applied.UnderRule12.36,theCourthas

widediscretiontoorderadvanceCosts,andtheprimary

considerationiswhethertheApplicanthassufficient

resourcestopayfortheirpartofthelitigation.Thepurpose

ofadvanceCostsawardsunderRule12.36isto“levelthe

playingfield”,andnoconsiderationisgiventothemerits

oftheClaim.JusticeTillmannotedthatMs.Milavskywas

68yearsold,earnednoemploymentincome,andhadan

incomethatwasinsufficienttokeepupwiththeescalating

legalfeesrequiredtoadvanceherClaim.Thisevidencewas

sufficienttomeetthetestforadvanceCosts.

TillemanJ.observedthat,underRule4.22,anApplicant

mustmeetthethreecriteriasetoutbytheSupremeCourt

ofCanadainBritish Columbia (Minister of Forests) v

Okanagan Indian Band2003SCC71,whichare:

(i) Theapplicantisimpecunioustotheextentthat

theywouldbedeprivedoftheopportunityto

proceedwiththecasewithouttheorder,

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(ii) Theapplicanthasaprimafaciecaseofsufficient

merit,

(iii) Theremustbespecialcircumstancessufficient

tosatisfytheCourtthatthecaseiswithinthe

narrowclassofcaseswheretheextraordinary

exerciseofitspowersisappropriate.

JusticeTillmanheldthatMs.Milavskydidnotmeetthetest

assetoutinOkanagan Indian Band.Intheresult,advance

CostswerepayablebytheEstate,butnotbytheTrusts.

STEWART ESTATE V TAQA NORTH LTD, 2016 ABCA 144 (ROWBOTHAM, MCDONALD AND O’FERRALL JJA)Rules 4.24 (Formal Offers to Settle), 10.31 (Court-Ordered Costs Award) and 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award) and Schedule C

TheAppellants,agroupofPlaintiffs,weresuccessfulin

theirAppealandinhavingtheRespondents’Cross-Appeal

dismissed.Thepartiessoughtadeterminationwithrespect

toCostsforTrialandfortheAppeal.

TheCourtofAppealheldthatawardingCoststothe

Appellantswasappropriateastheyweresuccessful,and

thefactorswhichwouldmilitateagainstCostsdidnot

ariseatTrialoronAppeal.Thekeyissuewaswhether

theCourtshouldawardenhancedCostsabovethetariffs

prescribedbyColumn5inScheduleC.TheCourtof

AppealreferredtoRules10.31and10.33,notingthe

Court’sdiscretioninawardingCostsandthefactorsthe

Courtmayconsiderwhendoingso.TheCourtofAppeal

observedthatamultipliermaybeappliedwhentheTrialis

longandcomplexandthequantumofdamagesclaimedis

significantlygreaterthan$1.5million.Generally,theCourts

recognizethat,wheretheamountindisputegreatlyexceeds

Column5,ScheduleCisdeficientandamultipliermaybe

applied.However,thecourtsmustbecarefulnottoavoid

over-indemnifyingthesuccessfulparty.GiventheAction’s

complexity,amultiplieroftwotimestheColumn5tariff

wasgranted.Further,theAppellantsbestedaFormalOffer

madebeforeTrialand,assuch,wereawardeddoubleCosts

fortheTrialfromthetimeoftheFormalOffer.

Inaddition,theAppellantsbestedtwoinformalOffers

beforetheAppeal.TheRespondentsarguedthatdouble

costsdidnotapply,relyingonRule4.24whichrequires

FormalOfferstouseForm22andbeunconditional.

TheRespondentscontendedthattheinformalOffers

wereconditionalonapprovalandweremerelyinvitations

totreat.TheCourtofAppealacknowledgedthatthese

informalOfferswereconditional,buttherewereindications

thatacceptancewouldhaveledtoapprovalbyallofthe

Appellants.TheseOfferswereasincereattempttosettle

thedisputeand,assuch,theAppellantswereawarded

doubleCostsfortheAppealforthestepstakenafterthe

informalOffers.

KITCHING V DEVLIN, 2016 ABQB 212 (JEFFREY J)Rules 4.29 (Costs Consequences of Formal Offer to Settle), 5.31 (Use of Transcript & Answers to Written Questions) and 5.36 (Objection to Expert’s Report)

ThePlaintiffwasinvolvedinapersonalinjuryClaimand

heretainedtheDefendantlawyer,Mr.Devlin,torepresent

him.Themattersettledfor$350,000.Subsequently,the

PlaintiffsuedMr.DevlinfornegligentlyhandlingtheClaim,

claimingthatthesettlementwasimprovident.

Bothpartiescalledexpertstoprovideevidencewithrespect

tothestandardofcareofapersonalinjurylawyer,and

whetherthatthresholdwasmetbyMr.Devlin.AtTrial,

thePlaintiffobjectedtotheDefendant’sexpertreport.

Sincetheobjectionwasnotmadeinaccordancewith

Rule5.36,thePlaintiffproposedthattheCourthearthe

Defendant’sexpert’sevidencesubjecttoalaterRuling

ontheobjection,towhichtheCourtagreed.Oneofthe

issuesindeterminingtheadmissibilityoftheDefendant’s

expertwastheuseofDiscoverytranscriptspursuanttoRule

5.31.TheDefendant’sexpert,Mr.Rodin,basedanumber

ofhisconclusionsonanswersgivenbytheDefendantat

Questioning.ThePlaintiffdidnotgiveMr.Rodinpermission

tousethetranscriptforthatpurposeandarguedthatthe

transcriptwasevidencebelongingtohimalone,andit

wasimproperfortheDefendant’sexperttointroducethat

evidenceatTrialthroughhisreport.




JusticeJeffreystatedthat,whileitwaslessthanidealthat

Mr.RodinreliedontheQuestioningtranscriptofMr.Devlin,

thisdidnotrenderthereportinadmissible.TheCourtfound

thatwherereferencestothetranscriptwerecorroborated

byotheradmissibleTrialevidence,theopinionsassociated

withthatevidencewouldbeadmissible.Conversely,if

transcriptreferenceswerenotcorroboratedbyadmissible

evidence,thentheassociatedopinionswouldnotbeused

bytheCourt.Indeterminingwhetherthesettlement,and

theadviceprovidedtothePlaintiffbyMr.Devlinwere

reasonable,theCourtlookedatthestatementsmadeby

Mr.DevlintothePlaintiff.Mr.DevlinadvisedthePlaintiff

thathewouldfacesignificantriskiftheywenttoTrial

becausehemayhavetopaydoubleCoststotheopposing

party.JeffreyJ.notedthat,underRule4.29,ifaDefendant

makesaFormalOffertoSettlethatisnotaccepted,and

thePlaintiff’sTrialJudgmentexceedsthatOffer,then

thePlaintiffmustpaydoubletheDefendant’slegalCosts

incurredaftertheOfferwasmade.SincetheDefendanthad

statedthataFormalOfferintheamount$350,000would

bemadeifthesettlementofferwasnotaccepted,Justice

JeffreyheldthatitwasreasonableforMr.Devlintoadvise

thePlaintiffhemightfaceseriousCostconsequencesifhe

pursuedthemattertoTrial.Intheresult,JusticeJeffrey

dismissedtheActionagainstMr.Devlin.

MIKKELESEN V TRUMAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, 2016 ABQB 255 (ERB J)Rules 4.29 (Costs Consequences of Formal Offer to Settle), 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs), 10.31 (Court-Ordered Costs Award) and 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award) and Schedule C

Thepartieswereinvolvedinadisputeovertheproposed

developmentofthePlaintiffs’farmland.TheTrialDecision

concludedthattherewasnobindingagreementbetweenthe

parties.Basedonthisconclusion,theCourtgrantedmuch

ofthereliefsoughtbythePlaintiffsbuttheresultswere

mixed.SomeoftheDefendant’sclaimsinitsCounterclaim

weregranted.ThePlaintiffssoughtfullindemnityCosts

or,alternatively,alumpsumawardof$300,000,which

representedapproximately60%oftheactualamountthey

paidaslegalfeesanddisbursements.TheDefendantargued

thatthepartiesshouldbeartheirownCosts.

ThePlaintiffsarguedthattheywerethesuccessfulparty,

andthattheCourt’sJudgmentatTrialwasequaltothe

FormalOffermadebythePlaintiffspriortoTrial.The

PlaintiffsfurtherarguedthattheDefendantengaged

inmisconduct,includingimproperlydenyingDiscovery

records,changingevidencegivenunderoathafterhearing

thePlaintiffs’caseatTrial,forcingthePlaintiffstoprove

factsthatshouldhavebeenadmitted,andforcingthe

Plaintiffstoexhaustlegalproceedingstoobtainthat

whichwasobviouslytheirs.TheDefendantarguedthatthe

PlaintiffsdidnotmeetorexceedtheFormalOffer,andthey

werenotwhollysuccessfulatTrial.TheDefendantindicated

thatthePlaintiffswereorderedtomakepartialpayments

totheDefendantforpre-developmentCostspursuanttothe

Counterclaim.

JusticeErbheldthat,pursuanttoRule10.29andcaselaw

arisingoutofthatRule,Costsgenerallyfollowtheultimate

result,butarenotusuallyapportionedonanissue-by-issue

orclaim-by-claimbasis,asitisrareforasuccessfulparty

tosucceedoneachitemclaimed.Overall,thePlaintiffs

succeededonthemostimportantissuebetweenthe

parties;theDefendant’ssuccesswas“minimal”forthe

purposeofdeterminingCosts.

JusticeErbconsideredRule10.31(6),notingthatCostsare

discretionary,andsubjecttospecificrequirementsinthe

Rules.Specifically,pursuanttoRule10.31(6)(b),theCourt

hastheabilitytoawardCostsonanindemnityoralump

sumbasis.PursuanttoRule10.33(1)(a),(b),and(g),the

Courtmaytakeintoaccountfactorsincludingtheresultof

theActionandeachparty’sdegreeofsuccess,theamount

claimedandtheamountrecovered,andanyothermatter

theCourtconsidersappropriate.Further,pursuanttoRule

10.33(2)(a),(b),(f)and(g),theCourtmayalsoconsider

theconductofapartythatunnecessarilylengthenedor

delayedtheAction,aparty’sdenialoforrefusaltoadmit

factsthatshouldhavebeenadmitted,acontraventionofor

non-compliancewiththeRulesoranOrder,andaparty’s

engagementinmisconduct.ErbJ.,referringtopriorleading

authority,heldthattheCourthasjurisdictiontoaward

CostsonahigherscalethanprovidedforinScheduleC,

butthatsolicitorandclientCostsareonlyawardedin“rare

andexceptional”circumstances.Withrespecttosolicitor

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clientCosts,ErbJ.notedthatenhancedCostsmayalsobe

appropriateforthepurposeofsatisfyingtheobjectivesof

deterrenceandpunishment.JusticeErbconsideredthat

theDefendant’switness’stestimonywasnotcredibleand

containedmanyinconsistencies,theunnecessaryexpenses

incurredbythePlaintiffs,andthesettlementoffer.

JusticeErbconcludedthatthecircumstancesofthiscase

supportedaCostsawardbeyondtheusualpartyandparty

amount.

WithrespecttotheFormalOffer,ErbJ.statedthat,under

Rule4.29(1),aPlaintiffisnormallyentitledtodouble

CostsifthePlaintiffmakesaFormalOfferthatwasnot

acceptedandsubsequentlyobtainsaJudgmentorOrder

thatisequaltoormorefavourablethantheOffer.However,

inaccordancewithRule4.29(4)(a),thisgeneralprinciple

doesnotapplyifCostswereawardedonanindemnity

orlumpsumbasisunderRule10.31(1)(b).JusticeErb

heldthattheOfferinthiscasewasasfavourableasthe

JudgmentinthemainAction,butdidnotaddressthe

Defendant’sCounterclaim.Asaresult,Rule4.29(1)was

nottriggeredinthiscase;however,itwasopentotheCourt

toconsider,asafactorindeterminingCosts,aFormalOffer

thatfell“marginallyshort”oftheJudgment,aslongasit

wasalegitimateattempttosettletheissuesindispute.

ErbJ.observedthat,whiletheScheduleCamountswere

inadequate,thiswasnotacasethatrequiredfullindemnity

forthePlaintiffs’Costs.HerLadyshipstatedthatthereare

numerousoptionsavailable,includingadjustingSchedule

Camountsinvariousways,aslongasthefinaltotalis

reasonable.Ultimately,JusticeErbhelditwasreasonable

toawardalumpsumCostsawardpursuanttoRule

10.31(1)(b)(ii).ThePlaintiffswereawarded$300,000,

whichwasdiscountedby$100,000becausethePlaintiffs

allegedbutfailedtoprovefraudagainsttheDefendant.

PARK AVENUE FLOORING INC V ELLISDON CONSTRUCTION SERVICES INC, 2016 ABQB 332 (MCCARTHY J) Rules 4.29 (Cost Consequences of Formal Offer to Settle), 5.10 (Subsequent Disclosure of Records), 5.12 (Penalty for Not Serving Affidavit of Records), 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs), 10.31 (Court Ordered Costs Award), 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award) and 10.41 (Assessment Officer’s Decision)

FollowingaTrialinacontractualdispute,theparties

returnedtoargueCosts.ThePlaintiffhadbeenrepresented

bycounselforonlypartofthelitigation.TheDefendant

arguedthatthePlaintiffwasonlyentitledtoCostsfor

thetimethatitwasrepresentedbycounsel,andwas

notentitledtoCostsforanyofthetimethatitwasself-

represented.McCarthyJ.notedthatRule10.29provides

thatasuccessfulpartytoanApplicationisentitledto

CostsandthatRule10.31(5)providesthat,inappropriate

circumstances,theCourtmayawardCoststoaself-

representedlitigantforanamountpartoforequaltothe

feesspecifiedinScheduleC.McCarthyJ.reviewedRule

10.33,whichlistsconsiderationsthataCourtmaytake

intoaccountwhenmakingaCostsaward.JusticeMcCarthy

concludedthat,giventhecircumstances,particularlythe

lengthoftheTrial,thecomplicatedfacts,andthedegree

ofconflictbetweentheparties,thePlaintiffwasentitledto

Costsduringthetimeitwasself-representedinaccordance

withRule10.31(5).

McCarthyJ.heldthat,despitetheFormalOffersbetween

theparties,anawardofdoubleCostspursuanttoRule

4.29wasnotappropriate.ThePlaintiffalsoarguedthat

theDefendantshouldbepenalizedfordelaypursuant

toRule5.12;specifically,foritsfailuretocomplywith

Rule5.10,whichprovidesthatapartymustsubsequently

discloserecordsthatitdiscoversinitspossessionthatare

relevantandmaterialifithasnotalreadydisclosedthem.

McCarthyJ.rejectedthisargumentanddidnotfindthat

theDefendant’sactionscausedsignificantdelay.Justice

McCarthyalsorejectedthePlaintiff’sargumentthatthey

shouldbeawardedinflationunderRule10.41(3)(d)asthis

RuledealswithhowanAssessmentOfficermaysetCosts.




RO-DAR CONTRACTING LTD V VERBEEK SAND & GRAVEL INC, 2016 ABCA 123 (SLATTER, MCDONALD AND BIELBY JJA)Rules 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay), 4.33 (Dismissal for Long Delay) and 5.10 (Subsequent Disclosure of Records)

ThePlaintiffappealedanOrderdismissingtheirActionfor

longdelayunderRule4.33.TheChambersJudgewhohad

grantedthedismissaloftheActionprovidedasummaryof

thelitigationhistory,whichincluded,amongstotherthings:

(i)theDefendantscomplyingwithanOrdercompelling

answerstoquestionsfromExaminationforDiscoveryon

October4,2010;(ii)settlementdiscussionsbetween

October2012andFebruary2013;(iii)theDefendants

disclosingadditionaldetailedinvoicesonOctober22,2012

aspartofthesettlementdiscussions;and(iv)thePlaintiff

servingaSupplementalAffidavitofRecordsonOctober

30,2013withamissingSchedule1.Priortotheinitial

Applicationfordismissalforlongdelay,thePlaintiffserved

theirmissingSchedule1withaSupplementalAffidavitof

Records.

TheMasterdismissedtheApplicationandaJustice

overturnedthepriorOrderandgrantedadismissalofthe

ActiononAppeal.

ThepartiesagreedthattheDefendants’compliancewith

theOrderonOctober4,2010,wasasignificantadvance

intheAction.ThenewRulescameintoforceonNovember

1,2010,effectivelystartingathreeyeardropdeadperiod.

Therefore,therelevantperiodofconsiderationwasbetween

November1,2010,andthedatetheApplicationtodismiss

wasfiledonFebruary24,2014.TheCourtofAppealnoted

thattheChambersJudgehadappliedafunctionalapproach

andstatedthatsettlementinitiativescouldsignificantly

advanceanAction,butthediscussionsinthisAction

accomplishedlittle.TheChambersJudgealsoheldthatthe

failuretoincludeSchedule1intheSupplementalAffidavit

ofRecordswasinadvertent,butthatthisstepdidnot

advancetheAction.

TheCourtofAppealreferredtoRules4.31and4.33as

thetwoRulesthatdealwithdelay,andnotedthatthe

functionalapproachwasadoptedbythe2013amendments

totheRules.Itwasheldthatthephrase“materially

advances”inthepriorRulehadthesamemeaningasa

“significantadvance”innewRule4.33.

TheCourtobservedthatproductionofnewinformationor

documentscansignificantlyadvanceanAction,butthe

natureofthosedocumentsandtheirimportancetothe

litigationmustbeexamined.TheCourtconsideredthe

disclosureofdetailedinvoicesonOctober22,2012.One

oftheissuesintheActionwashowmuchthePlaintiffwas

entitledtobepaid.Assuch,theinvoiceswererelevant

andmaterial,andtheDefendantswererequiredtoproduce

themunderRule5.10.Theyshouldhavedonesoina

SupplementalAffidavitofRecords,asopposedtoattaching

themtoasettlementletterona“withoutprejudice”basis.

Thesedocumentswereimportanttobothpartiesandtheir

productionconstitutedasignificantadvanceintheAction.

Therefore,theAppealwasgrantedandtheActionwas

restored.

WEAVER V CHERNIAWSKY, 2016 ABCA 152 (BERGER, MARTIN AND ROWBOTHAM JJA)Rules 4.33 (Dismissal for Long Delay) and 15.3 (Dispute Resolution Requirements)

ThePlaintiffappealedaDecisionwhichstruckherAction

forlongdelay.ThePlaintiff’sActionwascommenced

in2004,andQuestioningtookplaceinMay2009.In

October2011,thePlaintiff’scounselproducedacopyof

awrittennotewhichhadnotbeenproducedearlierdue

toinadvertence.InNovember2011,Plaintiff’scounsel

confirmedwiththeCourtthatthepartieshadagreedto

attendJudicialDisputeResolution(“JDR”);however,

noneoftheparties’agreeddateswereavailablefromthe

Court,andnofurtherattemptwasmadetoschedulea

JDR.InJune2014,theDefendantsappliedtodismiss

thePlaintiff’sClaimunderRule4.33.AMasterheldthat

disclosureofthewrittennotedidnotsignificantlyadvance

theAction,buttheagreementtoparticipateintheJDR

did.TheDefendantsappealed.TheJusticeheldthatthe

lastsignificantadvanceintheActionwasQuestioning

whichoccurredmorethan3yearsbeforetheApplicationto

dismissforlongdelay.ThePlaintiffthenappealed.

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TheCourtofAppealconfirmedthatthedelayRulesapplya

functionalapproach,whichrequiredeterminingwhethera

particularstepsignificantlyadvancedtheActionbymoving

theActionforwardina“meaningfulwayconsideringits

nature,value,importanceandquality”.ACourtisalsoto

lookatthegenuinenessandtimingofthestepatissue.The

emphasisisonsubstance,notform.TheCourtofAppeal

heldthattheagreementtohaveaJDR,andsubsequent

correspondencewiththebookingCoordinator,constituted

nothingmorethanafailedattemptatschedulingtheJDR

whichdidnotmateriallyadvancetheAction.TheCourt

rejectedthePlaintiff’sassertionthatagreeingtoparticipate

inanalternativedisputeresolution(“ADR”)process

significantlyadvancedtheActionbecauseitisamandatory

steprequiredbytheRules.BecausetheCourt’sanalysisis

oneofsubstance,notform,eventakingmandatorysteps

imposedbytheRulesdoesnotnecessarilysignificantly

advancetheActionforthepurposesofRule4.33.

Secondly,becauseQuestioningtookplacebeforeNovember

2010,Rule15.3operatedtomakeRules4.16and8.4

(whichrequiresomeformofADRbeforeaTrialdatecould

berequested)inapplicable.

Withrespecttotheproductionofthewrittennote,theCourt

heldthatitscontentshadalreadybeenextensivelycovered

inQuestioning.Itthereforecouldnotbesaidtohave

narrowedtheissuesindisputeormovedthemattercloser

toresolution.Accordingly,itdidnotsignificantlyadvance

theAction.TheAppealwasdismissed.

KOHAN V KOHAN, 2016 ABCA 125 (MARTIN, SLATTER AND VELDHUIS JJA)Rule 5.6 (Form and Content of Affidavit of Records)

TheDefendantappealedaJudgmentgrantingchildsupport

andspousalsupport.OneoftheissuesintheAppealwas

whetheradequateevidencewasadducedthattheparties’

daughteroughttobeconsideredadependantforthe

purposesofchildsupport.TheTrialJudgehadawarded

childsupportforaperiodinwhichthechildwasover

theageofmajority.TheCourtofAppealfoundtherewas

insufficientevidenceregardingthechild’spresentand

intendededucationalplantosupportthisfinding,andthat

thePlaintiff(Respondent)hadfailedtomeettheburden

ofproofforchildsupport.TheRespondentarguedthatthe

burdenofproofatTrialhadbeenmetbynotingthatshe

hadanswered99Undertakingsandprovided45Releases

withrespecttodocumentsintheAffidavitofRecords.The

CourtofAppealnotedthatRule5.6requireseachparty

toproduce“relevantandmaterial”documentsundertheir

control,andthatprovidingaReleasetoallowtheother

partytoobtainarecorddoesnotsatisfythisobligation.The

Courtheldthatthepartythatcontrolsthedocumentmust

obtainandproduceit.

TheCourtalsonotedthat,evenwhereapartytakesa

Release,anddoesnothingwithit,thatdoesnotaffect

theburdenofproofatTrial.Apartywhofailstoproduce

relevantandmaterialrecordscannottakethepositionat

Trialthatmissingevidenceistheresponsibilityoftheother

partybecausethatpartyhadobtainedaRelease.

WEATHERFORD CANADA PARTNERSHIP V ADDIE, 2016 ABQB 188 (VEIT J)Rules 5.31 (Use of Transcript and Answers to Written Questions), 6.6 (Response and Reply to Application), 6.7 (Questioning on Affidavit in Support, Response and Reply to Application), 7.3 (Summary Judgment) and 13.6 (Pleadings: General Requirements)

TwooftheDefendantsappliedforleavetoAmendtheir

StatementsofDefencetopleadtheLimitations Act,RSA

2000,cL-12,and,iftheamendmentApplicationwas

granted,forSummaryDismissalofthePlaintiff’sClaim.

Thepartiesagreedthattheamendmentsneedonlycrossa

lowbar,butthattheyshouldnotbeallowediftheycause

thepartyoppositeprejudicewhichcannotbecompensated

byCosts,oriftheproposedamendmentsarehopeless.The

partiesalsoagreed,withrespecttoSummaryJudgment,

thattherehasbeenashiftinthelegalculturewhichnow

supportsthegrantingofSummaryJudgmentinsituations

whereuncontrovertedevidenceestablishesthatthereisno

genuineissueforTrial.

TheDefendantsobjectedtothefilingofanAffidavit

byWeatherfordbecauseitwasfiledaftertheparties’

writtenbriefshadbeenfiled.JusticeVeitallowedthe

Affidavitinquestionstatingthattherewereprocedural




uncertaintiesincludingwhethertheDefendantswere

applyingonlytoamendtheirStatementsofDefence,or

whethertheApplicationforSummaryJudgmentwouldbe

includedintheApplicationaswell.TheDefendantsalso

objected,pursuanttoRule5.31(2),toWeatherford’suse

ofportionsofthetranscriptofQuestioningofoneofits

ownwitnesses.VeitJ.notedthatWeatherfordcouldnot

useitsownwitness’sQuestioningevidenceinaself-serving

way.However,inthiscase,itwasentitledtoensurethat

anyexcerptfromitswitness’evidenceconstitutedafair

representationofthatwitness’evidence.TheDefendants

alsoobjected,pursuanttoRule6.7,toWeatherford’suse

ofexcerptsfromthetranscriptsofcross-examinationon

AffidavitbyWeatherford’saffiant.JusticeVeitheldthat

theuseofthisevidencewasusedtoensurethatafair

representationofthatwitness’evidencewasbeforetheCourt.

Thepartiesalsodisagreedonwhetherlachesand

acquiescencecouldberaisedwithouthavingbeenpleaded.

JusticeVeitnotedthattherequirementofPleadingsis

tostatethefacts,nottostatethelaw.HerLadyshipalso

notedthatRule13.6(3)listsanumberofargumentsthat

mustbepleadedifapartywishestorelyonthematTrial.

Thelistdoesnotincludelachesandacquiescence.

WithrespecttoSummaryJudgment,VeitJ.commented

thatthepartiesarerequiredtoputtheirbestfootforward,

andtheCourtisentitledto,andshould,grantthe

Applicationifitcanfairlydosoonthebasisofthematerial

putforward,withoutrequiringaTrial.

VeitJ.allowedtheamendmenttotheStatementof

Defence,andconcludedthattherewasnogenuineissuefor

Trial,giventhatthelimitationsissuecouldbefairlydecided

onthebasisoftheevidencebeforetheCourt.HerLadyship

grantedtheDefendants’SummaryJudgmentApplication

accordingly.

GEOPHYSICAL SERVICE INCORPORATED V ENCANA CORPORATION, 2016 ABQB 230 (EIDSVIK J) Rule 5.36 (Objection to Expert’s Report)

ThePlaintiffsuedanumberofDefendantsinseparate

Actionsforbreachofcopyrightandbreachofcontract.The

CaseManagementJudgeorderedthetrialoftwocommon

issuesregardingthebreachofcopyrightclaiminan

attempttohelpstreamlinetheActionsandcleartheCourt’s

docket.

IntheTrialinrespectofthetwocommonissues,Eidsvik

J.consideredwhattheeffectoftheRegulatoryRegime

wasonthePlaintiff’sclaims,andwhetherornotcopyright

couldsubsistinseismicmaterialsofthekindthatwerethe

subjectmatterofthePlaintiff’sclaims.Theevidenceduring

theTrialofthetwocommonissueswasconsiderable,and

includedtheevidenceoffiveexperts.DuringtheTrial,the

Plaintiffobjectedtotheevidenceofoneoftheexperts,

arguingthathewasbiasedbecausehehadpreviously

beenemployedbyoneoftheDefendants.EidsvikJ.

determinedthattheexpert’sformeremploymentwith

oneoftheDefendantsdidnotnecessarilymeanthathis

evidencewasbiasedfortheTrialofthecommonissues.

JusticeEidsvikacceptedtheexpert’sevidence,notingthat

apartyobjectingtotheopinionofanexpertmustraise

theobjectioninadvanceofTrial,andmustnotifytheparty

servingthereport.HerLadyshipnotedthat,althoughRule

5.36doesnotspecificallyrefertoanexpert’squalifications

beingobjectedtoinadvance,asopposedtotheiropinion,

itisstillgoodpracticetomakeanobjectiontoanexpert’s

qualificationsinadvanceofTrial,pursuanttoRule5.36.

EidsvikJ.determinedthatcopyrightcouldanddidexistin

theseismicmaterialsthatwereatissue;however,under

theexistingRegulatoryRegime,theDefendantswere

permittedtodisclosethesematerialsafteracertainamount

oftime,andthereforetheyhadnotbreachedthePlaintiff’s

copyright.

FELDMAN V BENDLE GLASS CO (1975) LTD, 2016 ABQB 219 (LEE J)Rules 6.14 (Appeal from Master’s Judgment or Order) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)

ThePlaintiffsappealedfromaMaster’sDecisionwhich

grantedtheDefendants’SummaryDismissalApplication.

TheMasterdeterminedthatthePlaintiffshadextensive

knowledgeoftherequisitefactsmorethantwoyearsprior

tocommencingtheirAction,andthatapurportedstandstill

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agreementcouldnotpreservethePlaintiffs’claimssince

itwasenteredintoaftertheexpiryofthelimitationperiod.

JusticeLeereviewedRules6.14and7.3andobserved

that,giventhatthehearingwasde novo,nostandardof

reviewwasapplicable.

ThePlaintiffsfiledtranscriptsoftheproceedingsbeforethe

Masterandtheirnewevidencelate.ThePlaintiffsapplied

toextendtimelines,andJusticeLeeheldthat,although

thePlaintiffs’counselwasnotverydiligentaboutthe

deadlines,nothingprejudicialresultedfromthedelay.

JusticeLeestatedthatRule7.3establishesa“merit

based”testforSummaryJudgmentinAlberta:theCourt

willgrantSummaryJudgmentwherethereisnoissue

ofgenuinemeritrequiringTrial.JusticeLeeconsidered

evidencecontainedinanAffidavitfiledsubsequentto

theMaster’sDecision,filedpursuanttoRule6.14(3),

whichsetoutprima facieevidencethattherewasa

standstillagreementinplace.HisLordshipheldthatthe

issueregardingtheexistenceandscopeofthestandstill

agreementwasanissueoffactwhichshouldbedetermined

atTrial.

JusticeLeenotedthattheApplicationforSummary

JudgmentwasbroughtmanyyearsaftertheStatement

ofClaimwasfiled,andobservedthatatimelyandjust

adjudicationoftheissuesnecessitatedthattheparties

proceedexpeditiouslytoTrial.TheAppealwasallowedand

theSummaryDismissalsetaside.

BUSINESS BLOSSOMS INC V BLOSSOMS FRESH FRUIT ARRANGEMENTS LTD, 2016 ABQB 275 (YAMAUCHI J)Rules 6.14 (Appeal from Master’s Judgment or Order) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)

BusinessBlossomsInc.(“Business”)appealedthe

dismissalofitsSummaryJudgmentApplication.Business

wasseekingSummaryJudgmentagainstBlossomsFresh

FruitArrangementsLtd.(“FreshFruit”)inrelationtothe

natureoftherelationshipbetweenthepartiesanditsnet

lossesforfailedretailoperations.YamauchiJ.notedthat,

pursuanttoRule6.14,anAppealfromaMaster’sdecision

wasahearingde novoandthestandardofreviewwas

correctness.Further,whenapplyingRule7.3,Summary

Judgmentcouldonlybegrantedtoamovingpartyifthe

non-movingparty’spositionwaswithoutmerit.Inthiscase,

BusinesswasrequiredtoshowthatFreshFruit’sposition

waswithoutmerit,suchthatthefactsandlawmade

Business’sposition“unassailable”and“socompellingthat

thelikelihoodofsuccessisveryhigh”.Whenbalanced

againstSection19oftheFranchise Act,RSA2000cF-23,

theCourtstatedthatFreshFruitfirstboretheonusof

provingonabalanceofprobabilitiesthatthearrangement

betweenitandBusinesswasnota“franchise”.Ifit

succeededinthis,Businesswouldnothavemetitsonus

andtheCourtcouldgrantSummaryJudgmentinitsfavour.

Ifitdidnotsucceedinthis,theCourtwasrequiredtomove

onandconsiderwhetherBusinesscouldmeetthetestfor

SummaryJudgment.Themovingpartywasrequiredto

present“uncontrovertedfactsandlawwhichentitleitto

judgmentagainstthenonmovingparty”.

YamauchiJ.wasunabletodeterminewhetherthe

relationshipbetweenBlossomsandFreshFruitwasa

franchisebasedontheevidencebeforetheCourt.Inthis

case,thereweredisputedfactsandlawthatrequireda

fullTrialoftheissues.TherecordbeforetheCourtdidnot

showthatBusiness’spositionwas“unassailable”andHis

LordshipdismissedtheAppealoftheMaster’sOrder.

LINDE CANADA LIMITED V LUFF INDUSTRIES LTD, 2016 ABQB 298 (WILSON J)Rules 6.14 (Appeal from a Master’s Judgment or Order) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)

ThePlaintiffappealedfromaMaster’sDecisionwhich

dismisseditsApplicationforSummaryJudgmentas

againsttheDefendant,andrefusedSummaryDismissalof

theDefendant’sCounterclaim.WilsonJ.referredtoRule

6.14whichgovernsappealsofMaster’sdecisions.Justice

Wilsonreviewedtherecordandobservedthatnofurtheror

additionalevidencewasofferedbyeitherparty.

WithrespecttotheSummaryJudgmentApplication,

WilsonJ.notedthat,essentially,thisActionarosefroma

contractualdispute.WilsonJ.foundthattheunderlying

contractwasunclear,andtheMasterwascorrectin




determiningthatoneoftherealissuesinthecasewas

theexpectationsoftheparties.WilsonJ.agreedthatthere

wasagenuineissueforTrialandsoupheldtheMaster’s

DecisiontorefuseSummaryJudgmentasagainstthe

Defendant.

JusticeWilsonthenconsideredtheappealoftheDecision

whichdeniedSummaryDismissaloftheDefendant’s

Counterclaim.HisLordshipnotedthattheCounterclaim

wasoveramatterofanexclusionaryclauseinthecontract

betweentheparties.Afterreviewingpriorleadingauthority

withrespecttoexclusionaryclauses,WilsonJ.found

thattherewasnoevidencetosupporttheclaimthatthe

exclusionclauseshouldnotbeapplied.WilsonJ.therefore

allowedthePlaintiff’sAppealandgrantedSummary

DismissaloftheCounterclaim.

FELDMAN V BENDLE GLASS CO (1975) LTD, 2016 ABQB 321 (LEE J)Rules 6.14 (Appeal From Master’s Judgment or Order), 10.31 (Court-Ordered Costs Award) and 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award)

ThePlaintiffssuccessfullyappealedaSummaryDismissal

decision,soughtCostsfortheAppealandsoughtthe

returnoftheCostsawardedbytheMaster.TheDefendant

condominiumcorporation(therespondentontheAppeal)

arguedthattheCourtshouldnotgrantCostsfortheAppeal

or,alternatively,thatCostsshouldbeinthecause.The

DefendantsubmittedthatareturnoftheCostsawarded

bytheMasterwasnotwarrantedbecauseofthePlaintiffs’

improperAffidavit,admissionsduringQuestioningon

Affidavit,andtheirattempttorelyonevidencenotproperly

beforetheCourt.TheDefendantarguedfurtherthat

thePlaintiffsalsofailedtocomplywiththeprocedural

requirementsofRule6.14attheAppeal.

JusticeLeereferredtoRules10.31and10.33,andthe

Court’sgeneraldiscretiontograntCosts.HisLordship

heldthattheproceduralandevidentiaryirregularitieswere

duetotheconductofthePlaintiffs’formercounseland,

assuch,thePlaintiffsshouldnotbedeniedareturnof

theirCosts.AttheAppeal,theDefendantwaivedallof

theproceduralirregularitieswhenthematterwasheard;

and,theDefendantdidnotsufferanyprejudicefromthe

deficiencies.Therefore,theirregularitieshadminimal

bearingwithrespecttoCosts.ThePlaintiffswereawarded

theirCostsontheAppealandareturnofthethrownaway

CostspreviouslypaidpursuanttotheMaster’sOrder.

ELKOW V SANA, 2016 ABQB 235 (GRAESSER J)Rules 6.37 (Notice to Admit) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)

OneoftheDefendantsinadefamationAction,Ms.Sana,

appliedtosettlethetermsofaJudgmentfollowinga

SummaryJudgmentApplication.GraesserJ.hadgranted

SummaryJudgmentofsomeofthePlaintiff’sclaims,

andhadissuedasupplementalDecisionwithrespectto

damages.Ms.SanaobjectedtothesupplementalDecision,

arguingthatanassessmentofdamagesshouldnothave

beenremoved.Ms.Sanaalsoarguedthattheformal

JudgmentshouldclarifythattheclaimsforwhichSummary

Judgmentwerenotgrantedshouldbeexpresslydismissed.

GraesserJ.statedthat,generallyspeaking,aPlaintiffwho

appliesforSummaryJudgmentandfailsisnotatriskof

theirActionbeingdismissed.Similarly,aDefendantwho

bringsaSummaryDismissalApplicationandfailswillnot,

asaresult,haveJudgmententeredagainstthem.Graesser

J.thereforedeclinedtoexpresslydismissthoseclaims

whichremainedextantafterSummaryJudgment.

ThePlaintiffhadarguedthattherewasadeemedadmission

ofliabilitybyMs.SanabecauseaReplytoNoticetoAdmit

Factscontainedonlyabaredenialofthefactswhichthe

PlaintiffarguedwasnotmadeinaccordancewithRule

6.37(3)(a).ThePlaintiffarguedthattheRulerequiresthat

adenialtoaNoticetoAdmitFacts“setoutindetailthe

reasonswhythefactcannotbeadmitted”.JusticeGraesser

consideredthisatechnicalbutfairargument.However,

HisLordshipheldthatitwasinappropriatetodetermine

issuesofdefamationandmaliceonthebasisofadeemed

admissionwhichresultedfrom“imperfectcompliance”

withtheRulesrelatingtoNoticestoAdmit.

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336239 ALBERTA LTD (DAVE’S DIESEL REPAIR) V MELLA, 2016 ABQB 190 (SHELLEY J)Rules 7.3 (Summary Judgment) and 9.24 (Fraudulent Preferences and Fraudulent Conveyances)

ThePlaintiffobtainedaConsentJudgmentasagainst

theDefendantsandsubsequentlylearnedthatoneofthe

Defendantshadbeenusinghiswife’sbankaccountto

divertfundsthatwouldotherwisebesubjecttoenforcement

proceedings.ThePlaintiffsoughtJudgmentagainstthe

Defendant’swife,whowasnotapartytotheAction.The

PlaintiffarguedthattheFraudulent Preferences Act,RSA

2000,cF-24,ortheStatute of Elizabeth,13ElizI,C-5

(UK)allowedforaJudgmentagainstanon-partyrecipient

ofassetswhonolongerhadpossessionoftheassetsand

receivedlittleornobenefitfromthem.

ShelleyJ.notedthatRule9.24onlypermittedtheCourt

toorderanon-partytoanActionwhoreceivedwrongfully

conveyedpropertytosellthatpropertytopaythedebt

owedpursuanttotheAction.TheStatute of Elizabethdid

notgivethePlaintifftherighttodamagesorcompensation

asthatstatuteonlyallowedtheCourttosetasidea

conveyance.Further,asthePlaintiffdidnotbringan

ApplicationforSummaryJudgmentunderRule7.3,the

CourtwasnotpermittedtograntJudgmentagainstthe

Defendant’swifeasanon-party.

Afterexaminingtheimpugnedtransactions,theCourt

concludedthattherewasafraudulentconveyancebythe

Defendanttohiswife;therefore,thePlaintiffwasrequired

tocommenceanActionagainsttheDefendant’swife,since

Rule9.24andtheStatute of Elizabethonlyprovidedfor

seizingandsellingthetransferredasset.

1059028 ALBERTA LTD V CAPIO OILFIELD SERVICES LTD, 2016 ABQB 234 (MASTER SCHULZ)Rules 7.3 (Summary Judgment) and 13.18 (Types of Affidavit)

TheDefendantsappliedforSummaryDismissalon

thebasisthatthePlaintiffs’claimswerebasedonan

unenforceableRestrictiveCovenantinanagreement

betweentheparties.ThePlaintiffscross-appliedseeking

adeclarationthattheRestrictiveCovenantwasvalidand

enforceable.

ThePlaintiffsarguedthattheApplicationforSummary

JudgmentshouldbedismissedbecausetheDefendants’

Affidavitdidnotcontainastatementswearingpositively

thattherewasnomerittotheClaim.MasterSchulznoted

that,becauseaSummaryJudgmentApplicationmay

disposeofallorpartofaClaim,Rule13.18(3)applies.It

requiresthattheAffiantsweartheAffidavitbasedonhis

orherpersonalknowledge.MasterSchulzstatedthat“the

magicwordsarenotnecessary,butevidenceonpersonal

knowledgeisnecessary”.TheAffiant’sroleistoprovide

theCourtwiththeevidencerequiredtoformanopinion

ontheissuesinquestion.Thepresenceorabsenceofa

declarationthataclaimordefencehasnomeritwillnot

haveanybearingonanApplicationforSummaryJudgment.

MasterSchulzheldthattheRestrictiveCovenantwasvalid

andenforceableanddismissedtheDefendants’Application

forSummaryJudgment.

ALBERTA V GRETER, 2016 ABQB 293 (MASTER SCHULZ)Rule 7.3 (Summary Judgment)

AfterreceivingherPhD,theDefendantfailedtorepay

herstudentloansfromtheGovernmentofAlbertainthe

amountofoversixtythousanddollars.ThePlaintiffargued

thattheDefendanthadbreachedtheloancontract,and

theyappliedforSummaryJudgmentpursuanttoRule7.3

onthebasisthattheDefendanthadnorealdefencetothe

claim.MasterSchulzobservedthattheDefendanthadused

some“freemanontheland”tactics,andhadalsoinformed

thePlaintiffthatshewouldnotbeattendingtheSummary

JudgmentApplication.TheDefendanthadalsomade

argumentswhichtheCourtshavereferredtoas“Organized

PseudolegalCommercialArguments”(“OPCA”).

TheDefendanthaddelivereddocumentstothePlaintiff

whichunilaterallyimposedseveraltermsandobligationson

thePlaintiff.MasterSchulzdeterminedthattheDefendant

hadnobasisinlawtomakeanyofthedemandsorto

imposeanyobligationsontheDefendant.Further,Master

SchulzheldthattheDefendant’spositionwascontractually




WAQUAN V CANADA (ATTORNEY GENERAL), 2016 ABQB 280 (WITTMANN CJ)Rule 9.13 (Re-Opening Case)

WittmannC.J.reservedJudgmentinWaquan v Canada

(Attorney General),2016ABQB191,and,priortowritten

reasonsbeingissued,theFederalCourtissuedaDecision

inasimilarcase.CounselforseveralofthePlaintiffsasked

WittmannC.J.toreconsidertheearlierJudgmentinlightof

theFederalCourtDecision.HisLordshipnotedthatwhile

Rule9.13representsanexpansionofjudicialdiscretion

ascomparedwithitspredecessor,Rule339whichmerely

providedforcorrectionofclericalmistakesorerrorsarising

fromaccidents,slips,oromissions,discretionunderRule

9.13isnotboundless.TakingRule1.2intoaccountand

theprinciplesoffairness,justice,andefficiencywhichare

setoutinthatFoundationalRule,Rule9.13allowsthe

Courttocorrectaplainandmanifesterror,butdoesnot

permitparties“anotherkickatthecan”.

WittmannC.J.deniedtherequestforareconsiderationof

theJudgment,notingthattheFederalCourtDecisionwas

notbindingauthority.Theexistenceofacontrary,non-

bindingDecisionisaninsufficientgroundtoshowaplain

andmanifesterror.Further,theFederalCourtDecision

offerednonewanalysisforthecircumstancesintheinstant

caseanddidnot,contrarytotheargumentofPlaintiff’s

counsel,“cometotheexactoppositeconclusion”.

POLOMA INVESTMENTS LTD V YUEN, 2016 ABCA 93 (SLATTER, MCDONALD AND BIELBY JJA)Rule 9.15 (Setting Aside, Varying and Discharging Judgments and Orders)

ThePlaintiffsappealedaDecisionwhichsetasidea

DefaultJudgmentagainsttheDefendant,Yuen.TheCourt

notedthataDefaultJudgmentmaybesetasideincertain

circumstances,includingwherenonoticeoftheClaim

wasreceivedbytheDefendantpursuanttoRules9.15(1)

(b)and(3)(c)oftheRules.ThePlaintiffsarguedthat

thereisarequirementthattheApplicantseekingtoset

asideaDefaultJudgmentmustshow,notonlythatthe

documentwasnotservedonthem,butthattheydidnot

knowofthedocumentandthatthedocument’scontents

andlegallywrong,andthatshehadnodefencetothe

government’sactiontoenforcetheoutstandingstudent

loandebts.MasterSchultzawardedSummaryJudgmentin

favourofthePlaintiff.

CLEAR HILLS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION V HORSEMAN, 2016 ABQB 341 (ROSS J)Rules 7.3 (Summary Judgment) and 13.18 (Types of Affidavit) and Schedule C

TheDefendantsappliedforSummaryDismissalof

theclaimagainstthembythePlaintiff,ClearHills

DevelopmentCorporation.TheDefendantshadbroughta

priorApplicationin2014tosummarilydismisstheclaim.

RossJ.dismissedtheearlierApplication,asitdidnot

meetthetestforSummaryDismissal,andsuggestedthat

theSummaryTrialRulemighteventuallybeemployedto

disposeofsomeoftheissues.TheDefendantsarguedthat

thesubsequentApplicationwasappropriatebecausethe

lawhaddevelopedsincethe2014SummaryDismissal

Application.

TheCourtagreedthatthelawpertainingtoSummary

Dismissalhaddevelopedsincethe2014Application;

specifically,RossJ.notedthe6stepprocessforSummary

JudgmentApplicationsformulatedbyMasterSchlosserin

1214777 Alberta Ltd v 480955 Alberta Ltd,2014ABQB

301.JusticeRossexaminedtheparties’evidenceusing

the6stepanalysis,andbasedonthelackofevidence

frombothparties,amongotherdeficiencies,dismissedthe

SummaryJudgmentApplication.

ThePlaintiffsoughtsolicitorandclientCostsorenhanced

CostsonthegroundsthattheApplicationwasessentiallya

repeatofthe2014Applicationandthatitwasres judicata.

RossJ.heldthattheApplicationwasnotres judicata,

asthe2014ApplicationdidnotresultinafinalOrder.

Additionally,theCourtwasnotpreparedtocharacterizethe

Applicationasanabuseofprocess.TheCourtawardedthe

PlaintiffCostsbasedonColumn4ofScheduleC,payable

forthwith.

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didnototherwisecometotheirattention.TheCourtnoted

thattheestablishedcommonlawtestforsettingasidea

DefaultJudgmentunderpriorRule158,nowRule9.15(3),

directedthataCourtmaysetasideorvaryanyJudgment

enteredondefaultortocommitaDefencetobefiledbya

partywhohasbeennotedindefault.

TheCourtconcludedthattherewasevidencebeforethe

ChambersJudgewhichallowedaninferencetobedrawn

thattheRespondenthadnoknowledgeoftheClaimmade

againsthim.Further,hepromptlylaunchedtheApplication

toSetAsideoncehewasservedwiththeresultingDefault

JudgmentandidentifiedanarguabledefencetotheAction.

NoevidenceofprejudicewasadvancedbytheAppellants.

Intheresult,theAppealwasdismissed.

GEOPHYSICAL SERVICE INCORPORATED V ENCANA CORPORATION, 2016 ABQB 229 (STREKAF J)Rules 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs), 10.31 (Court-Ordered Costs Award) and 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award)

AMastergrantedtwenty-sixOrdersforSecurityforCosts

asagainstthePlaintiff,andthePlaintiffappealed.The

combinedamountofSecurityorderedtobepostedbythe

Masterwasreducedby$431,655.75,butthesuccesson

theAppealwasmixed.ThepartiesappearedbeforeJustice

StrekaftoobtainadirectionwithrespecttoCosts.

JusticeStrekafreferredtoRules10.29and10.31,stating

thattheCourthasdiscretioninorderingCosts,andthat

Rule10.33providesthefactorstheCourtshouldconsider.

Here,therelevantconsiderationsincludedthat:(i)thecase

involvedmultiplepartiesparticipatingontheAppealin

numerousActions;(ii)theamountinissueontheAppeal

was$1.9million;(iii)successwasmixed;(iv)theissue

wasamatterofconsiderableimportancetoallparties;(v)

theAppealraisedsomenovelarguments;(vi)therewas

cooperationamongcounselwhichallowedtheAppealto

proceedefficiently;and(vii)therewasnomisconduct

whichwouldjustifyaCostspenalty.StrekafJ.heldthat

theparties’proposalsastoCostswereunreasonable,and

assuch,HerLadyshipapportionedlessthanwhatwas

requested.

ET V ROCKY MOUNTAIN PLAY THERAPY INSTITUTE INC, 2016 ABQB 299 (STREKAF J)Rules 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs), 10.31 (Court-Ordered Costs Award) and 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award) and Schedule C

FollowingtheAppealofaMaster’sDecisioninwhichthe

Defendantwassuccessful,StrekafJ.heardtheparties’

submissionswithrespecttoCosts.TheDefendant,Mr.

Kwan,requestedsolicitorandclientCostsinanunspecified

amountor,inthealternative,fivetimesColumnCinthe

amountof$30,000.JusticeStrekafnotedthatRules

10.29and10.31providethatCostsareintheCourt’s

discretion,havingregardtotheconsiderationsoutlinedin

Rule10.33.

Despitetheallegationsbytheself-representedPlaintiffE.T.

being“highlyinflammatory”andnotrelevanttotheissues

beforetheMasterorintheAppeal,StrekafJ.declinedto

awardsolicitorandclientCosts.HerLadyshipnotedthat

suchCostsarereservedforexceptionalcircumstancesof

reprehensible,scandalous,oroutrageousconduct;were

inappropriatetoawardatthisstage;andoughttobeleftto

thediscretionoftheTrialJudge.However,StrekafJ.held

thatenhancedCostsshouldbeawardedgiventhatserious

allegationsofimproprietywereunsuccessfullyadvancedby

thePlaintiff.HerLadyshipawardedthreetimesthetaxable

ColumnCcosts,being$18,000.

VOISEY V CANADA (ATTORNEY GENERAL), 2016 ABQB 316 (CRIGHTON J)Rule 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs) and Schedule C

TheApplicant,aprisonerattheBowdenInstitution,applied

unsuccessfullyforhabeas corpusfollowinganinvoluntary

transferfromtheminimumsecurityGriersonInstitution

toBowdenInstitution,amediumsecurityfacility.The

AttorneyGeneralsoughtCostsoftheApplicationbased

onthepresumptionunderRule10.29thatthesuccessful

partyinacivilproceedingisentitledtotheirCosts.The

ApplicantarguedthatheshouldnotbeforcedtopayCosts

forenforcinghisrights,andthathewasimpecunious.




awardedthePlaintiffCostscalculatedusingthedraftBill

ofCostspreparedbyPlaintiff’scounsel,exceptforthefee

amountunderColumn5whichwasdoubled.

TURNER V BELL MOBILITY INC, 2016 ABCA 188 (BERGER, WATSON AND ROWBOTHAM JJA)Rules 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs), 10.32 (Costs in Class Proceeding), 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award) and 14.88 (Cost Awards) and Schedule C

FollowingasuccessfulAppealinaClassAction,the

Defendantcommunicationcompaniesarguedthatthey

wereentitledtoCostsoftheAppealandCostsfromthe

proceedingsintheCourtbelow.

TheCourtreiteratedthatithadjurisdictiontovary

TrialCostsasaresultofasuccessfulAppealinclass

proceedingspursuanttos.37oftheClass Proceedings

Act,RSA2000cC-16.5andRule10.32.TheCourt

notedthatRule10.32allowstheCourttoconsideraccess

tojusticeissuesinawardingCostsinclassproceedings.

TheCourtconsideredthefactorsoutlinedinRule10.33,

andawardedamultiplierof1.5timesScheduleCforthe

AppealandTrialleveltotheDefendants.Accesstojustice

considerationspersuadedtheCourttorejectlevyinga

“sanction”ofgreatlyenhancedCosts,despitenotingthat

ScheduleCCostshadnotbeenupdatedinsome20years

andthelawsuitwaspotentiallyworthbillionsofdollars.

WAYMARKER MANAGEMENT (SILVER CREEK) INC V TIBU, 2016 ABCA 118 (BERGER, WATSON AND O’FERRALL JJA)Rule 10.31 (Court-Ordered Costs Award)

TheAppellantandtheRespondentswereinvolvedina

disputewhichresultedinaRestrainingOrderagainst

theAppellant.TheTrialJudgeawardedCoststothe

Respondents,despitethefactthattheRespondents’

counselatTrialwasalsotheRespondentCompany’ssole

directorandmajorityshareholder.OnAppeal,theAppellant

arguedthatCostsshouldnothavebeenawardedin

counsel’sowncause.However,theCourtofAppealrejected

CrightonJ.notedthatthedefaultpositionforthequantum

ofcostsforanapplicationwithnomonetaryvalueis

basedonColumn1ofScheduleC,butthatsection8

oftheSchedulecontemplatesanenhancedcostsaward

wherethesubjectmatteriscomplex.TheApplicant

wasentirelyunsuccessful,andhadfiledvoluminous

applicationmaterialswhichwere“notparticularlywell

focused”.Further,JusticeCrightonfoundtheApplication

tohavebeenmeritless,whichraisedtheconcernthat

the“unrestricteduseofhabeas corpusbyincarcerated

individualsrisksunwarrantedandexpensivelitigationpaid

outofthetaxpayers’purse”.TheAttorneyGeneralwas

awardedcostsof$1,000.

MILAVSKY V MILAVSKY ESTATE, 2016 ABQB 347 (MAHONEY J)Rule 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs) and Schedule C

TheDefendantsunsuccessfullyappliedforSummary

DismissalofthePlaintiff’sAction.ThePlaintiffapplied

foranOrderforpaymentof60%oftheCoststhatshe

incurred.ThePlaintiffsubmittedthatanawardofCosts

pursuanttoScheduleCwouldbeinadequatebecause

Column5onlyentitledhertolessthan5%oftheactual

feesincurred.TheDefendantsarguedthatCostsshouldbe

determinedbytheTrialJudgefollowingTrial.

TheCourtfirstnotedthatitwaswellestablishedthat

Costswereawardedontheassumptionthatawinning

partydeservedcompensationforlegalcosts,butthat

fullindemnityoflegalfeescouldsignificantlyhampera

party’saccesstojustice.WhileCostsconsequenceswere

aneffectivemechanismforcontrollinglitigation,notall

unsuccessfulcaseswerewithoutmerit;therefore,aparty

shouldnotbeundulypunishedforbringingalosingAction.

MahoneyJ.heldthatCostsonindemnitybasiswerenot

justifiedbasedontheApplicationbeingcomplexornovel.

Nonetheless,theApplicationrequiredextensiveresearch

andpreparation.HisLordshipheldthat,whiletheSummary

JudgmentApplicationwasnotanabuseofprocess,the

Plaintiffwassuccessfulindefendingagainstacomplexand

voluminousApplication.Onthisbasis,JusticeMahoney

33

JULY 2016

Volume 2 Issue 2


RO V DF, 2016 ABCA 170 (COSTIGAN, PAPERNY AND ROWBOTHAM JJA)Rules 10.52 (Declaration of Civil Contempt) and 14.45 (Application to Admit New Evidence)

TheAppellant,R.O.,appealedtwoOrdersofaCase

ManagementJudgewhichdeclaredtheAppellanta

vexatiouslitigantandheldherincontemptofCourtfor

failingtocomplywithtworestrictedCourtAccessOrders.

TheAppellantalsobroughtthreeApplicationstoadmitnew

evidence.

TheCourtofAppealnotedthat,underRule10.52(3),a

findingofcontemptrequiredthatthepersonknowthat

theyhadbreachedaCourtOrderwiththeburdenofproof

forsuchafindingbeingbeyondareasonabledoubt.The

CaseManagementJudgeheldthattherewasnoevidence

whichraisedareasonabledoubtthattheAppellantwas

responsibleforbreachingtheRestrictedAccessOrders.In

responsetothisfinding,theAppellantsoughttoadduce

newevidenceonappeal.Inthisinstance,thebulkofthe

newevidenceconsistedofanExpert’sReportandthe

supportingAffidavitsforthatReport.TheCourtconcluded

thattheExpert’sReportcouldnotbeadmittedbecauseit

didnotmeetthecriteriasetoutinR v Palmer[1980]1

SCR759,andnoinjusticewouldarisefromadecisionnot

toadmitit.WhiletheAppellantsubmittedthattimeand

expensepreventedherfromobtainingtheReportearlier,

theCourtnotedthatshedidnotrequestanadjournmentof

theApplicationand,further,theReportcontainednonew

evidence.ThepurposeoftheReportwastocorroborate

orbolsterevidencethatwasbeforetheCaseManagement

Judge.TheCourtnotedthattheappellateprocesscouldnot

be“routinelyusedtoaugmentthetrialrecord”;therefore,

theApplicationstoadmitnewevidenceweredismissed.

Further,theCourtnotedthatthepenaltyimposedbythe

JudgeinstrikingtheStatementofClaimwasareasonable

exerciseoftheCourt’sdiscretion.

WithrespecttotheVexatiousLitigantOrder,theCourtof

AppealnotedthatthereasonsforgrantingtheOrderwere

focusedonthisActionagainsttheRespondent.TheCourt

ofAppealheldthattheOrderwastoobroadinthatthere

wasinsufficientevidencetosupportafindingthatthe

thisargument,holdingthattheTrialJudgehadbroad

discretiontoawardCostspursuanttoRule10.31(5).The

AppealagainsttheCostsawardwasdismissedaccordingly.

MA V COYNE, 2016 ABCA 119 (MARTIN, ROWBOTHAM AND O’FERRALL JJA)Rules 10.31 (Court Ordered Costs Award), 10.41 (Assessment Officer’s Decision) and 14.88 (Costs Awards)

TheDefendantsappealedfromaChambersJudge’s

DecisionallowinganOrderwhichawardedinterpreters’

feesincurredbeforeaStatementofClaimwasfiled.An

AssessmentOfficerhadallowedthefees.TheAssessment

wasappealedtotheCourtofQueen’sBench,anda

ChambersJudgedismissedtheAppeal.TheDefendants

appealedtotheCourtofAppeal.

TheCourtofAppealnotedthatmostcasesdecided

underpriorRule600concludedthatpre-commencement

disbursementswerenotrecoverable.However,thewording

ofthenewRulesisverydifferent.Rule10.31permitsa

CourtofQueen’sBenchJudgetoawardreasonableand

properCoststhatapartyincurredtofileanApplicationor

commenceproceedings.Foraddedclarity,Rule10.31(2)(a)

statesthatthisincludes“reasonableandpropercoststhat

apartyincurredtobringanaction”.TheCourtfurthernoted

thatRule10.41grantsanAssessmentOfficerjurisdiction

to“determinewhetherthecoststhatapartyincurredto

fileanapplicationortakeproceedingsarereasonableand

propercosts”.Rule10.41(2)(a)furtherclarifiesthat“costs

ofapartyundersubrule(1)includethereasonableand

propercoststhatapartyincurredtobringanaction”.

TheCourtheldthatthepre-commencementinterpreters’

feeswerereasonableandproperCostsascontemplatedby

Rules10.31and10.41.TheAppealwasdismissedandthe

CourtawardedtheRespondentstheirCostsinaccordance

withRule14.88.




KE V CSM, 2016 ABQB 342 (BROWNE J)Rule 14.5 (Appeals Only With Permission)

Inafamilylawdispute,KEappealedanOrderfromthe

ProvincialCourtwhichdeniedheraccesstochildrenborn

fromvariousrelationships.KEwasthesubjectofanOrder

fromtheProvincialCourtrestrictingheraccesstoProvincial

Courtprocesses.

JusticeBrownenotedthatRule14.5(1)(j)requiresaperson

whoissubjecttoavexatiouslitigantOrdertoobtainleave

toappeal,andthatdenialofleaveisfinal.Accordingto

priorleadingauthorities,thisleaverequirementapplies

toanyvexatiouslitigantdeclarationmadeunderthe

Judicature Act,RSA2000,cJ-2,theFamily Law Act,

SA2003,cF-4.5,orunderasuperiorCourt’sinherent

jurisdiction.Inthiscase,KEwasonlyrestrictedfrom

activitiesintheProvincialCourtofAlberta,andtherefore

herApplicationtoappealtheProvincialCourt’sOrder

wasnotsubjecttoavexatiouslitigantOrder.BrowneJ.

consideredthesubstanceofKE’sAppealoftheProvincial

CourtDecision,andreturnedthemattertotheProvincial

Courtforconsiderationofmaterialswhichwouldberelevant

toanApplicationforleavetoappeal.

SETTLEMENT LENDERS INC V BLICHARZ, 2016 ABCA 109 (ROWBOTHAM JA)Rules 14.5 (Appeals Only With Permission), 14.47 (Application to Restore an Appeal) and 14.65 (Restoring Appeals)

TheApplicant,Blicharz,soughtleavetoAppealaprior

DecisionwhichdeniedherApplicationtosetasidea

DefaultJudgment.TheApplicant’sfilingofaNoticeof

Appealwasoutoftimebyfourmonths,andherAppealwas

eventuallystruckforfailuretofiletheAppealRecordina

timelyfashion.ShethenbroughtanApplicationtorestore

theAppealorextendthedeadlinetofiletheAppealRecord.

ThatApplicationwasdismissedduetosignificantdelayand

alackofarguablemeritoftheAppeal.

JusticeRowbothamstatedthatanAppealofthedismissal

requiredleavepursuanttoRule14.5.HerLadyshipnoted

thatthetestforleavetoAppealisthatpermissioncan

Appellanthadahistoryof“’persistently’engaginginany

oftheprohibitedactions”againstanyoneotherthanthe

Respondent.Basedonthisfinding,theCourtofAppeal

variedtheOrdertospecificallyrequirethattheAppellant

seekleavetotheCourtbeforecommencingortaking

anystepsinlitigationagainsttheRespondentandthose

associatedwithhim.

IBU V LAH, 2016 ABCA 108 (SLATTER JA)Rules 13.4 (Counting Months and Years), 14.4 (Right to Appeal), 14.8 (Filing a Notice of Appeal), 14.14 (Fast Track Appeals), 14.16 (Filing the Appeal Record – Standard Appeals), 14.17 (Filing the Appeal Record - Fast Track Appeals), 14.24 (Filing factums – Fast Track Appeals) and 14.27 (Filing Extracts of Key Evidence)

TheAppellant(“IBU”)appliedtopermitthelatefiling

ofhisAppeal.TheDecisionbeingappealedfromwas

pronouncedonFebruary9,2016,whichprovidedfora

filingdeadlineofMarch9,2016inaccordancewithRule

13.4(1).IBUattemptedtofiletheAppealonthatdate,

butwasunabletodosobecauseofsomeuncertaintyasto

whetherhewasentitledtohavethefilingfeewaived.On

March10,2016,hereturnedwithdocumentationclarifying

hisentitlementtowaiverofthefilingfee.Rule14.8(2)(a)

(iii)requirestheAppealtobefiledwithin“onemonth”,so

thefilingwasonedaylate.

JusticeSlatternotedthattheAppealwasbroughtpursuant

tosection21oftheDivorceAct,RSC1985,c3(2nd

Supp),whichrequiresfilingwithin“30days”.Rule14.8(2)

(a)(i)recognizesthetimelinessetoutinanotherenactment

forfilinganAppeal.BecausetheDecisionwasrenderedin

February,whichhasonly29days,technicallytheAppellant

wasnotlateinfilingtheAppealandnoextensionoftime

wasrequired.JusticeSlattersetoutnewdeadlines,as

theAppealwasaFastTrackAppealunderRule14.14(2)

(b),andstatedthattheRespondent’smaterialswere

requiredtobefiledinaccordancewithRules14.24(1)(b)

and14.27(3).HisLordshipdirectedthat,ifthedeadlines

werenotmet,thentheAppealwouldbestruckunderRule

14.16(3).

35

JULY 2016

Volume 2 Issue 2


Themainissuebeforethepanelwaswhetherthe

Respondentrequiredpermissiontoappealpursuantto

Rule14.5(1)(g),whichstatesthatmatterswherethe

controversyintheappealcanbeestimatedinmoneyand

doesnotexceedthesumof$25,000exclusiveofcosts

cannotbeappealedunlesspermissiontoappealhasbeen

obtainedfromtheCourt.Inthiscase,thedollaramountof

thedamageswaswellwithinthe$25,000limit.However,

thepanelheldthatthe“matterincontroversy”inthiscase

wasaboutmorethanmoney.Itwasappropriatetoconsider

theextentthattheJudgmentunderappealaffectedthe

interestofthepartyprejudicedbyit.Here,theRespondent

contendedthattheChambersJudgeerredonwhetherthere

wasadebtatall–anditisthefactofadebt,regardless

ofthedollaramount,thatwouldgiverisetotherightto

fileaCaveatandtocommenceforeclosureproceedings.

TheApplicationtodismisstheAppealwasaccordingly

dismissed.

BARRY V INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS OF ALBERTA (COMPLAINTS INQUIRY COMMITTEE), 2016 ABCA 89 (WAKELING JA)Rules 14.15 (Ordering the Appeal Record), 14.16 (Filing the Appeal Record – Standard Appeals), 14.20 (Contents of Appeal Record – Appeals from Tribunals), 14.47 (Application to Restore an Appeal), 14.64 (Failure to Meet Deadlines) and 14.65 (Restoring Appeals)

ThePlaintiff’sAppealwasstruckpursuanttoRules

14.16(3)and14.64(a)forfailingtofiletheAppealRecord

intime.CounselforthePlaintiffsubsequentlypresented

aproposedcopyoftheAppealRecordtotheClerk,which

confirmedthattherecordswereinproperform.The

PlaintiffApplicantthensoughttorestorehisAppeal,

pursuanttoRule14.47,andfiledanAffidavitwhichset

outthereasonswhyhefailedtofileontime.WakelingJ.A.

referredtoRules14.15(1),14.16(3),14.20(1),14.47(a),

14.64(a)and14.65(3)statingthatanAppealmaybe

restoredwhenitisintheinterestsofjusticetodoso.The

CourtwillconsidersuchthingsaswhethertheApplicant

intendedtoprosecutetheAppeal;providedanexplanation

forthedeficiency;movedwithsufficientexpediencytocure

thedefect;hasarguablegroundsinsupportofanAppeal;

andhascausedanyprejudicetotheRespondent.

begrantediftheApplicantestablishesthatthereis:a

questionofgeneralimportance;apossibleerroroflaw;an

unreasonableexerciseofdiscretion;oramisapprehension

ofimportantfacts.

RowbothamJ.A.foundthattherewasnoquestionof

generalimportance,noerroroflaw,andnounreasonable

exerciseofdiscretion,emphasizingtheApplicant’s

delinquencyinfollowingproceduralRules.TheApplicant

contendedthatshedidnotreceivelegaladviceatthe

timesheenteredintotheagreementswhichwerethe

subjectoftheoriginallitigation,andthefailuretoconsider

thisconstitutedamisapprehensionofimportantfacts.

RowbothamJ.A.heldthattheApplicanthadhadlegal

advicebothduringthepresentAppealandintheCourt

below.RowbothamJ.A.alsoreiteratedthatthetestfor

restorationunderRule14.47andthetestforextension

oftimetofileanAppealbothrequireconsiderationofthe

factorsofdelayandarguablemeritoftheAppeal.The

Applicationforleavewasaccordinglydenied.

CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION NO 0311443 V GOERTZ, 2016 ABCA 167 (PAPERNY, ROWBOTHAM AND VELDHUIS JJA)Rules 14.5 (Appeals Only With Permission) and 14.38 (Court of Appeal Panels)

TheApplicants,acondominiumcorporationand

condominiummanagementcompany,filedcaveatsagainst,

andsoughtCourtOrderstoforecloseonpropertiesfor

whichcondominiumfeeswerenotpaid.Theindividual

RespondentarguedthathedidnotowetheApplicants

anything,andthereforetheCaveatsandproposed

foreclosureOrderswerebaseless.TheRespondentalso

counterclaimedfor$200,000forgeneralandpunitive

damages,aswellasout-of-pocketexpenses.TheChambers

JudgesummarilydismissedtheCounterclaim,andordered

theRespondenttopaydamagesof$1,562.62plusCosts.

TheRespondentappealed,andtheApplicantsappliedto

striketheAppeal.TheApplicationwasinitiallybrought

beforeasingleJusticeoftheCourtofAppeal,whodirected

theApplicationtobeheardbyapanel,asonlyapanel

may“allowordismissanappealonthemerits”underRule

14.38(1)(a).




evidencecouldhavebeenadducedatTrialiftheparties

exercisedduediligence.Second,theevidencemustbe

relevanttoadecisiveissueintheTrial.Third,theevidence

mustbecredibleandfourth,theevidencecouldreasonably

beexpectedtohaveaffectedtheresult.TheCourtadded

that,inapplyingthePalmertest,theymustconsider

whetherthe“proposedevidenceisorwouldbeadmissible

underanyrulesoflawapplicabletoitsnature,itssource,

itscontinuity”,and“itsbalanceofprobativeforceagainst

prejudicialeffect”.

TheMajoritynotedthattheAppellanthadnotcomplied

withRule14.45inthathedidnotfileaNoticeof

ApplicationbeforetheCourttointroducethefresh

evidence,nordidheprovideanAffidavitattestingto

compliancewiththePalmerfactors.Giventhesefailings,

theCourtheldthattheApplicant’sfreshevidencefailed

thethresholdrequirementsetoutinPalmer.TheCourt

thenconsideredtheRespondents’Applicationtoadduce

freshevidenceoftheApplicant’s“mischief”inpresenting

documentssuggestinghehadfiledachangeofaddress

withtheCourt.TheMajorityheldthatthisevidencemet

thePalmerrequirementsandclearlyestablishedthatthe

Appellant’sevidencewaseithernotprovidedatallprior

toAppeal,orwasalteredtomakeitappearasthough

theAppellantprovidedhisnewaddresstotheCourt.The

Majorityaddedthatbeingaself-representedlitigantdidnot

excusetheAppellant’sfailuretocomplywiththeRulesand

theAppealwasdismissed.

Indissent,MartinJ.A.focusedontheAppellantbeing

aself-representedlitigantwhocouldreasonablyhave

expectedtoreceiveasignificantawardofdamages.

MartinJ.A.opinedthatdismissingtheAppellant’sclaim

insuchcircumstanceswasasignificantlydisproportionate

consequenceforfailingtofileachangeofaddresswiththe

Court.MartinJ.A.wouldhaveallowedtheAppealonthe

basisthatdismissaloftheActionwasexcessivelypunitive.

JusticeWakelingheldthattheAppealshouldbe

restored:thePlaintiffhaddemonstratedaclearintent

toprosecutetheAppeal;theerrorwasduetocounsel’s

misunderstandingthattheAppealtribunalwould

commencepreparationoftherecordofproceedings;the

Plaintiffappliedpromptlytorestore;theAppealwasnot

frivolous;andtherewasnoprejudicetotheRespondent.

PINTEA V JOHNS, 2016 ABCA 99 (MARTIN, MCDONALD AND VELDHUIS JJA)Rule 14.45 (Application to Admit New Evidence)

TheAppellantwasaPlaintiffinanActionarisingfroman

automobileaccident.TheActionwasunderthedirectionof

CaseManagementandinMay2014,theCaseManagement

JudgedirectedthePlaintifftoproducehiswitnesslist

andcomplywithproceduralrequirementsforTrial.InJuly

2014,thePlaintiffmoved,butfailedtofileachangeof

addresswiththeCourtandsubsequentlyfailedtoattend

furtherApplicationsandCaseManagementmeetings.

WhenthePlaintifffailedtoappearataCaseManagement

meetinginJanuary2015,theCourtheldhimincontempt

andtheStatementofClaimwasstruck.ThisfinalOrder

wasalsoservedonthePlaintiff’sformeraddress,but

thePlaintiffbecameawareoftheOrderwhenitwasalso

emailedtohim.

ThePlaintiffappealedtheOrderandbothpartiessought

toadducefreshevidence.ThemajorityoftheCourtnoted

thatthePlaintiff’sFactumdidnotclearlystatehisgrounds

ofappeal,butnotedthatheappearedtoarguethatthe

ApplicationdocumentsfortheCaseManagementhearing

wereservedonhimimproperlyathisformeraddress.The

RespondentssubmittedthattheAppellantonlyraised

thenewaddressonAppeal.TheMajorityappliedthe

fourparttestfromR v Palmer,[1980]1SCR759,when

determiningwhetherornottoadmitfreshevidence.Under

thePalmertest,theCourtmustconsiderfirst,whetherthe

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