Foreign &

Commonwealth Office

Records and Historical Department

FCO HISTORIANS

OCCASIONAL PAPERS

No. 16

Journey to an Unknown Destination:

the British Arrival in Brussels in 1973

Foreign and Commonwealth (e November iggg

FOREWORD

The extent and meaning of the United Kingdom's commitment to the European Union is currently one of the most divisive issues in British politics. Some might argue that it has long been so. The uncertainties about Britain's post imperial role which conditioned British attitudes towards the European Communities in the i95os and i96os have given way to a new debate about how far we are, and should be, committed to the Union's further development. It was therefore singularly appropriate that Lord Thomson of Monifieth, who on 27 October gave this year's FCO Annual History Lecture, should have chosen as his subject Journey to an Unknown Destination: the British Arrival in Brussels in 1973'. The lecture not only added to our understanding of the diplomatic history of the ig7os, but also provided a stimulating contribution to the continuing debate on Britain's relations with its continental allies and partners.

Lord Thomson has long been involved in the politics of European integration. After having served during the ig6os as Minister of State in the Foreign Office and as Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs in Harold Wilson's Labour Government, he was, as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Minister with special responsibility for Europe. Then, following Britain's accession to the European Community in January 1973, he was appointed Comm oner in Brussels, a position he held for the next four years. He was, from 1977 to ig8o, Chairman of the European Movement in Britain, and until 1997 was Liberal Democrat spokesman in the House of Lords on foreign affairs and broadcasting.

We are pleased to publish Lord Thomson's lecture as the latest in the FCO Historians' series of Occasional Papers.

John Kerr November iggg

Foreign & Commonwealth Office

HISTORIANS

Occasional Papers

No. i6 November iggg

TIE 1999 FCO ANNUAL LECTURE

TOURNEY TO AN UNKNOWN DESTINATION: THE BRITISH ARRIVAL IN BRUSSELS IN 1973

by

Lord Thomson of Monifieth

Copies of this pamphlet will be deposited with the National Libraries

FCO Historians, Records and Historical Department,

Old Admiralty Building, Whitehall, London SW 1A 2AF

Crown Copyright

ISBN 0 903359 83 9

JOURNEY TO AN UNKNOWN DESTINATION: THE BRITISH ARRIVAL IN BRUSSELS IN 1973

A lecture delivered at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on

27 October iggg

It is a great, if slightly intimidating honour to be asked to deliver the annual Foreign and Commonweal h Office lecture-and to do so in the elegant and historic surroundings of the Locarno Suite. I remember these Locarno rooms when I first saw them in 1964 as a brand new Minister of State responsible among other things for the admmiiistrative side of things - at the Foreign Office. I discovered that the Locarno Suite had been converted into offices and was shocked to find a handsome marble mantelpiece divided in three by partitions to provide cubicles for three middle-ranking diplomats.

Well, times have certainly changed in the Locarno Room since 1964, as they have indeed in the whole pre-1939 system of European diplomacy which the Locarno Treaty represented, and which so signally failed to prevent a second great European civil war. It makes this an appropriate setting for a discussion of Britain's arrival in the European Community just over 25 years ago.

I have stolen my title-Journey to an Unknown Destination'--from the Pelican paperback by Andrew Shonfield which contained his 1972 BBC Reith lectures. As well as mountains of butter, the European Community has always produced mountains of books about itsel But I felt in 1972 that Shonfield's slim volume was more perceptive than most ... and a quarter century on, it bears re-reading.

Andrew Shonfield's unknown destination referred, of course to the voyage of the European Community as a whole, and unknown in many respects it

remains, as the European Union, now with its own currency prepares to face the challenge of Enlargement. But in the more limited sense of the journey, Christopher Soames and I undertook in January 1973 to join the European Commission it may seem a bit odd to describe Brussels as an unknown destination. We had both been much involved in Britain's

relations within the Community. I had been in the Cabinet as Minister for Europe, preparing the approach to our negotiations for entry, and Christopher had been a Labour Government appointment as Ambassador in Paris. We were to discover, however, that although we thought we knew a

good deal about the European Commission, a good deal of it was from the outside.

I approved the Cabinet paper with the draft of Britain's application to join in a hotel in my Dundee constituency just before Labour lost the General Election of May 1970. It was delivered by my Conservative successor, Tony Barber, almost word for word with only an opening preamble that the British Government had changed, but not the policy. It was a period of bi- partisanship between Government and Opposition, but it was not to last for long. By the time Soames and I went to Brussels, he had behind him a Prime Minister and a party which was by a great majority in favour of British entry. I came from the pro-Europe minority of a divided Opposition. The European issue had reasserted its deeply divisive impact on British politics.

Christopher Soames and I came from very different backgrounds--political

and otherwise-but Christopher proved a good man to go tiger hunting with in the jungles of the Berlaymont. Not for nothing, when Christopher Soames was leaving as Ambassador in Paris, did his favourite restaurateur remark `Un grand ambience est parti'. Christopher felt that nothing less than a plane of the Queen's Flight would do for our historic arrival in Brussels. Unfortunately that morning there was a Royal pre-emption of the plane on which we planned to travel, and, and we were left with the more modest end of the Queen's Flight which turned out to be the Board of Trade calibration plane. No glasses of champagne; only instant coffee in plastic cups in the midst of a flying laboratory. And the weather was foul. So in the most literal sense we found ourselves making a journey to an unknown destination. We had to be diverted to a local Dutch airfield. When we arrived, trudging across the tarmac with our briefcases, we found the terminal locked for lunch. If only The Daily Express had got a photograph at that moment of two portly commissioners visibly sagging before that locked door! So this is Europe!

However, the Europe of Brussels proved very welcoming when we f nally reached it that night. Given the chequered relations between Britain and the Community over the last twenty-five years, it is worth recalling the extraordinary enthusiasm there was in 1973 for the entry of Britain and of Ireland and Denmark. After years of indecision by Britain and after two vetoes by President de Gaulle, this first enlargement from the original six was regarded as a major milestone. Out of the whole quarter century to follow, 1973 has turned out to be the only twelve months in which Britain was regarded by the rest of the Community as fully participating with her partners in the next stage of the Community's voyage. The fact that the

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Labour Party had swung from seeking membership in i97o to opposing it in 1972 on what they described as `Tory terms' was regarded as a passing problem of domestic politics, since most of the former Labour Ministers involved in preparing the negotiations with Europe had declared they found the terms acceptable. Such goodwill was invaluable in the early months as Britain set out on its learning curve about the internal workings of the Community institutions, and they, in their tum, found themselves adapting to some of the Anglo-Saxon (and Irish and Danish) political habits. A

striking example of this two-way process occurred over time in the field of language. Despite elaborate interpretation arrangements the working language of the policy papers was French. And the French were well known to be properly proud and protective of their national language. It

was a considerable time before working papers arrived in English at the same time as in French. Today the transformation within the Commission has been remarkable. It gained added impetus with the arrival of the Swedes and the Finns. It is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that the new Italian President of the Commission, Professor Prodi, uses English as the working language of his cabinet under an Irish Chef de Cabinet. This reflects the fact that in the European Union, as in other international organisations, English has become the working language. In this country we take it too much for granted and we lose some of our advantage by becoming linguistically lazy about learning other nations' languages.

The most immediate challenge, however, facing the UK in 1973 related to the British bid to fill posts in the Commission secretariat and in the other institutions. For the interested departments in Whitehall and for the two future Commissioners, it was an immensely difficult task, a multi-dimensional jig saw puzzle. We could not know in advance which posts would be available for our bidding. The Byzantine nature of the appointments system with its dimension of political patronage was strange and alien to us.

There was a strong wish to ensure that the British contingent in Brussels was of high quality. We sought a mixture mainly of civil servants, but also people from business and industry and the universities with a sprinkling of political enthusiasts for the European ideal. We hoped that many would be attracted to stay and make their career as European civil servants, and that others, after useful experience in Brussels would return with their career prospects at home enhanced by their knowledge of the workings of the Community.

Within twelve months these hopes were severely set back by the departure of Mr Heath as Prime Minister, the renegotiation of the terms of entry by the new Government and the subsequent doubts about the degree of

3

Britain's commitment to the Community. Twenty-five years on one cannot say that the British participation in the European civil service of the Commission has been as substantial as it ought to have been. At the higher levels in the Commission the UK produced from the be"". ., some very good Directors and Directors General, including of course, Lord Williamson as the able successor as Secretary General to the legendary Emil Noel. With hindsight, however, I think the UK civil service failed to recognise the importance of posts in middle management, and of recruiting a big enough or good enough pool of younger Britain capable of working their way up the ladder.

For a British politician, there were many fascinating discoveries in those early days of entry of the differences between the Westminster and the continental political culture. For the first time I found myself working within a written constitution of the Treaty of Rome. A meeting of the Commission had a very superficial resemblance to the British Cabinet meeting with which I was familiar, but there at a side table sat the Service

3uridique--she legal advisers to the Commission--who did not hesitate to intervene as custodians of the Treaty. How different from Downing Street

where the Law officers appear rarely and only by special invitation. And yet ... and yet. Things are never quite what they seem in the European Union. I remember Sir Con O'Neill, that magnificent mandarin of the accession negotiations, telling me wryly that I would learn lessons in pragmatism in Brussels I had never dreamed of in the Fabian Society. He was right. I found the Commission (and equally the Council of Ministers where the final decons were taken) tried with paiinstaking patience to reach agreements on its proposals by consensus after wide ranging consultations with outside interests sometimes lasting years. It was a more open, less secretive institution than the Whitehall I had left and which, twenty-five years on, is still struggling to give birth to a Freedom of Information Act.

As a British Cabinet Minister, I was expertly briefed only on matters of departmental interest. For the rest I was on my own, and not encouraged to trespass on the departmental territory of other Ministers. In Brussels I found myself equipped with a Continental `Cabins'- a large Private Office

with officials shadowing other areas of Commission policy. This enabled me to be well briefed on the CAP or other responsibilities of other Commissioners far removed from my own portfolio. I have the confirmation of Lord Williamson with his long experience of both Whitehall and Brussels

that-and here I quote him-`the meetings of the Ws de Cabi nets which I

chaired for ten years brought a powerful and intellectually stimulating collegiality to the Commission's work. It is a complete misunderstanding to

4

suggest, as some commentators do, that the Cabinets simply battle to serve a national viewpoint. They were realistic about national concerns, but European in outlook'. This European emphasis will be reinforced by an initiative by President Prodi that in future every Commissioner must have either a Chef or Deputy Chef not of his own nationality. In regard to national interests I might say the same about the behaviour of the Commissioners. When it was necessary to tell their colleagues what the

national reaction to a proposal was likely to be-since no one else could

perform that duty-a nice euphemism was used and we talked of `the

country I know best'.

In 1973 I found that the President of the Commission was much more `first amongst equals' than the myth attached to the position of British Prime Ministers. But the Commission Presidency suffered from some particular handicaps which have damaged the effectiveness of the Commission over the years. President Ortoli, an able Chairman, with great previous experience of the Commission from the inside, had no influence over his choice of colleagues. Each of us emerged from the particular and sometimes peculiar political drannstances of the country from which we came. The President had some but not much influence over the distribution of portfolios. They emerged from discussions between the new Commissioners strongly influenced behind the scenes by the views of the member Governments. Once the posts were shared out the President had no powers during the four-year life of the Commission to bring about a re- shuffie. Still less could the President bring about the resignation of a Commissioner who failed to perform properly. There was only the ultimate deterrent of the Parliament proposing the removal of the entire Commission, an outcome that finally came to pass with the Santer Commission earlier this year over the exposure of a number of examples of serious maladministration.

From the beginning there has been a real problem for the Commission over its democratic legitimacy and its accountability. There is now a new European Commission, a new European Parliament and a new President of the Commission. There should be a warm welcome for the efforts President Prodi is making within the limitations of the present treaties to improve things. Commissioners are being asked for a prior commitment to resign if

requested, to accept changes in portfolios and to face individual approval from the European Parliament.

The European Parliament is steadily gaining a stronger constitutional role within the European Union. In 1973 it was no more than a consultative

5

assembly. It turned out to be the area where the Parliamentary practices of the new member states made the biggest impact.

Until the first band of British MP's arrived in Strasbourg led by the redoubtable Sir Peter Kirk, a serious question-time hardly existed. For the Commission there was no time limit for the preparation of answers to questions. Ministers representing the Council had never heard of supplementary questions and were quite unaccustomed to the rough and tumble of a real Parliamentary question-time. They found it difficult to answer the simplest questions without making a speech full of Continental rhetoric. I recall one scene in which the Italian Foreign Minister, Signor Fanfani, collapsed almost in tears over the affront to his dignity in having to face a hostile Westminster-type cross examination. His own party supporters in Parliament felt obliged to present him with a large bouquet of flowers to console him!

The European Parliament of iggg, however, like the Commission has its own problems of legitimacy and accountability. The relationship between the European Parliament and national Parliaments is difficult and unresolved- I retain the uncomfortable feeling that the indirectly elected European Parliament of 1973 with some major political figures preserving a link between the House of Commons and Strasbourg had advantages over the present situation. The present European Parliament tends to concentrate on popular declarations and sound bytes, rather than make the most of the increased Parliamentary powers of co-decision they have been

given. The MEP's before becoming too self-righteous about the Commission,

should guard their own arrangements for salaries and expenses against the sin of self-indulgence, the occupational disease of international

institutions-induding, of course, the Commission itself!

So much for the British learning curve on arriving inside the European Community. What are the lessons of those early days for British policy today as the European Union continues its voyage to a still uncertain destination?

A simple one is that membership of the Union does not involve abandoning the defence of British interests. Other member countries fight their own corners. Mrs Thatcher fought a battle over our share of Community financing, and she won Britain's rebate-because the others recognised however reluctantly that she was right. But I recall the remark of a wise Dutch Commissioner during the first years of British membership. My dear George, ' he said, `there are now two countries in the Community who are stubborn about defending their national interests, France and Britain. But a word of advice, " he added. "France always describes opposition to her

6

position as a betrayal of Europe. Britain makes it appear as if Europe is betraying Britain. Not the best way to get results! '

A second obvious and outstanding lesson for Britain over the whole period of our relationship with the European project: it is better to be in at the beginning. My own task of establishing the Community's first Regional Development Fund provided immediate evidence of the crucial advantage of being in at the birth of any major new policy. In the search for objective criteria for helping less-privileged areas Britain's distinctive problems could be given appropriate consideration. There is no doubt that if the Regional Development Fund, like CAP or the Common Fisheries Policy had been in existence reflecting the situation in the six original members before Britain, Ireland and Denmark arrived, all three countries would have been at a disadvantage. It is a fundamental reality of the European Union that the long and painful process of getting agreements between member states on any major decision, makes it very difficult to make changes afterwards--hence the notorious `acquis communautaire' which formidably faces late entrants.

What remains depressing is our failure to learn this simple lesson over the whole saga of Economic and Monetary Union, the Exchange Rate Mechanism and now the Single Currency.

The stark fact is that if we are to continue as a leading country in the Union, British participation in the single currency is essential. Inevitably those running the Single Currency and the European Central Bank are making administrative decisions to meet the needs of those inside while Britain is outside. The longer we remain outside the more we will find, as has happened before, that we are joining something created by others to reflect their interests. Nor should we be complacent about how long our present considerable capital of goodwill and influence in the Community under the present Government would last if finally, through a referendum or otherwise, we were to decide to remain outside the Single Currency.

History never repeats itself but there are sinularities between Britain's hesitations of the early seventies and those of the late nineties, in both cases involving the resort to a referendum to resolve them. In i97o I was involved in a White Paper that tried to prophesy the economic consequences of British membership. I described it like forecasting the uncertainties of a Dundee United football match In the event there were a number of economic troubles for us in the transition to full membership and some major unforeseen economic developments such as the 1973 Arab oil crisis. But despite these difficulties the referendum produced a massive

7

majority for continued membership and twenty-five years on, the economic benefits of membership have been undeniable. Going into the Single Currency, however carefully we arrange the timing is likely to produce its own awkward economic aspects in the short term. But the long term benefits as in 1973 will be substantial, with 6o% of our trade now within the European Union and Britain with its world business language as a prime attractive area for inward investment.

There is one final lesson for Britain of an essential characteristic of the European Union throughout its history. It is the importance of what is known in the Brussels lexicon as the political will. The European Union was born as an Economic Community and today the great majority of its operations remain economic, although the foreign policy, defence and home affairs pillars of the Union outside the jurisdiction of the Commission are becoming steadily more important. But all the economic achievements of the European Union have had their foundations in political decisions of historic significance. The Coal and Steel Community combining the war- making heavy industries of Western Europe was an act of political will with the political aim of Franco-German reconciliation after two catastrophic European wars. Messina in 1935, setting up the Common Market, was an act of political will of breath-taking audacity to which Britain was unbelievably blind.

The underlying aim of the European construction from the beginning has been political not economic. Politicians in Britain have been accused of concealing this fact. I do not believe that the public declarations of those of us who took Britain into Europe in 1973 are open to that charge. Like others I must have made scores of speeches about the political role of the European Community in making inconceivable the great European wars of the past, and in enabling Europe to pull its united weight in world affairs in a way impossible for any single member nation.

I come back in conclusion to Andrew Shonfield's `Unknown Destination' in 1972. Instead of the concept of a European Federation, he suggested a series of practical measures which taken together would make the Community significantly more capable. `What we can do', he said in his final words on the eve of British entry, `is to create a mood and a set of habits which will make it feasible

... to engage in joint European action on a scale we have never approached before'. That remains pretty true today.

In a European Union of ancient nation states the concept of surrendering national identities to a Super State is an unreal fantasy. Equally unreal is the concept that Britain can make the other member states re-write the

8

Treaties and confine their main activities to a free trade area and a single market.

In my own case I was the last British politician to hold the separate post of Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, and one of the first to become a UK European Commissioner. I had special reason to be aware of the upsetting truth of Dean Acheson's remark that Britain in creating an independent Commonwealth had lost an Empire and had to seek a new role in world affairs. That role has proved itself to be as a major player in the European Union. If we take our opportunities it is now perfectly reasonable to conclude that we could within a decade be a player of central significance right across the European board.

We are fortunate that the standing of Britain amongst its European partners is high at the moment and the British economy is in good shape. The case in principle for joining the single c urency enjoys the support of a broad band of leadership of Britain, in politics, business and the trade unions. But in circumstances where the referendum is now an accepted instrument of political decision maldng, and where there is a vociferous and xenophobic section of the press, there is much to do to inform public opinion not only of the case for a Single Currency, but much wider than that to bring home the general benefits of EU membership if we are to ensure the same decisive

majority in the next European referendum as in the last one in 1975. It is a lesson we learned a quarter of a century ago. Let us not forget it-today.

9

LORD THOMSON OF MONIF=

Lord Thomson is a Liberal Democrat Peer. As George Thomson, he was elected MP for Dundee East in 1952 and, following the Labour election victory in 1964, he served in Harold Wilson's Government first as Minister

of State in the Foreign Office (1964-6), and subsequently as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (1966-7). In August 1967 he became the last Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs. Then as Minister Without Portfolio (1968-9) and, again as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (1969- 70), he was Minister with special responsibility for Europe. He was Shadow Defence Minister (1970-2), and on the United Kingdom's entry into the European Community in January 1973 he was appointed Commissioner in Brussels. Lord Thomson has since been Chairman of the European Movement in Britain, and is currently Chairman of the Leeds Castle Foundation.

I0

Volume III German Rearmament, September-December 1950

Volume IV Korea, June 1950-April 1951

SERIES III (1960-)

Volume I Britain and the Soviet Union, 1968-1972

Volume II The Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe, 1972-1975

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I-Tug 14' Britishness and British Foreign Policy

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