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DOI: 10.1177/0022343301038004006 2001; 38; 493 Journal of Peace Research

Thomas Weber Negotiation

Gandhian Philosophy, Conflict Resolution Theory and Practical Approaches to

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Introduction

Many celebrated peace activists and NobelPeace Prize recipients have acknowledgedtheir intellectual debt to Mahatma Gandhi,and there has also been much written aboutGandhi’s influence on social activists (forexample, Ingram, 1990) and some writing onhis influence on the shaping of recent signifi-cant peace, justice and environmentalphilosophies (Weber, 1999). However, it ispuzzling that possible links between Gand-hian praxis and the recent conflict resolu-tion/negotiation literature have received solittle attention. Gandhi was, after all, a life-long practitioner of conducting major publicconflicts and a profound conflict theorist. Inshort, it could be argued that Gandhi shouldbe viewed from within conflict resolutiontheory, rather than as being distinct from it.The fact that this is not the case can appearparticularly puzzling to those versed in

Gandhian social philosophy who are alsofamiliar with the conflict resolution literature– given its Gandhian ‘flavour’.

It would seem to be a reasonable assump-tion that Gandhi’s well-publicized examplesof nonviolent resistance and the voluminouswritings on his techniques at least set the tonefor the later development and phenomenalgrowth of conflict resolution literature in theguise of modern problem-solving andwin–win (as opposed to power-based andzero-sum) approaches leading to integrativeconflict resolution (as opposed to mere compromise and distributive outcomes).However, the two bodies of knowledge –concerning Gandhian satyagraha andmodern conflict resolution theory and itspractical application as spelled out in negoti-ation guidebooks – seem to have developedin mutual ignorance. This raises the issue ofhow they may enrich the field if they are seenas parts of a larger whole.

© 2001 Journal of Peace Research,vol. 38, no. 4, 2001, pp. 493–513Sage Publications (London, Thousand Oaks,CA and New Delhi)[0022-3433(200107)38:4; 493–513; 018402]

Gandhian Philosophy, Conflict Resolution Theoryand Practical Approaches to Negotiation

THOMAS WEBER

School of Sociology, Politics and Anthropology, La Trobe University

It is puzzling that links between Gandhian social philosophy and recent conflict resolution/negotiationliterature, especially given the latter’s Gandhian ‘flavour’, have received so little scholarly attention.While there seems to be no direct causal link between the two bodies of knowledge, conflict resolutionliterature in the guise of modern problem-solving and win–win (as opposed to power-based and zero-sum) approaches leading to integrative conflict resolution (as opposed to mere compromise and dis-tributive outcomes) strongly echoes Gandhi’s own writings and the analyses of some Gandhi scholars.This is especially true in the case of non-mainstream writings that see conflict resolution techniques aspotentially being about more than the solution of immediate problems, that see a broader personal andsocietal transformation as the ultimate goal. This article explores these connections and argues thatGandhian satyagraha should be squarely located within conflict resolution discourse.

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Satyagraha as the GandhianApproach to Conflict Resolution

Satyagraha is Gandhi’s technique of nonvio-lent activism. The term has variously beentranslated as ‘passive resistance’, ‘nonviolentresistance’, ‘nonviolent direct action’, andeven ‘militant nonviolence’ (Weber, 1991: 2).For Gandhi it was not only a method of con-ducting conflict, it was also a way of life, ofliving in Truth.

Galtung (1992: 94–96), echoing Næss(1974: 70–85),1 summarizes Gandhi’s con-flict norms in such a way that at least parts ofthem could almost seem to have given rise toor been derived from the integrative conflictresolution literature. (Other parts go wellbeyond this literature into the realms ofhuman transcendence.)

The first norm relates to goals and con-flicts, and states that one should act in con-flicts (now, here, for your own group, out ofidentity and out of conviction); define theconflict well (state your goals clearly, try tounderstand the opponent’s goals, emphasizecommon and compatible goals, state conflictrelevant facts objectively); and have a positiveapproach to the conflict (give the conflict apositive emphasis, see it as an opportunity tomeet the opponent, as an opportunity totransform society and as an opportunity totransform the self ).

The second norm relates to conflictstruggle and enjoins one to act nonviolentlyin conflicts (do not harm or hurt with words,deeds or thoughts, do not damage property,prefer violence to cowardice, do good even tothe evil doer); to act in a goal-consistentmanner (by including constructive elements,using goal-revealing forms of struggle, actingopenly rather than secretly, and by aiming thestruggle at the correct point); not to cooper-ate with evil (do not cooperate with evilstructures, status, action or with those who

cooperate with evil); to be willing to sacrifice(by not escaping from punishment and beingwilling to die if necessary); not to polarize thesituation (one should distinguish betweenantagonisms and antagonists, betweenpersons and status, one should maintaincontact with opponents and have empathyfor their position, and be flexible in definingparties and positions); not to escalate (byremaining loyal, not provoking the opponentor allowing onself to be provoked, by nothumiliating or allowing oneself to be humili-ated, by not expanding the goals of the con-flict and by using the mildest forms ofconflict behaviour).

The third and final norm relates to conflictresolution, and it directs that conflicts shouldbe solved (do not continue the struggleforever, always seek negotiation, seek positivesocial transformation and seek transform-ation of both the self and the opponent); thatone should insist on essentials rather thannon-essentials (do not trade with essentials, bewilling to compromise on non-essentials);that one should see oneself as fallible (beaware that you may be wrong, admit yourmistakes, maintain consistency over time);that one should be generous with opponents(do not exploit their weaknesses, do not judgethem harder than yourself, trust them); andfinally that one should aim for conversionrather than coercion (seek solutions that canbe accepted by both you and the opponent,never coerce the opponent, convert the oppo-nent into a believer of the cause, or, asGaltung implies throughout this section, beopen to being converted yourself ).

Gandhi’s own statements readily reflectthese principles: ‘A satyagrahi2 must neverforget the distinction between evil and theevil-doer’ (Young India, 8 August 1929);3

j ournal o f PE AC E RE S E A RC H volume 38 / number 4 / july 2001494

1 In turn, both Næss’s and Galtung’s books are based ontheir earlier joint book (Galtung & Næss, 1955).

2 A satyagrahi is one practising satyagraha.3 Indian Opinion, Young India and Harijan were newspapersedited by Gandhi and are the major source of his writings.The full articles can be found in the appropriate volumes ofGandhi (1958–1991) at the relevant date.

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‘The essence of non-violence technique isthat it seeks to liquidate antagonisms but notantagonists themselves’ (Harijan, 29 April1939); ‘it is often forgotten that it is never theintention of a Satyagrahi to embarrass thewrong doer’; ‘The Satyagrahi’s object is toconvert, not to coerce, the wrong doer’(Harijan, 25 March 1939); ‘It is the acid testof non-violence that, in a non-violent con-flict, there is no rancour left behind, and inthe end the enemies are converted intofriends’ (Harijan, 12 November 1938).

In a conflict situation, for Gandhi, there isno other plan than the adherence to nonvio-lence in thought, word and deed, and noother goal than to reach the truth (and ulti-mately the Truth). Because good ends cannever grow out of bad means, the opponent(for Gandhi there may be opponents butnever enemies) is not forced to expose him orherself to loss. There is ideally no threat, co-ercion or punishment. Instead, in Gandhi’sscheme, the idea is to undergo ‘self-suffering’in the belief that the opponent can be con-verted to seeing the truth by touching his orher conscience, or that a clearer vision oftruth may grow out of the dialectical processfor both parties.

Conflict Resolution Theory in theGandhian Literature

A search through the English-languageGandhi literature reveals limited attempts tomake the connection with conflict resolutiontheory. Apart from one book that attemptsexplicitly to make this link (Weber, 1991), andthree others that examine Gandhi’s philos-ophy and praxis of conflict (Bondurant, 1965;Næss, 1974; Galtung, 1992), there appears tobe little in the way of other major publicationsdedicated to the topic. The rest of the litera-ture seems to be limited to a handful of articlesin the journal Gandhi Marg on the generaltheme, or at least with titles suggesting thatthey may relate to the general theme.

A classic in the field of scholarly Gandhianliterature, Bondurant’s book is subtitled TheGandhian Philosophy of Conflict. It not onlyanalyses Gandhi’s campaigns but also de-lineates a theoretical background that soundssimilar to, and in some aspects goes wellbeyond, the conflict resolution literature thatfollowed it. Bondurant points out that

The objective is not to assert propositions, butto create possibilities. In opening up newchoices and in confronting an opponent withthe demand that he make a choice, the satya-grahi involves himself in acts of ‘ethical exist-ence’. The process forces a continuingexamination of one’s own motives, an examin-ation undertaken within the context ofrelationships as they are changed towards anew, restructured, and reintegrated pattern.(Bondurant, 1965: vi–vii)

This dialectical process, she adds, is essen-tially creative and inherently constructive. Itsimmediate object is

a restructuring of the opposing elements toachieve a situation which is satisfactory to boththe original opposing antagonists but in such away as to present an entirely new total circum-stance . . . through the operation of non-violent action the truth as judged by thefulfilment of human needs will emerge in theform of a mutually satisfactory and agreed-upon solution. (Bondurant, 1965: 195)

This line is clearly echoed in some modernconflict resolution sources that do notmention Gandhi. For example, Burton(1997) sees conflict as inextricably linkedwith unfulfilled human needs, and Mitchell(1993: 79) sees the aim of problem-solvingexercises as a re-analysis of the conflict as ashared problem, as providing alternatives tocoercion and ‘new options for a generallyacceptable and self-sustaining resolution,involving agreement and a new relationshipbetween erstwhile adversaries’. And it is veryclosely reflected in the still relatively obscurerecent approach to conflict resolution calledthe transformative model (Bush & Folger,1994).

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Among other Western scholars, ArneNæss was greatly influenced by Gandhi(Weber, 1999), but his work on nonviolenceand conflict has not had the same impact ashis writings on ‘deep ecology’. His bookGandhi and Group Conflict (1974) system-atizes the norms and hypotheses that under-gird a Gandhian approach to the resolutionof conflict. Some of the propositions include:all human beings have long-term interests incommon; violence is invited from opponentsif they are humiliated or provoked; oppon-ents are less likely to resort to violence thebetter they understand your position; theessential interests which opponents have incommon should be clearly formulated andcooperation established on that basis; per-sonal contact with the opponent should besought; opponents should not be judgedharder than the self; opponents should betrusted; an unwillingness to compromise onnon-essentials decreases the likelihood of trueresolution; and a position of weakness in anopponent should not be exploited (Næss,1974: 60–84).

Næss’s ex-pupil and the founder ofmodern peace research, Johan Galtung, gaveus the Gandhi-inspired concept of ‘structuralviolence’ (Weber, 1999). He has also writtenat length on Gandhi and conflict resolution.A manuscript which explores this connection(Galtung, 1971) was never published. Areworked version (Galtung, 1992) did notappear between covers for more than twodecades, and then from a relatively little-known Indian peace research institute,almost guaranteeing that it would be un-noticed by Western scholars. In the book,Galtung includes a section on Gandhi andconflict resolution. He lists six approaches toconflict resolution where the incompatibilityis eliminated (he lists a further six where theincompatibility is preserved): resolving theincompatibility, compromise, trading, multi-lateralization (taking the conflict out of theframe where it is often stuck), integration,

and decoupling (Galtung, 1992: 84–93).This typology is similar to the ones presentedin much of the recent ‘guide to’ conflict reso-lution literature, but was written before thatliterature, and in typical Galtungian fashionis original thought and does not refer toanyone else’s work as source material.

Many Indian books on Gandhi’s satya-graha do have some references that sound asif they come from the same tradition asmodern conflict resolution literature. Forexample, Diwakar points out that in a con-flict situation ‘while violence to person andproperty diverts the mind of the parties con-cerned from the real issues involved, nonvio-lent action invites the parties to a dialogueabout the issues themselves. A common solu-tion of the problem begins to be the objectiveof both rather than the destruction of eachother’ (Diwakar, 1969: 25).

Dhawan’s early and still major study onGandhi’s political philosophy (Dhawan,1946) is, however, more typical. While itcontains sections on social conflicts, religiousconflicts and economic conflicts, the book isreally a detailed study of satyagraha, and waswritten while the Mahatma was still alive,well before the advent of modern conflict res-olution literature. The terminology, there-fore, is quite distinct.

Most contemporary Indian writing in thearea does not follow the lead of Bondurant,Næss and Galtung and does not take theliterature further than does Dhawan. Thequasi-scholarly journal Gandhi Marg seems alittle more encouraging at first glance, but itsarticles make few such connections. In ashort article, Rath (1986: 857) asserts thatGandhi’s satyagraha may be ‘one of the mostviable techniques of conflict resolution’, andthe author is astonished that this aspect of it‘has not received the attention it deserves’.Although he makes note of Gandhi’s stages ofconflict resolution (negotiation, followed byself-suffering and nonviolent direct action),this is not related to any modern literature on


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the techniques that may facilitate the resolu-tion of conflict. The same is true for otherarticles with promising titles (e.g. Chan-drasekaran, 1990; Mehta, 1991).

Gandhi in the Conflict ResolutionTheory and Negotiation PracticeLiterature

The Resource Manual for a Living Revolution(Coover et al., 1981) was an undergroundclassic, widely used by those conducting non-violence training workshops for several yearsbefore it was published. The book explores theprocess of working in groups and living in sup-portive communities, the techniques of per-sonal growth and consciousness-raising, and ispacked with exercises and other informationthat can be used to foster practical skills. Moreimportant, it also contains a chapter on thetheoretical basis for change and a sub-chapteron conflict resolution. The chapter, in asection dealing with developing a theory ofchange, lists Gandhian nonviolence as one ofthe important social change theories and rec-ommends the studying of case-histories as away of assisting in the formation of a frame-work for exploring the theory of social changemovements. A reading list of material onGandhi’s campaigns is provided. The sectionon conflict resolution focuses on ‘I-messages’,‘active listening’, ‘brainstorming’ and ‘no-loseproblem-solving processes’. The source ofmuch of this information was the hugelypopular Parent Effectiveness Training manual(Gordon, 1970). That manual, however, listsas suggested reading books in child psychol-ogy, therapy and parenting books, but noGandhian sources.

The first major ‘peace studies’ periodical,founded in 1957, the Journal of Conflict Res-olution (JCR) seems to be an appropriateplace to start a search for Gandhian theory aspart of the conflict resolution tradition.However it proves to have a less Gandhi-minded approach than its somewhat less

formal rival Journal of Peace Research (JPR),especially in the latter’s earlier years under itsfounding editor, Johan Galtung. After thefirst few issues, there is practically nothing onany potential link with Gandhi in JCR.Nevertheless, a content analysis of the journalreveals several important scholarly articles onsome of the aspects of the conflict processthat would later find their way into the newproblem-solving negotiation literature.

The early issues of the journal, not sur-prisingly, focused on international conflicts,with many articles on arms control, deter-rence and international bargaining. Still, ithad room for works on interpersonal con-flicts and bargaining as well as ones related toGandhian nonviolence. Over time, nonvio-lence seems to have become marginalized inthe scholarly conflict resolution literature,and during the 1960s JCR came to be heavilypredisposed towards the publication of gametheory-related articles.

However, in its second volume the journalcontains articles (Næss, 1958; Deutsch, 1958)which eventually would be incorporated intobooks on Gandhi and conflict or conflict witha Gandhian flavour (Næss, 1974; Deutsch,1973). The next volume contains a relevantarticle (Galtung, 1959), and a review essay onBondurant’s book (Sharp, 1959). Galtung’sarticle states that the antagonist should be sep-arated from the antagonism – a themecommon to Gandhian and the ‘win–win’ con-flict resolution literature. In their introduc-tion, the two Norwegian guest editors statethat these articles ‘seek to clarify some of theissues to be faced in developing research onnon-violent alternatives in conflict situations’(Rinde & Rokkan, 1959: 4).

The only other article to deal with Gandhiin JCR was a review essay dealing with bookson Gandhi (Erikson, 1969) and nonviolentactivism (Sharp, 1973). In this article, Lipsitz& Kritzer (1975) suggest that non-violenceshould be examined more closely as a form ofunconventional political action, but rather


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than linking it to conflict resolution theysuggest that the value of nonviolence lies inits healthy disregard for authority, which isgood for democracy, and because it may be away of getting children out of the habit ofgroup identification.

Although in its early years Galtung con-tributed theoretical papers on the generaltheme of nonviolence (e.g. Galtung, 1965),JPR tends to deal with actual inter- or intra-national conflicts and pays less attention toconflict resolution theory and negotiationpractice in the way that I am looking at themin this article. Only three articles (Pontara,1965; Klitgaard, 1971; Chatterjee, 1974)deal with approaches to conflict resolution ina manner that might show the applicability ofGandhian techniques to situations involvingthe conflicting process. Other Gandhi-related articles summarize Gandhian philos-ophy-in-action (e.g. Bose, 1981), deal withthe post-Gandhi Gandhian movement(Hettne, 1976), examine the attitudes ofGandhians to the question of the seemingreality of accommodation as against the idealof conversion (Nakhare, 1976), or detailGandhi’s influence on the field of peaceresearch (Sørensen, 1992) or on notable indi-viduals in the field (Weber, 1999).

Pontara, in an early and thorough philo-sophical examination of Gandhi’s attitude toviolence in extreme group conflict, points outthat he makes no detailed attempt to work outthe philosophy of conflict which is implicit inGandhi’s writings, and admits that he barelylooks at Gandhi’s satyagraha as an effectivesubstitute for violent methods of conductingsocial conflict. Klitgaard notes that satyagrahaas a hard-headed zero-sum bargaining tacticmay provide valuable payoffs, but possiblybecause its underlying principles were com-promised or its contradictions glossed over.Although Gandhian tactics may have beenultimately violent (or at least coercive), theymay have worked because they were perceivedas being nonviolent. However, he also notes

that ‘how the game was played, and how theopponent felt about his antagonist after thegame was over’ also mattered for Gandhi(Klitgaard, 1971: 147). This aspect was notexpanded on in the article, but it is at least oneof the main links between satyagraha andnegotiation practice as detailed in the recentproblem-solving literature.

Like Klitgaard, Chatterjee attempts toplace Gandhian satyagraha in a game theoryframework (that is one that subsumes arational strategic context). However, he con-cludes that satyagraha belongs to a class ofgames ‘with threat-vulnerable equilibria’, thatis, ‘where one or the other player is in a pos-ition to induce the other player to shift but notto force him to shift’ (Chatterjee, 1974: 28).

Several practically oriented journals withpromising titles (for example the NegotiationJournal and Mediation Quarterly) haveappeared in the relatively recent past. So far,Gandhi and Gandhian nonviolence have notbeen among the subjects they have covered.

The Links Between Gandhi’sSatyagraha and Modern ConflictResolution Practice

The words ‘conflict resolution’ can mean verydifferent things to different people. They areoften used synonymously with ‘disputesettlement’ and ‘conflict management’.Pioneering analyst of the position of needs inconflict situations, John Burton sees conflictresolution as a problem-solving exercise thataims at the elimination of the sources of theconflict, not merely the management of theconflict or the settlement (often throughcoercive power in a way that does not meetthe needs of all parties) of the manifestdispute. In short, for Burton, conflicts maybe managed and disputes may be settledwithout conflicts being resolved.

In contrast to an ‘adversarial powerapproach’, Burton champions a problem-solving approach which is grounded in his


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view of innate human needs, which tran-scend cultures, and which must be satisfiedif deep-seated conflicts are to be resolved.For Burton, the violation of the drives thatstem from these needs leads to conflict andcrime, while their satisfaction, throughproblem-solving processes, prevents vio-lence, and conflicts can be resolved bygetting to the roots of a problem through a‘searching analysis by all those concerned inthe light of which an agreement can bereached without any compromise of humanneeds’ (Burton, 1997: 45).

This collaborative problem-solvingapproach to conflict resolution seems to haveits origins in developments in industrialrelations in the 1960s, when the idea arosethat more cooperative interaction betweenthe parties could lead to a greater increase inproductivity than that which ensued frommore traditional forms of power bargaining(Scimecca, 1989: 267–268).4 In the mid-1960s, Burton instituted ‘internationalproblem-solving workshops’ at the Centre forthe Analysis of Conflict in London. One ofthe facilitators at the first workshop (whichmay have played a part in stopping hostilitiesbetween Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singa-pore), was the Harvard professor of inter-national law Roger Fisher (Scimecca, 1989:268). Also, around this time, some peaceactivists turned their attention to peacemak-ing activities; and dissatisfaction with thecostly, slow and adversarial court system ledto the development of what has come to beknown as the ‘alternative dispute resolution’(ADR) movement (Tidwell, 1998: 10–17).

This ‘alternative’ conflict resolutionmethod grew out of the adjudicative legal tra-dition and maintained the role of a third

party to determine the outcome in accord-ance with prevailing norms, and according totheorists like Burton still operated within thepower-bargaining frame, with legal or indus-trial norms determining the outcome. Laterin the 1960s a new approach, focusing onhuman needs, became more fashionable. Inthis approach, conflicting parties are broughttogether to analyse the conflict in a non-bargaining way that looks at its deep-rootedsources so that the conflict can be truly‘resolved’, rather than creating a situationwhere merely the manifest dispute is ‘settled’.For simple interpersonal disputes, com-munity or neighbourhood justice centresbecame popular, providing cheap mediationas an alternative to legal and quasi-legal pro-cesses.

These developments were graduallymoving towards the Gandhian model, andparticularly so in the recent non-mainstreamapproach known as transformative media-tion that sees mediation as a process thatpotentially can change individuals, andthrough them society, for the better. Thisapproach, very reminiscent of Bondurant’scharacterization of a Gandhian view of con-flict (but again without reference to Gandhi),starts from the premise that conflicts neednot be seen as problems in the first place.Instead it suggests that they should be seen asopportunities for moral growth and trans-formation (Bush & Folger, 1994: 81).

The Gandhian ‘Flavour’ of ModernConflict Resolution Literature andPractice

Deutsch (1987: 48), in his work on thedifferences between constructive anddestructive processes in the resolution of con-flict, summarized the position as follows:

If one wants to create the conditions for adestructive process of conflict resolution, onewould introduce into the conflict the typicalcharacteristics and effects of a competitive


4 Another impetus may have been the development of thefield of peace research (Laue, 1987: 21). Peace research, inturn, at least in the form given to it by Johan Galtung, wasdirectly influenced by the philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi(Weber, 1999). However, this connection does not seemenough to establish any strong causal link.

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process: poor communication; coercive tactics;suspicion; the perception of basic differencesin values; an orientation to increasing thepower differences; challenges to the legitimacyof the parties and so forth. On the other hand,if one wants to create the conditions for a con-structive process of conflict resolution, onewould introduce into the conflict the typicaleffects of a cooperative process: good com-munication; the perception of similarity inbeliefs and values; full acceptance of another’slegitimacy; problem-centered negotiations;mutual trust and confidence; informationsharing and so forth.

Deutsch (1969: 23) makes the point that ina cooperative context a conflict is seen as acommon problem in which the opponents‘have the joint interest of reaching a mutuallysatisfactory solution’. This process is likely tolead to a productive conflict resolutionbecause ‘it aids open and honest communi-cation of relevant information between theparticipants’, reducing misunderstandings‘which can lead to confusion and mistrust’; ittends to limit rather than expand the scope ofthe conflict by encouraging ‘the recognitionof legitimacy of each other’s interests and ofthe necessity of searching for a solutionwhich is responsive to the needs of each side’;and ‘it leads to a trusting, friendly attitudewhich increases sensitivity to similarities andcommon interests, while minimising thesalience of differences’ (1969: 24). He addsthat ‘Threat induces defensiveness andreduces the tolerance of ambiguity as well asopenness to the new and unfamiliar; exces-sive tension leads to primitivization andstereo-typing of thought processes’ (1969:22).

Pruitt (1987) also notes several possibleoutcomes to a negotiation. Where an agree-ment is reached, the outcome may be thecapitulation of one of the parties, or, morepositively, the traditional outcome of a com-promise, or, most positively, what he calls an‘integrative agreement’. Compromises arereasonable, but not outstanding. Integrative

agreements, on the other hand, resolveparties’ interests so that both parties are satis-fied. They reconcile the strongest interests ofthe parties, are more lasting than compro-mises and strengthen relationships as well as‘improve the chances of finding subsequentintegrative agreements’ (Pruitt, 1987: 69).

Various studies of individual preferencesfor methods of conducting conflict appear toindicate that settlement of disputes is easierfor individuals to grasp rather than coming toterms with underlying conflicts. Forexample, LaTour et al. (1976) argue that dis-putants generally preferred a form of dispute-managing procedure that involved a largedegree of third-party intervention rather thanindividual face-to-face bargaining, which wasthe least preferred method. It seems that ifdisputants can put their cases fully they aremore comfortable with an impartial thirdparty making a decision for them. Neverthe-less, the popular recent practically orientedtraining books on negotiation practicepromise that ‘you can get to yes’ (Fisher &Ury, 1987), ‘you can negotiate anything’(Cohen, 1980), ‘you can negotiate with diffi-cult people’ (Ury, 1991), that ‘I can win andyou can win’ (Wertheim et al., 1992), in factthat ‘everyone can win’ (Cornelius & Faire,1989), and generally that ‘win–win solutions’are possible to conflict. These books are self-help manuals that eschew third-party inter-vention, and they regularly make it ontobest-seller lists.

The advice on negotiating techniquesleading to integrative agreements that thesebooks dispense must have some empiricalbasis. However, as a rule they provide anec-dotal evidence rather than referenced sourcesand in fact ‘show little evidence of attentionto ongoing, empirical research’ (Weiss-Wik,1983: 707), let alone any connection withGandhi. Nevertheless, if we look at popularnegotiation manuals we find many proposi-tions that are backed up by empirical researchand Gandhian ‘flavoured’ statements. For


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example, the phenomenally successful bookGetting to Yes (Fisher & Ury, 1987) promoteswhat the authors call ‘principled negotiation’and suggests that in this method

you look for mutual gains wherever possible,and where your interests conflict, you shouldinsist that the result be based on some fair stan-dards independent of the will of either side.The method of principled negotiation is hardon the merits, soft on the people. It employsno tricks and no posturing. Principled negoti-ation shows you how to obtain what you areentitled to and still be decent. It enables you tobe fair while protecting you against those whowould take advantage of your fairness. (Fisher& Ury, 1987: xii)

And, ‘separating the people from theproblem allows you to deal directly andempathetically with the other negotiator as ahuman being, thus making possible an ami-cable agreement’ (Fisher & Ury, 1987: 14).

A plethora of these ‘how to do it guidebooks’ appeared in the late 1970s and early1980s. While they tend not to contain a bib-liography of their sources, the bargainingstrategies of the practice they describe mustbe based at least partly on uncredited theor-etical experimental literature. And in manyinstances the conclusions of this literature arerelatively obvious to those who have studiedGandhi’s thoughts on interpersonal conflictor been involved in nonviolent activism.

Weiss-Wik, in an examination of sixpopular ‘self-help’ negotiation manuals, dis-tills their common guidelines for successfulnegotiations. He lists them as the adoption ofa win–win outlook; incorporating the needto prepare for the negotiation by planning,studying the situation, setting objectives,establishing priorities, and plotting thecourse of action; concentrating on the nego-tiators’ needs and employing a problem-solving approach to ensure that they are met;considering sources of power and imple-menting appropriate tactics; endeavouring tocommunicate adroitly so that areas ofcommon concern are pinpointed, underlying

intentions discovered, basic assumptions andunderstandings checked and misinterpreta-tions minimized; demonstrating a willing-ness to cooperate and adapt by showing thata win–win solution is sought and the desirefor one conveyed; and finalizing agreementsclearly so that they ‘are definite enough topromote commitment and compliance’(Weiss-Wik, 1983: 715–716). In short, thebasic approach of these (and many later) self-help manuals is to attempt to achievewin–win solutions by separating the peoplefrom the problem. Problems and their solu-tion, rather than the defeat of enemies,becomes the goal. The books recognize thecompelling nature of needs and instruct theirreaders to focus on interests rather than pos-itions.

Some scholars, however, have pointed outpotential dilemmas involved in this integra-tive approach. Stating one’s position in termsof problems to be solved, rather than terms tobe accepted, and remaining open to possiblesolutions that may present themselves innegotiation means that there cannot be com-mitment to a position that is most favourableto one’s own interest. Further, providing theopponent with an accurate picture of one’sneeds precludes the tactic of preventing theopponent from learning in advance one’sbottom line (Pruitt, 1972: 141). Thesedilemmas notwithstanding, many of thesteps in this process are corroborated by theresearch literature as being efficacious in pro-moting successful bargaining outcomes.

The empirical conflict resolution litera-ture points out that the need to ‘save face’plays a large part in shaping negotiatingbehaviour (Brown, 1968; Swingle, 1970:267); Weiss-Wik (1983: 719) concludes thatthe studies seem to indicate that ‘face-relatedresponses’ in conflict situations ‘generallyproject resistance and increased competitive-ness toward the experimental other’.Although Rubin & Brown (1975: 155)found that frequency of cooperation and size


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of outcomes increased when intangible needs(such as those for self-esteem) were convertedinto tangible ones, Weiss-Wik, after examin-ing the empirical evidence, was able to con-clude that ‘If a negotiator concentrates onsatisfying his counterpart’s intangible needs,that would seem to be all for the better’, andthat ‘needs lend themselves to a greaternumber of solutions than do positions’(1983: 720).

The manuals advocate focusing on simi-larities, on drawing out interdependence bylooking to problems rather than positions.Rubin & Brown (1975: 202–206) note thatthe most effective bargaining was achievedwhen goals and orientations were formulatedcooperatively. The manuals also claim thatissues can be successfully worked throughwhen they are treated as problems that needto be solved. On this aspect Weiss-Wik(1983: 722) concludes that ‘several aspects ofintegrative bargaining . . . inform the train-ers’ recommendations to concentrate onneeds’.

Some studies, however, posit toughness,with extreme initial demands, few conces-sions and an unyielding position as the mostadvantageous strategy (Siegel & Fouraker,1960; Bartos, 1970: 65). Further, Rubin &Brown (1975: 267) found that subjects inexperimental studies achieved better out-comes with extreme rather than moderateinitial positions, and Komorita & Brenner(1968) found that in some cases the proba-bility of reaching an agreement was loweredif bargainers began with the positions theyeventually expected to settle upon. This maybe because extreme positions show that onewill not allow oneself to be exploited (Rubin& Brown, 1975: 268).

In contrast to the above, a study by Wilson& Bixenstine (1964) indicated that unjusti-fied insult, unfair reduction of one party’soutcomes by an opponent, or other behav-iour posing a threat or damage to ‘face’usually resulted in retaliation and mutual loss

rather than cooperative effort. This experi-ment indicates that when negotiators havebeen made to look foolish and weak beforeimportant audiences, they are likely to retali-ate against those causing the humiliation.And this may occur despite the knowledgethat ‘doing so may require the sacrifice of allor large portions of the available outcomes’(Brown, 1968: 119). Likewise, Siegel &Fouraker (1960: 100) concluded from theresults of their experiments that ‘Some nego-tiations collapse when one party becomesincensed at the other, and henceforth strivesto maximize his opponent’s displeasure ratherthan his own satisfaction.’ Where demandsare seen as excessive, giving in to them maybe viewed as tantamount to appeasement,and this may be seen as disadvantageousbecause appeasement ‘would only encouragethem to make even stronger demands’(Tedeschi & Rosenfeld, 1980: 241).

On the question of threats, Weiss-Wik(1983: 727) concludes that the authors of thenegotiation manuals and most of theresearchers concur that they are inappropri-ate for successful, that is win–win, negoti-ation outcomes. ‘An overwhelming amountof experimental research shows that threatstend to elicit counterthreats, which thendraw in competitive pressure, concern overrestoring face, and hostility. The conflictspirals’ (Weiss-Wik, 1983: 728).

Despite his finding that ‘those who weretough tended to receive a higher payoff thanthose who were soft’, Bartos (1970: 65)explained that ‘the main reason for this wasthe fact that toughness in the bargaining situ-ation did not impede progress towards anagreement too seriously’ because it was ofstyle. Where toughness becomes ‘positionalcommitment’ rather than style, negotiationstend to break down. Being tough, even wherethere is no subjective positional commit-ment, can have another drawback: it can beperceived as unfair and unfair demands willbe rejected.


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Diesing (1961: 369) maintains that goodrelationships make genuine agreements poss-ible, whereas if the relationship is bad‘chances of agreement are missed throughmisunderstanding, energies are absorbed inuseless belligerency, and dealings are dis-torted by attempts to retaliate for imaginedpast injustices and insults’. Presumablybecause of such factors, the manuals alsostress the use of appropriate bargainingtactics. This means being cautious aboutemploying extremely tough strategies andavoiding the use of threats.

Bartos (1977) presents the hypothesis thatnegotiators view the midpoint between theiroffers and demands as just, and strive to reachit, and consequently negotiations onlyproceed smoothly as long as there is a collec-tivist desire for fairness (i.e. cooperation).The reason negotiators do not zero in on theagreement they eventually expect to reach isbecause this may lead to exploitation by theopponent. Bartos, therefore, recommendsthat negotiators be scrupulously fair andavoid the temptation to take advantage ofopponents, because a tough stance may resultin larger early concessions but eventuallyopponents will discover that they are beingtreated unfairly and then become toughthemselves, leading to deadlocks or break-downs in negotiations.

When pressure tactics are employed in aconflict situation, they are generally incom-patible with the aim of persuading the adver-sary to make concessions, and such tacticsactually subvert the aim of a productive con-flict resolution (Pruitt, 1972: 136; Deutsch& Krauss, 1960: 188). Further, while tacticsthat centre on bluffing and deceitful state-ments may be successful in the short termand in one-off bargaining sequences, ‘they arelikely to backfire in the long run and across aseries of bargaining sessions because of thedistrust that is generated. Once one learnsthat a player continually bluffs and misrepre-sents his or her hand in a poker game, these

tactics lose their effectiveness’ (Tedeschi &Rosenfeld, 1980: 232).

When focusing on ‘adroit communi-cation’, the negotiation manuals employtechniques that go under the names of ‘bilateral focus’, ‘role reversal’, ‘active listen-ing’ and ‘restatement’. These techniques areintended to improve understanding, increasetrust and promote the compatibility of goals.Looking at the research literature, Weiss-Wik(1983: 730) finds that they do not appear tobe ‘a uniformly beneficial type of communi-cation’; however, he adds that some experi-ments (reported in Tedeschi & Rosenfeld,1980: 231, following Schelling, 1960) haveshown that negotiators who know theiropponent’s bargaining range (‘utility sched-ule’) ‘conceded more than uninformed onesbecause their norms of fairness came intoplay and restrained their demands’ (Weiss-Wik, 1983: 732), so as not to exploit anadvantage. In fact, the research seems to indi-cate that negotiators will conduct themselvesin ways consistent with their values andethical standards of behaviour, and thatpointing out that a certain course of actionwill allow the opponent to act in accordancewith a higher code of conduct is a powerfulnegotiating tool (Lewicki et al., 1994: 209).

Weiss-Wik (1983: 734) sums up theproblem-solving studies he examined bynoting that they ‘do lend some support totrainers’ prescriptions. They more or lessargue for defining the problems in negoti-ation, searching for and evaluating solutions,and making decisions.’ As a final conclusion,he is only able to admit that the ‘verbal styleof the successful negotiator as prescribed bytrainers currently lies beyond directlyrelevant, empirical criticism’.

Patchen (1987: 182), in his examinationof the literature and studies of the best strat-egy to use in order to get another party (andthis can refer to anyone from individuals tonations) to cooperate rather than to try towin an advantage, claims that there is a


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‘remarkable convergence of findings’. Itappears that ‘a policy of unconditionalcooperation tends to bring exploitation by anadversary whereas a policy of consistent co-erciveness tends to lead to a fight’. However,it seems that a strategy that begins with firm-ness, including a threat, coercion, and thenmoves to conciliation, will be effective insecuring cooperation from opponents.

Some studies in the conflict resolutionliterature, for example that of Shure, Meeker& Hansford (1965), found that those (atleast in laboratory studies) who employedpacifist strategies (that is those by ethicallymotivated cooperators who rejected violenceand coercion and instead aimed for con-version) in bargaining were not successful.Although pacifists tried to get their oppon-ents to see the unfairness of their claims andthe immorality of their actions, and tried toestablish their own personal resolve and giveassurance that all their actions were in goodfaith, a favourable image of the pacifist wasnot enough for an effective appeal. Domina-tors did not become cooperators because ofthe pacifist tactics, and such tactics couldeven invite exploitation and aggression. And,similarly, Deutsch et al. (1967) found that a‘turn the other cheek’ strategy was not suc-cessful in eliciting cooperation – it was in factmore likely to be exploited.

This, at first glance, seems to go against astrategy that one could consider Gandhian.Nevertheless, some other studies clearly seemto support this less immediate version of‘martyrdom pays’. Braver & Van Rohrer(1975: 653), for example, have found that‘subjects most often will cooperate if theyhave reason to believe their opponent will bebenevolent’. This, however, does not seem towork between martyrs and their exploiters(because easily exploited martyrs areexploited), but what the authors call a martyrstrategy does ‘evoke a high degree of cooper-ation from a later opponent who observes themartyrdom’. To the exploiters the martyrs

gave the appearance of being ‘suckers’, butobservers are moved by martyrdom and tendto treat martyrs with kindness.

This is backed up by Reychler (1979:257), who found that a pacifist strategy tendsto be most effective in reducing violence andexploitative behaviour when the human dis-tance between the opponents and subject issmall, the subject is well informed of thepacifist’s strategy, the subject is required tojustify his or her behaviour after the fact andwhen a third party is present. Pacifist strat-egies, and this is the key aim of Gandhianpraxis, force an opponent to choose betweenmorality and self-interest. And ‘the strongestpredictor of the effectiveness of the pacifiststrategy is the image of the pacifist held bythe subject’. Lewicki et al. (1994: 217) con-clude that ‘A negotiator’s reputation plays acritical role in how persuasive she will be:those with better reputations will be morepersuasive, especially in the long term’; theyadd that being ‘nice and pleasant is a logicalstep in being more persuasive’ (1994: 219).

Some conflict studies, however, point outthat this playing to a third-party audience cancut both ways. The social embarrassment ofadmitting to a moral error may increase theintractability of an opponent (Meeker &Shure, 1969).

Rapoport (1960), in an old but still usefultypology, classifies disputes in terms of fights(attempted mutual coercion, where theobject is to harm the enemy), games (wherethe object is to outwit the competitor) ordebates (where the object is to convert thepotential ally, to come to a win–win solution,in short to resolve the conflict). This classifi-cation ranks conflicts in order of increasingresolution potential and with an increasinglevel of humanity of the conflicting parties.Debates can involve the assistance of thirdparties or they can be based in face-to-facenegotiation. For a debate, the opponent mustbe heard and understood, and they mustknow that they have been heard; the areas of


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validity in the opponent’s stand must bedelineated, and an assumption of similarityshould be induced (Rapoport, 1960:286–287). The best method of doing this isto state the opponent’s case back to them, for‘To make a dent in the opponent’s armor, youmust make him listen, and something he issure to listen to is his own case’ (1960: 291).

This means that opponents should not bethreatened, and a relationship of trust andmutual responsiveness should be built up. Itis easier to move from cooperation to com-petition than from competition to cooper-ation, so trust needs to be built early in therelationship. This is particularly importantbecause approaches to trust can create self-fulfilling prophecies (Lewicki et al., 1994:336; Axelrod, 1984). Trust-building can bedone by showing a positive interest in theopponents’ welfare and demonstrating areadiness to respond helpfully to their needsand requests. Of course trust can beexploited, but too often conflicts are con-ducted on the assumption that if parties arenot sufficiently tough they will be exploited.There is risk, but the risk is less than the riskof the loss of a mutually acceptable resolutionthat would result from the use of pressuretactics.

Gandhi’s Satyagraha and ConflictResolution

Tidwell (1998: xi) claims that not all conflictscan be or should be resolved, some should bewon. Gandhian satyagraha, at least at a theor-etical level, rejects this on at least twogrounds. First, in Gandhi’s approach,attempts should be made to resolve all con-flicts and attempts should be made to convertall opponents so that the parties end up ‘onthe same side’. If, however, this is not poss-ible, it provides a way of fighting for justicethat minimizes the possibility of excludingthe chance of later conversion taking place.Second, while winning is not totally rejected

(after all Gandhi wanted his immediate goalof freedom for India to prevail, albeit withouthumiliation for the opponent), the main aimof conducting conflict may be somethingbeyond winning or losing, or even beyond awin–win resolution of the dispute at hand –it may have more to do with an existentialtransformation of the individuals involved.

Tidwell (1998: 17) further claims that thevalues that inform conflict resolution, that isnonviolence, fairness, individual choice andempowerment, as well as the support for avariety of fundamental principles such ashuman rights, common sense or humanneeds, are essentially Western in nature.Gandhi’s philosophy has come to epitomizemany of these values, and his method of con-ducting conflict can only partly be said toresult from his interaction with Westernculture and philosophy. This, therefore, mayindicate that rather than inhibiting ‘its usefulapplication across cultural and political bar-riers’ it may demonstrate the universality ofat least some of these values.

Those engaged in a conflict, and wantingto conduct the process in Gandhian terms,would look to the following propositions asgivens (Næss, 1974: 70–85; Weber, 1991:36–39).

First, violence is invited from opponents ifthey are humiliated or provoked.

Second, a violent attitude is less likely onthe part of a would-be satyagrahi if he or shemakes clear to him or herself the essentialelements of the case and the purpose of theconflict. The sincere undertaking of a conflictalong Gandhian lines requires an affirmativeanswer to the question: ‘Is my motive whenstarting this new direct action unmixed – is itjust to realise the goal of the campaign, andnot also to wish to injure the opponent or dueto other deviant motive?’ (Næss, 1974: 104).

Third, opponents should be provided witha full understanding of one’s case and conduct.According to Pelton (1974: 86), because nonviolent persuasion is based on the ‘straight-


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forward dissemination of information’, the‘packaging’ of issues by withholding infor-mation or making unsubstantiated charges,and by appealing to greed, prejudice or hatred,‘cannot under any circumstances be reconciledwith the philosophy of nonviolence’.

Fourth, the essential interests whichopponents have in common should be clearlyformulated and cooperation established onthis basis. Gandhi points out that when weput ourselves in our opponents’ shoes we willdo them justice and most of the ‘miseries andmisunderstandings in the world will dis-appear’ (Young India, 19 March 1925).

Fifth, opponents should not be judgedharder than the self: ‘An opponent is entitledto the same regard for his principles as wewould expect others to have for ours’(Harijan, 4 May 1940). In other words,Gandhi believes that love must be shown toopponents and that the way to do this is togive them the same credit for honesty as wewould claim for ourselves. He notes thattolerance is important because ‘we will neverall think alike and we shall see Truth in frag-ment and from different angles of vision’. Asconscience differs between individuals, whileit may be a guide for immediate conduct,‘imposition of that conduct upon all will bean insufferable interference with everyone’sfreedom of conscience’ (Young India, 23 Sep-tember 1926).

Sixth, opponents should be trusted. Whileit has been noted above that some studieshave shown that trusting behaviour may leadto exploitation rather than cooperation, theseexperiments did not factor in the veryimportant subjective and larger societalpayoffs (in the Gandhian scheme) that comefrom living by one’s personal morality(Pelton, 1974: 22–25).

Seventh, an unwillingness to compromiseon non-essentials decreases the likelihood ofconverting the opponent. For Gandhi,demands made must be of the ‘irreducibleminimum’, and they should never be lowered

just to please the adversary (Bose, 1972:115). However, one should be prepared to‘make large concessions on all points exceptwhere a principle is involved’ (Gandhi, 1928:245); in fact, in cases short of matters of prin-ciple ‘A satyagrahi never misses, can nevermiss, a chance of compromise on honourableterms’ (Young India, 16 April 1931). Never-theless, Bondurant (1965: 197) points outthat the Gandhian process of conflict is oneof synthesis rather than compromise. TheGandhian practitioner of conflict is neverprepared to yield a position which he or sheholds to be the truth, but ‘he may be per-suaded that he is in error in so holding them’(1965: 220).

Eighth, the conversion of an opponent isfurthered by personal sincerity.

Ninth, the best way of convincing anopponent of sincerity is to make sacrifices forthe given cause.

Tenth, a position of weakness in an oppo-nent should not be exploited, and advantageshould not be taken of an opponent’s weakmoments ‘if they have not been the result ofsatyagraha, but due to extraneous reasons’(Bose, 1972: 116). By the same token,however, satyagrahis ‘could not give up theirobjective if they found their strength dwind-ling away’ (Gandhi, 1928: 412).

Besides the obvious moral reason, suchweakness should not be exploited becausesurrender caused by some misfortune suf-fered by the opponent making it necessary tocall off the struggle may leave them, aftertheir capitulation, as opposed to the settle-ment as they were before their hand wasforced. Surrender without conversion is notthe ideal Gandhian way of terminating astruggle. Conversely, the demonstration ofgood will by not taking advantage of anopponent’s position may induce them totrust one’s sincerity and ‘prepare a suitableatmosphere for a settlement’ (Næss, 1974:104).

The above points, gleaned from Gandhi’s


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writings and personal experience, are veryreminiscent of the key concepts put forwardby the self-help negotiation manuals as themain components of achieving win–win sol-utions. But the Gandhian conflict processalso goes well beyond conflict resolution tointegration (or transformation) at a deeperlevel.

Galtung and Næss clearly make the pointthat for Gandhi the aim of the process of con-flict was not merely to reach a resolution inthe sense that it is advocated in the negoti-ation practice/training manuals. For theMahatma the process was about the achieve-ment of self-realization, nothing less. For himthe fundamental principle was that of theunity of existence (or more immediately,unity of humans). People are related to eachother in a way that has a transcendentalnature, and conflict should be seen as a giftproviding a rich opportunity, potentially tothe benefit of all (Galtung, 1992: 62), torealize a higher self.

Galtung (1992: 63) notes that socialscientists see conflicting parties as havingdiffering perceptions of the conflict, some-times wrong perceptions. The heat of con-flict may dim or distort visions, andtherefore third parties with objectiveunclouded visions may be needed to achieveresolution. For Gandhi, as interpreted byGaltung, things are different. While media-tors may play an important role in helpingparties come to a mutually acceptable agree-ment, generally third-party interventionshould be rejected and the conflict viewed ‘asa medium through which the parties candevelop a higher degree of awareness ofthemselves as well as of the other party’. Thisis because resolution is only one element ofthe desired outcome of the conflict. Others,equally or even more desirable as criteria ofsuccess, include a new social structure and a‘higher level of self-purification in bothactors’ (Galtung, 1992: 88).

According to Gandhian practice, in order

for needs to be met they must first be under-stood, and this requires true self-awareness.For Gandhi the discovery of Self was theprimary task of life. As noted above, however,parties to a conflict often preferred third-party intervention to being totally respons-ible for the disputing process. This is perhapsunderstandable, but it depends on what thedesired outcome of the process is – a settle-ment of this dispute, the resolution of anyunderlying conflict, or, in Gandhian terms,achieving the dignity that comes from takingresponsibility for the self, and thus aiding inthe understanding of Self.

Debates, or negotiations, in the Gandhianideal are bilateral; the two parties are them-selves the decision-makers. This reduces thedependence on experts but, as others haveargued, such independence can be frighten-ing for those without skills or clear insightsinto their own needs. In Gandhian termsmere dispute settlement does little to answerfundamental life questions. Taking personalresponsibility for negotiation, rather thanassigning the process to arbitrators or adjudi-cators, offers an increased opportunity forpersonal growth by exposing parties to theviews of the other, and provides the oppor-tunity for deep self-reflection. It takes theprocess beyond the immediate dispute. Themanuals also champion a bilateral approach.Even if the reason for this is more about costthan empowerment, and certainly not self-realization (but as noted above it should beabout being decent, according to Fisher &Ury, 1987), the approaches do have markedsimilarities. It should be noted here that themore recent literature on conflict transform-ation (e.g. Bush & Folger, 1994) attempts toplace mediators specifically within this para-digm and notes that this is the unfulfilled‘promise of mediation’.

While the findings and arguments thatmartyrdom tactics do not generally lead tosuccessful conflict outcomes, and seem tocontradict Gandhi’s dictum that self-suffering


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would melt the stoniest heart, nonviolencetheorists have long taken this knowledge intoaccount (Pelton, 1974: 135, 140, 143) anddemonstrated that Gandhian nonviolencedoes work in conflict situations, albeit inmore subtle ways. The Gandhian literatureacknowledges that conversion may not comeby such direct methods but may rely on con-version of third parties who in turn push theopponent into behavioural change.

Rogers (1961) notes that life can becomeexistentially dysfunctional if it is ‘incongru-ent’, and this, at some stage will force changein individual behaviour. In a conflict situ-ation, this incongruence is most likely to beinitiated by being out of step with thirdparties who are in a close social relationshipwith the actors (Galtung, 1989: 20–21, 25;Weber, 1993). If one can influence an audi-ence at a closer social distance to the oppo-nent or alter public opinion – the milieu inwhich opponents must live – there is a fairchance of influencing their attitude evenwhen there has been no opportunity fordirect communication. Gandhi, quite can-didly, claimed that ‘the method of reachingthe heart is to awaken public opinion. Publicopinion, for which one cares, is a mightierforce than that of gunpowder’ (Young India,19 March 1925). And this may help oppon-ents to clearer insights into their own moti-vation and sense of belonging in a largerreality.

In short, conducting conflict in what canbe termed a Gandhian context may not onlybe instrumentally valuable but may be intrin-sically important in an existential sense.

Conclusion

For many Indian scholars, Gandhi is the‘Father of the Nation’, and their examinationof Gandhi’s techniques tends to relate topolitical activism and the freedom struggle.Not surprisingly, it is the Western analysts ofGandhian thought who have undertaken

what little exploration there has been ofGandhi’s satyagraha in terms of conflict reso-lution.

Gandhi’s writings often refer to arbi-tration and even judicial adjudication as waysof resolving conflicts. It must be remem-bered, however, that much of his energy wastaken up with opposing large-scale violentethnic and religious conflicts, and in thesesituations anything that could calm passionswas welcome. Given that the Mahatma haddied decades before the advent of the alterna-tive dispute resolution movement or beforeconflict resolution literature had broughtsome sense of order to the terminology usedin the field, it is not surprising that he usedthe term ‘mediation’ interchangeably with‘arbitration’.

The Gandhian process of conflict-solvingsees the appearance of a case in an adjudica-tive tribunal as a failure of the parties to settlethe dispute and emerge as the friends themodel aims at. Adjudication generally pre-cludes the Gandhian dialectic from evercoming into play between the opponents.Although it may be a truism, it must be real-ized that individuals often see no other choiceopen to them than to go to the police or alawyer owing to mistrust of the other dis-putant and/or a general feeling of impotencein being able to carry out their own negotia-tions. Even when a dispute is in the hands oflawyers a settlement may be reached short ofactual adjudication, but rarely will one partysee the other’s point of view and have under-gone a process of ‘conversion’, therebyremoving the source of future such disagree-ments and the possible need for ensuing liti-gation (Weber, 1986).

The modern ADR movement has estab-lished a system aimed at avoiding legaladjudication and giving disputants a measureof control over the outcome of disputes insomething of a Gandhian spirit through thegood offices of a mediator. It is the mediator’sjob to assist the parties to come to their own


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resolution of their dispute (Deutsch, 1973:382–388). There is no power to compelsettlement; the disputants must rely on theirown mutual agreement with assistance fromthe mediator and, because it is in their inter-est, they themselves make settlements work.While the outcome sought is an accommo-dation between the parties, it could lead tothe conversion aimed at by satyagraha and socome close to the Gandhian ideal. In otherwords, this level of third-party involvement isnot totally outside the parameters of the idealGandhian conflicting process, as adjudi-cation or even arbitration would be. After all,Gandhi himself took pride in being a third-party assistant in so many disputes that hecould say that ‘a large part of my time duringthe twenty years of my practice as a lawyerwas occupied in bringing about private com-promises of hundreds of cases’, and ‘that thetrue function of a lawyer was to unite partiesriven asunder’ (Gandhi, 1940: 97; alsoWeber, 1986: 695–697). In short, while theGandhian conflict process is generally seen asa bilateral one, Gandhi himself may have per-ceived a role for mediators similar to the oneadvocated by the champions of transforma-tive conflict resolution as aiding in a spiritu-ally and morally enriching process by notmerely going beyond issues of power andrights, but even those of interests, to ones ofrelatedness (Dukes, 1993: 50).

In this vein, Bush & Folger (1994: xv)have recently argued that mediation has thepotential to do more than produce agree-ments and improve relationships. They go sofar as to argue that it can transform people’slives. They make the very Gandhian pointthat conflict affords opportunity for moraldevelopment and that the role of the media-tor is not only to find solutions to problemsbut also ‘to change people themselves for thebetter’; they complain that this potential haslargely been overlooked.

Bush & Folger (1994: 2) see this trans-formative process coming about through two

effects: empowerment (giving disputingparties a sense of ‘their own value andstrength and their own capacity to handlelife’s problems’) and recognition (generatingfeelings of ‘empathy for the situation andproblems of others’). Recently this approachhas been utilized in victim/offender media-tions, but perhaps its value has not beentaken as far as it could be. Some theorists feelthat the transformative dimensions of medi-ation, that is, empowerment and recognition,matter more than the settlement, not onlybecause of their intrinsic value but also ‘asexpressions of a much broader shift to a newmoral and social vision’ (1994: 4).

Although role-plays by nonviolentactivists, in preparation for involvement insituations of direct physical conflict, mayexplore the use of creative suffering, no onehas yet devised techniques of conflict resolu-tion or negotiation practice that are sospecifically Gandhian as to place a largeemphasis on self-suffering. Perhaps this is notpossible or even thought to be desirable;however, the shift from a model of conflictresolution that was traditionally based onpower and coercive bargaining to one ofproblem-solving processes that aimed toresolve conflicts (rather than merely settleimmediate disputes) seems to have producedconflict resolution processes with strongsimilarities to the preliminary phases ofGandhi’s satyagraha, and some new theoreti-cal thinking about the broader dimensions ofapproaches to conflict has strong parallelswith Gandhi’s quest for an existentially moresatisfying life.

In Gandhi’s vision satyagraha was not onlya useful technique for the resolution of con-flicts, and the satyagrahi was far more than amere practitioner of a certain skill. The satya-grahi was the embodiment of an ideal, andthe satyagrahi lifestyle was the lifestyle worthliving. In claiming that a person’s ‘highestduty in life is to serve mankind and take hisshare in bettering its condition’ (Indian


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Opinion, 23 February 1907), Gandhi wasmaking the point that the ultimate congru-ence of the self and the other means that the‘highest form of morality’ is the practice ofaltruism. While self-suffering was quite likelyto be a consequence of altruism, Gandhi wasfirmly convinced that to suffer wrongs wasless degrading than to inflict them.

Although none of the authors of thepopular books espousing the new win–winmodels acknowledge any debt to Gandhi,and although it seems that the theoreticalwork on which this new literature is basedcannot be causally linked to Gandhi’s satya-graha, the two bodies of knowledge are com-plementary in principles and goals. Further,the empirical literature, while not going asfar as Gandhian theory, does seem toprovide reasonably strong backing for thevalidity of the Gandhian approach to con-flict resolution that grew out of a lifetime ofconducting conflict and seeking Truth forthe Mahatma. Practitioners and populariz-ers of both disciplines could gain much byrealizing that they are in fact part of thesame discourse. They could profitably readthat part of the literature that is unfamiliarto them in order to help them better con-ceptualize conflict resolution. And perhapsskilled mediators could consider whether,consistent with Gandhi’s approach, theremay be a broader normative and trans-formative dimension in their search for inte-grative agreements.

References

Axelrod, Robert, 1984. The Evolution of Cooper-ation. New York: Basic Books.

Bartos, Otomar J., 1970. ‘Determinants andConsequences of Toughness’, in Paul G.Swingle, ed., The Structure of Conflict. NewYork: Academic Press (45–68).

Bartos, Otomar J., 1977. ‘Simple Model ofNegotiation: A Sociological Point of View’,Journal of Conflict Resolution 21(4): 565–579.

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Non-violent Suffering and Conversion’, Peaceand Change 18(3): 267–289.

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THOMAS WEBER, b. 1950, PhD in SocialSciences (La Trobe University, 1991), SeniorLecturer in Politics and Head of Peace Studies,La Trobe University (1991– ). Most recentbooks: Gandhi’s Peace Army: The Shanti Senaand Unarmed Peacekeeping (Syracuse Uni-versity Press, 1996), On the Salt March: TheHistoriography of Gandhi’s March to Dandi(HarperCollins, 1997) and (ed., with YeshuaMoser-Puangsuwan) Nonviolent InterventionAcross Borders: A Recurrent Vision (Spark M.Matsunaga Institute for Peace, 2000).


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