JOURNAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE · Commander R. M. Jones, RAN 23 The Name of the Game 35...

JOURNAL OF

THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE

VOLUME 1 AUGUST, 1975 NUMBER 1

THE COUNCIL OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE

1974-75

President: Commodore V. A. Parker, RAN

Senior Vice President: Captain J. A. Robertson, RAN

Vice President: Captain L G. Fox, RAN

Secretary: Commander W. B. Loftus, RAN

Treasurer:

Councillors:

Bennett, G.A.Berlyn, N. R. B.Bonnett, V. W. L.Brecht, A. H. T.Broben, I.W.

* Calderwood, G. C.Cole, S. E. W.Cummins, A. R.Cutts, G.Dalrymple, H. H. G.Davidson, J.Dickie, D. D.Fisher, T. R.Fox, L. G.George, J.Gibbs, B. G.

* Goddard, F. C.Grierson, K. W.Hall, I.W.

* Associate Member.

Captain I. K. Josselyn, RAN

Captain G. A. Bennett, QBE, RANCommodore J. Davidson, RANCommander B. G. Gibbs, RANCommander I.W. Hall, RANCaptain D. J. Martin, RANCaptain I. H. Nicholson, RANCaptain W. R. Sharp, RANLieutenant Commander K. C. Stephen, RANCommander D. York, RAN

FOUNDATION MEMBERS

Hermann, B. J.Misted, C.James, I. B.Jervis, G. E.Josselyn, I. K.Kemp, W. A.Knox, I. W.Lee, N.Loftus, W. B.Loosli, R. G.Martin, D. J.

* Martin, P. C. S.* Mayson, J. H.

McDonald, N. E.Macleod, B. D.Nattey, R. J.

* Nicholson, B. M.Nicholson, I. H.Orr, D. J.

Parker, V. A.Patterson, D. R.Ralph, N.Read, B. J.Reynolds, I.Robertson, J. A.Scott, B. P.Sharp, W. R.Shearing, J. A.Smyth, D, H. D.Snell, K. E.Stephen, K. C.Stevens, E. V.Stevens, J. D.Summers, A. M. F.Swan, R. C.Swan, W. N.Williams, K. A.York, D.

Public Officer: Commander D. R. Patterson, RANEM

JOURNAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE (INC.)

CONTENTS

Title Page

From the President 3The Australian Naval Institute - How it began 3Law of the Sea - Defence Implications - by Commodore K. D. Gray DFC, ADC, RAN 4Classic Signals 9Naval Manpower Management in the Next Twenty-Five Years - by Commander B. L. Spark 10

Shiphandling Corner 22

The Place of the Seaborne Aircraft Platform in Future Naval Warfare - by LieutenantCommander R. M. Jones, RAN 23

The Name of the Game 35The Size of the Game 35

CREST COMPETITION

The Council has authorised a competition for a crest suitable for adoption by the Australian NavalInstitute. The competition is open to all members. The submission should be as simple as practical bearingin mind the costs associated with reproducing intricate designs. Once adopted the crest would be used onall official stationery and the Journal and if sufficient demand was forthcoming lapel badges, tie pins, cufflinks could also be made available. The submission should be topical and linked with Australian NavalInstitute aims. All contributions will be considered by the Council. A prize of 3 years subscription will beawarded to the originator of the winning design. If no design is considered to have sufficient merit thenother avenues will be explored. Entries close on the 1 November 1975 and should be addressed to theSecretary, PO Box 18, Deakin, A.C.T. 2600.

NOTE

Members are also invited to send in comments and suggestions for improving this, your ownprofessional journal. Letters and contributions are requested for future editions of the journal.

MEMBERSHIP

The A.N.I, needs members - details inside back cover.

OUR COVER

The front cover picture is a reproduction of a painting by Dennis Hardy, by courtesy of Mr. A. E.Stephen of Surfers Paradise.

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute-Page 1

Protecting Australiais part of our business.

Philips are proud of their longassociation with the RoyalAustralian Navy. Systems fromthe worldwide group of Philipscompanies currently in serviceinclude:• SIGNAAL Weapon Control

Systems• Long Range Surveillance

Radars• Navigation Radars• Electronic Warfare• Audio Internal Communications.

And, of course, Philips play theirpart with instructional equipment,test and measuring instrumentsand medical systems.

Philips wish the AustralianNaval Institute every success inthe future.

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Page 2-Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

From the PresidentIt gives me great pleasure to write this first message to members of the Australian Naval Institute. In

the years to come many people will write for the Journal and so it is with this certainty and also the beliefthat the Institute will grow and go from strength to strength, that prompts me to say that at last, wepeople devoted to the advancement of professional knowledge with respect to maritime affairs from anAustralian stand point, have a forum dedicated to expressing such views. We should be proud to belong tothe Institute and having got off to such an auspicious start we can be quite confident about the future. Iwould like to express my appreciation of the hard work carried out by the steering Committee and othersassociated with our beginning and also to thank youfor the honour of electing me the first president.

I fl

It VI/JL~^+-. I*

THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE - HOW IT BEGAN

In October 1973, late one night, whenusually the most eloquent arguments are pro-pounded, the clearest statements made, and theNavy is put to rights V. Parker and J. Robertsoncame to the not original conclusion that what isneeded is a Naval Society. During the followingfew months the idea was discussed with variouspeople to gain some indication of support. Thusit was on 12 July 1974, 16 officers met in theConference Room of Navy Building 2, RussellOffices, Canberra to more formally discuss theproposal. At this meeting the formation of a NavalSociety, with the broad aims of encouraging andpromoting the advancement of knowledge relatedto the Navy and the maritime profession and toprovide a forum for an exchange of ideas relatedto the Naval profession, received encouragingsupport. A Steering Committee was formed con-sisting of V. Parker, J. Robertson, L.G. Fox,W.B. Loftus, A.M.F. Summers, N.E. McDonaldand K.W. Grierson. Several Meetings of theSteering Committee then followed, under theChairmanship of W.B. Loftus and drafted a con-stitution for consideration by the Registrar ofCompanies for Incorporation in the ACT. It wasdecided that the Society should be called theAustralian Naval Institute and on 2 October 1974a letter was forwarded to the Minister of Defencerequesting approval to use the word "Naval"this being a specified word for the purposes of theDefence (Prohibited Words and Letters) Regula-tions. The proposal received out of session NavalBoard support. Notwithstanding, it was not until15 January 1975 that the Minister's approvaldated 7 January 1975 was received. Meanwhilemembership was slowly increasing and reached 30by 21 January 1975.

With Ministerial approval to use the wordNaval our Honorary Solicitors were instructed on

21 January 1975 to formally seek incorporation.A most extraordinary series of events thenfollowed. At first the Registrar did not like ourobjectives. Then he thought the use of the wordNaval should be referred to the Attorney-General.When it was pointed out that the Minister ofDefence had approved this the Registrar then de-manded to see the original of the approval andnot to receive this through the Officers of theInstitute but direct from the Department of De-fence. You may draw your own conclusions fromthis stipulation. In any event the Registrar referredthe whole question of incorporation to theAttorney-General in early March 1975. In earlyApril the Attorney-General queried whether theAustralian Naval Institute was associated with theNavy League or Naval Association, which at thetime, you may recall, were issuing statements tothe press on Naval policy. The Attorney-Generalwas informed that we had no association withthese two bodies and for that matter with anyother organisation. Frustrated by these delays andin expectation of an earlier consent to our applica-tion a Special General Meeting had been set downfor 4 April 1975. This was duly held and an interimCouncil elected, an Auditor appointed and a paper"Law of the Sea-Defence Implication" wasdelivered by Commodore K.D. Gray DFC ADCRAN, an historic first. On the books on that datewere 57 foundation members.

The Attorney-General gave his consent inApril 1975. The Registrar approved the publicationof an advertisement in the Canberra Times on 24April 1975 giving notice of the intention to formthe Australian Naval Institute. The ANI wasformally incorporated on 10 June 1975 at whichtime the membership stood at 68. In all, twentymonths from conception to realisation.

Journal of The Australian Naval Institute-Page 3

Law of the Sea—Defence Implications

Address given by Commodore K.D. GRA Y DFC, ADC, RAN at the inaugural meeting of the AustralianNaval Institute on 4 April 1975.

Most of you will be aware that the secondsubstantive session of the Third UN Law of theSea Conference is being held at present in Geneva.This follows the first substantive - and inconclus-ive — session which was held in Caracas from Junethrough August last year. That session was heldafter three years of preparatory meetings, withsessions held in New York in the period March/April and in Geneva in July/August of each year.

By your presence here this evening, asmembers of the Naval Institute, you lady andgentlemen are expressing your concern for navalmatters. I wonder, however, how many of yourealize the potential which the present conferencehas for the future employment of navies. In mytalk I will try to identify these issues which haveimplications for sea power and to discuss thoseissues.

I do not intend to delve back into historyexcept to invite your attention to the First andSecond UN Conferences on Law of the Sea, heldin 1958 and 1960. Those conferences weresuccessful in codifying a number of customaryand traditional aspects of international law as theyapplied to the usage of the sea. They failed,however, to find compromise solutions on twoprincipal issues — the breadth of the territorialsea and the limits of exclusive fishing rights.

Thus in the late 1960s it was recognized thatthe 1958 Conventions were no longer suitable tothe requirements of the last part of the 20thcentury and beyond.

. Less than one third of all independentstates subscribed to those conventions

. A large number of independent stateshad no representation at the conferencewhich had codified existing law

. A large number of smaller states wereconcerned that the oceans of the worldwere becoming the preserve of the greatmaritime powers who could exploit themto their advantage ignoring the aspirationsof the developing states

. The security and the environment of thecoastal states were seen to be in jeopardy.

With these things in mind, the GeneralAssembly of the United Nations decided to con-vene a third Law of the Sea Conference. TheConference was charged with:

. The development of an equitable inter-national regime for the area of the sea-bed beyond national jurisdiction whichis declared to be "the Common Heritageof all Mankind".

. Establishing a precise definition of thearea.

. Studying and making proposals coveringa broad range of related issues including:

. the regime of the high seas

. the regime for the continental shelf

. the regime for the territorial sea(including the question of its breadthand the matter of passage throughinternational straits)

. the Contiguous zone

. fishing and conservation of the livingresources of the high sea

. the preservation of the marineenvironment and scientific research

The issues which are of particular defencesignificance are:

. the territorial sea

. the economic zone

. archipelagos

. straits

. regime of islands

. marine pollution

. scientific research

Territorial Sea

There is a little doubt that an overwhelmingmajority of countries favours a territorial sea notexceeding 12 nautical miles in breadth. However,

Page 4-Journal of The Australian Naval Institute

many hold important reservations and exceptionsrelating to this issue, namely:

. The maritime powers would accept anextension of the terrotirial sea to amaximum breadth of 12 miles only ifthere is an assured right of passagethrough and over straits (and archi-pelagos).

. The African Group is reserving its positionon the breadth of the territorial seapending acceptance or otherwise of theextensive economic zone concept, with amaximum breadth of 200 miles for thatzone.

. Some of those countries which alreadyclaim a territorial sea in excess of 12miles have constitutional problems inconceding a narrower limit.

Within the territorial sea there is generalagreement that a right of innocent passage shouldbe preserved. At the same time it is accepted thatexisting rules governing innocent passage throughthe territorial sea are capable of subjective inter-pretation and that objective rules, specifying whatconstitutes innocent passage or what constitutespassage which is not innocent, are needed. Withinthe territorial sea there is a general agreement thatcoastal states shall exercise sovereignty, includingthe right to impose their own pollution standardsand to control scientific research.

The rules governing innocent passage likelyto be developed will undoubtedly restrict thefreedom of warship movement in the territorialsea. In areas outside archipelagos and straits thisis acceptable, however, as, outside these areas,passage through the territorial sea of a foreign stateby a warship is more in the nature of a navigationalconvenience than a necessity. 1 will discuss theissue in respect of straits and archipelagos later.

Economic Zone

The concept of an economic zone receivedwide support at Caracas, but there were divergentviews on the extent of the zone and the conditionsapplicable within it. The most common breadthreferred to is 200 miles and this receives thesupport of perhaps as many as 100 states. Somestates, including Australia, wish to see the zoneextended, in respect of the sea-bed and sub-soilthereof, to the outer edge of the continentalmargin where that lies beyond 200 miles.

There is divergence whether:

. a coastal state should enjoy sovereignty,sovereign rights or jurisdiction within thezone;

. the zone should relate to all livingresources or only to living resourceswhich are not highly migratory or whichare not anadromous;

. a coastal state should impose its ownstandards of pollution control within thezone or only international standards;

. there should be freedom to conductscientific research, except as it may affectthe coastal state's right of explorationand exploitation, or whether all scientificresearch should be subject to the authori-sation of the coastal state.

There is general agreement that there shouldbe freedom of navigation and overflight within thezone although the status of the waters has not beendefined. In this regard, however, there is concernthat the right of coastal states to impose their ownpollution standards within their economic zonescould erode freedom of navigation. The concept ofan economic zone of 200 miles would have theeffect of denying access to the world's oceans,except through the economic zone of another stateor states, to more than 60 coastal state countries.Thus, if each state imposed its own standards ofpollution control, there would be a potential forthose states to be "zone-locked" and each subjectto the whims of its neighbours for access to itsown territorial sea and internal waters. The burdenof conforming to a whole series of separate regula-tions could become a significant barrier to worldtrade. The developing coastal states, on the otherhand, are concerned that unless they have thisright, together with the right to control scientificresearch within the zone, the concept will bemeaningless.

In addition to the navigational problemsthere would be a danger that unduly restrictivestandards imposed by a particular state could pro-vide potential for the dispute between neighbour-ing states or between the coastal state and statesthe maritime traffic of which passed through aparticular zone.

The USSR has made it clear that its supportof the concept is part of a package which wouldinclude unimpeded transit rights through straitsand archipelagos. The maritime powers insist that


a coastal state should have only those rightsnecessary for the exploration and exploitation ofthe resources of the zone.

In relation to the economic zone concept itwill need to be noted from a Defence aspect thatan extension of coastal state jurisdiction over abroad zone, probably 200 miles wide, could sub-stantially increase the surveillance task where thisremains a Services' responsibility. It will benecessary to ensure that a coastal state's jurisdic-tion and rights are not infringed and, if livingresources are included in the concept or if broadcoastal state jurisdiction over fisheries is includedunder separate provisions, there will be a responsi-bility placed on the coastal state to exercisemanagement over fisheries resources. This is likelyto entail surveillance to ensure that only authorisedforeign fishing fleets operate in prescribed areas,that they fish only for authorised species to aspecified level of catch, and that they fish onlywith approved gear etc. Not only will the extent ofthe area be greatly increased but offshore surveil-lance, to a range of 200 miles, will requiresurveillance platforms with different characteristics.

Straits

The question of passage rights through inter-national straits remains perhaps the dominant issueof the Conference. There are now three contend-ing views on this issue.

The first, held by a dozen or so states whichdominate strategically important straits such asGibraltar, Bab el Mandeb, Hormuz, Tiran andMalacca, is that the concept of innocent passageshould apply to the territorial sea wherever itoccurs. There would be no right of submergedpassage, except perhaps after seeking authorisationor providing notification; there would be no rightsof overflight. The only concession in respect ofstraits would be that there would be no right tosuspend innocent passage.

A second view, supported by most developingstates, other than those in the first category, andperhaps commanding a simple majority of theConference at present, accepts the need for aseparate regime of passage through straits usedfor international navigation. Under such a regimeit is envisaged that there should be assured rightsof unimpeded passage for all merchant ships butwarships would be required to seek authorisationor provide notification. Submarines would berequired to travel on the surface; there would beno rights of overflight.

The third view is expounded by the maritimepowers. This group is adamant that it will notagree to a Convention which does not provide aseparate regime of passage through the territorialsea where it occurs in straits used for internationalnavigation. They require transit rights through andover these areas for all categories of ships and air-craft, including submerged passage by submarines,without authorisation or notification. They would,however, be prepared to conform to sealanes andtraffic separation schemes. This category of statesargues persuasively that:

. the dozen or so states which dominate thestrategically important straits should notdetermine the balance of maritimepower;

. given the right to control military trafficthrough these straits the coastal statesconcerned would hold an instrument ofconsiderable political and economicpressure;

. in exercising their right to allow passageby the ships of one state and refusing itto another, a coastal state would exposeitself to the threat or use of force by thelatter;

. warships transiting a strait do not posea threat to the security of the coastalstate.

A further determinant of the final positionadopted by states in respect of passage throughstraits will be the definition adopted for "Inter-national straits". Most states would not have anyproblem with a definition which applied only tostraits leading from one part of the high seas toanother part of the high seas. Many would haveproblems with a definition which applied to straitsleading from one part of the high seas to theterritorial sea of a foreign power, but if justice isto be done to those countries — such as Israel —whose access to the high seas is through the terri-torial sea of another State or States, then provisionneeds to be made to cover this situation.

Archipelagic Concept

For over 50 years a number of learnedsocieties and academics have produced studies andgiven varying degrees of support to the archipelagicconcept, recognizing that these geographicalfeatures required a special status because of theimportance of the waters within an archipelago toits social, economic and political unity. At the


Hague in 1930 and at the 1958 and 1960 Genevaconferences the matter was raised but failed toattract much support. Following the 1960 Con-ference the Philippines and Indonesia madeunilateral claims that the waters enclosed withinstraight baselines connecting the outermost pointsof the outermost islands constituted internalwaters. Indonesia conceded, as a facility and withthe right to withdraw it at will, a right of innocentpassage through the area; the Philippines main-tained there was no such right. The internationalcommunity did not accept these unilateral claims.

In the preparatory committee of the Con-ference Indonesia and the Philippines were joinedby Fiji and Mauritius in seeking support forrecognition of the concept. They developed criteriadelimiting archipelagos, the status of archipelagicwaters and a regime of passage applicable to thosewaters. Their initial proposals attracted a gooddeal of opposition, particularly from the maritimepowers which feared that acceptance of the con-cept could lead to a situation where extensiveareas of what the international community re-garded as high seas would come under nationaljurisdiction and that commercial and militarydeployments could become severely restricted.

Observing that many of our neighbours arearchipelagic states or potential archipelagic statesAustralia made a careful analysis of the concept.You will appreciate that it is important both toour trade and to our strategic deployments thatit is important that passage through these areasshould be as free of restriction as possible. At thesame time we were anxious to satisfy the validand reasonable aspirations of our neighbours. Inparticular we were sympathetic to the specialrelationship of archipelagic waters to an arcni-pelagic state:

. that they are a medium which has apotential either for national unityor divisiveness;

. that their resources are of specialsignificance to an archipelagic people sothat the archipelagic state needs controlover the resources and the authority topreserve and protect them againstforeign exploitation and pollution;

. that an archipelagic environment isparticularly susceptible to seaborneinfiltration;

. that Indonesia especially, because of itsstrategic position, is an area of potential

major power confrontation - and thusthere could be prospect for such acountry to be unwillingly involved in aconflict situation between those powers.

In the late states of the preparatory Com-mittee's discussions Australia gave support to thearchipelagic concept. That support was subject tothe qualifications and suitable criteria, limitingarchipelagic claims to those states which aregenuinely archipelagic in character and limitingthe extent of individual archipelagic claims,should be found. In addition we insisted thatthere should be assured rights of transit, at leaston the surface, along sealanes through archipelagosfor all categories of ships. Following our lead, anumber of the maritime powers conceded thatthey could accept the concept subject to a suitableregime of passage being developed.

The archipelagic states further developedand revised their proposals in the light of thisqualified support for the concept. At Caracas,Indonesia, on behalf of its archipelagic co-sponsors, gave an assurance that it was preparedto grant a right of innocent passage throughoutarchipelagic waters for naval and merchant ships,and that it would provide transit lanes, followingnavigational routes, in which warships and shipswith special characteristics would have passagerights.

A further complication arose at Caracaswhen a number of continental states with off-lying archipelagos sought a similar status forthose archipelagos as has been developed forarchipelagic states. Many states, sympathetic toihe special case of archipelagic states, see this as aresource grab by those continental states. If thetwo categories cannot be separated there is a realrisk that the archipelagic concept could berejected.

Warship Passage

In the debate related to passage - in theterritorial sea, in the economic zone, in straits andarchipelagos - there is a clear trend towards re-stricting the rights of warships. Most developingstates recognize that freedom to trade is essentialto their own development and that unnecessaryrestrictions on merchant ship movements wouldbe to their disadvantage. They see, however, free-dom of warship movement as a threat to theirnational security and to world peace. If there wereno other pressures it is likely that there would besufficient support in the Conference to severely


restrict warship movement. On the other handmany States are convinced that the major powerswill not sign a Convention which unduly restrictsthis movement. In the end much will depend onthe credibility of the major powers and the extentto which developing states consider that a Con-vention to which the major powers did notsubscribe would have any value.

Regime of Islands

The question of the ocean space generatedby islands has become a major issue as a conse-quence of the likely recognition of a broaderterritorial sea and the likely acceptance of theeconomic zone concept. Some states are seekingto establish criteria that would limit the oceanspace (i.e., the territorial sea and economic zone)generated by islands according to their size,population, contiguity to the principal territory,location relative to the continental shelf ofanother country, and their geomorphologicalstructure and configuration. Others are concernedto ensure that all islands retain full value. Ifsome limitation is not imposed a number ofminute islets or rocks - some of them of dis-puted sovereignty - could attract considerableeconomic importance. This importance couldlead to sovereignty disputes.

Summary

In summary there is little doubt that thetraditional freedom of the high seas, at least forwarships, will be eroded. The extent of the highseas themselves will be reduced.

At best warship movements will not berestricted unduly. In the territorial sea, outsidestraits and archipelagos, they may be obliged toconform to certain restrictive rules or to remainoutside the territorial sea. Through straits andarchipelagos warship movement is likely to berestricted to sealanes; in the case of archipelagos,unless these sealanes are extremely broad, therecould be a threat to the security of deploymentsfrom, particularly, submarines which took upoffensive waiting positions. On the other hand, intimes of tension, it is dubious whether transitingforces would conform to the sealanes. Theeconomic zone concept should pose no barrier towarship movements.

In the worst case warships movements couldbe severely curtailed. They could be debarredfrom the territorial sea completely, wherever itoccurs, except with the express approval of thecoastal State concerned. They could be obliged

to provide notification of passage and perhapshave to seek authorisation for passage of sealanesthrough archipelagos. They could be debarredfrom the economic zone of foreign states. Theimplications of the worst case situation would beto restrict, effectively, warship movement to theirown areas of maritime space.

The Convention which I see as beingacceptable to the necessary majority, includingthe major powers, would contain the followingelements relevant to Defence interests:

. a territorial sea of 12 miles maximumwidth in which a coastal state would havesovereignty, but through which it would berequired to provide a right of innocentpassage and with what constitutes innocentpassage being spelt out.

. an economic zone of 200 miles width inwhich a coastal state would have sovereignrights over the resources of the zone andthe powers necessary to ensure that it couldexplore and exploit those resources. Theinternational community would enjoy theright to navigate and overfly the zoneprovided its activities did not interfere withthe exploration and exploitation by thecoastal state. The resolution of competingrights will be the most difficult issue to beresolved before the Conference. The extentto which a coastal state may controlpollution within the zone will be the mostdifficult right to resolve.

. acceptance of the archipelagic conceptapplicable only to archipelagic states, underwhich such states could draw straight base-lines joining the outermost points of theoutermost islands. Waters within would bearchipelagic waters, the territorial sea andthe economic zone would extend outwardsfrom these baselines. There would be a rightof innocent passage, applicable to all ships,throughout archipelagic waters. In additionthere would be wide transit lanes, followingmain traditional navigation routes, throughwhich warships and ships with specialcharacteristics could take passage, includingsubmerged passage, without notification orauthorisation.

. a special regime of passage through straitsused for international navigation and whichlead from one part of the high seas - underwhich all categories of ships and aircraft


would have a right of passage without notifi-cation or authorisation. Passage may berestricted to sealanes and obliged to conformto traffic separation schemes, includingvertical separation schemes for aircraft andsubmarines; restrictions are likely to beplaced on the activities in which a warship oraircraft may engage while exercising transitpassage.

In conclusion I wish to recount my tworecurring nightmares.

In the first the Conference breaks down. Avery large number of States, perhaps in excess of100, takes unilateral action to declare vast areasof ocean space to be national territorial seasthrough which passage may be taken only with theconsent of the coastal State. The terms of passagecould include the imposition of tolls, impossiblestandards of ship construction, manning andequipment. Warship passage could be debarred.The potential for dispute is too horrific tocontemplate.

In the second, not so violent, the Conferenceagrees to a Convention which is not acceptable tothe super-powers and some other maritime andfishing states. This is a disturbing prospect as thereare many countries which believe that it is notpossible to accommodate this group of States withina Convention. The prospects for dispute potentialwould still be considerable.

The Author

Commodore Kenneth Douglas Gray DFC, ADC,RAN was born in 1921 in Melbourne and educated atDandenong High School. He was a member of the RAAFbetween 1941-46 and saw service in Southern Rhodesia,Europe and Northern Australia. He was awarded the DFCin 1943. Commodore Gray joined the RAN in 1948 andwas promoted Commander 1957, Captain June 1966 andCommodore in January 1975. He attended the RN StaffCourse in 1960. Appointments held since then includeNaval Member Joint Planning Staff 1963-64; NavalOfficer Commanding North Australia 1965-66; Directorof Plans, Navy Office 1967-68; Australian Naval Rep-resentative UK 1969-71 and Leader Joint Policy Staff1972-74. He was the Defence representative on theAustralian Law of the Sea Delegation at internationalConferences in New York, Geneva and Caracas during1973 and 1974. Commodore Gray is currently serving inthe Department of Defence.

CLASSIC SIGNALS

Readers are invited to forward details of myclassic signal with which they have been involved,or which has come to their notice:-

the famous or infamous quote, theperfect squelch or the silly corruptionand its consequences.

Please keep contributions brief (and anony-mous if you wish), - but, hopefully, humourous,if not otherwise inspiring!

"The Admiral's Dinner Party"

"A decade or so ago the RAN Flagship wasabout to visit a S.E. Asian port after some weeksat sea and final details of the visit were arrangedby signal.

One item on the Admiral's programme was adinner for 12 local dignitaries in the "cuddy" onthe first evening of the visit. However the text ofthe message on this matter suffered a corruption intransit and the authorities ashore set about inviting120 guests, which did not seem unreasonable insuch a populous country.

The flagship duly arrived in harbour andeverything proceeded according to plan. However,as the day wore on the Admiral's secretary becameincreasingly puzzled and perplexed as he receivedscores of acceptances to the dinner party. Thefinal count, shortly before the event was due tobegin, amounted to over 100 guests.

While the Admiral was considered capable ofproducing a loaves and fishes miracle and theretinue and ships staff were ready and willing tocope with the crisis, the main problem was seatingand hosting so many VIP's. The solution really wassimple — the large overflow of additional guestswas shown to the Wardroom and all availableofficers onboard participated as hosts. It turnedout to be a very successful function — but the FlagLieutenant and the communicators were notallowed to forget the incident for some time, eventhough the error in transmission was traced to ashore radio station which relayed the originalmessage.

NOTE—In future it is hoped to introduce a column on Technical Topics for the "Plumbers" and"Weaponeers." Views and copy are required for this column. Please send in your contribution.


Naval Manpower Management in the Next 25 YearsThis paper by Commander B. L. Spark won first prize in the Officer Section of the 1973 Peter

Mitchell Trust Essay Competition and is reproduced here by permission of the Naval Board. The viewsexpressed by the author are his own and not necessarily those of the Australian Government, theDepartment of Defence, the Naval Board or the Australian Naval Institute.

"Naval Manpower Management" is a coldlabel for a subject which is anything but cold. As aphrase it leads the mind straight to considerationof organisational matters such as pay, conditionsof service, promotion prospects, living standardsand technical qualifications. Whilst these are im-portant factors which will be discussed, they formno more than the framework within whichmanagement is exercised. A sound framework isnecessary in order to enable managers and managedto go about their business, but inspiration inleadership will continue to be vital for the main-tenance of a complex society, the Navy, for thenext quarter of a century. For this reason it ishoped that the following examination of the sub-ject will be recognised always to be seeking a navyin which genuine affection, understanding andpride are fostered, and in which the authority andexperience of managers are developed andsupported for the benefit of those who aremanaged.

The Navy has just been referred to as acomplex society. Resentment has been known tobe aroused in sections of the community by anysuggestion that the Navy is "different". There isa strong desire to equate the Navy to civilian lifeand to seek to apply civilian criteria to the service-man's conditions. This is a mistake. Unless anygrouping of men under particular circumstancesis managed appropriately for those circumstances,they will be managed badly, and this applies asmuch to the Navy as it does to similarly identifi-able groupings such as office workers, airlinepilots, and clergymen. The services are differentonly in that they are uniquely self-containedsocieties with comprehensive levels of manage-ment, and in their respective environments, selfsupporting balanced mixtures of trades and pro-fessions working to a single common purpose.

Twenty-five years is a long time. Technicalprogress in the last quarter century has beenimmense, and the possibilities before the end ofthe century are infinite. But the nature ofhumanity changes much more slowly, and man isnot very responsive to dramatic or drastic changesin the manner in which his affairs are conducted.

Thus, although change in naval personnel manage-ment is consistently necessary and inevitable, itis essential to recognise that the search for suchimprovement has already been continuous andproductive throughout naval history.

Future change should properly be a continu-ing development from the past, seeking to forecastand avoid change for the worse, and to ensure thatevolutionary change is for the better. A navy issingularly defenceless against managerial experi-ments imposed by authority and can express itselfonly by reaction after the event. It is a mostunsuitable, but attractive, playground fortheoreticians. Sudden improvement has sometimesbeen apparently achieved, but examination alwaysshows that this has been not so much a matter ofimprovement as dramatic rectification after aperiod when natural progress has been unfairlyretarded.

Satisfactory achievement of a sound and fairframework will produce a placid, contented servicein peace, without undue recruiting problems andwithout troublesome publicity. It may also betotally uninspired and unwilling to fight for fleetreadiness at unpopular cost. But there is no pur-pose in any armed service unless it is prepared forwar, and it is the fostering of the abstracts, andtheir achievement, which is the true business ofleadership, in order to assure the spirit within theframework..The longer peace continues the moreattention needs to be paid to the spirit by thosewithin the Navy since the nation as a whole willcare less and less whether it exists at all.

The custodians of the management of navalpersonnel are the professional heads of the service.In the past the majority of improvements to boththe framework and the spirit of management hascome from humane and intelligent application ofthe experience gained by those who have held con-current responsibility for ships and men. In thelast two decades, in almost all countries of thewestern alliance, it has been political policy todivest service commanders of autonomy and thefree exercise of authority. Argument against thispolicy may not now be appropriate, but disciplinedServices do not benefit from lack of authority in

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their leaders, particularly since this spreads down-wards. Whilst this factor may not yet be ofdramatic importance, it is hard to avoid the con-clusion that it will become so within the nextquarter century if present trends continue. Againthe naval society is not unique. In many otherorganisations too much weight is today placed onthe dictates of outside academics or specialists whodo not themselves carry any burden of continuingdedicated responsibility; but disciplined forcesare particularly sensitive to the effects of partiallyunderstanding imposition against which they havelittle power of opposition. This matter is of suf-ficient significance to place it before any considera-tion of the present day state of either the frame-work or the spirit because although the Navy isdirected by a government, it can be managed onlyby professional authority.

The framework of conditions as they standat present is, in the main, sound. There can belittle doubt that many of the inequities prevailinguntil the 1950's have been removed in recentyears.

Pay, in particular, is no longer a source ofdiscontent. This could be a dangerous statementif it were to lead to complacency and to erosionby neglect of benefits gained. But in addition tothe accepted fairness of present pay rates therecan be some confidence that equity will be main-tained; not least, because the means has beenprovided for expression of dissatisfaction by votingwith the feet. Until relatively recently, pay wasamongst the most explosive of issues, primarilybecause the human components of the explosivewere confined by long engagements and theDiscipline Acts. But if pay is no longer a source ofdiscontent it should not be relied upon as anincentive which removes the need for goodmanagement. It has become a neutral factor. Paycan be regarded as a sound part of the framework,but it does little for the spirit. Morale, which canin part be described as producing manpoweramenable and amiably disposed to being managed,can be heightened by the expectation of increasedpay, but once any increase has been achieved thiseffect on morale is very rapidly neutralised by itsbeing taken for granted.

Conditions of service form the remainder ofthe framework, and these conditions must alwaysbe related to standards enjoyed by the populationas a whole. If matters such as organisation, leave,discipline, habitability and length of engagementare viewed in historical terms there has been astartling improvement in the recent past. But ifthe equation is between the man in the Navy and an

equivalent civilian, in differing historical periods,the improvement although positive is by no meansas great. The sailor who was hanged for strikingan officer must be compared with the countrymanhanged for stealing a sheep a hunder or so yearsago, and the amount the sailor is fined today foroverstaying his leave must be compared with to-day's financial penalties on the man who is late atthe factory. Management must be in an awarenessof the relativity of the sailor with his counterpart,and the actual improvement in sailors' conditionswith time is largely irrelevant. The purpose ofimprovement in conditions is to make it easier andmore agreeable for the managed to do their jobs,and not with any expectation or hope that theimprovement will be appreciated. Gratitude fromone individual to another can sometimes affectmorale and ease of management provided it is nottaken for granted; abstract gratitude from themanaged to the system is not a characteristic ofpeople whether naval or civilian since generalbenefits are very rapidly assumed to have beenno more than due.

An aspect of the framework of conditions ofservice which will occupy a dominant position intothe foreseeable future is that of separation. Thisis generally thought of as applying to the marriedman but in its fullest sense it has increasingmeaning to the single man separated from his girl-friend or even his friends and possessions. It is aproblem which will become greater with time, notas a result of increased separation, but becausesociety as a whole is becoming more self-indulgentand unwilling to accept any form of self-denial.

There is no true solution for separationexcept the ludicrous one of keeping warships withinapron string range of home. But it is a problemwhich can be effectively minimised by imaginativeand practical management and by recognising thatit is sufficiently significant to justify a degree ofenlightened expenditure.

In terms of man management one major factis frequently not appreciated; this is that with afew noisy and intemperate exceptions the majorityof naval people and their wives accept periods ofseparation as logical and inevitable. What theywill not lightly forget or forgive is the apparentlyminor ancillary irritations which are caused bypoor management and financial pettiness. Exam-ples in illustration are not hard to find. The manwho is duty watch the first night in his home portafter prolonged absence, the technician wholabours to rectify equipment prior to going to seaduring a brief weekend between absences; the


separation caused by tailoring ships' movements toindulge the rights of the less disciplined groups bypandering to industrial conditions and disputes.These examples involve minor periods, a nighthere and there, but they produce cumulative dis-satisfaction which is infinitely more unsettlingthan longer planned absences.

Any attempt to deal with separation as aproblem to be treated by generalised concessionsand conditions of service alone is doomed fromthe outset. The effect of separation is verypersonal and once general management has pro-vided for fair, service-wide regulations, it mustbe recognised that officers directly responsible formen have not only a duty to assess the problemsof the individual but also must be delegated thepower to take unfettered action when they judgeit necessary. Too many of us have lost highlytrained and genuinely willing men because "I'vebeen messed about too much", "my wife loathesthe Navy although I don't", or "once is enough andit is unreasonable to expect me to accept anotherdeployment already".

There could be no greater error of manage-ment than to consider that because all concessionswhich were judged expedient and practicable hadbeen granted, it was unreasonable for moralerelated to separation to be anything other thanhigh. This attitude would disregard one of thefundamentals of man management - that the ulti-mate effective judges of managers are the managed,not the managers.

Possibly one of the clearest and mostintractable separation cases is that of a ship de-ployed for the express purpose of being alongsidein a remote port for a considerable time. Theexample of a DDG sent for overhaul to the USA isworth detailed examination. Within its ship'scompany there will be married men who mindseparation and those who do not, single men wholook forward to going and those who would rathernot be separated from home for such a long periodwithout the changes of scene normal to a seadeployment. Once it is accepted that separationis something affecting the individual and not themass it is clear that there is no single generalisedconcession which will meet the requirement ofsound management.

The most obvious concession is an entitle-ment to family passages and allowances. But therewill be many in the ship whose wives cannot takeadvantage of the concession, either because theyare not the travelling kind or because the childrenare the wrong age. In these circumstances the


effect of a beneficial general concession on aparticular individual may be positively bad for tworeasons; his separation will be aggravated by theknowledge that others have seized the chance, orfamily tension may be caused by his wife's reluct-ance to move. The alternatives might be to concedea mid-deployment leave at home or to allow afamily visit for a leave period at mid-deployment.

Much depends on the importance which isplaced upon maintenance of the spirit of navalmanpower. From a minimum of no provision ataiyimited improvement is achieved by making asingle concession on a take it or leave it basis; butif man management is a primary considerationeach man should be given the option of individ-ually choosing one of the three alternatives in thepreceding paragraph. Implementation of the latterwould not be insuperably difficult, and the cost,although significant, would equate to the overhaulof a single major equipment.

Separation has been singled out for dis-cussion because it is the aspect of managementwhich will in future make the greatest demands inrelation to the privileges of the population as awhole. It is also symptomatic of the stage of navalpersonnel management today. We have progressedfrom an earlier disregard of men's needs and nowhave considerate general conditions of service. Weface the task of considering the individual and thiswill in the future demand enlightened general policyand greater trust and delegation to those placedin immediate responsibility, since the latter arethe only people who can know the individual man.

The only other aspect of the frameworkselected for brief discussion is habitability, as hereby seeking the impossible we are in danger ofbeing counter-productive.

Living conditions at sea are likely to lagbehind the material comforts to be found ashoreno matter what resources are applied. The ratiosof space available to space required for equip-ments do not significantly improve, and shipsmust inevitably continue to be starkly functionaland move uncomfortably. The present attemptsto overcome the disadvantages of living at sea byformica and fittings, with a few more inches ofliving space laboriously achieved per man, arescratching the surface of the problem. They areworthwhile in that they demonstrate that all thatcan be done is being done but in the end themanaged are interested in achievement not attempt.It is perhaps significant that the DDG's haveaccommodation which is well below average, anddrab, but they are manifestly effective and well

armed warships, and they attract above averagepride.

It is therefore suggested that serious thoughtbe given to calling a halt to the process of improv-ing habitability at the expense of armament,particularly because we are no longer planning forwars and absences of years' duration. In thesecircumstances it would be as well to devote theresources thus freed to practical compensation forthe difficulties of life in ships at times when menare not so employed, and to acknowledge thatduring service at sea all is subordinated to fightingeffectiveness. Amongst intelligent men such acourse can be expected to raise rather than lowermorale provided that the objective of fightingeffectiveness is genuinely pursued and the compen-sation during shore service is whole heartedlypractical.

Although the matters so far discussed con-cern the framework rather than the spirit ofmanagement there is one subject which straddlesthem both. This is discipline, which is still toofrequently considered only in terms of regulation,crime and punishment.

In the earliest days of ships, discipline con-sisted of the imposition of obedience by force,with any lack of personal strength and dominationresulting in its breakdown. Progressively over thecenturies, in tune with the establishment oforderly society ashore, the absolute authority of aship's captain was first supplemented by abstractauthority and then, overshadowed by it. Captainsceased to be the ultimate authority, but representedand interpreted the authority which could berecognised as resting with the Crown or Govern-ment. As a result we have a present day uniformityof standards which is highly desirable, and thosestandards are derived by consensus rather thanindividual whim.

In recent years the separate military codehas given place to civil law. Theoretically this isalso desirable but it has practical drawbacks, andproblems may well occur in the future if civil lawreflects an increasing freedom from constraint inthe community at large, which is not faced withthe naval demands of interdependence, obedienceand mutual trust in a confined environment.

Be that as it may, the application of theapproved code of justice rests in the hands of navalofficers except in the trial of the most seriousoffences, and even there the preparation of thecase on which the trial is based rests in their hands.Over recent years there has been a progressiveimplementation of increased common safeguards

under the law for sailors as for civilians, and thesesafeguards rely heavily on legal procedures andwording.

From a naval point of view it is to be hopedthat this development will not be carried too farand that we will be allowed sufficient latitude asnon-lawyers to concentrate on the intent ratherthan the form.

In many ways naval justice has, in the past,been more alive and progressive than that of civilianlife because it has recognised that both the dis-ciplined and those in authority are known to eachother outside the "court" and are players in thesame game. There is some danger that efforts toachieve common procedures will result in hesitancyand preoccupation with those procedures to thedetriment of accurate justice from those in im-mediate authority. In a situation where captainsare not lawyers it is probably better if they have acertain latitude to establish the truth.

Whilst this may be desirable there is littlechance that the administration of naval justice willbe simplified; if anything the equation with a courtof law will become closer. This being the case it issuggested that better grounding in law is requiredthan is currently given as a formal part of training,not in the interest of accurate justice alone butalso to ensure confidence in those administering it.Only with such confidence can there be mentalfreedom to enquire, assess and decide. Since disci-pline is more than crime, judgement and punish-ment, it is vitally important that those in authorityshould in so far as that particular aspect is con-cerned be known to be fair, dispassionate, un-hesitating and deeply concerned with the truth.The difference between a ship and a civilian com-munity is that in the former not only the badelements but also the good have a pretty fair ideaof the rights and wrongs of a case before it comesto trial. As a result discipline as a whole is affectedbecause the administration of justice in a smallcommunity is the subject of continuous assess-ment by a ship's company which is in itself botha highly sensitive jury and judge, which expressesits verdict in the form of morale.

In terms of crime and punishment we should,in looking ahead, ensure that at least as much atten-tion is paid to morale as to the form of law; indoing so we would be reinforcing a most importantthread from proven good management in thepast. This involves instilling an early sense of theimportance of humanity in justice and thenensuring oversight and guidance in practice untilsufficient experience has been gained for authority


to be exercised in situations where expert assist-ance cannot be assured. Lastly, whilst safeguard-ing the individual by expert scrutiny of results byshore staff, those given the responsibility foradministering justice must be supported, and wherethis ceases to be possible they must be replacedregardless of their other abilities. Above all, fearof criticism over procedures must not be allowedto dominate the efforts of Officers of the Day,First Lieutenants and Commanding Officers.

Although crime and punishment form nomore than a part of discipline they have beenallowed space because they are of major signifi-cance to the managed who have no say in determina-tion of the code within which they live.

Concerning discipline as a whole, which isthe vital ingredient of all man management: in itshighest form, self-discipline, an individual under-stands his objectives and subordinates his ownwishes, interests and well being to achievement bydedication of those objectives. It would seem aproper ultimate aim for any armed service toachieve self-disciplined personnel and success wouldremove the need for other forms of discipline.Although in the long term we should be able toachieve this, we can not afford to assume that wewill necessarily do so. But with this as an aim adesirable trend, not only in disciplinary terms butalso in human terms, becomes more likely.

Unfortunately it is not possible to instil self-discipline by telling a man he should have it;neither would it be wise to assume at present thatall or even a majority of any group of sailors arewilling to see the necessity for it. Even more un-fortunately, there are signs that officers are be-coming less inclined to subordinate their ownprivate lives to the demands of their profession,and without dedication at the officer level it isunrealistic to expect it elsewhere.

Discipline can be imposed, but if so it isfragile. It is stronger if it is a natural cohesion in agrouping of people who are working to a sensiblecommon purpose; in this event it will be enduringand indiscipline becomes offensive to the whole,not just the system. Provided leadership — ormanagement — is dedicated the prospect for sounddiscipline is better than it has ever been. From abase of higher education and intelligence men in-creasingly wish to work sensibly and to effectivepurpose. But we can throw it all away if manage-ment does not apply a genuine affection andconcern, or if the importance of a proper militarypurpose is not given pre-eminence amidst thewelter of other considerations afflicting high leveldecision.


No matter how improvements to the frame-work are initiated they are given effect by thosewith the power of the purse and parliamentaryauthority, and not by those with responsibility forthe management of naval manpower. The spiritwithin the framework is, however, with one majorexception, directly the latter's responsibility. Theexception is the pride inspired by the nation anavy serves.

As mentioned earlier, the longer a nation isat peace the less the esteem in which the servicesare held by the population as a whole. Furthermore,even a navy at war can be neglected unless thenation itself is threatened. Vietnam has beensymptomatic of limited wars since the fifties whichhave provided vivid examples of nations first com-mitting their servants and then displaying noconsequential obligation to sustain them, choosingrather to discuss with ostentatious detachmentwhether they are wrong to be there in the firstplace. This is not irrelevant to management, whichdepends on the willingness of the managed, and afighting service needs constantly to be sustained bythe conviction that it has been committed for aproper purpose. The long term effect on the RN ofnational detachment during Suez has not beenwidely recognised, the effect of Vietnam on theUSN is more evident, and the effect of Vietnamon the RAN, although not immediately evident,can be seen to be there on reflection. The averageage of a navy is low and enthusiasm, althoughtoday regarded as ingenuous, is healthier than theuninvolved idealism which appears consistentlyto attempt to destroy it.

It is of course stated that "the Navy willnever again be directed to take part in remoteconflict of that sort." But just as the road to hellis reputed to be paved with good intentions,political history is littered with repetitions ofevents which were never going to happen again.Furthermore, the statement is irrelevant in man-power terms. A nation provides itself with a navyof a certain quality, and it is then entitled toreceive service to the maximum of that navy'spotential whenever and in whatever form it is de-manded. Man management within the service hasthe purpose of preparing to respond to anydemand and is only concerned with the adequacyof political forecasting to the extent that it hopesthe eventual demand will not have been renderedimpossible to achieve.

Naval personnel are under conflictingpressures. In the first place the people in the Navyare ordinary in their fears; there is less casualadvocacy of a resort to force in the Navy during

times of international tension than there is in thepress and the general population. In peace thesailor is in a demanding profession which isapparently destructive in purpose, which is costly,and which is therefore fair game for criticism. Thecomplexity of ships and weapons demands at leastaverage, and desirably above the average, intelli-gence. Thus, oversimplifying, skilled and able menare employed in a career which is clearly notproductive, and which is as peace lengthens, in-creasingly unsympathetically viewed by the nationas a whole.

In these circumstances inspiration in, andconstant attention to, personnel management isincreasingly of importance to those who mustexercise it within the Navy.

There is no simple division betweenmanagers and managed. It is certainly not the "we"and "they" of officers and sailors. To attempt adefinition, a manager is someone who has respon-sibility for the affairs of people, and the managedare those who must be responsive to the directionof others in order to achieve successfully an endresult. In these terms a Leading Seaman can be amanager, and a senior Captain in another contextamongst the managed. This is of course true inmany large organisations, but needs stressing inrelation to the Navy where the formal andvisible distinguishing of rank requires heightenedvigilance to avoid "we" and "they" identification.There is also a need to highlight the mutual inter-dependence of all the levels of naval management,which can be lost sight of in peacetime; unlike acommercial organisation which always operatesunder a degree of tension, the weakness of a linkin the naval chain can become absolutely evidentonly when the chain is needed.

Men cannot work without consistent clearobjectives; there is little point in superb manage-ment in a vacuum. Those with power and authoritywithin the Navy have themselves a primary aim ofensuring that their subordinates are given a clearoverall purpose, and they will have failed if theyoffer the excuse that a rapidly changing politicalscene or financial climate makes it impossible todo so since their subordinates must then inevitablybecome confused and apathetic.

The following is offered as an aim of navalmanpower management which is achievable withoutreference to material considerations, and is there-fore capable of being maintained continuously.

The objective for which the navy exists inpeace is to become a cohesive, well prepared, and

effective force which can be trusted absolutely toattempt any tasks set in peace or war, and tocomplete those tasks successfully if it is humanlypossible.

If it is accorded more than lip service this isnot a small or easy objective, and to be capable offulfilment it must be consistently, honestly andunambiguously pursued. But it is not an unattrac-tive objective for a professional service, and tobe pursued successfully it must seek to ensure thatmen are kept content, confident and eager.

The two potential causes of failure could bethat it is not consistently maintained as an objectivewithin the Navy, or that it is not clearly recognisedand supported by those we seek to serve. Sadlythere is evidence that both these failings exist. Itwould, however, be wrong to lay the blameentirely on those who, in mortal terror of jingoism,denigrate or neglect the services. They may havethe choice whether to retain or disband the Navybut for so long as they do not choose the latterthose within the Navy must have no option but tomaintain the objective, since failure to do so mustreduce management to pointless organisationalmanipulation.

We are nowhere near a Utopia in which navalmanpower is consistent and predictable so thatfor any particular numerical mix of officers andsailors a finite output can be guaranteed. Trainingensures a minimum individual standard, but nomore. A ship's company still needs to be knittedtogether to utilise individual strengths and weak-nesses by a conscious and dedicated effort oforganisation and coaxing, or driving if necessary,on an individual basis. But just as the more juniorare individual so are those who lead. Again, wecome back to objectives, and the need to avoidlack of freedom by dictating methods rather thanspecifying results. Ships have to be responsive tocaptains; it is pointless to expect the same routeto success from an extrovert as from in introvert,or to expect a senior Captain to develop his ship'scapability in the same fashion as a juniorCommander. Yet each can achieve the desiredresult.

But considering man management as a matterof long term intention there is a fundamentaldemand when end results are being judged. Thisis that the men involved should be content toundertake the whole endeavour again. Failure topay sufficient regard to this is a particularly mod-ern evil, which arises from infrequent and tooshort an exercise of authority. A ship is not avehicle to be stepped into and driven, then relin-

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quished. It is an integrated mixture of people whoshould be improved not just used, and it is notpossible for this to happen unless those in author-ity are there for sufficient time.

Ambition is one of the strongest personalmotives and it is in the interest of the Navy thatproper personal ambition should be satisfied. Tosatisfy ambition the structure must be flexible,and one harsh fact has to be faced. Neithersailors nor officers can achieve their personal goalswithout the assistance of those above them. Thecivilian can answer an advertisement for a betterjob; he can also exert pressure on his employer.Neither alternative is open to the serviceman, andit is not suggested that it should be. However, thisplaces on those who do have the ability to satisfyambition a responsibility to recognise personalambition, to judge potential, to instruct, to guideand recommend. This will be as true in the nextdecade as in the last, all that will be changed is theapparent starting point of the man - not his indi-vidual needs. In this respect, as in many more,what is indicated is not a change in man manage-ment but a continuing reinforcement and restate-ment of known truths which will otherwise belost because it is less demanding to devote effortto technical competence.

This is not intended to denigrate technicalcompetence. Without it men today become in-capable of performing their duties. It is a matterof emphasis. Men will not be content unless theyknow their trade, and for this reason we havedevoted much effort to shore training. The bal-ance should now be tilted back so that more effortis devoted to putting that trade into practicebecause only in this circumstance is specific tech-nical work integrated with that of other sectionsof the naval community.

Ships' companies thrive on sensible work,and above all on operational work. A ship whichis basically of sound morale is rarely more con-tented than when it is performing well in a com-plex exercise and its capabilities are fullyextended. But it cannot exist in this conditionindefinitely, and it is in the periods betweenexertion that cracks in morale open; it is not thatwe are work-lovers but rather that when pressurescome off there is time and opportunity to explorethe weaknesses in the structure.

Thus it is at low-key times when goodmanagement of people is most important, and itis unfortunately at these times that the manageris inhibited. Acknowledgement of the evidentdisadvantages of seagoing is not wholeheartedly


practical. There are reasons why this is so; firstly,there is a tendency to imagine that if a ship is inharbour anywhere its manpower has reason to becontent - although individually, or as a whole,the ship's company may be many miles from .home or irritated by a place or event; secondly,there is the reluctance to give excuse for enviouscriticism by other sections of the community byany apparently elitist treatment of servicemen, andthis produces unnecessarily unimaginative regula-tions; finally, whilst Commanding Officers havecomplete and unchallenged authority at sea wheredecisions are major, they become subject to trivialoversight in harbour where they are not.

It would be an enlightened development inthe years ahead to 2000 if we could regain thethread of past management and restore the powerand freedom of captains of ships, which havebeen eroded as communications have improvedand as the focus of naval activity has shiftedfrom the sea to concrete buildings. This woulddemand a shift by higher management to judgingsubordinates on whether they succeed in thetasks set for them rather than how they are per-forming as individuals in their present capacity.In many ways such a method is harsher since itcontains less opportunity for excusing failure, butthe objective of leadership at all levels is tostimulate rather than featherbed. It would alsofocus the attention of higher authority on man-power by heightening the importance of trainingand selection for command and, by extension, forall other tasks involving responsibility for men.

To adopt such a policy would requiregreater freedom for captains in the handling oftheir ships' companies. If the correct objectivesare set for ships within the main objective, andthese are fully achieved, the nation will have re-ceived full value for its investment. The ruleswhich bind a captain should be those which pre-vent abuse of the rights of those who serve him,and these already largely exist. But irritant rulessuch as those designed to ensure that men do notexceed an arbitrary entitlement to leave or privi-lege should be removed where possible. Therewould be minor risks in such a course, not leastbecause captains may be initially inexperienced.

It is not by chance that the preceedingparagraphs have focussed on captains of ships.They are the kernel of our profession. In a searchfor the means of improving captains' managementthe levels above and below are inevitably affected.The levels above must concern themselves withcareful selection, and subsequently exercise con-stant vigilance in their judgement of the conduct of

ships for which they are responsible. The levelsbelow must have assurance not only of theircaptain's personal capability but also of hisauthority. Leadership in war is intensely personal,and it is developed in peace. Where a captain isfaced with a just request he should be able to grantit, and when faced with a need for decision hemust be free to make it. If he is constantly boundto refer to higher authority for approval he losesauthority, and furthermore the managed becomefrustrated since their affairs are decided by face-less men to whom they have no access. I do notsuggest that the current situation is bad, but thetrend is bad and needs reversal.

Men join the Navy because they wish to, andoverall the human desire is to achieve tasks set, tobe recognised and to be understood. Frustrationcan come from the last two aspects and removeincentive for the first, and anticipation and re-moval of potential causes of frustration in itselfconstitutes good management.

The ultimate responsibility for man manage-ment rests with the captain of a ship, but the onlyway he can meet that responsibility is through hisofficers. The officers are both managers andmanaged and provide the key to the future,whether for better or worse. They also provide oneof the greatest areas of doubt. Here it is necessaryto look at officers as a whole, and to leave theimmediate context of ships.

It is a characteristic of modern navies thatships and weapons are so costly that their num-bers diminish, although (since oceans have notreduced in size) the process must shortly bearrested if we are to avoid reduction to the pointof absurdity.

As ships reduce in number so the planningof their activities to obtain maximum benefitbecomes more critical and needs more officers.The additional argument is also sometimes advan-ced that more shore training is required, but thisparticular thesis lacks conviction. Nevertheless,everything combines to ensure that, as the yearsgo by, the rank at which officers expect to spendthe majority of their time at sea diminishes.

In considering the management of men theeffect of this is bad. One of the strengths of thegood officer has always been his perception of themorale and needs of his subordinates. This strengthis not because of any magic in training or unusualquality of recruit, but because the circumstancesof living in ships enforce a continuous contactwith those both above and below. The officer at

sea unless he is totally insensitive has a constantawareness of people as individuals. He cannotwithdraw totally into a detached private life, di-vorced from the ship, at any time. This character-istic is virtually unique even within the services,and it is shared only with the soldier actually inthe field. If an officer spends a sufficient propor-tion of working life in ships he can carry the con-fidence, humanity and understanding he hasgained through his later shore years, but that pro-portion must be significant, and seagoing mustnot stop too soon.

There are two forms of confidence. One is apersonal confidence in professional or technicalability. The second is a confidence in ability tolead, a confidence which would be foolish withoutsufficient of the experience on which soundjudgement is based. The two are complementary,but both are necessary in ships, and an officer whorelies exclusively on the former is unlikely togovern men well. But unless officers are employedat sea with sufficient frequency and continuitythey are forced into this position — particularlysince the same limitations on experience do notnow and seem unlikely in the future to apply tosenior and junior sailors within their shorterperiod of service.

The officer filling a post ashore is there be-cause his practical and experienced knowledge isrequired for the post. Considering officers brieflyas the managed rather than the managers, unlessthey possess sufficient experience for their posts(particularly those which are more senior) theylack conviction and absolute confidence. Theythemselves cannot be regarded as well managed.

But the greatest evil of shore appointmentstoo soon or too often is that people get a taste forthem. Officers as much as sailors have alwayslonged for the blessings of the land and the fruitsof their labours; but they find the fruits equallyattractive whether or not they come after theabstinence of service at sea. And in a short jobthey are more continuously available. Leadershipis demanding, and completely natural leaders ofmen are surprisingly few. An officer ashore, withthe exception of some specific training posts, israrely required to exercise naval man management,and without a full early grounding his subordinatesare unlikely to receive the leadership to whichthey are entitled for some time after he joins aship. It is not unusual now for a relatively juniorofficer to resent two consecutive sea postings,which does not augur well for his leadership ofsailors who may themselves prefer not to havebeen at sea for a similar period.


Sailors at the more junior level are now fullyprivileged members of the general national com-munity, a desirable situation which is comparative-ly recently achieved, although longer in the case ofthe USN and the RAN than most other navies.Although desirable in human terms, it is a situationwhich in itself will not guarantee easier or moreproductive management. A higher standard ofeducation, more enlightened conditions of service,a higher standard of pay and better communicationbetween all naval levels should ease the problemsof management and to an extent they do. How-ever, in any community there are criminal,disgruntled, and lazy elements, and there is anunchanged need for these elements to be fairlyand firmly disciplined. A higher general standardof education and intelligence also means thatthere is a quicker appreciation of injustice andimposition, and a quicker if unexpressed judge-ment of an contempt for poor management, byboth the good and bad elements.

This leads to a conclusion that there is agreater not lesser need for a high quality ofmanagement and leadership, particularly if themain objective is kept constantly in view. It iseasier to be misled about the results of managementoday. Men who are self-dependent can work to

achieve successfully a material purpose within,and largely untouched by, a management organi-sation during times of little stress. This can anddoes lead to a laissez-faire attitude in managerswho in any case have a full time load of technicalresponsibilities themselves. But the main objec-tive demands that naval manpower is a mutuallyconfident entity in adverse situations which maybe both prolonged and intensive. The Navy has notbeen placed in such situations since the nineteen-forties, and complacency is possibly the greatesthurdle to be overcome in developing man manage-ment in the future. If we cease to regard man-power as the most demanding professional prioritywe are in some danger of rendering the mainobjective unachievable.

Some proposals for constructive improve-ment are developed in the following paragraphs.They are not particularly radical since they mustbuild on a basically sound structure which hasalready been laboriously developed and practicallyproved. Any developing major organisation mustin the process of development take some wrongpaths; therefore, in many cases, developmentshould take the form of retrieving ancient virtues,rather than inventing new ones. We are also, inthinking about the next twenty-five years, con-cerned with the establishment of trends which


can be adapted successfully to contemporaryconditions rather than the construction of adetailed plan which if it proved admirable for to-day, would most probably be unsuitable fortomorrow.

The first consideration is the means of en-suring that manpower at all levels is well disposedto being managed. Each man needs to be confidentthat his individual talents are appreciated andbeing fully used for a sensible purpose. In seekingto achieve this it must be accepted that until acrisis actually arises - by which time it will be toolate — the Navy can no longer rely on emotionalincentive from the country, its press or politicians.Therefore the generation in our manpower of asensible and reasoned pride in fighting ability mustagain become a predominant rather than importantfactor in total naval management, particularlysince there are many other important materialfactors which have a transitory urgency.

Pride is no longer engendered by rhetoric,particularly when stress, which heightens emotion,is absent. It can come only from self-confidence inability and experience, and the knowledge that (inthe opinion of an authority which is respected andtrusted) the effort required is for good purpose.This means that man management must be devotedto professional preparation and the builing ofpersonal confidence in an unbroken chain fromthe bottom to the top. To maintain and strengthenthis the present trends must be reversed.

The beginning of pride must be instilled atthe initial training establishment, and within ourlimitations we have tried with honesty and somesuccess to achieve this. Of course there have beenoccasions of failure, usually well dramatised, butthe principles have been consistent and in tunewith the times.

But we have failed and are still failing inthe first year or so after a sailor leaves his trainingestablishment. He then knows very little, butbelieves he has some value. He is prepared to be avery small cog in a large machine, but he does wishto be involved. If training has succeeded he wishes,and expects, to go to sea as a minor component ofa ship's company. His spirit will be killed if he isheld ashore, or goes to a ship in prolonged refit, oris sent to sea as an unneeded supernumary.

This, therefore, is suggested as the firstcritical time of management. It requires organisa-tional management ashore to give priority tosailors at this stage so that all, not merely amajority, have their aspirations satisfied. Not for

the last time, it also requires dedicated leadershipat sea; it is no use sending a man to sea and ne-glecting him. In his early days in a ship a sailorneeds to be asked to put to use his training, to befirmly directed, and to be fairly treated. Herequires to remain an individual and to see that ifhe wishes to progress he will be helped to do so.If he is given this care in leadership and demon-strates that he cannot measure up he should bedischarged from the Navy; his peers' pride cannotpossibly be maintained if statements on the stan-dards required are not matched by equivalentdemands in practice.

All this and much more is the function ofthe Divisional Organisation, which needs strength-ening and adapting rather than changing. Therehas been a trend towards separating the manmanagement and functional tasks of officers andsenior sailors. This is not universal and the strengthof a divisional system varies between ships, butoverall the trend exists, particularly becauseofficers are under increasing pressures of work andare not encouraged or able to devote their prin-cipal efforts to man management.

We no longer manage our officers well. Theythemselves, in spite of braid and buttons, aremerging into the faceless ranks of minor manage-ment. In a ship of three hundred men a wardroomof twenty officers possesses a complete power tocause the ship to run smoothly or badly. It willrun smoothly if they devote their energies toproviding the right conditions and climate forthe mass of the complement to work purposefully.It will run badly if the officers are nagged andharried since they will pass this on. It will alsorun badly if the General List officers come tobelieve that they are paid primarily to solve themore difficult material problems.

If we were to adopt the policy of judgingthe success of units in reaching objectives insteadof the performance of those involved, there wouldbe hope that we might also break away from thecurrent fallacy that it is natural for those withthe greatest responsibility to work the longesthours. How long they work is irrelevant but howsuccessful they are affects people.

In war men are asked at times to give moreeffort than they know they can; they are forced toassume major responsibility at an earlier stagethan may be desirable; in general they respondwell. These demands and the consequent sense ofachievement are the source of the wartime service-man's nostalgia to a far greater extent than anypleasure in war itself. As peace lengthens we be-

come progressively more cautious; the ago ofreadiness for responsibility is assumed to creep up,and the extent of responsibility allowed becomesmore limited. The fun goes out of the game.

If we are to manage men in readiness forwar throughout a future period of peace, a cons-cious effort will be needed to drive responsibilitydown to the lowest level which is possible ratherthan that which is prudent. This can only beachieved by personal knowledge within a strongchain of command.

Captains of ships must be extended by thedemands upon their ships. Officers must be exten-ded by demands upon their ability to lead and toundertake responsibility. Senior sailors must becalled upon to complement the officers, andjunior sailors must t»e primarily employed indeveloping and using their professional skills.There is nothing new in these targets but in recentyears they have lost their clarity.

In part this is because with fewer ships thereis less competition. In a ship which operates alonefor prolonged periods the responsibility for thestandards set rests exclusively on the CommandingOfficer, and it is difficult for him to avoid eithereasing or tightening them undesirably but un-wittingly. In addition a ship's people become boredwithout the stimulation of competition; afootball team which rarely played another teamwould soon find continuous practice unutterablyboring. Man management is not just telling peopleto do things; it is placing them in the right situa-tion and then telling them to do them. Theneed for ships to operate in company for a highproportion of their time for the well being oftheir complements should be a cardinal principleof Fleet Programming, and one which shouldrarely be subordinated to other factors.

The managers must be in sympathy with themanaged. To achieve this a manager must ex-perience the same general conditions of service ashis subordinates. This is less and less the case, andthere is one particular aspect which demonstratesa faulty sense of priority. Officers postings areincreasingly tailored either to the requirements oftheir planned career, or to the requirement toprepare an individual for higher positions. Whilstthis may be reasonable in the management ofofficers, it impacts badly on total personnelmanagement.

Stability is much prized by ships' companies.Too many changes have an irritant effect on aship as an entity. As has already been stated,officers at the more senior levels go to sea ever


more infrequently. We have now arrived at aposition where ships' captains and heads of depart-ment may change at almost yearly intervals.Amongst the many disadvantages of this is theneed for whole ships constantly to readjust todifferent personalities and methods, thus creatingan inability to ensure that ships work towardscon-sistent long term effectiveness. In additioninsufficient time exists for those holding respon-sibility to gain the personal knowledge requiredfor proper judgement and guidance of people.Furthermore, shortage of sea jobs must meangreater inexperience on assuming charge so thatrelief at the end of a year comes at the time whenfull effectiveness is just being reached. Ships canbe properly governed only when those principallyresponsible have a mastery of them. In humanterms a ship is sufficiently small for sailors toknow whether their captain and officers are com-petent. They will pay regard to rank but will res-pect only experience, confidence, and professionalskill; these cannot be developed by infrequent,short, sea postings.

Different methods have been tried to gainthe best of all worlds by variations on the themeof "wet" and "dry" lists after promotion toCommander. These half measures have alwaysfailed. They are artificial and have proved im-possible to sustain, and in any case deal only withthe Executive branch.

Perhaps they fail because the main objectiveof fleet effectiveness is subordinated to theinterest of only a section of the manpower. Ifthe main objective is pursued wholeheartedly itis necessary to do all that is required to achieve it.In the process the personal interests of certainsections may suffer, but it is better to acceptthis as needed and to compensate those sectionsthan to distort the whole to be fair to a few.

Personnel management in the future shouldtherefore be guided by the following principlesassuming peace continues (they will be followedby necessity in the event of conflict). The mostimportant part of the Navy is always its ships. Theships' companies must be led by competent andappropriately experienced officers. Seniorofficers must be known to the fleet. Sailors andjunior officers must be known for long enough toensure proper individual guidance and to make itpossible for them to be reported upon justly. Theofficers in a ship should serve in it for roughlythe same period as the sailors, as they cannototherwise be in sympathy with the effect of theprogramme on the ship's company - a captainwho joins in mid-commission tends to think that


everyone should be as fresh as he is. The chainof knowledge and trust should be maintained bypersonal knowledge at least two steps up and atleast two down.

These principles are not achievable wherethe demands of promotion structures and shorejobs cause bulk at the senior levels. If it is agreedthat "wet" and "dry" lists are not the solution,then something more needs to be done. The onlyapparent solution is to tailor the uniformedstrength to the seagoing requirement. Thereshould be sufficient officers to fill the sea billetson a generally similar sea-shore ratio to that ofmanpower as a whole. This would necessitateabbreviation of many uniformed careers, but theend of a career in uniform does not involve theend of usefulness to, or service required by, theNavy.

The experience gained at sea is a complementto other talent. An increasing number of tasksashore which are carried out by uniformedpersonnel could equally well be carried out bycivilians provided that they are qualified by pastuniformed experience at the medium and lowerlevels, since it is normally the experience which isrequired for the job rather than a rank. It istherefore suggested that in the interest of man-power as a whole, individuals whose talents arebest used ashore, or who are no longer requiredfor sea service, should be given the option ofcivilian service or retirement. This would involvecreation of a new and separately identifiablecivilian element with a sensible promotion struc-ture under the Naval Discipline Act. Substantialseagoing experience would be a prerequisite forentry. There would be some difficulties, butmany advantages.

Above all those who continued in uniformwould do so knowing that their experience wouldbe consistently enlarged and fully exploited, andthat uniformed shore postings would be limitedto those relevant to subsequent and preceding seaposting. Furthermore, their capability and weightof experience would be known to the sailors inthe Fleet. It is tempting to develop this theme,but to do so would detract from the reason forraising it as a possibility in the first place.Officers exist to lead and manage men, theycannot win wars by themselves; therefore it isessential to ensure that those with the greatestresponsibility for the conduct of ships are con-tinuously prepared for the discharge of that res-ponsibility at a level appropriate to the rank theyhold.

If we do not restore men to their proper andpre-eminent position how will management developin the next twenty-five years? For a start we canexpect little drama. Conditions are unlikely togive rise to major discontent, but a more insidiousdisease, ordinariness, is highly likely.

The trend which has relatively recentlycaused the preoccupation of the professionalheads of the service with political and materialmanagement will be accentuated; in the processthey themselves will become progressively moredispirited by reaching an ever more powerlesspinacle.

Captains of ships will have fewer demandsplaced upon them and the simple and overridingobjective of preparing their ships as effectiveweapons for war will cease to be placed clearlybefore them. The art can be lost in one genera-tion. We fool ourselves is we believe that thecontempt in which some other navies are heldarises from an inborn national inferiority.

Officers generally will lose the touch ofarrogance and pride which goes with spirit inleadership. They will increasingly believe thattheir value to the Navy lies in their intelligencerather than their readiness to serve and lead. Theywill become very ordinary. A man with a jobrather than a vocation is not likely to give adequateattention to the well being of subordinates, and asa result some form of naval Trade Union willassume importance as visible evidence of thefailure of the integrated naval society, whichshould otherwise not require a divisive internalpressure group.

The various matters discussed in relation tonaval personnel management in the next quarterof a century have all assumed that changes mustnecessarily be developments from what has alreadybeen achieved, and that abrupt or radical changeswould be destructive rather than beneficial. Butit has not been argued that improvement is un-necessary, although much of the improvement hasbeen foreseen to be retrieval of aspects of leader-ship which have been wrongly discarded.

The key issue is emphatically believed to bethe provision and maintenance of an overridingobjective for our manpower. The objective hasbeen stated as the continuous fighting effectivenessand readiness of the Fleet; it is an objectivewhich ceases to have meaning when qualified byexternal considerations.

The framework of conditions of servicewithin which management operates is sound, and islikely to continue in tune with the progress ofconditions in civilian life, because of the pressuresfor equality in an increasingly aware society.

But it is the matters of the spirit which havebeen questioned. Personnel management mustachieve a pride in service, enthusiasm and aneagerness to succeed. Weakness which needs posi-tive correction lies in the diminution of theimportance of leadership in the lives and careersof officers. To restore and strengthen this thereneeds to be clear proof to officers that thedevelopment of their ability to lead and managehas an unquestioned pre-eminence. Such proof canbe given only by positive action which placescorrect demands on them. Amongst the areascovered the restoration of greater authority toCommanding Officers has been emphasised, bothas a key to management and as a catalyst for actionby all the other levels in the naval society. Indeveloping this theme it has been argued that thecareers of officers, at present too much orientedto their own interests, must be patterned toachievement of the main objective.

Naval personnel management is a profes-sional responsibility which can be exercised onlyby experienced, uniformed men. Pride, enthusiasmand effectiveness can be engendered only by thosewho themselves possess them in full measure.These qualities cannot be achieved unless theNavy holds a deep conviction that the service isneeded in the interest of the nation; in generalthis is still so but is in danger of fading. But thereis a further condition which is that a similar con-viction exists in the nation itself, and here wehave been given decreasing grounds for belief.If the stated necessity for a Navy ever becomestransparently no more than lip-service to anecessary evil, the next twenty-five years canresult at best in a well organised but spiritlessand badly managed service.

Author Commander Brian Lee Spark was born in 1927 atCoibiidge, U.K. He graduated from RNC Dartmouth inmid 1944 and saw service in the English Channel and EastIndies until the end of the war. After Sub-Lieutenantscourses in 1946 Commander Spark had a variety of seapostings including command of HM Ships ML 3511, LochAlvie, Loch Lomond and Argonaut. In 1952 he sub-specialised in Action Information and Aircraft Direction.After subspecialisation Commander Spark had two yearsexchange service with the RAN, first at HMAS Watson andthen in HMAS Sydney. He was then Direction Officer of809 Squadron (Sea Venoms) embarked in HMS Albionduring the Suez operation. Shore appointments with theRN included instructing at HMS Dryad, the RN StaffCourse, Officer-in-charge Special Duties Officers Courseat Greenwich, Officer-in-Charge ADA Rule Writing Groupand a member of the Naval Staff involved in the develop-ment of a radical new command and control organisationon ships which has now been implemented.

Commander Spark retired from the RN at his ownrequest in mid 1970 and then served 4 years on theEmergency List of the RAN. During most of this servicehe was Project Director for the introduction of computerassisted Command and Control systems in the RAN.


SHIPHANDLIIMG CORNERWhat Happened?

This incident occurred at Victoria Basin,Hong Kong. The ship was a Daring Class Destroyerand it had been given a berth on East Wall, bowssouth. The geometry of this problem is worthlooking at on the chart. Having entered the basin,the ship had to turn through about 70°, frommemory, in about 1 Vi ship's lengths. It waspossible, but much would depend on conditionsand the wind in particular. Once inside the basin,the flood which would be running strongly at thetime would of course have no effect.

As the ship passed North Point a reasonablystiff easterly was blowing, and this was welcomed.It was considered it would allow the necessarysteep approach and help blow the bows around.

At the basin, FEARLESS was outside on theNorth Arm, but inside appeared quite empty.

A normal approach was made with a goodwide sweep through the Star ferries' tracks and,as the run to the entrance was made, it was seenthat an R.N. Frigate was berthed inside on NorthWall. This further reduced the room to turn andadded to the problems. Worse still, the easterlyhad shifted to become a light westerly. As theBull's Nose came nearer the Navigator remarked"We should now be out of the flood". No soonerhad it been said than the tide moved the shiprapidly towards the all too solid sea wall in frontof Tamar. A few quick corrections sorted that out,but it had altered the line of approach and hadbeen, to say the least, unsettling. The turn tostarboard was hampered by the R.N. Frigatereducing the area to port for the stern to swing andas the westerly breeze started to catch the ship,the starboard anchor was let go. By then the bowswere getting too close to the wall to go any furtherahead and there was very little room astern. Sothe two tugs standing by were secured, and theship was berthed using them.

What Self Criticism is Offered?

It would have been much better handledwith a more realistic plan. It had been decided thatthe worst possible position to get into was to beat an angle between East and North Wall with thebows near the former and the stern near the latter.Ironically it was just this worst case which de-veloped. In hindsight, there were two, or maybethree, important mistakes. Firstly it was unwise toenter the basin with so much tide running. Itwould have been better to wait, anchoring in JunkBay if necessary, until conditions were better.

Secondly, it would have been simple enough toask COM Hong Kong if there were any ships in thebasin, and adjust the berthing plan accordingly.Finally and most importantly, two tugs wereavailable, so why try to prove that it could bedone without them?The best plan, I believe, wouldhave been to get safely into the basin, stop, buttonon the tugs, and make a cold move of it. Verysimple, no fuss and quite seamanlike; much moreso than taking on a difficult task with engines,rudder and anchor. The tugs were available andhad to be used anyway, as it turned out.

Lessons Learnt

Always make it easy for yourself. The hardones develop all on their own; save your strengthfor them.

A Professional Wrecker's Comment

Berthing oi) the East Wall of Victoria Basinis not an easy evolution. The points mentionedunder "Self Criticism" - State of Tide, Localinformation and Use of Tugs — need no furtheramplification.

Entering Hong Kong through SulphurChannel and approaching from West may havebeen preferable in this case. The advantages are:-

1. slow steady approach to the basin

2. basin entrance and berth is visible to thecommand earlier

3. approach track cuts across Star ferriestrack at right angles which is preferableto making a wide sweep through the tracks.

CYCLOPS

SHIPHANDLING CORNER

Contributors are invited to relate theirreactions when coping with difficult or awkwardshiphandling problems and how the situation wasretrieved (and if it wasn't — why not). Contributorsmay remain anonymous if they wish and also leaveout ship names and places if desired. Articlesshould be between 300 and 500 words. Commentsfrom members will be printed in succeedingeditions.

Page 22-Joumal of the Australian Naval Institute

The Place of the Seaborne Aircraft Platformin Future Naval Warfare

This paper by Lieutenant Commander R. M. Jones RAN won equal first prize in the Officer Sectionof the 1974 Peter Mitchell Trust Essay Competition and is reproduced here by permission of the NavalBoard. The views expressed by the author are his own and not necessarily those of the A ustralianGovernment, the Department of Defence, the Naval Board er the Australian Naval Institute

"The assistance of aircraft in a modern Navalforce has been proved to be essential. Especiallyis this so when the force is small and strength inships must be compensated for by particularlygood reconnaissance.'

Admiralty staff 1920-21

Very early in the story of the aircraft thepotential of the flying machine as a war vehiclewas realised. Various lighter-than-air-craft were usedlate in the nineteenth century but not until theFirst World War 1914-18 was the heavier-than-airmachine available in a form suitable for warfare.In this war the aircraft was an outstanding successin a variety of roles, including maritime warfare,and the future of the aircraft as a war machine wasassured.

In maritime warfare the aircraft proved itselfessential and ships had been adapted to carry andoperate aircraft. As the decades passed the shipborne aircraft underwent changes, some of themof a fundamental nature, nevertheless the aircraftbecame, and remained, an integral part of manynavies.

The future role of the aircraft in maritimewarfare is difficult to define in detail. It is, how-ever, not difficult to see that the aircraft has anassured place in maritime warfare of the future.This place will be secure for as long as the aircraftpossesses that desirable capability, best expressedas mobility, not possessed by ships. Whether it isthe mobility to monitor a large sonobuoy field,mobility to reconnoitre over the horizon ormobility to rapidly close and attack a warship, thesurface ship — even one employing the principlesof the hovercraft or hydrofoil — will never becomparable in performance.

Far less certain is the nature of the base orship which will operate these aircraft. In sixtyyears of existence the future of the aircraft carrieras a mobile airfield has seldom appeared souncertain. This essay will trace the developmentof the seaborne aircraft platforms in use atpresent so that some of the associated problems

will be understood and then consider the threeexisting types of air capable ships and their future;finally an entirely new type of seaborne aircraftplatform or air capable ship with special applica-tions will be described.

AIRCRAFT CARRIER DEVELOPMENT

First World WarThe history of the seaborne aircraft platform

can be traced back, in various forms, to the FirstWorld War. At the beginning of the war, a radiusof 100 miles from shore bases was considered areasonable distance over which reconnaissanceaircraft could be expected to operate. Experi-mental take-offs from ships at sea had been madein both the Royal Navy and the United StatesNavy and even a landing had been effected on theUSS Pennsylvania in 1911, but routine embarkationof aircraft was generally thought to be in the re-mote future.

Circumstances of the war in the North Seaquickly forced the development of the shiplaunched aircraft. The struggle between theGerman High Seas Fleet and the Grand Fleet ofthe Royal Navy took place principally in this area,mainly between cruisers and battleships. Priorto the war, Germany had become involved with theairship and once hostilities began was able to makeuse of Zeppelin rigid airships for naval reconnais-sance. These airships were unhindered in theirtask of observing, and bombing, the Royal Navy asthey could operate at heights above the maximumattainable to guns then in service in the RoyalNavy. Aircraft could sometimes shoot downZeppelins but shore-based aircraft did not have ade-quate range to accompany the Fleet to sea. Thusthe first ships to operate aircraft at sea joinedthe Royal Navy to provide aircraft at sea whenshore-based aircraft could not meet the require-ment.

These vessels were converted cross-Channelferries carrying a few seaplanes which werehoisted onto the water for take-off. Seldom wasthe North Sea calm enough to allow these frail

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute- Page 23

seaplanes to take-off undamaged and if one didmanage to clear the water the drag of the largefloats reduced the performance to uselessnessagainst Zeppelins. A few bombing raids werecarried out with mixed success but these did notprevent airships shadowing at their will.

To ensure that aircraft would be availableat all times, even with reduced performance, oneseaplane carrier was fitted with a flying-off deckforward from which fighter seaplanes took off ontrolleys. They could then attempt to land on thewater for hoisting in after completion of theflight - if damaged, at least the task would havebeen tried. Such seaplanes suffered from the dragpenalty imposed by floats and not many weekselapsed before a wheeled fighter successfully tookoff from this platform. The wheeled fighter couldnot be recovered by the launching ship and mustditch if not within range of land, but it couldshoot down Zeppelins. This trade of one fighterfor one airship was very favourable to the RoyalNavy.

Wholesale defence against Zeppelins wasnot yet possible as seaplane carriers were in shortsupply and those available were too slow to staywith the battle-fleet. Acceptance of the possibleloss of the aircraft after the flight had alreadycleared the way for the next stage; fitting of flying-off platforms above turrets on cruisers, battle-cruisers and battleships. Fighters launched fromthese platforms could shoot down shadowingZeppelins before they had seen much of import-ance or before they could return to Germany. Thedrawback was the limited number of these aircraftavailable as each could be launched only oncebefore a return to harbour to embark anotherone. Still, a force with ten or twelve such shipsincluded had available about twenty fighters,enough to deal with most forseeable threats dur-ing the average sortie into the North Sea.

The idea of a ship devoted principally to theoperation of wheeled aircraft evolved quite slowlythrough several intermediate stages demonstratedby the cruiser, HMS Furious. She was first fittedwith a flying-off deck forward; aircraft afterlaunch being intended to fly ashore or ditch. In anattempt to recover and re-use these valuable itemsof equipment another deck was built aft of themain superstructure to allow aircraft to land on. Un-fortunately the airflow over this landing-on deck wasso badly disturbed by the superstructure that veryfew aircraft ever managed to land successfully. Thenext stage was elimination of the superstructureentirely and HMS Argus (the 'flat iron') was the first

ship to try out this idea shortly after the war andtoo late to prove herself in action.

Between the Wars

HMS Argus pointed the way and betweenthe wars the aircraft carrier slowly developed intoa mobile airfield of about 20,000 tons with a fewmonsters of 33,000 tons or more which had beenlaid down as battleships and modified to complywith the terms of the Washington Treaty. Althoughthe Royal Navy and the United States Navy usedthe carrier in slightly different roles both naviessaw the value of the aircraft carrier as in providingaircraft whenever and where-ever required withoutworrying about the proximity to land and friendlyairfields.

When carriers would not be available othermeans of providing aircraft at sea were developed.The value attached to aircraft reconnaissance wasso great that the catapult aircraft evolved from thecrude flying-off platforms of the 1914-18 period;instead of a 'one-shot' system, the aircraft wascatapult launched and landed on the water along-side the parent ship for hoisting on board bycrane ready for another flight.

Second World War 1939-45

The Second World War 1939^5 had asimilar effect as the previous world war on navalflying; decades of peace-time development anddiscussion were compressed into a few years ofrapid progress measurable against the cold figuresof aircraft lost and ships sunk. In these years thecruiser-borne aircraft began to enter obsolescence;the range of shore-based aircraft and the increasingavailability of aircraft carriers reduced the need forthese individual aircraft and radar was taking overthe reconnaissance role without the problemsattendant on launching and recovery of the aircraft.The cruiser-borne aircraft had proved very suscept-ible to damage during enemy, bombing attacks andtended to burn readily sending burning petrol overthe remainder of the ship. In short, the aircraft nolonger offered, at a reasonable cost, a capabilitynot otherwise available to the warship.

Frequently the claim is made that this hasestablished the aircraft carrier as the capital shipinstead of the battleship. A more accurate assess-ment is that of Vice Admiral Sir Arthur Hezlet inhis book 'Aircraft and Sea Power'; the aircraft, notthe carrier, supplanted the battleship. The role ofthe ship became that of carrying the aircraft, co-operating with the aircraft and exploiting thecommand of the sea won by the aircraft.


Post-War Period

At the end of the war the typical fleet air-craft carrier being designed or under constructionwas about 50,000 tons full load displacement andapproximately 900 feet long, an appreciable in-crease on the pre-war ship. The entire length wastaken up by a single aircraft operating area usedfor both take-off and landing. In excess of 100aircraft of various types and roles were embarked.Catapults were installed but free take-offs weremore usual; the catapult was used only underspecial circumstances. Arrester wires were anaccepted means of ensuring the aircraft stopped inan acceptable distance (and in the right place),and the pilot had the assistance of a landing signalofficer ('batsman') to signal landing information tohim during the approach to the deck.

In the immediate post-war period severalproblems related to the introduction of the turbo-jet powered aircraft arose. The jet-powered aircrafthad entered service towards the end of the war andhad speeds far in excess of those possible withpropeller driven fighters but major drawbacksarose when operations from ships was contem-plated. The steam catapult, mirror landing aid andthe angled deck solved these problems but in-creased the cost and complexity of the carrier.

The cost of the aircraft carrier was furtherincreased when new ships had to be far larger tooperate enough of the newer, larger and fasterjets to be worthwhile. The growth in size of thecarrier can be typified by comparing the Midwayclass, which was designed during the Second WorldWar, and the Kitty Hawk (or improved Forrestal)class still in use. USSMidway displaced 55,000tons at full load and was 968 feet long; dependingon the types she could carry up to 137 aircraft.The Midway class is now considered marginal forsome fighters in current use because it is too small.USS Kitty Hawk, name ship of her class, was laiddown in 1956 and displaces 75,200 tons at fullload, she is 1,047% feet long and operates 90 air-craft; appreciably fewer than the Midway class buteach aircraft is larger and more effective.

CARRIERS IN SERVICE

Large Attack Aircraft Carriers

Large aircraft carriers, such as USS Kittyhawk,are strategic units, with a proven ability to threatenthe security of another nation. United States Navycarriers have performed this function since theadvent of the atomic bomb; apparently with agood deal of success as a large proportion of the

Soviet Navy was designed, built and trained withthe primary role of destroying American attackcarriers. Soviet efforts to have aircraft carriersincluded under the terms of the strategic armslimitations talks (SALT II) indicates that theKremlin still regards the attack carrier as a stra-tegic threat.

In the purely maritime environment, thesesame attack carriers can be tasked against enemyshipping, military or commercial; her own aircraftwill provide an air superiority umbrella overfriendly forces and allow ships and lower perform-ance aircraft to carry out their equally importanttasks. Under such circumstances these vesselschange their role slightly to that of control of thesea.

Limited war applications have been as float-ing, mobile airfields from which naval air powerhas been projected inland. Seldom since 1945 hasa year passed when movement of an aircraft carrierinto an area of potential conflict has not served asa warning; or an aircraft carrier has not beenactively engaged in support of political objectives.As was the case when aircraft first went to sea,the carrier is providing aircraft which are notavailable any other way. A cursory study of post-war history shows carriers in action in Korea, Suez,Kuwait, Vietnam, Aden and Beria to name a few ofthe better known occasions; in every case theshore-based aircraft either could not reach thescene at all or was severely limited when it didarrive.

The United States Navy is now the onlyoperator of a useful number of attack aircraftcarriers, other Western navies operate a rapidlydwindling handful and the Soviet Union has noneyet. Fortunately the growth of naval aircraft insize and weight has stopped and carriers alreadyin commission or under construction will allow theretention in service of the large aircraft carrieruntil about the year 2000 at least. Of the sixteenships at present in commission twelve will still bein service in 1980; of these four will be nuclearpowered. The remaining eight were commissionedbetween 1955 and 1968 and are given a thirty yearlife.

Small Aircraft Carriers

While the size of the large attack or 'fleet'aircraft carrier was growing during the war, avariety of smaller ships had been proving useful.The earliest of these was the escort carrier whichwas originally used to provide anti-submarinedefence to Atlantic convoys when in the gap be-


tween shore-based aircraft operating from thewestern side of the Atlantic and those on theEuropean side. Built principally on merchant shiplines and in many cases carrying cargo as well asaircraft, these ships were built quickly andcheaply and once in service made up in quantityfor what they lacked in quality. In the post-warrun down of the armed services all the escortcarriers were either scrapped or returned to mer-chant service. Their legacy was acceptance of theprincipal that the aircraft carrier could be anescort unit rather than a ship always demandingescorting warships.

A closely related type of small ship, thelight fleet carrier, was not scrapped entirely at theend of the war. Serving both the Royal Navy andthe United States Navy these small carriers werebuilt on mercantile principles but purely as aircraftcarriers. Carrying between 45 and 30 aircraft de-pending on their size, they shared with the escortcarriers the responsibility for controlling the seaand air around convoys; fighters drove off, orshot down, shadowing and attacking aircraft whileanti-submarine aircraft such as the Avenger andSwordfish harassed submarines opposing theconvoy. In the Pacific they supplemented thelarger attack carriers in their support of the am-phibious assaults which were characteristic of thistheatre.

Several of these smaller carriers were pur-chased by various smaller navies as the backbone oftheir post-war naval air arms. For these smallernavies such vessels were ideal, economic in man-power and relatively cheap to maintain and run;another advantage was that a useful number of air-craft could be embarked. While operating in thePacific theatre in 1945 one ship embarked 33aircraft — 12 Barracuda torpedo bombers and 21Corsair fighters. With these aircraft embarked auseful role in projecting naval air power ashorecould be filled. Enough aircraft were available todefend the ship and mount an effective strike. Hadthe need arisen, these same small carriers couldhave been used effectively against other warships.

As the years passed the size and weight ofcarrier-borne aircraft increased to such an extentthat adequate air groups for multi-threat defenceand offence could not be embarked and the largernavies decided retention of the small carriers un-warranted. Smaller navies had the unpalatablechoice of giving up aircraft carriers entirely orresigning themselves to obtaining only aircraftwhich would fit on their existing carriers afterextensive and costly modification. Purchase of

larger carriers was not economic either because ofinsufficient money or manpower, so several naviescarried on with the small (20,000) ton ship.Replacements became increasingly difficult toobtain because the miniature attack carrier, whichis what some small navies were attempting tooperate, was basically unrealistic. Enough aircraftcould not be fitted onboard to effectively defendthe parent ship and still have a capability to strikea target, nor could enough fuel, ordnance andother consumables be carried by such a small shipto support other than 'hit and run' raids.

Some ships became specialist anti-submarinevessels and in that role enough aircraft could beembarked and operated to perform a worthwhiletask.

All the hulls of these smaller carriers werebuilt before 1945, by the 1970's they are all ofadvanced age but no replacement is planned.Since none of the smaller navies appear able toafford to build replacements and the larger naviesare not interested, the small carrier - as we nowknow it - had no future. Nations requiring air-craft capabilities at sea must look to shore-basedaircraft or other air capable ships.

SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT

The frequent, almost continuous, cry ofopposition to the aircraft carrier in any shape isthat shore based aircraft can do the job withoutneeding an expensive and vulnerable ship. Thiswas demonstrably not true in two world wars butwhat of the present and future when improvingtechnology promises better maritime patrol air-craft?

Despite the potential for greater range andendurance, no attempt is presently being made togreatly extend the in-service range or endurance,any discernible trend is towards better sensors andon-board computers to handle information moreefficiently. The most representative of such aircraftin the West is the Lockheed Orion which 'Jane'sAll the Worlds Aircraft' credits with a 'missionradius' of 2,070 nautical miles with no time ontask, or three hours on task at 1,500 nautical miles.Such performance would require at least fourexpensive aircraft to keep one on station at arange of 1,500 miles for even a short time; forprotracted operation at a range of 1000 miles theUnited States Navy considers a squadron on nineOrions necessary to allow for maintenance onaircraft. The same service regards a radius of 300to 500 miles from base as the maximum foreffective use.


Other maritime aircraft have similar per-formance; although unclassified figures such asthose given for the Orion are not available, theHawker Siddeley Nimrod has a ferry range of4,500 - 5,000 miles quoted, indicating a radius ofaction comparable to the Orion. A maritimeversion of the well known Boeing 707 is underdevelopment and the performance must be amatter for conjecture, however the 707-320Bmodel - the basis for the United States Air Force'sAirborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)airborne radar station - could well be the basisfor a maritime aircraft and is given a 6,493 nauticalmiles range with maximum fuel and no reserves onlanding.

These figures assume high altitude flight, themost favourable environment for jet engine fuelconsumption figures. Low-level operation is anessential capability for a maritime patrol or re-connaissance aircraft if the functions of identifi-cation and weapon delivery are to be performed.Magnetic anomoly detection equipment, possiblythe most effective means of classifying and track-ing a submerged submarine, requires the sensinghead to be close to the water.

The present total lack of apparent interestin extending the range of the shore based aircraftindicates that present ranges are acceptable. Unlessthere is some quite unexpected development, shore-based anti-submarine and reconnaissance aircraftwill be limited to a useful radius of action of nomore than 1,000 miles; at the outer limit of thisradius a number of aircraft will be required tomaintain one on station. Such performance mayprovide support to coastal convoys and limitedprotection to ocean convoys if all geographicallyavailable airfields could be used. Shifting alliancesand the emergence of touchily independentnations make the political availability of airfieldshighly suspect. The only reliable airfields are theones built in the homeland; to operate only fromthem leaves no ability to provide support far atsea.

Fighter Aircraft

Provision of shore based fighter aircraft todefend a force at sea involves more complicatedcalculations and expense to supply in-flightrefuelling facilities (and defend them); varyingtransit distances from bases to combat air patrolstations and changing weapon and fuel loads fur-ther complicate the problem. Only one countryGreat Britain - has seriously attempted to adoptthis method of defending warships against attack

and no figures are available to assist in judging theeffectiveness of the system. Undoubtedly theshortage of bases from which to operate the aircraftmust restrict the idea on a world-wide basis.

Maritime strike is one role which could becarried out with limited effectiveness by shore-based aircraft as long as a nation was prepared towait while the offensive was prepared out of range,and to waste time finding the target once it camewithin range.

SMALLER FLIGHT DECKSHelicopters

The helicopter first became a useful navalvehicle during the Second World War when theGerman Navy used a twin-rotor design in convoyescort operations in the Aegean and the Mediter-ranean. Across the Atlantic the United StatesCoast Guard became interested in Ivor Sikorsky'sVS-300, the first practical helicopter to be built inAmerica. In those days of the 'mid-Atlantic gap'any way of obtaining the services of aircraft far atsea was eagerly grasped; however, the potential ofthe helicopter was far greater than the reality andmuch work was seen as necessary before the heli-copter would be an effective aid to convoy escort.Several other applications of the available resourcespromised quicker results and development of thehelicipter was given low priority.

In the immediate post-war years the heli-copter was employed and developed mainly as anaircraft to embark in an aircraft carrier, not forsome years did the need for the helicopters capa-bilities in the smaller warships become apparentand then as an anti-submarine weapon carrier.Beginning as a simple torpedo dropping embarkedsingly in small ships, the helicopter was quicklyaccepted; the mobility of the aircraft meant thatit was used for a variety of other tasks, especiallyreconnaissance. In many respects the lessonslearned during the years of the catapult aircraftwere re-learned; particularly that there is a way tofind out what is over the horizon before it be-comes an immediate threat.

Present and future roles for the helicopterhave expanded from the simple one first planned.The United States Navy sees the helicopterprimarily as an anti-submarine unit which canextent the sensor and weapon range of a smallship, anti-surface ship capability is severelylimited. The Royal Navy takes a different viewand has developed the Lynx, a helicopter designedwith anti-submarine warfare as a secondary role -the primary role is that of surface search andattack using surface skimming missiles.


Ships

Many navies now have in service, or areplanning to have in service shortly, destroyers withtheir own helicopters; a few navies have decidedthat two aircraft per ship is a more flexible num-ber. Some have decided on the cruiser size shipwith an even larger number of helicopters embarked;the most publicised of these is the Soviet Navy'sMoskva class, closely comparable to the ItalianAndrea Doria or the Japanese Haruna. All of theseships are designed, equipped and armed as cruisersbut also have a larger than usual helicopter deck aftand embark a number of helicopters to enhance theships' capabilities.

The Royal Navy is constructing another typeof ship, the through-deck cruiser; HMS Invinciblewill be the first and is planned to complete in1978-79. Sometimes referred to as an aircraft carrierby another name, Invincible will be armed as acruiser (at least by Western standards) with twotwin area defence surface-to-air missiles (Sea Dart).These two launchers will absorb twenty per centof the total cost of the ship, reported as fc60 million.The quadruple surface-to-surface missile launchers(Exocet) originally planned have been deleted. Shewill have comprehensive radar equipment and willbe able to operate up to nine medium size helicopters— the Sea King is presently planned. The best way toprovide a reasonable number of helicopter operatingspots was found to be by adoption of the straightdeck with a hangar below rather than the more usuallayout of a superstructure forward of a large platformon the stern.

Such a configuration enables an alternativevertical or short take-off and landing (VSTOL)aircraft to operate from Invincible. Earlier trialswith the Harrier from HMS Blake and the lightfleet carrier INS Vikrant demonstrated convincinglythat such aircraft have far better performance ifthey can take-off with a short run. Invincible hasher deck arranged so that such a run is possible andshe is capable of embarking six Harriers.

Despite her appearance as a small aircraftcarrier, the British through-deck cruiser can fairlybe described as a cruiser which carries aircraft toassist in performing her duties. Her area defencemissiles, her sensor fit and extensive commandfacilities enable her to perform a useful role withoutaircraft embarked. As with the smaller helicopterfitted warships, she can still perform the task, butto a lower level of effectiveness, without theaircraft. Helicopters or VSTOL aircraft will allowInvincible to be far more aware of her surroundingsand in a better position to influence them, but shecannot carry enough aircraft of any type toconsider aircraft as her primary weapon.

A closely related ship, at least in generalappearance, is the latest addition to the Soviet


Navy. Until comparatively recently the SovietNavy has been content to rely upon shore-basedaircraft entirely - even the notoriously shortrange anti-submarine helicopters were shore based.In the last two decades this thinking has altered,first with the introduction of ship-basedhelicopters to provide target information for cruisemissiles, then the Moskva class of anti-submarinecruisers. Now a most unusual ship has beenreported which appears to be an attempt tocombine the desirable featrues of both the cruiserand the aircraft carrier.

This 45,000 ton ship, anmed Kiev, is 900 feetlong with an angled deck running for the aft twothirds. Presumably catapults or arrestor gear arenot installed, although catapults could well beconsidered worthwhile by the Russians. An islandsuperstructure is to starboard amidships andseveral missile launchers are forward. Such a con-figuration could derive from the same philosophyas led to the flight deck on the HMS Invincible butis more likely the result of awareness that the sternmounted deck of the Moskva class will not allowoptimum use of VSTOL aircraft. Kiev willcertainly be able to operate STOL aircraft inappreciable numbers and therein lies the basicdifference between the Royal Navy ship and herSoviet counterpart \Kiev is over twice aslarge, she has far heavier armament and couldoperate many more aircraft than Invincible'shandful; she could do this in a high threat area.Whether she should be described as a cruiser withextensive aviation arrangements or a heavily armedaircraft carrier will depend on what air group theRussians finally embark and the emphasis givento her aircraft capability.

VERTICAL TAKE-OFF AIRCRAFTThe fixed wing aircraft which can take-off

vertically has been advanced as the ideal ship-borne aircraft. Unfortunately wholesale replace-ment of present helicopters by VTOL aircraft isnot nearly as simple as is generally believed; theHarrier, for example, is just not compatible withthe average small ship deck. For instance, a mini-mum freeboard of 25 feet during take-off andlanding is essential to remain clear of the cloud ofspray generated by the jet exhaust striking thewater. If the aircraft enters this'doud the pilotcannot see at a critical stage in the' flight andspray will be ingested into the engine resulting inloss of power. Additionally, because of the mannerin which the nozzles are rotated to achieve verticalflight the amount of deck movement acceptable tothe Harrier is very small, not nearly as much asthe 4 or 5 degree acceptable to the helicopter; farbetter stabilisation than presently available isnecessary for small ships.

Any VSTOL aircraft has poor load liftingcapability when taking off vertically because nolift is derived from the wings. In the short take-offmode, when lift from the wings is available, thelift (payload) of the Harrier increases by approxi-mately 100 pounds with each one knot increaseof airflow over the wings. A short take-off run toaugment any natural wind to 50 knots would in-crease the payload by 5000 pounds. To plan forVTOL operation from platforms built on the sternof ships where such take-off runs are not possiblewould be to disregard most of the potential of theVSTOL aircraft.

The Harrier is referred to whenever VSTOLaircraft practical performance figures are neededbecause it is the only VSTOL aircraft in produc-tion in the Western world. The type equips theRoyal Air Force.and the United States MarineCorps has purchased 110 for evaluation; amaritime version has been designed for use fromthe through-deck cruiser and has been offered forsale around the world but production has not yetcommenced. The United States Navy is working onalternative types of VSTOL aircraft as successorsto the Harrier but none are yet near flight trials;these successors will, hopefully, not suffer fromsome of the limitations in speed and range fromwhich the Harrier suffers because of engine design.

FUTURE FLIGHT DECKS

The future of the very large flight decks onattack carriers and the very small flight decks ondestroyers is relatively secure. Hulls now in exist-ence will last for some decades and further con-struction is likely in one case and assured in theother. While the need for both types of deck andassociated aircraft is recognised and no unforseentechnological changes take place the attack carrierand destroyer deck will continue.

For the small or middle size ship the futureis far less clear. As has been described, all the hullspresently in service are old and near, or beyond,the end of their economic life. The only exceptionto this general rule are the amphibious assault shipswhich operate troop carrying and cargo helicoptersonly; these are already fully committed to theamphibious role. As with the attack carriers andthe destroyer decks the specialised amphibious shipwill exist as long as the need is recognised.

Only one ship which could possibly be des-cribed as an aircraft carrier and able to take overthe tasks of the remaining small carriers is even inthe planning stage, this is the United States Navy's

sea control ship - a ship which in its plannedmethod of operation is very similar to escort carrieror light fleet carrier when first designed. Thiscomparison should not be taken too strictly as thesea control ship is severely limited when consideredas a carrier.Sea Control Ship

The sea control ship is designed exclusivelyto carry and operate aircraft. Adopting the operat-ing concept of the escort carrier, these sea controlships will be as simple and inexpensive as possible —single screw with a minimum of installed sensors.Fixed armament is planned to consist of 20 milli-metre Vulcan-Phalanx rapid fire guns for close-indefence. Main sensors and armament will be in-stalled in aircraft.

Ultimately, enough aircraft will be embarkedto provide one radar early warning helicopter andtwo anti-submarine helicopters airborne at alltimes, with another anti-submarine helicopter atimmediate radiness. Such a flying programme willprovide warning of all air, surface and sub-surfacethreats and the weapon to meet the sub-surfaceone. At least one VSTOL aircraft will be atimmediate notice to meet the surface and airthreat which the USN feels the fixed wing aircraftis better suited to meet. An air group of this sizewill not be large enough to be effective in highthreai areas nor is it intended to be; neither couldthe ship provide ihe storage loi ihe large quantitiesof jet-fuel and ordnance needed for high-threatarea operation. For escort of military and commer-cial convoys in low threat areas the ship promisesto be very effective.

Trials have begun of this idea using USSGuam, an LPH which is approximately the size ofthe planned sea control ship. The usual assaulthelicopters have been replaced with an air group ofSea Kings and Harriers which are demonstratingthe practicality of the ship as an escort unit. Thehelicopters provide effective anti-submarinedefence and the Harriers are proving an ability todestroy the shadower, that bane of the convoycommander. Beginning from a realistic decklaunch the Harrier is consistently achieving Side-winder launch positions against genuinely shadow-ing Societ aircraft at ranges of 100 miles from theship. In the anti-submarine role the Harrier isproving useful as a rapid-reaction sonobuoy layingvehicle and could no doubt carry and drop homingtorpedoes.

VariationsThe future of the sea control ship idea seems

assured, regardless of United States Navy perse-

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Page 29

verence with the planned eight ships. Any navyintending to work outside the effective range ofshore based aircraft must have shipborne aircraft.The aircraft requirements for effective defence,even at a very low threat level, is such that only aspecialised seaborne aircraft platform can providethe numbers at reasonable cost. Through-deckcruisers could operate the necessary number ofaircraft but at a unit cost far in excess of the outlayto built the far simplest sea control ship.

Existing hull and machinery designs for fleetsupport ships but with a flight deck and hangarinstead of the usual superstructure would be oneinexpensive method available to smaller navies toensure that sufficient numbers of aircraft will beavailable at sea. Sensors will be the minimum forcontrol of aircraft and weapons will be restrictedto a single type of point-defence missile or rapidfire gun. An air-group of helicopters and fixed-wingaircraft will be embarked, the exact compositiondepending on the role envisaged and the amountof progress in VTOL aircraft technology.

An interim stage before this specialised shipwould be an oiler or supply ship with accommoda-tion for a squadron of helicopters for anti-submarinedefence. The Netherlands Navy has already builtthe first of two Poolster class fast replenishmentships with space for five helicopters aft and theRoyal Fleet Auxiliary Tidespring can operatethree anti-submarine Sea Kings. Navies seeing thefuture aviation needs only in terms of helicoptersmay be content to remain at that level of navalair power - embarking in such hybrid vessels amixture of medium size anti-submarine helicopters(e.g. Sea Kings) with a smaller helicopter for sur-face search and strike (e.g. Lynx).

Replenishment ship requirements conflictwith some of the needs of aircraft operating shipsand navies which recognise the need, and canafford to fill it, will move on to the next stage andbuild the specialised ship with the hangar andflight deck greatly extended. Such a seaborne air-craft platform could operate aircraft already avail-able in the sea control role; classed as an escortshe would provide the aircraft to control the mari-time environment around herself. The most bene-ficial improvement over the less specialised shipwould be the ability to despatch the shadowingaircraft which so easily remains just outside themissile envelope of conventional surface ships.

Exact details of the VSTOL fixed-wing air-craft to equip these ships are still obscure. Theroad to the present level of VTOL expertise isstudded with numerous expensive experimentalPage 30-Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

and developmental vehicles, none of which justi-fied production. Even the Harrier's range andspeed abilities are not particularly good when takenin isolation; VTOL ability justifies the aircraft andonly those services which have a clear requirementto operate away from prepared bases have so farbought Harriers in any quantity. Aircraft beingplanned to have higher performance all incorporatetechnical features which are unproven and there-fore include a degree of uncertainty. For ship-borne operation an aircraft designed for catapultlaunching when heavy with fuel and weapons butcapable of a vertical landing after the flight mayprove the most effective compromise betweenuser requirements and technical abilities. After all,a catapult launch is a short take-off withoutattracting an airframe size or weight penalty andvertical landings at the end of a sortie, lighter bythousands of pounds of fuel and ordnance is atechnically less difficult problem.

THE MODERN CONVOY

One capability which has atrophied in theprevailing low-threat setting has been that ofconvoy defence. Present equipment capabilities,mental attitudes and training are biased towards aconvoy speed in the vicinity of 12 to 15 knots.Such speeds may be above those commonly avail-able during the Second World War, when lastthere was a serious world-wide threat to shipping,but they are far less than the speeds now used bythe average merchant ship. Large tankers whichply the trade routes of the world have speeds inthe vicinity of 17 to 20 knots; container ships arealready faster and increasing in size and speed.

Not only are these container ships muchfaster than older ships, they are individually moreimportant. Large, fast container ships are notreplacing conventional 'break-bulk' ships on a one-for-one basis; rather one container ship is replacingseven or more of the older variety. As a specificexample — about 150 ships were used to carryammunition to Vietnam during the busiest yearsof the fighting; in any future such operation 25 or30 container ships would be adequate to carry thesame amount of ammunition.

Loss of a single Victory ship to a submarinein the Battle of the Atlantic was undesirable butcould seldom be described as a serious blow to thewar effort. The loss of a single container ship, per-forming the same amount of load carrying as fiveVictory ships, is more undesirable; the loss of twoor three to enemy action would be the equivalentof a whole convoy lost — a catastrophe. Accord-

ingly a high degree of protection is appropriate;but how?

High speed is a mixed blessing when convoydefence is planned. Service speeds of 23 knots arecommon and up to 30 knots is not unusual; thishigh speed in transit, with the rapid turnaroundpermitted by the use of containers and specialhandling equipment, is the key to the efficiencyof the container ship and cannot be reduced with-out severe degradation in cargo-carrying capacityof the system as a whole. On the credit side,speed reduces the time spent in focal areas andpresents the torpedo firing conventional submar-ine with a major time and distance problem. Tobalance these advantages, grave limitations areapparent when escorts are being earmarked forconvoys of container ships.

At speeds of 20 knots and above, the flowof water around the sonar dome generates noisewhich interferes with the sonar, the higher thespeed the greater the noise until well below 30knots the ship is deaf, with no anti-submarinesensor. Ships with the speed necessary to escorta 25 knot convoy effectively are rare, as the escortneeds a margin of speed superiority to investigatecontacts and move around relative to the screenedbody. Even rarer, nowadays, are ships which couldmaintain a speed of over 20 knots for over twothousand miles - fuel stowages are not sufficient.

Helicopters

Adequate defence against the air and surfacethreat could be provided by building ships withthe speed, range, sensors and armament appropriateto the role and consideration of this ship in detailwill make up the latter part of this essay. Sensorsappropriate to anti-submarine defence at speed aremore difficult to provide. Whether passive oractive modes are used, sonar is the only underwaterlong or medium range sensor available in the for-seeable future and sonar devices must be movingslowly, ideally stationary. Immediately one of theprime advantages of the sonar fitted anti-submarinehelicopter comes to mind; a stationary transducerwhen in the water, but with a high speed ofadvance — the ideal vehicle for escorting fastmerchant convoys. Aircraft such as the Sea King,already in service in several versions in manynavies, have transit speeds of 100 knots and anendurance of three to four hours. Two or fourhoming torpedoes or depth bombs can be carriedand although medium range variable depth sonaris presently installed there is no reason whypassive arrays or sonobuoys should not be carried.

Providing a base for such helicopters neednot cause problems. A United States Navy pro-gramme designated project ARAPAHO has alreadydescribed how all the support facilities needed bya squadron can be embarked in standard 8 x 8 x 20feet shipping containers. These containers arealready air conditioned and insulated, fitted withstandard naval fire-fighting and safety equipmentas well as power and telephone. In a trial of thisconcept, an entire Sea King squadron (HS-5)embarked in USS Wasp with all required workshops,offices, spare parts and stores in 21 such contain-ers averaging 7000 pounds in weight. Embarkationin a merchant ship would need additional contain-ers for personnel accommodation and facilities aswell as the storage of fuel for the aircraft.

The principle advantage of such a scheme isthat squadrons earmarked to embark in suchships — ideally Reserve squadrons — could nor-mally operate from the containers ashore. Whenactivated and aboard ship they would be usingthe same facilities as used ashore with, hopefully,higher serviceability. The type and number of heli-copters to embark could be determined by thethreat assessment and the space available; airgroups could be assembled ashore and embarkedwhile the host ship was being turned around at theend of a journey. No prior preparation or alterationto the host ship is envisaged, she would still bemanned and operated as a commercial cargocarrier with a self-contained naval componentembarked to provide defence, exactly as has beendone by merchantmen for hundreds of years.

Such a plan does have drawbacks; storage ofconsumables — fuel, water, food, spare parts, wouldbe a major limitation and a reduction in the com-mercial capacity of a ship would be another. TheARAPAHO plan envisages between 50 and 100containers to support six Sea Kings in a merchant-man; other authorities give a figure of up to 500containers being replaced although this latterfigure presupposes a certain amount of permanencyin the arrangement and a good deal of prior pre-paration. Using the working figure of 2000 con-tainers per ship this is a reduction of between 5 and25 per cent in cargo capacity.

The carriage of helicopters does not entirelyprovide all-round defence to convoys or individualships. Some air defence is still needed and thehelicopter is not yet an effective air-defencevehicle; either surface-to-air missiles or fighteraircraft are still lacking. Installation of missile sys-tems in containers has been suggested; these wouldhave to be built at a great cost, then stored awaiting


the call for use. Storage would demand somedegree of preservation and consequent settingto work after installation in the host ship, thusdefeating the whole aim of the module conceptwhich is quick installation of an already function-ing system. Embarkation of fighter aircraft ismore feasible, especially when the reduced num-bers required for deck alert operations are calcu-lated and the ineffectiveness of missiles againstshadowing aircraft is included.

Still lacking are the necessary radar andcommand and control facilities in the host ship.These may be placed in modules but for theradar at least the disadvantages of 'mothballing'for long periods are evident, as would be the diffi-culty of obtaining trained operators. The largenumber of containers is reducing the cargocarrying capacity of the host ship to an alarmingdegree, a detailed calculation would produce afigure approaching half of the ship's normal cargoreplaced by defensive containers by the time heli-copters, VSTOL fighters, radar, missile systemsand associated operations rooms with necessaryfuel supplies, weapon storage and personnel facili-ties are included. Removal of the air defence andcommand capability into a special purpose shipwould restore a more reasonable balance betweendefended and defender.

THE MICRO-AIRCRAFT CARRIERSuch a special purpose air defence ship

would need an area air defence missile system(Standard?), a suitable long range air warning/air direction radar and be able to operate aboutsix fighter aircraft. An operations room designedto accept information from, and take control of,anti-submarine and surface strike helicopters, aswell as the air defence weapons, would be installed.She must be capable of up to forty knots and beable to sustain this speed for over three or fourthousand miles, in a sea state in which a tanker orcontainer ship can operate.

HydrofoUObviously this will not be a conventional

ship with a displacement hull. Either a hydrofoilor surface-effect ship is possible and plans forboth have been prepared. Hydrofoils so far builthave been intended for developmental patrol boatroles but results of tests indicate that a 1,000ton hydrofoil is feasible. A micro-carrier of 1,000tons has been designed which would be capable of50 knots with a range of over 2,000 nautical mileswhen operating on foils. Such a carrier couldoperate two VTOL fighters and could be equippedwith the necessary direction equipment.

Page 32 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

Surface Effect Ship

Surface effect ships of 2000 tons are alsobeing planned as the next step from the two 100ton developmental vehicles (SES-100A and -100B)now being assessed by the United States Navy.

Operating at a height of twenty feet to provide astable platform in any but the most extremeweather and travelling at up to 60 knots, such amicro-carrier would fill the requirements for con-voy escort. The configuration of such a ship is sub-ject to detailed calculation and experiment but inbroad detail a 200 feet by 100 feet micro-carrierwould have one half, traditionally the port half,reserved for aircraft operating areas. Two 75 by 50feet grids would be installed from which VSTOLfighters would operate. Experience has provedgrids of this size essential to allow exhaust gasesto escape instead of recirculating into the engineintakes when operating Harriers; the Harriersuccessor is unlikely to be much larger. The windover the deck generated by either the hydrofoilor surface effect micro-carrier ensures that aircraftoperating in the VTOL mode will have adequatepayload. Should VTOL technology not make goodits promise one or two catapults could be installedin this deck, the aircraft making a short landingon completion of the flight. The starboard half ofthe ship would be occupied by a conventional butstreamlined superstructure which would incorpor-ate radar antennae and missile launchers. Aseparate helicopter deck may be found to be advan-tageous on the starboard quarter so that immediate-notice fighters need not be disturbed for helicop-ter movements.

Intended specifically as an air defenceescort, the surface effect ship has the same anti-submarine advantages as a helicopter. Remainingmotionless on the water, variable depth sonar canbe operated to detect submarines and high speedcan be used to regain station. Provided space andweight capacity can be found without detractingfrom the primary role, the secondary role of anti-submarine defence could be filled relieving thehelicopters of some of the load.

New Escort in Use

A hypothetical setting for using these facili-ties would be an increase in international tensionleading to a requirement to provide multi-capable escorts for merchant shipping. Thescheduling of tankers and container ships is basedon the loading and unloading facilities availableand forcing loaded ships to wait before sailingwould reduce the effectiveness of the wholesystem, even more than slowing ships down in

transit. Convoys may, therefore, consist of onlytwo or three ships. Each ship would have a heli-copter squadron embarked simultaneously withthe loading of the cargo; the aircraft, providing amix of anti-submarine and anti-surface capabilities,would fly on as the ship sailed. Also joining atdeparture would be a fast micro-carrier escort toprovide full anti air defence with missiles andfighters.

The convoy would proceed to its destinationunder the control of the micro-carrier acting asthe command and control authority for all pur-poses. The convoy commander, embarked in theescort, would have available the necessary com.-munications and information display equipmentto assist him in decision making; equipment whichbecause of its complexity could not readily beprovided in the merchant ship, even using themodule principle. All air-defence would be carriedout by the escort, aided by airborne early warninghelicopters operated from the merchantmen fordetection and her own missiles and fighters fordefence. Surface defence would be co-ordinated bythe escort using her own radar with helicoptersfor surface search and strike aided by fighters forstrikes against tougher targets; submarine defencewould be left principally to the anti-submarinehelicopters operating from the merchantmen butco-ordinated by the escort.

Fast micro-carriers would have many otheruses, even to escorting military convoys includingattack carriers. A VTOL fighter at immediatereadiness on deck could be regarded as a lowaltitude combat air patrol ready to be scrambledby an airborne early warning aircraft. The nearimpossibility of a successful torpedo attack, andthe difficulty of a successful missile attack againstthe fast moving vehicles make them attractive fora variety of roles where the conventional displace-ment hull would be at too great a risk.

As with all weapon systems there are disad-vantages - cost being the greatest. The expenseof providing full air direction and workshopfacilities for each embarked detachment will behigh, this very high cost will probably slow downthe introduction of the micro-carrier but it isinevitable that eventually there will be some suchvessel providing the aircraft necessary for defenceof commercial convoys.

CONCLUSION

The driving force behind the development ofthe seaborne aircraft platform has been the needfor the capabilities of the aircraft far at sea. To

meet this need several types of air capable shiphave been developed; of these, the large attackcarrier, the small carrier and the helicopter fittedescort are the most prominent; three other shipsare notable for some features — the sea controlship, the through deck cruiser and the latestSoviet air capable ship.

Shore based aircraft have often been sug-gested as a better proposition than the sea basedcounterpart. Within useful range of bases this maybe true but beyond 500 miles from fixed shorebases present or projected maritime reconnais-sance aircraft are not economic. Beyond 500miles the extended transit times reduces the usefultime on task to a useless level, beyond about 2000miles the shore based aircraft cannot reach thescene of action at all. On a global scale, andallowing for the unreliability of overseas bases,this is unacceptable.

Destroyer-based helicopters are gainingworld-wide acceptance as a normal part of thenaval scene. The proliferation of deck f i t tedships and the increasing capabilities of the embar-ked aircraft ensures a long and profitable associa-tion between the warship and the helicopterwhich will last as long as the aircraft can performtasks which the ship cannot perform unaided.These destroyer decks could not easily be adaptedfor carriage of VTOL fighter aircraft and for thehigh performance aircraft some form of specialisedair capable ship is essential.

The large attack carriers, operated princi-pally by the United States Navy, are political asmuch as naval weapons with the role of projectingnaval air power ashore or over large areas of ocean.As long as the political need for this capability toproject air power remains, and is recognised, thelarge attack carrier will remain in service;probably in a form very like that we now know.

The future for the small aircraft carrier isnot so rosy. During the post-war proliferation ofthe small carrier, naval aircraft were small enoughfor a useful number to be carried in a single ship.Increasing size of carrier-borne aircraft forced areduction in the numbers embarked to the pointwhere the small ship could not retain a multi-role capability. The large navies gave up the smallcarrier entirely when this occurred, smaller naviescould not afford to do so and persevered with thesmall carrier. All of these remaining examples areold and at the end of their lives; several possiblereplacements are possible.


Alternatives

The Royal Navy approach is the through-deckcruiser, a ship which will operate a handful ofhelicopters and VSTOL fighters. This ship willalso be equipped with area defence surface to airmissiles and comprehensive sensor and commandfacilities. Such a ship will be very expensive, tooexpensive to build in any numbers, but will be aversatile ship. Rather than a serious contender asthe latest variation in aircraft carriers the high costof the ship and the low number of aircraft carriedplaces this ship in the class of a cruiser withextensive aviation arrangements.

The American answer to the problem is quitedifferent. The sea control ship has been designedfrom the outset solely to operate aircraft whichwill control the sea environment in the vicinityof the parent ship. Essentially this is a defensiveor escort role and such is freely admitted by theUnited States Navy which considers the ship toosmall to support enough aircraft for long enoughto even be called an aircraft carrier. Unlike thethrough-deck cruiser, the sea control ship willexist solely to operate aircraft for the defence ofaccompanying ships - without her aircraft she willbe a liability.

The Russian ship appears to be an attemptto provide a cruiser with enough aircraft to con-fidently face a high level of threat for a reasonabletime. Exactly how it will be employed remains amatter for conjecture, it appears to fall in the samecategory as the attack carrier — if the need forair power of that scale is admitted, the ship willremain in service.

Sea Control Ship VariationsSmaller navies with a desire to operate

beyond the range of shore based aircraft must lookto the sea control ship idea as the only source ofaircraft they can afford. Navies prepared to limittheir naval air arms to helicopters could settle onthe hybrid supply ship/helicopter carrier able tocarry a small squadron of defensive helicoptersbut unable to combat the shadowing aircraft. Moreambitious services could use the basic hull andmachinery of a support ship as the basis of aninexpensive locally built sea control ship able tooperate enough fighters and helicopters to provideadequate defence against all forms of threat.

Such a ship must be defensive. The nationwishing to operate an offensive naval air armposing a credible threat has no choice but to lookfor large aircraft carriers. Only the large ship canoperate enough aircraft or carry enough aviation

consumables to operate aircraft for a reasonablelength of time.

Convoy Escort

The main disadvantage of a sea control ship islow speed - it would be unable to stay with amodern 25 to 30 knot container ship. Defence ofcommercial convoys in the decades to come willneed the capabilities only aircraft can provide.Helicopters operating from shipping containersincluded in the commercial cargo of merchantships would provide emergency defence againstsubmarines and some surface threats. Provisionof air defence by these modules is not feasible astoo high a proportion of commercial cargo must bedisplaced. Rather, a special purpose air defenceand command escort is needed.

Speed, range and seakeeping requirementsfor this escort are such that only a hydrofoil orsurface effect ship could be considered. For airdefence fixed wing aircraft are essential so theescort must be able to operate fighter aircraft andincorporate the necessary radar and commandfacilities. Communications and information displayfacilities are best provided in this single unit toprovide the escort commander with a convenientand efficient unit from which to exercise controlof the convoy.

This micro-aircraft carrier will take someyears to develop but must eventually enter serviceas it is the only forseeable way in which thecapabilities of aircraft, so essential for convoydefence, can be obtained at sea.

THE AUTHORLieutenant Commander Raymond Marshall Jones RAN

was born in 1943 at Oakleigh in Victoria. He matriculatedfrom Christian Brothers College, East St. Kilda in 1959and joined the Victorian State Public Service as a Drafts-man. Lieutenant Commander Jones joined the RAN in1963 as a Supplementary List (Air) Midshipman. Hecarried out Observer training with the Royal Navy atMalta and then served in various squadrons seeing servicein Vietnam 1967-68. Promotion to Lieutenant tookplace in 1966 and to Lieutenant Commander 8 yeaislater. In 1974 he transferred to the General List.Other appointments held have been RN exchange service1969-71, Basic Aircrew Training Officer HMAS Cerberus1971-73, Watchkeeping training HMAS Hobart 1973-74and as Air Operations Officer NAS Nowra 1974-75.Lieutenant Commander Jones is currently at RAAF EastSale on the Advanced Navigation Course and will assumethe duties of Senior Naval Officer RAAF East Sale oncompletion of the course.


THE NAME OF THE GAME THE SIZE OF THE GAME

An extract from a speech made to 101st AnnualMeeting of the U.S. Naval Institute by AdmiralJ.L. Holloway HI, U.S. Navy.

Admiral Holloway referred to a questionposed to him by a Congressional Committee whichwent like this "Why is it that the United StatesNavy is receiving the lion's share of the defencebudget? At 31 billion dollars you are getting morethan the Air Force and considerably more thanthe United States Army".

My reply was very simple. I said "MrChairman, there has been no time since World WarII when the role of the United States Navy hasbeen more important. If the Navy does its job incarrying out its roles and missions in our nationalstrategy, there will be no job for the Army and theAir Force to do in defending our country".

Addressing the Navy League Convention in NewOrleans, on 23 April 1975, President Ford emphasizedthe threat posed by expanding Soviet naval strengthand asserted that the U.S. must maintain "sea, landand air forces that are second to none." He declared:" . . . Soviet Naval units now freely roam the world'sseas.

"Let me /five vnu a graphic example - some-thing that ha* happened within the past few days.Elements from all Jour fleets of the Soviet Navyhave just completed global maneuvers. More than220 Soviet ships, deployed in all the oceans of theworld, participated in the exercise. More than 50Soviet ships were deployed in the Atlantic, extend-ing their maneuvers to the Norwegian Sea andsouthwest of the British Isles. Soviet reconnais-sance aircraft operating from Cuba and Guineaconducted ocean surveillance over wide areas ofthe A tlantic. The Soviet Navy was also active inthe Mediterranean, the Pacific and the IndianOcean. "

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AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTE

1. The Australian Naval Institute has been formed and incorporated in the Australian Capital Territory.The main objects of the Institute are:—

a. to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and theMaritime profession.

b. to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy andthe Maritime profession.

c. to publish a journal.

2. The Institute is self supporting and non-profit making. The aim is to encourage freedom of dis-cussion, dissemination of information, comment and opinion and the advancement of professionalknowledge concerning naval and maritime matters.

3. Membership of the Institute is open to:-

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b. Associate Members—(1) Members of the Reserve Naval Forces of Australia.

(2) Members of the Australian Military Forces and the RoyalAustralian Air Force both permanent and reserve.

(3) Ex-members of the Australian Defence Forces, both permanentand reserve components, provided that they have been honourablydischarged from that force.

(4) Other persons having and professing a special interest in navaland maritime affairs.

c. Honorary Members-A person who has made a distinguished contribution to the Naval ormaritime profession or who has rendered distinguished service to theInstitute may be elected by the Council to Honorary Membership.

4. Joining fee for Regular and Associate Member is $5. Annual Subscription for both is $10.

5. Inquiries and application for membership should be directed to:-

The Secretary,Australian Naval Institute,P.O. Box 18,DEAKIN, A.C.T. 2600.

CONTRIBUTIONS

As the Australian Naval Institute exists for the promotion and advancement of knowledgerelating to the Naval and maritime profession, all members are strongly encouraged to submitarticles for publication. Only in this way will our aims be achieved.

DISCLAIMER

In writing for the Institute it must be borne in mind that the views expressed are those of theauthor and not necessarily those of the Department of Defence, the Naval Board or the Institute.

PLESSEY CONGRATULATES THE AUSTRALIAN NAVAL INSTITUTEON THE PUBLICATION OF THIS INAUGURAL ISSUE

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