JP 3-10 Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations

28 May 1996

Joint Doctrine forRear Area Operations

Joint Pub 3-10

PREFACE

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1. Scope

This publication provides guidelines forplanning and executing joint rear areaoperations primarily in terms of the majorfunctions of infrastructure development,communications, intelligence, security,combat operations, sustainment, survivability,area management, movements, and host-nation support. It also addresses commandand control. It places particular emphasis onthe joint rear area coordinator’s responsibilityfor the overall security of the joint rear area.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared underthe direction of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to governthe joint activities and performance of theArmed Forces of the United States in jointoperations and provides the doctrinal basis forUS military involvement in multinational andinteragency operations. It provides militaryguidance for the exercise of authority bycombatant commanders and other jointforce commanders and prescribes doctrine forjoint operations and training. It providesmilitary guidance for use by the Armed Forcesin preparing their appropriate plans. It is notthe intent of this publication to restrict theauthority of the joint force commander (JFC)from organizing the force and executing themission in a manner the JFC deems mostappropriate to ensure unity of effort in theaccomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established inthis publication apply to the commandersof combatant commands, subunifiedcommands, joint task forces, and subordinatecomponents of these commands. Theseprinciples and guidance also may apply whensignificant forces of one Service are attachedto forces of another Service or whensignificant forces of one Service supportforces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication isauthoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP)will be followed except when, in the judgmentof the commander, exceptional circumstancesdictate otherwise. If conflicts arise betweenthe contents of this publication and thecontents of Service publications, thispublication will take precedence for theactivities of joint forces unless the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally incoordination with the other members of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, has provided morecurrent and specific guidance. Commandersof forces operating as part of a multinational(alliance or coalition) military commandshould follow multinational doctrine andguidance ratified by the United States. Fordoctrine and guidance not ratified by theUnited States, commanders should evaluateand follow the multinational command’sdoctrine and procedures, where applicable.

WALTER KROSSLieutenant General, USAFDirector, Joint Staff

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................... vii

CHAPTER ITHE JOINT REAR AREA

• General..................................................................................................................... I-1• Joint Rear Area......................................................................................................... I-1• Evolution of JRA...................................................................................................... I-2• Operations Within the JRA........................................................................................ I-3• Threat....................................................................................................................... I-5

CHAPTER IICOMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS, ANDINTELLIGENCE

• Introduction............................................................................................................. II-1• Responsibilities........................................................................................................ II-1• Base Defense Operations........................................................................................ II-10• C2 in Multinational Operations.............................................................................. II-13• Communications.................................................................................................... II-14• Intelligence............................................................................................................ II-14

CHAPTER IIISECURITY

• Introduction........................................................................................................... III-1• Security-Related Operations................................................................................... III-3• Combatting Terrorism............................................................................................ III-4• NBC Defensive Operations.................................................................................... III-5• Military Deception Operations............................................................................... III-6• Psychological Operations....................................................................................... III-6• Civil Affairs Operations......................................................................................... III-7• Operations Security................................................................................................ III-7• Alert Notification System....................................................................................... III-8• Laws and Agreements............................................................................................ III-9• Area Damage Control........................................................................................... III-11

CHAPTER IVCOMBAT OPERATIONS

• General.................................................................................................................. IV-1• Military Operations Other Than War...................................................................... IV-6

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CHAPTER VLOGISTICS

• General................................................................................................................... V-1• Rear Area Logistic Principles.................................................................................. V-1• Responsibilities....................................................................................................... V-2• Considerations........................................................................................................ V-2

CHAPTER VIAREA MANAGEMENT

• Introduction........................................................................................................... VI-1• Infrastructure Development.................................................................................... VI-1

CHAPTER VIIMOVEMENTS

• General................................................................................................................. VII-1• Responsibilities..................................................................................................... VII-1• JRA Movement Considerations............................................................................. VII-1

CHAPTER VIIIHOST-NATION SUPPORT

• General................................................................................................................ VIII-1• Responsibilities.................................................................................................... VIII-1• Considerations..................................................................................................... VIII-2• Role of Civil Affairs Personnel in HNS................................................................ VIII-4• Public Affairs (PA)............................................................................................... VIII-4• Role of PSYOP in HNS....................................................................................... VIII-5

APPENDIX

A Naval Coastal Warfare..................................................................................... A-1B References........................................................................................................ B-1C Administrative Instructions............................................................................... C-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Acronyms and Abbreviations................................................................... GL-1Part II Terms and Definitions.............................................................................. GL-3

FIGURE

I-1 Operations Within the Joint Rear Area........................................................ I-3I-2 Threats to the Joint Rear Area..................................................................... I-7II-1 Geographic Combatant Commander’s Responsibilities.............................. II-2

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II-2 Joint Rear Area Command and Control Network for Security Operationswith Army Component Commander Designated as JointRear Area Coordinator........................................................................... II-5

II-3 Joint Rear Area Command and Control Network for Security Operationswith Joint Rear Area Coordinator Selected from the Joint ForceCommander’s Headquarters................................................................... II-6

II-4 Classification of Bases............................................................................. II-12III-1 Objectives of Security Operations in the Joint Rear Area......................... III-1III-2 Response to Terrorism............................................................................. III-5III-3 Objectives of Civil Affairs Operations in the Joint Rear Area.................... III-8III-4 Categories of the Law of War Relating to Security Operations................ III-10IV-1 Options for a Tactical Combat Force........................................................ IV-3IV-2 Tenets for Successful Combat Operations................................................ IV-4IV-3 Security Requirements Planning Factors in Military Operations

Other Than War....................................................................................IV-8V-1 Logistic Considerations............................................................................ V-3VI-1 Positioning Considerations...................................................................... VI-2VII-1 Movements Within the Joint Rear Area................................................... VII-1VIII-1 Host-Nation Support Planning Factors................................................... VIII-2VIII-2 Specific Types of Host Nation Security Support..................................... VIII-4A-1 Conceptual Naval Coastal Warfare Organization....................................... A-1A-2 Notional Naval Coastal Warfare Organization Outside the US.................. A-3

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

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Describes the Concept of the Joint Rear Area (JRA)

Discusses Command, Control, Communications,Computers, and Intelligence Requirements for JRAOperations

Provides Guidance on JRA Security Considerations

Covers Combat Operations in the JRA

Discusses Logistics, Area Management, and Movementsin the JRA

Describes the Role of Host-Nation Support in JRAOperations

The joint rear area (JRA) is designated by the joint forcecommander (JFC) to facilitate protection and operationof installations and forces supporting the joint force. Rearareas are becoming increasingly vulnerable to modern enemyforces with sophisticated surveillance devices and systems,accurate, long-range weapon systems, and transport assetscapable of inserting forces deep behind friendly lines. TheJFC normally designates a joint rear area coordinator(JRAC), which is a critical link in coordinating security. TheJRAC establishes reliable intelligence and counterintelligencesupport as well as secure and survivable communications withall forces operating in the JRA. The JRA will typically evolveand expand as a theater develops in accordance withrequirements to support and defend the joint force. It may bepreceded by a maritime area of operations before establishinga lodgment in a single country. Operations occurring withinthe JRA either protect the JRA or support the joint forceand include security, communications, intelligence,sustainment, area management, movements, infrastructuredevelopment, and host-nation support.

A joint rear area (JRA) isa specific land areawithin a joint forcecommander’s (JFC’s)operational area.

The Joint Rear Area

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Typical level I threats include enemy-controlled agents, enemysympathizers, terrorism, demonstrations, and riots. Level IIthreats include guerrilla forces, unconventional forces, andsmall tactical units. Level III threats are conventional forces,air or missile attacks, and nuclear, biological or chemicalweapons.

Successful planning and execution of operations using reliablecommand, control, communications, and/or computer systemsand intelligence functions allows the JFC to exercise commandauthority by designating a JRA, selecting a JRA commandstructure, and establishing a command and control networkthrough subordinate commanders to direct and coordinate theactions of all components toward achieving common securityobjectives. The geographic combatant commander isultimately responsible for all joint rear area operationsconducted in the area of responsibility. Those responsibilitiesinclude assigning responsibility to subordinate joint forcecommanders and component commanders, determiningcommand relationships, and making base classificationdecisions.

The JRAC is responsible for coordinating the overallsecurity of the JRA. The JRAC accomplishes this bycoordinating with appropriate JRA commanders to ensure thatthey maintain the security of their respective area of operations(AO) in order to facilitate sustainment, host-nation support(HNS), infrastructure development, and movements of the jointforce. The JRAC also ensures that commanders establishreliable intelligence support and practice area managementwithin their AOs with due consideration of securityrequirements. Additionally, the JRAC establishes secure andsurvivable communications with all forces and commandsoperating in or transiting the JRA. Component commands,normally Army or Marine Corps commands, operate insingle geographic areas under a single command and helpwith security responsibilities and command and controlelements.

Threats to JRAoperations are usuallytheater-dependent andare divided into threecategories.

Achieving local andoverall security of theJRA requires establishingunity of command andunity of effort among allforces in the JRA, toinclude combat forcestransiting and operatingin the JRA.

Threat Levels

Command and Control Responsibilities

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Executive Summary

Each Service organizes, trains, and equips forces capable ofcontributing to the security and defense of the rear area inconsonance with legislated Service functions. At the baselevel, the component in command of a base has overallresponsibility for defense of the base. The base clustercommanders are responsible for coordinating the defense ofbases within their base cluster and integrating base defenseplans into a base cluster defense plan. Base commanders areresponsible for base defense, including establishing a basedefense operations center (BDOC) and alternate BDOC andplanning for employment of transient forces. Individualcomponent commanders are responsible for tenant forces ofeach component at a base.

The objectives of security operations in JRA include: toprevent or minimize disruption of support; prevent or minimizeenemy interference with command, control, communications,computers, and intelligence; protect personnel and facilities;protect JRA lines of communications (LOCs); find, fix, contain,and defeat the enemy; plan and execute area damage control;and assess and prioritize bases. Security-related operationssuch as populace and resource control operations, enemyprisoner of war operations, civilian control operations, andnoncombatant evacuation operations are not the exclusiveresponsibility of US forces, but do impact on the security ofthe JRA. US forces are frequently involved in these types ofoperations and should be prepared to provide assistance asnecessary. Combatting terrorism is the responsibility ofthe JRAC and can be responded to by antiterrorism orcounterterrorism. Important aspects of JRA which arecoordinated by the JRAC include nuclear, biological, andchemical operations; deception operations; psychologicaloperations; civil affairs operations; and operations security.Early threat warnings, such as air, surface, and land warnings,are essential to the protection of US forces in the JRA.Reliable, responsive, and redundant early warning systemsare established from the joint force level to the base levelin the JRA. The JRAC will ensure that a standardized alertsystem is implemented throughout the JRA to ensure warningand uniform response to threats. Area damage control ensuresprevention, containment, and rapid restoration of operations.

The base and base clusterare the fundamentalbuilding blocks forplanning, coordinating,and executing basedefense operations.

The JFC is responsiblefor providing sufficientforces to ensure thesecurity of the JRA.

Base Defense Operations

Rear Area Security

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Treaties, agreements, and national interests determinerelationships and support between allies and friendlynations. They provide a primary basis for the legal aspects ofsecurity operations and, in general, regulate the status andactivities of US forces across the range of military operations.The laws of war include treatment of combatants, insurgents,prisoners, and rules of engagement. US law, internationalagreements, and host-nation laws also need to be consideredin JRA operations.

The JFC must develop and organize plans for a tacticalcombat force (TCF) that is trained, led, and equipped toconcentrate the necessary combat power at the decisive timeand place in the JRA in order to maintain the integrity of theJRA and continue sustainment operations. The JFC must alsoensure that appropriate active and passive measures are takenin the JRA to protect US forces and equipment. The JFCdetermines the need for a TCF based on the threat, friendlyforces available, and amount of risk the JFC is willing toaccept. The JFC plans for combat and recovery operationsmust be designed to optimize the use of all available combat,combat support, combat service support, and host-nation forces.Ground, air, and naval operations should be mutuallysupporting, able to support a TCF if required, and fulfill therequirements of the overall concept of operations. Specificplanning considerations include key asset defense plans,positioning considerations, unit movement plans, and areadamage control. The tenets for successful combat operationsin the JRA are knowledge of the enemy, unity of command,economy of force, and responsiveness. Fire support andcounterair operations help safeguard friendly installations andpersonnel as well as help gain control of the air environment.Military operations other than war (MOOTW) may beconducted in crisis situations that present a definite threat toUS interests. A JFC (normally a commander, joint task force)is designated by the Secretary of Defense, by a combatantcommander, by the commander of a subordinate unifiedcommand, or the commander of an existing JTF. Securityrequirements will vary greatly and are highly dependent onthe area in which the MOOTW is being conducted.

In the event of armedconflict involving USforces, it is US law thatthe law of war and theobligations of the USGovernment under thatlaw are observed andenforced by the USforces.

The JFC must considerand plan for combatoperations in the JRA.

Laws and Agreements

Combat Operations

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Executive Summary

Rear area logistics include balancing the necessity forsecurity with the logistic principles of responsiveness,simplicity, sustainability, survivability, flexibility, economy,and attainability. Identifying logistic principles necessaryfor the successful execution of an operational plan is critical.The combatant commander is authorized to exercise directiveauthority over logistic operations within his area ofresponsibility. Sustaining the force is the responsibility of theforces in the rear area; their technical duties are explained inService doctrine and field manuals. Medical evacuationoperations, reception and preparation of reinforcements in JRA,and reconstitution actions are also considerations for the reararea sustainment units when supporting the units fartherforward.

The security implications of positioning assets that mayprovide protection for the JRA or determining locationsfor vital support facilities that require security assistanceare critical for effective area management. The JRAC andcomponent commanders support the assigned responsibilitiesgiven by the JFC such as review of the positioningconsiderations and competing risks (clustering, location, anddispersal). Joint forces deployed to developed areas shouldbe able to capitalize on established infrastructure and the useof existing facilities. Assistance for host nation (HN)governments to rebuild HN infrastructure will be based on USlaw.

The following movements need to be coordinated within theJRA: movement of materiel, replacement personnel, andsupport forces; evacuation of patients and other casualties;evacuation of US nationals; evacuation of enemy prisoners ofwar, civilian internees, detainees, and refugees; and retrogradeof materiel. Maintaining movement control, keeping LOCsopen, protecting key reception and transshipment points,and obtaining HNS are critical requirements in preservingfreedom of movement throughout the JRA. In wartime orduring crisis action deployments, the JFC should as a minimumconsider having an agency, center, or cell to execute themovement control function. This is normally the jointmovement center. In peacetime the JFC should also establish

Joint rear area logisticsintegrates strategic,operational, and tacticallevel logistic operations.

Effective areamanagement is critical tothe success of joint reararea operations.

Movements within a JRAinvolve the receipt ofcombat forces and theirmovement to forwardareas.

Logistics in the Rear Area

Area Management

Movements

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a similar organization in order to perform the planning andresolution of conflict function and to coordinate transportationissues with HN activities as required.

HNS is normally based on agreements that commit theHN to provide specific support in prescribed conditions.Agreements are made at various levels including national,theater, subordinate joint force command, Service componentcommand, and unit. In general, HNS is highly situational andheavily dependent on both the operational capabilities of theHN and its support for US policies. The National CommandAuthorities are responsible for establishing treaties andagreements for HNS. The JFC ensures that available HNS isconsolidated and prioritized to support the requirements ofthe joint force. JRAC and component commanders coordinateand expedite the directions and guidelines from the JFC. HNSis particularly valuable during periods of transition, such asgoing from peacetime military operations to war, and includescivilian movements, reception and onward movement, andmedical care and health service support as well as support forsecurity-related activities. Commanders at all levels can beexpected to be involved in civil affairs (CA) activities andshould use CA personnel to monitor those activities and assistin the communicating of information concerning all aspectsof joint rear area operations to the HN. The public affairs rolein the HN is to gain support and understanding from all publics.Commanders at all levels can expect to be involved inpsychological operations (PSYOP) activities and should usePSYOP personnel to support and exploit efforts to obtainmaximum cooperation from the populace in the JRA.

This publication sets forth doctrine to govern the conduct ofjoint rear area operations during joint and multinationaloperations. It focuses on achieving local and overall securityof the joint rear area by establishing reliable command, control,communications, computers, and intelligence at everycommand level. It also provides guidelines for commandersof combatant commands, subordinate joint force commands,and subordinate component commands for coordinating andintegrating security operations with their other operationalresponsibilities. This publication defines a joint rear area,defines joint rear area operations in terms of major functions,and establishes criteria for and responsibilities of a joint reararea coordinator.

The effective use of host-nation support enhancesthe capability of USforces to maintainsuccessful combatoperations on anybattlefield.

Host-Nation Support

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER ITHE JOINT REAR AREA

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“The person who wants to wage war securely against an enemy must firstmake sure that his own lands are secure. By secure I mean not only thesecurity of the army but of the cities and the entire country, so that thepeople who live there may suffer no harm at all from the enemy.”

Anonymous Byzantine General

1. General

a. A geographic combatant commander ora subordinate joint force commander (JFC)must expect and be prepared to engage theenemy in every sector of the operational area.Rear areas are increasingly vulnerable tomodern enemy forces with sophisticatedsurveillance devices and systems, accurate,long-range weapon systems, and transportassets which are capable of inserting forcesdeep behind friendly lines. Foreignintelligence and security services will continueto pose espionage, disinformation, andpsychological operations threats. Threatsposed by indigenous elements capable of thefull spectrum of unconventional operationsranging from sabotage to large-scale raids andambushes are also likely.

b. The rear area may be small or it mayspan several national boundaries withdivergent cultures. It will contain units andfacilities from all components that are criticalto successful joint force support operations.It may also contain the units and facilities ofone or more allied nations or coalitionpartners. Vital sea lines of communications(LOCs), through which the bulk of logisticsupport for forward-deployed forces flows,have their greatest vulnerability where theyconverge at the rear sector of the theater.Likewise air LOCs, which bring in forcesand critical supplies, frequently terminate atairfields within range of enemy action.Numerous other support units and facilitieslocated in rear areas are inviting targetsbecause of their importance in sustaining

theater operations. Support units located inrear areas are required to perform their supportmissions and provide for their own defense.There may be exceptions to this requirement,such as military airlift or civilian reserve airfleet crews and Military Sealift Commandcrews who may not have the capability forself-defense and would fall under theprotection of the base commander. Otherexceptions are medical units, which areincluded under the provisions of the GenevaConventions.

c. A geographic combatant commander isa JFC and may form subordinate jointcommands whose commanders are JFCs.The general term “JFC” will be usedthroughout the remainder of this publicationto identify the commander of a joint force,except where specific responsibilities orfunctions are vested solely in the geographiccombatant commander’s authority, in whichcase the term “CINC” will be used.

2. Joint Rear Area

a. A joint rear area (JRA) is a specific landarea within a JFC’s operational areadesignated by the JFC to facilitate protectionand operation of installations and forcessupporting the joint force. The size of a JRAmay vary considerably and is highly dependenton the size of the operational area, logisticsupport requirements, threat, or scope of thejoint operation. A JRA is usually to the rearof the combat zone, but it is not necessarilycontiguous to the combat zone. The airspaceabove the JRA is normally not included in

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GENERAL OF THE ARMY WILLIAM T. SHERMANON THE NATURE OF THE REAR AREA

“I never saw the rear of an army engaged in battle but [when observing troopsin the rear] I feared that some calamity had happened at the front - the apparentconfusion, broken wagons, crippled horses, men lying about dead andmaimed, parties hastening to and fro in seeming disorder, and a generalapprehension of something dreadful about to ensue; all these signs, however,lessened as I neared the front, and there the contrast was complete - perfectorder, men and horses full of confidence, and it was not unusual for generalhilarity, laughing, and cheering. Although cannon might be firing, themusketry clattering, and the enemy’s shot hitting close, there reigned ageneral feeling of strength and security that bore a marked contrast to thebloody signs that had drifted rapidly to the rear; therefore, for comfort andsafety, I surely would rather be at the front than the rear line of battle.”

SOURCE: The Memoirs of General W . T. Sherman, 1885

the JRA; airspace is normally considered acombat zone governed by procedurespromulgated in Joint Pub 3-52, “Doctrine forJoint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone.”

b. A JRA may be collocated with thecommunications zone but normally wouldnot include a naval area of operations (AO).Operations in sea areas are considered to bepart of a combat zone and will not normallybe included in a JRA. When a naval AO anda JRA meet along a coastline, the high watermark will normally designate the boundarybetween the two. Ports and harbors (butnot the built-up areas around them) arenormally included in the naval AO.

c. A JRA in a joint operation may adjointhe rear areas of one or more of the combatforces making up the combat power of thejoint force.

d. A JRA can be adapted to anymodern environment. In any circumstance,a JRA may be segmented and may containisolated pockets of relatively secure supportareas that may collectively make up a JRA.

e. Concurrent with the designation ofa JRA, the geographic combatantcommander or subordinate JFC normally

designates a joint rear area coordinator(JRAC) . The JRAC is responsible forcoordinating and maintaining the overallsecurity of the JRA as directed by the JFC.The JRAC’s responsibilities are addressedthroughout this publication. The JRAC is acritical link in coordinating security,establishing reliable intelligence andcounterintelligence support, and ensuringsecure and survivable communicationswith all forces operating in the JRA.However, in cases of level III threat orother emergencies, the JFC may assign asubordinate commander the responsibility tocounter the threat and restore JRA security.In this case, the assigned subordinatecommander would be tasked with restoringthe JRA security and assume those JRACresponsibilities required to accomplish hismission. The JRAC will support anyrequirements requested by the assignedsubordinate commander. This option wouldbe exercised for the duration of the threat oras directed by the JFC. The area air defensecommander (AADC) is responsible for thedefense of the airspace above the JRA.

3. Evolution of JRA

a. Austere Rear Area to DevelopedTheater. The JRA will typically evolve and

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ensure survival and sustainment of missioncapability. It also includes the specificcategory of security operations thatcontributes to the security of the joint force.Security is the principal concern of thispublication. Other functions are discussedas they relate to the security of the JRA.Security, within the context of thispublication, includes area damage control.

b. Communications. A command,control, communications, and computer(C4) system should be establishedthroughout the JRA that will provide forinteroperable, secure , re l iab le , andredundant communications.

c. Intelligence. Effective intelligencesupport, merged with counterintelligence andlaw enforcement agency information, isessential to conducting successful securityoperations in the JRA. Current intelligenceand counterintelligence estimates focused on

expand as a theater develops in accordancewith requirements to support and defend thejoint force. It may be preceded by amaritime amphibious objective areabefore establishing a lodgment in a singlecountry. A lodgment would normally beexpanded to an area including existing portsand air strips from which bare base operationscould be conducted, and then eventuallyevolve to areas including multiple countriesand sea boundaries. A developed theaterwould generally have the characteristicsof numerous forward deployed forces:extensive transportation infrastructure (ports,highway networks, airfields, and railroads);in-place command, control, communications,computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems;and significant host-nation support (HNS).

b. Other Envir onments. In otheroperat ions, t he d imens ions andconfiguration of a JRA may be particularlyfluid . However, locales established withinthe area of responsibility (AOR)/jointoperations area (JOA) may be “de facto”JRAs; i.e., areas such as metropolitan zonesor regions isolated by geographic boundariesthat become relatively segregated from themain areas of conflict. The JFC may designatesuch areas as a part of the JRA. Austereconditions should be anticipated. Supportfacilities, population receptiveness, andoverall HNS may be unpredictable andunreliable. The joint force will normally haveto rely on its own resources for support untilLOCs can be established.

4. Operations Within the JRA

Operations occurring within the JRA eitherprotect the JRA or support the joint force.They are best described as broad functionsand include, but are not limited to, the itemsshown in Figure I-1 and described below.

a. Security. The security functionaddresses those measures or activities used toprotect against hostile threats in order to

OPERATIONS WITHINTHE JOINT REAR

AREA

Security

Communications

Intelligence

Sustainment

Area Management

Movements

Infrastructure Development

Host-Nation Support

Figure I-1. Operations Within theJoint Rear Area

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the JRA should incorporate intelligence fromall US, multinational, and host-nation sources.

d. Sustainment. The primary missionof many of the forces in the JRA is tosustain the joint force. All security andcounterintelligence activities are focused onproviding a secure JRA in which force

sustainment can continue. The time supportunits spend performing security and selfdefense operations may detract from theirability to meet support requirements.

e. Area Management. The effectiveutilization and positioning of military assetsin the JRA is critical to successful operations.Both mission support and security shouldbe considered when positioning assetsthroughout the JRA.

f. Movements. The planning, routing,scheduling, control, and security of themovement of personnel and materiel in theJRA is vital to the support of the joint force.The JFC normally centralizes transportationmovement control at the highest level bydesignating a joint movement center (JMC)where it can be exercised to ensure thatcommon-user transportation resources are

allocated to support command missions andpriorities.

g. Infrastructure Development. Theavailability of adequate and secure facilitiesin the JRA for elements of the joint force isessential. Close coordination with HN forcesand governing agencies is required for use

of their facilities or for construction of newfacilities on their territory as well as forcesnecessary to establish and maintain securityof the facilities. The required level of basedevelopment should be established as earlyas possible in order to prevent overloading oft ranspor tat ion modes wi th excessconstruction material.

h. Host-Nation Support. A viable andfriendly host nation (HN) can provideinvaluable civil and/or military assistanceto US forces throughout the range of militaryoperations. This assistance, backed by mutualagreements between nations, can significantlycontribute to support of the joint force andsecurity of the JRA. The completion of arange of HN agreements is required in orderto define relationships and roles explicitly inareas of strategic interest to the United States.When more than one HN is involved, careful

Flightline security in the JRA is vital to deploying jointforce personnel and materiel.

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management is required to ensure that specificnational restrictions are met. Joint operationsareas encompassing more than one HN mayrequire significantly different restrictionsand sensitivities for each nation involved.Violations could result in loss of HNS, whichcould significantly affect US forces’ abilityto achieve national objectives. Operationsmay occur in a foreign nation whosesovereignty remains viable and where HNSagreements are in effect. In such cases,responsibility for selected JRA functions maybe passed to the HN. In any case, overallresponsibility for JRA operations remainswith the JFC.

5. Threat

Threats to the JRA exist throughout therange of military operations. These threatsmay be related or independently prosecuted,but their effects are frequently cumulative.Threats to JRA operations are usuallytheater-dependent and are not limited tothose outlined in this document. Commandersmust be aware that nuclear, biological, andchemical (NBC) munitions may be used. Thethreat to the JRA is divided into threelevels in order to provide a generaldescription and categorization of threatactivities, identify the defense requirementsto counter them, and establish a commonreference for planning guidelines. This doesnot imply that threat activities will occurin a specific sequence or that there is anecessary interrelationship between eachlevel. The threat to JRA begins with collectionby foreign intelligence services using signalsintelligence or human resources intelligence.Throughout the operation of the JRA, foreignintelligence services will continue to collectagainst air and sea ports, LOCs, marshallingareas, troop strength, and types of equipment.

a. Typical Level I Threats

• Enemy-Controlled Agents. Enemy-controlled agents are a potential

threat throughout the JRA. Theirprimary missions include espionage,sabotage, and subversion. Enemy-controlled agent activity spans the rangeof military operations and may increaseduring both military operations other thanwar and war to include assassination ofkey military and civilian personnel,kidnapping, and/or guiding special-purpose individuals or teams to targetsin the JRA.

• Enemy Sympathizers. Civilianssympathetic to the enemy may becomesignificant thr eats to US andmultinational operations. They may bethe most difficult to neutralize becausethey are normally not part of anestablished enemy agent network andtheir actions will be random andunpredictable. During mil i taryoperations other than war and war,indigenous groups sympathetic to the

A collection of weapons seized during securityoperations in Somalia is indicative of threatsfacing joint forces.

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enemy or those simply opposed to theUnited States can be expected to provideassistance, information, and shelter toguerrilla and enemy unconventional orspecial purpose forces operating in theJRA.

• Terrorism. Terrorists are among themost insidious and difficult threats toneutralize and eradicate. Their actionsspan the range of military operations.

• Civil Disturbances. Although civildisturbances such as demonstrations andriots in a host country may not besufficiently pervasive or violent enoughto threaten the stability of the society,commanders should be aware of thedirect or indirect thr eats that they maypose to military operations.

b. Typical Level II Thr eats

• Guerrilla For ces. Irregular andpredominantly indigenous forcesconducting guerrilla warfare can poseserious threats to military forces andcivilians and can cause significantdisruptions to the orderly conduct oflocal government and Services.

• Unconventional Forces. Specialoperations forces are highly trained inunconventional warfare techniques.They are normally inserted surreptitiouslyinto the JRA before the onset of armedconflict. They establish and activateespionage networks, collect intelligence,carry out specific sabotage missions,develop target lists, and conduct damageassessment of targets struck.

• Small Tactical Units. Speciallyorganized reconnaissance elements, aswell as other potential threat forces, havethe capability of conducting raids andambushes in addition to their primaryreconnaissance and intelligence-

gathering missions.

c. Typical Level III Threats

• Conventional Forces. Potential threatforces have the capability of rapidlyprojecting combat power by land, air,or sea deep into the JRA. Specificexamples include airborne, heliborne,and amphibious operations; largecombined arms ground force operations;and infiltration operations involving largenumbers of individuals or small groupsinfiltrated into the JRA, regrouped atpredetermined times and locations, andcommitted against priority targets.

• Air or Missile Attack. Threat forcesmay have the capability of launchingan air or missile attack throughout theJRA. It is often difficult to distinguishquickly between a limited or full-scaleattack before impact; therefore,protective measures will normally bebased upon maximum threat capability.

• Nuclear, Biological, Chemical.Commanders must be aware thatNBC munitions may be used inconjunction with air or missile orother conventional force attacks. NBCweapons could also be used at level I orII by terrorists or unconventional forcesin order to accomplish their political ormilitary objectives.

d. Threat Levels. The threat levelmatrix , shown in Figure I-2, lists threatlevels with likely appropriate responses.The threat levels listed are based on the typeof threat. The matrix should not be construedas restricting the response options to anyparticular threat.

e. Threat Priorities. Operations againsttargets in the JRA will be characterized byair , ground, space, surface, and subsurfaceefforts to perform the following: detect and

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The Joint Rear Area

identify targets; destroy or neutralizeoperational weapon system capabilities; delayor disrupt the timely movement of forces andsupplies; weaken the command and control(C2) network of the joint force; disrupt supportto combat forces; set the stage for futureenemy operations; and create panic andconfusion throughout the JRA. Typical

examples of enemy priority targets include:NBC weapon storage sites and deliverysystems; key C4I facilities; air defenseartillery (ADA) sites; airfields and air bases;port facilities; main supply routes (MSR) andMSR chokepoints; key LOCs; reserveassembly areas; troop barracks; and criticalcivilian and logistic facilities.

Figure I-2. Threats to the Joint Rear Area

THREATS TO THE JOINT REAR AREA

EXAMPLES

Agents, saboteurs,sympathizers,terrorists

Small tactical units,unconventional warfareforces, guerrillas

Large tactical forceoperations, includingairborne, heliborne,amphibious, infiltration,

RESPONSE

Unit, base, and basecluster self-defensemeasures

Self-defense measuresand response force(s)with supporting fires

May require timelycommitment of tacticalcombat force

LEVEL I

LEVEL II

LEVEL III

THREAT LEVEL

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IICOMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS,

COMPUTERS, AND INTELLIGENCE

II-1

“Rear guards are the safety of armies and often they carry victory with them.”

Frederick the Great, Instructions to his Generals, 1747

1. Introduction

Achieving local and overall security of theJRA requires establishing unity of commandand unity of effort among all forces in theJRA, to include combat forces transiting andoperating in the JRA. It also requiressuccessful planning and execution ofoperations using reliable C4 systems andintelligence functions. The JFC workstoward this end by designating a JRA,selecting a JRA command structure, andestablishing a command and controlnetwork through subordinate commandersto direct and coordinate the actions of allcomponents toward achieving commonsecurity objectives. This network, supportedby reliable and interoperable communicationsand intelligence, enables the JFC to exercisecommand authority and to achieve the desiredgoal of JRA security.

2. Responsibilities

a. Geographic Combatant Commander’sGeneral Responsibilities. A geographiccombatant commander, as commander of aunified command, is ultimately responsiblefor all joint rear area operations conductedin the combatant commander’s (CINC’s)AOR (See Figure II-1). Joint Pub 0-2,“Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),”provides a l ist ing of a geographiccombatant commander’s primaryresponsibilities, the first of which states:“Planning and conducting military operationsin response to crises, to include the securityof the command and protection of the UnitedStates, its possessions and bases against attackor hostile incursion.”

b. Geographic Combatant Commander’sForce Protection Responsibil i t ies.Additional direction on the securityresponsibilities of a geographic combatantcommander is provided by Joint Pub 3-0,“Doctrine for Joint Operations,” whichincludes the following.

• Peacetime. Geographic combatantcommanders establish measures andprocedures that preserve the combatpower of their forces.

• Wartime. Geographic combatantcommanders carry out assigned andimplied missions in pursuit of theaterstrategic objectives derived from nationaland alliance or coalition strategic goals.Force protection responsibilities aremodified as necessary in order to ensuresecurity of assigned forces and to protectUS interests in their AORs.

c. Geographic Combatant Commander’sBase Defense Responsibilities. Thegeographic combatant commander isresponsible for the following.

• Assigning Responsibil ity. Thegeographic combatant commanderassigns responsibility for local defenseof a base and establishes the method ofcommand or coordination to be exercisedby the local base commander.

• Command Relationships. Thegeographic combatant commanderensures that appropriate commandrelationships between subordinate area,subarea, and local base defense

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Figure II-1. Geographic Combatant Commander’s Responsibilities

GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDER'SRESPONSIBILITIES

Ultimately responsible for all joint rear areaoperations conducted in the area of responsibility

Peacetime:Establishes measures and procedures thatpreserve the combat power of their forces

Wartime:Carries out assigned and implied missions in pursuitof theater strategic objectives

Assigning Responsibilities: assigns responsibility forlocal defense of a base and establishes the methodof command or coordination to be exercised by thelocal base commander

Command Relationships: ensures that appropriatecommand relationships between subordinate area,subarea, and local base defense commanders areestablished and local defense areas are delineated

Base Classifications: determines the classificationof bases in the theater in accordance with policiesestablished by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff (unless determined by higher authority)

GENERAL

FORCE PROTECTION

BASE DEFENSE

determine the classification of bases inthe AOR in accordance with policiesestablished by the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff (see subparagraph 3dbelow for general criteria for baseclassifications).

commanders are established and localdefense areas are delineated.

• Base Class i f icat ions. Unlessdetermined by higher authority, thegeographic combatant commander will

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Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence

expanded discussion of naval coastalwarfare.

“It is just as legitimate to fight an enemyin the rear as in the front. The onlydifference is the danger.”

Colonel John S. Mosby,Mosby’ s War Reminiscences, 1887

e. Joint Rear Area Coordinator

• General. Establishing and maintainingsecurity in the JRA, although vital to thesurvivability and success of the jointforce, is nevertheless an economy offorce mission. The JFC dedicates assetsfor force protection operations inproportion to the severity of the threat inorder to conserve resources and preventdegradation of support, which is theprimary mission of most of the forces inthe JRA. In a low-threat environment,where the inherent defensive capabilitiesof bases and support or HN forces aregenerally adequate to deter the threat andthe focus of most security efforts is onthorough security planning, the JFCmay determine that a JRAC workingclosely with appropriate commanders,staff, and HN commands has sufficientauthority to manage the overallsecurity of the JRA.

• JRAC Selection Options. The JFCmay designate a subordinatecommander or a member of theJFC’s staff as the JRAC. The JFCconsiders mission requirements, forcecapabilities, the nature of the JRA, andthe threat in determining the JRAC.

• General Responsibilities. The JRACis responsible for coordinating theoverall security of the JRA inaccordance with JFC directives andpriorities. The JRAC accomplishes thisby coordinating with appropriateJRA commanders to ensure that they

d. Other Command Responsibilities.The geographic combatant commandernormally assigns subordinate commandersresponsibility for operations in the JRA inaccordance with mission requirements, forcecapabilities, and the nature of the strategicenvironment, including the threat. Thegeographic combatant commander ensuresthat subordinate commanders are givenauthority commensurate with theirresponsibilities.

• Subordinate Joint Force Commander.Subordinate JFCs may be subunified orjoint task force commanders.

• Component Commanders. Thispublication discusses a joint forcecommand structure with a Servicecomponent alignment. It is equallyadaptable, however, to a functionalalignment.

• Naval Coastal Warfare Commander.The JFC assigns responsibility forsecurity of territorial seas contiguous tothe rear area to the Navy componentcommander, who may delegate thisresponsibility to a naval coastal warfarecommander (NCWC). The NCWCconducts naval coastal warfare(NCW) missions within a designatednaval coastal geographic area. TheNCWC and the JRAC, if designated,will coordinate all relevant aspects oftheir missions and responsibilities fortheir respective areas of operations aswell as provide mutual support toensure the security of the JRA and thecoastal area. The common boundarybetween the NCWC’s area of operationsand the JRA will normally be the highwater mark. The NCWC, or designatedsubordinate commanders, will coordinatesecurity operations with the JRAC (ifdesignated) and the appropriate area orbase commander(s). See Appendix A,“Naval Coastal Warfare,” for an

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maintain the security of their respectiveAOs in order to facilitate sustainment,HNS, infrastructure development, andmovements of the joint force. The JRACalso ensures that commandersestablish reliable intelligence supportand practice area management withintheir AOs with due consideration ofsecurity requirements. Additionally, theJRAC establishes secure andsurvivable communications with allforces and commands operating in ortransiting the JRA. The JRAC is alsoresponsible for ensuring that the surfacearea security requirements andpriorities for the JRA are integrated inthe overall security requirements of thejoint force and are coordinated with thearea air defense commander who isresponsible for defending the airspaceover the joint rear area.

• Security Integration Responsibilities.Although other agencies or componentsmay have primary responsibility forspecific JRA functions, the JRAC isresponsible for coordinating thesecurity aspects of all functionsthroughout the JRA. The JRAC’soverall coordination responsibility forsecurity of the JRA does not lessen theresponsibility that component elementsresiding or operating in the JRA have fortheir own security.

• Specific JRAC Responsibilities.Specific responsibilities across therange of military operations includecoord inat ing wi th appropr ia tecommanders and staff to ensure that thefollowing applies.

•• The security posture in the JRAsupports the JFC’s concept of operationsand is adaptable to support futureoperations.

•• The overall JRA security plan isdeveloped and coordinated withappropriate US, multinational, and HNcommands in accordance with JFCdirectives and guidelines.

•• The chain of command establishedby the JFC and the degree of authoritygranted to the JRAC are adequate for themutual protection and security of all USpersonnel and assets in the JRA. (SeeFigures II-2 and II-3 depicting a genericJRA C2 network for security operationsand possible selection options for theJRAC.)

•• Sufficient response forces areidentified to respond to anticipatedthreats to the JRA.

•• The intelligence, counterintelligence,and law enforcement networks areresponsive to the needs of commandersoperating in the JRA.

•• Objective criteria are developedand disseminated for assessing thecriticality and vulnerability of bases inthe JRA in order to prioritize securityimprovements and position reactionforces or area damage control assets.

•• Coordination with the AADC hasbeen completed to ensure that air defenserequirements for the JRA are integratedinto US, multinational, and/or HN airdefense plans in accordance with JFCpriorities and concept of operations.

•• Positioning and stationing of unitsand facilities in the JRA are made withdue consideration for security.

•• Defense plans incorporate adequateprovisions and procedures for NBCdefense, to include NBC warning andreporting procedures.

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Figure II-2. Joint Rear Area Command and Control Network for Security Operations withArmy Component Commander Designated as Joint Rear Area Coordinator

JOINT REAR AREA COMMAND AND CONTROLNETWORK FOR SECURITY OPERATIONSWITH ARMY COMPONENT COMMANDER

DESIGNATED AS JOINT REAR AREACOORDINATOR

JOINT FORCECOMMANDER

BASE

1 1 1 1 1

2

1. Candidates for Joint Rear AreaCoordinator

2. May be intermediate commands

COCOM/OPCON

Coordinating authority, unlesscoinciding with previouslyestablished command lines or asotherwise directed by the joint forcecommander

BASE CLUSTER JOINT/ISOLATEDBASE

JOINT REAR AREACOORDINATOR

SUBORDINATECOMMAND

COMPONENTCOMMAND

AIRFORCE

FORCES

ARMYFORCES

MARINECORPS

FORCES

NAVYFORCES

JOINTSPECIAL

OPERATIONSTASK FORCE

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Figure II-3. Joint Rear Area Command and Control Network for Security Operations withJoint Rear Area Coordinator Selected from the Joint Force Commander’s Headquarters

JOINT REAR AREA COMMAND AND CONTROLNETWORK FOR SECURITY OPERATIONS WITHJOINT REAR AREA COORDINATOR SELECTED

FROM THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER'SHEADQUARTERS

JOINT FORCECOMMANDER

(JFC)

BASE

1

1. May be intermediate commands

COCOM/OPCON

Coordinating authority, unless coincidingwith previously established command linesor as otherwise directed by the joint forcecommander

BASE CLUSTER JOINT/ISOLATEDBASE

SUBORDINATECOMMAND

COMPONENTCOMMAND

JOINT REAR AREACOORDINATOR

JFC HEADQUARTERS

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•• Appropriate liaison is established withmultinational and HN commands forcoordination of security issues.

•• All relevant international anddomestic (US and HN) legal guidelinesimpacting on security within the JRA(such as HNS agreements, Law of Warguidance, status-of-forces agreements,and rules of engagement [ROE]) aredisseminated to appropriate commandlevels.

•• Civil Affairs and Judge Advocatesupport are available to assist inresolution of security issues.

•• Development and positioning ofinfrastructure are made with dueconsideration of security requirements.

•• Component commander(s) in theJRA coordinate security at theboundaries of their AOs (if the JRA isdivided) to ensure coordinated JRAsecurity efforts.

•• Threat estimates to the JRA aredeveloped and disseminated to

appropriate commands in a timely manner.•• A tactical combat force (TCF), ifestablished by the JFC, is positioned andgiven the appropriate mission inaccordance with JFC directives.

•• Any additional security forces (US,multinational, and/or HN) are properlyintegrated into an overall JRA defenseplan.

•• Key LOCs through the JRA areprotected to support current and futureoperations.

•• Key movements and sustainmentoperations have priority for security,mine detection and clearing, and areadamage control (ADC) assets.

•• Liaison is established with theNCWC to coord inate secur i tyoperations. (NOTE: If it is necessary toplan and/or execute an amphibiousoperation in the JRA, the JRAC alsoestablishes liaison with the Commander,Amphibious Task Force [CATF], and theCommander, Landing Force [CLF], asrequired. The JRAC’s authority will notinfringe on the authority granted the

One of the most important JRAC responsibilities is to ensure anadequate NBC defense.

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CATF and CLF as delineated in JointPub 3-02, “Jo in t Doct r ine forAmphibious Operations.”)

• JRAC Staff Element. The JRAC mayform a joint rear tactical operationscenter (JRTOC) using elements fromthe JRAC’s staff and representatives fromcomponents operating in the JRA toassist in meeting joint rear areasecurity responsibilities. Componentand staff representation will vary inaccordance with mission, forces, andarea requirements and should supportthe planning, coordination, andexecution of joint rear area operations.The JRAC will ensure that componentrepresentation and representation on theJRAC’s own staff are sufficient to supportassigned mission responsibilities.Critical to the planning and executionof JRA operations is the interfacewith the joint i ntelligence center(JIC) or joint intelligence supportelement (JISE), as appropriate, to providecurrent intelligence and counterintelligenceestimates on t h e situation in theJRA. A counterintelligence representativefrom the JIC/JISE is essential to thetimely flow of JRA requirements toand from the JIC/JISE. The JRTOCserves as the JRAC’s centralizedplanning, coordinating, monitoring ,and advising agency for JRA operations.It coordinates with other elements on theJRAC’s staff (with higher, lower, andadjacent command staffs and with HNand/or multinational command staffs) toassist the JRAC in accomplishing hisresponsibilities.

f. Component Commands. The JFC mayelect to segment the JRA by formingcomponent commands wi th arearesponsibilities. These commands, normallyArmy or Marine Corps commands, operatein a single geographic area under a single

commander. Component commanders mayfurther elect to subdivide their area ofoperations with subordinate commands,which also have area responsibilities. Thepurposes for establishing area commandsinclude achieving unity of command andeffort for assigned operations andcoordinating defense, combat support (CS),combat service support (CSS), and use ofavailable facilities. An example of an Armyarea command that may be located, eitherpartially or entirely, in a designated JRAincludes a Theater Army with its subordinateTheater Army area commands (TAACOM)and the TAACOM’s subordinate area supportgroups. An example of Marine Corps areacommands are Marine air-ground task forces,the largest of which is the Marineexpeditionary force (MEF). The MEF maylocate support forces that comprise its combatservice support elements in a designated JRAand may have some or all of its aviationcombat element in a JRA as well. Navy forcesmay also locate facilities in the JRA thatprovide a CSS function. Navy forces mayreceive operational logistic support inforward areas through advanced logisticsupport sites and/or forward logistic sites.

• Security Responsibilities. Componentcommanders with area responsibilitiesare responsible for the defense of thearea, and the overall defense of baseslocated in the area, against enemy forcesthat may interfere with area or baseoperations. Area defense responsibilitiesare usua l l y mod i f ied by HNagreements when operating in thesovereign territory of allies whonormally retain responsibility for theoverall security of the JRA. In theseci rcumstances, the componentcommanders would continue to executetheir security responsibilities (other thanoverall area security) as directed bythe JFC through other appropriatecommanders and in coordination with theJRAC, to include the following.

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through the JRAC. In the absence of aviable HN with existing securityagreements, component commands witharea responsibilities will have bothoverall area responsibility for securityand the responsibilities inherentin coordinating local security ofUS bases and base clusters in theirarea of operations. Area commandresponsibilities for other JRA functionswill vary in accordance with HNagreements and capabilities and with thelevel and capabilities of the areacommand.

• C2 Elements. Army and Marine Corpscomponent area and subarea commandsusually have rear area operationscenters (RAOC) or rear tacticaloperations centers (RTOC) to assisttheir commanders in accomplishingtheir joint rear area operations missions.Specific responsibilities for these C2elements should be complementary tothose of the JRTOC and are found inappropriate Service manuals. Areacommands without these organizationsshould create equivalent organizationsto accomplish the mission. RAOCs orRTOCs, upon approval from higherheadqua r t e r s , w i l l e s t a b l i s hconnectivity with the JRTOC in orderto coordinate defense, exchangeintelligence information, requestsupport, and respond to information.

“Most terrible, or rather most effectiveof all manoeuvres, is sudden attackagainst the enemy’s rear. . . For nohope of safety would remain for themin flight, and they would be unable toturn backwards, since the opposingarmy would attack, or to go forward,because of the detachment assailingtheir rear.”

Onasander,The General, 58 AD

•• With the concurrence of the JFC,organizing appropriate bases intobase clusters and designating base andbase cluster commanders. (NOTE:Statement applies only to designation ofbases and base commanders withinJFC’s authority. Selected bases may havetheir commanders determined at a levelof authority higher than JFC.)

•• Coordinating the local security ofUS bases and base clusters to includeestablishing priorities for security andADC in accordance with JFC directives.

•• Establishing a command and controlnetwork linking US bases and baseclusters, and ensuring that adequatecoordination is established withmultinational forces and HN activitieswithin or bordering their area ofoperations. The JRTOC should have adedicated radio net.

•• Ensuring that US base and base clusterde fense p lans are adequa te,coordinated, and complementary toapplicable HN security plans.

•• Serving as the US single point ofcontact for coordinating security issueswithin their area of operations with theHN (if so designated by the JFC).

•• Ensuring that US bases that are otherCINC or national assets, but located intheir area of operations, areadequately defended.

•• Ensuring that response forces areidentified, trained, and positioned inaccordance with JFC directives andpriorities.

•• Performing other securityresponsibilities as directed by the JFC

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3. Base Defense Operations

a. General. The base and base cluster(designated when required) are thefundamental building blocks for planning,coordinating, and executing base defenseoperations. Each Service organizes, trains,and equips forces capable of contributing tothe security and defense of the rear area inconsonance with legislated Service functions.The base commander coordinates theforces of the various Service or functionalcomponents to best capitalize on theircombined capabilities, synergies, and mutualsupportiveness, while minimizing thevulnerabilities of each. At the base level, thecomponent in command of a base hasoverall responsibility for defense of thebase; hosted forces from other Service orfunctional components defend their ownfacilities and may be tasked to contribute tothe overall base defense, commensurate withtheir capabilities and the circumstances.Medical personnel may only guard theirown unit and wounded and sick withoutjeopardizing their protective status under theGeneva Convention. The basic principlesgoverning these responsibilities are addressedin this section.

b. Responsibilities

• Base Cluster Commanders. Basecluster commanders (when designated)are responsible for coordinating thedefense of bases within their base clusterand integrating base defense plans intoa base cluster defense plan. Theirspecific responsibilities for basecluster defense include the following.

•• Establishing a base clusteroperations center (BCOC) fromavailable base or cluster assets to serveas the base cluster’s tactical operationscenter and focal point for planning,directing, coordinating, integrating, andcontrolling base cluster defense

activities. This tactical operations centerusually serves as both the base defenseoperations center (BDOC) and theBCOC. An alternate BCOC and basecluster commander will be designatedand will have the capability to assumeBCOC and/or command functionsshould the primary facility and/orcommander be neutralized. The BCOCwill establish connectivity with theJRTOC through the RAOC or RTOC asrequired.

•• Providing appropriate facilities andhousing for necessary liaison personnelfrom bases within the cluster.

• Base Commanders. The basecommanders are responsible for basedefense. The forces of components otherthan their own, assigned to the baseprimarily for the purpose of local basedefense, will be under their operationalcontrol. Forces of other Services orfunctional components assigned orattached to the base for primary purposesother than local base defense will supportlocal base defense during an imminentattack or threat of an attack. The basecommanders’ specific responsibilitiesfor defense of the bases include thefollowing.

•• Establishing a BDOC from availablebase assets to serve as the base’s tacticaloperations center and focal point forsecurity and defense. The BDOC willassist with the planning, direction,coordination, integration, and control ofbase defense efforts. The BDOC willestablish connectivity with the JRTOCthrough the RAOC or RTOC.

•• Establishing an alternate BDOCfrom base resources or, if base assetscannot support this requirement,designating a headquarters element fromunits dedicated to the base for its local

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•• Participating in the preparation ofbase defense plans.

•• Providing, staffing, and operatingbase defense facilities in accordancewith the base defense plans. The tasksassigned each commander will follow, ingeneral, the Service functions identifiedin DOD Directive 5100.1, “Functions ofthe Department of Defense and Its MajorComponents.”

•• Conducting individual and unittraining of assigned and attached forces,as necessary, to ensure their readiness toperform their assigned tasks in defenseof the base.

•• Providing appropriate facilities andessential personnel for a BDOC for thebase commander, and providing liaisonand support as necessary for the basecluster commander at the BCOC.

•• Providing liaison personnel to advisethe base commander on matters peculiarto their Service and, if a joint staff isestablished, to be regular workingmembers of the staff.

Each Service organizes, trains, and equips forces capable of base defensecommensurate with their capabilities and circumstances.

defense. The alternate BDOC may belocated on or off base, but must be able toprovide the necessary C4 for base defenseif the primary BDOC is neutralized.

•• Planning for employment oftransient forces by ensuring that basedefense plans include provisions foraugmenting the regularly assignedbase defense forces present at the baseduring an attack or when the base isthreatened with attack. In an emergency,the base commander will be consideredan area commander insofar asestablishing authority and commandrelationships for base defense areconcerned. All other principlesgoverning support provided by atransient force during an emergency to acommander in whose area the transientforce is located, and the responsibilitiesof the commanders concerned, are fullyaddressed in Joint Pub 0-2, “UnifiedAction Armed Forces (UNAAF).”

• Individual Component Commanders.Commanders of tenant forces of eachcomponent at a base are responsible forthe following.

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•• Providing for the internal security ofthe command.

•• Providing housing for the forcesunder their command.

•• Providing C2 communicationssystems, to include common-usercommunications within the command.

•• Providing health service support(HSS) for the forces under theircommand.

c. Determining Service Identity of theBase Commander. The commander of a baseis determined by the classification of thebase and by the functions assigned tothe individual Services. The Servicedes igna ted w i th base commandresponsibilities provides the C2 structure forbase defense operations.

d. Classification of Bases.

See Figure II-4.

e. Base Clusters. Base clusters canperform a valuable C2 role in securityoperations and can enhance the support andsecurity of numerous individual bases in anAO.

• Base clusters may be designated when:

•• The large number of bases in an areaor subarea exceeds the commander’snormal span of control;

•• Their designation would lead toimproved support and security forbases in a localized area;

•• Bases are located in such closegeographic proximity as to requiredeconfliction of their respective defenseplans; and when

•• Directed by appropriate higherauthority .

• Large, single-Service bases and jointbases that are geographically isolatedmay be independent of base clusters.

Figure II-4. Classification of Bases

CLASSIFICATION OF BASES

A single-Service base

A joint base in which eitherOne Service has primary interestTwo or more Services have coequal interest

The combatant commander will determine (unlessdetermined by higher authority) and announce theclassification of bases in the area in accordancewith policies established by the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff. A base may be:

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4. C2 in MultinationalOperations

a. General. The JRA will normally besovereign territory presided over by viableand capable HN governments. Thesegovernments, represented by forces andtheir law enforcement agencies, will generallyhave overall responsibility for many ofthe functions identified with joint rear areaoperations. In these circumstances, theCINC will be responsible for coordinatingUS requirements for selected functionswith HN commands (and receivingsignificant HN assistance) while assumingfull responsibility for other functions.(NOTE: Even though all functions aregenerally coordinated with the HN, selectedfunctions like sustainment are usually USresponsibilities.) In certain operational areas,however, and in many contingencyoperations, the JFC may have no HNS

or may operate in a noncooperative HNand will have full responsibility for allfunctions conducted in the JRA.Therefore, the JFC must plan for and beprepared to execute all joint rear areafunctions with or without HNS . C2responsibilities wi l l vary by functionalarea, by theater, or by contingencyoperation, and are determined to a great extentby HN agreements and by US forcecomposition and capabilities.

b. Coordination Responsibilities. TheJFC establishes coordination with HNcommands in accordance with existingagreements at all appropriate levels withinthe joint force. In some instances orcontingencies, the JFC will have access to theUS Ambassador and his country team forhelp in the coordination process. Details ofHNS are addressed in Chapter VIII, “Host-Nation Support.”

WORLD WAR II

A graphic example of disruptive operations in an opposing force’s rear areawas the Soviet partisan movement against invading German forces in WW II.At its height, it grew to a well-organized force of a quarter million membersand forced the Germans to commit up to 25 divisions to maintain their supplylines against this sustained rear area threat. Typical missions for partisanforces were to blow up bridges and railroads; damage telephone and telegraphlines; set fire to forests, stores, and transports; support partisan welfare;and, later in the war as their strength and capabilities grew, attack Germancombat support forces. In general, they made the occupied areas unbearablefor the Germans and, in effect, created a front behind the front. The netresult of their efforts was to disrupt communications and transport, denyraw materials and local supplies, remove potential local labor sources, anddivert front-line German combat forces for rear area security missions.

German operations in the allied rear areas were nowhere near as extensive asthose of the Soviet partisans but were, nonetheless, credited with delayingallied advances. For example, the Ardennes campaign was slowed bysuccessful infiltration of German sabotage detachments, who disrupted logisticand communications support behind US lines. These German operationsresulted in allied follow-on and support units having to be redirected from thefront routinely and tasked to eliminate pockets of resistance in mop-up actionsbehind the allied front lines.

SOURCE: Multiple Sources

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5. Communications

a. General. The JRAC must haveinteroperable, secure, reliable, flexible, andsurvivable intertheater and intratheaternetworks in order to accomplish the mission.Exist ing mi l i tary or commercia lcommunications systems will be used to themaximum extent possible. However,additional communication systems may berequired to reconfigure or expand the network.

b. Responsibilities

• JRAC. The JRAC, in conjunction withthe JFC C4 Directorate (J-6), normallydesignates a joint rear areacommunications officer (JRACO) toprovide overall management of organiccommunications systems (i.e., singlechannel radios and internal switchingor terminal equipment supporting theJRA headquarters element only) and tocoordinate with the appropriate systemmanager for nonorganic C4 systemssupporting the JRA. The JRAC alsodesignates units to establish HNconnectivity in order to fulfill rear arearesponsibilities. (NOTE: The JRACwill establish necessary liaison with theJ-6 and/or JRACO to ensure that allcommunications requirements for therear area intelligence activity are met.)

• JRACO

•• Provides overall management oforganic communications systemssupporting the JRAC and coordinationwith the appropriate system managerfor nonorganic C4 systems supporting theJRAC.

•• Publishes C4 plans, annexes,directories, and operating instructionsto support the assigned mission.

•• Coordinates network connectivitywith units operating in, and transiting, therear area.

•• Coordinates the use of communicationssecurity materials.

•• Coordinates with HN agencies forcommunications support.

• Individual Components. In accordancewith joint procedures, each componentis responsible for its own internalC4 systems. Each componentcommand should be prepared to supportestablishing communications with theJRAC. Deficiencies in communicationsassets should be identified and requestedthrough the JFC.

c. C4 Systems Employment. TheJRACO must coordinate with the joint forcecommunications officer, components, allies,and HNs to support the rear area mission.Within an established theater communicationssupport is built on an existing communicationsinfrastructure, but an undeveloped theatermay require a tailored theater communicationssystem.

d. Reference. A further discussion of C4systems support to joint operations can befound in Joint Pub 6-0, “Doctrine for C4Systems Support to Joint Operations,” and the6-series publications.

6. Intelligence

a. General. Effective collection, analysis,and distribution of intelligence andcounterintelligence are essential for planningand conducting successful security operationsin the JRA.

b. Responsibilities. The JRAC isresponsible for identifying the intelligence

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and counterintelligence requirements ofJRA units and activities with rear area securityresponsibilities to the Intelligence Directorate(J-2). The J-2, through the JIC/JISE, isresponsible for ensuring that theappropriate resources and operations areallocated to support these requirements. Thetheater J-2 and JIC will use interoperable,secure communications and/or dataprocessing systems wi th ex is t ingintelligence and counterintelligence liaisonor coordination channels to transmit theinformation. The J-2 will ensure that chainsof command are fully utilized in order toconvey essential information and intelligenceto support all forces engaged in rear areaoperations.

c. Intelligence Considerations

• Operational Intelligence. The JRACrequi res t imely and accurateoperational intelligence in order tocoordinate appropriate defensive actions.For the JRA, this operationalin te l l i gence w i l l come f r omsupport ing counterintelligenceelements operating in the JRA. Thisis particularly important because of thelimited availability of combat forces inthe JRA. Friendly forces operating inthe JRA are also a lucrative source ofinformation regarding potentialunconventional, subversive, NBC,guerrilla, and terrorist threats. Thisinformation is usually reported throughcounterintelligence and operationalchannels simultaneously. The JRAC, inconjunction with the combatantcommand counterintelligence supportofficer (CISO) or the joint task force(JTF) counterintelligence coordinationa u t h o r i t y, c o o r d i n a t e s w i t happropriate commanders and staff toensure that reporting means andprocedures are established andutilized for the timely reporting ofsuspicious activities or incidents to the

JRTOC; that adequate liaison isestablished with HN military commandsand government agencies in the JRA tocollect valuable information from thosesources; that component command andtactical chains of command are fullyutilized in order to convey essentialinformation and intelligence to supportall forces engaged in rear area operations;and that separate or transient forces thatmay have been diverted from other tasks,and which may not otherwise have accessto critical information, receive effectiveintelligence support.

• Counterintelligence. An effectivecounterintelligence process is one of themost important ways in whichcommanders can contribute tomaintaining security in the JRA. Thecounterintelligence process includes thecomplementary functions ofinvestigations, operations, collectionand report i ng and ana lys i s ,production, and dissemination. The J-2,through the CISO and in conjunctionw i t h t h e S e r v i c e s u p p o r t i n gcounterintelligence organizations, shoulddevelop a counterintelligence plan forcollection requirements, l iaisonoperations with HN intelligence andsecurity services, incident investigations,and analytical support. Thecounterintelligence plan should includean assessment of all foreign intelligenceservices that could affect the JRA.Counterintelligence is particularlyeffective in assisting commanders andstaff in identifying the espionage,sabotage, subversion, and terroristthreats to the JRA. Counterintelligencecan provide commands and staff withidentification and analysis of threats fromunconventional forces, partisans, andcivilian groups sympathetic to the enemy.The CISO is responsible for providingthe commander with currentcounterintelligence estimates that

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d. Reference. Aspects of intelligencesupport to joint operations and the integrationof intelligence in support of joint operationscan be found in Joint Pub 2-0, “Doctrine forIntelligence Support to Joint Operations.”Counterintelligence support to jointoperations can be found in Joint Pub 2-01.2,“Joint Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Counterintelligence Supportto Operations.”

include analysis of enemy or otherforeign intelligence capabilities andother threats as appropriate. TheCISO must ensure that effectivecommunication networks and liaisonwith HNs, allies, joint forces, and lawenforcement agencies are established andthat this information is reported in atimely and consolidated manner to theimpacted components in the JRA.

CHAPTER IIISECURITY

III-1

“Even in friendly territory a fortified camp should be set up; a general shouldnever have to say: ‘I did not expect it.”

The Emperor Maurice, The Strategikon, c. 600 AD

Figure III-1. Objectives of Security Operations in the Joint Rear Area

1. Introduction

a. General. The JFC is responsible forproviding sufficient forces to ensure thesecurity of the JRA. All US forces in theJRA have an inherent responsibility tocontribute as many forces as possible for basedefense and local security for themselves,their facilities, installations, and activities.This must be done without seriouslydegrading their capabilities to perform theirprimary mission. Major aspects of securityare introduced in this chapter. Thefundamental principles of base defenseanalysis and planning are addressed in JointPub 3-10.1, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Base Defense.” Headquarterswill frequently be collocated with HNcounterparts. The security of the area will

be enhanced by close cooperation with HNauthorities. Additionally, the integration ofHN security personnel with US facility andpersonnel detachments is invaluable inevaluating and resolving issues and incidentswith the local population and with HNauthorities.

b. Objectives of Security Operations inthe JRA

See Figure III-1.

• Prevent or Minimize Disruption ofSupport Operations. Commandersshould take all reasonable measures,including camouflage, concealment,deception, dispersion, and movement, toavoid becoming engaged with threat

OBJECTIVES OF SECURITY OPERATIONS INTHE JOINT REAR AREA

Prevent or Minimize Disruption of Support Operations

Prevent or Minimize Enemy Interference with Command,Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence

Protect Personnel and Facilities

Protect Joint Rear Area Lines of Communications

Find, Fix, Contain, and Defeat Enemy Incursions

Plan and Execute Area Damage Control

Assess and Prioritize Bases

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forces that could disrupt forward supportof combat forces.

• Prevent or Min imize EnemyInterference with Command, Control,Communications, Computers, andIntelligence. US forces should establisheffective C4I for day-to-day operationsand for successful security operations.Security forces should protect key C4Ifacilities to prevent or minimize enemyinterference.

• Protect Personnel and Facilities. Unitsshould take active and passive measuresthat protect themselves and high valueassets in the JRA.

• Protect JRA Lines of Communications.Protection of land, water, and air routeswithin the JRA that connect an operatingmilitary force with its theater baseof operations is essential to sustainingcampaigns. Geographic features maybe used, and friendly security forcesand uncommitted combat units shouldbe employed to maximize LOCs security.Responsibility for overall protectionof JRA LOCs is assigned to theJRAC, with active participation

and coordination by the respectivecomponent commanders.

• Find, Fix, Contain, and DefeatEnemy Incursions. US forcesshould use all means of intelligence,counterintelligence, reconnaissance,counterreconnaissance, law enforcementagency support, surveillance, anddetection to anticipate and locateenemy incursions. Surveillance andwarning assets as well as fightingforces should be linked together assimply, robustly, and reliably as possible.Once located, enemy forces should becontained or defeated quickly.

• Plan and Execute Area Damage Control.Commanders at all levels must prepareplans, establish specific responsibilities,and ensure that all available assets areprepared for operations to ensurecontinuous support and restoration ofassets. Comprehensive intelligence,coun te r in te l l i gence , and lawenforcement agency informationregarding threats to the rear area are keyto the prior planning in ADC that willprevent or minimize casualties or

Joint forces protect a food distribution convoy in Somalia.

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Security

physical damage associated with enemyattacks against JRA facilities andpersonnel.

• Assess and Prioritize Bases. The JRACensures that component commanders, inaccordance with JFC priorities and thenature of the threat, assess and prioritizebases for protection and damage repairin order to ensure that operational andlogistics planners are able to identify keybases, establish security and ADCrequirements for those bases, andposition other assets. This processshould help to maximize defense forceand ADC efforts.

2. Security-Related Operations

a. General. Security-related operationssuch as populace and resource control (PRC)operations, enemy prisoner of war (EPW)operations, civilian control operations, andnoncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs)are not the exclusive responsibility ofUS forces, but do impact on the security ofthe JRA. US forces are frequently involvedin these types of operations and should beprepared to provide assistance as necessary.

b. Responsibilities

• JRAC. The JRAC coordinates withappropriate commanders and staffsconcerning security-related operations,ensuring that JFC-directed securitymeasures and priorities are established,disseminated, executed, and coordinatedwith HN commanders.

• Component Commanders. Componentcommanders are responsible forensuring that adequate security ismaintained for security-relatedoperations within their area of operationsand that these operations are coordinatedwith appropriate HN authorities.

c. PRC Operations. PRC operations aredesigned and conducted to detect, isolate,and neutralize insurgent or guerrillaactivities. These operations are normallycarried out by HN police or military forces,but US forces are frequently called on toconduct PRC operations until HN forces areavailable to relieve them. PRC operationsare generally accomplished in concert withcivil affairs (CA) efforts . Additionalguidance may be found in Joint Pub 3-57,“Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs.”

d. EPW Operations. Military policeand/or security police are normallyresponsible for EPW operations in theirrespective Services; however, additionalforces may be required to ensure control.The JRAC should establish proceduresfor all phases of EPW operations andcoordinate with appropriate HN commandsto ensure a smooth flow of EPWs throughthe JRA. Procedures for security of sick,injured, or wounded EPWs in medicaltreatment facilities will also be established.US military police have the lead inpreparation for and receipt, processing, andtransfer of EPWs. US-captured EPWs are theresponsibility of the United States and mustbe processed through the EPW channels beforeeither transfer to HN or retention in the JRA byUS Army military police at EPW facilities.

e. Civilian Internees, Detainees, andRefugees. Civilian control operations arethe responsibility of HN authorities(excluding US NEOs), but US forces may betasked to collect, retain, and interrogatecivilian internees and detainees until they canbe evacuated. US military forces do not assumecontrol of refugee movements unless requestedto do so by the HN or unless operating in anenvironment with a hostile government. USforces may have to assist, direct, or deny themovement of civilians whose location, directionof movement, or actions place them in jeopardyand/or hinder military operations.

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f. NEOs. US forces will be responsiblefor the safety and security of US citizensduring NEOs. Commanders must ensure thatjoint operation planning for NEOs addressessecurity and that security is maintainedthroughout the execution of NEOs. Additionalguidance may be found in DOD Directive3025.14, “Protection and Evacuation of USCitizens and Certain Designated Aliens inDanger Areas Abroad;” Joint Pub 3-07.5,“Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures forNoncombatant Evacuation Operations;” andin Joint Pub 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for MilitaryOperations Other than War.”

“. . . give the enemy a spanking frombehind. You can kill more soldiers byscaring them to death from behind witha lot of noise than by attacking themfrom the front.”

General George S. Patton, Jr.,The Patton Papers, 1940

3. Combatting Terrorism

a. General. Acts of terrorism span theglobe and are an inescapable elementacross the range of military operations. EachJFC must institute continuous andaggressive programs to combat terrorismin his AOR/JOA. These include use ofpsychological operations (PSYOP)support to develop operations that encourageinternational acceptance of US actions.

b. Responsibilities

• JRAC. The JRAC’s responsibilitiesfor combatting terrorism in the JRAvary in accordance with the JRAC’scapabilities and JFC directives. TheJRAC may serve as a coordinatingauthority for these actions or assistanother office or agency in thisresponsibility. Additionally, the JRACmonitors terrorist acts and ensures thatcomponent commanders are informed oftheir security implications.

• Component Commanders. Componentcommanders’ responsibilities forcombatting terrorism in their area ofoperations, to include ensuring thatall US forces meet their requiredresponsibilities, are in accordance withJFC directives.

c. Response to Terrorism. Responses toterrorism can occur with either of the twomeasures summarized in Figure III-2 andexplained below.

• Antiterrorism (Defensive Measures).The basis of this program includes thecollection, analysis, and disseminationof timely threat information , theconduct of threat awareness programs,and the implementation of sounddefensive programs. The JRAC andcomponent commanders ensure that thesemeasures are incorporated into securityoperations. Counterintelligence servesas the main source for collection,analysis, and dissemination ofantiterrorism information for theJRAC. Details of this support are foundin Joint Pub 2-01.2, “Joint Doctrine andTactics, Techniques, and Procedures forCounterintel l igence Support toOperations.” The primary source forguidance on antiterrorism is Joint Pub3-07.2, “JTTP for Antiterrorism.”

• Counterterrorism (Offensive Measures).The responsive phase of combattingterrorism is based on extensivepreparations and planning, as well asresponse measures that can includepreemptive, retaliatory , and rescueoperations. The type forces andcommand and control structure useddepend on the location, type of incident,and degree of force required. The JRACand area commanders supportcounterterrorism operations withinforce capabilities. Additional guidanceon combatting terrorism can be found in

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Security

Joint Pub 3-07, “Joint Doctrine forMilitary Operations Other than War.”

4. NBC Defensive Operations

a. General. NBC defensive operations areof primary importance to joint rear areaoperations and must be incorporated into allappropriate plans and procedures. EnemyNBC operations pose a significant threatto rear area security. Many potential threatforces have the capability to employ NBCweapons that can reach critical facilitieslocated in the JRA. All US forces in the JRAmust be prepared to actively participate inplanning and execution of NBC defensiveoperations.

b. Responsibilities

• JRAC. The JRAC coordinates withcomponent commanders and otherappropriate commanders and staffs,ensuring that they incorporateappropriate NBC planning, exercises,equipment, personnel decontaminationmeasures, and preventive measures intooverall security planning and operationsthroughout the JRA. This responsibilityincludes due consideration forpositioning of friendly NBC assets tosupport current mission requirements andanticipated follow-on actions.

• Component Commanders. Componentcommanders incorpora te NBCplanning, exercises, equipment,personnel decontamination measures,and preventive measures into area and

RESPONSE TO TERRORISM

Supported within forcecapabilities by joint reararea coordinator and areacommandersIncorporated into

security operations byjoint rear areacoordinator andcomponent commanders

Extensive preparationsand planning

Response measures thatcan include preemptive,retaliatory, and rescueoperations

Collection, analysis, anddissemination of timelythreat information

Conduct of threatawareness programs

Implementation ofsound defensiveprograms

COUNTERTERRORISMANTITERRORISM

Figure III-2. Response to Terrorism

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base or base cluster defense plans withintheir area of operations. They alsoposition friendly NBC personnel andassets in their AO to support currentmission requirements and facilitatefuture operations, in accordance withJFC directives and priorities.

c. Additional guidance on NBC defensiveoperations can be found in Joint Pub 3-11,“Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, andChemical (NBC) Defense.”

5. Military Deception Operations

a. General. The destructive power ofmodern weapons and possible numericalsuperiority of enemy personnel and weaponsmake it imperative that military deceptionis integrated into operations at every possiblelevel. In the JRA, effective militarydeception can reduce the vulnerability offriendly facilities, installations, andactivities.

b. Responsibilities

• JRAC. The JRAC coordinates withappropriate commanders and staffs,ensuring that the JFC’s deceptionplanning and operations areincorporated into security plans andoperations throughout the JRA. TheJRAC makes recommendations to theJFC on deception operations designed and/or required to protect assets in the JRA.Additionally, the JRAC ensures that alldeception proposals, concepts, plans, andactivities are coordinated to ensure theirmutual consonance and to preventunintended negation of effort in theJRA and the combat zone.

• Component Commanders. Componentcommanders plan and execute, orassist in the execution of, deceptionoperations in their area of operations

in accordance with JFC directives andpriorities. Component commandersmake recommendations to the JRACon deception operations designed and/orrequired to protect assets in the JRA.

c. Objective. The overall objective ofdeception in support of joint rear areaoperations is to mislead the enemy byproviding manipulation, distortion, orfalsification of evidence in order to induce himto react in a manner prejudicial to his interests.

d. Planning. Deception planning andpreparation should be considered for allmajor joint rear area operations andincorporated into those operations whenit is determined that it will aid in theaccomplishment of the mission. Planningdeception efforts should be an integral partof the planning process, not an afterthought.Planning must be coordinated with allappropriate headquarters to ensure theaccomplishment of those actions that willmake the deception believable to the enemy.Counterintelligence personnel are availableto assist the commander and his staff indetermining enemy intelligence collectioncapabilities and in developing militarydeceptive indicators and strategies. Foradditional guidance on military deceptionoperations and counterintelligenceprocedures, see Joint Pub 3-58, “JointDoctrine for Military Deception,” and JointPub 2-01.2, “Joint Doctrine and Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures forCounterintelligence Support to Operations.”

6. Psychological Operations

a. General. PSYOP activities should beplanned and conducted as an integral part ofjoint rear area operations. PSYOP includesthe use of various communications techniquesto reduce potential or actual enemy prestige andinfluence and increase friendly prestige orinfluence in hostile, neutral, or friendly areas.

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Security

“. . . a move round the enemy’s frontagainst the rear has the aim not onlyof avoiding resistance on its way but inits issue. In the profoundest sense, ittakes the line of least resistance. Theequivalent in the psychological sphereis the line of least expectation. Theyare the two faces of the same coin, andto appreciate this is to widen ourunderstanding of strategy.”

Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart,Strategy, 1954

b. Responsibilities. The JRAC coordinateswith component commanders to ensure thatthey follow the PSYOP program whenappropriate to enhance the security of theJRA and that each PSYOP concept, activity,plan, and proposal is complementary to otherJRA and combat zone efforts.

c. Considerations. PSYOP elementsadvise commanders and staffs on psychologicaleffects and implications of proposed coursesof action and assist in negating or minimizingeffects of hostile disinformation. PSYOPelements develop and conduct activities tobring psychological pressure to bear on enemyforces and civilians under hostile control.PSYOP planning for the JRA, as with themain battle area, should be done incoordination with military deception andoperations security (OPSEC). SuccessfulPSYOP can provide significant support tothe JFC concept of operations by gainingthe confidence of friendly populations,reducing the effectiveness of the enemy forces,and facilitating informational and goodwillprograms. To preclude PSYOP activitiesworking at cross purposes with HN securityefforts and to prevent possible miscalculationof US intentions, PSYOP normally requiresprior coordination with friendly HNauthorities. See Joint Pub 3-53, “Doctrinefor Joint Psychological Operations,” foradditional guidance.

7. Civil Affairs Operations

a. General. CA operations assist JRACsin establishing and maintaining positiverelationships between assigned forces andcivil authorities and population in a JRA.They are integral to efforts to ensure civilauthority and popular understanding of, aswell as compliance with, military securityand stability measures. They enhancesupport for US forces and alleviate conditionsthat may result in local interference withmilitary operations.

b. Responsibilities

• JRAC. The JRAC coordinates withcomponent commanders, ensuring thatthey incorporate CA procedures intoall joint rear area operations throughoutthe JRA.

• Component Commanders. Componentcommanders are responsible for CAprocedures within their area ofoperations in accordance with JFCdirectives.

c. Considerations. CA personnel andforces can assist in conducting securityoperations by providing assessments onlocal civilian capabilities and vulnerabilitiesin such areas as publ ic fac i l i t ies,transportation, and supplies. They can provideinterface and coordination directly withdesignated civil agencies and authoritiesto facilitate or develop the objectives shownin Figure III-3. Additional information on CAcan be found in Joint Pub 3-57, “Doctrine forJoint Civil Affairs.”

8. Operations Security

a. General. OPSEC must be an integralpart of joint rear area operations at all levelsof command. Because of the relatively static

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Figure III-3. Objectives of Civil Affairs Operations in the Joint Rear Area

OBJECTIVES OF CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONSIN THE JOINT REAR AREA

Force protection measures

Essential population and resource control measures

Organization of civil security and defense forces

Civilian movement or evacuation plans

Relief efforts by governmental and international agencies

Civil information activities, in conjunction withpsychological operations programs, to dispel rumor anddisinformation generated by hostile elements

nature and predictable, repetitive activities ofmost units in the JRA, OPSEC takes on aspecial significance and must beaggressively pursued by the chain ofcommand. All-source intelligence andcounterintelligence threat information areessential to understanding the threat andimplementation of effective countermeasures.

b. Responsibilities

• JRAC. The JRAC coordinates withcomponent commanders, ensuring thatthey incorporate OPSEC proceduresinto all joint rear area operationsthroughout the JRA.

• Component Commanders. Componentcommanders are responsible for OPSECprocedures within their area ofoperations in accordance with JFCdirectives.

c. Considerations. Additionally, USpersonnel in the JRA are frequently workingwith HN personnel who may not be clearedfor classified information. Communications

within the JRA will often rely heavily on host-nation telephone systems. Care must be takento prioritize the employment of SecureTelephone Units where vulnerability toexploitation is most damaging. Additionalinformation on operations security can befound in Joint Pub 3-54, “Joint Doctrine forOperations Security.”

9. Alert Notification System

a. General. Early threat warning isessential to the protection of US forces in theJRA. Alert notification systems are dividedinto two general categories.

• Air Warning. The air defense andmissile warning system is a critical linkin the JRA early warning system. Earlywarning and identification of enemy airthreats, enemy air- and surface-to-surfacemissiles, and airborne and air assaultoperations are provided by several typesof forward collection methods,including forward-deployed combatreconnaissance units, air defense systemsand the Airborne Warning and Control

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• Component Commanders. Componentcommanders are responsible forensuring that adequate early warningsystems are established in their area ofoperations in accordance with JFCdirectives.

c. HN Support. HN intelligence andalert systems, if the HN is viable and supports

US objectives, should be incorporatedinto US early warning systems.

10. Laws and Agreements

a. General. Treaties, agreements, andnational interests determine relationshipsand support between allies and friendlynations. They provide a primary basis forthe legal aspects of security operations and,in general, regulate the status and activitiesof US forces across the range of militaryoperations. This section provides a summaryof principal legal instruments that may impacton the JRA.

b. Responsibilities

• JRAC. The JRAC coordinates withappropriate commanders and staffs to

System, Navy Airborne Early Warningaircraft, and the Marine air command andcontrol system. A CINC’s tacticalwarning requirements are supportedby national and theater intelligencesystems.

• Surface and Land Warning. Informationabout potential surface and land

threats is provided by various sea, land,air, and space intelligence, surveillance,and target acquisition systems. Thecounterintelligence element at the JIC/JISE will provide fused intelligenceearly warning of surface or land threatsto the JRA.

b. Responsibilities

• JRAC. The JRAC coordinates withappropriate commanders and staffs toensure that a reliable, responsive, andredundant early warning system isestablished from the joint force level tothe base level in the JRA. The JRACwill ensure that a standardized alertsystem is implemented throughout theJRA to ensure warning and uniformresponse to threats.

Air defense forces are critical to rear area defense.

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ensure that ROE procedures and otherlegal issues are addressed throughoutthe JRA in accordance with JFCdirectives.

• Component Commanders. Componentcommanders ensure that ROE ,consistent with National CommandAuthorities (NCA) and JFC ROE, arepublished and disseminated to allmembers of the joint force operatingin or passing through their area ofoperations. They ensure that laws,regulations, and procedures regardingtreatment of belligerents, insurgents,and prisoners are published anddisseminated to all appropriate USforces and that adequate liaison isestablished with HN authorities inorder to coordinate these actionswhen required. If hostilities are likely,they also ensure that legal representativesare available to assist US forces and tocoordinate with friendly HN authoritieson such matters as HN supply of USforces, acquisition of HN and enemymateriel, responsibility for handling ofEPWs, division of police authoritybetween HN and US forces, andresponsibility of area damage control.The Army component commandernormally has primary responsibility forEPWs.

• In certain operational areas and inmany contingency operations, the JFCmay have no HNS or operate in anoncooperative HN and will have fullresponsibility for all functions conductedin the JRA. Therefore, the JFC mustplan for and be prepared to executeall joint rear area functions with orwithout HNS.

c. Law of War (See Figure III-4). In theevent of armed conflict involving US forces,it is US law that the law of war (also calledlaw of armed conflict) and the obligations

of the US Government under that law areobserved and enforced by the US forces.US commanders will ensure that theDepartment of Defense (DOD) Law of WarProgram is implemented in accordance withDOD and Service directives and thatadequate procedures are in place for theprompt reporting and thorough investigationof any allegations of violations of the law ofwar by or against US or enemy personnel.Three general categories within the law ofwar relating most closely to securityoperations are briefly discussed below.Legal representatives should be consultedconcerning implementation of these basiclaws.

• Treatment of Combatants. Duringarmed conflict, treatment of combatantsis governed by the law of war and

Figure III-4. Categories of the Law of WarRelating to Security Operations

CATEGORIES OF THE LAWOF WAR RELATING TO

SECURITY OPERATIONS

Treatment ofCombatants

Treatment ofInsurgents

Treatment ofPrisoners

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Security

relevant HN and domestic laws.Enemy personnel acting in accordancewith the law of war will be accordedenemy prisoner of war status. All enemycombatants will be accorded theprotection of the law of war and will betreated in a manner consistent with EPWstatus until an Article 5 tribunal makes adetermination of the merits of the claimto EPW status.

• Treatment of Insurgents. US policyrequires and directs humane careand treatment for insurgents heldin US military custody duringcounterinsurgency operations fromthe moment of capture until releaseor repatriation. Inhumane treatment,even under stress of combat and withdeep provocation, is a serious andpunishable violation under internationallaw and the US Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice.

• Treatment of Prisoners. The treatmentof EPWs is outlined in the 1949 GenevaConvention, relative to the treatment ofprisoners of war, which prescribesspecific protective measures for EPWscaptured during armed conflict.

d. Rules of Engagement. The CINCestablishes ROE for the AOR in accordancewith ROE established by NCA and incoordination with Department of Staterepresentatives through authorized militarycommand channels. ROE must conform tothe law of war, but the formulation processalso takes into account operational, political,and diplomatic factors such as HN lawsconcerning defense of others, self defense, andprotection of military facilities. (NOTE: ROEmay change at national boundaries.)

e. US Law. US forces, regardless oflocation, follow US law, executive orders,DOD directives, Service regulations, and

CINC regulations promulgated under the lawas well as international agreements concludedpursuant to US law.

f. International Agreements. Internationalagreements are the primary source of rulesof international law applicable to US,multinational, and HN forces. The mostcomprehensive are status-of-forcesagreements (SOFAs); however, these maybe modified or become inapplicable in timeof armed conflict. Other important types ofinternational agreements concern securityassistance and HN support agreements.

g. HN Laws. HN laws apply to officialactivities of the US forces in the HN tothe extent provided by internationalagreement. HN laws apply to individualmembers of the US forces in the HN, engagedin other than official activities, unlessspecifically modified or made not applicableto US forces by the terms of an internationalagreement. HN laws have broad as well asfinite implications on the conduct of allfunctions involved in joint rear areaoperations.

11. Area Damage Control

a. General. The improved destructivecapabilities of modern weapons systemssignificantly increase the need for effectivedamage control. Effective planning,establishment of specific responsibilities,and use of all available assets are necessaryto conduct ADC and to ensure prevention,containment, and rapid restoration ofoperations.

b. Responsibilities

• JRAC. The JRAC coordinates withappropriate commanders and staffs toensure that ADC operations in the JRAare conducted in accordance with theJFC’s directives and priorities.

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c. ADC Planning Requirements

• General. Effective ADC planning isdecentralized and executed at thelowest level. Base and base clusterdefense plans should have ADC annexesidentifying responsibilities, priorities,requirements, and procedures forconducting ADC operations. Theseplans will be coordinated and integratedat the component and subordinatecommand levels to ensure rapid responseand efficient utilization of limited ADCassets. Vulnerability analysis isnecessary to ensure that units andfacilities are not positioned in such amanner that could place units atunnecessary risk; e.g., a hospital unitshould not be within the danger zone ofan HN ammunition storage site or fuelfacility.

• Specific Planning Responsibilities.Base and base cluster ADC annexesshould identify responsibilities andprocedures required before, during,and after an incident. Plans should alsoinclude responsibilities for all unitsoccupying the base or located in the basecluster that can make contributions toADC. Examples include, but are notlimited to, military and security police,engineers, ordnance, NBC decontaminationor reconnaissance, civil affairs,maintenance, health service support,C4 systems, supply, and transportation.

• Component Commanders. Componentcommanders are responsible forensuring that ADC plans in their areaof operations are developed,prioritized, coo rd ina ted , andexecuted in accordance with the JFC’spriorities and concept of operations.

• Host Nation

•• Authority. The HN, depending onapplicable agreements, may haveoverall responsibility for ADC withintheir territorial boundaries. In thesecircumstances, US forces will retainresponsibility for ADC within US baseperimeters and be prepared to assist theHN within its unit capabilities with ADCoperations outside US base perimeters.Assistance should be provided with theconcurrence of the appropriate UScommand authority and should supportthe JFC’s ADC priorities and concept ofoperations.

•• Assistance. HN agreementsfrequently address HN assistance forADC operations. Componentcommanders usually serve as singlepoints of contact for coordinating ADCoperations within their respective area ofoperations and, in that capacity, shouldensure that HNS for ADC is planned,coordinated, prioritized, and executed inaccordance with the JFC’s priorities andconcept of operation.

CHAPTER IVCOMBAT OPERATIONS

IV-1

“A general should direct his whole attention to the tranquillity of hiscantonments, in order that the soldier may be relieved from all anxiety, andrepose in security from his fatigues.”

Attributed to Frederick the Great

1. General

a. Introduction. The JFC must considerand plan for combat operations in the JRA.The JFC must develop and organize plansfor a TCF that is trained, led, and equippedto concentrate the necessary combat power atthe decisive time and place in the JRA in orderto maintain the integrity of the JRA andcontinue sustainment operations. The JFCmust also ensure that appropriate active andpassive measures are taken in the JRA toprotect US forces and equipment. Thesegeneral guidelines for planning andconducting combat operations in the JRAshould be supplemented by the joint pubsreferenced in this chapter.

b. Responsibilities

• JFC. The JFC ensures the following.

•• Determines the need for a TCF basedon the threat, friendly forces available,and amount of risk the JFC is willing toaccept. If required, the JFC designates aTCF and a TCF commander.

•• Establishes C2 relationships ofthe TCF with JRAC, componentcommanders, allies, HN commands, andother subordinate commanders.

•• Determines when and under whatconditions the TCF may be used.

•• Establishes ROE for the TCF.

• JRAC. The JRAC is responsible for thefollowing.

•• In coordination with the componentcommanders advises the JFC, whodesignates the operational area for theTCF and provides mission guidance.

•• Effects coordination to ensure thatthe TCF has the required fire support,intelligence, counterintelligence,logistics, liaison, and other support toaccomplish the mission.

•• In coordination with componentcommanders, recommends combatforces (air, ground, naval) that may bedesignated as a TCF or directed tosupport a TCF.

•• Establishes liaison and communicationswith TCF, normally through the JRTOC.

•• Coordinates with appropriatecommanders and staffs to ensure thatJFC priorities for security and ADC aredisseminated and executed in the JRA.

• TCF. The TCF commander's duties areas follows.

•• May receive operational control(OPCON) or tac t ica l cont ro l(TACON) of security response forcesdesignated by the JFC in the designatedoperational area.

•• May receive OPCON of transientforces in an emergency, as directed byappropriate higher headquarters and inaccordance with conditions establishedin Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action ArmedForces (UNAAF).”

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•• May receive augmented f iresupport and air defense as directed byappropriate higher command.

•• Receives necessary liaison fromcomponent or other joint forcecommands (normally, liaison fromcomponent commands with arearesponsibilities comes from RAOCs orRTOCs).

• Service Component Commands. Servicecomponent command support to the TCFincludes the following.

•• Fire support , i n t e l l i g e n c e,counterintelligence, logistic, liaison,and other support as directed by highercommand.

•• Coordination with appropriatebases and base clusters to ensure thatlocal defense efforts are complementarywith TCF objectives.

•• Supply combat forces for the TCFas directed by the JFC.

c. Designation of TCF. Actual andpotential level III threats to the JRA mandatethe requirement to designate a TCF that canrespond to the threat and protect the forcesin the JRA. The geographic combatantcommander normally determines thesubordinate JFC’s options and parameters forselection and commitment of a TCF. Thegeographic combatant commander mayallocate combat forces to the subordinate JFCfor use as a TCF, give a TCF mission to anelement of the geographic combatantcommander’s strategic reserve, direct thesubordinate JFC to use the subordinate JFC’sown forces for a TCF mission, or selectanother option as appropriate. Based onthe geographic combatant commander’sdirection and guidelines, the subordinateJFC’s options for a TCF include the itemslisted in Figure IV-1.

d. Planning Considerations. The JFC’splans for combat and recovery operationsmust be designed to optimize the use of allavailable combat, CS, CSS, and HN forces.Ground, air, and naval operations should bemutually supporting, able to support a TCF ifrequired, and fulfill the requirements of theoverall concept of operations. HN and otherfriendly forces should be integrated asappropriate. Specific planning considerationsinclude the following.

• Key Asset Defense Plans. Plans mustbe developed for defense andreinforcement of key assets or sensitiveareas in the JRA that have majorimplications for the success of jointforce operations. Key asset defensemust also consider attack from theatermissiles, aircraft, artillery, and navalforces.

• Positioning Considerations. Theplacement of reserves, ADA units,military police, engineers, responseforces, field artillery, aviation assets,naval assets, and command posts allrequire special consideration of thethreat to the JRA, the vulnerability ofthe JRA, and the JFC’s concept ofoperations.

• Unit Movement Plans. All rear areaunit defense plans should include plansto displace, if necessary, rather than beoverwhelmed. These must be coordinatedwith the Movement Control Center.

• Area Damage Control. ADC isparticularly important before andafter combat operations and must beexecuted by all units in the JRA. ADCoperations reduce the spread ofdamage and restore essential assets byassessing damage, neutralizing oreliminating unexploded ordnance,providing HSS, making essential repairs,and removing hazards. Preventive ADC

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Figure IV-1. Options for a Tactical Combat Force

OPTIONS FOR A TACTICAL COMBAT FORCE

A theater strategic reserve force

Tactical units passing through the joint rear area (JRA)to the forward-deployed combat forces

Units assigned to security missions in the JRA or unitsbeing reconstituted in the JRA

Multinational tactical units under operational control ortactical control of the joint force commander (JFC)

Tactical units from forward-deployed combat elements

A task-organized force from assets disembarking in thetheater

Combat elements assigned to the JFC

Other combat forces as directed by the JFC

actions before combat operations canalso minimize expected damage.

e. Tenets. The tenets for successfulcombat operations in the JRA are knowledgeof the enemy, unity of command, economyof force, and responsiveness. These tenets,described in Figure IV-2, are also validwithin the more constrained context ofsecurity operations.

f. Fire Support

• Considerations. The JFC may providethe TCF commander additional firesupport assets. The TCF commandercoordinates actions and fire support withthe JRAC, through the JRTOC, andwith appropriate component and HNcommanders. The TCF commandermust be cognizant of SOFA and othertreaties which establish ROE that may

severely restrict activities in the JRA.Fire support planning must be detailedand take into account air and naval assets(close air support [CAS] and navalsurface fire support) and the nonlinearand dispersed nature of friendly forcesin the JRA. CAS aircraft are effectivefor countering deep enemy attacksagainst support forces operating in thefriendly rear area. The responsivenessand firepower of CAS greatly augmentthe combat power of rear area forces. Thepotential for fratricide is high in reararea operations because of the largernumber of support personnel andactivities located there. CAS aircrewsand terminal controllers must takespecial care to identify friendly forcesand ensure that they are not subject todirect attack or weapons effects fromCAS ordnance delivered against enemyforces operating in friendly rear areas.

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See Joint Pub 3-09.3, “JTTP for CloseAir Support (CAS),” for details.

• Fire Support Coordination Measures.The TCF must use effective fire supportcoordination measures to assist in

expediting fires and safeguardingfriendly installations and personnel.Joint Pub 3-09, “Doctrine for Joint FireSupport,” provides doctrine for fire supportin joint operations.

TENETS FOR SUCCESSFUL COMBATOPERATIONS

Knowledge of the Enemy

Unity of Command

Economy of Force

Responsiveness

Knowledge of the enemy's capabilities, vulnerabilities, andlikely intentions is essential to prepare for combatoperations, prevent surprise, and protect the joint rear area(JRA).

Unity of command is the cornerstone for uninterruptedsupport of the main effort and the protection of the reararea. It may be achieved by the joint force commander(JFC) through the joint rear area coordinator, componentcommanders, base cluster commanders, and basecommanders. A tactical combat force (TCF), if required,may be employed directly by the JFC, a componentcommander, or another commander as directed by higherauthority. The TCF will normally operate in a specifiedarea of operation within the JRA.

Protection of the JRA should not detract from the overallcombat tasks of the joint force. Consequently, only theminimum means necessary to accomplish the missionshould be employed in the JRA.

Responsiveness requires immediate reaction and rapiddeployment of sufficient combat power to destroy theenemy and area damage control resources to minimizedamage. Responsiveness is enhanced by timelyintelligence and reliable communications.

Figure IV-2. Tenets for Successful Combat Operations

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Combat Operations

coordination with the JFACC or adesignated representative.

• Coordination. The JRAC will maintainc lose coord ina t ion w i th theJ FA C C and AADC in order tomaximize the contributions of all thecapabilities available to protect friendlyforces. In accordance with the JFC’spriorities, protection of priority assetsin the JRA should be coordinated bythe JRAC and integrated into the JFC’sairspace control plans and orders.

• Defensive Counterair Operations.The common aim of all counterairoperations, including active and passiveair defense operations and measures, isto gain control of the air environmentand protect friendly forces. Combatzone airspace control procedures mustprevent mutual interference from allusers of the airspace, facilitate air defenseidentification, and safely accommodateand expedite the flow of all air traffic inthe theater of operations. Defensivecounterair (DCA) operations are bothactive and passive. Active DCAoperations are normally conducted near

g. Counterair Operations

• Responsibilities. The JFC maydesignate a joint force air componentcommander (JFACC), an airspacecontrol authority (ACA) , and an areaair defense commander (AADC).Because of the integrated nature ofairspace control and air defense, ACAand AADC duties should normally beperformed by the same person, whomay also be the JFACC. The AADCis responsible for air defenserequirements above the JRA and willensure that these requirements areintegrated into joint force air defenseplans. The JFC normally assigns theJFACC r esponsibility for planning,coordinating, allocating and taskingfor counterair operations based uponthe JFC’s concept of operations and airapportionment decisions. The JRACensures that air defense requirementsfor the JRA are integrated into US,multinational, and/or HN air defenseplans in accordance with JFC prioritiesand concept of operations. The JRACensures that this integration isaccomplished by establishing

Close coordination between the JRAC and the JFACC and/or AADC maximizesthe protection of friendly forces.

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Rear area defense weapons use passive as well as active defense measures.

or over friendly forces such as the JRA,and are generally reactive to enemyoffensive air (theater missile andaircraft) operations. Passive DCAmeasures are required by all elementsof the joint force, to include units inthe JRA. These measures areimplemented before, during, and afterattack and include:

•• Camouflage, concealment, anddeception to frustrate effective enemytargeting;

•• Dispersal to decentralize criticalassets;

•• NBC defense to counter NBC effects;and

•• Enhanced facility construction orexpedient hardening to reduce attackdamage.

• References. The two primaryreferences for additional informationare Joint Pub 3-01, “Joint Doctrine forCountering Air and Missile Threats,”and Joint Pub 3-52, “Doctrine forJoint Airspace Control in the CombatZone.”

2. Military Operations OtherThan War

a. General. Military operations other thanwar (MOOTW) may be conducted in crisissituations that present a definite threat to US

KOREA

The allied assault at Inchon and subsequent penetration of North Korean reararea LOC provide one of history’s best examples of the implications of asuccessful thrust of a major combat force into an enemy’s vulnerable reararea. It demonstrated the impact of disrupting or destroying an enemy’s logistictail, severing LOC, isolating C2 elements, and shutting off reinforcements.


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Combat Operations

responsibility for their local security and willcoordinate their local security measures withHN commands as appropriate.

• Lack of HNS. If the HNS is not viable,the CJTF is in a hostile country, or HNagreements do not exist, the CJTF mustensure that US forces take adequatemeasures for local security and thatforces are identified to ensure securityfor MOOTW as required. If the risk istoo great, the JTF commander mayposition bases outside the JOA untilsecurity of JTF forces is ensured.

• Planning Factors. Secur i tyrequirements in MOOTW depend onseveral key factors and will only bespecifically decided as the mission isplanned. Key planning factors that affectthe C2 and force structure required forsecurity operations are shown in FigureIV-3.

d. Planning and EmploymentConsiderations. Military operations otherthan war are often of limited duration andscope, but commanders must prepare for awide range of mission requirements andemployment considerations. Commandersmust be prepared for the possibility that suchoperations may lead to extended combatoperations. See Joint Pub 3-07, “JointDoctrine for Military Operations Other ThanWar,” for a discussion of the range of militaryoperations. See Joint Pub 5-00.2, “JointTask Force Planning Guidance andProcedures,” for a discussion of JTFconsiderations. See Joint Pubs 2-02,“National Intelligence Support to JointOperations,” and 2-01.2, “Joint Tactics,Te c h n i q u e s , a n d P r o c e d u r e s f o rCounterintelligence Support to Operations,”for a discussion of counterintelligence supportto JTFs in the planning, predeployment, anddeployment phases.

interests. A JFC, normally a Commander, JointTask Force (CJTF), is designated by theSecretary of Defense, by a CINC, or by thecommander of a subordinate unified commandor an existing JTF. For the purpose of thisdiscussion, it is assumed that a CJTF and JOAhave been designated. Joint C2 is frequentlycomplex, especially during the early phase ofoperations. Commanders must be prepared toadjust quickly to new task organizations and beprepared to serve multiple roles to support theMOOTW.

b. Responsibilities

• Commander, JTF. The CJTF may task acombat force commander assigned to thejoint force or a member of the JTF staff withthe mission for the overall security of theJOA. This officer’s specific responsibilitiesare tailored to fit MOOTW but parallelthose of the JRAC as identified in thispublication. A JRTOC or equivalentorganization may be designated to assistin accomplishing this mission.

• Subordinate Commanders. Allsubordinate commanders have area and/or local security responsibilitiescommensurate with the responsibilitiesthey would have during normaloperations or as directed by the CJTF orthe designated representative.

c. Security Considerations. Securityrequirements will vary greatly and are highlydependent on the area where the MOOTW isbeing conducted. General considerationsinclude HNS, lack of HNS, and planningfactors.

• HNS. If the MOOTW is in support of anallied nation and valid agreements forsupport and security exist, the HN mayprovide overall security for the JOA orsegments of the AO. US forces will retain

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SECURITY REQUIREMENTS PLANNINGFACTORS IN MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER

THAN WAR

Military operations other than war force mission and supportrequirements

Threat capabilities

Terrain and weather

Friendly force capabilities

Time available

Intelligence and counterintelligence assessment (tactical,operational, and strategic)

Posture of host-nation government and military

Degree of acceptable risk

Figure IV-3. Security Requirements Planning Factors in Military Operations Other Than War

CHAPTER VLOGISTICS

V-1

“Co-equal with the security of flanks, the maintenance and full use of thelines of communications to the rear are of major concern to the commander.It is his responsibility that the incoming supply is equal to the needs of hisdeployments and that the supporting arms and fires which have beenpromised him keep their engagements. Or if they do not, he must raise hellabout it.”

BG S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire, 1947

1. General

Joint rear area logistics integratesstrategic, operational, and tactical levellogistic operations. Planners abide byrequirements necessary for effective CS/CSS,while seeking to prevent or minimize thedisruption of support operations because ofrear area security requirements.

2. Rear Area Logistic Principles

a. To support the CINC’s strategy, jointrear area logistics must balance thenecessity for security with the logisticprinciples (cited in Joint Pub 4-0, “Doctrinefor Logistic Support of Joint Operations”) ofresponsiveness, simplicity, sustainability,survivability, flexibility, economy, andattainability. Identifying logistic principlesnecessary for the successful execution ofan operation plan is critical to the joint reararea logistic system. Operationally, theaterlogistic constraints may dictate the rate ofbuildup or theater movement, overall size ofthe combat force, the depth of any attack, orthe speed of advance. Often, the logisticianwill be faced with conflict between variousprinciples, operational requirements, and reararea security.

b. Responsiveness ensures that anyconcept of operations of the supportedcommander is supported. Simplicity fostersefficiency in both the planning and executionof any operation. Sustainability requirescontrol measures that can adjust the flow of

supplies and services in the pipeline or in thetheater to meet changing situations andrequirements. Survivability requires somedegree of dispersion and duplication duringtransit to and within the theater of operations.Active measures must include a plan forground defense of logistic installations withprovisions for reinforcement and fire support.Passive measures include dispersion andlimitation of the size and capabilities of aninstallation to what is essential for the mission.Survivability may dictate dispersion anddecentralization at the expense of economy.The allocation of reserves, development ofalternatives, and phasing of logistic supportcontribute to survivability. Flexibility is theability to adapt logistic structures andprocedures to changing situations, missions,and concepts of operation. Logistic plans andoperations must be flexible in order to achieveboth responsiveness and economy. Theprinciple of flexibility also includes theconcepts of alternative planning, anticipation,reserve assets, redundancy, forward supportof phased logistics, and centralized controlwith decentralized operations. Economy isthe provision of support at the least cost interms of the resources available andnecessary to accomplish the mission.Unwise use of logistic resources may deprivecombat forces of either manpower, equipment,supplies, or opportunities to pursue otheroptions. Attainability (or adequacy) is theability to provide the minimum essentialsupplies and services required to begin combatoperations. The inability to attain the

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necessary level of support in any functionalarea can jeopardize success.

3. Responsibilities

a. CINC

• Commanders of combatant commands mayexercise directive authority for logistics(or delegate directive authority for acommon support capability). The CINC’sdirective authority over logistic operationsdoes not release the Services from theirresponsibility to staff, equip, train, andsustain their respective components.

• Under wartime conditions, or when criticalsituations mandate diversion from thenormal logistic process, this authority isexpanded to authorize combatantcommanders to use all necessary facilitiesand logistic resources for theaccomplishment of their missions.

b. JRAC

• Sustaining the force is the responsibilityof the forces in the rear area; their

technical duties are explained in Servicedoctrine and field manuals. These reararea forces operate under appropriate C2structures using the JRAC as the meansof coordinating cross-Service, joint, ormultinational requirements.

• The JRAC coordinates the overallsecurity in the rear area and seeksefficient joint support of the theatercampaign’s logistic concepts, scheme ofmaneuver, and operations timing. TheJRAC should coordinate with theJMC on employment of all theatertransportation. (Additional responsibilitiesare discussed in Chapter VII,“Movements.”)

4. Considerations

Rear area sustainment units aregenerally wholesale outfits that movesupport to retail units farther forward. Thereare some retail (direct support) units in therear area, but they are generally geared towardsupporting other rear area units. They maynot be organized, equipped, or trained todefend against or engage high level or

Aeromedical evacuation operations are dependent on the level of securityin the rear area.

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emergency threat forces unassisted.Understanding the limitations of theServices components’ rear area units isessential in order to avoid assigning missionsfor which they will be unsuited orrequirements that they will be unable toprovide. Specific considerations are shownin Figure V-1 and described below.

a. Medical Evacuation Operations.Enemy operations in the JRA may interdictLOCs and disrupt sustainment activities. Thiscould seriously impact on the ability of HSSpersonnel to retrieve and evacuate wounded,sick, and injured personnel and provide timelymedical care. Although forbidden by theGeneva Convention, attacks on medicalorganizations, personnel, or medicalmateriel may occur and result in seriousdegradation of HSS and morale of US forces.

b. Reception and Preparation ofReinforcements in JRA. There will berequirements in all operational areas to receiveand prepare reinforcing units for furtherdeployment and employment. These unitsmay not be fully organized for combat duringthese operations, and thus may be particularlyvulnerable to a hostile threat.

c. Reconstitution. Reconstitution actionstaken by a commander to restore a unitto a desired level of combat effectivenessinclude reestablishment of command andcontrol; cross-leveling or replacement ofpersonnel, supplies, and equipment; andconduct of essential training. Reconstitutionsites in the JRA may require securityaugmentation and should be consideredin JRAC and component command securityplans.

LOGISTIC CONSIDERATIONS

Medical Evacuation Operations

Reception and Preparation of Reinforcements inthe Joint Rear Area

Reconstitution

Figure V-1. Logistic Considerations

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER VIAREA MANAGEMENT

VI-1

“He is best secure from dangers who is on his guard even when he seemssafe.”

Publilius Syrus, Sententiae, c. 50 BC

1. Introduction

a. General. Effective area management iscritical to the success of joint rear areaoperations because of the securityimplications of positioning assets thatmay provide protection for the JRA or ofdetermining locations for vital supportfacilities that require security assistance.

b. Responsibilities

• JFC. The JFC has overall responsibilityfor area management in the JRA andassigns specific JRA area managementresponsibi l i t ies to subordinatecommanders as appropriate.

• JRAC. The JRAC coordinates areamanagement in the JRA within JRACcapabilities and in accordance withdirectives and guidelines established bythe JFC. The JRAC’s primary areamanagement responsibility is ensuringthat positioning and stationing of unitsand facilities in the JRA are made withdue consideration for security.

• Component Commanders. Componentcommanders are responsible for areamanagement in accordance withdirectives and guidelines establishedby the JFC. They ensure that positioningand stationing of units and facilities aremade with due consideration for security.

c. Positioning Considerations

• Unit Positioning. Factors affecting unitpositioning include the implicationsof the current JRA threat assessment,

the suitability and survivability ofavailable facilities, and the subordinateunit’s mission requirements. Componentcommanders and their staffs should usethese factors and their own riskassessments to determine whether unitsshould be dispersed in order to enhancetheir survivability or grouped togetherfor mutual support.

• Facility and Supply Positioning.Factors affecting facility or suppliespositioning include the current JRAthreat assessment, the securityimplications, the requirements of theunits operating or using the facility and/or supplies, the impact of the facilityor supplies on the joint force missionand/or concept of operation, LOCs, andaccessibility.

• Competing Risks. Commanders at alllevels must balance mission andsecurity requirements when theyposition assets. Considerations includethose described in Figure VI-1.

2. Infrastructure Development

a. General. Infrastructure is a termgenerally applicable to all fixed andpermanent installations, fabrications, orfacilities that can be used for the support andcontrol of military forces. Joint forcesdeployed to developed areas should be ableto capitalize on established infrastructure andthe use of existing facilities. Infrastructuredevelopment should focus on facilitysecurity modification and battle damagerepair. HNS in manpower, HSS, equipment,and materiel should be maximized. Joint

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Figure VI-1. Positioning Considerations

forces deployed to less developed areas mustrely more on construction of new butaustere, initial, or temporary facilitiesi n accordance with established basedevelopment criteria. HNS should be soughtbut will normally be less available than indeveloped areas.

b. Responsibilities

• JFC. The JFC, in conjunction with allies andinvolved HN, is responsible foridentifying the wartime facility andconstruction requirements for US forcesprior to hostilities. During hostilities,the geographic combatant commanderspec i f ies thea te r constructionpolicy through the civil engineeringsupport plan for each operation plan.

• JRAC. The JRAC coordinates withcomponent commanders to ensure thatthe JFC’s construction policy in theJRA is implemented with dueconsideration to security concerns andrequirements.

• Component Commanders. Componentcommanders are responsible forimplementing construction policy inaccordance with JFC directives andguidelines. They plan and implementconstruction projects with dueconsideration to security concerns andrequirements.

c. US Assistance to HN Governments.Assistance for HN governments to rebuildHN infrastructure will be based on US law.CA assets can provide assistance innegotiating agreements concerning thismatter, including providing advice on tailoringproposed support agreements to HNexperience, institutions, and expectations. Foradditional discussion of infrastructuredevelopment, see Joint Pub 4-04, “JointDoctrine for Civil Engineering Support.”

POSITIONINGCONSIDERATIONS

Clustering of support activitiesreduces vulnerability to ground

attack but can increasevulnerability to air, missile, and/or

nuclear or chemical attack.

Clustering

Locating key facilities away fromhigh-speed routes minimizesvulnerability to enemy ground

penetrations but may also reduceaccessibility to units requiring

support.

Location

Dispersal of critical supplies suchas fuel, ammunition, and spare

parts reduces the risk of loss butalso reduces the ease and speed

of distribution.

Dispersal

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VIETNAM

Even though a “rear area” in Vietnam could not be defined by establishedlinear boundaries, there were isolated pockets (de facto rear areas) that wereconsidered to be relatively secure and yet found to be vulnerable to adetermined enemy attack. The city of Saigon before the 1968 TET Offensiveis an example. Saigon was an insulated city. Aside from occasional incidentsof small-scale terrorism during more than 20 years of civil strife, theCommunists had done little to disturb the sense of security enjoyed by mostSaigonese. Defended by 10 ARVN battalions and a division-sized nationalpolice force, and encircled by a series of major US command centers andbases, the capital seemed invulnerable to serious attack. TET would changethat. Despite initial success, North Vietnamese attacks into the “rear area”eventually failed, but not before changing the course of the war.


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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER VIIMOVEMENTS

VII-1

“Roads that lead from an army’s position back to the main sources of foodand replacements, and that are apt to be the ones the army chooses in theevent of a retreat, have two purposes. In the first instance they are lines ofcommunications serving to maintain an army, and in the second they arelines of retreat.”

Clausewitz, On War, 1832

Figure VII-1. Movements Within the JointRear Area

1. General

Movements within a JRA involve theactivities listed in Figure VII-1. Maintainingmovement control, keeping LOCs open,protecting key reception and transshipmentpoints, and obtaining HNS are criticalrequirements in preserving freedom ofmovement throughout the JRA.

2. Responsibilities

a. JRAC. The JRAC is responsible forcoordinating the overall security of the JRAso that all movements can take place. TheJRAC may become involved in criticalmovement operations (movements ofspecial weapons, critical cargo, receptionand onward movement operations, andnoncombatant evacuation services) to ensurethat security and ADC assets are adequate andprioritized, if necessary, to support theoperation.

b. Component Commanders. Componentcommanders are responsible for movementsin accordance with JFC directives andguidelines. Their responsibilities includeplanning, coordinating, and providingadequate security for movementoperations.

3. JRA MovementConsiderations

In wartime or during crisis actiondeployments, the JFC should consider as aminimum having an agency, center, or cell

to execute the movement control function.In peacetime the JFC should also establish asimilar organization to perform the planning

MOVEMENTSWITHIN THE JOINT

REAR AREA

Receipt of combat forcesand their movement to

forward areas

Movement of materiel,replacement personnel, and

support forces

Evacuation of patients andother casualties

Evacuation of US nationals

Evacuation of enemyprisoners of war, civilian

internees, detainees, andrefugees

Retrograde of materiel

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and resolution of conflict function and tocoordinate transportation issues with HNactivities as required. The JFC normallydesignates a JMC to manage theseactivities. The JRAC should establish liaisonwith the JMC through the JRTOC to monitor

movements in the JRA. Joint Pub 4-01.3,“Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Proceduresfor Movement Control,” addresses jointmovements and movement controlorganizations in detail.

Airfield perimeter security is a vital component in movement control.

CHAPTER VIIIHOST-NATION SUPPORT

VIII-1

1. General

The effective use of HNS enhances thecapability of US forces to maintainsuccessful combat operations on anybattlefield. Many HNs can provide valuablesupport for conducting security operations.The JRAC and appropriate subordinatecommanders must consider their HNcapabilities when planning and conductingsecurity operations in the JRA. HNpersonnel and organizations can frequentlyperform many functions as well as, or betterthan, US personnel or units because of theirfamiliarity with language, local customs,terrain, transportation and communicationnetworks, facilities, and equipment. Thescope of HNS is limited only by theavailability of resources and the ability of theUnited States and the HN to reach agreementsconcerning their use.

2. Responsibilities

a. National Command Authorities. TheNCA, working through the Department ofState, its embassies, and embassy countryteams, are responsible for establishingtreaties and agreements for HNS.

b. Geographic Combatant Commanders.Geographic combatant commanders mustcoordinate with the HN for the acquisitionand use of facilities and real estate.Geographic combatant commanders andcomponent commanders will ensure use ofexisting HN support, if applicable, to avoidduplication of effort with the HN.

c. Subordinate JFCs. The subordinateJFC is responsible for ensuring thatavailable HNS is consolidated andprioritized to support the requirementsof the joint force and that legal agreementsare in place to allow full execution ofoperations. The subordinate JFC shouldestablish a single office to serve as theexecutive agent to manage and coordinateHNS. This office would serve as the singlepoint of contact with the HN and resolveconflicts between components seeking thesame HN assets.

d. JRAC. The JRAC, coordinating withappropriate commanders and staff, ensuresthat HN security assets in the JRA are usedto enhance the overall security of the JRAand support the JFC’s current and futureconcept of operations.

e. Component Commanders. Componentcommanders are responsible for the use andemployment of HNS in accordance withJFC directions and guidelines. When HNSsecurity assets are available, componentcommanders’ responsibilities includeensuring that the following applies.

• HN security assets dedicated to USforces are used and positioned to helpdefend critical operations or facilities inthe JRA and can support the JFC’scurrent and future concept of operations.

• US base and base cluster defense plansare coordinated with and complementHN overall security plans.

“Never break the neutrality of any port or place, but never consider as neutralany place from whence an attack is allowed to be made.”

Nelson, Letter of Instruction, 1804

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• Appropriate HN commands are advisedof US forces’ general priorities forsecurity.

3. Considerations

HNS is normally based on agreements thatcommit the HN to provide specific supportin prescribed conditions. Agreements aremade at various levels, including national,theater, subordinate joint force command,Service component command, and unit. Ingeneral, HNS is highly situational and

heavily dependent on both the operationalcapabilities of the HN and its support for USpolicies.

a. Planning Factors. The JFC mustdetermine functional types and levels ofHNS that can be accepted with a highassurance that the HN will be able todeliver on the commitments. Factors to beconsidered in determining whether to useHNS for specific missions and functionsinclude the items shown in Figure VIII-1.

Figure VIII-1. Host-Nation Support Planning Factors

HOST- NATION SUPPORT PLANNINGFACTORS

Capability, dependability, and willingness of the hostnation to provide and sustain resources

Shortfalls in US forces supplemented by host-nationsupport (HNS) and reductions in US forces madepossible by using HNS

Effects of HNS on morale

Effects of HNS on the political structure within thehost nation

Effects on security, to include operations security

Host nation international agreements and treatiesthat specify US involvement in the area of operations

Capability of US forces to accept and manage HNS

Availability of HNS in the type and quantity agreedupon across the range of military operations

Capability of US forces to supplement and assist hostnation forces executing rear operations

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Host-Nation Support

b. Command and Control. US and HNpersonnel command their respective units andnormally work in cooperation with orTACON of (but not usually under OPCONof) each other. The degree of coordinationbetween US forces and HNS activitiesdepends on the type of HNS involved, thelocation, tactical situation, the politicalenvironment, and existing agreements. TheUnited States coordinates its control of HNresources through local officials or HNterritorial commands and defines control withtreaties or HNS agreements. When anestablished Armed Forces of the US structureis absent, the US security assistanceorganization assigned to the country teamwill normally be the point of contact for USforces’ coordination of HNS requirements.

c. HNS During Transition Periods. HNSis particularly valuable during periods oftransition , such as going from militaryoperations other than war to war. Threeexamples of operations that normally beginduring transition periods and may extend intoconflict and/or war include the following.

• Civi l ian Movements. HNS isinvaluable in controlling and assistingin the evacuation of all civilians locatedin or moving through the JRA, includingUS NEO activities, movement of thirdcountry nationals, and planned orunplanned movement of HN civilians.Details for these civilian movementsare found in appropriate Servicepublications.

• Reception and Onward Movement.Unit reception and movement willoccur simultaneously with civilianmovement and materiel arriving andmoving in the theater. All of thesemovements will require considerableHNS, especially in the areas of port andairport operations, highway regulation,traffic control, and security.

• Medical Care—Health ServiceSupport. Before and after initial onsetof hostilities, HN medical HSS may becritically needed until US medical HSScapability is established in the joint reararea. After US medical care HSScapability is established significant HNSmay be necessary, particularly in areasof base operating and infrastructuresupport.

d. HN Security Support. Many HNsprovide extensive support for security-related activities. Specific types of HNsecurity support are shown in Figure VIII-2and described below.

• Civilian Guard and Labor ServiceUnits. These units are usually in placeduring peacetime or developed after thecommencement of hostilities. Duringpeacetime, civi l ian guards arefrequently employed with varyingretainability after hostilities commence.

• Special Military Units. These units aredesigned during peacetime to performspecific wartime missions, such asguarding enemy prisoners of war andsecuring valuable facilities, materiel, orammunition. Included in this group areHN military police units , which providesupport but are not necessarily assignedor totally dedicated to US forces.

• Individual Military Personnel Units .These personnel may be used as fillersfor selected HN units which provideindividual HN personnel in order tosupport US forces, such as the Koreanaugmentation to the US Army in Korea.

• Paramilitary Units. Some nations’police are paramilitary in nature, such asBelgium’s Gendarmerie, and function inboth civilian and military roles . Theyhave significantly more utility for HNS

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Figure VIII-2. Specific Types of Host NationSecurity Support

in a hostile environment than normalcivilian police.

• Light Infantry and Security Units.Most HN countries use these type of unitsas their primary security forces. Theyare frequently given both area and pointsecurity missions.

• Civilian Police. These organizationsfrequently assist US military police andsecurity police forces during peacetime,but have significantly less capabilityduring wartime. Under the GenevaConventions, civilian police areclassified as noncombatants and assuch are not required to provide anysupport to friendly military units.

• Intelligence Units and Agencies.Intelligence organizations located in the

rear area must be employed to satisfythe JFC’s requirement for rear areaessential elements of information. HNorganizations can provide tacticalintelligence on enemy ground, naval, andair forces; counterintelligence onforeign intelligence and security servicethreat (through the CISO); terroristintentions and collection capabilities; andinterrogation and debriefing reportsfrom EPWs, refugees, returnees, andthreat sympathizers.

e. HNS in NBC Environment. In theevent of an NBC attack or NBC environment,many types of HNS support may be needed.The need of HNS may be due to limited NBCsupplies and/or units. Some of the types ofHNS that can be requested aredecontaminates, water, water transportationassets, NBC detection devices, engineerdigging equipment or units, anddecontamination equipment or units.

4. Role of Civil AffairsPersonnel in HNS

Commanders at all levels can be expectedto be involved in civil affairs activities andshould use CA personnel to monitor thoseactivities and assist in the communicating ofinformation concerning all aspects of joint reararea operations to the HN. CA personnelefforts are critical to the success of US-HNinterface efforts in the JRA. They can alsoprovide assistance in negotiating HNSagreements and treaties. See Joint Pub 3-57,“Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs,” foradditional guidance.

5. Public Affairs (PA)

The PA role in the HN is to gainsupport and understanding from allpublics. The JFCs, through their subordinatecommanders and staffs, should coordinatePA activities to ensure that all actions arecomplementary. PA offices plan flexible

SPECIFIC TYPES OFHOST NATION

SECURITY SUPPORT

Civilian Guard and LaborService Units

Special Military Units

Individual Military PersonnelUnits

Paramilitary Units

Light Infantry and SecurityUnits

Civilian Police

Intelligence Units andAgencies

VIII-5

Host-Nation Support

internal media and community relationsprograms in order to support the mission ina dynamic threat environment. JointInformation Bureaus (JIBs) are frequentlyestablished in order to improve disseminationto internal audience and other publics. TheJIB also provides a central location for newsand media access and support. See Joint Pub1-07, “Doctrine for Public Affairs in JointOperations,” for more details.

6. Role of PSYOP in HNS

Commanders at all levels can expect to beinvolved in PSYOP activities and shoulduse PSYOP personnel to support and exploitefforts to obtain maximum cooperation fromthe populace in the JRA. Additionally,PSYOP personnel can assist in search oridentification of indigenous hostileequipment, supplies, personnel, andcommunications media. See Joint Pub 3-53,“Joint Doctr ine for PsychologicalOperations,” for additional guidance.

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Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX ANAVAL COASTAL WARFARE

A-1

1. Mission

NCW forces plan and conduct operationsto ensure strategic mobility and provide a safehaven for US and multinational forces inNCW areas, during time of war or othercontingency situations, in support of theJFC’s concept of operations.

2. Concept

a. NCW is the responsibility of the JFC.This responsibility is exercised through theNavy component commander (NCC), whowill normally assign a NCWC for anappropriate NCW area. The NCWC plansand conducts NCW operations within adefined geographic area, normally designatedas the NCW area. NCW encompasses coastalsea control, harbor defense, and port security.NCW operations include but are not limitedto:

• Intelligence gathering;

• Reconnaissance and surveillance;

• Interdiction;

• Security and safety; and

• Supporting operations.

These opera t ions may be doneindependently or in support of otheroperations.

b. The NCWC may assign subareaoperational commanders as needed for coastalsea control and harbor defense in order toconduct these operations. Supportingfunctions such as mine countermeasures orsearch and rescue may be assigned to the

NCWC. The conceptual organization isillustrated in Figure A-1.

3. Command Relationships

a. Geographic combatant commanders andsubordinate joint force commanders have theresponsibility for NCW within their respectiveAOR/JOA. This responsibility is exercisedthrough the NCC. The NCC tasks the NCWCto conduct NCW operations. The NCC willassign supporting forces to the NCWC as

CONCEPTUAL NAVALCOASTAL WARFARE

ORGANIZATION

Joint ForceCommander

Navy ComponentCommander

Naval Coastal WarfareCommander

Supporting Forces(As Assigned)

Subarea Commanders

Figure A-1. Conceptual Naval CoastalWarfare Organization

A-2

Appendix A

Joint Pub 3-10

required and available. The NCWC mayrequest Coast Guard support before thetransfer of the Coast Guard as a Serviceto the Navy. A notional NCW organizationoutside the United States is illustrated inFigure A-2.

b. Naval Coastal Warfare Commander.The NCWC conducts NCW operationswithin a designated NCW area. The NCWCmay identify one or more coastal sea controlcommanders (CSCCs), harbor defensecommanders (HDCs), and supportingfunction commanders, as appropriate.

c. Liaison With Other Commands andAuthorities

• Forces Ashore. The NCWC conductsliaison with Service component forcesashore via the JRAC or the JRA

commander, if designated, during jointoperations. Close coordination isessential. CSCCs and HDCs establishcorresponding relationships with Servicecomponent forces ashore to coordinatesecurity operations.

• Host Nation. The NCWC is subject toall agreements between the US and HNgovernments. Close liaison between theNCWC and appropriate HN agencies isnecessary in order to operate within thatcountry’s territorial waters and tocoordinate support from local, civil, andmilitary authorities.

• Reference. Details of the organization,functions, and liaison requirementsof the NCWC and subordinates arediscussed in detail in NWP-39, “NavalCoastal Warfare Doctrine.”

A-3

Naval C

oastal Warfare

NOTIONAL NAVAL COASTAL WARFARE ORGANIZATION OUTSIDE THE US

Other SupportingFunction ElementCommanders as

Required

SurveillanceCommander

Search and RescueCommander

Mine CountermeasuresCommander

Joint ForceCommander

Navy ComponentCommander

Naval Coastal WarfareCommander

Harbor DefenseCommander

Coastal Sea ControlCommander

Figure A-2. Notional Naval Coastal Warfare Organization Outside the US

A-4

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Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX BREFERENCES

B-1

The development of Joint Pub 3-10 is based upon the following primary references.

1. Department of Defense

DOD Directive 5100.51, “Protection and Evacuation of US Citizens and Certain DesignatedAliens in Danger Areas Abroad.”

2. Joint Pubs

a. Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).”

b. Joint Pub 1-01, “Joint Publication System: Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques,and Procedures Development Program.”

c. Joint Pub 1-02, “DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.”

d. Joint Pub 2-0, “Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations.”

e. Joint Pub 2-01.2, “Joint Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures forCounterintelligence Support to Operations.”

f. Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations.”

g. Joint Pub 3-02, “Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations.”

h. Joint Pub 3-07, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.”

i. Joint Pub 3-07.2, “JTTP for Antiterrorism.”

j. Joint Pub 3-09, “Doctrine for Joint Fire Support” (In Development).

k. Joint Pub 3-10.1, “JTTP for Base Defense.”

l. Joint Pub 3-11, “Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense.”

m. Joint Pub 3-13.1, “Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W).”

n. Joint Pub 3-52, “Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone.”

o. Joint Pub 3-53, “Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.”

p. Joint Pub 3-54, “Joint Doctrine for Operations Security.”

q. Joint Pub 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs.”

B-2

Appendix B

Joint Pub 3-10

r. Joint Pub 3-58, “Joint Doctrine for Military Deception.”

s. Joint Pub 4-0, “Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.”

t. Joint Pub 4-01.3, “JTTP for Movement Control.”

u. Joint Pub 4-02, “Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations.”

v. Joint Pub 4-04, “Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support.”

w. Joint Pub 6-0, “Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations.”

3. Multi-Service Pubs

a. FM 90-12/FMFRP 2-73/TACP 50-50/PACAFP 50-50/USAFEP 50-50, “Base Defense.”

b. FM 90-19/FMFRP 2-71/TACP 50-43/USAFEP 50-43/PACAFP 50-43, “Deception.”

c. FM 90-23/TACP 50-49/USAFEP 50-49/PACAFP 50-49, “Rear Security Operations.”

d. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-47/TAC, USAFE, PACAF, “Joint Concept and Proceduresfor Close Air Support in the Rear Battle.”

4. Army Pubs

a. FM 1-111 (Draft), “Aviation Brigades.”

b. FM 5-116, “Engineer Operations: Echelons Above Corps.”

c. FM 9-6, “Munitions Support in Theater of Operations.”

d. FM 11-23, “Theater Communications Command.”

e. FM 19-1, “Military Police Support for the AirLand Battle.”

f. FM 33-1, “Psychological Operations.”

g. FM 34-1, “Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations.”

h. FM 34-37, “Echelons Above Corps Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations.”

i. FM 34-60, “Counterintelligence.”

j. FM 41-10, “Civil Affairs Operations.”

k. FM 55-10, “Movement Control in a Theater of Operations.”

l. FM 63-3, “Combat Service Support Operations: Corps.”

B-3

References

m. FM 63-4, “Combat Service Support Operations: Theater Army Area Command.”

n. FM 90-14, “Rear Battle.”

o. FM 100-5, “Operations.”

p. FM 100-7, “Decisive Force, the Army in Theater.”

q. FM 100-16, “Support Operations: Echelons Above Corps.”

r. FM 101-5, “Staff Organization and Operations.”

s. TRADOC Pam 11-9, “Army Programs: Blueprint of the Battlefield.”

5. Air Force Pubs

a. Air Force Historical Study: “The 31 Initiatives: A Study in Air Force-ArmyCooperation,” 1987.

b. Air Force Pamphlet 206-4, “Joint Operational Concept for Air Base Ground Defense,”July 1986.

c. Air Force Instruction 10-212, “Air Base Operability Program,” April 1994.

6. Marine Corps Pubs

a. FMFM 2-6, “MAGTF Rear Area Security.”

b. OH 6-1, “Ground Combat Operations.”

c. FMFM 3-5, “Employment of Military Police in Combat.”

7. Navy Pubs

a. NWP 39, “Naval Coastal Warfare Doctrine.”

b. NWP 40, “Inshore Undersea Warfare.”

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Joint Pub 3-10

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX CADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

C-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to theJoint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division, Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe,VA 23651-5000. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness,consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the US Army. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor forthis publication is the Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes Joint Pub 3-10, 29 April 1993, “Doctrine for Joint Rear AreaOperations.”

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: CSA WASHINGTON DC//DAMO-FDQ//INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans andInteroperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in thispublication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as anenclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requestedto notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected inthis publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTEDNUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

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Appendix C

Joint Pub 3-10

5. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publicationcenters.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands,Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreigngovernments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (DefenseAttache Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, Room 1A674, Pentagon,Washington D.C. 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assignedadministrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,“Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.”

By Military Services:

Army: US Army AG Publication Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2898

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Naval Inventory Control Point700 Robbins AvenueBldg 1, Customer ServicePhiladelphia, PA 19111-5099

Marine Corps: Marine Corps Logistics BaseAlbany, GA 31704-5000

Coast Guard: Coast Guard Headquarters, COMDT (G-OPD)2100 2nd Street, SWWashington, D.C. 20593-0001

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications isunrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified jointpublications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.

GLOSSARYPART I—ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

GL-1

AADC area air defense commanderACA airspace control authorityADA air defense artilleryADC area damage controlAO area of operationsAOR area of responsibility

BCOC base cluster operations centerBDOC base defense operations center

C2 command and controlC4 command, control, communications, and computersC4I command, control, communications, computers, and

intelligenceCA civil affairsCAS close air supportCATF commander, amphibious task forceCINC combatant commanderCISO counterintelligence support officerCJTF commander, joint task forceCLF commander, landing forcesCS combat supportCSS combat service supportCSCC coastal sea control commander

DCA defensive counterairDOD Department of Defense

EPW enemy prisoner of war

HDC harbor defense commanderHN host nationHNS host-nation supportHSS health service support

IMINT imagery intelligence

J-2 Intelligence Directorate of a Joint StaffJ-6 C4 Directorate of a Joint StaffJFACC joint force air component commanderJFC joint force commanderJIB Joint Information BureauJIC Joint Intelligence CenterJISE joint intelligence support element

JMC joint movement centerJOA joint operations areaJRA joint rear areaJRAC joint rear area coordinatorJRACO joint rear area communications officerJRTOC joint rear tactical operations centerJTF joint task force

LOC lines of communications

MEF Marine expeditionary forceMOOTW military operations other than warMSR main supply route

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemicalNCA National Command AuthoritiesNCC Naval Component CommanderNCW naval coastal warfareNCWC naval coastal warfare commanderNEO noncombatant evacuation operation

OPCON operational controlOPSEC operations security

PA public affairsPRC populace and resources controlPSYOP psychological operations

RAOC rear area operations centerROE rules of engagementRTOC rear tactical operations center

SOFA status-of-forces agreement

TAACOM Theater Army area commandTACON tactical controlTCF tactical combat force

UNAAF Unified Action Armed Forces

GL-2

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-10

antiterrorism. Defensive measures used toreduce the vulnerability of individuals andproperty to terrorist acts, to include limitedresponse and containment by local militaryforces. Also called AT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area command. A command which iscomposed of those organized elements ofone or more of the armed services,designated to operate in a specificgeographical area, which are placed undera single commander. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area damage control. Measures takenbefore, during or after hostile action ornatural or manmade disasters, to reduce theprobability of damage and minimize itseffects. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area of operations. An operational areadefined by the joint force commander forland and naval forces. Areas of operationdo not typically encompass the entireoperational area of the joint forcecommander, but should be large enough forcomponent commanders to accomplishtheir missions and protect their forces. (JointPub 1-02)

area of responsibility. 1. The geographicalarea associated with a combatant commandwithin which a combatant commander hasauthority to plan and conduct operations.2. In naval usage, a predefined area ofenemy terrain for which supporting shipsare responsible for covering by fire onknown targets or targets of opportunity andby observation. Also called AOR. (JointPub 1-02)

base. 1. A locality from which operationsare projected or supported. 2. An area orlocality containing installations whichprovide logistic or other support. (Joint Pub1-02)

base cluster. In base defense operations, acollection of bases, geographically groupedfor mutual protection and ease of commandand control. (Joint Pub 1-02)

base cluster commander. In base defenseoperations, the senior officer in the basecluster (excluding medical officers,chaplains, and commanders of transientunits), with responsibility for coordinatingthe defense of bases within the base clusterand for integrating base defense plans ofbases into a base cluster defense plan. (JointPub 1-02)

base commander. In base defenseoperations, the officer assigned tocommand a base. (Joint Pub 1-02)

base defense. The local military measures,both normal and emergency, required tonullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemyattacks on, or sabotage of, a base, so as toensure that the maximum capacity of itsfacilities is available to US forces. (JointPub 1-02)

civil-military operations. Group of plannedactivities in support of military operationsthat enhance the relationship between themilitary forces and civilian authoritiesand population and which promote thedevelopment of favorable emotions,attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly,or hostile groups. ( Joint Pub 1-02)

coastal sea control. The employment offorces to ensure the unimpeded use of anoffshore coastal area by friendly forces and,as appropriate, to deny the use of the areato enemy forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatant commander. A commander inchief of one of the unified or specifiedcombatant commands established by thePresident. (Joint Pub 1-02)

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

GL-3

GL-4

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-10

combat service support. The essentialcapabilities, functions, activities, and tasksnecessary to sustain all elements ofoperating forces in theater at all levels ofwar. Within the national and theaterlogistic systems, it includes but is notlimited to that support rendered by serviceforces in ensuring the aspects of supply,maintenance, transportation, healthservices, and other services required byaviation and ground combat troops topermit those units to accomplish theirmissions in combat. Combat servicesupport encompasses those activities at alllevels of war that produce sustainment toall operating forces on the battlefield.(Joint Pub 1-02)

combat support elements. Those elementswhose primary missions are to providecombat support to the combat forces andwhich are a part, or prepared to become apart, of a theater, command, or task forceformed for combat operations. (Joint Pub1-02)

combined. Between two or more forces oragencies of two or more allies. (When allallies or services are not involved, theparticipating nations and services shall beidentified, e.g., Combined Navies.) (JointPub 1-02)

communications zone. Rear part of theaterof operations (behind but contiguous to thecombat zone) which contains the lines ofcommunications, establishments for supplyand evacuation, and other agenciesrequired for the immediate support andmaintenance of the field forces. (Joint Pub1-02)

concept of logistic support. A verbal orgraphic statement, in broad outline, of howa commander intends to support andintegrate with a concept of operations in anoperation or campaign. (Joint Pub 1-02)

coordinating authority. A commander orindividual assigned responsibility forcoordinating specific functions or activitiesinvolving forces of two or more MilitaryDepartments or two or more forces ofthe same Service. The commander orindividual has the authority to requireconsultation between the agenciesinvolved, but does not have the authorityto compel agreement. In the event thatessential agreement cannot be obtained, thematter shall be referred to the appointingauthority. Coordinating authority is aconsultation relationship, not an authoritythrough which command may beexercised. Coordinating authority is moreapplicable to planning and similaractivities than to operations. (Joint Pub1-02)

counterintelligence. Information gatheredand activities conducted to protect againstespionage, other intelligence activities,sabotage, or assassinations conducted byor on behalf of foreign governments orelements thereof, foreign organizations, orforeign persons, or international terroristactivities. Also called CI. (Joint Pub 1-02)

deception. Those measures designed tomislead the enemy by manipulation,distortion, or falsification of evidence toinduce him to react in a manner prejudicialto his interests. (Joint Pub 1-02)

decontamination. The process of makingany person, object, or area safe byabsorbing, destroying, neutralizing,making harmless, or removing, chemicalor biological agents, or by removingradioactive material clinging to or aroundit. (Joint Pub 1-02)

essential elements of information. Thecritical items of information regarding theenemy and the environment needed by thecommander by a particular time to relatewith other available information and

Glossary

GL-5

intelligence in order to assist in reaching alogical decision. Also called EEI. (JointPub 1-02)

evacuation. 1. The process of moving anyperson who is wounded, injured, or ill toand/or between medical treatmentfacilities. 2. The clearance of personnel,animals, or materiel from a given locality.3. The controlled process of collecting,classifying, and shipping unserviceable orabandoned materiel, United States andforeign, to appropriate reclamation,maintenance, technical intelligence, ordisposal facilities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

high-water mark. Properly, a mark left ona beach by wave wash at the preceding highwater. It does not necessarily correspondto the high-water line. Because it can bedetermined by simple observation, it isfrequently used in place of the high-waterline, which can be determined only by asurvey. When so used, it is called the high-water line. (Joint Pub 1-02)

host nation. A nation which receives theforces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on,or to operate in, or to transit through itsterritory. (Joint Pub 1-02)

host-nation support. Civil and/or militaryassistance rendered by a nation to foreignforces within its territory during peacetime,crisis or emergencies, or war based onagreements mutually concluded betweennations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint base. For purposes of base defenseoperations, a joint base is a locality fromwhich operations of two or more of theMilitary Departments are projected orsupported and which is manned bysignificant elements of two or moreMilitary Departments or in whichsignificant elements of two or moreMilitary Departments are located.

(Approved for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02.)

joint force commander. A general termapplied to a combatant commander,subunified commander, or joint task forcecommander authorized to exercisecombatant command (command authority)or operational control over a joint force.Also called JFC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint logistics. The art and science of planningand carrying out, by a joint forcecommander and staff, logistic operations tosupport the protection, movement,maneuver, firepower, and sustainment ofoperating forces of two or more MilitaryDepartments of the same nation. (Approvedfor inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub1-02.)

joint movement center. The centerestablished to coordinate the employmentof all means of transportation (including thatprovided by allies or host nations) to supportthe concept of operations. This coordinationis accomplished through establishment oftransportation policies within the assignedarea of responsibility, consistent withrelative urgency of need, port andterminal capabilities, transportation assetavailability, and priorities set by a joint forcecommander. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint rear area. A specific land areawi th in a joint force commander’soperational area designated to facilitateprotection and operation of installations andforces supporting the joint force. (Approvedfor inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub1-02)

joint rear area coordinator. The officer withresponsibility for coordinating the overallsecurity of the joint rear area in accordancewith joint force commander directivesand priorities in order to assist inproviding a secure environment to

GL-6

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-10

facilitate sustainment, host nationsupport, infrastructure development, andmovements of the joint force. The jointrear area coordinator also coordinatesintelligence support and ensures that areamanagement is practiced with dueconsideration for security requirements.Also called JRAC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint rear area operations. Those operationsin the joint rear area that facilitate protectionor support of the joint force. (Approvedfor inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub1-02.)

joint rear tactical operations center. A jointoperations cell tailored to assist the jointrear area coordinator in meeting missionresponsibilities. Also called JRTOC. (JointPub 1-02)

lines of communications. All the routes,land, water, and air, which connect anoperating military force with a base ofoperations and along which supplies andmilitary forces move. Also called LOC.(Joint Pub 1-02)

logistics. The science of planning andcarry ing out the movement andmaintenance of forces. In its mostcomprehensive sense, those aspects ofmilitary operations which deal with: a.design and development, acquisition,storage, movement, distr ibution,maintenance, evacuation, and dispositionof materiel; b. movement, evacuation, andhospitalization of personnel; c. acquisitionor construction, maintenance, operation,and disposition of facilities; d. acquisitionor furnishing of services. (Joint Pub 1-02)

military capability. The ability to achieve aspecified wartime objective (win a war orbattle, destroy a target set). It includes fourmajor components: force structure,modernization, readiness, andsustainability. a. force structure—

Numbers, size, and composition of the unitsthat comprise our Defense forces; e.g.,divisions, ships, airwings. b.modernization—Technical sophisticationof forces, units, weapon systems, andequipments. c. unit readiness—The abilityto provide capabilities required by thecombatant commanders to execute theirassigned missions. This is derived fromthe ability of each unit to deliver the outputsfor which it was designed. d.sustainability—The ability to maintain thenecessary level and duration of operationalactivity to achieve military objectives.Sustainability is a function of providing forand maintaining those levels of readyforces, materiel, and consumables necessaryto support military effort. (Joint Pub 1-02)

movement control. 1. The planning, routing,scheduling, and control of personnel andcargo movements over lines ofcommunications. 2. An organizationresponsible for the planning, routing,scheduling, and control of personnel andcargo movements over lines ofcommunications. Also called movementcontrol center. (Joint Pub 1-02)

naval advanced logistic support site. Anoverseas location used as the primarytransshipment point in the theater ofoperations for logistic support. A navaladvanced logistic support site possesses fullcapabilities for storage, consolidation,and transfer of supplies and for supportof forward-deployed units (includingreplacement units) during majorcontingency and wartime periods. Navaladvanced logistic support sites, with portand airfield facilities in close proximity, arelocated within the theater of operations butnot near the main battle areas, and mustpossess the throughput capacity requiredto accommodate incoming and outgoingintertheater airlift and sealift. When fullyactivated, the naval advanced logistic

Glossary

GL-7

support sites should consist of facilities andservices provided by the host nation,augmented by support personnel located inthe theater of operations, or both. Alsocalled ALSS. See also naval forwardlogistic site. (Joint Pub 1-02)

naval coastal warfare. Coastal sea control,harbor defense, and port security, executedboth in coastal areas outside the UnitedStates in support of national policy and inthe United States as part of this Nation’sdefense. Also called NCW. (Joint Pub1-02)

naval coastal warfare area. An assignedgeographic area of operations whichincludes offshore waters, harborapproaches, harbors, ports, waterfrontfacilities, and those internal waters andrivers which provide access to portfacilities. (Approved for inclusion in thenext edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

naval coastal warfare commander. Anofficer designated to conduct naval coastalwarfare missions within a designated navalcoastal geographic area. Also calledNCWC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

naval forward logistic site. An overseaslocation, with port and airfield facilitiesnearby, which provides logistics support tonaval forces within the theater of operationsduring major contingency and wartimeperiods. Naval forward logistic sites maybe located in close proximity to main battleareas to permit forward staging of services,throughput of high priority cargo, advancedmaintenance, and battle damage repair.Naval forward logistic sites are linked toin-theater naval advanced logist icssupport sites (ALSSs) by intratheaterairlift and sealift, but may also serve astransshipment points for intertheatermovement of high-priority cargo into areasof direct combat. In providing fleet logisticsupport, naval forward logistic site

capabilities may range from very austereto near those of a naval advanced logisticsupport site. Also called FLS. See alsonaval advanced logistic support site. (JointPub 1-02)

port. A place at which ships may dischargeor receive their cargoes. It includes anyport accessible to ships on the seacoast,navigable rivers or inland waterways. Theterm “ports” should not be used inconjunction with air facilities which aredesignated as aerial ports, airports, etc.(Joint Pub 1-02)

port security. The safeguarding of vessels,harbors, ports, waterfront facilities andcargo from internal threats such as:destruction, loss, or injury from sabotageor other subversive acts; accidents; thefts;or other causes of similar nature. (JointPub 1-02)

rear area. For any particular command, thearea extending forward from its rearboundary to the rear of the area assignedto the next lower level of command. Thisarea is provided primarily for theperformance of support functions.(Approved for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02.)

reception. 1. All ground arrangementsconnected with the delivery and dispositionof air or sea drops. Includes selection andpreparation of site, signals for warning andapproach, facilitation of secure departureof agents, speedy collection of deliveredarticles, and their prompt removal to storageplaces having maximum security. When agroup is involved, it may be called areception committee. 2. Arrangements towelcome and provide secure quarters ortransportation for defectors, escapees,evaders, or incoming agents. (Joint Pub1-02)

GL-8

Glossary

Joint Pub 3-10

reconstitution site. A location selected bysurviving command authority as the site atwhich a damaged or destroyedheadquarters can be reformed fromsurvivors of the attack and/or personnelfrom other sources, predesignated asreplacements. (Joint Pub 1-02)

rules of engagement. Directives issued bycompetent military authority whichdelineate the circumstances and limitationsunder which United States forces willin i t ia te and/or cont inue combatengagement with other forces encountered.Also called ROE. (Joint Pub 1-02)

security. 1. Measures taken by a militaryunit, an activity or installation to protectitself against all acts designed to, orwhich may, impair its effectiveness. 2.A condition that results from theestablishment and maintenance ofprotective measures that ensure a state ofinviolability from hostile acts or influences.3. With respect to classified matter, it isthe condition that prevents unauthorizedpersons from having access to officialinformation that is safeguarded in theinterests of national security. (Joint Pub1-02)

status-of-forces agreement. An agreementwhich defines the legal position of avisiting military force deployed in theterritory of a friendly state. Agreementsdelineating the status of visiting militaryforces may be bilateral or multilateral.Provisions pertaining to the status ofvisiting forces may be set forth in a separateagreement, or they may form a part of amore comprehensive agreement. Theseprovisions describe how the authorities ofa visiting force may control members ofthat force and the amenability of the forceor its members to the local law or to theauthority of local officials. To the extentthat agreements delineate matters affectingthe relations between a military force andcivilian authorities and population, theymay be considered as civil affairsagreements. Also called SOFA. (Joint Pub1-02)

subordinate command. A commandconsisting of the commander and allthose individuals, units, detachments,organizations, or installations that havebeen placed under the command by theauthority establishing the subordinatecommand. (Joint Pub 1-02)

sustainability. See military capability. (JointPub 1-02)

Assess-ments/

Revision

CJCSApproval

TwoDrafts

ProgramDirective

ProjectProposal

J-7 formally staffs withServices and CINCS

Includes scope of project,references, milestones,and who will developdrafts

J-7 releases ProgramDirective to Lead Agent.Lead Agent can beService, CINC, or JointStaff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2Program Directive

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The CINCS receive the pub andbegin to assess it during use

18 to 24 months followingpublication, the Director J-7, willsolicit a written report from thecombatant commands andServices on the utility and qualityof each pub and the need for anyurgent changes or earlier-than-scheduled revisions

No later than 5 years afterdevelopment, each pub is revised

STEP #5Assessments/Revision

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Submitted by Services, CINCS, or Joint Staffto fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services andCINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive

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STEP #1Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchyas shown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrine publications.The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Pub 3-10 Operations

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JOINT PUB 1-0

PERSONNELand

ADMINISTRATION

JOINT PUB 4-0 JOINT PUB 5-0 JOINT PUB 6-0

LOGISTICS C4 SYSTEMSPLANS

JOINT PUB 0-2

JOINT PUB 1

UNAAF

JOINTWARFARE

JOINTDOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makesrequired changes and prepares pub forcoordination with Services and CINCS

Joint Staff conducts formalstaffing for approval as a Joint Publication

STEP #4CJCS Approval

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Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority(PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCS, Services,and Joint Staff

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STEP #3Two Drafts

ENHANCEDJOINT

WARFIGHTINGCAPABILITY

INTELLIGENCE

JOINT PUB 2-0

OPERATIONS

JOINT PUB 3-0

JP 3-10 Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations

Documents

Transcript of JP 3-10 Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations