Journal of Medieval Military History~Vol. 3

THE JOURNAL OF

Medieval MilitaryHistory

Volume III

THE JOURNAL OF MEDIEVAL MILITARY HISTORY

Editors

Kelly DeVriesClifford J. Rogers

ISSN 1477–545X

THE JOURNAL OF

Medieval MilitaryHistory

Volume III

Edited by

KELLY DEVRIES

CLIFFORD J. ROGERS

THE BOYDELL PRESS

© Contributors 2005

All Rights Reserved. Except as permitted under current legislationno part of this work may be photocopied, stored in a retrieval system,

published, performed in public, adapted, broadcast,transmitted, recorded or reproduced in any form or by any means,

without the prior permission of the copyright owner.

The right of the Contributors to be identified asthe authors of this work has been asserted in accordance with

sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988

First published 2005The Boydell Press, Woodbridge

ISBN 1 84383 171 6

The Boydell Press is an imprint of Boydell & Brewer LtdPO Box 9, Woodbridge, Suffolk IP12 3DF, UK

and of Boydell & Brewer Inc.668 Mt Hope Avenue, Rochester, NY 14620, USA

website: www.boydellandbrewer.com

A CIP catalogue record for this book is availablefrom the British Library

This publication is printed on acid-free paperEdited and typeset by

Frances Hackeson Freelance Publishing Services, Brinscall, LancsPrinted in Great Britain by

Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wiltshire

Contents

ARTICLES

1. A Lying Legacy? A Preliminary Discussion of Images of 1Antiquity and Altered Reality in Medieval Military History

Richard Abels and Stephen Morillo

2. War and Sanctity: Saints’ Lives as Sources for Early 14Medieval Warfare

John France

3. The 791 Equine Epidemic and its Impact on Charlemagne’s 23Army

Carroll Gillmor

4. The Role of the Cavalry in Medieval Warfare 46J. F. Verbruggen, translated by Kelly DeVries

5. Sichelgaita of Salerno: Amazon or Trophy Wife? 72Valerie Eads

6. Castilian Military Reform under the Reign of Alfonso XI 88(1312-50)

Nicolas Agrait

7. Sir Thomas Dagworth in Brittany, 1346–7: Restellou and 127La Roche Derrien

Clifford Rogers

8. Ferrante d’Este’s Letters as a Source for Military History 155Sergio Mantovani

NOTEProvisions for the Ostend Militia on the Defense, August 1436 176

Kelly DeVries

1

A Lying Legacy? A Preliminary Discussion of Images ofAntiquity and Altered Reality in Medieval Military History

Richard Abels and Stephen Morillo

Introduction

In 1990 one of the co-authors of this article, Richard Abels, was asked byDonald Scragg to contribute a chapter on late tenth- and early eleventh-centuryEnglish tactics and strategy to a volume of essays marking the millennium of thebattle of Maldon. He agreed readily, though he was concerned about the paucityof source materials describing battles. Other than the poem of the battle of Maldon,he knew only two extended battle narratives for this period that might shed lighton English tactics, John of Worcester’s accounts of Edmund Ironside’s victoryover Cnut at Sherston and his subsequent defeat at Ashingdon in the year 1016.1

To the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle’s accounts John added telling details. At Sherston,he tells us, when Edmund

drew up his army according to the terrain and the forces he had, he moved the best soldiersinto the front line, placed the rest of the army in reserve [in subsidiis], and addressing eachman by name, exhorted and entreated them to remember that they strove for country,children, wives and homes, and with these most inspiring words he fired the soldiers’spirits. Then he ordered the trumpets to sound, and the “cohorts” [cohortes] to advancegradually. The enemy army did the same. When they arrived at the place where they couldjoin battle they rushed together with their hostile standards and with a great shout. Theyfought with spear and lance, striving with all their might. Meanwhile, King EdmundIronside made his presence felt in fierce hand-to-hand fighting in the front line. He tookthought for everything; he himself fought hard, often smote the enemy; he performed atonce the duties of a hardy soldier and of an able general.2

1 The Chronicle of John of Worcester, vol. 1, ed. R. R. Darlington and P. McGurk, trans. JenniferBray and P. McGurk, Oxford Medieval Texts (Oxford, 1995), pp. 486 and 490 (s.a. 1016).

2 John of Worcester, Chronicle, 2:486–7: Vbi exercitum pro loco et copiis instruit, optimumquenque in primam aciem subducit, ceterum exercitum in subsidiis locat unumquenque nominasappellat, hortatur, rogat, ut meminerint se pro patria, pro liberis, pro coniungibus, atque suisdomibus certare, et optimis sermonibus militum animos accendebat, deinde tubicines canereet cohortes paulatim incedere iubet. Idem facit, hostium exercitus. Vbi eo uentum est ubi ab illisprelium committi posset, maximo clamore cum infestis signis oc currant, lanceis et gladiis pugnageritur, maxima ui certatur. Interea Eadmundus Ferreum Latus in prima acie comminus acriterinsta bat, omnia provide bat, multum ipse pugna bat, sepe hostem feri bat, strenui militis et boniimperatoris officia sumul exequebatur. Italicized passages are from Sallust, Catiline, 59.1–60.4.

2 Richard Abels and Stephen Morillo

John’s description of Ashingdon is similar. Edmund, we are told, “drew up hisbattle line with three lines of reserves” [triplicibus subsidiis aciem instruit] andattacked in that order Cnut’s troops, who had deployed “on level ground.”3

In comparison with the vague accounts in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle of theseand other battles, John’s narratives are a treasure trove of detail about prepara-tions for battle and deployment of troops, derived, Abels then believed, fromeither a lost recension of the Chronicle or some other near contemporary source.4

Edmund’s approach to battle, as presented by John, was strikingly similar to thatof the ancient Romans, and the resemblance was made even clearer by John’suse of classical phrases such as copiis instruit and words like cohortes. Afterwriting a draft of the article, Abels discovered why. John had lifted his accounts,almost word for word (though in highly edited form), from, respectively, Sallust’sCatiline and his Jugurthine War.5 Chagrined, Abels removed his extended analy-ses of Sherston and Ashingdon, added a discussion of “military organization” tofill out the article, and hoped his readers would not notice how little there was in iton battlefield tactics.6 Before he did this, however, he asked our friend and col-league Professor Bernard S. Bachrach for advice. Bachrach did not see a real prob-lem. That John had selected these particular passages from Sallust was to himhighly significant, for John undoubtedly had chosen them because he deemed themto be accurate characterizations of what had actually occurred in Edmund’s battles.

Abels did not agree then nor do we agree now. Rather, we think that all thatJohn knew about these battles came from his main source, the Anglo-SaxonChronicle, and that he added the details from Sallust to spruce up the narrative

3 John of Worcester, Chronicle, 2:490–1: “triplicibus subsidiis aciem instruit, dein singulas turmascircumiens, monet atque obtestatur uti memores pristine uirtutis atque uictorie sese regnumquesuum a Danorum auaritia defendant cum iis certamen fore quos antea uicerunt. Intera Canutuspaulatim in equum locum suos deducit . At contra rex Eadmundus aciem sicuti instruxeratuelociter movet, et repente signo dato Danos inuadit. Italicized words are from Sallust, Jugurtha,49. 2–50. 3. Cf. also Sallust, Catiline, 59: “paululum commotus, … instructos ordines in locumaequum deducit.”

4 C. R. Hart argues that the Worcester Chronicle up to the year 1016 was compiled between thatyear and c.1020 by the monk Byrhtferth of Ramsey, to whom he attributed the composition ofthe later annals, including these battle descriptions. C. R. Hart, “The Early Section of theWorcester Chronicle,” The Journal of Medieval History 9 (1983), 251–215. More cautiously,Michael Lapidge, noting the resemblance between the language of the Worcester Chronicleand Byrhtfeth’s Life of St. Oswald, has suggested that a lost version of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicleunderlies the entries for 958 through 992, and that this chronicle could possibly have beencomposed at Ramsey, perhaps even by Byrhteferth. Michael Lapidge, “Byrhtferth and Oswald,”in St. Oswald of Worcester, eds. N. Brook and C. Cubitt (Leicester, 1996), p. 76. See alsoAlfred P. Smyth, The Medieval Life of King Alfred the Great (Basingstoke, Hampshire andNew York, 2002), pp. 69–71. Cf. P. McGurk, “Introduction” to The Chronicle of John of Worces-ter, 2:lxxix-lxxxi, which rebuts Hart’s case.

5 R. R. Darlington and P. McGurk, “The ‘Chronicon ex Chronicis’ of ‘Florence’ of Worcester andIts Use of Sources,” Anglo-Norman Studies 5 (1983), 185–96, at 193, n. 37; C. R. Hart, “EarlySections of the Worcester Chronicle,” Journal of Medieval History 9 (1983), pp. 303–4.

6 Richard Abels, “English Tactics, Strategy and Military Organization in the Late Tenth Cen-tury,” in Donald Scragg, ed., The Battle of Maldon, AD 991 (Oxford, 1991), 143–55. John ofWorcester’s accounts of Sherston and Ashingdon are discussed on p. 153, n. 17.

Images of Antiquity and Altered Reality 3

and to demonstrate his own erudition. To be sure, John’s compression and edit-ing of the Sallust texts may be significant. Among the details that he chose not toinclude in his narrative of the battle of Sherston are Catiline’s decision to driveaway his horses so that his men would have to stand and fight, descriptions oftopography and terrain clearly inappropriate for Sherston, and references to cen-turions and subordinate commanders on the wings. John also changed Sallust’s“pila omittunt, gladius res geritur” to “lanceis et gladiis pugna geritur.” Simi-larly, in his account of the battle of Ashingdon, John edited out Sallust’s descrip-tion of how the Roman commander Metellus deployed his slingers (funditores)and archers (sagittarios) between the companies of infantry, and placed his cav-alry on the wings. These omissions may reflect John’s awareness of differencesbetween armies of his day, the first decades of the twelfth century, and thosedescribed by Sallust. (In this respect, John’s decision to change Sallust’s de-scription of soldiers throwing javelins [pila] to soldiers thrusting with lances[lanceae] is suggestive.) Or John may have simply wished to condense the nar-ratives. In either case, John probably used Sallust’s Cataline and Jugurtha notbecause Edmund Ironside actually commanded and fought like a first centuryBC Roman general but to demonstrate his familiarity with a classical authoritythen in vogue.7 Bachrach’s interpretation is indeed possible, but strikes us asinherently less likely.8 It is less likely unless, of course, one begins, as doesBachrach, with the assumption that “the picture of medieval military historywhich is emerging today” is that of “continuity between the ancient and medi-eval periods.”9 Bachrach’s thesis is founded, in part, upon his careful study and

7 The growing popularity of Sallust is suggested by the rise in the number of copies of extantmanuscripts of his work between the tenth and twelfth centuries: four in the tenth, thirty-threein the eleventh, and fifty-eight in the twelfth. L.D. Reynolds, ed., Texts and Transmission. ASurvey of the Latin Classics (Oxford, 1983), pp. xxvi-xxvii.

8 Some obvious questions suggest themselves regarding Bachrach’s interpretation that John usedSallust because the description fit what he knew of the battle. Why Sallust? Did John searchthrough any number of classical sources until he found an appropriately parallel battle? Whatother descriptions did he have available? Given that John edited the accounts in Sallust inways already noted, why did he not borrow shorter phrases and descriptions from severalsources, surely a technique more likely to produce an accurate description than wholesaleappropriation of a single battle-piece from a single source? All medieval chroniclers’ headswere full of classical words and short phrases, many of which regularly found their way intodescriptions of warfare – see for example the discussion of Orderic Vitalis below, pp. 10–11and notes 18–20. But when they had clear and abundant information about a battle, either fromwitnessing it or from other eyewitnesses, they had no trouble creating original descriptions inwhich classical words and phrases provided some of the bricks of the structure, so to speak,rather than the entire architecture. See, for example, William of Poitiers’ description of theHastings campaign and battle, which positively invited borrowings from Caesar, but whoseaccount of Hastings is clearly his own: The Gesta Guillelmi of William of Poitiers, ed. andtrans. R.H.C. Davis and Marjorie Chibnall (Oxford, 1998), hereafter WP; see further discus-sion below, pp. 5–6 and notes 15–16.

9 Bernard S. Bachrach, “Medieval Military Historiography,” in Michael Bentley, ed., Compan-ion to Historiography (London, 1997), p. 206. On Charlemagne’s study of Roman militarytactics and strategy, see Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare: Prelude to Empire (Philadel-phia, 2001), p. 162.


intimate knowledge of the literary and documentary sources that survive fromthe early and central Middle Ages and, in part, upon his complete rejection of theold historical paradigm of Rome’s “Fall” and the West’s descent into “the DarkAges.” Early medieval texts, as he takes pains to point out, abound with classicalallusions and often employ technical Roman military and administrative termi-nology in describing events. Bachrach contends, moreover, that the preserva-tion, transmission, and popularity (as measured by numbers of manuscripts) through-out the early Middle Ages of Roman military handbooks, notably Vegetius’s De remilitari and Frontinus’s Strategemata, attests to the Roman foundations that un-derlay military organization in the West between the fourth and twelfth centuries.“[F]rom the efforts of Diocletian and his successors during the fourth and fifthcenturies,” Bachrach asserts, “until the development of gunpowder toward the endof the Middle Ages, the essentials of military organization, relative effective troopstrengths, strategy, and tactics demonstrate startling continuity in Rome’s succes-sor states – Byzantium and the kingdoms of the medieval West.”10 But how muchof this apparent continuity is real and how much is the consequence of the classi-cizing tendencies of medieval chroniclers? All historians when assessing sourcesface the problem of representation versus reality. For military historians of theMiddle Ages, this problem takes the special form of classicizing sources versus therealities of early medieval warfare. This article considers this problem.

Our consideration cannot rest on an exhaustive survey of all the possible evi-dence for this problem. Rather, we will examine a few selected and representa-tive pieces of evidence in order to make points about the evidence as a whole,points that are as much philosophical as they are specific historical analysis.Indeed, this article and the rejoinder by Professor Bachrach that will follow inthe next volume of this journal are attempts to distill and thus clarify the variousissues – methodological, historiographical, terminological and philosophical –implicit in divergent interpretations of early medieval warfare contained in theworks each of us has published on specific subjects.11

Written Sources

The problem of classicizing terminology is a pervasive one in the sources formedieval military history. John of Worcester’s use of Sallust to describe the battles

10 Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, p. 51. Bachrach has developed and advanced this thesisin three monographs, Early Carolingian Warfare; The Anatomy of a Little War: A Diplomaticand Military History of the Gundovald Affair: 568–586 (Boulder, CO, 1994); Fulk Nerra, theNeo-Roman Consul, 987–1040: A Political Biography of the Angevin Count (Berkeley, CA,1993); in dozens of articles, many of them gathered in two Ashgate Variorum volumes, Armiesand Politics in the Early Middle Ages (London, 1993) and Warfare and Military Organizationin Pre-Crusade Europe (London, 2002); and in several critical book reviews.

11 Directly relevant to the terminological difficulties of the sources for early medieval warfare isS. Morillo, “ Milites, Knights, and Samurai: Medieval Military Terminology and the Problemof Translation,” in The Normans and Their Adversaries at War: Essays in Memory of C. War-ren Hollister, ed. Richard P. Abels and Bernard S. Bachrach (Woodbridge, 2001), 167–84.


of Sherston and Ashingdon, in other words, though unexpected, is far from iso-lated. Some are explicit; others may be hidden. Classical models, for example,may have influenced the Maldon-poet’s account of that battle. Take the poet’sdetailed description of Byrhtnoth’s deployment of troops (ll. 17–21), with itsemphasis upon the ealdorman’s “instruction” of his troops about how to standfast and hold their shields:

Ða þær Byrhtnoð ongan beornas trymian,Rad and rædde, rincum tæhte,hu hi sceoldon standon and þone stedan healdan,and bæd þæt hyra randan rihte heoldon,fæste mid folman, and ne forhtedon na.(Then Byrhtnoth set about drawing up the men there,he rode and instructed, he told [literally, taught] the soldiershow they should form up and hold the position,and he asked that they should hold their shields properly,firmly with their fists, and not be at all afraid.)12

Although these lines have often been read as evidence for the lack of trainingof the Essex fyrd, they may simply be the poet’s attempt to render and explain theLatin stock phrase for drawing up battle lines, instructio aciem (or copias), asAbels suggested in the aforementioned article.13 Indeed, the Maldon-poet’s rep-resentation of Ealdorman Byrhtnoth as having ordered his men to drive awaytheir horses may have drawn upon the same battle narrative from Sallust’s Catilinethat John of Worcester later used in his account of Sherston.14 If so, the poemtells us less about late Anglo-Saxon military practice and the actions of Byrhtnothin command than many have thought.

William the Conqueror’s crossing of the English Channel positively invitedcomparisons with Caesar’s invasion of Britain in 55 BC, and William’shagiographer William of Poitiers, a clerk from a military background who mightbe expected to provide informed contemporary descriptions of William’s inva-sion, readily and openly obliged. And while the list he provides of the ways inwhich William was greater than Caesar15 is relatively easy to deal with, moreproblematic are the ways in which his account of the Conqueror’s crossing may

12 The Battle of Maldon, ll. 17–21, ed. and trans. Donald Scragg, in Scragg, ed., Battle of Maldon,AD 991, pp. 18–19.

13 Abels, “Tactics,” in Scragg, ed., Battle of Maldon, p. 153, n. 10. Compare, by contrast, thedetailed description by William of Malmesbury of Henry I instructing his English troops (pre-sumably also the fyrd) in 1101: …docebat quomodo, militum ferociam eludentes, clypeusobjectarent et ictus remitterunt; (“he taught them how, in meeting the attack of the milites, todefend with their shields and return blows”): William of Malmesbury, De Gestis regumAnglorum, ed. William Stubbs (Rolls Series, 1887–89), p. 472.

14 Cf. Sallust, Catiline, 59: “Dein, remotis omnium equiis, quo militibus exaequato periculoanimus amplor esset, ipse pede exercitum pro loco atque copiis instruit.” This was first sug-gested by C. R. Hart, “Maldon,” in An Essex Tribute: Essays Presented to Frederick G. Emmison,ed. Kenneth Neale (London, 1987), pp. 75–6, reprinted in Cyril Hart, The Danelaw (London,1992), pp. 542–3.

15 WP, pp. 168–70.


have been embellished to make it closer to Caesar’s. Did William really becomeseparated from his fleet early in the crossing, dropping anchor to wait for the restto catch up, just as Caesar had?16 It is possible, of course, but also suspicious.

Suspicion, however, is useful, because when classical episodes and motifsappear, they can be more or less totally discounted, leaving us with less informa-tion (which is bad), but not misleading information (which is worse). A moredangerous problem arises with the classicizing hidden in basic terminology. TheAnnals of Metz is typical of Carolingian sources, for example, in consistentlydescribing Charlemagne’s forces as legiones, as for instance the four groups oftroops the King sent against the Saxons in 774 that the Royal Frankish Annalssimply calls “detachments” [scarae].17 Similarly, Orderic Vitalis uses legiones todescribe forces of troops and cohors to describe smaller units, but the examplesshow how far from the classical meaning of these terms the medieval terminol-ogy had wandered. In addition to using legio of Crusader forces, for example,18

he also used it to describe units of Turks [legio Turcorum], and noted that Peterthe Hermit had fled back to Constantinople before Kilij Arslan’s attack at Civetotbecause sua cohors no longer obeyed him.19 For Orderic, clearly, cohors did notcarry any implication of Roman-style organization, but rather was it simply agood classical term for a group of soldiers; we know this because he had alreadycharacterized Peter’s followers as an imbellam catervam – an unwarlike rabble.20

Nor could legio carry implications of Roman organization when applied to Turks.But what about Charlemagne’s army?

Here we come face to face with the central interpretive problem facing mili-tary historians of early medieval Europe: how we read the military terminologydepends crucially on how we conceptualize the economic, social and adminis-trative worlds that produced armed forces, it being a given that armies are shapedby the worlds that produce them, reflecting the material capabilities and culturesof those worlds. But armies and warfare, so central to the narrative sources forearly medieval history, are by their very centrality a large part of the evidence wehave for the economic, social and administrative capabilities of those worlds. Inthis situation, pervasive classical terminology creates a great danger of tautol-ogy: How do we know early medieval kingdoms were administratively sophisti-cated? Because they produced legiones. How do we know these legiones wereup to Roman military standards? Because they were produced by administra-tively sophisticated governments operating on Roman models.

16 WP, p. 110 and n. 3, where the editors also point out the many Vergillian passages in WP’sdescription of the crossing.

17 Annales Mettenses Priores, ed. B. von Simson (Hannover: MGH SUS, 1905), s.a. 774; Annalesregni Francorum 741–828, ed. F. Kurze (Hannover: MGH SRG, 1895), s.a. 774. See the dis-cussion in John France, “The Composition and Raising of the Armies of Charlemagne,” Jour-nal of Medieval Military History 1 (2002), 61–82 at 73 and n. 37: “The use of such classicalterms to describe quite different realities is one of the problems of using Carolingian sources.”

18 The Eccelsiastical History of Orderic Vitalis, ed. and trans. Marjorie Chibnall, 6 vols. (Oxford,1969–80), 5:78 (hereafter OV).

19 OV, 5:38.20 OV, 5:32.


There is also broader linguistic and representational evidence for continu-ity, as in titular nomenclature and pictures on coinage that take Roman mod-els. On the basis of such evidence, Roman continuity maximalists such asBachrach, Charles Bowlus and K. F. Werner argue that any general transfor-mation of society, economy and government from late Roman times into theearly Middle Ages was minimal.21 Thus, while Bachrach admits briefly in histome on Carolingian warfare that western Europe was less wealthy than itsMuslim neighbors,22 he argues that “the militarization of the civilian popula-tion for local defense [occurred] within the institutional structures of the laterRoman empire”23 and that the obsequia – the military households – of thepowerful men of Francia were the functional and state-directed equivalent ofthe “professional element of armies that had flourished during the later Ro-man empire.”24 Classical terminology and the classicizing world view of ourearly medieval sources, in other words, if taken at face value, create a worldthat will admit of some change, but constrains it within institutional struc-tures and mental outlooks whose viability and influence assume central im-portance in this world.

In short, the very coherence of the literary sources creates a powerful lens. Ifone believes, as we do, that it is a distorting lens, and that the underlying realitiesof early medieval warfare had fundamentally changed, making a lie of the legacyof antiquity found in the sources, how do we step outside that lens? Where canwe turn to decide between opposed positions on Roman continuity in militaryorganization and practice?

Physical Evidence

In some cases one may test the hypothesis of military continuity with Romeagainst physical evidence. Alfred the Great’s system of burhs in the late ninthcentury is one such case. King Alfred’s connections with Rome are numerousand clear. He made two childhood pilgrimages to the Eternal City, producedcoinage closely modeled on Roman originals, and interpolated references to the

21 The results of this approach are epitomized by the title of Bachrach’s study of the eleventh-century ruler of Anjou, Fulk Nerra, the Neo-Roman Consul, 987–1040: A Political Biographyof the Angevin Count. For maximalist views of Carolingian warfare, both in terms of Romanadministrative continuity and especially in terms of demographic stability and Big Numbersfor Carolingian armed forces, see Charles R. Bowlus, Franks, Moravians and Magyars. TheStruggle for the Middle Danube 788–907 (Philadelphia, 1995); K. F. Werner,“Heeresorganisation und Kriegführung im deutschen Königreich des 10. und 11. Jahrhunderts,”Settimane de Studi de Centro Italiano sull’alto Medioevo 15 (Spoleto, 1968). France, “Armiesof Charlemagne,” provides an excellent balanced overview of the issue of numbers inCarolingian armies; his conclusions tend to the Small Numbers side.

22 Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, p. 175.23 Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, p. 53.24 Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, p. 167; see also 210.


city and its history into his translations.25 Most dramatically, Alfred in the 880sand 890s created a defensive network of fortified towns and cities, at least fiveof which, Bath, Chichester, Exeter, Portchester, and Winchester, were refur-bished Roman foundations, and restored the Roman city of London.26 What isinteresting is how little continuity can be found between the Roman civitatesand the Alfredian burhs. By Alfred’s time most Roman cities in England werelike London; the enclosed Roman city lay deserted and derelict, while a com-mercial wic had sprung up outside its walls. The reoccupation and refurbish-ment of deserted Roman walled towns had less to do with a memory of Romethan with the pragmatic realization that these sites were strategically well sited,since they were lined up with the Roman road system that was still the majorconduit for transportation in ninth-century Wessex, and possessed the rem-nants of formidable defenses (which Alfred’s surveyors often chose to ignore;see below). Although Alfred had lived in Rome for a year during his child-hood, soon after the completion of the walled “Leonine City” to defend St.Peter’s and the pilgrim communities against raiders from the sea, the king andhis builders made no effort whatsoever to emulate Pope Leo IV and his prede-cessors and build in stone. Alfred’s burhs were defended by outer and inner ditchesand earthen ramparts. This was true even for those that had Roman walls. AtWinchester an impressive new double ditch was dug and traces of its trenchsurvive, indicating an original width of 8.2 m and depth of 1.7 m. As with Offa’sDyke, dump construction was the rule, though the earthen walls were often rein-forced with turf and timber revetments, and, in some cases, crowned with woodenpalisades.27 There is no evidence that the stone walls of Winchester or the otherburhs of Roman origin were restored before the end of the tenth century. Dis-crepancies between the actual measurements of the circuits of the Roman wallsof Exeter and Bath and the predicted measurements for their defenses based onthe Burghal Hidage suggest that the Alfredian and Roman defenses did not infact coincide. Alfredian Exeter, whose 734 hides imply a wall length of 3028 ftbut whose Roman walls have a circuit of 7600 ft, seems to have occupied only asmall portion of the Roman city, perhaps Rougemont Hill where the later Norman

25 Richard Abels, Alfred the Great: War, Kingship and Culture in Anglo-Saxon England (London,1988), pp. 57–77, 212. King Alfred’s Version of St. Augustine’s Soliloquies, ed. T. A. Carnicelli(Cambridge, MA, 1969), p. 97: “nat ic no thi hwa Romeburh timbrede the ic self gesawe” (“Iknow not who built Rome on account that I myself saw it”).

26 Hastings and Worcester may also have begun as Roman sites. John McN. Dodgson, “TheBurghal Hidage Place-Names,” in David Hill and Alexander R. Rumble, ed. The Defence ofWessex: The Burghal Hidage and Anglo-Saxon Fortifications (Manchester and New York, 1996),p. 99; David Hill, “Gazetteer of Bughal Hidage Sites,” in Hill and Rumble, Defence, pp. 190–1, 195–6, 202–4, 205, 214–15, 225, 226.

27 Abels, Alfred the Great, p. 206. Vegetius discusses the construction of ditch-earthen wall-rampart field fortifications (Vegetius, Epitoma rei militaris, 3.8), but the Alfredian burhs wereconceived as permanent fortresses more akin to the late Roman Saxon Shore Forts. Nor doVegetius’s prescriptive depths and widths for ditches and walls match well the actual measure-ments for the surviving Anglo-Saxon defenses. Cf. discussion by Bachrach, Early CarolingianWarfare, pp. 233–4.


castle was built.28 Bath’s 1000 hides indicate defenses measuring 1375 yds, some125 yds more than the measure of the Roman wall. Archaeologist T. J. O’Leary’sexcavations have revealed Anglo-Saxon defenses lying outside the wall, whichsuggests that “the Burghal Hidage assessment was being made for the perimeterof the outworks, since their circumference, as opposed to that of the survivingRoman wall, approximates closely to the 1,375 yards of the Burghal Hidage.”29

Nor did Alfred’s or his son Edward’s fortress builders employ Roman surveyingtechniques or manuals (Agrimensores or Gromatici). Manuscripts of gromatictexts circulated in ninth-century Francia but were used mainly for teaching ge-ometry rather than for practical surveying.30 The most useful of these surveyor’smanuals for military planners, pseudo-Hyginus’s De Munitionibus Castrorum,was not among those preserved in Carolingian gromatic collections and wasonly rediscovered in 1493 by the humanist Galbiato,31 and it was not until theend of the tenth century that the Agrimensores crossed the English Channel.32

Significantly, the formula appended to the Burghal Hidage calculating how manyhides and men are needed for the manning and maintenance of specific lengthsof wall is given in native English units of linear measurement, the “pole” (OEgyrd) of 16 ft 6 in, “acre” (66 ft), and “furlong” (660 ft), rather than in the Romanpedes and actus used by Roman land surveyors.33 Equally telling is the completelack of correspondence between the medieval street planning of these Alfredianburhs and the underlying Roman street grids, seen most dramatically at Win-chester and London.34 Despite Alfred’s issue of a Roman “London” coin to cel-ebrate his restoration of that city in 886, the actual street planning for Alfred’sLondon ignored completely whatever traces of the Roman street system thenremained. In short, there is little if any real continuity to be found between thedefensive system of Late Roman Britain and the Alfredian network of burhs.Alfred’s Burghal network may indeed have been designed strategically to be adefense-in-depth system, but if so, Alfred and his advisors did not draw their

28 Hill, “Gazetteer,” in Hill and Rumble, Defence, p. 204.29 T. J. O’Leary, “Excavations at Upper Borough Walls, Bath,” Med. Arch. 25 (1981), p. 22, cited

by Hill, “Gazetteer,” in Hill and Rumble, Defence, 191.30 P. K. Marshall, “Agrimensores,” in Reynolds, Texts and Transmission, 1–6, at 4–5. On Roman

surveying, see O.A.W. Dilke, The Roman Land Surveyors: an Introduction to the Agrimensores(Newton Abbot, 1971). The gromatic texts have been translated by B. Campbell, The Writings ofthe Roman Land Surveyors: Introduction, Text, Translation and Commentary (Hertford, 2000).

31 Marshall, “Agrimensores,” 2.32 Marshall, “Agrimensores,” 5. Cambridge, Trinity College 939 (belonging to St. Augustine’s,

Canterbury) and Oxford, Bodl. Douce 124 (St. Swithun’s, Winchester).33 Rumble, ed., “An Edition and Translation of the Burghal Hidage,” in Hill and Rumble, De-

fence, pp. 30 and 34. See discussion by Rumble, “The Calculation,” in Hill and Rumble, De-fence, pp. 70–1. For a brief discussion of Roman measurement, see O.A.W. Dilke, Mathemat-ics and Measurement (Los Angeles, 1987), pp. 26–7. That the Old English words for measur-ing, gemetan, and for a measurer, metod, apparently derive from Latin metior suggests, how-ever, that the early Anglo-Saxons associated measures and surveying with Rome.

34 M. Biddle and D. Hill, “Late Saxon Planned Towns,” Antiquaries Journal 51 (1971), 70–85;Robert Cowie and Robert Whytehead, “Lundenwic. The Archaeological Evidence for MiddleSaxon London,” Antiquaries Journal 63 (1989), 706–18.


inspiration from the Roman past.

Analysis

If archaeology leads us away from the Roman world, further insight into thedisjunction between classicizing sources and altered realities can be had throughcloser consideration of the sources themselves from the perspective of the ar-chaeological results and all they imply. In order to illustrate this, let us lookclosely into one sentence from Orderic Vitalis, describing the indiscipline of theAngevin army that invaded Normandy in 1137. The translation offered here dif-fers slightly from Marjorie Chibnall’s, in order to highlight some key terms.35

The optimates [“magnates” in Chibnall], however, who ought to have led separate gath-erings [coetus; Chibnall uses “squadrons”] in a lawfully led [legali ductu; Chibnall has“properly levied”] army, were ignorant, unless I am mistaken, of the rigor of Romandiscipline in military matters, nor did they conduct their “knightly quarrels” [as Chibnallrenders militares inimicicias] in the moderate manner of great men [literally “heroes”:haeroum more modeste. Chibnall has “with restraint as lords should”].

The obvious reference here is to Roman discipline and what that implies aboutthe proper method for raising and leading an army. Chibnall notes that this isprobably a reference to Vegetius, whose De re militari “was well known in Normanmonastic circles.”36 Since Orderic is implicitly drawing a contrast between thehated Angevins and his own Normans, one might conclude that Orderic is im-puting to the Normans knowledge of Vegetius, Roman methods of raising andtraining troops, and so on, by contrast with woeful Angevin ignorance. This isindeed exactly the sort of implication Bachrach and others do draw about refer-ences to Romanitas in general and Vegetius in particular in Norman and Angevinsources, among others.37

But for us the real emphasis of the source is not on Roman discipline but on asocial structure and a set of social expectations that distinguish Orderic’s worldfrom Rome and link Normandy and Anjou together. The key words are optimates,the tellingly mis-spelled haeroum, and militares. Orderic is describing a world inwhich great men – magnates who should be noble heroes – create armies fromamong their own followers: optimates leading their own gatherings, and notRoman discipline, is clearly the context for legali ductu. This tells us that thestate, as we and probably the Romans understood it, a res publica whose inter-ests were separate from and largely superior to private interests, is not there.These great men dispute prominence among themselves, and settle such disputesaccording to a set of cultural expectations that surround milites. It is this last

35 OV, 6:472; translation by S. Morillo.36 OV, 6:472, n. 1.37 See, e.g., B. S. Bachrach, “The Practical Use of Vegetius’s De Re Militari During the Middle

Ages,” The Historian 47 (1985), 239–255. For a critique see S. Morillo, Warfare under theAnglo-Norman Kings 1066–1135 (Woodbridge, 1994), pp. 118 n. 89, 135 n. 156, 155 n. 68.


word that bears closest scrutiny, for it still carries the classical meaning “elitesoldiers,” but the elite is no longer the legionary foot soldiers recruited and trainedby the state, but the mounted social elite of optimates and their military house-holds; it is often, though not always accurately, rendered into English as “knights,”and certainly designates mounted troops when used in the common phrase militespeditesque: horse and foot.38 Note that Orderic does not imply that milites neverquarrel (which might be the expectation if indeed they were part of a militarymachine run according to principles of Roman organization and discipline), butthat they settle their quarrels haeroum more modeste – one is tempted to translate“in the discreet way Normans do,” since the Normans were Orderic’s heroes.This passage probably should not be pushed so far as to become an early referenceto chivalry, nor should one argue that the Normans were in fact models of knightlydiscretion – image and reality can cut in many directions, after all. But the clearsocial and political sense of the sentence, stripped of its misleading classicizingveneer and its erudite allusion to Vegetius, describes a world far from the state-dominated universe of the Roman empire, and describes warfare that even Vegetius,with all his complaints about the decline of proper Roman discipline in his ownday, might find chaotic. Of course it wasn’t chaotic, especially not in mid-twelfthcentury Normandy and Anjou, but its principles of organization are not obvious toanyone expecting a state-centered system. It is a different world from Rome – and,crucially, a different world from our own – socially and administratively, and theconclusion we draw is that it was a different world militarily. The implication ofthis for the classical language in our sources is clear.

Conclusion

Early medieval chroniclers and historians were familiar with Roman authorsand liked to demonstrate their knowledge. We should not mistake this literaryfashion for reality, especially when considering Anglo-Saxon and English medi-eval military history, and early medieval military history generally. When Assertells us that Alfred the Great “closed the testudo in proper order,” during thebattle of Ashdown, “and immediately advanced his standards (vexilla) againstthe enemy,”39 we ought not to imagine that Alfred had found a copy of Vegetiusor Frontinus’s Strategemata (neither of which are quoted in an Alfredian text)40

38 For a fuller examination of the word miles and the problems with translating medieval militaryterms generally, see Morillo, “ Milites, Knights, and Samurai.”

39 Asser’s Life of King Alfred together with the Annals of Saint Neots, ch. 38, ed. W. H. Stevenson(with an Introductory article by Dorothy Whitelock) (Oxford, 1959), pp. 29–30.

40 The earliest surviving English manuscript copy of Vegetius’ss De re militari, B.L. CottonCleo. D. 1 (s. xi), also containing texts by Vitruvius and Solinus, was probably produced at St.Augustine’s, Canterbury in the first half of the eleventh century. Vegetius, however, was cer-tainly known in eighth-century England, since Bede paraphrased him, though whether from afull copy of De re militari or from a florilegia is unknown. See Bede, Ecclesiastical History of theEnglish People, 1.5, ed. Bertram Colgrave and R.A.B. Mynors (Oxford, 1969), p. 26 and n. 1.


and revived the Roman “tortoise” formation. Rather, he was using – or misusing– a classical term to express something quite different from Roman practice, a“shield wall” maintained by untrained and, by Roman standards, atrociouslyundisciplined troops. This tells us nothing about continuity in military practice;only about Asser’s own classical learning. The same, of course, is true for termssuch as comes and dux. There can be little doubt that when Bede characterizedKing Penda of Mercia’s forces in the Battle of the River Winwaed as thirty legionesled by thirty “most noble dukes” (ducibus nobilissimis) he was using classiciz-ing language to describe warbands of ealdormen and great nobles.41 The comitesand duces of the early Middle Ages may have borne the same titles as Romansector commanders in the Late Empire, but this does not mean that their officesor duties derived in any real sense from the imperial military bureaucracy.42 Simi-larly, if a source describes a battle or a pre-battle oration in terms that recallclassical Roman practice, as Bede does on occasion, it may not mean that themedieval general had studied his Vegetius; it may simply mean that the authorhad.43 Similarly, the proliferation of early medieval monastic manuscripts ofVegetius’s De re militari or of Frontinus’ss Strategemata do not necessarily indi-cate their practical use by commanders. As Guy Halsall has wisely observed,

[W]e cannot be sure that the popularity of Vegetius was not mainly a matter of anti-quarianism and the desire to acquire classical learning … [E]arly medieval people werequite prepared to accord great authority to classical works, even while recognizing thatthey had nothing to do with the world in which they lived. There is no evidence at allthat Vegetius’s detailed tactical and organisational recommendations were ever put intopractice, and it seems unlikely that his advice on campaigning was followed closelyeither.44

Though in this article we do not have the space to do more than suggest it, theproblem of representation versus reality faced by those who study medieval mili-tary history extends well beyond the problem of classicizing chroniclers. Per-haps even more important was the influence of Biblical models upon their writ-ing and thought. Thus those who write on the Crusades tend to take quite seri-ously the accounts of Fulcher of Chartres and Raymond d’Aguiliers detailingthe glorious horrors of the sack of Jerusalem in 1099. But these tales of blood-letting have Biblical echoes in the books of Joshua, Kings, and Revelation that

41 Bede, Ecclesiastical History of the English People, 3.24, ed. Bertram Colgrave and R.A.B.Mynors (Oxford, 1969), p. 290.

42 This is probably true even of seventh-century Visigothic Spain where provincial armies werecommanded by generals termed a dux exercitus provinciae . See Guy Halsall, Warfare andSociety in the Barbarian West, 450–900 (London and New York, 2003), pp. 60–3 and 250, n.110. This outstanding book provides the most sophisticated examination to date of the evolu-tion and transformation of military recruitment, organization, and practice from late Romeinto the early middle ages.

43 Cf. Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, p. 162.44 Guy Halsall, Warfare and Society in the Barbarian West, pp. 145 and 268, n.35. Cf. Bachrach’s

careful delineation of the differences between Hrabanus Maurus’ De Procinctu romanae miliciaeand his source, Vegetius, and how he infers from that ninth-century military practices. Bachrach,Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 84–131.


have not yet been sufficiently explored. In short, the legacy of Antiquity on thestudy of medieval military history is that of a distorting lens that imposes appar-ent continuity on changed reality.

2

War and Sanctity: Saints’ Lives as Sources forEarly Medieval Warfare1

John France

Saints’ lives were works of edification that were addressed to all Christians –but they arose from dialogue amongst the clergy themselves and very stronglyreflected clerical attitudes.2 Their authors were usually anonymous. Few of thosewhose names we know were great intellectuals or men of high importance andfrom what we can deduce of the vast majority of anonymous writers, they weremuch the same. The ideas they express, therefore, are likely to be those currentamong the literate clergy. The lives are, therefore, likely to be representative ofthe literate “Church” as a whole in a way few other types of literature are. Theyare often highly conventionalized: written to explain what a saint ought to berather than to describe an actual life. They are deeply concerned with miracles,reflecting the influence of the famous Life of St. Martin by Sulpicius Severus.But however conventionalized, they reflect contemporary reality, as more andmore scholars have come to realize. Ian Wood has recently given us a masterlytreatment of a group of such lives to reveal the crisis in Merovingian politicsaround 675, while Carroll Gillmor has succinctly analysed the Miracula SanctiGermani to demonstrate the movements of Vikings in ninth-century West Francia.3

They have their traps. Arnulf the Martyr is a soldier accused of disloyalty by hislord; he died in battle against pagans when he gave his horse to his unhorsed lordso that he could flee. He is nominally eighth-century, but I suspect this is a laterlife.4 Another is the commander of the Theban Legion, Gerone, allegedly martyred

1 The author is grateful for the support of Leverhulme Fellowship and British Academy Travel-ling Grant which enabled him to do the research which underlies this article.

2 Some useful introductions to the study of hagiography are: P. Sheingorn, “The Saints in Medi-eval Culture: Recent Scholarship. Envoi: A Review,” Journal of Medieval Literature 2 (1990),1–29; S. Wilson, Saints and their Cults: Studies in Religious Sociology, Folklore and History(Cambridge, 1985). See also Thomas Head’s useful web-site: http://orb.rhodes.edu/encyclop/religion/hagiography/guide1.htm

3 I. Wood, The Merovingian Kingdoms (London, 1994), pp. 224–38; C. M. Gillmor, “Aimon’sMiracula Sancti Germani and the Viking Raids on St. Denis and St. Germain-des-Près,” in R.P. Abels and B. S. Bachrach (eds), The Normans and their Adversaries at War. Essays in Memoryof C. Warren Hollister (Woodbridge, 2001), 103–27.

4 Acta Sanctorum quotquot toto orbe coluntur vela catholicis scriptoribus celebrantur ed. J.Bollandus and G. Henschenius. 2nd edition, 70 vols. (Brussels, 1863–1940), 3, January 29,587–9. Hereafter cited as AS.

with 318 other martyrs under Maximian. His life emphasizes the idea that Chris-tianity flourished behind the screen of the legions, and it has been suggested thatthis should be seen as Ottonian ideology.5 They were often rewritten, as a studyof Thomas Head’s book on the diocese of Orléans has revealed in detail.6 This iswhy the editors of the Monumenta Germaniae Historica took the rather extremeposition that they would print only those lives with secure manuscript traditions.Detailed studies of saints’ lives from a textual point of view are, however, rare,and I have had to use my own judgement on such issues – and must, therefore,accept responsibility for errors.

Here the intention is to discuss their value for the study of military history in thevery early medieval period down to the Carolingians, though there are occasionallater references. I want to convey something of the various kinds of material whichthey provide, and I intend to weight my material accordingly. It should come as nosurprise that these lives are very important because they tell us a great deal aboutattitudes to war. When I looked at the saints’ lives written before 1000 I was underthe influence of a conventional view which emphasized the supposed pacifism ofearly Christianity and suggested that this remained a powerful trait and as a resultthe Christian Church retained a grudging attitude towards war. In fact systematicstudy of attitudes to war in the early Middle Ages is rare, and powerfully influ-enced by Erdmann who noted that some saints had been soldiers, but argued thatthey went on and “achieved holiness in opposition to their military profession.” 7

In fact this is clearly not true, and I doubt very seriously if early Christianity wasever in any sense pacifist, though a current of hostility to the waging of war can befound in every age. It was quite natural from the earliest times for the struggles ofmartyrs to be compared to those of soldiers. Nabor and Felix were martyred at theend of the third century under Maximian at Milan: they faced death “armored withinvincible arms, clad in the breastplate of faith and the helmet of salvation, pro-tected all about by heavenly strength.”8 About 700 St. Tillo, a Saxon captured inwar, was redeemed from slavery by St. Eligius who made him a monk. He is de-scribed as “a soldier of Christ, the Cross of Christ on his forehead was to him ahelmet, and he was protected by the breastplate of faith.”9 Examples of this kindcould be multiplied ad nauseam across the whole medieval period.

The early Christian Church produced a large number of military men whobecame martyrs. Many Roman soldiers were executed for refusing sacrifice tothe emperor. Andrew the Tribune was noted as a fine soldier, but was driven outof the army when Christians were being deliberately sought out.10 Fabius the

15War and Sanctity

5 AS 53, October 10, 36–42; J. F. Nieus, “La Passion de S. Géréon de Cologne (BHL3446) Unecomposition de l’époque ottonienne,” Analecta Bollandiana 115 (1997), 5–38.

6 T. Head, Hagiography and the Cult of Saints. The Diocese of Orléans 800–1200 (Cambridge,1990).

7 C. Erdmann, The Origin of the Idea of the Crusade, trans. M. W. Baldwin and W. Goffart(Princeton, 1977), pp. 14–15.

8 AS 30, July 12, 277–8.9 AS 30, January 7, 376–80; L. d’Achery and D. J. Mabillon, Acta Sanctorum Ordinis Sancti

Benedicti, 9 vols. (Paris, 1668–1701), 2:994–1001. Hereafter ASOSB.10 AS 37, August 19, 723–6.

16 John France

Standard Bearer equally was forced to refuse to play his military role by thedemands of his superiors, as were many others.11 Maximillian the Conscript andTypasius were in this respect most atypical. The former refused service on thegrounds that he was a Christian, and although it was pointed out that plenty ofother Christians were serving in the army he persisted and was martyred on 12March 295. Typasius was a veteran who, recalled to the colors to deal with aNorth African revolt about 297, refused service and was martyred.12 These casesdo support Flori’s suggestion that some soldiers rejected their military role infavor of Christianity, thereby accepting martyrdom.13 But the more general pat-tern is one of men driven to their deaths who would otherwise have happilysoldiered on. In none of these is there disapproval of the soldier’s job and it issometimes explicitly stated that they were good and brave soldiers. Martyrdomcomes to an abrupt halt after Constantine and the pattern changes. St. Martin ofTours (330–97), in the life by Sulpicius Severus, is the son of a tribune whobecame an officer then converted.14

This pattern of conversion to the clergy is a major theme in the lives of medi-eval saints and one whose understanding is peculiarly important from now on. Itis at the root of Erdmann’s belief that clerics saw the military profession as radi-cally opposed to their Christian vocation. Many early medieval saints had beensoldiers. There are explicit statements to that effect in about fifty cases, but thisis likely to be a gross understatement, because in real terms the choice for ayoung man of the noble class throughout the early Middle Ages was betweenbeing a soldier, and being a cleric – these were the two honorable professions.The world portrayed by the Vitae is an overwhelmingly aristocratic world. Non-noble bishops are rare and their origins are commented on, usually defensively.Lebuinus, bishop of Chartres (ob. 556) is noted to have been “humble in originbut noble in spirit,” and the same is said of John of Naples (ob. 850). More oftenwriters were at pains to stress the noble descent of their subjects. A spectacularcase is that of Desiderius, bishop of Auxerre (ob. 621), whose Life stresses hishigh status and connections with the Frankish and Burgundian kings viaBrunechildis. Much more commonly, as in the case of Domitian of Tongres (ob.560), one of many Aquitanians who in the sixth century were called to sees in thenorthern Frankish lands, there is the remark that he was “noble in birth and inspirit.” This high status, of course, is the reason such men as Praejectus andLeodegar, the primary victims of the crisis of 675, were involved in high politics.A lesser victim of this crisis was Ragnabert, whose nobility as the son of a duke“between Seine and Loire” is stressed, in contrast to the low birth of his killer,

11 Analecta Bollandiana 9 (1890), 123–34.12 Bibliotheca Hagiographica Latina (Bruxelles, 1898–1911) No. 5813; Analecta Bollandiana 9

(1890), 110–34.13 J. Flori, Guerre Sainte (Paris, 2001), pp. 127–9.14 K. Halm (ed.), Vita Martini Sulpicius Severus in Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum

1 (Vienna, 1866).15 AS 8, March 14, 344–9; AS 10, April 1, 33–4; AS 61, October 27, 361–69; AS 15, May 7, 146–

7; Wood, Merovingian Kingdoms, pp. 224–38; AS 23, June 23, 188–9.

17War and Sanctity

Ebroin, Mayor of the Palace, portrayed as a mere “soldier.”15 It was clearly pos-sible to rise as a soldier (even if this is a libellous remark), but aristocracy wasthe norm for participation in politics and leadership in war.

Any nobleman who is not recorded as entering the clergy at a young ageprobably had military training and perhaps experience. In the early middleages the overwhelming majority of saints are bishops, and some are recordedas having had a military career. Their lives stress that they “converted” fromtheir military career to a clerical one although even that is not a constant. ThusFaronus of Meaux had fought the Saxons in battle, though, as befits a futurecleric, he converted his prisoners rather than killed them.16 But Arnulf arch-bishop of Metz, who died in 640, remained a soldier after his elevation.17 Bish-ops could take the lead in war. The most famous example is St. Germanus ofAuxerre who in 429 led the British to the Alleluia Victory near St. Albans.18

Hainmar of Auxerre fought for Pepin III (741–68) against Duke Eudo ofAquitaine, his own son-in-law. He captured Eudo, who escaped; Hainmar wasaccused of collusion, and died seeking vengeance on his accusers.19 Gerannusof Auxerre (910–14), when the Vikings approached, led the forces of the cityagainst them in full armor and won the battle.20 Udalric bishop of Augsburg(923–73), whose life is unusually detailed, refortified the city and fought at thebattle of the Lech in 955 where his brother and nephew were killed and buriedwith honor at Augsburg.21 Writers of saints’ lives were all too aware that theirchoice of career did not free the senior clergy from the violence of lay society.Rigobert of Rheims (696–733) in 717 refused to let Charles Martel into the cityduring his war with Raganfridus for the royal succession, because he was uncer-tain of the outcome of the war: when Charles Martel won, unsurprisingly he wasexiled! But he was still revered as a saint.22

In all these cases, and many others, the authors stress that the saint entered ahigher and more holy life by entering the clergy. But in no case is there criticism ofthe bishop’s former military role. These soldier-bishops are not really seen in adifferent way from those who never entered the military life. It is very interestingthat the miracula of soldier-saints exhibit the same kinds of miracles as other saints.

When particular wars between Christians are discussed, approval is expressedonly where they could be shown to be defensive, and, therefore, in some sense

16 AS 61, October 28, 609–16; ASOSB 2:606–25.17 ASOSB 2:150–7.18 AS 35, July 31,212–30; B. Krusch and W. Levison (eds.), Passiones vitaeque sanctorum aevi

merovingici 7 (Hanover, 1919–20), pp. 247–83, French trans. by R. Borius; Constance de Lyon,Vie de S. Germain d’Auxerre, Sources Chrétiennes 112 (Paris, 1965), English trans. by F. R.Hoare; The Western Fathers, in Makers of Christendom Series (London, 1954), pp. 281–320.

19 AS 61, October 27, 369–71.20 AS 33, July 28, 566–99. The texts of the lives of Hainmar and Gerannus are taken from Gesta

Episcoporum Autissiodorensium in P. Labbe, Nova bibliotheca manuscriptorum librorum, 2vols. (Paris, 1657).

21 AS 28, July 4, 97–122; ASOSB 5:415–77.22 AS 1, January 4, 174–8.

18 John France

“Just Wars” in the Augustinian sense.23 A good example is to be found in the lifeof St. Droctoveus of Autun. When Autun was attacked by Childebert and Clotharabout 576, Droctoveus paraded the relics of St. Vincent and thus enabled thecitizens to repel them. Clearly, although this was a war against Christians, theaction was approved, for God gave victory to the devotees of St. Vincent.24 Anunusually explicit case is that of the tenth-century Scottish bishop, Gervadius.He was present as battle was about to be joined between an invading Englishforce and the Scottish army. One of the English invaders asked him for absolu-tion, concerned for his soul because he was partaking in a war of aggression. Hereceived it and his body was later found on the battlefield because it had a whitebird (not black like the rest) upon it.25 Even in the lives of Irish saints, whichcontain a great range of military stories in some of which holy men seem enthu-siastically to endorse the violence of lay patrons, Augustinian notions seem tohave had some influence. St. Fintan had a vision of a forthcoming battle in whichmost of those who fought were evil men, but he distinguished them from those“qui bene vixerunt, et pro necessitate bellaverunt,” and it was for their souls thathe prayed when they had perished.26 St. Tigernach felt he had to bless the offen-sive military expedition of his patron, King Fiarchrius: but the savagery of warwas ameliorated because the victorious king, as Tigernach had asked, returnednot as tradition demanded with the heads of the enemy dead swinging from hissaddles, but with mud and straw imitations.27

When it came to fighting against social outcasts like robbers, the Church’sattitude was positively encouraging. When St. Gudwal, a sixth-century Britishmissionary to Brittany, was confronted by thieves he prayed for their destruc-tion, recalling Moses with hands raised in prayer against the enemies of Israel.28

The violence of patron saints in defence of their churches and property is a well-known phenomenon. A recent analysis of the famous Miracula Sancti Benedictishows that even in the ninth century 12% of the miracles attributed to him by themonks of Fleury involved violence and this rose to 34% for the period 965–1008. The miracles of St. Faith of Conques show a similar penchant for support-ing violence in the cause of the saint.29

Approval of the use of violence against infidels is even more patent; herethere is no suggestion that war should be defensive, and even the participation ofclergy was approved. The Miracula Sancti Bertini record with approval the defeat

23 John Gilchrist, “The Erdmann Thesis and the Canon Law 1083–1141,” in Crusade and Settle-ment: Papers Read at the First Conference of the Society for the Study of the Crusades and theLatin East and Presented to R. C. Smail, ed. Peter W. Edbury (Cardiff, 1985), pp. 37–45, drewattention to the strength and persistence of the Augustinian notion of the “Just War”; Flori,Guerre Sainte, pp. 266–7, points to the very crude and unsophisticated use of Augustiniannotions before the age of the crusades.

24 AS 8, March 10, 36–9.25 AS 67, November 8, 855–6.26 AS 6, February 17, 17–20.27 C. Plummer, Vitae Sanctorum Hiberniae 2 vols (Oxford, 1910), 1, No. 84, pp. 265–6.28 AS 21, June 6, 718–36.29 Flori, Guerre Sainte, pp. 101–24.

19War and Sanctity

of Viking attacks on the abbey about 860–70 and attribute victory to St. Bertin.30

In the 930s Odo of Canterbury was present in battle against “pagans” and notonly prayed for the victory of the Christian army, but saved King Athelstan whenit seemed he might be struck down in battle.31

It is among monks that hostility to war is often thought to have been mostdominant. The thirteenth canon of St. Basil certainly was a vigorous continua-tion of earlier pre-Constantinian traditions against violence, yet it was a deadletter in practice.32 Those who joined the monastic life certainly were not ex-pected to participate in war. Saint Marculf in the sixth century was a Bretonabbot who went to a British island that was attacked by Saxon ships. He prayedand encouraged the defenders, but never fought himself.33 Those with late voca-tions were expected to break with their military past. St. Bavo of Ghent died in655. As a young man he had been ruler of Brabant and a soldier but after mar-riage turned away from the wildness of youth and became a pious defender ofthe poor before becoming a monk and solitary.34 A similarly brief, though faintlypositive view of his early career as a soldier is taken by the biographer of St.Guibert who died in 962. He abandoned the warrior life, during which he is saidto have fought mercifully and never looted the poor, in order to found Gembloux.35

But although monks distanced themselves from violence, their lives do not con-demn it.

In the cases of St. Bavo and St. Guibert their biographers could slide over thedetails of their military careers and focus upon their monastic lives. St. Odofaced a very different challenge in his Life of St. Gerald because his subjectremained a layman throughout his life. It is often cited as showing hostility towar because Odo tells us that Gerald ordered his men to reverse their spears andto use the flats of their swords. In fact this is an evasion of condemnation.36 Asimilar case is the sixth-century Irish St. Comgall. He was forced into the armyof Dailnaraida because his father was too old to fight, but the campaign wasbroken off as God sent peace to save him from necessity of fighting.37 Odo’s Lifeof St. Gerald is often seen as the earliest attempt to sanctify the powerful nobleprince, but a much earlier effort is the early eighth-century Adelbert count ofOstrevant.38

Underlying this acceptance of war is the same force which determinedAugustine’s own thoughts when he worked out his view that the state couldproperly, within Christian terms, wage war, was one very powerful imperative:the need to preserve the political and social order. Augustine saw war in judicial

30 AS 42, September 5, 596–603.31 AS 29, July 4, 67–73.32 J. Haldon, Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World, 565–1204 (London, 1999), p. 16.33 AS 14, May 1, 72–7; ASOSB 1:128–33.34 AS 49, October 1, 229–35; ASOSB 2:324–41.35 AS 18, May 23, 262–9; ASOSB 3:299–314.36 Odo of Cluny, Life of St. Gerald, trans. G. Sitwell (New York, 1958).37 AS 15, May 10, 577–87; Vitae Sanctorum Hiberniae, 2:3–21.38 AS 12, April 22, 74.

20 John France

terms, as a punishment for wrong deeds. Just as “the barbed hooks of theexecutioner” had to be deployed against the criminal, so the panoply of warwould be approved by God if directed by His agent, the sovereign power, againstexternal enemies. This anxiety is most clearly stated in a rather later saint’slife, that of Bruno, archbishop of Cologne:

If anyone who is ignorant of the divine dispensation objects to a bishop ruling thepeople and facing dangers of war and argues that he is responsible only for theirsouls, the answer is obvious: it is only by doing these things that the guardian andteacher of the Faithful brings to them the rare gift of peace and saves them from thedarkness in which there is no light.39

Running through almost all lives, and especially those of monks, is the idea ofconversion. The early martyrs and confessors were converts. The Christiansoldier-martyrs refuse to sacrifice to the emperor because in converting theysought a better master, though not one who forbade them to participate in war.Once the Church was established, a new conversion comes to the fore, conver-sion to the clerical life. This theme of conversion clearly emphasizes theapartness of the clergy as a whole and of the monks in particular. War was seenby the writers of saints’ lives as a part of the life left behind by the process ofconversion. They were aware of its sinful nature, but probably this was lessimportant than the simple fact that for most of the people who they revered,people of the upper class, it was the clear and obvious alternative to the clericallife. War was not in itself condemned, most particularly because so many bish-ops had to fight. Rather it was always seen as part of the evil of the world thathad to be faced and made the best of. War could, therefore, be directed andused, for it was part of the created order which men could only escape by theultimate renunciation of monasticism. But the first concern of the writers ofthe lives of saints was to emphasize the apartness of the clergy and their asso-ciation with sanctity. This institutional imperative is a dominant theme in earlymedieval saints’ lives. It is certainly true, as Erdmann says over and over, thatCanon Law forbade the senior clergy to involve themselves in war.40 But actualpractice made it virtually essential, so the careful drawing of the line betweenclergy and laity was always vital in the eyes of clerical writers, but this did notand could not involve attacking those who practised warfare.

When we turn to incidents and events of war, the Lives, as you wouldexpect, reveal episodes rather than provide sustained information. There are,of course, some very famous ones, most notably Severin. He lived the mostcrucial part of his life in the Danube valley and died in 482. About 511 hispupil, Eugippius wrote a Vita which shows how late Roman Noricum survived

39 Ruotger, Vita Sancti Brunonis, Coloniensis Archiepiscopi (953–65), PL 134:937–77 or MGHSS 4:252–6.

40 Erdmann, The Origin of the Idea of the Crusade, p. 15.

21War and Sanctity

and depicts regular Roman troops in the area.41 Rather less well-known is hiscontemporary, St. Lupicinus, abbot of St. Claude in the Jura who died about 480.He made representations to the Patrician Hilperic (presumably a Burgundian) onbehalf of the people afflicted by war. The Life mentions the power of Aegidiusand his role as Magister Militum by which he appointed men like Aggripinus asComes Galliae. The Vita claims that to defend the province the saint went toRome to defend this count against false accusations: the Emperor was, of course,convinced and acquitted him.42

Lupicinus’s concern for those who suffered in war is quite a common themein these lives. Cetheus of Pescara perished as a result of the terrible instability insixth-century Italy. Senzius of Bieda was a holy man in the fifth century who fledhis native city to Sardinia to escape Vandal attack, and after many adventuresreturned. Valerian, Archdeacon of Langres, at the time of great Germanic inva-sions of Alans, Vandals and Goths, because his bishop was dead, led his peopleinto the Jura for safety but was captured and killed in 268. Severus of Agun wasa Syrian in whose life, written somewhat after his death in 507, the province ofAquitaine is described as devastated by invaders and its Gothic (though Arian)king praised for his efforts to check the attacks. St. Joseph was one of a numberof Greek saints who in the ninth century fled Sicily: in his case he went to thePeloponnesus where he became a famous monk and hymnographer before beingcaptured by Saracens on a visit to Rome and taken to Crete where he was mi-raculously liberated. Magdalveus bishop of Verdun, died in 777. In his life thebitter sufferings of a city located in a disputed area during the conflicts of CharlesMartel are vividly described.43

The obligation on men of substance to do military service for the king is veryclearly referred to in a number of lives. St. Leonard of Vandoeuvre, who died in570, was accused of recruiting so many young men for his monastery that he wasdepriving the king of their services. Clothar I (511–61) investigated and acceptedthe acts of the holy man. The noble Geremarus (ob. 658), when he wanted to bea monk, had first to agree with Dagobert I (622–38) that his son would replacehim in the army. Examples could be multiplied, especially among the Irish whereSenan was required to serve despite already being a monk.44

Perhaps more interesting are references to those elusive Roman military settle-ments which are alleged to have survived in Gaul after the departure of Rome.

41 Eugippius, Das Leben des Heiligen Severin, ed. R. Noll (Berlin, 1963); there is an Englishtranslation by L. Bieler and L. Krestan, The Life of St. Severin (Washington, 1965). Notablerecent studies are: J. Haberl and C. Hawkins, “The Last of Roman Noricum: St. Severin andthe Danube,” in C. and S. Hawkes (eds.), Greeks, Celts and Romans. Studies in Venture andResistance (Totowa, 1973), 97–149; E. Weber, “Soziale Gruppen in der Vita Severini?,” in E.Dabrowa (ed.), Donum Amicitiae. Studies in Ancient History Published on the Occasion of the75th Anniversary of the Foundation of the Department of Ancient History of the JagiellonianUniversity (Jagiellonian University, Cracow, 1997), 201–7.

42 AS 9, March 21, 261–66.43 AS, October 58 22, 531–5; AS 23, June 23, 183–7; AS 39, August 25, 159–6; AS 10, April 3,

268–76.44 AS 55, October 15, 47–9; AS 46, September 24, 698–703; AS 6, March 8, 768–78.

22 John France

Senochus, who died in 576, converted to Christianity under Euphronius of Tours(555–72) and founded and ruled the abbey of Ligueil (or St. Senou). He is de-scribed as a Taiphal; these were a warrior people settled in Roman times aroundmodern Tiffauges in the Vendée who retained some sense of identity for a verylong time, as a marginal emendation in a twelfth-century hand to a manuscript ofRodulfus Glaber testifies.45 Ermenfred of Cousance was a mid-seventh-centuryabbot whose life was written early in the following century by Egilbert. He re-fers to two places that appear to have been military settlements: Mandatum Du-rum, Mandeure in the Jura, which he says was so-called because Hadrian usedpeople there in siege of Jerusalem, and Vincunt milites which is unknown.46 Muchmore tantalizing is the story of Amantius of Rodez who died before 506. He wasa missionary to the pagans in this area, and according to the Vita he had estab-lished two churches near the city. He told the people of these churches to fish inthe river and take their catch to Rodez. As they did so they were attacked androbbed of their fish by the garrison of the place. Trouble then erupted in the cityand the bishop’s house was burned, but in the end the saint won over the soldiersand peace was restored. This garrison was presumably of Goths, but there is nohint of a clash between Arians and Catholics in the story, although the next bishopof Rodez, Quintianus (506–15), was driven out in a troubled period when thecity changed hands twice after Clovis’s victory at Poitiers. He ended up as bishopof Clermont.47

Many of the lives report the terrors of plundering troops in general terms.There is a nice illustration of how important it was to soldiers in the life of Nicetiusof Lyons (552–73). After his death, one Dado from Tours joined the army ofKing Guntram (561–92), which attacked the usurper, Gundovald, and defeatedhim at St. Bertran de Comminges in 585. He vowed to give to St. Nicetius twosilver chalices that were among his booty, but in the event bestowed only oneuntil a vision of the saint made him fulfil his vow. Finally, a hint about that mostneglected of medieval military subjects: logistics. In the life of St. Médard weare told that King Clothar (probably the first of that name), crossed the Somme,ravaging and looking especially for carts with which to carry the goods of thearmy. The ravagers came to Sallancy, which belonged to the saint: he orderedthem off and made good his stance with the king.48

Overall, saints’ lives are very valuable in themselves for what they tell us ofclerical attitudes, and from our perspective, particularly for what they tell us ofclerical attitudes to war. What they tell us about the conduct of war is, as I thinkI have demonstrated, much more fragmented and only becomes comprehensibletaken in conjunction with other source material.

45 AS 59, October 24, 769–71 and see J. France (ed.), Rodulfi Glaberi Opera (Oxford, 1989), pp.lxxxvii and 234.

46 AS 59, October 24, 769–71; AS 47, September 25, 106–13.47 AS 65, 4 November 4, 276–82.48 AS 23, June 8, 78–81.

3

The 791 Equine Epidemic and its Impacton Charlemagne’s Army*

Carroll Gillmor

Charlemagne led his Franks on campaigns of conquest in nearly every year ofhis reign. From this general pattern, however, the years 791–93 stand out insharp relief. Even the strong stimulus of Count Theodoric’s defeat by the Saxonsin 793 and renewed Muslim incursions from Spain failed to evoke any responseby the great king himself.1 The anomalous cluster of 792–94 events deviatingfrom the established pattern include the natural disasters of an equine epidemicin autumn of 791 and a famine in 793. Politically, Pippin the Hunchback,Charlemagne’s eldest son, rebelled in 792, and Duke Grimoald of Beneventodefected to the Byzantines. Yet with all these emergencies urging vigorous ac-tion, Charlemagne spent 792–93 sitting motionless at Regensburg, an exception-ally prolonged residency there, building mobile bridges in the first year and work-ing on a great (though ultimately unsuccessful) canal project in the second.2

Never before in his reign had this peripatetic and warlike King of the Franksappeared so passive. At the core of these difficulties was a lack of mobility asevidenced by the unusually long stay at Regensburg with no response to immi-nent military emergencies.

Modern historians have recognized that this atypical period required someexplanation. Hofmann suggested that the famine of 793 prevented Charlemagne

*In addition to the reviewers, the author would like to express gratitude to Professor RichardAbels, United States Naval Academy, Professor Charles Bowlus, University of Arkansas, andDr. Erik Szameit, University of Vienna, for their careful evaluation of the manuscript. Also,this article could not have been written without the generous assistance of the InterlibraryLoan Department of the J. Willard Marriott Library, University of Utah.

1 Timothy Reuter, “The End of Carolingian Military Expansion,” in Charlemagne’s Heir, NewPerspectives on the Reign of Louis the Pious (814–840), ed. Peter Godman and Roger Collins(Oxford, 1990), p. 391, the Avar campaign of 791 and subsequent forays against these steppenomads in the 790s was the “last really large aggressive military operation conducted by theCarolingians.” This view was accepted by John France, “The Composition and Raising of theArmies of Charlemagne,” Journal of Medieval Military History, 1 (2002), p. 77, and p. 78 fora critique of Reuter’s view.

2 Sigurd Abel and Bernhard Simson, Jahrbücher des fränkischen Reiches unter Karl dem Großen,2 vols. (1883; repr. Berlin, 1969), 2:16–61, for a lengthy discussion of these events.

24 Carroll Gillmor

from moving away from the plentiful reserves at Regensburg.3 Karl FerdinandWerner explained that itinerant kingship was more concerned with prosecutingmilitary campaigns than with providing sustenance for the royal retinue so thatCharlemagne’s stay at Regensburg should be associated with the Avar campaign.4

Charles Bowlus has also argued that in 791–93 Charlemagne was first and fore-most concerned with finishing the Avar war as quickly as possible, which ex-plains his extended stay at Regensburg despite pressing problems elsewhere.5 Tosolve the puzzle of 791–93 convincingly, however, requires evaluation of anelement to which these historians did not give due weight: the equine epidemicof 791. The heavy loss of seasoned warhorses in that year compromised theking’s mobility and hence his military capability for dealing with these crises.The documentation for a shortage in seasoned warhorses has to be pieced to-gether from fragmentary evidence, including the completeness of the mobiliza-tion for the first Avar campaign in 791, the occurrence of an equine epidemictowards the end of that campaign, and the defeat of Count Theodoric’s army in793 which worsened the problem and extended the hobbling of Charlemagne’sarmies until the end of 794.

In the scholarly literature on Charlemagne’s cavalry6 and his Avar campaigns,the equine epidemic of 791 has received little recognition; in fact, Deér and Pohl

3 Hanns Hubert Hofmann, “Fossa Carolina: Versuch einer Zusammenschau,” in Karl der Große:Lebenswerk und Nachleben, ed. H. Beumann et al., 4 vols. (Düsseldorf, 1965), 1:439.Regensburg was founded in the late second century as a Roman stone fortress for the Legio IItalica, and would have relied on the surrounding fertile countryside to maintain its garrison ofsome 5,400 men. On the number of men comprising a legion during the Principate, see JohnBrian Campbell, “Legion,” in The Oxford Classical Dictionary, 3rd ed., ed. Simon Hornblowerand Antony Spawforth (Oxford, 1996), p. 839. Regensburg clearly will have retained thesecapabilities in order to sustain Charlemagne and his retinue for a period of nearly two years.See Carlrichard Brühl, Palatium und Civitas, Studien zur Profantopographie spätantiker Civi-tates vom 3. bis zum 13. Jahrhundert (Cologne, 1990), pp. 221–4, and Stephen Johnson, LateRoman Fortifications (Totowa, N.J., 1983), p. 174.

4 Karl F. Werner, “Missus-Marchio-Comes. Entre l’administration centrale et l’administrationlocale de l’empire carolingien,” in Histoire comparée de l’administration (IVe-XVIIe siècles),ed. Werner Paravicini et Karl Ferdinand Werner (Munich, 1980), p. 194, explained that thereason for Charlemagne’s itinerant lifestyle was not to govern but to make war. Regensburgserved as the base for launching the first Avar campaign.

5 Charles R. Bowlus, Franks, Moravians, and Magyars, The Struggle for the Middle Danube,788–907 (Philadelphia, 1995), p. 51.

6 François L. Ganshof, “L’armée sous les Carolingiens,” Ordinamenti militari in Occidentenell’alto medioevo (Settimane di Studio del Centro Italiano di Studi sull’alto medioevo 15,Spoleto, 1968), pp. 109–30; “Charlemagne’s Army,” in Frankish Institutions underCharlemagne, trans. B. and M. Lyon (Providence, RI, 1968), pp. 59–68, 151–61, and his “Apropos de la cavalerie dans les armées de Charlemagne,” Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres: Comptes rendus des séances (1952), 531–7. J. F. Verbruggen, “L’armée et la stratégiede Charlemagne,” in Karl der Große, 1:420–36. Bernard S. Bachrach, “Charlemagne’s Cav-alry: Myth and Reality,” Military Affairs 47 (1983), 181–7 and reprinted in Armies and Politicsin the Early Medieval West (London, 1993), pp. 1–20; “Animals and Warfare in Early Medi-eval Europe,” L’uomo di Fronte al mondo animale nell’alto medioevo, 2 vols. (Settimane diStudio del Centro Italiano di studi sull’alto medioevo 31, Spoleto, 1985), 1:707–51, and re-printed in Armies and Politics in the Early Medieval West, no. xvii.

25The 791 Equine Epidemic

did not consider the epidemic of sufficient consequence to include in their chro-nological tables listing the events of the Avar campaign.7 As described in theRevised Frankish Annals, the epidemic was so virulent that “scarcely a tenthpart of so many thousands of horses is said to have survived.”8 In other words,the 791 epidemic killed about ninety per cent of the horses that accompaniedCharlemagne on his Avar campaign. The effects of this disaster on Charlemagne’ssubsequent war-making capabilities is the subject of this inquiry.

The figure of ninety per cent is so high that it will naturally evoke someskepticism, particularly in the light of the Reviser’s own caution in adding “issaid to.” Significantly, the report of the epidemic did not appear in the AnnalesRegni Francorum but in the revised annals. The Reviser clearly thought theevent important enough to incorporate into his account, but his phrasing indi-cates that he was not an eyewitness,9 having instead received the informationfrom someone who may have been present on the expedition.

7 Bowlus, Franks, Moravians, Magyars, p. 53. Walter Pohl, Die Awaren, Ein Steppenvolk inMitteleuropa, 567–822 (Munich, 1988), p. 317, and chronological table p. 500. Josef Deér,“Karl der Große und der Untergang des Awarenreiches,” in Karl der Große, 1:724–5, 785.

8 Annales Regni Francorum and Annales q.d. Einhardi, ed. F. Kurze (Hanover, 1895), p. 91: “…exercitu tanta equorum lues exorta est, ut vix decima pars de tot milibus equorum remansissedicatur.” Contemporary evidence does not provide sufficient data to determine with certaintythe disease that caused the epidemic. Ann Hyland, The Medieval Warhorse, From Byzantium tothe Crusades (Conshohocken, PA, 1994), p. 65 and n. 83 p. 177, made a case for strangles, adisease that can affect horses of all ages, but usually strikes those younger than three years. Forevidence that strangles is far less lethal than Eastern Equine Encephalomyelitis (EEE), see TheMerck Veterinary Manual, 8th ed., ed. E. A. Susan (Rahway, NJ, 1998), p. 1091: “Morbidity[of strangles] may approach 100% in a previously unexposed population, although mortality isabout 2%,” resulting from complications such as pneumonia. Also Calvin N. Kobluk, et al.,(eds.) The Horse: Diseases and Clinical Management, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, 1995), 1:85, statesthat complications of strangles occur in approximately 20% of infected horses, and mortalitymay reach 10%, and p. 219, gives morbidity rate of 20–50% but could reach 80% with mortal-ity rates of up to 10%. An intriguing reason for the sudden withdrawal of the Avar forces at theapproach of Charlemagne’s army in 791 may have been the Avar intent to introduce an equinedisease into Charlemagne’s army. Germ warfare would be feasible for diseases such as stranglesthat are passed from horse to horse, but not for mosquito borne diseases such as equine en-cephalomyelitis or West Nile virus. Not a shred of evidence can be construed to credit theAvars with the concept, ingenious for the time had it occurred, of practising germ warfare todebilitate Charlemagne’s army. The Annales Regni Francorum, s.a. 791, p. 88, and the AnnalesLaureshamenses, s.a. 791, ed. G. Pertz, MGH, Scr. (1826; repr. New York, 1963), 1:34 do notsuggest even remotely that the Avars left horses behind that could have spread the disease. Thepassages explicitly stating that the Avars fled from their fortifications can only mean that theywere positioned inside their defenses at the approach of Charlemagne’s army. Moreover, anattempt to infect Charlemagne’s horses with a disease passed from horse to horse risked dis-abling the mounts the Avars intended to ride for their own escape. Both sets of annals explicitlyagreed that the Avars fled at the sight of Charlemagne’s formidable army, consisting of a largeforce moving along each bank with logistical support ships on the Danube. See Bowlus, Franks,Moravians, Magyars, p. 51.

9 See France, “Armies of Charlemagne,” p. 72: “In the reign of Louis the Pious the annals be-tween 741 and 812 were revised and enlarged by a ‘Reviser’ who … expanded many of theentries and included information about Carolingian problems and reverses.”

26 Carroll Gillmor

Arguably, if the equine epidemic was so decisive a factor in alteringCharlemagne’s military activities, the Reviser, the only source for the event, shouldhave referred to it as such. The equine epidemic should be viewed in the contextof the other military reverses Charlemagne experienced. The original version ofthe Annales Regni Francorum omitted the military setbacks of 775, 778, 782,and 793, events which the Reviser included in his work along with a lengthydescription of Charlemagne’s itinerary on the first Avar campaign. A scholarlyarticle, discussing these military setbacks, included only those listed above,10 butthe present inquiry will provide a nuanced argument that the equine epidemic of791 should be added to the list.

Explaining the events of 793, the Reviser ended his short description of CountTheodoric’s defeat of 793 with the statement that, “When he received this infor-mation [concerning the defeat of Count Theodoric], he discontinued the marchinto Pannonia, but concealed the magnitude of the loss.”11 In other words,Charlemagne deliberately suppressed the information on this reversal. More-over, the omissions of 793 were not restricted to the original version of the AnnalesRegni Francorum. The Annales Laureshamenses contains no reference to thesecond Avar campaign and the defeat of Count Theodoric.12 Einhard most cer-tainly would have realized the significance of the equine losses in 791, and theabsence of the 793 events from his narrative surely deserves an explanation. Thefirst Avar campaign was a success. The epidemic struck at the very end of thecampaign, so that the effect of the contagion would have been on subsequentmilitary operations. In this regard, Einhard wrote nothing about Theodoric’s de-feat and the aborted second Avar campaign. In fact, he specfied that Charlemagnemade only one expedition to Pannonia,13 and did not mention that he had startedout on a second one that had to be discontinued because of Count Theodoric’sdefeat. Thus, the reverses associated with the second Avar campaign, CountTheodoric’s defeat, and the aborted campaign were not reported in three of themost important sources for Charlemagne’s reign, the Annales Regni Francorum,the Annales Laureshamenses, and Einhard. These four reverses of 775, 778, 782,and 793 share a common feature in that all of them were associated primarilywith Charlemagne’s subordinates.14 This observation does not altogether elimi-nate Charlemagne’s involvement. In 793 Charlemagne was more directly impli-cated in that he personally gave the order to abort the second Avar campaign

10 Roger Collins, “The ‘Reviser’ Revisited: Another Look at the Alternative Version of the AnnalesRegni Francorum,” in After Rome’s Fall: Narrators and Sources of Early Medieval History, ed.A. C. Murray (Toronto, 1998), p. 209, citing the examples of 775, 778, 782, and 793 withoutincluding the equine epidemic of 791.

11 Annales q.d. Einhardi, s.a. 793, p. 93.12 Annales Laureshamenses, s.a. 793, p. 35.13 Einhard, Vita Caroli Magni, 13, ed. and trans. Louis Halphen (1923; repr. Paris, 1994), p. 38ff.

for his narrative of the first Avar campaign.14 Collins, “The ‘Reviser’ Revisited,” p. 209. The Annales Laureshamenses and Einhard did not

include the setbacks of 775 and 782 associated with the Saxon campaign, but both did reporton the 778 rearguard ambush at Roncesvalles, placing Charlemagne far removed from thescene of the attack at the head of the army.


after receiving the news of Count Theodoric’s defeat. What makes the equineepidemic so unique among these military reverses is Charlemagne’s direct par-ticipation, as he made the decision to lead his army into Savaria, where the epi-demic struck.

On the credibility of the ninety per cent losses to equine pestilence, thequestion is whether an equine disease existed that could inflict so much dam-age in so short a time, killing many thousands of horses from the possibleinitial exposure in mid-September to arrive at a ninety per cent loss by the endof October. Veterinary studies on equine infectious diseases explain that East-ern Equine Encephalomyelitis (EEE) kills within two to three days of exposureand the “mortality in EEE epidemics is about 90%.”15 Even horses that contractthe disease and happen to survive cannot be ridden again because of neuro-logical damage.16 This modern ninety per cent figure coincides precisely withthe phrasing of the eighth-century entry in the Revised Frankish Annals, andwas not an exaggeration. EEE, a mosquito-borne disease, would have thrivedalong the marshy banks of the Danube, an ideal habitat, where Charlemagne’sarmy was advancing into Avar territory. Outbreaks of this magnitude still rav-age unvaccinated equine populations in south-central Europe, including mod-ern Hungary, the area occupied by the Avars.17 Swamps and marshes prolifer-ate in the region between the Danube and the Raab, and would have been ex-cellent breeding grounds for mosquitoes. Mosquitoes were worse in autumnbecause they had been breeding all summer long and they were more vora-cious at night. While EEE is communicable to humans, the most susceptiblepersons are children, the elderly, and the immunosuppressed.18 The soldiers ofCharlemagne’s army were presumably healthy military-age males who werelargely covered with clothing, having long-sleeved shirts and and long pantsunderneath their protective armor, minimizing the contact area of mosquitobites. Wariness against fast-striking hit-and-run Avar attacks would have pro-vided an incentive for keeping armor on at night.

A discussion of the demography of Charlemagne’s army will not appearhere. Nor will the paper contain references to absolute numbers as posited by

15 Hanns-Jürgen Wintzer, Equine Diseases, trans. and rev. A. David Weaver (New York, 1986), p.354. R. P. Hanson, “Virology and Epidemiology of Eastern and Western Arboviral Encephalo-myelitis of Horses,” in Equine Infectious Diseases, 3 vols., ed. J. T. Bryans et al. (Basel, 1973),3:100–14. Other equine diseases having a high fatality rate, but which do not apply to eighth-century Pannonia, are African Horse Sickness and Borna Disease. Having a limited geographi-cal range, African Horse Sickness has been largely restricted to Africa and more recently theMiddle East, according to the Merck Veterinary Manual. Borna Disease, a fatal neurologicdisease of horses and sheep, was first described approximately two hundred years ago. SeeJürgen A. Richt et al., “Borna Disease Infection in Animals and Humans,” in Emerging Infec-tious Diseases, National Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Pre-vention, vol. 3, no. 3 (Atlanta 1998).

16 Ibid.17 Hanson, “Virology and Epidemiology,” p. 106, fig. 2.18 Merck Veterinary Manual, p. 934.

28 Carroll Gillmor

the two extreme positions of Karl F. Werner19 and Timothy Reuter.20 Acceptanceof either set of numbers cannot change the wording of the passage in the RevisedAnnals that Charlemagne lost ninety per cent of so many thousands of his horseson the first Avar campaign.

Einhard dwelt upon the extensive preparations for the Avar wars, assertingthat these measures were second only to those against the Saxons,21 justifyingthe maximum number of cavalry being called up. The Annales Regni Francorumprovide a clearer idea of what Einhard meant. Early in the summer of 791, theking arrived in Regensburg to prepare for an invasion of Avar territory; he as-sembled a large and well equipped army consisting of forces drawn from theFranks (Francia defined roughly as the area between the Rhine and the Loire,comprising Austrasia and Neustria), Saxons, and Frisians and other regna east ofthe Rhine, namely, Ripuarians, Thuringians, Alamanni, and Bavarians.22 More-over, his son, Louis the Pious, arrived with a force from distant Aquitaine.23 Thus,the mobilization for Charlemagne’s second-greatest campaign represented nearlyan empire-wide effort, although excluding regions such as Brittany,24 Burgundy,Provence, and Gothia (Septimania).

The forces assembled at Regensburg split into two principal elements, as wasoften the pattern in Charlemagne’s warfare. One army, under the command of

19 Karl Ferdinand Werner, “Heeresorganisation und Kriegsführung im deutschen Königsreichdes 10. und 11. Jahrhunderts,” Ordinamenti militari in Occidente nell’alto medioevo, 2vols. (Settimane di Studio del Centro Italiano di Studi sull’alto medioevo 15, Spoleto, 1968),2:819–22. A fuller explanation of this data appeared in Philippe Contamine, War in theMiddle Ages, trans. Michael Jones (Oxford, 1984), p. 25, and Werner’s figures were ac-cepted by Simon Coupland, “Charles the Bald and the Defence of the West Frankish King-dom Against the Viking Invasions: 840–877” (Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge, 1987), p. 102.Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 275 n. 200, 295 n. 62, 296 n. 66, does not analyzeWerner’s numbers in depth as do his articles cited by John France, “Recent Writing onMedieval Warfare: From the Fall of Rome to c. 1300,” Journal of Military History, 65 (2001),p. 450 n. 17.

20 Reuter, “The End of Carolingian Military Expansion,” p. 398 n. 38; “Carolingian and OttonianWarfare,” in Medieval Warfare: A History, ed. Maurice Keen (Oxford, 1999), pp. 28, 30.

21 Einhard, Vita Caroli Magni, 13, p. 38. Bowlus, Franks, Moravians, Magyars, p. 349 n. 8:“He waged it [the Avar war] with more vigor than any of the others and with much greaterpreparation.” Also, on the mobilization for the first Avar campaign, see France, “Armies ofCharlemagne,” pp. 68–9.

22 Annales Regni Francorum, s.a. 791, pp. 86–8. Abel and Simson, Jahrbücher, 2:17–21. Bowlus,Franks, Moravians, Magyars, p. 47 n. 6. On the boundaries of Francia, see Julia M. H.Smith, “Fines Imperii: the Marches,” in The New Cambridge Medieval History (Cambridge,1995), 2:171. For contingents from regna east of the Rhine, see the Annales Laureshamenses,p. 34, the Chronicon Moissacense, MGH, Scr. 1:299.

23 Anonymi (Astronomi) Vita Hludowici Imperatoris, MGH, Scr., ed. G. H. Pertz (Hanover,1829), 2:609–10. Abel and Simson, Jahrbücher, 2:16. Bowlus, Franks, Moravians, Magyars,p. 349 n. 7.

24 The mobilization of contingents from Brittany, especially during the era of the Saxon andAvar wars, will have been a remote possibility, except for the Spanish campaign of 778 (n.58, below), as Carolingian lordship over Brittany remained tenuous at best until 799, whenthe Annales Regni Francorum, p. 108, reported that the Franks had subjugated Brittany. SeeSmith, Province and Empire, Brittany and the Carolingians, pp. 47–8, 58–9.


Count Theodoric and the camerarius Meginfried, advanced to the north of theDanube, while another, directly under Charlemagne’s command, travelled southof the great river. Together these forces devastated the countryside more than300 km (186 miles) down the valleys of the Danube and the Raab during themonth of September and into October for fifty-two days,25 and attacked26 Avarfortifications.27 The Revised Royal Annals specify that the epidemic struck onlythe army south of the Danube under Charlemagne’s direct command.28 The epi-demic did not affect the horses of the army campaigning north of the Danubeunder Count Theodoric and Meginfried, nor the strike-force scarae of Pippinwhich Charlemagne ordered to attack the Avars from Italy.29 Some of the man-power for these elements may have come from the areas like Provence and Bur-gundy which were not recorded as contributing to the Regensburg assembly,rather than representing detachments from the main forces.

Charlemagne’s route during these raids is well known. With this informationfrom the Reviser’s account, we can determine exactly when the outbreak oc-curred. The king marched along the Danube until he reached the confluence ofthe Raab, where he was joined by Theodoric and Meginfried who with theirarmy of Saxons and Frisians returned to Francia via Bohemia. Charlemagne thenleft the Danube to march roughly 100 km southwest to Savaria (Szombathely), a

25 Annales Regni Francorum, s.a. 791, p. 89. Annales Laureshamenses, s.a. 791, p. 34. Bowlus,Franks, Moravians, Magyars, p. 51. Bachrach, “Charlemagne’s Cavalry,” pp. 6, 28, tended tominimize the importance of the epidemic, stressing that the outbreak did not make much dif-ference to the outcome of the largely successful first Avar campaign. This author agrees, butwould add that the real effect of the epidemic was on subsequent campaigns.

26 Bowlus, Franks, Moravians, Magyars, p. 52 provided a scenario wherein he implied that cav-alry was largely ineffective against fortifications in assuming that cavalrymen were impetuousby nature, and consequently would leave fortifications in the rear. “Cavalry is, however, at adisadvantage when it must deal with systems of fortifications. Mounted units can bypass anyparticular fortress, but in so doing they take great risks. If the invading army must contendwith a well-organized system of fortifications, … then the question of whether to bypass anyone of them becomes a serious tactical problem, for if a fortress is avoided, its garrison (per-haps together with other garrisons) can sally out from time to time to harass intruding forces…” This assumption appears to rest on the performance of the Frankish horsemen at the battleof Süntel in R. H. C. Davis’s critique of Bachrach’s earlier interpretation of the battle of Süntel;see n. 52 below.

27 Deér, “Karl der Große und der Untergang des Awarenreiches,” p. 757, explained the tendencyof court historians to compare the Avars with the Huns, and advised that by the end of theeighth century the Avars had ceased to be steppe nomads. Bachrach, “Charlemagne’s Cav-alry,” p. 16 n. 27, noted that Avar fortifications and garrisons in the eighth century indicatedthat the Avars had changed their migratory lifestyle (citing Bowlus, “Warfare and Society inthe Carolingian Ostmark,” Austrian History Yearbook 14 [1978], p. 9). For the more recentdiscussion of the terminology and literature on Avar fortifications, see Pohl, Die Awaren, p.316, and p. 462 n. 55.

28 Annales q.d. Einhardi, s.a. 791, p. 91.29 Bowlus, Franks, Moravians, Magyars, p. 49. Katharine Fischer Drew, “The Carolingian Mili-

tary Frontier in Italy,” Traditio, 20 (1964), p. 439. Also, Deér, “Karl der Große und der Untergangdes Awarenreiches,” p. 765, and on p. 785, while discussing the 796 campaign against the Avarsby margrave Erich of Friuli, Deér noted that the heartland (the Kagan’s residence) of Avar terri-tory could be reached at a shorter distance from Italy than via the Donau from Bavaria.

30 Carroll Gillmor

town that was strategically important because it controlled overland communi-cations through western Pannonia.30 Despite its strategic significance,Charlemagne probably would not have left the Danube for Savaria had the epi-demic already occurred. This scenario would explain why Theodoric’s forceswere unaffected by the epidemic. His army did not participate in the march toSavaria. Thus, the epidemic must have occurred somewhere around Savaria (or onthe way to or from Savaria) very late in the campaign. The ravaging of the country-side for fifty-two days also would place the epidemic towards the end of October.

The absence of recurrent outbreaks in the years after 791 can be explained inpart by the Reviser’s detailed account of Charlemagne’s itinerary. His inclusionof place names permitted localization of the epidemic to Savaria. This data, whenconnected with another point of information, namely, the lack of any documentedsignificant numbers of horses in this area in subsequent Frankish raids into Avarterritory,31 makes the argument against subsequent epidemics more convincing.Finally, provided the disease is to be identified with EEE, the virus can remaindormant for a period of years before reactivating, and the conditions of reappear-ance are still imperfectly understood.32

Although the equine epidemic affected only the army operating directly un-der Charlemagne, sparing the forces of Theodoric and Meginfried, the contin-gents of the royal army alone – drawn from a wide expanse of territories (Francia,Aquitaine, Thuringia, Bavaria) – represented a large portion of the empire’s dis-posable cavalry strength, and contained enough horses to account for the Reviser’s“many thousands.” The devastating losses it inflicted brought the Avar campaignof 791 to a premature halt.

After the equine epidemic struck Charlemagne’s army, cutting short the Avarcampaign, an undocumented logistical nightmare must have occurred, consist-ing of a dreary procession of former horsemen who had to walk back from thecampaigning area to the supply boats waiting on the Danube,33 possibly carryingall of their equestrian equipment, including saddles, and bridles – valuable warmateriel which could not lightly have been left behind – in addition to their armsand armor. All of this equipment could have been transported to Regensburg byboat along the Danube,34 occupying the vacant space left by supplies that had

30 Annales q.d. Einhardi, s.a. 791, p. 89. Bowlus, Franks, Moravians, Magyars, map p. 50.31 Annales Regni Francorum (both versions), s.a. 796, pp. 98–100.32 Wintzer, Equine Diseases, p. 353: “The [EEE] virus may persist for years in a swamp cycle

between swamp birds and a fresh water mosquito without affecting mammals to any greatextent. In particular years infection then spreads through a more widely distributed bird spe-cies, and then via various species of mosquitoes to horses, man, and other mammals.” Also,Hanson, “Virology and Epidemiology,” p. 109.

33 Covering up military failures in the Annales Regnum Francorum was acknowledged by theirinclusion in the Revised Annals, as discussed above, n. 10. An alternative view, Pohl, DieAwaren, pp. 317, 463 nn. 70–1, argued that the deaths of several bishops and many horses didnot demoralize the Frankish army coming back to Regensburg, explaining that Charlemagnestill controlled the territory as far as the Vienna Forest. Deér, “Karl der Große und der Untergangdes Awarenreiches,” p. 785.

34 Abel and Simson, Jahrbücher, 2:25 n. 8, citing the Annales Laurissenses, ed. G. Pertz, MGH,Scr., 1:176 that Charlemagne retreated along both banks of Danube.


been consumed. In this scenario, the boats would be moving upstream againstthe current, possibly by animals pulling the boats from the banks.

Another event subsequently exacerbated the shortage of cavalry mounts re-sulting from the equine epidemic. In 793 Charlemagne continued his plans for asecond offensive against the Avars with the mobilization of forces led by CountTheodoric. The Saxons intercepted and destroyed this army on the Weser as itwas marching through Frisia.35 As we have seen, the equine epidemic of 791struck Charlemagne’s army only; the northern army under the command ofTheodoric and Meginfried had retraced its itinerary through Bohemia.36 AlthoughTheodoric’s cavalry remained intact after the epidemic, most of these horseswere probably killed or captured by the Saxons, leaving Charlemagne with aminimal number of mounts for another expedition.

The equine epidemic was followed by a gap of nearly three years, during792–3 and most of 794, in full scale military campaigns defined as includingcolumns (Charlemagne’s preferred mode of advance for his own army and thatof participating armies including Theodoric’s), which could be deployed to actas pincers.37 The absence of a second column under Charlemagne, the Carolingianweakness resulting from 791 epidemic, doubtless contributed both to emboldeningthe Saxons to renewed rebellion, and to allowing them to concentrate entirelyagainst Theodoric. This reality enhances the importance of the 791 epidemic asthe root cause of Theodoric’s defeat in 793.

Theodoric’s defeat further diminished Charlemagne’s war-making capabili-ties with losses of militarily trained horses and cavalrymen. Even after the disas-ter on the Weser, Charlemagne still had some capability for cavalry operations,including the ten per cent of the military mounts that survived the epidemic ofthe Avar campaign, and a remnant from Theodoric’s army. Pippin’s scarae wereunlikely to have participated in the raids of 793, as these forces were alreadycommitted to a campaign in Benevento, where they succumbed to famine. Apossible source of additional cavalry may have come from magnates, residing inareas remote from the staging area of the campaign, who had not contributedcontingents to the Avar campaigns.38 These horsemen drawn from disparate

35 Annales q.d. Einhardi, s.a. 793, p. 93: “… copias, quas Theodericus comes per Frisiam ducebat,in pago Hriustri iuxta Wisuram fluvium a Saxonibus esse interceptas atque deletas.”

36 Annales q.d. Einhardi, p. 89. Bowlus, Franks, Moravians, Magyars, p. 51 n. 24.37 On pincer deployment, see Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 42, 193, 363 n. 176,

citing Verbruggen, “L’armée et le stratégie de Charlemagne,” pp. 434–6. France, “Armies ofCharlemagne,” p. 68. On p. 70, he claims that pincer movements were exceptional, but theexamples he cites were drawn from the best documented and renowned campaigns, includingthe advances into Spain of 778 and Pannonia in 791. Thus, it seems likely that what wasexceptional in these years is not that pincers were used, but that they were noted.

38 France, “Armies of Charlemagne,” p. 70, emphasized that before 800 magnates negotiatedwith Charlemagne to arrive at a consensus about the contingents they were to contribute to agiven campaign. The earliest chapters of capitularies on Charlemagne’s army as composed ofcontingents mobilized by the magnates first appeared in the Capitulary of Aachen of 802–3 inCapitularia regum Francorum, ed. A. Boretius, MGH, Leges, II, 2 vols. (Hanover 1893), 1:171,c. 9, No. 77, and Ganshof, Frankish Institutions under Charlemagne, p. 63 and 156 n. 27.

32 Carroll Gillmor

sources fit together with and explain two brief passages in two of the annalswhich described limited military operations. The Annales Guelferbytani 793 re-ported that while Charlemagne was residing at Regensburg, he sent scarae, con-strued here as mounted forces,39 wherever they were needed; the Annales Petavianifor 793 described forces sent by Charlemagne as devastating Avar territory.40

These wide-sweeping raids by Charlemagne’s scarae partly can be explained bythe effect of the epidemic on Avar warhorses, particularly devastating as theAvars’ only reserve of warhorses untouched by the epidemic would have beenthose that campaigned outside the area around Savaria. The passages of theAnnales Guelferbytani and Annales Petaviani verify the occurrence of mountedoperations during the year 793 and attest that mounted operations were not totallyeliminated in this period, but no major campaigns were completed. The equineepidemic diminished Charlemagne’s military power; the limited cavalry strengthleft to him was then slashed by Theodoric’s defeat; the severe shortage of seasonedwarhorses thus created left the Frankish monarch temporarily hamstrung.

The crippling of Carolingian mounted forces helps to explain the series of events,792–94, that otherwise appear puzzling when compared with the pattern of previ-ous military activities: the 792–93 events that deviate from the established patterninclude the prolonged residency at Regensburg, the clear-cut lack of an expeditionin 792, the logistical projects of the portable bridges and the canal enterprise, thefluvial journeys, and the military emergencies that evoked no large-scale responsefrom Charlemagne, particularly the resumption of the Saxon revolt. All of theseevents reflect a lack of overland mobility and can be connected with the Avarcampaign and the twin disasters of the equine epidemic and Theodoric’s defeat.

At the end of the first Avar campaign Charlemagne retired to Regensburg forthe winter and began a prolonged residence there which lasted from the end of791 until autumn of 793, a stay of almost two years.41 Werner and Bowlus view

Significantly, not until after 800, when most of the major campaigns of the reign had taken place,were military regulations, including mobilization procedures, set down in writing, and cannot beused to document the customary practices during the Saxon and Avar wars. Reuter, “The End ofCarolingian Military Expansion,” p. 398: “It will not do simply to take capitulary provisions ofthe period 800–830 and project them indefinitely into the Frankish past.” Similarly, France,“Armies of Charlemagne,” p. 66: “almost all of the capitularies on all topics date from after 800and we have no proper base for making a comparison with what earlier material might have said.”

39 Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, p. 81, that scara should be defined according to the spe-cific operation this force was performing.

40 Annales Guelferbytani, s.a. 793, MGH, Scr., 1:45: “Karolus resedit Reganespuruc; inde transmisitscara sua ubi necesse fuit.” Annales Petaviani, s.a. 793, MGH, Scr., 1:18: “Gloriosus rex Karolusiterum resedit Bawarios, missisque exercitibus suis, vastavitque Hunia, victorque resedit Bawarios.”For scorched earth tactics on Avar territory, see Abel and Simson, Jahrbücher, 2:54 and n. 2.

41 Annales Regni Francorum, p. 90 and Annales q.d. Einhardi, p. 91. Annales Regni Francorum,s.a. 792: Charlemagne celebrated Easter at Regensburg; Annales Regni Francorum, p. 92, s.a.793: Charlemagne did not leave Regensburg until Autumn 793. Deér, “Karl der Große und derUntergang des Awarenreiches,” p. 785 and n. 457; Abel and Simson, Jahrbücher, 2:26, 55f. Thetwo classic studies on Charlemagne’s itinerary, A. Gavert, “Zum Itinerar Karls des Großen,” inKarl der Große, 1:307–21, contains no reference to the residency at Regensburg, and Brühl,Fodrum, Gistum, Servitium Regis, 2 vols. (Cologne, 1968), 1:67 and n. 259, mentionsCharlemagne’s lengthy residence there.


the extended residency at Regensburg as reflecting Charlemagne’s first priorityof completing the Avar campaign. But their explanations, which do not givesufficient weight to the equine epidemic, leave it unclear why the Frankish kingwould pursue that primary goal by sitting still at his own residence, instead ofmoving against the Avars. In the absence of a full scale campaign during 792–93, a close look at military activities of these intervening years at Regensburgwill show a twofold shift from active campaigns to logistical projects. Two setsof events took place during the stay at Regensburg indicating a lack of mobilityfollowed by sedentary logistical construction. For the year 792, the year follow-ing the epidemic, the Royal Frankish Annals expressly reported that no militaryexpedition took place; this makes 792 one of only four such years out of theheaviest campaigning seasons of Charlemagne’s reign dating from the inceptionof the Saxon wars in 775 through the resumption of the Saxon war in 794 follow-ing the interlude resulting from the equine epidemic.42 With a view to a secondAvar campaign, the king instead was preoccupied with the construction of por-table bridges that could be assembled and dismantled to provide for easy accessof troops across rivers.43 Thus, the first Avar campaign, ending with the equineepidemic, was followed by an entire year without a major campaign; a logisticalproject replaced the customary military expedition.44 And yet, it should be notedthere is nothing in the descriptions of the 791 campaign which indicate its failurehad anything to do with difficulties in making river-crossings, which might havejustified a pause in campaigning to solve a known problem. A repetition of thesame pattern occurred in 793, when Charlemagne aborted the limited Avar cam-paign of that year in response to Theodoric’s defeat and ordered the canal project.In each pair of events a sedentary logistical enterprise followed a setback in thesupply of cavalry.

The second Avar campaign of 793 shows that a major campaign was under-taken, albeit abortively, but the sources of cavalry indicate that the 793 expedi-tion was attempted on a much reduced scale in comparison with that of 791. Thehorses for the second Avar campaign in 793, the surviving horses of the epi-demic, the preliminary strike forces of the Annales Guelferbytani and AnnalesPetaviani coalesced and were incorporated into Charlemagne’s army to form the

42 Annales Regni Francorum, s.a. 792, p. 92. Also, s.a. 790 (both versions), pp. 86–7, no cam-paign took place, because, as the Revised Annals suggest, Charlemagne and the Avars wereattempting to negotiate the boundaries of their respective kingdoms. Earlier in the reign s.a.781, pp. 56–7 (both versions) for an Italian expedition which entailed no military conflict, ands.a. 788, p. 80 ff. (both versions), the year largely occupied by the loyalty issue with DukeTassilo III of Bavaria.

43 Annales Regni Francorum, s.a. 792, p. 92: “Eodem anno nullum iter exercitale factum est.Pons super navigia flumina transeuntia factus est, anchoris et funibus ita coherens, ut iungi etdissolui possit.” Bowlus, Franks, Moravians, Magyars, pp. 51–2.

44 P. D. King, Charlemagne (London, 1986), p. 22, connects the equine epidemic with the ab-sence of a campaign in 792, but more recently, France, “Armies of Charlemagne,” p. 77, as-cribes the absence of a campaign in 792 to the revolt of Pippin the Hunchback. As arguedbelow, the rebels clearly took advantage of Charlemagne’s immobility at Regensburg, andsurely would not have undertaken an action so drastic as to depose and assassinate the king hadthey not known about Charlemagne’s sudden reduction in cavalry forces.

34 Carroll Gillmor

king’s troops of the pincers movement. This sequence fits best the passage fromthe Royal Frankish Annals describing Charlemagne’s decision to abort the Avarcampaign: “When he received this information [the news of Theodoric’s defeat],he discontinued the march into Pannonia …”45 Most important, the passage ex-plicitly stated that Charlemagne was already advancing towards Pannonia, there-fore, he must have had enough military mounts in his own army to undertake thecampaign provided Count Theodoric also participated. In order to keep the ad-vancing columns roughly equal, the old and the new forces would presumablyhave been divided in the lull of 792. Had this not taken place, a very lopsidedpincers would have resulted with Theodoric’s the stronger and Charlemagne’sweaker. Despite the reapportionment and the pause of 792, however, in 793 therewere still substantially fewer horses available for campaigning than previously,so both pincers must have been weaker than usual in cavalry. The weakness ofthe northern column helps explain its severe defeat; the weakness of the south-ern column helps explain why, on receipt of the news from the Weser, its opera-tions were called off entirely instead of redirected towards Saxony.

After cancelling the 793 Avar expedition, Charlemagne undertook the logisti-cal enterprise of building a canal linking the Rhine and the Danube as reported inthe Revised Frankish Annals: “The king was persuaded by self-styled expertsthat one could travel most conveniently from the Danube into the Rhine if anavigable canal was built between the rivers Rednitz and Altmühl.”46 A look atthe circumstances and phraseology of the canal project reflect Charlemagne’spriorities. The canal enterprise suggests an interesting aspect of Charlemagne’sdecision making. Charlemagne himself made the decision to stop the Avar cam-paign, but only after the Avar expedition ceased to be a possibility with the de-feat of Theodoric’s army with its share of his remaining cavalry forces. Whatshows that Charlemagne was still thinking in terms of traditional military expe-ditions is the mobilization of Count Theodoric which the Revised Annals placesafter the portable bridges project but before the canal project. Once the defeat ofCount Theodoric ended Charlemagne’s first priority of a renewed Avar cam-paign, according to the Revised Annals, he relied on his advisors to determinewhat he should do next. Their plan envisioned a canal-digging project, a militaryoperation that did not require large numbers of horses,47 but which if successfulwould have facilitated an advance down the Danube the following year, relyingeven more than usual on boats rather than pack-animals (which of course werealso lost in large numbers in 791–93) for logistical support. The equine epidemicof 791 and the portable bridge construction of 792 followed by the defeat of

45 Annales q.d. Einhardi, s.a. 793, p. 93. France, “Armies of Charlemagne,” p. 77, mistakenlyattributes Charlemagne’s decision to stop the second Avar campaign to the resumption of theSaxon revolt and a major Muslim invasion, apparently without cognizance of the explicit con-nection to Count Theodoric’s defeat.

46 Annales q.d. Einhardi, s.a. 793, p. 93. For this passage I have used the translation of BernhardWalter Scholz, Carolingian Chronicles (Ann Arbor, 1970), p. 71. Hofmann, “Fossa Carolina,”pp. 437–53.

47 Hofmann, “Fossa Carolina,” pp. 445ff., giving the manpower and nutritional requirements forthis kind of pick and shovel work.


Count Theodoric and the canal project were all associated with finishing theAvar campaign from his base at Regensburg. The two logistical events suggest alack of mobility in Charlemagne’s army and a response to a shortage of trainedwarhorses brought about by the epidemic and Theodoric’s defeat: they show theFrankish king making the best of a bad situation, but one clearly a second-bestchoice. This does not imply that Charlemagne’s logistical undertakings were“second-best” activities, performed only because of the lack of ability to wageaggressive war. Such a trend cannot be shown throughout the reign. The onlyother major logistical activity of the reign dates to 789, when Charlemagne con-structed fortified bridgeheads and continued the campaign.48 The unusual cir-cumstances of 791–93, when Charlemagne’s first priority was finishing the Avarcampaign, should be ascribed to reverses in the supply of cavalry, specifically,the equine epidemic and the defeat of Count Theodoric.

Just as the direct and indirect results of the equine epidemic of 791 help explainthe decisions to spend 792 and much of 793 on logistical projects rather than activecampaigning, so too do they illuminate the causes of two other related characteris-tics of this anomalous period of Charlemagne’s reign: his prolonged residency atRegensburg (in contrast with his normal itinerant kingship) and his use of fluvialtransport for his court when it did move. The demise of ninety per cent of horses inAvar campaign must have included pack horses and other equidae, namely mules;in subsequent years, this loss would have placed limits on itinerant monarchy withinsufficient pack animals to transport the royal retinue for journeys overland.

The long stay in Regensburg of nearly two years, which was interrupted onlyby a brief interlude of the aborted march towards Pannonia in the summer of793, was partly due to a lack of horses, both cavalry mounts and pack horses andmules. This is why the canal project and the fluvial journeys are significant. Inthis context, the canal project assumed major importance in strategic planningfor a two-front war with the Avars and the Saxons with the possibility of linkingthe two great fluvial systems,49 thereby reducing dependence on overland trans-port whether for military or commercial purposes. Charlemagne’s itinerary indi-cates that he made few fluvial journeys during his reign: one in 790, two in 793,one in 794; he also conducted two portage operations, 793 and 797; all exceptthe fluvial excursion of 790 date from the post-epidemic period, and that loneexception, after negotiations with the Avars in 790, appears to have been simplya roundtrip pleasure cruise with no apparent strategic objective.50 The arrival of48 Annales Regni Francorum, s.a. 789, p. 84.49 Hofmann, “Fossa Carolina,” p. 440. Paul Fouracre, “Frankish Gaul to 814,” in New Cam-

bridge Medieval History, 2:103.50 Annales q.d. Einhardi, s.a. 790, p. 87, roundtrip from Worms to Salz. Annales Regni Francorum,

s.a. 793, pp. 92–4 and Annales q.d. Einhardi, s.a. 793–94, pp. 93–5: during the autumn of 793Charlemagne came by ship from Regensburg to the great trench between Altmühl and Rednitzand following the canal project, he went by ship on the River Rednitz into the River Main andon to Würzburg, where he celebrated Christmas and continued on, by ship, to Frankfurt. Thetexts for both portage operations appear in the Annales Guelferbytani, s.a. 793, p. 45: “cumillis navibus et per terram tractis et per flumina venit ad Franchonofurt” (part of the fluvialjourney noted above), and s.a. 797, p. 45: “Karolus rex iterum in Saxonia cum naves magnasper terra tractas et per aquas.” Hofmann, “Fossa Carolina,” p. 440 n. 30.

36 Carroll Gillmor

Charlemagne and his army at Regensburg on horseback and their departure byship in the autumn of 793 still leaves a one-year gap beyond the stay in Regensburg,continuing the absence of a major campaign until the autumn of 794. These eventsand the occurrence of nearly all the fluvial journeys in this period strongly supportthe conclusion that Charlemagne was experiencing a serious shortage of horses.

Charlemagne abandoned the canal project upon the receipt of two reports: thefirst of continuing unrest in Saxony followed by news that the Muslims had crossedthe Pyrenees to Narbonne and attacked the Rouergue. In order to argue that adeficient number of horses prevented Charlemagne from campaigning againstthe Saxons for nearly three years (792, 793, and most of 794), two points wouldhave to be made: first, that mounted operations had been necessary for carryingout Saxon campaigns successfully before 791; second, that the presence of mili-tary emergencies 792–94 required immediate attention but received no responsefrom Charlemagne. Before 791 two types of cavalry actions were undertaken inSaxony. The only set battles of Charlemagne’s reign occurred during Saxon cam-paigns. The Frankish army lost the battle of Süntel.52 Another set battle in 784involved mounted forces; Charlemagne’s son, Charles, defeated the Saxons in acavalry engagement.53 Far more typical of the Saxon wars, scarae or small mobilestrike forces of cavalry engaged reconnaissance and raiding.54 Horses, then, wereclearly of the utmost importance in Charlemagne’s Saxon campaigns before 791.

The unusual character of the years 792–94 is further suggested by militaryevents in Saxony. Charlemagne’s lack of a military response to the Saxon revoltwhile he was residing at Regensburg contrasts markedly with the pattern of hismilitary activity in the previous period. During the pre-792 era every documentedexample of unrest in Saxony was met by an immediate response during the sameyear either by Charlemagne in person or by his delegates, but not so in 792–93.55

51 Annales q.d. Einhardi, s.a. 793, p. 95. Hofmann, “Fossa Carolina,” p. 440.52 Annales Regni Francorum (both versions), s.a. 782, pp. 60, 63. On the performance of the

Frankish cavalry at the Battle of Süntel, see R. H. C. Davis, The Medieval Warhorse (London,1989), p. 13, citing Bachrach, “Charlemagne’s Cavalry,” p. 9, and more recently Bachrach,Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 193–9.

53 Annales q.d. Einhardi, s.a. 784, p. 69: “Karlus vero filius eius, cum ei iter agenti in pago Draigniiuxta Lippiam fluvium Saxonum occurrisset exercitus, commisso cum eis equestri proelio feliciac prospero eventu dimicavit; nam magno eorum numero interfecto, ceteris in diversa fugatisvictor ad patrem Wormaciam reversus est.” Bachrach, “Charlemagne’s Cavalry,” p. 18 n. 38.

54 Texts from the Annales Regni Francorum on the Saxon campaigns 774–791 contain refer-ences to the term scara: s.a. 774, p. 40, s.a. 778, p. 52, s.a. 782, p. 60, s.a. 784, p. 66, s.a. 784,p. 68, s.a. 785, p. 68. On scara as a mounted force, see n. 39 above.

55 Annales Regni Francorum, s.a. 775, p. 40: the Saxon campaign commenced at the initiative ofCharlemagne; s.a. 776, p. 44: the Saxons revolted in 776, and Charlemagne responded thesame year; s.a. 778, p. 52: while campaigning in Spain, the Saxons again revolted, andCharlemagne sent a Frankish host against them in the same year and a Frankish detachmentpursued the Saxons to the River Eder, winning the battle; (both versions) s.a. 782, pp. 60, 62,61, 63: the Saxons met Charlemagne at an assembly at the river Lippe. Upon Charlemagne’sdeparture, Widukind incited the Saxons to revolt; Charlemagne responded by sending emis-saries to lead the army to the eventual battle of Süntel; Annales Regni Francorum, s.a. 783, p.64: the Saxons revolted again; Charlemagne initiated another campaign and the Franks wontwo battles; s.a. 784, pp. 66–8: the Saxons joined the Frisians in a revolt which prompted


In addition to his preoccupation with the Avar war, a shortage of suitable militarymounts incurred as a result of the epidemic and Count Theodoric’s defeat, offersa plausible explanation for this otherwise puzzling inactivity.

After 785 no further campaigns took place in Saxony until the autumn of 794,despite the existence of military emergencies there from 792 requiringCharlemagne’s immediate intervention. The Saxons resumed belligerence in 793when they destroyed the forces of Count Theodoric who with Charlemagne wasgoing to lead a second expedition against the Avars. Following the description ofthe canal project in 793, the Revised Annals report that papal messengers cameto the king at Regensburg, announcing that Saxons had again broken their faith.56

The Annales Laureshamenses for 792 suggest that Saxon hostilities began evenearlier, almost immediately after the equine epidemic. These annals mention thatthe Saxons conspired with the Avars to undermine Charlemagne’s efforts foranother campaign; this source also dated the Saxon rebellion to 792 instead ofthe Royal Frankish Annals’ year of 793.57 An integration of these two accountswould suggest a continuous thread of Saxon hostility from the end of the Avarcampaign, spanning the years 792, 793, and most of 794, a sequence of eventsindicating that the Saxons took advantage of some military weakness here asthey did in 778 when Charlemagne was defeated in the Pyrenees.58 To identifythis military weakness, it is important to explore whether any other events be-sides the equine epidemic occurred that could have affected the mobilization ofan army. Under the year 793 the Annales Laureshamenses report that Charlemagnesent Pippin and Louis with an army to Benevento, where a great famine over-came their army; the famine, a result of the poor harvest of 792, also struckBurgundy and other places in Francia in 793,59 which the Chronicle of Moissacspecified as Gothia (Septimania) and Provence.60 The famine appears to havebeen confined geographically to these four areas and affected only Pippin’s armyin Italy. The losses incurred from the famine appear to have been significant, forPippin did not mobilize another army in Italy until 796, for a campaign againstthe Avars.61 As noted above, in 791 Charlemagne had ordered Pippin’s scarae of

Charlemagne to conduct an additional campaign which continued into 785 resulting in theconversion of Widukind.

56 Annales Regni Francorum, s.a. 793, p. 94.57 Annales Laureshamenses, s.a. 792, p. 35.58 Annales Regni Francorum, p. 52: the Saxons rebelled when they learned of Charlemagne’s

defeat in the Pyrenees in 778. The Saxons repeated with another revolt of 793 in response tothe Avar defeat as reported in the Annales q.d. Einhardi, p. 95. See Deér, “Karl der Große undder Untergang des Awarenreiches,” p. 766 and n. 345.

59 Annales Laureshamenses, s.a. 793, p. 35.60 Chronicon Moissacense, s.a. 793, p. 300. Abel and Simson, Jahrbücher, 2:55 and n. 2. Hofmann,

“Fossa Carolina,” p. 439 ascribed Charlemagne’s prolonged stay in Regensburg during thefirst part of 793 to the occurrence of this crop failure. The famine did not spread over the entireCarolingian domains but was confined largely to Italy, Burgundy, Provence, and Gothia. Thefamine did not extend to the line of march to Saxony in the campaign of 794.

61 Bowlus, Franks, Moravians, Magyars, p. 55 n. 39: scarae were used in these subsequent Avarcampaigns. Operations against the Avars had resumed in 795 with the campaign of margraveErich of Friuli. See Deér, “Karl der Große und der Untergang des Awarenreiches,” p. 785.

38 Carroll Gillmor

cavalry from Italy to Pannonia. The famine overcame Pippin’s army in Italy in793, so that Charlemagne could not expect any military assistance from thesescarae.62 Moreover, Pippin’s scarae were too far removed geographically to beeffective against the Saxons. This famine of 793, however, actually did notprevent Charlemagne’s mobilization for the Saxon campaign the very next year,794. The king’s army, considering its itinerary towards Saxony through Co-logne, appears to have been mobilized from the Carolingian heartland.63 Themilitary weakness of Charlemagne’s army in 793 should be connected with theonly other event that could have led to this perception by the Saxons, the equineepidemic. The Saxons, having participated in the 791 Avar expedition as partof Count Theodoric’s forces,64 were in a good position to have known aboutthe equine epidemic. The 792 report in the Annales Laureshamenses of theSaxons conspiring with the Avars indicates that the Saxons had received newsabout the results of the Avar campaign and suggests that Count Theodoric’sarmy may have remained in the area of the confluence of the Danube and theRaab long enough to learn about the fate of Charlemagne’s army in Savaria(Szombathely). That the Saxons acted on this information in the form of arevolt is a logical inference given that Charlemagne’s immobility precludedsuppression of the conflict. In 793 the Saxons continued to exploitCharlemagne’s deficiency of suitable military mounts. In that year the Saxondefeat of Count Theodoric, whose cavalry force had remained intact after theepidemic, exacerbated the shortage of militarily trained mounts. Furthermore,since their own horses had escaped the disease, their withdrawal from Frank-ish service would have had a disproportionately large impact on the cavalrystrength left available to Charlemagne.

The prolonged stay in Regensburg lasted for two years of the nearly three-year gap in full-scale campaigns against the Saxons and the Avars. The diver-gent scholarly views discussed at the beginning of this paper have ascribedCharlemagne’s campaign inactivity to a need to focus on finishing the Avarwar from his headquarters in Regensburg as well as to famine, despite theexistence of pressing military emergencies. The Saxon uprising was clearlyundertaken with knowledge of the equine epidemic and the realization thatCharlemagne lacked the cavalry strength to respond militarily. The remainingexamples of political unrest exploited the king’s apparent immobility atRegensburg, a direct result of the equine epidemic. The revolt of Pippin the

62 See n. 29 above for reference to Deér, who rightly explained that the easiest access to thePannonian plains was through Italy, but the scarae raids of 793 as reported in the AnnalesGuelferbytani and the Annales Petaviani could not have been conducted by Pippin because ofthe famine in his army. Pippin was not in a position to take advantage of the vulnerability of thePannonian plains as a result of the raids of 788 described in the Annales q.d. Einhardi, p. 83.

63 Annales Regni Francorum and Annales q.d. Einhardi, s.a. 794, pp. 94–5. This campaign was acontinuation of Charlemagne’s war of conquest in Saxony. Reuter, “The End of CarolingianMilitary Expansion,” p. 399, rightly pointed out that the distinction between offensive warfareundertaken by select troops and defensio patriae was a post–800 development.

64 Annales Regni Francorum, s.a. 791, p. 88, for the Saxon participation in Avar campaign.


Hunchback in 792 took advantage of the king’s apparent fixed position atRegensburg.65 The absence of an immediate response by Charlemagne to theSaxons surely enhanced the prospect of a successful revolt, as Charlemagne hada record of dealing promptly with the Saxons. Another disgruntled individualrecognized an opportunity as well. Grimoald of Benevento removedCharlemagne’s image from his coins and omitted Charlemagne’s regnal yearsfrom the documents of the duchy of Benevento. The Saracens operated from adifferent understanding of the king’s preoccupations; the Emir of Cordoba wasunder the impression that the second Avar campaign would not permitCharlemagne to return to Francia.66 This perception was rendered invalid by theSaxon defeat of Count Theodoric, a result which ultimately traced back to equineepidemic; the absence of Theodoric’s cavalry contingents with their vital role inthe pincers movement had forced Charlemagne to abort the campaign. Thesevarious malcontent entities took advantage of Charlemagne’s lack of mobilityduring this three-year gap to make their moves in pursuing their own politicaland military objectives.

In explaining the delayed response to the Saxons, it would be inaccurateto argue that Charlemagne was preoccupied with the logistical enterprises ofthe Avar campaign, specifically, the bridge building and canal digging in792–93. He had abandoned the canal project at the end of 793, but did notresume any campaigning until the end of 794, an interval of almost a year. Amore plausible dimension to these logistical projects and the scheduling ofthe Council of Frankfurt in the spring of 794 might well be connected withthe length of time needed to replenish the supply of suitable military mounts.To replace these mounts may not necessarily mean restoring the cavalry backup to full strength, but simply having sufficient mounted forces capable ofconducting a major campaign. The three-year gap in the resumption of full-scale campaigns coincides with the maturation process of horses. The tradi-tions of the Roman agronomists on animal husbandry appear to have beenmaintained in Carolingian times. Writing in the second century, Columella,whose work De re rustica was preserved in the monasteries of Corbie andFulda,67 advised that horses must reach three years of age before they could be

65 Capitula missorum, MGH, Capit., 1:67, c. 4, No. 25, contains a list of oathtakers includinglords who equipped their servi with horses and arms. Ganshof, “Note sur deux capitulaires nondatés de Charlemagne,” in Miscellanea historica in honorem Leonis van der Essen, 2 vols.(Brussels, 1947), 1:128–32, dated this capitulary to 792–93. In his Frankish Institutions underCharlemagne, p. 153 n. 8, Ganshof connected the Capitulare Missorum with the mobilizationfor the second Avar campaign: “these dispositions had been decreed in view of an anticipatedexpedition against the Avars in 793 (which did not occur).” More recently, Matthias Becher,Eid und Herrschaft, Untersuchungen zum Herrscherethos Karls des Großen (Sigmaringen,1993), pp. 79–85, systematically takes apart Ganshof’s criteria for 792–93, presenting com-pelling arguments for dating the capitulary to 789.

66 Abel and Simson, Jahrbücher, 2:36–59.67 Texts and Transmission: A Survey of the Latin Classics, ed. L. D. Reynolds and P. K. Marshall

(Oxford, 1983), p. 146 (Columella).

40 Carroll Gillmor

ridden regularly; not until four years could they be ready for military campaigns.68

In searching for the reasons a horse cannot be ridden regularly until threeyears old, the ancient veterinary sources did not have the modern advantages ofdiagnostic equipment and invasive procedures to evaluate and treat the causes oflameness.69 For a technical explanation, modern veterinary science has foundthat the closure of the growth plates of the knees, the distal radius bones, occursfrom eighteen months to two years; should a horse be ridden prematurely on aregular basis, he most likely will contract epiphisitis, a condition in which:

… one side of the growth plate [distal radius] grows faster than the other. This changesthe normal axis of the leg and affects the weight bearing alignment of the limb … theconcussion [of each stride] is not spread evenly over the bones. This predisposes theyoung horse to various injuries involving the knees and lower legs, especially the fet-locks.

Ancient and medieval trainers in the West possessed no tradition of veterinarymedicine that would have explained this; sheer experience riding young horsesbefore closure of the growth plates would have been their sole means of derivinginformation.71 Cognizant of chronic lameness in horses trained to be ridden be-fore three years of age, trainers then adjusted their schedules to school in ground-work at age two years, then begin riding at age three.

Replacing the equine losses of 791 involved the expenditure of scarceresources in a nearly subsistence economy, assuming these horses wereraised on Carolingian farms similar to the ones described in the BreviumExempla72 and the capitulary De villis.73 Before reaching age three, these

68 Columella, Lucius Junius Moderatus, De re rustica, 6.29.4, trans. Harrison Boyd Ash, 3 vols.(Cambridge, MA, 1941–55), 2:200–1: “Equus bimus ad usum domesticum recte domatur;certaminibus autem expleto triennio: sic tamen ut post quartum demum annum laboricommittatur.” (“At two years of age a horse is suitable to be trained for domestic purposes; but,if it is to be trained for racing, it should have completed three years, and provided that it isentered for this kind of effort only after its fourth year.”) Certamen is here translated as racing,but equally could be construed as combat. See Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A LatinDictionary (Oxford, 1966), p. 319. Also, Paul Vigneron, Le cheval dans l’antiquité gréco-romaine in Annales de l’Est, Mémoire no. 35, 2 vols. (Nancy, 1968), 1:31.

69 R. E. Walker, “Roman Veterinary Medicine,” appendix to Jocelyn M. C. Toynbee, Animals inRoman Life and Art (Ithaca, NY, 1973), pp. 303–43, 404–15. Klaus-Dietrich Fischer, “AncientVeterinary Medicine,” Medizinhistorisches Journal 23 (1988), 191–209.

70 James M. Giffin and Tom Gore, Horse Owner’s Veterinary Handbook (New York, 1989), p.235, making this material intelligible to the educated layperson. For a professional veterinaryexplanation, see Ted S. Stashak, Adams’ Lameness in Horses, 4th ed. (Philadelphia, 1987), pp.317–24.

71 Karl Brunner, “Continuity and Discontinuity of Roman Agricultural Knowledge in the EarlyMiddle Ages,” in Agriculture in the Middle Ages, ed. Del Sweeney (Philadelphia, 1995), p. 39n.37, citing Columella’s reliance on the primacy of experience in De re rustica, 1.16. Walker,“Roman Veterinary Medicine,” p. 315, reached the same conclusion after evaluating Varro’swork: “The observations are only those derived from common experience.”

72 MGH, Capit. 1:128. On the Brevium Exempla, see H. R. Loyn and John Percival, The Reign ofCharlemagne,Documents on Carolingian Government and Administration (London, 1975), p.98ff. Klaus Verhein, “Studien zu den Quellen zum Reichsgut der Karolingerzeit,” DeutschesArchiv, 11 (1955), 333–92.


colts had to be maintained in healthy condition with proper forage, shelter, andspace for exercise. Applying the data developed by Bachrach for the mainte-nance of war horses, we can appreciate the magnitude and the cost of maintain-ing a Carolingian mounted force.74 Attending to the daily needs of these coltsrequired an enormous infrastructure working on the various estates. An entiresupport staff of trainers would be needed to train these colts to ride, and oncerideable, they had to be schooled to perform military maneuvers such as thecavalry exercises later described by Nithard.75 Taking rideable three-year-oldson a military campaign would not have been advisable, even though they wouldbe old enough to be physically sound. At three years of age they underwenttraining to be ridden, but could remain highly unpredictable. If frightened, aswould be likely with horses unschooled in military situations, some might boltand/or buck. Horsemanship skills included wide ranging levels of achievement.The mounted troops in Charlemagne’s army were doubtless competent horse-men accustomed to riding trained horses, but even such riders might not be ableto maintain their seat should the horses seriously misbehave.

After the epidemic of 791 and the additional loss of horses followingTheodoric’s defeat, Charlemagne had the major task of rebuilding his mountedforces if he ever wished to use the pincers movements again. Unlike moderntanks, neither war horses nor pack animals can be manufactured quickly at thecommand of a head of state. Powerless to speed up natural processes, Charlemagneremained immobilized at Regensburg, while these destabilizing events were tak-ing place throughout his kingdom. Moreover, Theodoric’s defeat with its atten-dant reduction of cavalry contributed to the disruption of the 793 campaign, yetthe epidemic of 791 nevertheless continued to affect the quality of Charlemagne’sown mounted forces, and possibly diminished the Avars’ supply of cavalry horseseven more by destroying a large portion of the Avar breeding stock.76 The main

73 MGH, Capit. 1:84, c. 13–15. The fundamental study on this capitulary is still Verhein, “Studienzu den Quellen zum Reichsgut der Karolingerzeit,” 355–94. For the more recent scholarlyliterature on De villis, see Jane Martindale, “The Kingdom of Aquitaine and the CarolingianFisc,” Francia, 11 (1983), 131–91, at pp. 159–61. For the equine provisions of De villis, seeAnn Hyland, The Medieval Warhorse, from Byzantium to the Crusades, pp. 62–3, and R. H. C.Davis, “The Warhorses of the Normans,” Anglo-Norman Studies, 10 (1988), p. 72.

74 Bachrach, “Animals and Warfare in Early Medieval Europe,” pp. 707–64, and his “Some Ob-servations on the Military Administration of the Norman Conquest,” Anglo-Norman Studies, 8(1986), 1–25, reprinted in his Warfare and Military Organization in Pre-Crusade Europe(Aldershot, 2002), no. xiv.

75 For a discussion of these military games see Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, p. 128, andCarroll Gillmor, “Practical Chivalry: the Training of Horses for Warfare and Tournaments,”Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History, 13 (1992), p. 12.

76 Dr. Erik Szameit, University of Vienna, via email correspondence, suggested that the epidemicstruck the Avar breeding stock, thus preventing or at least seriously hindering the productionof cavalry horses. The epidemic, he argued, helps to explain why the Avars offered so littleresistance to the 796 raids of Duke Erich of Friuli and Pippin, as reported in the Annales RegniFrancorum, p. 98. The validity of this hypothesis would depend on the territorial extent of theepidemic and the geographical distribution of the Avar stud farms. According to the AnnalesLaureshamenses, p. 34, the Franks raided most of the areas in Pannonia for fifty-two days.

42 Carroll Gillmor

concern to keep in mind here is Charlemagne’s supply of militarily trained horses.Yes, there were horses available, but they were not yet seasoned war horses,having still to undergo the initial training period. Allowing seven to eight yearsfor the service life of a warhorse77 means that the normal replacement stream peryear must be one-seventh to one-eighth of the total. For the sake of argument,one-eighth will suffice. Four years would be required to recover half strength ofthe lost horses and full strength reasonably could be expected in eight years.Half of the 791 losses would have been replaced by 795, the year after the nextSaxon campaign, and a full recovery could have been expected by 799. Thistimetable assumes normal development with no increase in production, main-taining the existing breeding stock without reducing its quality with the intro-duction of less desirable stallions or mares, and without diverting into cavalrytraining second-class horses, those lacking genuine athletic ability and tempera-ment. The foals replacing the 791 losses would include the crop of 791 whichwere already born by the time of the epidemic. These foals would have been fouryears old in 795, the year after Charlemagne resumed the Saxon war. The re-placement stock that participated in the 794 Saxon campaign would have beendrawn from the foal crops of 790, 789, and 788. In 791 these horses would havebeen too young to have participated in the Avar campaign, but by 794 they wouldhave been four, five, and six-year-olds respectively. The foals of 791, age threein 794, rideable but not militarily trained, would not have been included in theSaxon expedition. Nor would the foals of 787; having reached age four in 791,most of these would have been fatalities of the epidemic. Thus, Charlemagne’sreplacement cavalry was less than half strength in 794, a shortfall suggestingthat cavalry-trained second-class horses may have participated in the Saxon cam-paign. Increasing the supply with the introduction of more breeding stock but oflesser quality would provide a longer term recovery of the 791 losses. The earli-est possible year for the introduction of new breeding stock would be 792, thespring following the epidemic; the first foals of this activity would not be born

During this period the Franks had no encounter with EEE until Charlemagne’s army marched100 km to Savaria (Szombathely), where the epidemic was concentrated. The sources containno information on the distribution of Avar stud farms. Concentration of the farms in the vicin-ity of the Ring, the Avar power base in the center of the Alföld, some 200 km direct distancefrom Savaria (Bowlus, Franks, Moravians, Magyars, p. 50, map 2), would minimize the like-lihood of infection there. By contrast, the distribution of Avar stud farms throughout Pannoniawould mean that only a portion of the breeding stock would have been affected, specifically,those around Savaria. The Annales Regni Francorum, p. 98, explicitly gave the reason for theabsence of Avar resistance in 796, that the Avars had been exhausted by civil war during theinterval between 791 and 796, an activity which may have involved some cavalry operations.

77 Information on the service life of a war horse is found in Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare,p. 63 and n. 104 and pp. 299–300. Frederick L. Devereux, Jr., The Cavalry Manual of HorseManagement (South Brunswick and New York, 1979), held a more conservative view of theage for horses entering cavalry service in the early twentieth century practice of the UnitedStates Cavalry School, Fort Riley, Kansas. On p. 143, Devereux explained that “Horses underfive years of age are too young, and often six years is a better minimum age. Those over fifteenyears of age are approaching the age of senility, but some individuals beyond this age willrender excellent service.”


until 793, as the horse has an eleven-month gestation period, so that these 793foals would not be functional warhorses until 797. Considering the urgency ofthe Saxon revolt which required a more immediate response, the introduction ofnew breeding stock would not have been a viable option. Full replacement of the791 losses, the second four years of the normal timetable, would have includedthe foal crops of 792, 793, 794, and 795. Reaching age four years in 799, the 795foals would have been basically trained as cavalry horses. By then the warhorsesof the first replacement phase (the foals of 788–91) would have been retired. Theproduction of warhorses would have resumed its normal schedule by 800, theaccepted date for the capitulary De villis and the Brevium Exempla. These twosources indicate that Charlemagne’s horsebreeding program was already a flour-ishing established practice.

Applying this data provides some insights into the supply of cavalry horsesduring the first phase of the recovery period. In 793, the year of the aborted Avarcampaign, Charlemagne had horses which were two and three years old in 791,so that they were four and five in 793. The five-year-olds would have had themost training and possibly some raiding and reconnaissance experience as ex-plained in the earlier discussion of the Annales Petaviani and the AnnalesGuelferbytani. In order to include on the Saxon campaign the horses which reachedtheir fourth year in 794, they would have spent most of the year in training toperform military maneuvers. The four-year-olds would have begun their militarytraining but should not be considered seasoned war horses, assuming that mostof these horses lacked solid experience in military situations and therefore couldstill behave unpredictably. In the semi-official ordering of events for 794, theSaxon campaign followed the Council of Frankfurt. The autumn mobilizationfor the Saxon campaign would have permitted an extension of horsetraining ac-tivities in providing additional requisite time to school these newly rideable coltsto be war horses.78

The Avar and Saxon campaigns were clearly interrelated. The horses lost inPannonia meant that Charlemagne could not campaign against the Saxons until794. By then, Charlemagne evidently had enough horsemen to advance with hiscustomary two-pronged attack mode, before which the Saxons capitulated.79 Tra-ditional discussions of Charlemagne’s cavalry have appeared in the context of aneighth-century military revolution that placed the mounted warrior at the center78 Louis Halphen, Études critiques sur l’histoire de Charlemagne (Paris, 1921), p. 189, noticed

the slowness of the troop concentration in 794, and the absence of an explanation in the sources.79 Annales Regni Francorum, s.a. 794, p. 94, for a two-pronged assault against the Saxons and

their capitulation. France, “Armies of Charlemagne,” p. 77, noted without documentation thatthe use of the word turmas to denote the advancing columns in 794 implied a small force. Itremains unclear how this term fits into military terminology, possibly something less than anexercitus but larger than a scara. In 795 (Annales Regni Francorum, p. 96), the Annals re-ported that Charlemagne advanced into Saxony with an exercitus during a year when he pre-sumably would have had an additional crop of cavalry horses. On p. 79, France continued histheme of magnate consent in the raising of armies explaining, “The Saxon War simply did notproduce profitable campaigns like those against Bavaria, Italy and the Avars … The absence oflarge-scale pincer-movements in the Saxon war is perhaps indicative of the limited resourcesat the great king’s disposal.”

44 Carroll Gillmor

of warfare.80 More recently, scholarship on Carolingian warfare has arrived at aconsensus on the predominance of logistics and siege warfare,81 assigning cavalryto the more supportive role of reconnaissance and raiding. Of these books andarticles that have discussed mounted forces in Charlemagne’s army, none has ob-served how dramatically the focus of this evidence shifts after the equine epi-demic. Before 791 tactical descriptions include horses engaged in various militaryoperations, such as the battle of Süntel and the raids of the scarae in the Saxoncampaigns. A close look at the chronology of the evidence points to 791 as awatershed in that all but one of the texts devoted to ensuring the supply, provision-ing and care of horses in Charlemagne’s armies date from the period after theepidemic.82 The capitulary De villis, dated around 800, by which point the losses of791 would have been fully recovered, elaborated on the details for horsebreedingto improve an existing system rather than to establish a new one. The inventoriesof four estates contained in the Brevium Exempla of c. 800 provided invaluablenumerical data on mares as well as two and three-year-olds. Charlemagne’s let-ter to Abbot Fulrad dated 804–11, containing the fullest description of Carolingianarmaments, was preoccupied largely with the mobilization requirements of theequestrian contingents, including a detailed list of cavalry equipment.83 In 806

80 For a summary of the issues surrounding an eighth-century military revolution, see most re-cently France, “Recent writing on medieval warfare,” pp. 445–9, and Kelly DeVries, MedievalMilitary Technology (Ontario, 1992), pp. 95–110. For older discussions, see Contamine, Warin the Middle Ages, pp. 179–84; Gillmor, “Cavalry: Western European,” in Dictionary of theMiddle Ages, ed. Joseph R. Strayer (New York, 1983), 3:201–2, 207. Davis, Medieval Warhorse,pp. 11–16, 50–51.

81 A number of Bernard S. Bachrach’s articles on this point appear in Warfare and MilitaryOrganization in Pre-Crusade Europe. See also his Early Carolingian Warfare, pp. 103, 212(for Aquitaine). Bowlus, Franks, Moravians, and Magyars, p. 19 and n. 55, citing Bachrach,“Charlemagne’s Cavalry,” p. 184. France, “Armies of Charlemagne,” pp. 67–8.

82 With the exception of one text, dated in 781, Charlemagne prohibited the exportation of stal-lions. See MGH, Capit. 1:190, c. 7. Loyn and Percival, Reign of Charlemagne, p. 50. Davis,Medieval Warhorse, p. 53.

83 MGH, Capit. 1:168. Georg Waitz, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, 3rd ed. (Berlin, 1885),4:544: “In einem Schreiben Karls an den Abt Fulrad, das diesen zur Heerversammlung nachSachsen entbietet und im einzelnen angiebt welche Rustüng verlangt wird, ist nur von Reiternund ihrer Bewaffnung die Rede.” Also, Lynn White, Jr., Medieval Technology and Social Change(Oxford, 1962), p. 6, explained, “the only extant military summons sent by him [Charlemagne]to a magnate of his realm, that issued to Abbot Fulrad of Vermandois and Lobbes between 804and 811, spoke in detail of horsemen but did not indicate that the abbot was expected to pro-duce any footmen for war.” Abbot Fulrad’s letter nevertheless specified, “let the men of eachone of your vassals march along with the carts and horsemen.” If the men are marching withthe horsemen, then they are not horsemen. These men were presumably footsoldiers, but onlythe equipment of the horsemen is further specified. The capitulary texts that included passageson cavalry should be set in the context of the larger body of evidence on military activities,specifically the topical organization of the capitularies. For example, three other capitulariesdevoted exclusively to military campaigns were concerned with the property qualification andeligibility for military service for individuals who served on foot. See MGH, Capit. 1:134–5,no. 48: Memoratorium de Exercitu in Gallia occidentali praeparando of 807; 1:136, no. 50:Capitulare missorum de exercitu promovendo of 808; 1:164, no. 73: Capitula de rebusexercitalibus in placito tractanda of 811. The topical arrangement of these military capitular-


Charlemagne issued a capitulary on a mobilization against the Frisians, emphasiz-ing that the horsemen be well prepared.84 In apparent realization of the fragility ofcavalry and their principal source of transportation, Charlemagne was forced totake precautions to ensure the supply of military mounts.

In a historiographical context, the texts on the supply of horses should be viewedas a response to the epidemic and Theodoric’s defeat not as an extension of anearlier military revolution. The equine epidemic of 791 significantly modifiedCharlemagne’s war-making capabilities, forcing him to curtail the first Avar cam-paign. Insufficient numbers of riding and pack horses affected more than thecavalry alone. Charlemagne and his royal retinue had to alter their lifestyle ofitinerant kingship, remaining in Regensburg for the unusually long period of nearlytwo years. The more sedentary logistical enterprises of the pontoon bridge andthe Rhine–Danube canal assumed first priority only after an offensive against theAvars became impossible. A chronological gap of three years in military cam-paigns followed the equine epidemic of 791. Large-scale military interventiondid not resume until the end of 794, despite the presence of military exigencies.The three-year hiatus in major campaigns cannot be explained solely by the stayin Regensburg to fight the Avar war, for this residency lasted only two years.Charlemagne waited an additional year before resuming the Saxon campaign.Indeed, the stay at Regensburg itself cannot in any case be explained convinc-ingly without reference to 791. The lack of sufficient numbers of suitable mountsand pack animals best explains this gap. The loss of ninety per cent of the cavalryforce in his division of the army of 791 prevented campaigning and the three-yearinterval was spent waiting for the restoration of the supply of horses to opera-tional capacity. Human lives, especially those in the agrarian societies of earlymedieval Europe, depended on the good health of their animals.

ies suggests that Charlemagne evaluated the tactical needs of a projected campaign and mobi-lized the various kinds of troops accordingly. France, “Armies of Charlemagne,” p. 62, ex-pressed a similar view, “that there was no single Carolingian army, but rather that we shouldthink in terms of different kinds of armies raised in particular circumstances and differing inmake-up.”

84 MGH, Capit. 1:136, c. 3: “De Frisionibus volumus, ut comites et vassalli nostri qui beneficiahabere videntur et caballarii omnes generaliter ad placitum nostrum veniant bene praeparati.”

The Role of the Cavalry in Medieval Warfare*

J. F. Verbruggen

Translated by Kelly DeVries

In an article, “The Role of Cavalry in Medieval Warfare: Horses, Horses AllAround and Not a One to Use,” appearing in the Mededelingen van de KoninklijkeAcademie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van België, BryceLyon challenged the hegemony of the cavalry in medieval warfare.1 He consid-ers my conclusion concerning the supremacy of knights to be “a romantic state-ment of this idée fixe.” He thinks that scholars should follow the studies of Ber-nard Bachrach and others on warfare in the early Middle Ages to the eleventhcentury. From the study of Carolingian military operations, he concludes thatsieges with ladders and tunnels and campaigns in dark woods and marshy terrainwere more numerous than battles.

If these campaigns were more numerous than battles, how is it then that in1066 there were three battles which followed each other: the landing of Hardradaand his defeat of the troops of Edwin and Morcar at Fulford on September 20, themarch of Harold to the north and his defeat of Hardrada at Stamford Bridge onSeptember 25, and, afterwards, the battle of Hastings on October 14? Where were thesieges? And the woods? Harold came out of a forest to do battle, and he was defeated.

Bryce Lyon gives no examples of the campaigns in dark forests and marshyterrain, and he gives no numerical comparisons with battles. There were a fewexceptions. There were certainly sieges with ladders and tunnels. It also followsthat the Carolingians were victorious in these campaigns and sieges. Lyon for-gets that an attacker who was stronger than the defender could avoid the darkwoods and marshy terrain and could march through the rest of the land, plunder-ing all that was there, burning the houses, destroying the environs, and leadingthe people away as prisoners. The attacker could then wait to see how long thedefender could live in his dark woods, his marshy terrain, and his fortifications,while the rest of his land was destroyed and he received no more supplies. If theattacker alone had as his purpose to undertake a chevauchée,2 he could burn

4

*(Original: “De rol van de ruiterij in de middeleeuwse oorlogvoering,” Belgisch tijdschriftvoor militaire geschiedenis 30 (1994), 389–418.

1 Academie Analecta, Klasse der Letteren, Jaargang 49, 1987, nr. 2, p. 77–90. [Translator’snote: Dr. Lyon is named only as Br. Lyon by Professor Verbruggen in the original article; Ihave filled in Lyon’s first name.]

2 [Translator’s note: The original Dutch translates as “punishment expedition.”]

everything and steal from the population, take prisoners and then return to hisown home, and return again a year later. He did not have to fight any battle, ifthe defender did not wish to. He could achieve his purpose without battle. Thenumber of battles had no importance in some campaigns. Much of the warfareof the seventh through the eleventh centuries would have been forgotten hadmonks not written the few sources in which it was recorded. On the smallnumber of battles Lyon could find much more information in my studies thanin Bachrach’s.3 This small number of battles showed the caution of medievalmilitary leaders. The weaker defenders placed themselves in a fortification toavoid battle and to strengthen their territory against the influence of theCarolingians.

According to Bryce Lyon, cavalry would only have been used for recon-naissance and raids. He forgets the attack or assault, the pursuit, the retreat,and the possibility of advancing or attacking the land of an enemy on a broaderfront. Cavalry did not play a decisive tactical role in one significant battle orcampaign.4 Lyon has not read my study on the warfare in the Carolingianempire (714–1000), nor my two studies on the tactics of the fourteenth andfifteenth centuries. In total, he should have read ten of my works before hewrote his criticism.5 His erroneous claims are already refuted in those studies.

As a conclusion, he writes: “Cavalry was never militarily superior tofoot soldiers, not even in the Middle Ages when it might have been pos-

47The Role of the Cavalry

3 J. F. Verbruggen, De krijgkunst in west-Europa in de middeleeuwen (IXe tot XIVe eeuw),Verhandelingen van de Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie voor wetenschappen, letteren en schonekunsten van België, Klasse der letteren, Verhandelingen, nr. 20 (Brussels, 1954), pp. 509–14,524, 535–9; Het leger en de vloot van de graven van Vlaanderen vanaf het ontstaan tot in1305, Verhandelingen van de Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie voor wetenschappen, letteren enschone kunsten van België, Klasse der letteren, Verhandelingen, nr. 38 (Brussels, 1960), pp.147–55, 158, 169–90; The Art of Warfare in Western Europe During the Middle Ages from theEighth Century to 1340, trans. S. Willard and S. C. M. Southern (Amsterdam, 1977), pp. 288–91. [Trans. note: As this article was published before the appearance of the second edition ofThe Art of Warfare in Western Europe During the Middle Ages from the Eighth Century to1340, I have used the first edition of this work as cited in the original footnotes.]

4 Lyon, “The Role of Cavalry in Medieval Warfare,” p. 81.5 J. F. Verbruggen, “L’art militaire dans l’empire carolingien (714–1000),” Revue Belge d’histoire

militaire 23 (1979–80), 289–310, 393–412; “Un plan de bataille du duc de Bourgogne (14septembre 1417) et la tactique de l’époque,” Revue internationale d’histoire militaire 20 (1959),443–51; “La tactique de la chevalerie Française de 1340 à 1415,” Publications de l’universitéde l’état à Elisabethville 1 (1961), 39–48; “Vlaamse gemeentelegers tegen Franse ridderlegersin de 14de en 15de eeuw,” Revue Belge d’histoire militaire 24 (1981), 359–82 (translated as“Flemish Urban Militias against French Cavalry Armies in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Cen-turies,” trans. Kelly DeVries, Journal of Medieval Military History 1 (2002), 145–69); Hetgemeenteleger van Brugge van 1338 tot 1340 en de namen van de weerbare mannen (Brussels,1962); “De militairen: In de middeleeuwen en de bourgondische tijd,” in Flandria Nostra, ed.J. L. Broeckx et al. (Antwerp, 1960), V:161–233; “Bewapening en krijgkunst: het Gentse enhet Brugse gemeenteleger in 1477–1479,” Militaria Belgica (1984), 15–23; “Vrouwen in demiddeleeuwse legers,” Revue Belge d’histoire militaire 24 (1982), 617–34 (Joan of Arc againstthe English); “De naam guldensporenslag voor de slag bij Kortrijk (11 juli 1302),” RevueBelge d’histoire militaire 24 (1982), 701–6 (Joan of Arc at Patay, p. 705).

48 J. F. Verbruggen

sible.”6 This claim is so wrong that one can immediately conclude that Lyonknows so little of the subject that he should have known better than write aboutit. Bryce Lyon and Bernard Bachrach wish to push the exceptions of medievalwarfare as the rule: according to them, the infantry played a greater role, and therole of the cavalry was small. But they do not believe the sources, as they thinkthat what was written is completely wrong.

Bryce Lyon has not studied the sources of even one battle in the Middle Ages.Should he have done that, he would have found contradictions in thirty differentnarrative sources, such as those for the battle of Courtrai and the battle of Crécy,and he would afterwards have to be more careful. Then he might think that hehas found contradictions in the text of one source, only to simply discover thatthere were no contradictions. So he gives the French version of camouflagedtrenches for the battle of Courtrai, that Henri Pirenne and myself have shown tobe a French excuse for the defeat. Bryce Lyon knows better without having stud-ied the sources.7

Lyon does not know enough concerning military theory and practice to makejudgements or write about these problems. This lack of expertise shows in hiserroneous conclusions. It shows also in the use of the word “infantry” for thefootsoldiers of the time.8 Infantry was first introduced in the sixteenth or seven-teenth century. The word “infantry” appears in English around 1579. Lyon shouldnot use it for the Middle Ages. Bachrach started to make the same mistake, buthe improved under the influence of my study of Carolingian warfare of 714 to1000. The same thing occurs when Lyon speaks of the “Frankish knight” in thearmy of Charlemagne.9 Knights did not exist yet, they were vassals. The samemistake was made in his translation of a study on the army of Charlemagne inthe work of F. L. Ganshof, Frankish Institutions under Charlemagne.10 In hisedition of The Wardrobe Book of William de Norwell, Lyon speaks of men whodo service in the nature of officers of the general staff,11 for a time when therewas no general staff! In this work and others one can see that he has not studiedthe fundamental criteria of the strength of the armies.

6 Lyon, “The Role of Cavalry in Medieval Warfare,” p. 90. On the contrary, see Carl vonClausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, 1976), p. 289:“Cavalry was the more effective arm, consisting of the elite; this made such a difference that,although cavalry was always smaller by far, it was always considered to be the decisive ele-ment; while foot soldiers were in low esteem and hardly ever mentioned.”

7 Lyon, “The Role of Cavalry in Medieval Warfare,” p. 83.8 Lyon, “The Role of Cavalry in Medieval Warfare,” pp. 82 fn. 16, 83, 85.9 Lyon, “The Role of Cavalry in Medieval Warfare,” p. 81.

10 Translated by Bryce and Mary Lyon (Providence, 1968), pp. 65–6.11 The Wardrobe Book of William de Norwell, 12 July 1338 to 27 May 1340, ed. Mary Lyon,

Bryce Lyon, and Henry S. Lucas, with assistance of Jean de Sturler, Koninklijk Academie vanBelgië, Koninklijk Commissie voor Geschiedenis (Brussels, 1983), p. XCV.


The Judgement of Aristotle and the Example of the Greeks

In his work, Politics, Aristotle gives a number of meditations on military ser-vice, of cavalry and foot soldiers, which is very important for the study of mili-tary service in the Middle Ages because the same problems also existed then:

The earliest government which existed among the Greeks, after the overthrow of thekingly power, grew up out of the warrior class, and was originally taken from the cav-alry, for strength and superiority in war at that time depended on cavalry; indeed, with-out discipline, foot soldiers are useless.12

The foot soldiers still had no tactical unities, and as long as this was the case, themartial cohesion of the cavalry was better. This period in the history of the Greekscan be compared with the superiority of heavy cavalry in western Europe duringthe Middle Ages. When the Greek cities became larger and richer, their foot sol-diers became more important. And the Greeks had in their cities a small place forthe foot soldiers to train, which did not exist in the Middle Ages in western Europeand which would not be introduced until the seventeenth century. This situationchanged in Greece under King Philip of Macedonia and his son, Alexander, throughwhom the Greek city-states were overthrown. They commanded a good cavalry.The cavalry strength of Alexander’s army was responsible for the success of hisconquest of the Persian empire. In the final battle, he commanded over 47,000men, among whom were 7,000 cavalry. He struck into the Persian kingdom to con-quer it and to overthrow it completely. The cavalry played an important role in this.

The Romans

The Romans had also used their foot soldiers in an efficient way, with anexemplary discipline. The foot soldiers were the main force. But the impor-tance of the cavalry appeared in the armies of their enemies. The battle ofCannae in 216 BC showed this. Polybius writes about this: “At Cannae … theCarthaginians being on this occasion, as on previous ones, mainly indebted fortheir victory to their superiority in cavalry: a lesson to posterity that in actualwar it is better to have half the number of infantry, and the superiority in cav-alry, than to engage your enemy with an equality in both.” Hannibal com-manded more than 10,000 cavalry and more than 40,000 foot soldiers; theRomans had around 80,000 foot soldiers and somewhat more than 6,000 cav-alry. The Romans were defeated.14 This superiority of the Carthaginian cavalrywas thus responsible for the victories of Hannibal.

12 Aristotle, Politics, Book IV, chapter 13.13 Hans Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen des Politischen Geschichte (Berlin,

1920), I:208–9.14 Polybius, Histories, III:114, 117. See also The Rise of the Roman Empire, trans. Ian Scott-

Kilvert (Harmondsworth, 1979), pp. 270–1, 274.

50 J. F. Verbruggen

The Romans had an outstanding army of foot soldiers at the time of Caesarand in the first century AD But in the large plains of Asia they fought against thecavalry of the Parthians and this led them to a serious defeat. The Parthians hadat their disposal heavily armored cavalry soldiers with lances and horse archersand a light cavalry with large and strong bows. At Carrhae in 53 BC, Crassus andhis legions were defeated: his army may have included 36,000 men, of which4,000 were cavalry.15 The Romans never did try to conquer the Persian kingdom.In comparison with Alexander the Great, they did not have enough cavalry. Afterthe defeat of Crassus, Antony fought a campaign against the Persian kingdomand had no success in 36 BC. In the year 260 AD, Emperor Valerian foughtagainst Shapur I and was taken prisoner. A century later, in 363, Emperor Julianwas killed there.16 In the expansive plains of Asia the Roman foot soldiers had tomarch for long distances in a terrain in which they would suffer thirst, hunger,privation, fatigue and from the effects of heat and sun. The Persian cavalry couldavoid battle and surround the Roman foot soldiers, attacking them in their flankand back, shooting them with arrows and wounding or killing many soldiers.The Roman foot soldiers became exhausted by the long marches, the thirst, andthe privation.

In Europe, the Romans had to deal with the invasions of Barbarians throughwhich their state weakened and their economy collapsed during the conflict be-tween the candidates for the emperorship. Cavalry soldiers invaded the RomanEmpire: the Goths, the Vandals, the Gepids, the Alans, the Huns. In a battleagainst the Goths, Emperor Decius and his son were killed and his troops de-feated in the summer of 251 by Abrittus. In 378, Emperor Valens was defeatedby the Goths at Adrianople.17

At the end of the fourth or in the first half of the fifth century Flavius RenatusVegetius wrote that there were many instructions for the cavalry. But this part ofthe army distinguished itself through its use of training, in the nature of its armorand in the worth of its horses. Therefore, he was not writing about the cavalryfrom earlier works. The Goths, Alans, and Huns had provided an example of thearmor of the cavalry. The foot soldiers were not armored. They did not wear ahelmet or armor. They were only used in defense, and motionless must await theenemy’s attack.18

This inactive posture of the foot soldiers is typical for the entire Middle Ages.It is still suggested by Jean de Bueil in the fifteenth century: “une bataille à piéne doit point marcher, mais doit toujours attendre ses enemis pié coy. Car quantils marchent, ils ne sont pas tous d’une force, ils ne peuvent pas tenir ordon-nance. Il ne faut que un buysson pour les départir.” Also, the Swiss establishedthis: “Une autre foys advint, devant Basle, que les Suysses se trouvèrent contreles Françoys et, parce qu’ilz marchèrent, les Franchoys les desconfirent.” Heconsidered as a doctrine: “toutes et quanteffoiz que gens à pié marchent contre

15 Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst, I:475.16 Verbruggen, The Art of Warfare, p. 5.17 Ammianus Marcellinus, Res gestae XXXI, 13, 1–13.18 Vegetius, Epitoma rei militaris, III:26; I:20; II:17; III:14.


leurs ennemys front à front, ceulx qui marcheront perdront, et ceulx quidemeureront pié coy et tiendront ferme gaigneront. Et ceulx de cheval tout aucontraire, car ceulx qui assaillent et marchent à cheval, gaignent, et ceulx quidemeurent et actendent, perdent.” Elsewhere, Jean de Bueil added this: “En autreslieux, il est advenu que les foibles combateurs … ont vaincu leurs ennemys,comme naguères, devant Basles, les Françoys desconfirent les Suysses.”19 Thesmall number of French heavy cavalry thus defeated the Swiss foot soldiers atSankt Jacob an der Birs in 1444 according to Jean de Bueil who was the com-mander of the French forces and therefore was well informed. The noble of theMiddle Ages believed that he with a smaller number of cavalry could defeat footsoldiers: 100 noble cavalry could fight against 1000 foot soldiers according tothe Frenchman Guillaume Guiart and the the Brabantese cleric Lodewijk vanVelthem. The Bretons held that one noble rider was worth seven non-noble war-riors.20 For Jean de Bueil, the most dangerous weapons in the world were thewarhorse and the lance, as there were no means to fight against them. At the endof the fifteenth century, the French warriors were still the masters of the battle-field. Sometimes they were also defeated, as at Guinegate in 1479 against theFlemish foot soldiers. But in 1494, still more than half of Charles VIII’s army oncampaign in Italy was composed of heavy cavalry.21

The Strategikon

In the Eastern Roman Empire, an exceptional treatise on the art of warfarewas written, the Strategikon, which in most manuscripts is indicated as writtenby Maurikios. It is an original work. The writer is a man with experience inleading troops on at least two fronts. He writes in the colloquial language withmilitary technical words placed therein. He explains everything well and givesdiagrams that show the order of battle clearly. He knows the daily life of a sol-dier on march and in camp. As an experienced officer, he writes about the enemyand his method of fighting. This military handbook exercised influence on west-ern European armies until the beginning of the seventeenth century. TheStrategikon was written between 573 and 628, years of hostilities against thePersians before the appearance of the Saracens. The enemies of Byzantium werethe Persians; the Lombards, appearing after 568; the Avars, after 570; the Slavs,

19 Jean de Bueil, Le Jouvencel, ed. C. Favre and L. Lecestre (Paris: Société de l’histoire deFrance, 1887), I:153, cxiv, n.1; II:63.

20 Lodewijk van Velthem, De guldensporenslag, ed. W. Waterschoot (The Hague, 1979, v. 279–80 (p. 64); Guillaume Guiart, La branche des royaus lingnages, ed. N. de Wailly and L. Delisle,Recueil des historiens de la Gaule et de la France, xxii, v. 20454–56 (p. 290): “10,000 hommesd’armes montez, 100,000 entre la piétaille”; Stephen of Llandaff, Liber Landavensis, ed. W. J.Rees (Llandovery, 1840): “ut milites Armorici fortiores fierent in equitando omnibus gentibus …Sunt enim Armorici amplius victoriosi in equitando, septies quam ut essent pedites,” cited by B.S. Bachrach, “The Origin of Armorican Chivalry,” Technology and Culture 10 (1969), 166.

21 Le Jouvencel, II:100, and Malcolm Vale, War and Chivalry: Warfare and Aristocratic Culturein England, France and Burgundy at the End of the Middle Ages (London, 1981), p. 128.

52 J. F. Verbruggen

around the same time, and the Antae, who were not further mentioned after 601.In the best study on this subject, the French scholar F. Aussaresses supported theattribution of this work to Emperor Maurikios. It would have been written in theyears 580–582, before the ascension to the throne by Maurikios. While the bookis the work of an officer with experience, a general or the emperor, it cannot besaid with complete certainty that this officer was Emperor Maurikios. There isnow a scholarly edition of the text of the Strategikon by George T. Dennis, and aGerman translation by Ernst Gamillscheg in the Corpus Fontium HistoriaeByzantinae, vol. 17: Mauricii Strategicon, published in Vienna in 1981. Dennishas also published an English translation.22 The Strategikon is especially impor-tant because it is written by a man with the occupation of soldier. This appearsfor the first time in the text concerning stirrups; these gave the rider so muchmore stability in the saddle and made the attacks of the heavy cavalry morepowerful.23 These stirrups had already appeared by this time in Byzantium andcould have been transferred from the Franks or other people of western Europewho had seen them in the Byzantine army in Italy or elsewhere. Stirrups were thusalready in use in Byzantium before the time of Charlemagne in the west.

The Strategikon is of even more importance because it recounts: “The generalwould be well advised to have more cavalry than infantry. The latter is set onlyfor close combat, while the former is easily able to pursue or to retreat, and whendismounted the men are all set to fight on foot.”24 The writer speaks about theneglect of the footsoldiers and about their disappearance. He endeavors to dowhat is necessary to train the soldiers again. Maurikios explains the problembetween the cavalry and footsoldiers as it later would be understood in the west:heavy cavalry would dominate, with a lesser role for footsoldiers – either notappearing at all or only in support of the cavalry. The book is three-quarterswritten for the cavalry and one quarter for the footsoldiers.

Byzantium disposed the necessary finances to maintain a professional armyand could train both cavalry and footsoldiers at the same time. Still, the com-manders chose cavalry because they could perform all of the military functionsbetter. In western Europe, there was no professional army, and foot soldiers werenot trained. The vassals who formed the heavy cavalry were trained from youthand, as soon as they had learned their military occupation, they took part in awar. During peacetime, they practiced in military games and later in tourna-ments. They gained experience. The footsoldiers had no collective training; theywere not trained in a group. They could only gain experience in war when theyhad fought for a long time in conflict, and this was exceptional. In that case, thefootsoldiers also lost many warriors in the fight.

Maurikios and Jean de Bueil were commanders, men of practice who knewtheir business. They knew more about this than Bryce Lyon who dared to write

22 Strategikon des Maurikios, ed. George T. Dennis, trans. Ernst Gamillscheg (Vienna, 1981),and Maurice’s Strategicon: Handbook of Byzantine Military Strategy, trans. George T. Dennis(Philadelphia, 1984).

23 Strategikon des Maurikios, bk. I, 2, 40, pp. 80–1.24 Strategikon des Maurikios, bk. VIII, 2, 85, pp. 296–7.


that “cavalry was never militarily superior to foot soldiers, not even in the MiddleAges when it might have been possible.” This erroneous claim is typical. Inplace of studying the sources and afterwards coming to a conclusion, Lyon ar-rives at a preconceived thesis. The conclusion of Jean de Bueil can be followedby looking at the Flemish footsoldiers. When the Flemings attacked at Cassel in1328, at Westrozebeke in 1382, and at Gavere in 1453, they were defeated bycavalry soldiers, because the latter were better trained, had more experience inwar and, as noble, professional soldiers, were more knowledgeable in handlingweapons.

From the time of Maurikios in Byzantium, and the time of Charlemagne inthe west, the footsoldiers had to wage a defensive battle against the heavy cav-alry. They were not able by their own strength to make a meaningful assault inbattle and to gain victory on the battlefield. In such an assault the footsoldierscould not keep their solid formation together – it would be brought to a standstilland surrounded – nor could they break the cavalry by this formation. When thefootsoldiers were victorious in a defensive battle, with a counter-attack deliveredat the moment that the heavy cavalry had suffered heavy casualties or were ex-hausted, it seemed very difficult to maintain this victory for a long time. Iffootsoldiers were able to successfully fight against the cavalry for a certain amountof time, as the Flemings did from 1302 to 1304 and from 1314 to 1319, it wasafterwards expected that this success would be repeated in the next period. Ithappened that the footsoldiers might be victorious once, but would later be de-feated by the cavalry. Hans Delbrück rightly suggests as a criterion thatfootsoldiers on their own must show their worth in an attack on the battlefield.And then it must be concluded whether the victory of the footsoldiers was thebeginning of a tradition or a solitary victory.25

Siege or Battle? Clovis and Charlemagne

In a single battle Clovis was able to destroy the realm of Syagrius in 486; withanother battle he was able to conquer the kingdom of the Alemanni in 496; onebattle sufficed to defeat the Burgundian army of Gundobad, and Gundobad wasforced to flee to Avignon (500 or 501), and the battle of Vouillé destroyed thekingdom of the Visigoths in 507. Bachrach, the model for Bryce Lyon, has notonce noticed nor discussed this strategy: “From Clovis’s siege of Paris in the480s to Charles Martel’s siege of Avignon in 737, the investment of fortifiedpositions, whether walled cities or garrisoned castra, dominated Merovingianwarfare. The Roman origin of this city-oriented warfare which necessarily evolvedfrom it cannot be too strongly emphasized.”26 This conclusion is entirely in errorfor the strategy of Clovis and Charles Martel. Bachrach did not know then whatwas the difference between strategy and tactics, as is apparent in the following

25 Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst, III:373, 458–9.26 Bernard S. Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization, 481–751 (Minneapolis, 1972), pp. 127–8.

54 J. F. Verbruggen

sentence: “Siege warfare was not the only tactic of the Merovingian military.”The siege of Paris, which Bachrach speaks of three times in his book, is not ahistorical occurrence. It comes from the Vita of Saint Genoveva and this story isnot accepted by scholars such as Bruno Krusch and Ferdinand Lot. According toBachrach this siege lasted for five years. Another manuscript of the Vita gives aten-year length. The best text does not speak of a siege and reports that Genovevasupplied Paris after the war. The siege is placed during the reign of Childerich.29

This undated and thus disputed siege cannot be used in a history of war. It mustbe classified within the inventions of Saints’ Lives, where the saint destroys theenemy army with the waving of his or her hand. The siege of Verdun is describedby Kurth as follows:

Au dire d’un vieil hagiographe, l’armée franque aurait déployé à cette occasion toutesles ressources de la poliorcétique la plus savante. Du haut des murs, les assiégés virentl’investissement de leur ville progresser tous les jours, jusqu’à ce que les lignes decirconvallation furent achevées. Alors le bélier commença à battre les murailles, et unegrêle de traits refoula les défenseurs qui se présentaient sur les remparts.30

This description was evidently too strong for the art of warfare of Clovis and wasnot reported. The siege receives only a single line from Bachrach.31 Since thedate of the siege of Verdun is impossible to ascertain, it cannot be used in thestrategy of Clovis: “Though Tolbiac was a formidable fortress, it seems that thisbattle, unlike several of Clovis’s previous actions did not involve siege warfare.”32

At the same time, when there was no siege, Bachrach must discuss it in order toprotect his thesis. His description of the battle of Vouillé in 507 is entirely incor-rect. The text states that the Goths eminus fought the Franks comminus; thismeans that the Gothic warriors threw their spears from a certain distance, fol-lowing their usual tactic, while the Franks wished to fight hand-to-hand and somoved close. This interpretation has already been given by Ferdinand Lot.33 Ac-cording to Bachrach, there were Frankish archers and spear-throwers placed be-hind the formation, and it was from there that they discharged their projectiles,while others of Clovis’s soldiers fought hand-to-hand.34 This interpretation isunacceptable. It is a bad military solution. According to Bachrach, the siege of

27 Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization, p. 128.28 [Translator’s note: I have again added the first names.]29 Vita Genovefae virginis Parisiensis, ed. B. Krusch, Monumenta Germaniae historica, Scriptores

rerum Merovingicarum, III, (Hanover, 1896), p. 204: “Eius enim Vita, quae extat quadruplex,nullius auctoritatis est.” See also F. Lot, Les destinées de l’empire en Occident de 395 à 888(Paris, 1940), I:194–5; G. Kurth, Clovis, 3rd ed. (Brussels, 1923), I:262–3; G. Kurth, Etudesfranques (Paris, 1919), II:27–8, 65, 85; and Philippe Contamine, La guerre au moyen âge(Paris, 1980), p. 84 n.1.

30 Kurth, I:263. See also Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization, p. 6.31 Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization, p. 4.32 Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization, p. 6.33 Gregory of Tours, Historiarum libri X, ed. B. Krusch, Monumenta Germaniae historica,

Scriptores rerum Merovingicarum (Hanover, 1937), I.II.37:87. Ferdinand Lot, L’art militaireet les armées au moyen-âge en Europe et dans le proche orient (Paris, 1946), I:81–2.

34 Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization, p. 11.


Paris still must serve to dispute an important appearance of a Frankish navyagainst Danish pirates in 515. The Franks then had no experience with a navy, heasserts. And at the moment that the sons of Clovis inherited the largest part ofGaul they were not able to raise a strong army (validus exercitus) of Franks.35

After 286, the Franks were already settled in an area between the mouths of theRhine and Schelde during the time of Maximianus. Around 280 the Franks weresettled by the Romans along the coast of the Black Sea. They stole ships andcame back from the Mediterranean Sea, and through the columns of Herculesthey returned to their lands in the Netherlands.36 Franks served in the army andthe navy of the Romans in the time of Constantine. In the middle of the fourthcentury the Franks possessed the largest part of the southern Netherlands. Frank-ish and Saxon pirates appeared in the area between the Rhine and the Waal underValentinus I (364–75).37 Between the years 300 and 515 they had more than 200years in order to learn to travel with a fleet while they lived in an area of streamsand along the coast of the North Sea.

Under Charles Martel the offensive strategy dominated again with a fastadvance towards the enemy and the forcing of a battle. In 716 Charles Martelfirst fought a conflict against Radbod and the Frisians, but as his army was toosmall he was forced to retreat: “He sent envoys to everyone with the power tomuster an army for the defense of the land.”38 This was the mustering of themilitia. Afterwards the army of Raganfred attacked Amblève. In 717 Charlesattacked Neustria and defeated the army of Raganfred and King Chilperic atVinchy. The army of Chilperic and Raganfred was large, but was made up onlyof commoners. Charles had a smaller army, but of very experienced soldiers.39

Chilperic was defeated and Raganfred, fleeing from them, left his comrades inthe lurch. Charles pursued them almost to Paris, apparently with his cavalry. Theentire area under the authority of Austrasia was subjugated. In 718 Charles at-tacked Saxony and advanced to the Weser River; this was the first invasion intothis land. In 719 he again advanced against Raganfred who had called in the helpof Eudes, the duke of Aquitaine. Raganfred and Eudes were defeated at Soissons.

After the death of Radbod in 719 Charles advanced against the Frisians andrestored the authority of the Franks in the conquered southern part of Friesland.In 720, 722, and 724 Charles led punitive expeditions against the Saxons. In 724he marched to Angers and besieged Raganfred there, who, following an agree-ment, was able to hold onto this town. In 725 Charles attacked the land of theAlamanni, reached the Donau, and invaded Bavaria. He conquered this land.Afterwards he advanced on Eudes of Aquitaine and crossed the Loire. Eudes

35 Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization, pp. 18–19. Later, Charles Martel landed a fleetin Friesland. See below.

36 Zosimus, Historia nea, I, 71, Eumenii oratio, Paneg V (or IX), 18, in Panégyriques latins, ed.E. Galletier, Collection G. Budé (Paris, 1949–52), I:136; Kurth, I:73; and L. Schmidt, Geschichteder deutschen Stämme bis zum Ausgang der Völkerwanderung (Berlin, 1918), II:440.

37 Ammianus Marcellinus, Res gestae, XVII,8,3; XXVII,8,5, and Kurth, I:116.38 Annales Mettenses priores, ed. De Simson, Monumenta Germaniae historica, Scriptores re-

rum Germanicarum in usum scholarum (Hanover, 1905), p. 21.39 Ibid., p. 24.

56 J. F. Verbruggen

was put to flight. In 732 Charles marched against the Saracens and fought themat Poitiers. The following year Charles traveled to Burgundy, conquered it, andgarrisoned its borders with his most brave leudes, diligent men who would fightthe rebels and the disloyal; and, after bringing peace to this land, he gave Lyon tohis subjects. Also in the region of Orléans, Charles took possession by siege ofthe lands of those who resisted him and gave part of them to his satellites. In 733Charles undertook a new invasion of Friesland, in the northern area, to theWestergo. In 734 he traveled with a fleet to Friesland, from the Rhine to theNorth Sea, to the coast of Friesland, and between the islands of Westergo andOstergo. Afterwards he discharged his soldiers. Charles fought a battle againstthe Frisian duke Bubo near the Boorne River. Bubo was killed, his army de-feated. Friesland was conquered again. While Charles was in Friesland, Eudes ofAquitaine died. Charles marched with his troops to Bordeaux and Blaye andbesieged Aquitaine.

After 734 Charles advanced against the nobles in Burgundy and placed theregion of Marseilles under the authority of his counts. So he came in contactwith Maurontus, whom he had made master of the town of Avignon, and hissocii. Charles sent Childebrand with an army to Avignon, in order to besiege thisfortress, apparently with his cavalry. Then Charles arrived with the rest of hisarmy, assaulted the town with battering rams and ladders and entered it. Charlesmarched afterwards to Narbonne and besieged it. Then an army of Saracenscame to relieve Narbonne. Charles marched against them and defeated themalong the banks of the Berre. Charles still devastated the area around Nîmes,Agde, and Béziers, but an uprising in Saxony caused him to make an expeditionto hold onto that land.

In 737 Charles sent Childebrand with dukes and counts into Provence, tosubject again the area of Avignon. Maurontus fled to an island in the Mediterra-nean Sea. It is here alone in the campaigns of Charles Martel that sieges wageduntil their completion are spoken of, against Maurontus who ruled in the area ofAvignon. He did not dare to wage battle and defended his fortress, which wasconquered. Charles Martel had subjected the whole of Gallia, again by battles,and had to besiege Avignon and Narbonne there. He did not have the time toconquer Septimania. Bachrach writes: “The investment of fortified positions,whether walled cities or garrisoned castra, dominated Merovingian warfare.”40

This is completely false for Clovis and Charles Martel, the primary figures ofMerovingian history. This strategy is purported to have had a Roman origin, asthese cities were founded in the Roman time. This is an incorrect interpretation.The Roman origin which Bachrach ascribes to the Merovingians is an inventionwith no foundation. One can correctly answer that the Roman people of Galliaformed the majority there and so influenced the common army, and that thefortified cities there had a Roman origin. But the particular strategy of the con-querors Clovis and Charles Martel – gathering their army and marching to theenemy; defeating him; pursuing him; and afterwards conquering his last bases –is a classic method of waging war for the strongest army. This strategy was40 Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization, p. 127.


practiced in all times by capable commanders and can not be attributed to Ro-man influence. But Bachrach is not objective in his book on Merovingian mili-tary organizations; he is very biased against the Franks.

Battle or Fortifications? Waifar

For the defense of the fortifications of a land, Waifar, duke of Aquitaine, gavean interesting example in his war against Pepin III. In 760 Pepin went for the firsttime on an expedition against Waifar. The latter did not dare to do battle. In 761Pepin conquered the fortress of Bourbon, Chantelle, and the fortress of Clermont,which was burned. Afterwards he conquered the fortifications in Auvergne. Headvanced on Limoges. His armies took lots of booty and destroyed much. In thecampaign of 762 Pepin destroyed another fortress, conquered the fortified cityof Bourges and the fortress of Thoars. In 763 a fourth expedition took place,which led to Cahors. The area was devastated. In 764 and 765 no expeditionstook place. In 766 Waifar established that there was no fortified city nor anyfortress that could offer resistance to King Pepin and his Franks. He commandedthat the walls of his strongest cities and forts be destroyed. Pepin rebuilt thefortress of Argenton and placed a garrison of Franks there, while he allowed thescara of Bourges to control Aquitaine. In 768 Waifar was forced to flee. Pepinsent “his counts, his soldiers of the scara and his leudes” in four directions totake him as a prisoner. Waifar was killed.41 In 760 Waifar thus had realized thathe was not strong enough to do battle; in 766 he understood also that the resis-tance of his very strong cities was useless. The superiority of Pepin was there-fore very clear. The war was lost for Waifar. In the meantime, the scara wereplaced in garrisons at Bourges and from there could advance. They appeared inthe pursuit, a role which Bryce Lyon does not delegate to the cavalry. The de-fender, Waifar, decided which strategy he would apply against the invader. Herefused to do battle and retreated into his fortifications. He was also not able totake a stand there. He was still able to retreat into a neighboring land, among theBasques over the Pyrenees. But when he retreated there it was too late.

By Foot or by Horse?

We can also once more follow what the warriors or the people of the timethought about this: to fight on foot or on horse? One must here particularly con-sider the soldier who in time of warfare went on a campaign of 600 to 800 km, 20

41 Fredegar, Chronicarum quae dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici libri IV cum continuationibus,ed. B. Krusch, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores rerum Merovingicarum, II(Hanover, 1888), pp. 186–92, cc. 42–52; Annales regni Francorum, ed. F. Kurze, MonumentaGermaniae Historica, Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum (Hanover, 1895), p.19 (anno 760), p. 27 (anno 768); and Annales Mettenses priores, pp. 50–5.

58 J. F. Verbruggen

or 30 km a day, 50 km a day at the most. Compare this with the soldiers whoundertook this exhausting movement on horse and thus arrived much fresher attheir destination. The soldiers also suffered fewer casualties in the conflicts, asthey were more strongly armored, were able to take more booty with them, andcould more easily escape in the event of a defeat. Then they would not need totake the exhausting flight on foot; on horse they were more quickly beyond thereach of their enemies.

The British in Armorica

The first people who after the Romans made a choice and chose to have theirwarriors fight on horse were the British who had left Britannia after the invasionsof the Angles and the Saxons. They appeared in the history of the continent in469–70. Then they found themselves in Bourges under their commander,Riothamus, and had a 12,000 man army, if this number can be trusted. They wereforced to fight in the service of Rome against the Visigoths. They were defeatedby King Euric and his soldiers and suffered heavy losses at Déols.42 The Bretonshad then settled in mass in the outermost part of Armorica and had come insmaller numbers to the area around the Loire. They were acquainted with Ger-man cavalry and had been defeated by them. Their land, the future Brittany,contained many marshes and forests. Under the sons of Clovis they came underthe control of the Franks and paid a tribute. Their leaders were counts, not kings.Now and then disputes erupted and the Merovingians sent an army against theBretons. In 590 two dukes with their troops marched throughout Brittany, overthe Vilaine and the Oust Rivers. One part was sent under Beppolenus, the otherunder Ebracharius. The two leaders did not work together and advanced sepa-rately. Beppolenus was opposed by Queen Fredegund when the Saxons of theneighborhood of Bayeux worked together with the Bretons. Beppolenus wasdefeated and killed. His troops were enclosed between the roads and the marshes.Ebracharius reached Vannes and concluded an accord with the Breton leader,Varocus. He returned with his army to his land, but had difficulty in crossing theVilaine. His army was made up of robustiores, inferiores and pauperes. Therobustiores, the cavalry, crossed the stream with some of the others. The soldierswho still waited to cross over were attacked by Bretons under the leadership ofthe son of Varocus and many were taken prisoner. Ebracharius marched with hissoldiers again to his land but followed a different route than during the advance,because his soldiers had plundered too much of the area. He did this again dur-ing his retreat from Angers. Ebracharius and Count Wiliachar were accused bythe king. They were said to have been bribed by Varocus. Later he allowed theimprisoned soldiers to go free. From the text of Gregory of Tours it appears that

42 Jordanes, Getica, ed. Theodor Mommsen, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Auctoresantiquissimi (Hanover, 1882), V.1:118 ff., cc. 44–45; Gregory of Tours, I.II:65, c. 18; Kurth,I:227; and Lot, Les destinées de l’empire, I:87.


the robustiores, the cavalry, had no problem during the battle, while the othersdid.43 The Bretons did not keep the army of Britannia, but introduced heavycavalry as their main arm. And this occurred in a land with marshes and woods.In the ninth century these Bretons practiced tactics which were like those of theVisigoths, against whom they had fought shortly after their arrival on the conti-nent.

The Franks and their Cavalry: Charlemagne

Lyon cites an example of the defeat of a part of the Frankish cavalry againstthe Saxons in 782. For him this brought the dominance “of the Frankish knight”into question. But everyone knows that in 782 there were still no knights, butvassals.

In July 782 Charlemagne held a general muster with his entire army atLippspringe near Paderborn. After this muster the leader returned to Gallia. Whenhe heard that the Sorben, who cultivated the fields between the Elbe and theSaale, had plundered their neighbors in Thuringia and Saxony, burned their homesand destroyed their fields. The king sent his ambassadors, Chamberlain Adalgisus,Stable-master Geilo, and the Count of Palace Worad, with the charge of an armyraised from the East Franks and Saxons to punish a small number of rebelliousSorben. They, with a part of the scara, were to travel with the greatest speed.While on their way they mustered the East Franks. Their force contained differ-ent counts and famous noblemen. When they had crossed over the borders of theSaxons, they heard that an uprising under the leadership of Widukind had bro-ken out. The three leaders advanced in the direction of the land of the Sorben.They changed the direction of their march and traveled with their East Franks tothe place where the rebellious Saxons were gathered. In Saxony, Count Thierry,a relative of the king, himself marched against them with Riparian Franks whomhe had quickly gathered. Thierry ordered his lords to employ spies to discover asquickly as possible where the Saxons were and what they were doing. His com-mand was followed and the two sides met near the Süntel mountain. The Saxonshad pitched their camp on the northern side of the mountain. Thierry set up hisown camp, while the lords agreed afterwards to travel over the Weser and recon-noiter where they could most easily advance around the mountain. They set uptheir camp next to the stream. The lords discussed their position with each otherand feared that the honor of victory would be awarded to Thierry, if they were tofight together with their troops against the Saxons. They decided only to attackthe enemy on their own. They gathered their scara and advanced towards theenemy. But the Franks did not array themselves as in a normal engagement,when they would attack an opponent in battle formation. Here they were madeready with the greatest speed, as quickly as each horseman was able to. It was asif they had only to chase a fleeing enemy and to gather the booty. The attack was

43 Gregory of Tours, I.X:491–94, c. 9.

60 J. F. Verbruggen

badly carried out and ended even more badly. Almost all were killed; whoevercould flee went to the camp of Thierry rather than the camp from which they hadmarched. It was a substantial massacre for this part of the army. Two lords,Adalgisus and Geilo, four counts, and twenty other titled and noble men werekilled, as were all those who followed them desiring to die with rather than sur-vive them. The defeat was emphasized more mainly because of the high rank ofthose killed, and naturally was for the rebellious Saxons a strong encouragement.44

But a defeat still does not show that there was no dominance of heavy cavalry.One can equally conclude that these horsemen were already overconfident oftheir dominance and were reckless. They could also have miscalculated. Maybethey wanted through a quick attack to nip the rebellion of the Saxons in the bud.They had as an original charge to march as quickly as possible against the Sorben.The reconnoitering of the rebellious Saxons needed also to be accomplished asquickly as possible. On each occurrence, the author of the Annales regniFrancorum writes that they attacked hastily in disorder, without working togetherwith those Count Thierry’s soldiers.45 The text is presented as the narrative of aneye-witness, who shows through his criticism that he was well aware that theattack occurred too quickly and without order. The narrative of the second redac-tion of the Annales regni Francorum seems to have come from Count Thierry.Besides, from the text it appears that no footsoldiers took part in the battle. Inorder to punish the Sorben, they were able to invade their land with a cavalryarmy and to cause destruction, set fires, and plunder there. They could raise aunit of footsoldiers close to the border of the Sorben, in order to assist the cav-alry in the punishing raid, if they deemed it desirable.

In my study of the art of warfare in the Carolingian realm from 714 to 1000the observations of Bryce Lyon have already been refuted. His argument con-cerning the number of battles and the number of sieges has no value. It is normalthat the weaker defenders would retreat into their fortifications and not fight abattle against the stronger invaders who had more cavalry available to them. It isalso normal that these weaker ones would retreat into the woods and marsheswhere the heavy cavalry of the invader could not be used at all or not so effi-ciently. However, he forgot that the vassals of the Carolingians could fight aswell on foot as on horse and thus also on this occasion could follow into thewoods and the marches, and fight in the sieges. This increased the value and theprestige of these soldiers because they could fight as well on foot as on horse.Here one simply must be referred to the attack on the camp of the Vikings atLeuven by the Franks of King Arnulf in 891.46 One part of the Frankish cavalrymade their assault of the camp by foot, another part remained on horse to protectthe attackers, and their rear, or each beat off a counterattack. This example destroys

44 Annales regni Francorum, pp. 59–63 (anno 782).45 Ibid., p. 63.46 Annales Fuldenses, ed. F. Kurze, Monumenta Germaniae historica, Scriptores rerum

Germanicarum in usum scholarum (Hanover, 1891), p. 120 (anno 891), and Regino, Chronicon,ed. F. Kurze, Monumenta Germaniae historica, Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usumscholarum (Hanover, 1890), pp. 137–8 (anno 891).


another idea put forth by Bernard Bachrach. Besides, Bryce Lyon takes a periodin which the texts are so scarce and so brief that there are no narratives of battlesfor the time of Charles Martel, Pepin III, and Charlemagne. The example of 782is an exception, perhaps because of the appearance of Count Thierry, one of theleaders. Kleinclausz has already called attention to the fact that the musteringletters of Charlemagne were especially directed towards the cavalry. The writersnever speak about the role of the footsoldiers, while they often stress the appear-ance of the cavalry, especially when the sources are detailed enough, such as forthe campaign to Tortosa in Spain in 809 and 810. Besides the service of the scarais often described.47

The dominance of the armies of Charlemagne was so great that many enemiesdid not dare fight a battle against these troops. There were few battles in thesubjugation of the Saxons. According to Einhard, Charlemagne personally hadto fight only two battles during the subjugation of the Saxons, which lasted forthirty years. He meant the two decisive battles in 783. In truth, Charles took partalso in other conflicts. Battles or encounters were fought in 774, in 775 on theWeser and near Lubbecke, in 778, in 779, the defeat in 782, and a fight betweencavalry on the Lippe in 784. During the invasion of Saxony in 794 Charlemagneadvanced with an army, and his son, Charles, came with troops from anotherdirection. The Saxons wanted initially to fight a battle, but decided against thisonce they discovered that they were being threatened from two directions. Thiswas the normal strategy of the weaker defender.48

The Vikings

The best and strongest evidence for the hegemony of the heavy cavalry in theninth century is supplied by the Vikings. These invaders had fought against thevassals of the nobility of West Francia. As footsoldiers they were able to decideif these horsemen were better than they; if cavalry to choose to be above thefootsoldiers. And they had chosen. After a time the Vikings also mounted them-selves on horses, after 853–54. Somewhat later they fought on horse, perhapsalready at Brissarthe in 866 where they appeared together with the Bretons whowere used to fighting on horse and numbered 400 cavalry. The “great army” ofthe Vikings for the most part was cavalry (881). In 888 they fought on horse atMontfaucon and were defeated. In 891 they rode on horseback to relieve theirfootsoldiers. Once established in Normandy after 911 they were cavalry andlater knights.

The Vikings who invaded England in the same period stood against Anglo-Saxon footsoldiers. These Vikings were also sometimes mounted, but fought asfootsoldiers, the same as the Anglo-Saxons. The Normans who had become

47 A. Kleinclausz, Charlemagne (Paris, 1977), p. 164. See also J. F. Verbruggen, “L’art militairedans l’empire carolingien,” pp. 292–6.

48 Verbruggen, De krijgkunst in west-Europa in de middeleeuwen, pp. 510, 489–90.

62 J. F. Verbruggen

knights invaded England under Duke William the Conqueror, defeated the Anglo-Saxon army in only one battle, conquered the entire kingdom, and importedmilitary service on horseback for his vassals there. The Duke of Normandy be-came king of England, and his knights became the masters of the land and re-mained so.49

The choice of the Vikings in the years 866–88 occurred for purely militaryreasons. At the risk of their lives, by the sweat of their brows, and in the fear ofdeath, they established that heavy cavalry was a better instrument than footsoldiers.They also knew that these soldiers would be able to fight on foot as well ashorseback.

The Franks, who then fought on horseback, did not allow themselves to beinfluenced by the Vikings who fought on foot, and did not return to fighting onfoot as some had done previously and as a number of others still did. They con-tinued to fight on horseback. While Bryce Lyon has not read my study on the artof warfare in the Carolingian realm from 714 to 1000, it has been well consultedand studied by Bernard Bachrach. He gave no answer to the chief argument: whydid the Vikings become heavy cavalry and thereafter knights, if they continuedto prefer footsoldiers?

The evolution of an army in which the heavy cavalry won dominance as vas-sals was explained by Heinrich Brunner and his account remains still the best.The explanation of Bernard Bachrach is not convincing. P. Roth and H. Brunnerhave realized that the common subjects of the Carolingians showed less and lessdesire to take a role in the yearly campaigns which had taken place since the timeof Charles Martel.50 Under Charlemagne this was made clear. Under his son,Louis the Pious, this evolution continued. In 830 the people were discontentedbecause they had to advance against Brittany. They found the march along thecoast to be too difficult, which incited them to rise up against their leaders and todepart towards Paris. This led to the uprising of Lothar and Pepin against Louisthe Pious, and to the disappearance of the footsoldiers from the army.51 This isclear in the war between the sons of Louis the Pious in the years 840 to 842. Thearmies were then small and made up almost completely of cavalry.52 The treatyof Meersen in 847 allowed the vassals to follow their lord if he dwelt in anotherkingdom, except in the case of the army, where men had to serve in the landwhere they dwelt.53 The edict of Pîtres in 864 retained the general rule that all

49 Verbruggen, “L’art militaire dans l’empire carolingien,” p. 306.50 P. Roth, Geschichte des Benefizialwesens von den ältesten Zeiten bis ins zehnte Jahrhundert

(Erlangen, 1850), pp. 313–416; Heinrich Brunner, “Der Reiterdienst und die Anfänge desLehnwesens,” Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Germanistische Abteilung8 (1887), 1–38; and Bernard S. Bachrach, “Charles Martel, Mounted Shock Combat, The Stir-rup, and Feudalism,” Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History 7 (1970), 49–75.

51 Annales Bertiniani, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usumscholarum, ed. G. Waitz (Hannover, 1883), p. 2, and Annales Mettenses priores, p. 96.

52 G. Waitz, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte (Berlin, 1885), IV:543, and F. Lot, L’art militaire etles armées au moyen-âge, I:104.

53 Capitularia regum Francorum, ed. A. Boretius and V. Krause, Monumenta Germaniae Historica(Hanover, 1890–97), II:71, nr. 204, and Verbruggen, “L’art militaire dans l’empire carolingien,”p. 297.


able-bodied men must serve for the defense of the fatherland.54 From this periodon armies in West Francia were almost entirely made up of vassals or heavycavalry. The Capitulary of Quierzy, issued by Charles the Bald in 877, musteredonly vassals for normal campaigns. He who would live by his own property, hisallodium, was not required to perform military service, except on the occasion ofthe invasion of the land, when every able-bodied man was mustered for the army.55

Saxons and Thuringians

In other areas the evolution to a cavalry army of vassals can likewise be fol-lowed. In Saxony, Henry I raised an army of vassals, skilled in warfare on horse-back. As soon as he was strong enough, he refused to pay tribute to the Hungar-ians. An invasion followed, but the Hungarians were defeated in the battle ofRiade on 15 March 933. Afterwards the Hungarians were again defeated in thelarge battle of Augsburg by Otto I.56

In Germany the Indiculus loricatorum, the list of heavy cavalry of 981, showsthat the king could arrange to levy contingents of cavalry from the archbishops,bishops, abbots, dukes, marquises, counts, and lords. A total of 2,160 heavycavalry made up a part of the army that went with the king or emperor to Italy.57

No footsoldiers were with them. The complete list for all of Germany containedperhaps 6,000 heavy cavalry, and maybe 8,000 or more. While no one has anumerical strength for Charlemagne, there were in the tenth century more than6,000 cavalry that could be called up for a campaign into Italy. There the armycould be strengthened by local units of cavalry and footsoldiers.

The cavalry was also sent into Scandinavia. On 4 June 1134 an army of 300heavy cavalry, German mercenaries, defeated a Swedish army made up entirelyof footsoldiers. The feudal army of heavily armored cavalry was then sent intoScandinavia.58

The cavalry was thus the most important weapon of the Romans, theByzantines, the Bretons, the Franks, the Normans, the Saxons, and theThuringians, and afterwards the Anglo-Saxons and the Scandinavians. They fol-lowed the example of the Parthians, the Persians, the Goths, the Alans, the Van-dals, the Huns, the Lombards, and the Hungarians.

If we are to believe Bryce Lyon there were no battles before the eleventhcentury in which armored cavalry played the primary role. If he had read my

54 Verbruggen, “L’art militaire dans l’empire carolingien,” pp. 297, 301, and Capitularia regumFrancorum, II:321, c. 27.

55 Capitularia, II:358, c. 10, nr. 281, and Verbruggen, “L’art militaire dans l’empire carolingien,”p. 302.

56 Verbruggen, “L’art militaire dans l’empire carolingien,” pp. 394–5.57 Ibid., p. 308.58 L. Musset, “Problèmes militaires du monde scandinave (VIIe–XIIe siècle),” in Ordinamenti

militari in occidente nell’alto medioevo, Settimane di studio del centro italiano di studi sull’altomedioevo, XV (Spoleto, 1968), I:290, and L. Musset, Les peuples scandinaves au moyen âge(Paris, 1951), p. 179.

64 J. F. Verbruggen

article on the art of war from 714 to 1000, he would have found several. A firstexample is the battle of Andernach in 876 waged by Charles the Bald against hisnephew, Louis the Younger. In both armies the battle was fought by units ofcavalry; there were no footsoldiers reported.

In Italy there was the battle between Rudolf II of Burgundy and Berenger,king of Italy, on 17 July 923 at Fiorenzuola near to Piacenza; the battle betweenthe troops of Sarilo, count palatine, and those of Anscarius, marquis of Camerino,in Spoleto in 940; and the battle of Capo Colonne in 982 between Emperor OttoII and Emir Abulkasem, between the German cavalry and the Muslims.

In Germany the battle of Riade in 933 was fought by King Henry I against theHungarians, and afterwards the battle of Augsburg in 955.59

Besides, in France the examples given by Richer must be considered. He givesthe best witness for the dominance of the cavalry in the tenth century. Five timeshe indicates that the enemy took flight “for the fear of the royal cavalry:” CountRicouin of Verdun in 921; the Vikings in 930; and during the siege of Langres in936. In a battle waged in 943, 800 horsemen broke through the formation of thefootsoldiers of the Vikings and drove them into flight. In 955 Duke William ofAquitaine retreated in the face of the king.60

There was also the battle of Nouy in 1044 between the count of Anjou, GeoffreyMartel, and Thibaut III, count of Blois, a battle of cavalry who were accompa-nied by footsoldiers, the role of whom is not discussed.61

The period from 840 to 1000 is indeed characterized by the dominance of theheavy cavalry in West Francia. Some appear alone, without footsoldiers, as inseveral of the cited battles. It is also the period in which the Vikings fought ascavalry from 860 to 870.

Bryce Lyon apparently does not accept the evolution of footsoldiers to cav-alry. As a historian he ought to support with sources the military history he writes.This he does not do. He has not studied the sources and invokes the authority ofBernard Bachrach. Bachrach has written a book: Merovingian Military Organi-zation, 481–751. Before it was published Bryce Lyon read a manuscript of thisbook.62 At that time he had Bachrach read the Strategikon of Maurikios, the prin-cipal treatise on the art of warfare in the middle ages, in which, among otherthings, is written how to fight against the Franks, and in which the stirrup isalready mentioned. The text about the Franks is important for the time of theMerovingians, and Bachrach had to use it in his book, even more because he inan appendix speaks about other Byzantine sources. In place of studying the sourcesand afterwards drawing conclusions, Lyon and Bachrach set out towards a pre-conceived thesis that is worthless. Another contention is that the heavy cavalry isnot able to be used for a siege, which would be the task of the footsoldiers. They

59 Verbruggen, “L’art militaire dans l’empire carolingien,” pp. 393–7.60 Richer, Histoire de France (888–995), ed. R. Latouche, Les classiques de l’histoire de France

au moyen âge (Paris, 1930–37), I.I.I:62–64, c. 27; I.I.I:110, c. 57; I.II:132–34, c. 5; II.I.III:12,c. 4.

61 Verbruggen, “L’art militaire dans l’empire carolingien,” pp. 396–7.62 Bachrach, Merovingian Military Organization, p. viii.


forget that before this an important number of medieval sieges were waged as ablockade of the fortification, which after a certain time was driven to surrenderfrom hunger. In such a siege the cavalry played an very important role becausethey were able to close off all approaches around a certain siege of the fortifica-tion and do it better than footsoldiers. They can also better protect the besiegers.

Lyon and Bachrach have not studied enough sources; they know the militarytheory and the art of war in an incomplete way. They impose their erroneousdogmas before they have studied the art of medieval warfare from the sources.The exceptions of the art of medieval warfare are for them the rule. Bachrachallows himself to be misled by modern data and information for his study ofmedieval military life. As Lyon sees him as a model, I shall take the trouble toshow in another study how wrong Bachrach is in some articles and how he trans-forms the texts, manipulating them in an unscientific manner, which naturally isnoticed by those who know better. Above I have already spoken about his erro-neous thesis concerning the military organization of the Merovingians. His ar-ticle, “Charles Martel, Mounted Shock Combat, the Stirrup, and Feudalism” isalso wrong and can easily be refuted. This is also the case with “Charlemagne’sCavalry: Myth and Reality.”63 Two other works, “Some Observations on the Mili-tary Administration of the Norman Conquest”64 and “On the Origins of Williamof Conqueror’s Horse Transports,”65 are a series of miscellaneous suppositionsconcerning the numerical strength of the troops and concerning ships. Bachrachdid not once have the factual basis to understand the numerical strength of thearmies.66 He already had this in his book on the Merovingian soldiers and in hisstudies on Charlemagne and his soldiers. But these studies do not provide enoughfoundation. He writes about the assurance of “logistical support” in the camp ofDives-sur-Mer for 14,000 men and 2,000 to 3,000 horses. There is no evidencethat such a camp existed.67 But Bachrach assumes it and he calculates the amountsof horse manure of William the Conqueror’s warhorses in this imaginary camp:5,000,000 lbs of manure and 700,000 gallons of urine.68 The author is so proud

63 Military Affairs 47.3 (Oct 1983), 181–7.64 Proceedings of the Battle Conference on Anglo-Norman Studies 8 (1985), 1–25.65 Technology and Culture 26 (1985), 505–31.66 “Some Observations on the Military Administration of the Norman Conquest,” pp. 24–5, con-

tains an appendix on the population of England in 1066. He suggests there that in antiquityable-bodied men made up one quarter of the population. Saxon England would thus have hadmore than 375,000 able-bodied men, half of whom were still a “formidable military potential.”The military historian can not begin with these theoretical data. The difficulties lay in thesupport, the provisions, and the payment of the soldiers, and afterwards in their military worth.In each land of western Europe there was a disproportion between the number of able-bodiedmen and the warriors who take part in a campaign. In the work “On the Origins of William theConqueror’s Horse Transports,” pp. 511–12, he ascertains that Harold could muster roughly50,000 soldiers. The 375,000 able-bodied men and the 50,000 real soldiers did not send a largearmy to Hastings, perhaps only 7,000 to 10,000 men.

67 “Some Observations on the Military Administration of the Norman Conquest,” pp. 5–8.68 “Some Observations on the Military Administration of the Norman Conquest,” p. 15.

66 J. F. Verbruggen

of his calculations that he repeats them again in a book about the cavalry andchivalry meant for American teachers.69 The author does not know that therewere camps for the Vikings in Denmark and that William the Conqueror did notneed to use a Roman model. Besides, he could have gained just as good aninspiration from a fortification from the time of Charlemagne and his successorsor a fortified town or village, or a camp of Charlemagne during his campaignsagainst the Saxons. There was no camp for the cavalry at Dives. They were housedin the town and the neighborhood. This was the normal procedure. If William theConqueror had congregated his army in a camp, his chroniclers would certainlyhave mentioned it. The camp is an invention of Bachrach who attached 3,000horses to the army in order to make a calculation supported by modern informa-tion, which is naturally different from medieval data. His military knowledge isinspired greatly by modern American notions. In place of starting with the defi-nitions of Clausewitz, he comes forward very slowly with modern Americandefinitions of strategy, strategy for a campaign, grand strategy, and tactics. Hedoes not hesitate to manipulate his texts and to decree that cavalry mentioned ina source actually are footsoldiers, or “infantry” which did not exist in the MiddleAges. These footsoldiers were well trained, while in the entire Middle Ages inwestern Europe from the sixth to the fifteenth century there is no training offootsoldiers.

Bryce Lyon asks why in the fourteenth century so much time was spent on thetraining of the cavalry and so much money on their horses when this cost somuch? According to him it was then apparent that the cavalry had only littlefuture and that the future thereafter belonged to the pikemen, archers, and otherfootsoldiers. He forgets that the French cavalry would dominate the battlefield,and furthermore warfare, to the end of the fifteenth century and was itself stillthe only constant element in the French royal army formed throughout a largepart of the sixteenth century. Archers and pikemen disappeared far more quicklythan the cavalry.

Bryce Lyon speaks of the defeat of Harold and his Anglo-Saxons at Hastings.Harold should have avoided battle and retreated with his army deeper into En-gland, there to fight a guerilla war, and practiced the policy of scorched earth;thus he would have exhausted William the Conqueror and his army and forcedhis retreat. The Norman horsemen had only just won victory after they repeat-edly failed in their attacks on the Saxon shield-wall and after a feigned retreathad lured the Saxons from their position. The heavy horseman won not becausehe was better than the Saxon who fought on foot. Here the author of the argu-ments contradicts himself and does not realize that the cavalry unity in which thehorsemen fought was so much more free and flexible than the footsoldiers whohad to remain standing motionless and densely packed together on the hill with-out drinking or eating, and there became condemned to suffer through fatigueand through the losses inflicted on them by the archers and the cavalry, leading

69 Bernard S. Bachrach, “Caballus et Caballarius in Medieval Warfare,” in The Study of Chiv-alry, ed. H. Chickering and T. H. Seiler (Kalamazoo, 1988), p. 182.


finally to defeat. The invader who wished to conquer the land could quicklywage a battle in the hopes of a quick victory and the annexation of the wholeland. That was the ideal. Why did Harold not avoid battle? He had apparentlyjudged that his footsoldiers were numerous enough to defeat the army of theinvader. Maybe he judged, as had Bryce Lyon and Bernard Bachrach, that hisfootsoldiers were just as good as or better than the cavalry of William the Con-queror. But in the event, he lost the battle and the entire land was conquered afterone battle, and it stayed conquered. The results of the battle were the same asthose of the victories of Clovis against Syagrius, the Alemanni, and the Visigoths.One battle and the land was conquered.

Bryce Lyon gives the example of the footsoldiers of the Lombard towns andthe battle of Legnano. In footnote 16 he quotes the judgement of Oman, whowrites that the cavalry was not always the weapon that gave the decisive push.Bryce Lyon does not seem to know that the government of the Lombard townshad come to the same conclusion. They preferred knights and cavalry for thecampaigns outside the town, strengthened with archers and pikemen, while theurban footsoldiers were especially established to defend the town.70

A comparison can be made with Flanders. In 1292 at Bruges the urban cav-alry was mustered. The rich Brugeois burghers had to possess a warhorse and asuit of armor, and had to do service as horsemen, in order to strengthen thecavalry. This was broken off however by the defeat of the count in 1300 and theuprising of the Brugeois in 1301, which led to the replacement of the burghersby the artisans, an evolution that had not been foreseen. And this could be adanger for the count and his nobility.

In looking at the great feats of arms of the footsoldiers, Bryce Lyon places hisattention on the footsoldiers of Renaud of Dammartin at the battle of Bouvinesin 1214. If all leaders of footsoldiers had them so well mustered, the battle wouldhave ended otherwise, he writes.71 What is the truth? Renaud’s footsoldiers wererequired to stay motionless in place on the right wing of the army, the last to beattacked. Renaud and his cavalry carried out charges against the French andafterwards retreated to their footsoldiers who had to receive and protect them. Infact, he used these footsoldiers poorly. While Renaud and his cavalry attackedthe French, his footsoldiers did nothing. In the meantime, the French units de-stroyed the left wing and center of the allies and turned afterwards againstRenaud’s wing which was then defeated. Lyon does not understand the tacticwhich occurred.

For the battle of the Golden Spurs I must remind myself that I repeated thethought of the time: 100 cavalry were worth 1000 footsoldiers. This was assertedby the Frenchman Guillaume Guiart and the Brabantese Lodewijk van Velthem.The Bretons judged that their horsemen were worth seven footsoldiers. This wastrue on certain occasions, but not always.

Lyon reproached me for diminishing the merits of the Flemings in my writ-ing, that they had used the advantages of their terrain well. But Lyon does the

70 Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst, III:374.71 Lyon, “The Role of Cavalry in Medieval Warfare,” p. 82.

68 J. F. Verbruggen

same. According to him the Flemings had ordered themselves smartly behindcamouflaged ditches. Henri Pirenne and I have, however, shown that this wasmerely a French excuse for their defeat.72

For the battle of Woeringen in 1288 he cites the example of the farmers ofBerg and the townspeople of Keulen who contributed to the victory there. Butthese footsoldiers appeared as auxiliaries at the moment that all other troopswere fighting the battle, and their intervention was easy.73

In his work, The Wardrobe Book of William de Norwell, Bryce Lyon has notonce provided a table for the number of lords, knights, squires, men-at-arms, andarchers. His figures do not agree with those of A. E. Prince.74 The first task of amilitary historian is as near as possible to calculate the numerical strength. Hereit is very important as Lyon criticizes the strategy of the kings of England, be-cause they fought on two fronts on the continent and in the north set out from theNetherlands. Lyon does not once compare the numerical strength of the army ofthe king of France and that of the king of England. This numerical strength is ofprincipal importance for an understanding of the strategy of the king of England.The ridiculousness of this all is as follows. According to Prince, Edward III cameto the continent with more than 1,600 English men-at-arms and 3,150 archers in1339; with 2,700 men-at-arms and 5,500 archers according to Lyon. The differ-ence between these two numbers is not discussed. I have made my own calcula-tion and reached about the same result as Prince for the men-at-arms. For thearchers my calculation comes closer to that of Lyon. Edward III faced an army ofmore than 17,000 French royal men-at-arms and 500 footsoldiers on 1 August1340, more than 18,000 men-at-arms and 2,300 footsoldiers on 1 September.Serving with them also were the Tournaisien urban militia, perhaps 3,991 men.75

It proves that Edward III was very poorly informed about the numbers of theking of France’s army. With 1,600 men-at-arms he was forced to attack the Frencharmy that in 1340 numbered 17,000 or 18,000 men-at-arms. Bryce Lyon appar-ently does not know that I have studied the accounts of the king of France andthe numerical strength of the armies of Bruges, studies not consulted by him.76

The king of England needed allies to reinforce the small army that he had broughtfrom England. The army of Jacob van Artevelde, that of the duke of Brabant, thecount of Hainault, the duke of Gelre, the margrave of Jülich, and a number oflords from the Netherlands and Germany stood with him. Bryce Lyon did notknow the numerical strength of the Brugeois and the Ghentenaars who, thanks tothe financial support of the king of England, had sent strong armies: Bruges had

72 Lyon, “The Role of Cavalry in Medieval Warfare,” pp. 82–3. See also note 21 above.73 Lyon, “The Role of Cavalry in Medieval Warfare,” p. 83.74 A. E. Prince, “The Strength of English Armies in the Reign of Edward III,” English Historical

Review 46 (1931), 361, and The Wardrobe Book of William de Norwell, pp. xcv–cii. See alsoLyon, “The Role of Cavalry in Medieval Warfare,” p. 87.

75 Verbruggen, “La tactique de la chevalerie Française de 1340 à 1415,” pp. 40–1, and Verbruggen,“De militairen: In de middeleeuwen en de bourgondische tijd,” p. 215.

76 Verbruggen, “La tactique de la chevalerie Française de 1340 à 1415,” and Verbruggen, Hetgemeenteleger van Brugge van 1338 tot 1340. Lyon should have consulted the latter book alsoto identify some of the Brugeois mentioned in the Wardrobe Book.


6,204 soldiers and 343 boys and servants at Tournai; Ghent had 5,385 soldiersand 70 boys and servants.77 The 11,589 townsmen of these two cities contrastedsharply with the 1,600 men-at-arms and the 3,150 or 5,500 archers of EdwardIII. The general conclusion that comes from this is that Edward III had too fewmen-at-arms, and too few warhorses, the opposite of what Lyon writes. Throughthe fact that the king of England at best had only around 5,000 nobles who foughtas heavy cavalry against 17,000–18,000 with the king of France, he was forcedto take archers with him and to attempt to find allies on the continent, in theNetherlands, the Rhineland, Brittany, and southern France.78

Lyon asked the question why the king had brought so many heavy cavalry tothe continent, after he had won so many victories in Scotland with archers andcavalry who had fought on foot: “Why did he put such stock in a mounted forcewhen just six years later at Crécy his longbowmen so easily vanquished the clumsyFrench knights? There is no certain answer to this question.”79 We again try tounderstand even a bit of the reasoning of Lyon. Because he does not know theanswer, there must be no answer! The answer is simple. It begins with the erro-neous interpretation of a number of investigators who did not correctly under-stand why in certain circumstances the nobles fought on foot in order to standwith the footsoldiers, to strengthen them and give them courage. As a generalrule it appears that in normal circumstances the medieval footsoldiers could nothold their own against heavy cavalry. On some occasions the footsoldiers didgain victory, such as those of the Flemings at Courtrai (1302) and at Guinegate(1479). In both battles the Flemish footsoldiers were strengthened by nobleswho fought together with the footsoldiers in order to lead them and give themcourage. At Cassel (1328), Westrozebeke (1382), and Gavere (1453), the Flemingshad no nobility in their ranks and were defeated. On some occasions cavalryfought on foot with the footsoldiers because they were not numerous. Perhapsthis was because they were not strong enough in relation to their opponents anddid not dare attack this powerful enemy on horse because they knew that theywould be driven away from the battlefield. On other occasions the reason lay ina terrain that was more favorable for them to fight on foot. There were manyreasons, and the correct explanation differed from engagement to engagement.Lyon maintains that the general conclusion is that it was better to fight on foot.This is wrong. And the erroneous answer is derived from his lack of knowledgeof the sources and of the art of war, theory and practice.

Edward III later was victorious at Crécy. There he was very lucky, while theFrench made many mistakes. I have read 23 of the narratives of Crécy and muststill study several others before I can write a completely critical narrative. Lyonhas not read the sources and still gives his opinion!

Bryce Lyon claims that the cavalry did not dominate the medieval battlefieldsfor five centuries. But he forgets that they drove the English from France with

77 Verbruggen, Het gemeenteleger van Brugge van 1338 tot 1340, pp. 16, 79–80.78 Prince, “The Strength of English Armies”, p. 364.79 Lyon, “The Role of Cavalry in Medieval Warfare,” p. 88.

70 J. F. Verbruggen

the help of their artillery. The great defeats of French men-at-arms at Crécy,Maupertuis (Poitiers), and Agincourt can partly be blamed on the blunders oftheir leaders and certain units which occurred on those days. The cavalry couldwin a victory if they employed better strategy and tactics, which later occurred inthe time of Joan of Arc.

In some areas of western Europe footsoldiers were the primary weapon:Friesland, the land of the Stadingen or Stedingen on the Weser around Bremen,Dithmarschen near Holstein, and the area of the future Switzerland. Living therewere villages of peasants, the descendants of communities from the time of theGermans. In these areas there lived few nobles or horsemen and the terrain wasvery unfriendly to cavalry. Through this the peasants were able to maintain theirfreedom and to develop their military more completely. When a lord and hisnobility governed the state, the peasants were subject to them and this led to anarmy in which the cavalry dominated, with the most important model being France.When the townspeople and peasants and a part of the nobility in the county ofFlanders fought with success against the king of France and his cavalry from1302 to 1304 and from 1312 to 1319, an uprising broke out from 1323 to 1328 inwhich the townspeople of Bruges and Ypres and the peasants from the neighbor-hoods of those towns and from coastal Flanders fought against their count, thenobility, the ecclesiastics, and the king of France and his nobility. Also in the yearsof Jacob van Artevelde and under Philip van Artevelde the Flemish nobility stoodon the side of the count and the king of France. The use of a strong army composedof footsoldiers, townspeople and peasants, posed a danger to the king or the countthat these common subjects might restrict his power and that of his nobility.

Bryce Lyon concludes his study as follows:

Cavalry was never militarily superior to foot soldiers, not even in the Middle Ageswhen it might have been possible. The centuries-old and deeply ingrained belief thatmounted men surpassed all others so blinded ruler, aristocrat, and general to the reali-ties of the battlefield that there was not only defeat in the field and needless sacrifice ofmen and their mounts but also indefensible costs.

Note 50, which in Lyon’s book follows this statement, says: “See the remarks ofMalcolm Vale, War and Chivalry (Athens, Ga., 1981), and J. R. Hale, “The Mili-tary Education of the Officer Class in Early Modern Europe,” in: Renaissance WarStudies (London, 1983), pp. 245–46.”80 The article from Hale says nothing aboutthe Middle Ages. The text of Malcolm Vale is very important. But Bryce Lyon doesnot give the precise reference. What did he read in this book? One has a choicehere: to give him the benefit of the doubt, one must conclude that Lyon has only reada part of this study and not the end. If he had read the entire book, then he carefullyconceals the conclusion and we must presume a deception by Bryce Lyon.

80 Lyon, “The Role of Cavalry in Medieval Warfare,” p. 90. [Editor’s note: This reference ismissing from Verbruggen’s article, although a footnote is placed in the text; I chose to add itfor continuity.]


What are the Conclusions of Malcolm Vale?

Without cavalry, a fifteenth-century army was unlikely to achieve a decisivevictory on the field of battle. To pursue an enemy, whether in the hope of ransomor in an attempt at annihilation, was scarcely possible without mounted units.

Heavy cavalry was not the obsolescent arm that military historians have oftendecried, eking out an irrelevant existence for social reasons unconnected withthe art of war. In 1494, over one half of Charles VIII’s army which began theItalian campaigns was composed of heavy cavalry. The gendarmerie of nobles,all mounted and fully armed, was to be the only truly permanent element inFrench royal armies for most of the sixteenth century.

“The most dangerous arms in the world,” wrote Jean de Bueil in Le Jouvencel,“are those of horse and lance, because there is no means of stopping them.”Heavy cavalry could carry all before it through the momentum and impact of aproperly-conducted charge and the resolute pursuit of a fleeing enemy. The lordsof battle could rule the field in the fifteenth century as they had rarely donebefore.”81

81 Vale, War and Chivalry (Athens, GA, 1981), pp. 127–8. [Editor’s note: Again there is a miss-ing reference to this footnote in the original text. My copy, which came from J. F. Verbruggenhimself, has the reference written in his hand in the bottom margin.]

5

Sichelgaita of Salerno: Amazon or Trophy Wife?

Valerie Eads

Sichelgaita of Salerno: Amazon or Trophy Wife?

Sichelgaita of Salerno would seem to present a golden opportunity to anyoneinterested in studying medieval reports of women waging war. In 1081, her hus-band, the Norman leader Robert Guiscard, undertook an invasion of the Byzan-tine Empire. The Byzantine historian Anna Comnena gives a lively account ofSichelgaita on the field at the battle of Dyrrachium:

Our men resisted bravely and the enemy turned back (they were not all picked men).They threw themselves into the sea up to their necks and when they were near theRoman [Byzantine] and Venetian ships begged for their lives – but nobody rescuedthem. There is a story that Robert’s wife Gaita, who used to accompany him on cam-paign, like another Pallas, if not a second Athena, seeing the runaways and glaringfiercely at them, shouted in a very loud voice: “How far will ye run? Halt! Be men!” –not quite in those Homeric words, but something very like them in her own dialect. Asthey continued to run, she grasped a long spear and charged at full gallop against them.It brought them to their senses and they went back to fight.1

They also won convincingly. As Eleanor Searle once remarked concerning anotheraccount of a militarily active woman, “That sounds like the real thing.”2 But, is it?

Earlier generations of military historians apparently did not think so. There isnot a lot in the secondary literature about the goddess-like Sichelgaita. While itis hardly surprising that medieval accounts of women waging war were oncegreeted with a greater or lesser degree of gender-based incredulity, the case ofSichelgaita stands out because this exploit took place at one of the few engage-ments between Conquest and Crusade that was of interest to that generation of

1 Anna Comnena, The Alexiad of Anna Comnena, trans. E.R.A. Sewter (Harmondsworth, 1969)bk.4, chap.6, p.147 [hereafter cited as Alexiad]. The parentheses appear in Sewter’s edition;comments in square brackets are my addition; Sewter’s spelling is followed for Greek names.For the Greek text, Anne Comnène, Alexiade (Règne de l’empereur Alexis I Comnène, 1081–1118) 2nd ed., 4 vols., ed. and trans. Bernard Leib (Paris, 1967–89) was consulted [hereaftercited as Leib].

2 Eleanor Searle, “Emma the Conqueror,” in Studies in Medieval History Presented to R. AllenBrown, ed. C. Harper-Bill, Christopher J.Holdsworth and Janet L. Nelson (Woodbridge, 1989),pp. 281–88.

scholars. C. W. C. Oman’s account of Dyrrachium does not, however, mentionSichelgaita.3 He was, after all, writing “not a book of annals, but a treatise on theArt of War.”4 As Oman saw it, the significance of the battle was that it markedthe last appearance of massed infantry until the resurgence of the foot soldierin the fifteenth century. The presence of the amazonian Sichelgaita was notrelevant.

Hans Delbrück’s discussion of Robert Guiscard is limited to a few pointsthat suit his emphasis on the small size of medieval armies and relies almostentirely on the secondary literature.5 He considers the sources inadequate toreconstruct the battle at Dyrrachium, and “Anna Komnena is not such a reli-able source.”6 There is, of course, no mention of Sichelgaita.

That virtually no one any longer discusses the Age of Cavalry and the Ageof Infantry and that scholars study women waging war would probably leaveOman or Delbrück rather bemused. If they thought of her at all, they probablydismissed Sichelgaita as something of a dancing dog, interesting or amusing,but not a subject for serious historical study.7 Adding women on the field tominuscule armies and the small number of proper battles was not the sort ofthing that would raise the opinion of the art of war in the Middle Ages. Thequestion is: Can the new orthodoxy, which has revised the view of such pointsas troop strength and the role of battles in medieval warfare, do any better ininterpreting the sources when women appear?8

Although Anna’s description is colorful, like many of the reports of medievalwomen and military actions, it raises a number of basic questions. Not even themost enthusiastic researcher of women’s military activities claims that medievalwomen were usually on the field of battle. What was she doing there? Annawrites that Sichelgaita took up a spear. Does this mean that she was trained toarms? If so, why, when it would not be expected that she would ever use suchtraining? Would even a prince of Salerno squander a valuable resource, skilledweapons masters, to train a daughter in weapons?9

73Sichelgaita of Salerno

3 Charles W. C. Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages 1, 2nd ed. (1924; repr. NewYork, 1969), pp. 166–67.

4 Ibid., p. vi.5 Hans Delbrück, History of the Art of War 3, trans. Walter J. Renfroe, Jr. (Westport, CT, 1982),

pp. 184–86.6 Ibid., p.186.7 An attitude not limited to writers of military history; see Women in Medieval History and

Historiography, ed. Susan Mosher Stuard (Philadelphia, 1987), pp. vii–xvi.8 For developments in medieval military historiography since the 1950s, see Bernard S. Bachrach,

“Medieval Military Historiography,” in Companion to Historiography, ed. Michael Bentley(London, 1997), pp. 203–20.

9 Dorotea Memoli-Apicella, Sichelgaita: tra Langobardi e Normanni (Salerno, 1997), p. 227[hereafter cited as Memoli-Apicella], concludes that the descriptions of Sichelgaita’s militaryactivities speak to her command skills and warrior spirit rather than her physical prowess forthe simple reason that she would have had little time to practice the latter. These points will bediscussed below.

74 Valerie Eads

′

The account of Dyrrachium is the most frequently quoted passage, but Annawrites a bit more about Sichelgaita:

Robert set out from Salerno and arrived at Otranto. There he stayed for a few dayswaiting for his wife Gaita (she went on campaign with her husband and when shedonned armour was indeed a formidable [ϕοβερου] sight). She came and he embracedher; then both started with all the army again for Brindisi, the seaport with the finestharbour in the whole of Japygia [Apulia].10

So, Dyrrachium was not an anomaly. Sichelgaita habitually accompanied herhusband, one of the most warlike men of his generation, on campaign. In thiscase, the army seems to have set out in at least two groups, one with Robert andone with Sichelgaita, and Robert did not embark until she arrived with her troops.What Anna does not say is why this was the case. She does, however, suggestthat Sichelgaita played an active role in Robert’s policy decisions:

The subsequent events [the invasion] apparently came about as follows. Robert, theysay, was a thoroughly unscrupulous rascal and working hard for a conflict with theRomans; he had for a long time been making preparations for war; but he was preventedby some of his more reputable friends and by his own wife Gaita, on the grounds that hewould be starting an unjust war against Christians. Several times his attempts to beginsuch an enterprise were put off.11

Whatever his scruples, or lack thereof, by 1081, the volatile politics of theByzantine Empire had given Robert Guiscard a causus belli. The rebellion thateventually brought Alexius I Comnenus to the throne also prevented the arrangedmarriage of one of Robert’s daughters to Constantine, the son of Michael VIIDucas, the deposed emperor. The little girl was placed in a convent, and Robertundertook a campaign, ostensibly on her behalf.12 And her mother went as well.

Dyrrachium was not Sichelgaita’s only appearance in battle. The emperorAlexius entered into a treaty with the Venetians to undertake naval operationsagainst Robert’s fleet:

Not long afterward, they [the Venetians] made ready dromons, triremes and someother ships (small, fast sailers) and attacked Robert in greater force. They caught upwith him off Butrinto (where he was encamped) and joined battle. The Venetianswon, killing many of their adversaries and throwing more into the sea. They verynearly captured his (Robert’s) own son Guy, as well as his wife. The report of this finesuccess was sent in full to the emperor, who rewarded them with many gifts andhonours.13

10 Alexiad, bk. 1, chap. 15, p. 66.11 Alexiad, bk. 1, chap. 12, p. 59.12 Ferdinand Chalandon, Histoire de la domination normande en Italie et en Sicile 1 (Paris,

1907), pp. 264–65. [Hereafter cited as Chalandon.] This article relies largely on Chalandon’schronology with additional information from G. A. Loud, The Age of Robert Guiscard: South-ern Italy and the Norman Conquest (Harlow, 2000); Huguette Taviani-Carozzi, La principautélombarde de Salerne (IXe–XIe siècle).Pouvoir et société en Italie lombarde méridionale, 2vols. (Rome, 1991); idem, La Terreur du Monde: Robert Guiscard et la conquête normande enItalie (Paris, 1996).

13 Alexiad, bk. 6, chap. 5, pp. 190–91. Butrinto is on the mainland, close to the island of Corfu.


Anna reports four naval battles between Robert Guiscard’s forces and theVenetian fleet during the 1084–85 campaign. Robert was heavily defeated inthe first two. He then won a resounding victory with a surprise comebackafter which the Venetians attacked again and were again victorious. The finalencounter took place in spring 1085, a few months before Robert’s death.14 Itis admittedly difficult to avoid the battlefield during a naval battle, but Sichelgaitais again reported as present when some sort of engagement was clearly a possi-bility, and she was in some danger. Dyrrachium thus cannot be dismissed as asingle anomalous incident.

Anna Comnena is not the only source for Sichelgaita’s exploits at Dyrrachium.The report of William of Apulia is, however, somewhat different:

In this battle, Robert’s wife was wounded by a stray arrow. Frightened by the woundand not expecting help, she was nearly overcome by the enemy: Fearing the dangers ofdeath approaching close she wanted to entrust herself to her ship. God delivered her, notwanting mockery to be made of such a lady, so noble and worthy of veneration.15

If William’s account is less colorful and his portrayal of her somewhat lessheroic, he makes clear why Sichelgaita could have been expected to wear armoras Anna describes. Combatant or not, she was in danger of death or capture likeany of her troops.

William mentions twice that part of the army traveled to Otranto with Sichelgaita:“He [Robert] stayed a while at Otranto awaiting the arrival of his wife and of manycounts whom he knew were going to be his companions on the march.”16 And,“Meanwhile his wife arrived, and the counts who had been sworn.”17

William also gives further evidence that Sichelgaita regularly accompaniedRobert on campaign. In 1080, during one of the numerous rebellions of Peter IIof Trani, Robert left Sichelgaita in command of the siege of Trani while he himselfwent south to Taranto to undertake operations there.14 Chalandon 1, pp. 282–83, and Loud, Age, p. 222, omit this action from their discussion. Leib,

vol. 2, p. 54, notes the disbelief that this passage once aroused, but accepts Anna’s testimony.15 Guillaume de Pouille, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, ed. and trans. Marguerite Mathieu (Palermo,

1961) bk. 4, ll. 425–431, p. 226 [hereafter cited as WmA].

Uxor in hoc bello Roberti forte sagittaQuadam laesa fuit. Quae vulnera territa, nullamDum sperabat opem, se pene subegerat hosti:Navigio cuius se commendare volebat,Instantis metuens vicina pericula lethi.Hanc Deus eripuit, fieri ludibria nolensMatronae tantae tam nobilis et venerandae.

English translations are my own. A complete translation by G. A. Loud can be found at: http://www.leeds.ac.uk/history/weblearning/MedievalHistoryTextCentre/medievalTexts.htm

16 WmA, bk. 4, ll. 159–62, p. 212.

…, modico remoratus IdrontiTempore, praestolans adventum coniugis atqueMultorum comitum, quos noverat ipse futurosEsse viae socios.

17 WmA, bk. 4, l. 185, p. 214.

Advenit interea coniunx, comitesque rogati.

76 Valerie Eads

The duke set siege to Trani with an army reinforced by contingents from Bari who wereallied to him. The siege was incited by the rebellion of Peter. The duke left his wife at thissiege. He went to Taranto, not without many troops, and besieged it by land and by sea.18

Trani was a well-fortified city that had been given to the Norman Peter I in1042 by Sichelgaita’s father, Guaimar IV of Salerno.19 Peter II also had a claimto Taranto through the guardianship of a minor heir, his nephew Richard.20 Wil-liam gives no information as to how Sichelgaita conducted the siege, or evenhow active a role she took, but Peter of Trani later formally surrendered andsought Robert’s forgiveness, so the operation must be considered a success.21

This is not a large body of sources from which to reconstruct and evaluateSichelgaita’s military career. Despite the considerable space devoted to warfarein both works, the logical description of military actions was not a priority foreither Anna or William.

Anna was not yet born when Robert Guiscard undertook his invasion. She wasstill at work on the Alexiad in 1148, when she was 65 years old.22 Her purposeswere panegyric, and her model literally homeric. The numerous parallels betweenthe Iliad and the Alexiad have long been noted by scholars.23 The description ofSichelgaita’s actions at Dyrrachium includes a quote from Homer, “or somethingvery like it in her own dialect” along with other details that allude to the Iliad.

Anna describes Sichelaita at Dyrrachium as “another Pallas, if not a secondAthena.” If the reference is to the giant slain by Athena, an exploit that gave thegoddess her double name, Pallas Athena,24 Anna could be simply commentingon Sichelgaita’s display of physical vigor, a quality appropriate to giants andbarbarians, who are lacking in the more cerebral martial virtues, such as strategyand discipline, associated with Athena and Romans. Anna also describes RobertGuiscard as being like Achilles, at least with respect to his voice which was

18 WmA, bk. 3, ll. 668–72, p. 200.Dux sibi coniunctis Barensibus obsidet auctisAgminibus Tranum, Petro stimulante rebelle.Hac dux uxorem dimittit in obsidione.Non sine militibus multis petit ipse Tarentum.Protinus obsessum terraque marique recepit.

19 At that time, the town was still in Byzantine hands. Chalandon 1, p. 105. Guaimar IV used tobe numbered Guaimar V due to the misdating of a single document. Loud, Age, p. 61, n. 3, andTaviani-Carozzi, Principauté Lombarde 1, pp. 366–69 give the particulars.

20 On the competition between the Hautevilles and another Norman extended family, the “sons ofAmicus” to which Peter belonged, see Loud, Age pp. 234 ff.

21 WmA, bk. 3, ll. 674–684, pp. 200–03; Chalandon 1, p. 256, Loud, Age, p. 242, with, again, nomention of Sichelgaita’s presence.

22 Alexiad, p. 14. Anna is unusual in that, as a porphyrogenita, her birthdate, 1 December 1083, isknown although the date of her death is not.

23 The pioneering study of Anna Comnena’s work is Georgina Buckler, Anna Comnena (London,1929); Andrew R. Dyck, “Iliad and Alexiad: Anna Comnena’s Homeric References,” Greek,Roman and Byzantine Studies 27 (1986), pp. 113–20 summarizes earlier scholarship on thepoint. [Hereafter cited as Dyck.]

24 Apollodorus, The Library, trans. James George Frazer (Cambridge MA, 1976) bk. 1, chap.6:1–2, pp. 42–47.


extraordinarily loud.25 The volume was no doubt needed given the poor disci-pline that she attributes to barbarians in general.26 For Anna, the ability to main-tain a formation is a hallmark of Roman (i. e. Byzantine) military superiority.27

The flight of Robert’s forces is merely another example of this well-known flaw.The task of rallying the faltering troops is achieved by Sichelgaita’s spear

rather than by Robert’s voice. The etymological connection of Pallas to the bran-dishing or shaking of the spear makes it easy to assume that Anna added thatdetail.28 The earlier reference to Sichelgaita’s failed efforts to dissuade Robertfrom undertaking an unjust war recall Athena’s successful calming of Achilles.29

Sichelgaita, while failing at the task more appropriate for a woman, preventingwar, succeeds at the task more acceptable for a man, whipping the troops backinto formation.30 Robert, a model barbarian, fails to accept her good advice andfails to properly discipline his troops. The incident, as Anna describes it, comesclose to being too good to be true.

Anna had access to historical as well as literary sources. Chief among thesewere her father, who was the loser at Dyrrachium – his attempt to lift the siege ofthe city failed – and the defender of the city, George Paleologus, a kinsman, thehusband of her mother’s sister. Another important source, her husband, the Cae-sar Nicephorus Bryennius, was not directly involved at Dyrrachium, but gath-ered information for his own unfinished life of Alexius. This has led some schol-ars to describe the Alexiad as his work, rather than Anna’s.31 She also refers to a“Latin” informant, an envoy sent by the bishop of Bari to Robert. From this manshe received her account of the wreck of part of Robert’s fleet.32 Anna does notsay when or in what language they spoke, but he told her that he had been inRobert’s camp, and he is a potentially valuable source of information.33

25 Alexiad, bk. 1, chap. 10, p. 54.26 “Anna scorns as ‘barbarians’ all other nations not her own ….” Buckler, Anna, p. 5, with a

fuller discussion pp. 441 ff. Anna attributes the defeat of the Varangian Guard at Dyrrachiumto the hotheadedness of the “axebearers” who, like the “Kelts,” a term here applied to Robert’stroops, were overly passionate in battle with the result that they advanced too far and were thencut off and slaughtered. Alexiad, bk. 4, chap. 6, p. 147.

27 Alexiad, bk. 15, chaps. 5–6, pp. 484–91, repeatedly notes the value of such discipline, this timeduring a campaign against the Turks.

28 Dyck, pp. 117–18.29 Homer, Iliad, 2nd ed., trans. A. T. Murray, rev. William F. Hyatt (Cambridge, MA, 1999) bk. 1,

ll. 188–222, pp. 26–29.30 The gender issues are discussed in Patricia Skinner, “‘Halt! Be Men!’: Sikelgaita of Salerno,

Gender and the Norman Conquest of Italy,” in Gendering the Middle Ages, ed. Pauline Staffordand Anneke B. Mulder-Bakker (Oxford, 2001), pp. 92–111.

31 Ruth Macrides, “The Pen and the Sword: Who Wrote the Alexiad?” in Anne Komnene and HerTimes, ed. Thalia Gouma-Peterson (New York, 2000), pp. 64–65.

32 Alexiad, bk. 3, chap 12, p. 133. For the close relationship between Robert Guiscard and Ursusof Bari, see Loud, Age, p. 243; idem, “Anna Komnena and Her Sources for the Normans ofSouthern Italy,” in Church and Chronicle in the Middle Ages: Essays Presented to John Taylor,eds. Ian Wood and G. A. Loud (London, 1991), p. 46, n. 20.

33 Bari, taken by Robert Guiscard in 1071, was the last Byzantine holding in Italy. There is evi-dence that even the Lombards of that city had some Greek. Loud, Age, pp. 33–34; on the siegeof Bari, ibid., pp. 134–37, Chalandon 1, pp. 186–90.

78 Valerie Eads

The Byzantine court had an understandable interest in their former territories,and a number of Robert’s troops took service with Alexius after the duke’s death.34

Although she never took part in a battle, Anna and her mother, the empress IreneDucas, accompanied Alexius on some of his numerous expeditions.35 She is carefulto note that she had read and listened to the accounts – good and bad – of those whoparticipated in the events she is writing about.36 Anna doesn’t seem to lack sources.

Not surprisingly, war provides much fuel in the debate on the value of Anna’swork and her authorship. The Alexiad is full of blood and battle, and the idea ofa woman writing accurately on these subjects is troubling to some scholars whomust make use of her work.37 She apparently doesn’t get it all wrong. C. W. C.Oman, although he omits any mention of Sichelgaita, relies on Anna’s descrip-tion in his brief analysis of the destruction of the Varangian Guard which, as hesees it, is the important part of the battle of Dyrrachium.38 In his description ofthe battle of Calavryta (1079), in which Byzantines fought each other, Omanagain relies on Anna whom he finds to have

… for a lady, a very fair grasp of things military. No doubt she accurately put down herfather’s account of his doings, and we are really reading Alexius’ versions of his fight.39

Positioning Anna as a dutiful daughter, her father’s amanuensis, makes it accept-able to rely on her battle reports which are otherwise unwomanly in their accu-racy. More recently, Anna’s observations on warfare have been cited alongsidethe surviving Byzantine military treatises.40

William of Apulia wrote the Gesta Roberti Wiscardi, dedicated to Roger Borsa,Robert and Sichelgaita’s son, in the mid to late 1090s.41 The Gesta is thus muchcloser in time and place to many of the events described than is Anna’s account.Virtually nothing is known of William, whether he was a Lombard or a Norman42

or a layman,43 but this lack of information has not raised questions about theaccuracy of his descriptions of military actions.44 If Anna’s work presents the

34 WmA, bk. 5, ll. 387–90, p. 256; Loud, “Anna Komnena,” pp. 42–46.35 Alexiad, bk. 14, chap. 7, p. 459; chap. 8, p. 463. Macrides, “Pen and Sword,” p. 70.36 Alexiad, bk. 14, chap. 7, p. 461; Macrides, “Pen and Sword,” pp. 64–65; Loud, “Anna Komnena,”

p. 45.37 Macrides, “Pen and Sword,” p. 67, especially note 27.38 Oman, History, 1, pp. 166–67.39 Ibid., p. 226, n. 1.40 John Haldon, Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World, 565–1204 (London, 1999),

pp. 208–09, 227–28.41 WmA, pp. 11–13, Chalandon 1, pp. xxxviii–xl, Kenneth Baxter Wolf, Making History: The

Normans and Their Historians in Eleventh-Century Italy (Philadelphia, 1995), pp. 123–24.[Hereafter cited as Wolf.] The question of date revolves around the status of the first crusade atthe time the work was completed. Given the short time between the fall of Jerusalem (15 July1099) and the death of the pope (29 July) more precise dating may not be possible.

42 WmA, pp. 18–21, Wolf, pp. 126–27.43 WmA, pp. 23–24, Wolf, pp. 124–26.44 Both Wolf, pp. 125–26, and Emily Albu, The Normans and Their Historians (Woodbridge,

2001), pp. 136–37, note William’s interest in military matters, but neither mentions Sichelgaita’smilitary role although Albu in particular discusses warfare. [Hereafter cited as Albu.]


best possible interpretation of her father’s reign, William’s no doubt gives a ver-sion of events acceptable to both Duke Roger and to Pope Urban II, to whom itwas also dedicated. As Anna consciously modeled herself after Homer, Williamconsidered himself the heir of the Latin poets of Roman antiquity, especiallyVirgil.45 These literary models must be taken into consideration when evaluatingthe portraits of Sichelgaita.

Not surprisingly, the two works show a degree of similarity since Anna andWilliam are writing about many of the same events. This has led to conjecturesthat Anna relied on William’s earlier work or that both shared a common source.46

She would not have relied directly on William’s account for her telling ofDyrrachium since she did not read Latin47 and, in any case, had far better sourcesin her father and George Paleologus.

The portrait of Sichelgaita is not, however, one of the points of similarity.Anna uses the topos of the barbarian virago which she blends with that of bar-barian indiscipline. Although she presents these themes by means of homericquotes and allusions, the Iliad is not a direct source since barbarians and the“man-hating Amazons” play almost no role in that poem. Anna’s description ofSichelgaita has more in common with Cassius Dio’s portrait of Boudicca, theBritish ruler who led a bloody revolt against Rome in the first century:

In stature she was very tall, in appearance most terrifying, in the glance of her eye mostfierce, and her voice was harsh; a great mass of the tawniest hair fell to her hips; aroundher neck was a large golden necklace; and she wore a tunic of divers colours over whicha thick mantle was fastened with a brooch. This was her invariable attire. She nowgrasped a spear to aid her in terrifying all beholders and spoke as follows:48

Boudicca and Sichelgaita have in common a fearful glance and a loud voice.The British queen’s distinctive attire, both rich and colorful, and her red haircould not be attributed to Sichelgaita whose armor and appearance would havebeen described by Anna’s informants. Both women take up a spear to reinforcetheir words, Boudicca while haranguing her troops, Sichelgaita while orderingthem back into battle. The more colorful, and barbarous, Boudicca is grim, wild-haired and somewhat masculine (βλοσυρωτατη) while the armored Sichelgaitais simply terrifying (ϕοβερου). The overall effect is striking.

The relevant books of Cassius Dio’s Roman Histories were abridged by themonk Xiphilinus during the reign of Michael VII Ducas, shortly before Anna’sbirth. Her contemporary John Zonaras made extensive use of Cassius Dio.49 Itseems obvious that Anna knew this work as well.

45 WmA, Prologue, ll. 1–2, p. 98; bk. 5, ll. 413–14, p. 258; p. 61, n. 4.46 WmA, pp. 38–46, Loud, “Anna Komnena,” p. 50.47 Buckler, Anna, pp. 179, 185; Loud, “Anna Komnena,” p. 50. Cf. Albu, p. 135, n. 55, “Anna’s

Alexiad translates three brief passages of the Gesta almost verbatim … so perhaps she reliedon a bilingual informant …”

48 Dio’s Roman Histories 8, trans. Earnest Cary (Cambridge MA, 1970) bk. 62, chaps. 2–8, pp.82–97 [hereafter cited as Dio].

49 Dio 1, pp. 23–24.

′′

80 Valerie Eads

William’s portrait is also homeric, but the goddess recalled is Aphrodite ratherthan Athena. When Aeneas is wounded, Aphrodite makes an uncharacteristicappearance on the battlefield to rescue her son, but is herself wounded byDiomedes and must be rescued in turn by Apollo.50 William’s Sichelgaita comesunder arrow fire, tries to flee the field, and must be rescued by divine will. Annadescribes a woman not merely present, but actively participating and turning thecourse of the battle.

The descriptions of the death of Robert Guiscard show the same contrast.Anna mentions that Sichelgaita was at the deathbed of her husband.51 Williammakes Robert’s deathbed rather than the battlefield her big scene, including alengthy tragic lament such as Homer gave to Andromache.52 There is little, ifany, evidence that William knew Greek, so the Iliad was an indirect source, butmany aspects of the story of Troy can be seen as “the common property of medi-eval poets.”53 In Virgil’s Aeneid, to which William made frequent references,54

Diomedes appears as the leader of the Greeks living in Italy. His city is Argyripaor Arpi in Apulia. He alludes to his wounding of the goddess in a lengthy speechin which he refuses to aid the Latins against Aeneas.55 During the long narrationto Queen Dido of the fall of Troy and his subsequent journeys, Aeneas describesa meeting with Andromache who gives a long and tearful account of her life afterthe death of Hector and the fall of Troy, events that she recalls vividly.56

Since they are writing from opposing sides, it is no surprise that Anna andWilliam present a different view of the battle itself. Anna attributes the failure ofher father’s relief action to the hot-headedness of the Varangians who rushedahead and were cut off. The barbarians thus ruined Alexius’ well-laid plans.57

William attributes the near-disaster to a difficult position. Robert’s troops werecaught on a narrow neck of land under heavy arrow fire. He implies that this istheir own fault for going heedlessly (incauta) rather than blaming Robert’s tacti-cal plans.58 William also agrees that some of Robert’s troops ran into the sea, notin flight but to escape the press and re-deploy. Then they simply waded out andrejoined the duke who had fought his way through.59 Sichelgaita’s presence,wounded and frightened, is noted only after Robert’s victorious charge, the num-bers of the dead on each side, and the quality of the spoils are described.

Anna and William agree only that Sichelgaita was present at the battle ofDyrrachium, which her side won, and that she was close to the action. Anna saysthat this happened because she habitually accompanied her husband on campaign,

50 Iliad, bk. 5, ll. 311–54, pp. 228–33.51 Alexiad, bk. 6, chap. 6, p. 192.52 WmA, bk. 5, ll. 295–315, p. 252; Iliad, bk. 6, ll. 405–439, pp. 304–07; Wolf, pp. 132–33.53 WmA, pp. 61–62, Albu, p. 121.54 WmA, pp. 61–62; Albu, p. 126; Wolf, p. 129.55 Virgil, Aeneid, bk. 11, ll. 275–78, in Virgil 2, rev. ed., trans. H. Rushton Fairclough (Cambridge

MA, 2000), pp. 254–57.56 Virgil, Aeneid, bk. 3, ll. 294 ff., ibid., 1, pp. 390 ff.57 Alexiad, bk. 4, chap. 6, pp. 147–48.58 WmA, bk. 4, ll. 377–88, p. 224.59 WmA, bk. 4, ll. 395–98, pp. 224, 226.


not as Anna herself accompanied her father, remaining where it was consideredsafe and withdrawing when the battle came too close,60 but actively participat-ing, witness the fact that she went armored.

William’s Sichelgaita was left at or sent to (dimittit) Trani when her husbandmoved on to Taranto. That she had any function there is left to the reader to infer.The following year she is somehow wounded during a battle, where she againappears with no apparent purpose. Robert had burned his camp – presumably afortified camp that he did not want to risk being occupied by the enemy – beforesetting out,61 but Sichelgaita did not return to the ships at that time. She advancedinto battle with the army, and was wounded when Alexius’ troops, presumablythe Turkish archers, responded to the advance with an arrow barrage. Anna de-scribes the instructions given to the Varangians to open and close their lines forthe archers. Despite her wound, Sichelgaita could not be evacuated because bythat time most of Robert’s sailors had fled.62 Four years after that, Anna writes,she is nearly captured in a naval battle. A few months later she reaches herhusband’s bedside shortly before his death, where, according to William, shelaments with the same homeric vigor that Anna attributes to her on the battle-field. The marked contrast of these two portraits cannot be attributed only todifferent literary traditions.

Literary analysis, although useful, is not sufficient to evaluate the conflictingaccounts of Sichelgaita’s role in the campaign, but if the accounts of her militaryactivities are collated with what is known of the other events of Sichelgaita’s lifeit is possible to gain a fuller picture, and certain points stand out:

Obviously, the most important of these known points is her marriage to RobertGuiscard in December 1058. Robert repudiated his first wife, Alberada, on speciousgrounds of consanguinity.63 The alliance with her nephew, Gerard of Buonalbergo,was no longer as valuable as it had been several years earlier when the 200 militesthat Gerard could bring were a great prize. His subsequent military successes,augmented by the appropriation of the inheritance of his brother Humphrey in1057, made Robert a man of much greater consequence. Prince Gisulf II of Salerno,Sichelgaita’s younger brother, sought his alliance against the depredations of an-other newly-powerful Norman, Robert’s brother, William of the Principate.64 Gisulffirst tried to obtain help from the anti-Norman pope Stephen IX, but Stephendied on 29 March 1058.60 Alexiad, bk. 15, chaps. 1–2, pp. 473–74, gives a vivid picture of the empress Irene on campaign

with Alexius.61 WmA, bk. 4, ll. 369–70, p. 224.62 WmA, bk. 4, ll. 373–74, p. 224.63 The observations of Loud, Age, pp. 113–14, do not substantially change the usual perception

of Robert’s marriage strategy. If Robert’s elder brother Drogo opposed the marriage becausehe knew of the consanguinity, it is unlikely that Robert was unaware of the fact. He thusentered knowingly into a consanguinous marriage when it was to his advantage and ended itwhen circumstances changed. Similarly, Pietro Dalena, “‘Guiscardi coniux Alberada’: donnee potere nel clan del Guiscardo,” Roberto il Guiscardo tra Europa, Oriente e Mezzogiorno:Atti del Convegno … ottobre 1985), ed. Cosimo Damiano Fonseca (Galatina, 1990), p. 164.

64 Chalandon 1, pp. 153–54; Loud, Age, p. 128, on the considerable advantages to both Robert andGisulf.

82 Valerie Eads

The intention was to pay Robert, but Gisulf had previously failed to keep hisfinancial commitments, and Robert was in a strong enough position to insist on amore substantial arrangement.65 This was not the first marriage between theprincely house of Salerno and a Norman. During the lifetime of their father,Guaimar IV, another sister, Gaitelgrima, had married Robert’s elder half-brother,Drogo.66 A cousin had married the oldest half-brother, William Iron-Arm, andanother cousin married William of the Principate shortly after Robert’s marriageto Sichelgaita.67 Another half-brother, Humphrey, may have had a similar con-nection, but the sources are unclear.68 In August 1059, Robert’s position in Italywas further regularized by the new pope, Nicholas II, who invested him with hisconquests in Apulia and Calabria as well as hoped-for future conquests in Mus-lim Sicily.69 Robert’s brother-in-law, Richard of Capua, also received papal rec-ognition of his recent conquest of that city. Certainly the unrest surrounding thereform papacy and the need for protection against the Roman aristocracy, whoraised anti-popes at every opportunity, was a factor in this change of policy to-ward the Normans, but the value of their new association with Lombard princelycircles, whether by marriage or by conquest, is also relevant.

From one point of view, Sichelgaita could hardly have done otherwise thanaccompany Robert on campaign, since he did little else – other than produce alarge family with his second wife. They had ten children.70 Because so little isknown of Sichelgaita’s early life, her knowledge of or views on warfare beforeher marriage are impossible to determine,71 but certainly these long years ofalmost constant campaigning gave her plenty of opportunity to learn.

One of Robert’s goals was to gain control of the remaining Byzantine terri-tory in Apulia and Calabria. Cariati fell in 1059. The city of Reggio that hadsuccessfully resisted previous attacks fell in 1060 after which the Empire alsoabandoned Squillace and all of Calabria. Earlier in the same year Robert hadalso occupied Taranto and Brindisi.

At the same time, one facet of Byzantine policy in Italy was to take advantageof dissensions that existed among the would-be conquerors. At times, Robertwas opposed by some of his numerous nephews. When his brother Humphreydied in 1057, Robert took over his territory without regard to the claims of his

65 Chalandon 1, p. 146. The information about Gisulf’s unsavory personality comes from Amatusof Montecassino, a notoriously biased source. Wolf, pp. 112–16.

66 Chalandon 1, p. 110. Guaimar IV apparently had two daughters named Gaitelgrima. Since hehad only one wife, Drogo’s wife may have been illegitimate. Loud, Age, p. 128.

67 Chalandon 1, p. 153; Loud, Age, pp. 99, 128.68 Chalandon 1, p. 147, WmA, pp. 325–26, Walter Schütz, Catalogus Comitum: Versuch einer

Territorialgliederung Kampaniens unter den Normannen von 1000 bis 1140 von Benevent bisSalerno (Frankfurt am Main, 1995), pp. 91–92, 441.

69 Chalandon 1, pp. 167–71; Loud, Age, pp. 186–94, includes the text of Robert Guiscard’s oath.70 Loud, Age, p. 300 provides a clear genealogical table while Chalandon 1, p. 283, supplies the

names of the “other daughters.” Elisabeth van Houts, ed. and trans., The Normans in Europe, p.298, credits Emma, the mother of Tancred, to Alberada rather than Sichelgaita.

71 Memoli-Apicella, pp. 12–13, describes the methods by which she attempted to “reconstruct”Sichelgaita despite the gaps in the historical record.


son, Abelard. Geoffrey of Conversano and Robert of Montescaglioso, the sonsof one of Robert’s sisters, often opposed him as did the descendants of Peter I ofTrani, a family rivalry that was now in the second generation. Just as Robert hadquarreled with his elder half-brothers, Drogo and Humphrey, he was now some-times at odds even with his youngest brother, Roger, and his brother-in-law, Rich-ard of Capua, although these men were also important allies.72 The Byzantineswere aware of and took advantage of the opportunities these quarrels provided.Troops were sent in 1060. They retook Brindisi, Taranto, Oria and Otranto beforemoving against Melfi in 1061, only to see many of these gains reversed the follow-ing year. A new catepan sent in 1064 organized a rebellion that occupied Robertfrom 1064–67.73 These wasted years made Robert decide that he had to deal withthe Greeks before he could again take up another important project, the conquestof Sicily. This was only completed by Roger some thirty years later, but Robertcampaigned there in 1061, 1064, and 1071. The last Byzantine stronghold of Barifell in 1071 when the onslaught of the Seldjuk Turks and the defeat at Manzikertmade it impossible for the Empire to continue the contest in Italy.74

This almost ceaseless campaigning eventually exhausted even Robert whonearly died in 1073. At that time, Sichelgaita called together Robert’s Normanfollowers and had them recognize her son, Roger, as his heir.75 The determina-tion that her son would succeed to all of his father’s patrimony appears to be aprime motivator of Sichelgaita’s actions.

The next milestone was the quarrel between her husband and her brother thatresulted in the latter being driven from Salerno in the autumn of 1077. The eventssurrounding Robert Guiscard’s taking of Salerno remain unclear. According toAmatus of Montecassino, Gisulf not only failed to make the payments promisedto allies, but also commandeered supplies that he had ordered his people to lay infor the coming siege.76

The hostility of Amatus, who devotes a good part of the fourth book of hisHistory of the Normans to a catalogue of the sins of Gisulf, is notorious.77

Simple incompetence is the most likely explanation for Gisulf’s vulnerabil-ity, but one of Amatus’ accusations, that Gisulf abandoned his wife by meansof a false vow of celibacy78 may provide a clue. By 1077, Gisulf was wellinto his thirties, and whether unwilling or unable had apparently produced no

72 Loud, Age, pp. 234–46.73 Chalandon 1, pp. 179–84.74 Chalandon 1, pp. 173–225, covers these events in detail; Loud, Age, pp. 130–37, 149–53, gives

a more concise discussion including re-evaluation of the sources used by Chalandon.75 Chalandon 1, p. 225.76 Chalandon 1, pp. 244–47.77 Wolf, pp. 112–16.78 Storia de’ Normanni di Amato di Montecassino volgarizzata in antico francese, ed. Vincenzo

de Bartholomaeis (Rome, 1935) bk. 4, chap. 49, pp. 219–20. The text of Amatus survives onlyin a 14th-century French translation. Because Amatus declined to give further details, whichwould sicken his readers, the translator concludes that Gisulf’s lusts were “against nature.”

84 Valerie Eads

heir.79 Sichelgaita and Gisulf had several living siblings.80 To these and theiroffspring can be added the children of Guaimar IV’s siblings81 plus his wife’salso numerous family.82 The legal claim to succession was small or nil for manyof these relatives, but, given the number of potential contestants for the princi-pality, Robert and Sichelgaita may have decided to take action shortly after RogerBorsa came of age.83 After a lengthy siege, Gisulf was exiled, and spent the restof his life at the papal court in Rome where he died in 1091. It is obvious that theresources of Salerno greatly increased Robert’s capacity to conduct his opera-tions, but the possible connection of these events to the sudden appearance ofSichelgaita in the field has not been noted.

Sichelgaita’s reported military activities cluster in the last decade of her life.84

By 1080, the large family that she and Robert Guiscard produced was complete.Although she obviously spent some time with her husband, the numerous preg-nancies and childbirths would have limited her activities during the years from1058 to 1077 which were devoted to childbearing. Then, just as this activitywound down, Robert took control of the city that her family had long ruled, andwithin a few years, his wife is reported independently commanding troops at thesiege of Trani.

Given the difficulties that Robert Guiscard had with his reluctant Normanallies and subordinates, how could he risk turning over command to his wife? Ifshe was not in command, why was she there at all? If Taranto was considered toodangerous for reasons unspecified, who was responsible for her safety at Trani,and, if an un-named man was commanding the siege, why was her mere pres-ence recorded? Were these troops Salernitans who could be counted on to obeyher, possibly more reliably than they would have obeyed Robert? That RobertGuiscard needed the resources of Salerno is obvious; what has been less notedwas that Sichelgaita’s presence assured their availability.85 Gisulf’s extended kin-dred could have made attempt after attempt to recover the principality if Roberthad not been able to establish himself as something other than a conqueror. Forthis he needed his wife as an active co-ruler who could position her son as aminor heir, acceptable to the Salernitans, and under the guardianship of his mother,

79 A daughter may be recorded in a charter of Roger Borsa issued in 1087. Schütz, p. 390; Léon-Robert Ménager (ed.), Recueil des acts des ducs normands d’Italie (1046–1127) (Bari, 1980),p. 208.

80 Taviani-Carozzi, Principauté Lombarde, 1:371, 373.81 Ibid., 2:872, 934.82 Among the assassins who killed both Guamar IV and his brother Paldolf were his four broth-

ers-in-law. Ibid., 1:403.83 Roger’s estimated year of birth is 1060, based on Romuald of Salerno’s statement that he was

50 years old at his death in 1111. Ménager, Recueil, p. 166, n. 1.84 She died on 27 March 1090, and was presumably born in the late 1030s since Gisulf was a

younger brother. He was associated with his father in the rule of Salerno in 1042, apparentlywhile still a small child.

85 The point was not lost on contemporaries. WmA, bk. 2, II. 436–39, p. 156; G.A. Loud, “Con-tinuity and Change in Norman Italy: the Campania during the Eleventh and Twelfth Centu-ries,” Journal of Medieval History 22, p. 325.


a legitimate member of the ruling house, and of her husband whose militaryskills could bring opportunity and prosperity to the city.

Sichelgaita’s appearance at Trani is only one of several similar actions under-taken by women in Italy in the eleventh century. Adelheid of Turin, Beatrice ofLorraine and Matilda of Tuscany commanded sieges.86 In this respect, she wasnot an amazonian anomaly, but something of a late bloomer.

The battle at Dyrrachium, then, was not her first outing, as Anna correctlyreports. It is likely that the troops that she ordered back into the battle, like thoseshe commanded at Trani, were her troops, Salernitans, dependants of Salerno, orin the pay of Salerno.87 According to Anna Comnena, the left wing of Robert’sarmy, the wing that was driven into the sea, was commanded by Amicus ofGiovenazzo (Anna’s “Count Amiketas”) a cousin of Peter II of Trani, and a partyin the rebellions against Robert Guiscard. Both Anna and William of Apuliareport that Robert had difficulty in organizing this campaign which was bothrisky and expensive as well as unlikely to be profitable, at least in the shortterm.88 William’s reference to their grief at being separated from their familiessuggests that Robert had taken hostages from his reluctant allies as well. He leftmany of his most reliable supporters in Italy and divided his opponents by takingsome with him, to command the troops they had been obliged to send, and leav-ing others behind.

He also divided his family. Roger, approximately 21 years old, was left inSalerno, as regent, but with the supervision or protection of two of his father’smost reliable supporters – his cousin, Robert of Loritello, and Gerard ofBuonalbergo, the uncle of Robert’s first wife.89 This would be a normal step inRoger’s career and also reinforce his position as successor. Bohemond, the sonof Robert’s first wife, would be of more use in the field, and also be kept awayfrom the temptation to cause trouble in Italy. Sichelgaita went on the Byzantinecampaign because Roger needed a chance to establish himself as an adult, andRobert needed as many reliable people with him as possible. To have put an entirewing of his army under the command of Amicus, a recent opponent, would invitetrouble, especially if that wing were composed of troops loyal to Amicus. Sichelgaitawas with the left wing, and that is the most likely position as well for the troops thatcame from Salerno. Although Robert took over the rule of Salerno after Gisulf wasdriven out, Sichelgaita may well have had to take on an active role to prevent adestructive and drawn-out resistance. Her presence with his armies shows the lim-its of Robert Guiscard’s authority as much as it indicates her physical vigor.

86 Valerie Eads, “Women and Military Power in Eleventh-Century Italy” (Paper delivered at theInternational Medieval Congress, University of Leeds, July 15, 2003) makes clear that in theeleventh century a number of Italian noble women made effective use of the military resourcesat their disposal.

87 Memoli-Apicella, p. 240, describes these troops as Normans whose admiration for Sichelgaita’scourage led them to follow her as their lady. This presumably refers only to those Normanswho were at the moment loyal to Robert.

88 Alexiad, bk. 1, chap. 14, pp. 65–66; WmA, bk. 4, ll. 128–32, p. 210; Loud, Age, pp. 217–18.89 Chalandon 1, pp. 267–68.

86 Valerie Eads

Another element is her determination to insure Roger Borsa’s succession toall of his father’s patrimony. Robert had repudiated his first wife, but the son ofthat marriage, Bohemond, was a grown man and with his father on the 1081campaign. Bohemond had, of course, no claim to the principality. Roger had aclaim to his father’s position as duke of Apulia and Calabria, but his status therewas less clear cut. It is not necessary to repeat melodramas of attempted plotsand poisonings90 to understand why Sichelgaita would have risked her life to bepresent. It was the best way to protect Roger’s interests; to insure that Robert didnot decide to provide for Bohemond, now technically illegitimate, at the expenseof her son. As things turned out, Bohemond provided very well for himself, butthat was years in the future. Sichelgaita may well have seen Apulia and Calabriaas part of her own father’s patrimony since Guaimar IV had claimed the title. Itwas as duke of Apulia and Calabria that he oversaw the first apportioning of landto the Normans in 1042.91

Whether she shouted homeric lines or something less heroic is not at issue.No matter how loud her voice was, she would not have been heard in the middleof a battlefield! Perhaps she did have to keep her troops from breaking and bolt-ing; if the men were indeed panicked, charging across their path – emphasizingher orders with a spear, an object that they could actually see – was about theonly way to get them back into order. One possibility is that the spear thatSichelgaita snatched up was one with a banner attached. Thus she would beincreasing her her visibility and using a signal familiar to the troops, not per-forming a complex physical skill, charging with a lance, that she had probablynever learned.92 A position close to the banner is a logical place for someone whomust be with the troops, but not actually engaging the enemy, but neither sourcesupplies this detail.

Anna Comnena tells how her father’s well-laid plans broke his opponents.The “Kelts” were running into the sea to get away, until a monstrous woman,more frightful than Roman battle lines or Turkish archers, drove them back intothe fight. Then the “barbarians” in his army were undone by their impetuousnessand lack of judgment. Perhaps, as William reports, the “Normans” waded intothe water to get clear of a difficult and dangerous position. Sichelgaita decidedthat if too many of her troops took this route, there was the possibility that theywould be forced into deep water. To avoid this danger she turned them, issuing herorders in the most practical way. In any case, the battle was a victory for Sichelgaitaand Robert, and for Roger. That she was present, properly armored, to oversee theactions of her, and her son’s, troops and to insure that they acquitted themselves atleast as well as Bohemond’s – that still sounds like the real thing.

90 Dalena, “‘Guiscardi,’” pp. 175–77 summarizes the speculations that Sichelgaita either has-tened Robert’s death or attempted to poison Bohemond.

91 Chalandon 1, pp. 105–06.92 Memoli-Apicella, p. 240, concludes that Sichelgaita led the troops back into position instead

of simply turning their flight. In the process, she crossed into the enemy’s lines and was in thethick of the fight when wounded. Under these circumstances, her surviving, much less avoid-ing capture, could well seem miraculous since Memoli-Apicella also concluded that Sichelgaitadid not actually practice fighting skills, p. 227.


The purpose of this overview of her career was to decide whether Sichelgaitawas an Amazon, a woman who made use of the military capabilities available toher, or a more passive woman who brought those means to her capable and ag-gressive husband, a trophy wife. Like the earlier studies of Oman and Delbrück,this article began with certain presuppositions; namely, that in a hierarchicalsociety like that of medieval Europe women would undertake gender-role non-conforming actions only under unusual circumstances, such as a regency or wid-owhood, when a power vacuum existed, and considerations of class became moreimportant than those of gender. Sichelgaita does not fit this presupposition. Shenot only had a husband, alive and fit to fight, but he was one of the most ambi-tious, aggressive and competent predators of his generation. She had three sons.The eldest was still young, but nonetheless an adult.

It took a while to determine where the power vacuum was, but it was Robert.If he had merely starved out Salerno and killed or exiled Gisulf, the result couldhave been years of war that resulted only in devastation. Robert was not theundisputed leader of the Normans of southern Italy. As his numerous nephewscame of age, some, like Robert of Loritello, allied with him and others, such asthe dispossessed Abelard and Geoffrey of Conversano, fought him every waythey could. Nor were the numerous descendants of Tancred d’Hauteville theonly Normans in the picture. Peter II of Trani was but one representative ofanother large family, the “sons of Amicus” that contended for wealth and power.The Norman princes of Capua were kinsmen by marriage, sometimes allies andsometimes not.

The sources, being all of Norman origin, are somewhat suspect, but aspects ofGisulf’s rule left him vulnerable, and he apparently had no heir. Sichelgaita andRobert may have presented a desirable alternative. Robert alone was only one ofa number of aggressive Normans. It was Sichelgaita’s active presence that madeSalerno a valuable resource rather than yet another source of trouble. Since Salernowas not her husband’s only holding, she took steps to insure that her son suc-ceeded to the entire patrimony. She remained active after Robert’s death in 1085until her own death in 1090, a period that has been characterized as “The Re-gency of Sichelgaita.”93 The very fact of her strong presence in his life may haveinfluenced William of Apulia to mute his description of her actions in a bookdedicated to her son. Conversely, the fact that he was writing about the duke’smother makes it unlikely that William would make up a battle wound that hispatron knew never happened.

Sichelgaita’s presence on the field at Dyrrachium was not a historical curios-ity. It was an integral part of the ambitious plans of one of the most warlikefigures of the Norman world and also very much a part of her own dynasticplans.

93 Ménager, Recueil, pp. 164–68.

6

Castilian Military Reform under the Reign ofAlfonso XI (1312–50)

Nicolas Agrait

Despite more attention from researchers in the past two decades, AlfonsoXI’s reign remains somewhat neglected. The most important historian of thismonarch is still Salvador de Moxó1 who brought with him his concern forCastilian political and social institutions, especially the history of the nobility.Even though interest in the events and circumstances of the first half of thefourteenth century in Castile was certainly not lacking, most historians, withthe possible exception of general works by Marie-Claude Gerbert, Miguel Angel

List of Principal Abbreviations in Footnotes:AHN: Archivo Histórico Nacional (Madrid)CAIV: Crónica do rei Afonso IVCAXI: Crónica de Alfonso XICDACLXI: Colección documental del Archivo de la Catedral de León. XI. (1301–1350)CDAML: Colección documental del Archivo Municipal de León (1219–1400)CDPI: Colección documental de Pedro I de Castilla, 1350–1369CFIV: Crónica de Fernando IVCLC: Cortes de los antiguos reinos de León y CastillaCODOM6: Colección de documentos para la historia del reino de Murcia, Vol. 6, Documentos de

Alfonso XICODOM7: Colección de documentos para la historia del reino de Murcia, vol. 7, Documentos de

Pedro IGCAXI: Gran Crónica de Alfonso XILBB: Libro Becerro de las BehetríasRAH: Real Academia de la Historia (Madrid)1 Though Moxó’s production was vast, some of his most useful works include “Relaciones entre

la Corona y las órdenes militares en el reinado de Alfonso XI,” in VII Centenario del Infante D.Fernando de la Cerda, ed. Manuel Espada Burgos (Ciudad Real, 1976), pp. 117–58; “Lasociedad política en la época de Alfonso XI,” Cuadernos de Historia 6 (1975), 187–326; andthe closest he came to a complete monograph on the whole reign: “Epoca de Alfonso XI,” inHistoria de España vol. XIII: La expansión penínsular y mediterránea (c.1212–1350), vol. I:La Corona de Castilla, ed. José Javier Zamora (Madrid, 1990), pp. 279–428. He presentedAlfonso, especially after 1330, as a conquering monarch both within and outside Castile, whotamed his realm’s aristocracy, introduced radical administrative changes, and expanded thepredominance of Castile over the whole Iberian Peninsula. This view has been echoed by JoséSánchez-Arcilla Bernal’s popularizing volume Alfonso XI, 1312–1350 (Palencia, 1995).

Ladero Quesada and Joseph F. O’Callaghan,2 gravitated towards more specificareas and interests like legal institutions,3 the development of the monarchy,4 andurban, social and economic issues.5 Thus, the overall history of Alfonso’s longreign presently lies unwritten.

One of the pieces of the picture which has not yet been given full treat-ment is military practice during Alfonso’s regime even though his rule, muchlike those of his European counterparts, was marked by armed struggles.Military conflict, in fact, abounds in the chronicle6 and documentary7 sources:from the frontier wars and the defeat in 1319 of the king’s regents at the Vegade Granada;8 Alfonso’s first campaigns as an adult;9 his struggle againstGranada and Morocco and the loss of Gibraltar to the latter in 1333;10 thebloody pacification of the Castilian nobility, in particular Juan Núñez de Lara

89Castilian Reform under Alfonso XI

2 Some good starting points are Marie-Claude Gerbert, “Les espagnols de la frontière, VIIIe-milieu XIVe siècle. Les grands royaumes chrétiens: les élites, XIe–milieu XIVe siècle. Letemps des tragédies,” in Histoire des Espagnols, vol. I: VIe–XVIIIe siècle, ed. BartoloméBennassar (Paris, 1985), pp. 185–299; Miguel Angel Ladero Quesada et al., Historia de España4: De la crisis medieval al Renacimiento (Barcelona, 1988); and Joseph F. O’Callaghan, AHistory of Medieval Spain (Ithaca, 1975).

3 Some examples include Joaquín Cerda Ruiz-Funes, Estudios sobre instituciones jurídicasmedievales de Murcia y su reino (Murcia, 1987); Joseph F. O’Callaghan, The Cortes of Castile-León, 1188–1350 (Philadelphia, 1989) and Manuel García Fernández, “La Hermandad Gen-eral de Andalucía durante la minoría de Alfonso XI de Castilla: 1312–1325,” Historia,Instituciones, Documentos 12 (1985), 351–75.

4 One should consult Miguel Angel Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poder real en Castilla (1252–1369) (Madrid, 1993); Peter Linehan, History and the Historians of Medieval Spain (Oxford,1993); and the essay collection Génesis medieval del estado moderno-Castilla y Navarra (1250–1370), ed. Adeline Rucquoi (Valladolid, 1987).

5 Concejos y ciudades en la Edad Media Hispánca. II Congreso de Estudios Medievales (Avila,1990); Ricardo Izquierdo Benito, “Repercusiones de una crisis y medidas para superarla. To-ledo en el siglo XIV,” En la España Medieval 5 (1986), 1:515–36; Teófilo Ruiz, Crisis andContinuity; Land and Town in Late Medieval Castile (Philadelphia, 1994).

6 The main narrative source for Alfonso’s reign is the official history Crónica del rey don Alfonso,el Onceno in Crónicas de los Reyes de Castilla, ed. Cayetano Rosell (Madrid, 1953), pp. 171–392. It was written by Fernán Sánchez de Valladolid, Alfonso’s chancellor and keeper of theprivy seal, under royal auspices in the same chronicling workshop that produced the chroniclesof Alfonso X (1252–84), Sancho IV (1284–95) and Fernando IV (1295–1312). Between 1376and 1379, an anonymous author composed a second and longer version of this chronicle whichis known as the Gran Crónica de Alfonso XI, 2 vols., ed. Diego Catalán (Madrid, 1977). Bothworks cover Alfonso’s reign up until 1344. [Hereafter CAXI and GCAXI respectively.]

7 Alfonso’s chancery records were lost along with those of most of the fourteenth-century Castilianmonarchs. The remaining documentation is scattered among the various national, ecclesiastic,and urban archives. Two particularly important published collections are Colección documen-tal de Alfonso XI. Sección del Clero, ed. Esther González Crespo (Madrid, 1985) and Colecciónde documentos para la historia del reino de Murcia, Vol. 6, Documentos de Alfonso XI, ed.Francisco de Asís Veas Arteseros (Murcia, 1997). [Hereafter CODOM6].

8 CAXI, chaps. 9, 11, 14, 16, 30, pp. 180–85, 191–94.9 CAXI, chaps. 57–58, 86–88, pp. 207–09, 226–27.

10 “Letter from Alfonso XI announcing to all his realms that he had signed a truce with the emirof Granada (Seville, February 19, 1331),” in CODOM6, pp. 188–92, doc. 168; CAXI, chaps.108, 110, 114, 126, pp. 242–45, 248, 257–58.

90 Nicolas Agrait

and Juan Manuel;11 the wars against Navarre (1335)12 and Portugal (1336–38);13 the duel with the Marinid dynasty of Morocco for ascendancy in theStrait of Gibraltar, which he achieved through his victory at Salado (1340),14

and the successful siege of Algeciras (1342–44);15 to his death from the bu-bonic plague during the failed siege of Gibraltar of 1350.16 Among English andAmerican historians, research into the military developments of Castile hasmostly concentrated on the thirteenth century along the lines set by ElenaLourie17 and James F. Powers,18 the mid-fourteenth century when the HundredYears War spilled into the Peninsula,19 and on the fifteenth century.20 Consider-ing the great number of military operations and the period’s general impor-

11 CAXI, chaps. 154, 156, 158, 161, 164, 166, 172, 188, pp. 273–80, 282–83, 293–94; “Letterfrom Alfonso XI to the council of Murcia ordering it to return to Don Juan Manuel all of hisproperties and honors (Mérida, June 4, 1337),” in Andrés Giménez Soler, Don Juan Manuel.Biografía y estudio crítico (Zaragoza, 1932), pp. 631–32, doc. 550.

12 CAXI, chaps. 142–50, pp. 267–71. The most complete treatment so far of this episode remainsPilar Azcárate Aguilar-Amat, “La guerra de 1335 entre Castilla y Navarra,” Hispania 49 (1989),805–40.

13 Crónica do rei don Afonso IV in Crónicas dos sete primeiros reis de Portugal, ed. Carlos daSilva Tarouca (Lisboa, 1952), chaps. 31–49, pp. 241–93, [hereafter, CAIV]; CAXI, chaps. 166–69, 177, 185, pp. 280–83, 287–92; “Response by King Afonso IV to Benedict XII’s legate andto the French ambassador (October 23, 1338),” in As gavetas da Torre de Tombo, 12 vols.(Lisboa, 1960–77), 5:662–67, doc. 3659; “Letter from Benedict XII to Alfonso XI telling himthat the bishop of Rhodes, papal legate, was headed to the Peninsula to negotiate peace be-tween him and King Afonso IV of Portugal (Avignon, December 30, 1336),” in MonumentaHenricina, ed. Manuel Lopes de Almeida et al., vol. 1 (Coimbra, 1960), pp. 173–74, doc. 81.

14 CAIV, chap. 62, pp. 338–49; CAXI, chap. 251, pp. 325–38.15 “Letter from vice-admiral Mateo Mercer to Pedro IV detailing the capitulation and entrance of

Alfonso XI into Algeciras (Algeciras, March 26, 1344),” in Giménez Soler, Don Juan Manuel,p. 642, docs. 572–73; CAXI, chaps. 268–337, pp. 342–390.

16 Philip Ziegler, The Black Death (1969, repr. Dover, NH, 1993), p. 86.17 Elena Lourie, “A Society Organized for War: Medieval Spain,” Past & Present 35 (1966), 54–76.18 James Powers, A Society Organized for War: The Iberian Municipal Militias in the Central

Middle Ages, 1000–1284 (Berkeley, 1988).19 Clara Estow, Pedro the Cruel of Castile, 1350–69 (New York, 1995); Kenneth Fowler, “The

Wages of War: The Mercenaries of the Great Companies,” in Viajeros, peregrinos, mercaderesen el Occidente Medieval: actas de la XVIII Semana de Estudios Medievales (Pamplona, 1992),pp. 217–44; idem, “Deux entrepreneurs militaires au XIVe siècle: Bertrand du Guesclin et SirHugh Calveley,” in Le Combattant au Moyen Age: 18e Congrès de la Société des Historiensmédiévistes de l’Enseignment supérieur public, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1995), pp. 243–56; idem, Medi-eval Mercenaries, vol. 1. The Great Companies (Oxford, 2001); Peter Edward Russell, TheEnglish Intervention in Spain and Portugal in the time of Edward III and Richard II (Oxford,1955); Jonathan Sumption, The Hundred Years War: Trial by Battle (London, 1990); idem, TheHundred Years War: Trial by Fire (London, 1999).

20 John Edwards, The Spain of the Catholic Monarchs, 1474–1520 (Oxford, 2000); BarbaraHolmgreen Fyroozye, “Warfare in Fiffteenth-Century Castile”, Ph.D. Thesis, University ofCalifornia-Los Angeles (Ann Arbor, 1974); Jocelyn Nigel Hillgarth, The Spanish Kingdoms,Vol. 2: 1410–1516 Castilian Hegemony (Oxford, 1978); a very old yet still useful text is Will-iam H. Prescott, The Art of War in Spain. The Conquest of Granada 1481–1492, ed. Albert D.McJoynt (London, 1995). Prescott’s book is based on A History of the Reign of Ferdinand andIsabella (New York, 1941).


tance,21 it should come as no surprise then that this subject has recently elicitedserious consideration from Spanish historians.22 Even so, the early-to-mid-fourteenthcentury remains understudied.

Within Castilian military practice, I will concentrate on three specific reformsthat Alfonso introduced at various points during his reign. First, in response towhat he perceived to be a marked decline in the ideals and practice of caballería(roughly, chivalry),23 Alfonso became one of the first Castilian monarchs to ac-tively promote the ideals and practice of caballería as part of his monarchical

21 James Powers termed the period between 1252 and 1284 as the “end of an era,” during whichthe urban militias were brought under the Castilian crown’s authority and consequently lostmuch of their previous autonomy and significance. His convincing argument, echoed by oth-ers, was that this move towards military centralization resulted from a shrinking Castilian–Muslim border, coupled with Alfonso X’s endeavor to consolidate the huge expanses of Mus-lim territory conquered during the thirteenth century, and codify and centralize political au-thority in the kingdom. This solid contention suggests that the decades comprising the end ofthe thirteenth century and the first half of the fourteenth century constitute a significant transi-tional period in the evolution of Castilian military practices and institutions. The study ofAlfonso XI’s reign, therefore, is crucial because it comprised the last stage of the great Castiliansouthern expansion drive. It was also a time when Alfonso introduced important reforms inCastilian military practice, especially during the last fifteen years of his regime (Powers, ASociety Organized for War, pp. 68–82).

22 Some important works include: Los recursos militares en la Edad Media hispánica, ed. MiguelAngel Ladero Quesada (Madrid, 2001); Francisco García Fitz, Castilla y León frente al Islam.Estrategias de expansión y tácticas militares (siglos XI–XIII) (Sevilla, 1998) in which he de-tails the military developments in Castile up until the start of the fourteenth century; ManuelGarcía Fernández, El reino de Sevilla en tiempos de Alfonso XI (1312–1350) (Sevilla, 1989),and “La defensa de la frontera de Granada en el reinado de Alfonso XI de Castilla, 1312–1350,” in Relaciones exteriores del reino de Granada, ed. Cristina Segura Graiño (Almería,1988), pp. 37–54, covering Seville during the reign of Alfonso and its defense; the essaycollections Las relaciones de la Península Ibérica con el Magreb (siglos XIII–XIV), ed. MercedesGarcía Arenal and María de Jesús Viguera (Madrid, 1988), and Actas del Congreso Internacional“El Estrecho de Gibraltar,” Tomo II: Historia de la Edad Media, ed. Eduardo Ripoll Perelló(Madrid, 1988); Miguel Angel Ladero Quesada, “La organización militar de la corona deCastilla durante los siglos XIV y XV,” in La incorporación de Granada a la Corona de Castilla.Actas del symposium conmemorativo del Quinto Centenario, ed. Miguel Angel Ladero Quesada(Granada, 1993), pp. 195–227; Manuel Rojas Gabriel, “Guerra de asedio y expugnación castralen la frontera con Granada. El reinado de Alfonso XI como paradigma,” in IV Jornadas Luso-Espanholas de História Medieval. As relaçoes de fronteira no século de Alcañices (Oporto,2000); and most importantly Antonio Torremocha Silva, Algeciras entre la Cristiandad y elIslam: estudio sobre el cerco y la conquista de Algeciras por el rey Alfonso XI de Castilla, asícomo de la ciudad y sus términos hasta el final de la Edad Media (Algeciras, 1994) which isespecially significant because the author analyzed and diagrammed the city of Algeciras be-fore and during the siege, the route used by Alfonso to reach the city, the battle of Palmones(1343), and the course of the city’s history after Alfonso’s reign.

23 Caballería can be roughly translated as “chivalry.” Yet just like the latter term, it is difficult todefine precisely. It can mean simply the practice of fighting on horseback, yet by the thirteenthcentury in Castile caballería came to refer also, as in the rest of Europe, to a code of conductfor caballeros and nobles (Maurice Keen, Chivalry [New Haven, 1984], pp. 16–17, 239).Caballería itself, however, must be differentiated from caballería popular which was the practicein Castile of non-nobles to arm and serve as mounted warriors in return for a set of privilegeswhich included tax-exemption.

92 Nicolas Agrait

project. To that end, he created the Order of the Band, one of the first monarchi-cal chivalric orders in Europe, perhaps for his own personal protection and toincrease the magnificence of his entourage. Yet he did not limit his attention tothe magnate class, targeting also the established institution of “popular chiv-alry.” Specifically, he substituted the so-called Castilian or promotional system,in which a person who achieved a certain amount of personal wealth could chooseto maintain a horse and arms and serve in return for some specific social privi-leges, with its Leonese counterpart, in which ascent into the ranks of popularchivalry was mandatory according to income. The caballería de cuantía hadcome into existence. Alfonso also addressed the apparent lack of popular cabal-leros by demanding that urban centers draw up more updated and thorough listsof those required to serve, and setting minimal standards for equipment and arms.24

Second, Alfonso in his Ordenamiento de León (1338) set down specific guide-lines of how the king’s vassals were to spend the royal disbursements known assoldadas. Specifically, those vassals in the northern regions of Castile were tospend two-thirds of those royal monies they received as soldadas for the recruit-ment of mounted warriors and infantry. These statutes also specified that forevery 1,100 maravedíes, roughly 55 florins,25 the recipient had to recruit onecaballero and one lancer or spearman and one crossbowman.26 In setting downthese procedures, Alfonso achieved more control over the recruitment of troopsand also over royal military expenditures. Furthermore, this recruitment mecha-nism appears to place Castile much more in line with England and France, re-sembling the indenture system and lettres de retenue respectively.

Third, Alfonso, plagued with constant deficits in his royal treasury, attemptedto reform the Castilian fiscal structures. Yet his constant need for military fund-ing led him not only to rely on traditional taxation related to warfare, but to opennew revenue streams like extraordinary levies, alcabalas, loans, and royal sharesof ecclesiastical rents. While Alfonso did not ameliorate Castile’s fiscal prob-lems, he did manage to adequately fund all of his victorious campaigns.

Through a detailed exploration of these developments, one can then addressseveral issues. One is whether the sources permit us to ascertain to what degreethese reforms were actually implemented. Related to this, is determining whateffect these reforms had on the long-term military development of Castile. Withregards to popular chivalry, the creation of the caballería de cuantía exacerbatedthe hardening of the social classes within Castile, with military service becom-ing increasingly the franchise of the urban elites. In the case of the changes in thesoldada system, the practice would persist until the end of the fifteenth century,although to a much lesser extent. Finally, addressing these areas will determinewhether these reforms were the result of particularly original thinking by Alfonsoor simply the logical outgrowth of earlier developments.

24 Cortes de Alcalá de Henares, 1348; Cortes de los antiguos reinos de León y Castilla. 5 vols.(Madrid, 1882–1903), 1:617–19. [Hereafter CLC].

25 I am using an estimated exchange rate of 1 florin per 20 maravedíes as presented in PeterSpufford et al., Handbook of Medieval Exchange (London, 1986), p. 158. I will hereafter usemrs. for maravedíes and and fls. for florins.

26 CLC (Cortes de Alcalá de Henares, 1348), 1:450–53.


During the early part of his adult rule, Alfonso could not but conclude that theideals and practice of caballería had significantly deteriorated.27 Even so, thedecline in chivalry extended back to the reign of Alfonso X (1252–84). As thegreat Christian expansion during the thirteenth century progressively moved thefrontier southward, the ideal of chivalric endeavors remained strong for both thehigh nobility and the urban militias. In practice, however, military service lagged.In the case of the high nobility, the internal armed struggles that took place duringthe reigns of Alfonso X, Fernando IV, and Alfonso XI had displayed its willingnessto forgo loyalty to the crown and caballería in return for personal gain. In the caseof the urban contingents, particularly in the kingdom’s northern regions, there ap-peared to be a certain apathy and outright hostility towards armed service.28 All inall, it appeared that Castilian caballería sorely needed to be re-energized.

One of Alfonso’s principal responses to this decline was to actively promotethe chivalric ideals as they had been expressed in Alfonso X’s Siete Partidas,29

especially military service and loyalty to the crown. He created the first truemonarchical European order of knighthood in 1332, the Order of the Band, withhimself as its master.30 The members of this order wore a distinctive white tunicover their armor along with a black band stretching diagonally across it.31 Thosechosen for this new order had to be of noble birth, be a vassal of either themonarch or one of his sons, and take an oath to never leave Alfonso’s service.32

To further stress his own importance and chivalry, Alfonso traveled to Santiagode Compostela, where he held a solemn knighting ceremony for himself. Afterthe archbishop of Santiago blessed his weapons, the king stepped up to the altar,armed himself with armor and weapons, and had himself knighted by a statue ofSt. James. In this manner, he showed all the nobles and caballeros present thathe was indeed a great caballero, but also that no one but the saint had bestowedknighthood upon him. He then went to Burgos and held a crowning ceremony atthe monastery of Las Huelgas for himself and his queen. Afterwards, he welcomed

27 Linehan, History and the Historians, p. 582.28 Manuel González Jiménez, “La caballería popular en Andalucía (siglos XIII al XV),” Anuario

de Estudios Medievales 15 (1985), p. 320.29 Alfonso X’s Partidas (Partida 2, Title 21), ed. Robert I. Burns, trans. Samuel Parsons Scott

(Philadelphia, 2001) has a large section devoted to the definition and nature of caballería andcaballeros. Alfonso XI gave the Partidas the power of law in his Ordenamiento de Alcalá(1348); Jesús D. Rodríguez Velasco, El debate sobre la caballería en el siglo XV; La tratadísticacaballeresca castellana en su marco europeo (Salamanca, 1996), p. 23; Moxó, “Epoca deAlfonso XI,” pp. 385–87.

30 CAXI, chap. 99, p. 234; Rodríguez Velasco, El debate sobre la caballería en el siglo XV, pp.22–23. D’A.J.D. Boulton, The Knights of the Crown; The Monarchical Orders of Knighthoodin Later Medieval Europe, 1325–1520 (Woodbridge, 1987), pp. 30–33, has argued that al-though the “Fraternal Society of Knighthood of St. George” in Hungary was founded in 1325–26, surely by King Károly I (1309–42), it was not a true monarchical order because it wasidentified with the dynasty and not the monarch himself. Furthermore, the leadership positionin this order was not reserved for the monarch.

31 CAXI, chap. 97, p. 231.32 Boulton, The Knights of the Crown, pp. 74, 80–81.

94 Nicolas Agrait

many nobles into his service.33 Some of these hidalgos continued to arm vassalsof their own, which raised the number of men knighted to one hundred and thirty-five.34

Although from this point on members of the Order of the Band were alwayspresent in Alfonso’s court, in the administration of the realm and on all his cam-paigns, the king’s specific designs for and use of this order are not entirely clear.There is very little information as to the actual duties of the individual memberssince the order’s statutes were notoriously vague.35 Furthermore, little evidenceof Alfonso’s use of the order survives until he linked it in the Ordenamiento deAlcalá (1348) to his project of increasing and centralizing monarchical power. Inother words, Alfonso either did not want to or did not have the opportunity toclosely administer or further develop it. After his death, the Band continued toexist but its significance slowly waned until it became just one more honor be-stowed at the king’s discretion.36

So what utility could Alfonso have derived from these Banda nobles, if any?To begin with, the Castilian monarch availed himself of the order to promotecaballería and specifically service to him.37 His public displays at Santiago deCompostela and later on at Burgos were designed to promote the image of him-self as the ideal Christian caballero and king, specifically for the aristocracy.38

Second, Alfonso – considering the rebellious nature of many of Castile’s mag-nates – certainly intended to surround himself with a group of nobles whoseloyalty he could always count on. Since almost all of the Banda’s members camefrom so-called new noble lineages, the order served as an Alfonsine counter-weight against the regional power of the established aristocratic families. Theprestige of the Order could have served as a powerful incentive for lesser noblesto come into Alfonso’s service.39 Third, induction into the Band represented away for the king to increase the number of royal vassals, in particular for them toserve whenever he needed them. These vassals may have occupied a positionsimilar to those nobles who were subject to indenture contracts in England orwere life retainers.40 Finally, Alfonso may have fully intended the Order of the

33 CAXI, chaps. 99–100, pp. 234–35.35 Boulton, The Knights of the Crown, p. 81.36 Jesús D. Rodríguez Velasco, “The Monarchy’s Discourse according to Alfonso XI: The Order

of the Band,” (38th International Congress of Medieval Medieval Studies, Session 600,Kalamazoo, May 2003). Professor Rodríguez Velasco is preparing a monograph on the Orderof the Band entitled Alfonso XI, la Banda y la caballería europea.

37 CAXI, chap. 97, pp. 231–32.38 Boulton, The Knights of the Crown, p. 74.39 Rodríguez de Velasco, El debate sobre la caballería , p. 23.40 Although they appear similar, there are problems comparing membership in the Order of the

Band to formal indenture or life retainer. First, the Castilian sources do not specify muchregarding the duties between the monarch and his vassal, other than the latter’s receipt ofmoney in the form of a fief-rente, which consisted of an annual payment from a lord to a vassalin return for service, without the supposedly traditional landed fief. (Philippe Contamine, Warin the Middle Ages, trans. Michael Jones [Cambridge, MA, 1984], p. 92; Bryce D. Lyon, FromFief to Indenture; The Transition from Feudal to Non-Feudal Contract in Western Europe [Cam-bridge, MA, 1957], pp. 5, 244). Another difference between the indentures and membership in


Band to be his personal elite military unit. He could then have relied on it toensure his safety while traversing his kingdom or during military campaignsabroad, and to project his authority and power to all.41

While the founding of the Order of the Band was in most respects an appeal tothe kingdom’s elite, Alfonso also addressed the institution of caballería popular,generally linked to Castilian urban centers.42 The military function of towns wasnot a specifically Castilian phenomenon. The fundamental difference with therest of Europe lay in the fact that the constant presence of a frontier with theMuslims had led to the creation of elaborate urban militias, with defensive andoffensive capabilities. The urban forces were feasible because in many cities allcitizens were in theory required to provide military service. The existence ofthese armed forces in turn assured that each town’s administrative divisions hada definite military component.43 These urban militias included both infantry, re-ferred to in the sources as gentes de pie (those on foot), or peones (peons), andcavalry, which were mentioned as caballero (roughly, knight), ome de caballo(man on horseback), jinete (rider), and ome de armas (man-at-arms). The maindifficulty with these multiple terms is that, depending on the text, they are some-times utilized synonymously while in others they point to important distinctionsamong the fighting forces.

the Order was that the latter offered no specific right to restauro equorum, the practice ofvaluing horses before campaign so as to provide compensation to the owner if the steed werelost during the campaign (Andrew Ayton, Knights and Warhorses. Military Service and theEnglish Aristocracy under Edward III [Woodbridge, 1999], pp. 88–89; Albert E. Prince, “TheArmy and Navy,” in The English Government at Work, 1327–1336. Vol. 1: Central and Pre-rogative Administration, eds. James F. Willard and William A. Morris [Cambridge, MA, 1940],p. 353). Compensation for horses was provided for in Castile from established custom, and notspecific agreements. If anything, the English indentures were certainly much more specificregarding the privileges and obligations of both parties involved.

41 Boulton, The Knights of the Crown, pp. 81, 94.42 James Powers in A Society Organized for War has outlined in some detail the military obliga-

tions of these contingents. His monograph still remains the best comprehensive treatment ofthis phenomenon. The literature on the urban militias, however, is large. Some important worksinclude Nicolás Tenorio y Cerero, “Las milicias de Sevilla,” Revista de Archivos, Bibliotecas yMuseos (1907), 222–63; J. M. Garate Córdoba, Espíritu y milicia en la España medieval (Madrid,1967); María Dolores Cabañas González, La caballería popular en Cuenca durante la bajaEdad Media (Madrid, 1980); Bonifacio Palacios Martín, “Las milicias de Extremadura y laconquista de Andalucía,” in Andalucía entre Oriente y Occidente (1236–1492), ed. EmilioCabrera (Córdoba, 1988), pp. 79–94; Manuel González Jiménez, “Las milicias concejilesandaluzas (siglos XIII–XV),” in La organización militar en los siglos XV y XVI: Actas de las IIjornadas nacionales de historia militar (Sevilla, 1993), pp. 227–41.

43 Each city was divided into districts or wards known as colaciones, which in turn were usuallydivided by parish lines. Each of these districts would then be led by an official known as analcalde. When a military operation was underway, the alcalde would have been in charge ofcalling the residents of his colación to service as caballeros or footsoldiers. He then accompa-nied them to the main town square, where they would be met by the town’s jueces or judges foran alarde or muster. After the inspection, the town’s militia would march out of the town tofight under the city’s banner, with each colación remaining distinct within the larger whole.Powers, A Society Organized for War, pp. 95–97, 309–10.

96 Nicolas Agrait

Although the gentes de pie or corps of infantry during the first half of thefourteenth century included specialists such as siege engineers, the main divi-sion within them was between the peones or plain footsoldiers, and ballesterosor crossbowmen. The peones were generally armed with shortened lances orspears to be used in a thrusting motion with both hands, cast as missile weapons– identified in Castile as dardos – or held steady in a defensive position by stick-ing the butt of the end of the lance in the ground.44 Other weapons associatedwith the footsoldiers included knives and daggers, short swords, maces, handaxes, and guisarmes, a type of pole with a long curved blade edged on the con-cave side with a slender spear point opposite, used to either spear opponents, tohook and forcibly dismount knights, or to sever the sinews in horses’ legs.45 Forprotection, footsoldiers generally wore no more than a simple loriga (mail shirt)or light leather armor supplemented with a helmet or a shield or anything elsethe fighter may have personally acquired.

The ballesteros, as their name indicates, were specialists who overwhelm-ingly utilized crossbows in battle. By the fourteenth century, this weapon wasoften built from a combination of wood, horn, and sinew. The bolts or arrows,narrower than they had been before, were designed specifically to pierce armor.Their effective range was probably about 100 meters.46 Since the ballesteros’effectiveness lay in their firing missiles onto the enemy, they tended to avoidhand-to-hand combat. Regardless, they often wore light armor and carried weap-ons such as swords, daggers, and the like for their defense. Ballesteros have beendocumented as having utilized bows as well, although it is important to stressthat the English longbow was never widely adopted in the Iberian Peninsula.47

The cavalry or caballeros occupied a position of fundamental importance inthe Castilian urban militias. Within the urban militias, there were two distinctivetypes of mounted warriors: 1) those who rode a la brida, which implied usingheavy armor for both the rider and the horse, straight stirrups and a high saddle;and 2) those who rode a la jineta, a style that used shorter stirrups and smallersaddles allowing the lightly-armed horseman more speed, agility, and mobility.48

The a la brida caballeros wore mail lorigas or hauberks reinforced with metalplates in its vulnerable spots. These included rodeletas used to protect jointssuch as wrists, elbows, shoulders as well as parts of the chest; guardabrazosproviding further cover for the arms; manoplas or gauntlets for the hands; quijotesor cuisses covering the front of the thighs; rodilleras or knee pads; grebas orgreaves to safeguard the legs; and escarpes which protected the feet.49 An ar-mored caballeros’ neck and head were protected by almófares or mail coifs and

44 Alvaro Soler del Campo, La evolución del armamento medieval en el reino castellano-leonésy Al-Andalus (siglos XII–XIII) (Madrid, 1993), pp. 47–50.

45 Ada Bruhn de Hoffmeyer, Arms and Armour in Spain II (Madrid, 1982), p. 210; Powers, ASociety Organized for War, p. 132.

46 John France, Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades (Ithaca, 1999), pp. 26–27.47 Soler del Campo, La evolución del armamento medieval, pp. 47–50.48 Ibid., p. 157.49 Soler del Campo, La evolución del armamento medieval, pp. 133–47.


different types of helmets. To safeguard the face without sacrificing visibility orventilation, helmets were fitted with visors attached by means of leather straps.50

The final piece of defensive equipment was the shield, which was generally rect-angular-shaped, although there is evidence of shields fashioned either in triangu-lar, circular, or “U” shape.51 Their weaponry completed the Castilian caballeros’equipment. Their principal weapon was a heavy lance, composed of a long woodenshaft topped with a sharp iron point. Another fundamental weapon was the sword.While some swords could be very heavy, especially the two-handed ones, it isclear that they had to be relatively light in order to be used with one hand by acaballero who might be holding a shield with the other.52 Besides these, thecaballeros also used daggers, knives, and less frequently, short axes and maces.53

Although some caballeros may have been regarded as lightly-armed becausethey could not afford all the necessary a la brida equipment, a la jineta mountedwarriors, heavily influenced by Muslim equestrian practices, embraced the useof lighter armor and weapons. With shorter stirrups, smaller saddles, and noarmor for their horses, these caballeros prioritized speed and freedom of move-ment over power and protection.54 In the frontier regions of Castile, where themain types of military operations were lightning quick raids and counter-raids,these light horsemen were indispensable. They wore only a light hauberk with-out plates and were armed with shorter lances used strictly as thrusting and mis-sile weapons; lighter, more limber swords; crossbows; and bows. By the four-teenth century, one type of warrior who had fully adapted to this style of fightingwas the adalid. Alfonso X’s Partidas described the adalides as a dedicated andselect corps of military officials in charge of both cavalry and infantry.55 DuringAlfonso XI’s reign the term adalid referred to specialized frontier warriors whoseexpert knowledge of the terrain, ability to organize military operations, and lead-ership qualities along the frontier made them very valuable.56

Due to the general obligation of the kingdom’s subjects to serve, an institu-tion known as the caballería popular – essentially, that any town resident achievinga certain amount of income could choose to keep a horse and weaponry andserve as a caballero – developed within these urban milieus. In return for ser-vice, the individual caballero and his familiy received tax-exempt status for aslong as the mount and equipment were maintained.57 To determine who wasrequired to serve, local officials compiled lists known as padrones. Although

50 Bruhn de Hoffmeyer, Arms and Armour in Spain, pp. 257, 260.51 Torremocha Silva, Algeciras entre la Cristiandad y el Islam, p. 165.52 Ibid., p. 163.53 Bruhn de Hoffmeyer, Arms and Armour in Spain, pp. 198, 200, 204, 211.54 Cristobal Torres Delgado, “El ejército y las fortificaciones del reino nazarí de Granada,” Revista

del Centro de Estudios Históricos de Granada y su Reino 1 (1987), p. 210.55 Partidas, 2, 22, 1–4.56 Torremocha Silva, Algeciras entre la Cristiandad y el Islam, pp. 130–32.57 González Jiménez, “La caballería popular en Andalucía,” p. 317; Salvador de Moxó,

Repoblación y sociedad en la España cristiana medieval (Madrid, 1979), p. 463; CarmelaPescador, “La caballería popular en León y Castilla,” Cuadernos de Historia de España 35–36(1962), pp. 93, 37–38; (1963), pp. 148–49; Powers, A Society Organized for War, p. 99.

98 Nicolas Agrait

almost none of these lists have survived, these documents were extremely de-tailed and contained rosters of the local caballeros. In 1349, for example, Alfonsosent a royal confirmation of privileges to the town of Tolosa. The document alsoapproved a padrón naming the 319 hidalgos who lived in or around the town.58

These lists were especially significant in the event that a town chose to payfonsadera (scutage) instead of mobilizing its militias because it contained a listof those that were obligated to pay.59

After a few years of adult rule, Alfonso became convinced that caballeríapopular in Castile was in serious decline. This was a particularly vexing problembecause the populations in and around towns had long been considered an im-portant manpower reservoir by the Castilian kings. While there were severalfactors at work here – the rise of many non-noble caballeros into the ranks of thelesser nobility, making them less likely to respond to a summons, and the hard-ening of social differences within the cities that may have reduced the number ofthose eligible, willing, or permitted to serve as caballeros – the principal reasonfor the deterioration in mounted military service in most northern Castilian townswas that as the border with the Muslims became more distant many towns nei-ther needed nor wanted to maintain forces beyond those used for local defense.In a losing struggle to preserve their military readiness, many urban centers heldannual alardes or reviews to determine the state of their forces and ensure nonehad become derelict in their duties.60 This decline, however, was not new sinceits origins could be traced back to the previous century. In fact, Alfonso X hadalready expressed concern about this issue. Worried that the disinclination ofmany Castilian cities to respond to royal summons could result in a shortage ofmilitary manpower, he implemented a series of measures granting special privi-leges to urban non-nobles who maintained a horse and weapons. Even so, thesemoves did not prove to be unqualified successes since many urban caballerosenjoyed the privileges, but found ways not to serve.61

To address this increasingly serious predicament, Alfonso XI attempted torevitalize the caballería popular. One route was to make sure that the serviceremained an attractive option. He accomplished this by the constant affirmationof the privileges that caballeros had previously enjoyed. The most important of

58 “Privilege from Alfonso XI to Tolosa (Gibraltar, August 11, 1349),” in Colección de documentosmedievales de las villas guipuzcoanas (1200–1369), ed. Gonzalo Martínez Díez et al. (SanSebastián [Donostia], 1991), pp. 265–69, doc. 247.

59 “Letter from Alfonso XI ordering the city of León to collect fonsadera for the year 1330 fromall those obligated to pay according to the new padrones (Segovia, September 28, 1331),” inColección documental del Archivo de la Catedral de León. XI. (1301–1350), ed. José AntonioMartín Fuertes (León, 1995), p. 356, doc. 2989. [Hereafter CDACLXI].

60 González Jiménez, “La caballería popular en Andalucía ,” pp. 320, 322. In fact, Alfonso evendecreed in 1331 that knights should travel on horses around the kingdom and not mules. Theking was perhaps trying to exalt the chivalric virtue of the horses. This policy was apparentlynot very successful since the heavier burden upon horses caused many to die and when muleswere allowed as steeds again, there was a shortage. CAXI, chap. 93, pp. 228–29.

61 Joseph F. O’Callaghan, The Learned King : The Reign of Alfonso X of Castile (Philadelphia,1993), pp. 92–94.


those was, of course, tax-exemption.62 Yet it was not the only type of benefitgranted. In 1322, Alfonso, through his regents, confirmed the right of the cabal-leros in Cuenca to receive the monies collected from fonsadera in the area inreturn for armed service. Ten years later, he allowed the caballeros to keep roughlyone seventh of the royal tax of montazgo63 to assure their preparedness for mili-tary service.64

Alfonso also endeavored to streamline the process by which the urban cabal-leros were recruited and mobilized. Concerned with increasing the supply ofmounted warriors, he ordered the various towns across Castile to update theirpadrones of caballeros under the rationale that cities should provide mountedfighters, or the equivalent in fonsadera, according to their current populationsand not outdated lists. The difficulties with communications, armed conflicts,and the resistance of urban councils resenting royal interference in their internalaffairs, made the implementation of this reform a troublesome task. Alfonso, forexample, commanded the city of León in 1330 to draw up new padrones so thatroyal officials would be paid fonsadera according to the new lists, instead of anolder agreed-upon global sum. The new registers took time to compile for in thenext year Alfonso again demanded payment.65 The problems persisted since fora new royal request of military aid in 1332 the king ordered the Leonese urbancouncil not only to draw up new padrones but also assign two men from eachdistrict and village to work along with notary publics.66 Even so, eleven yearslater Alfonso sent a royal inquiry to León to deal with complaints regardingsome of the local compilers.67 The difficulties, of course, were neither limited to

62 Alfonso XI granted or confirmed tax-exemption for the caballeros of Ubeda in 1334 (Coleccióndocumental del Archivo Municipal de Ubeda. II [Siglo XIV], ed. José Rodríguez Molina et al.[Granada, 1994], pp. 131–32, doc. 47); Almoguera in 1335 (Colección documental de Pedro Ide Castilla, 1350–1369, ed. Luis Vicente Días Martín [Salamanca, 1998], 3:150–54, doc. 820[hereafter CDPI]); Ecija in 1336 (Manuel García Fernández, “Regesto documental andaluz deAlfonso XI,” Historia, Instituciones, Documentos 15 [1988], p. 63, doc. 281); Murcia in 1336,1337, 1341, and 1342 (CODOM6, pp. 371–72, 385, 436–37, 446, docs. 327, 341, 385, 393);León in 1339 (CDPI , 3:77–78, doc. 729); the whole realm in 1339 (CLC [Cortes de Madrid,1339], vol. 1, pp. 475–76); Baeza in 1344 (Colección diplomática de Baeza [Siglos XIII–XV],ed. José Rodríguez Molina [Jaén, 1983], 1:142–44, doc. 55); and Córdoba in 1345 (GarcíaFernández, “Regesto,” p. 93, doc. 417), to name only some.

63 The montazgo, rather than an agrarian tax, was a fee charged by local authorities to the ownersof large herds of sheep in return for protection as the grazing animals moved seasonally throughCastile’s established cañadas (migratory sheep walks). Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poderreal en Castilla, p. 121.

64 “Privilege from Alfonso XI to the caballeros in Cuenca (Cuellar, May 20, 1322),” “RoyalPrivilege from Alfonso XI (1332),” cit. in González Cabañas, La caballería popular en Cuenca,pp. 37, 44.

65 “Letters from Alfonso XI to the city of León (Salamanca, April 12, 1330), (Segovia, Septem-ber 28, 1331),” in CDACLXI, pp. 339–41, doc. 2978.

66 “Letter from Alfonso XI to the city of León (Burgos, August 10, 1332); Colección documentaldel Archivo Municipal de León (1219–1400), ed. José Antonio Martín Fuertes (León, 1998),pp. 134–35, doc. 92. [Hereafter CDAML].

67 “Letter from Alfonso XI at the behest of one of his tax collectors to the city of León (Algeciras,September, 1343),” in CDAML, p. 187, doc. 135.

100 Nicolas Agrait

the northwestern part of Castile, nor did they get resolved by the end of Alfonso’sreign.68 Yet the attention that the king paid to this issue certainly produced, if nota higher number of caballeros performing military service, a mechanism throughwhich many towns had to reassess the scope of their military contribution.

Although it is impossible to know exactly when he made up his mind, Alfonsodecided that revitalizing the caballería popular required a much bolder solutionthan promoting it or streamlining its procedures: he had to change its very na-ture. Alfonso’s final reform of this institution was to eliminate the voluntarycharacter of Castilian popular chivalry. He replaced the so-called Castilian, orpromotional system, with its Leonese counterpart, in which ascent into the ranksof caballería was mandatory once a certain amount of personal wealth had beenachieved. The caballería de cuantía had come into existence. In 1333, for in-stance, he decreed that any Murcian citizen with a patrimony of 12,000 mrs.(600 fls.) and over was required to own a horse and weapons.69 At the cortes heldat Alcalá in 1348, Alfonso implemented new guidelines regarding the minimumincome requirements, lowering the amounts for those towns located in the fron-tier areas. In Seville, for instance, the minimum amount of patrimonial wealththat would trigger the requirement of owning a horse was 5,000 mrs. (250 fls.);for Córdoba and Jaén, 4,000 mrs.(200 fls.); for Murcia, 8,000 mrs (400 fls.). Fortowns in northern Castile further away from the border, the minimum patrimonyrequired was much higher. For those living in Salamanca, Toro and Zamora, theminimum income level of a non-noble caballero was 10,000 mrs. (500 fls.) andin places like Logroño and Calahorra, 15,000 mrs. (750 fls.).70 The higher quan-tities in the northern towns made it more difficult for urban poor and middlegroups to afford to rise to caballero status, and consequently the caballeros inthese locales were recruited from wealthier, even noble, sectors. In other words,mounted military service in these cities appears to have been increasingly re-served for a privileged elite. The more expensive requirements may have re-flected both the desire to assure that mounted warriors were available, but alsothe local wish to strictly limit who could become a caballero and enjoy its ac-companying privileges. In the long run, these onerous requirements exacerbatedthe decline of the caballería popular across Castile as most found themselves

68 “Royal missive to the alcaldes at Cáceres commanding they correct the abuses alleged by itsurban council and that they commit to the compilation of new taxpayer lists (Alcalá la Real,July 17, 1341),” in Documentación histórica del Archivo Municipal de Cáceres, 1229–1471,ed. Antonio C. Floriano (Cáceres, 1987), pp. 82–83, doc. 48; “Royal letter to the López Díazde Rojas, merino mayor at Guipúzcoa, and Pedro Ibáñez de Urbieta, alcalde at Aiztondo, todraw up a new padrón of the hidalgos from Tolosa (Burgos, May 10, 1345),” in Coleccióndiplomática del Archivo Municipal de Tolosa. vol. I (1256–1407), ed. José María Roldán Gual(San Sebastián [Donostia], 1991), pp. 35–36, doc. 17; “Royal letter from Alfonso XI to thecouncil of Murcia ordering that a padrón be drawn up containing the names of all the citizenswho had enough income to maintain a horse and arms (Gibraltar, November 16, 1349),” inCODOM6, pp. 509–10, doc. 442.

69 “Letter from Alfonso XI to Murcia (Seville, September 10, 1333),” in CODOM6, p. 286, doc.249.

70 CLC (Cortes de Alcalá de Henares, 1348), 1:617–19.


unable to afford caballero status, leaving it an activity reserved for the upperclasses. In the short run, however, eliminating the voluntary aspect of thecaballería popular must have induced a sharp reaction and may even have pro-duced a marked, if temporary, increase in the pool of potential caballeros. Manytown dwellers likely found themselves forced to become caballeros or contractthe services of others to go in their place.71

As he modified the nature of popular chivalry, Alfonso also targeted one ofthe principal methods of royal military funding: the soldada72 system. Soldadas,which had been in use since at least the twelfth century, took the form of finan-cial grants from the royal coffers either in the form of money-fiefs, an agreedsum paid to an individual in return for military service, or rent-fiefs, the privilegeof collecting the rents from specified royal lands, in order to entice current andpotential vassals to serve.73 There were two types of soldadas: the vassal soldada,which was paid to vassals in continuous service, and the war soldada, which wasdoled out to an individual, vassal or not, for his expenses related to a specificmilitary campaign. As the thirteenth century came to a close, the differencesbetween these two types of royal payment blurred as the Castilian kings increas-ingly used them not only to help defray military expenditures but also to ensurethe loyalty of certain sectors of the aristocracy. The nobles in turn, whether royalvassals or not, came to expect these sums as a reward for fulfilling their duty ofservice regardless of the amount of their individual patrimonies. By the start ofFernando IV’s reign in 1295, the payment of soldadas had become a necessaryportion of royal expenditures.74 There were several important instances of theiruse. In 1296, the queen mother Doña María was forced to mint new coinage inorder to pay a soldada totaling 2,000 mrs. each day to a series of magnates whohad gathered at Valladolid to ensure their loyalty to the infant king.75 During1305 and 1307, Fernando had to implement the collection of extraordinary taxesin order to meet his vassals’ demands for soldada payments.76

When Alfonso’s reign began, soldadas assumed an even larger role. Thechivalric conventions regarding relationships between lords and subjects remained

71 Moxó, “Epoca de Alfonso XI,” p. 399; González Jiménez, “Las milicias concejiles andaluzas(siglos XIII–XV),” p. 233.

72 Besides soldada, there are several terms related to this system of royal payments. One isquitación, which specifically means income derived from land rents, and the over-archingterm of libramiento, which simply refers to a disbursement of royal funds.

73 This type of arrangement was not exclusive to Castile. France was already using the soldeunder Philip IV, the Fair (1285–1314) in order to compensate for some, but certainly not all,the costs of recruiting an army (Elizabeth Lalou, “Les questions militaires sous le règne dePhilippe le Bel,” in Guerre et société en France, en Angleterre et en Bourgogne XIVe–XVesiècles, ed. Philippe Contamine et al. [Villeneuve d’Ascq, 1991], 44), and the English crownhad used money fiefs in similar fashion (see note 40).

74 Hilda Grassotti, “Para la historia del botín y de las parias,” Cuadernos de Historia de España39–40 (1964), pp. 100, 103–05; Fernando Redondo Díaz, Historia del ejército español, vol. 2:Los ejércitos de la Reconquista (Madrid, 1984), pp. 107–10.

75 Crónica del rey don Fernando IV in Crónicas de los Reyes de Castilla, ed. Cayetano Rosell(Madrid, 1953), chap. 2, pp. 104. [Hereafter CFIV].

76 CFIV, chap. 13, pp. 140, 144.

102 Nicolas Agrait

very important, but it was clear that the crown needed these payments to providea financial incentive for nobles to agree to become vassals. These probably be-came ever more significant because rent income must have declined for all land-lords, whether royal, noble or otherwise, due to the acute economic crisis of thelate thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries and the further instability of thesuccessive minorities of Fernando IV and Alfonso.77 In 1315, with the king barelythree years old, a survey of royal rent income found it seriously lacking and thecortes had to concede several new taxes so the regents could pay royal soldadas.78

In 1329, when Alfonso asked for further funding for a campaign along the Mus-lim frontier, he specifically mentioned the need for money to give to the mag-nates, knights, and others who would accompany him.79 Along with diminishingrents, he could no longer count on acquiring vast amounts of land from the Mus-lims with which to reward his followers for distinguished service. It was clearthat the king had no alternative but to rely on the soldada mechanism, as expen-sive as it was.

Nearing the end of the tumultuous 1330s, Alfonso modified the soldada mecha-nism, introducing in his Ordenamiento de Burgos (1338) specific guidelines forthose who received either soldadas or quitaciones. They stipulated that anyonereceiving a soldada had to spend one-third of the amount received from thecrown for personal armament, equipment, and other costs. The remaining two-thirds were slated for the recruitment of mounted warriors and infantry. For ev-ery 1,100 mrs. (55 fls.) left over, the vassal had to recruit a caballero and twoinfantrymen (one lancer and one crossbowman). Any magnate who had the privi-lege of bringing his own banner was obligated to have at least one heavily ar-mored caballero for every ten lesser-armed ones. This particular warrior wouldcount 1,300 mrs. (65 fls.) against the two-thirds to be used for recruitment.80

While it is tempting to assume that heavily armored caballeros were simplythose who rode a la brida and that the rest were a la jineta horsemen, theOrdenamiento did not make this distinction. The guidelines simply attempt tomake sure that a corps of heavily-armed mounted warriors would be available.The rest of the caballeros’ equipment would have varied depending on personaland local circumstances. Judging from the Crónica, it appears that Castilian ca-balleros would have been arranged by ascending degrees of protection: 1) a lajineta; 2) a la brida; and 3) heavily armored caballero. Even so, Castilian cabal-leros never fought as encumbered with armor as their northern European coun-terparts. The heaviest Castilian caballeros, though in most ways resembling theknights in northern France or England, would have worn lighter equipment.81

77 Teófilo Ruiz, Crisis and Continuity, pp. 307–10.78 CAXI, chap. 8, p. 179.79 CAXI, chap. 80, pp. 222–23.80 CLC (Ayuntamiento de Burgos, 1338), 1:450–51.81 CAXI, chap. 270, p. 344; Torremocha Silva, Algeciras entre la Cristiandad y el Islam, pp. 162–

63. The event in question was the death of a German crusader during the siege of Algeciras.According to the chronicler, the German noble, not familiar with Muslim tactics, chargedagainst a Muslim force at the walls of the city, was quickly surrounded, and killed.


The Ordenamiento also addressed the quality of mounts and equipment, pen-alties for non-service, and extra compensation. It specified a minimum value of800 mrs. for each of the horses in any vassal’s retinue. Each individual receivingsoldadas was required to serve in person unless he provided a legitimate excuse.Alfonso was perhaps trying to safeguard himself against soldada recipients whodisobeyed his orders, such as Pedro Hernández de Castro who refused to attackPortugal in 1336 despite the monarch’s direct commands.82 This document alsoestablished that those men who received soldadas and their retinues would havea fixed term of service. After that term came to an end, these warriors wereexpected to remain, but were to receive extra compensation. Caballeros were tobe paid according to how much additional time they served and the discretion ofthe king while the foot lancers were to be paid 1 mr. and the ballesteros 1.3 mrs.per day. There were also stipulations within the Ordenamiento providing heavypenalties for those who either refused to serve or did not provide the requiredground forces. Finally, the Ordenamiento explicitly stated that these standardsonly applied to the monies received from the crown away from the southernfrontier regions. Any high nobles or caballeros living and serving near theCastilian-Granadan border were exempt from these guidelines because they con-tributed according to the amount of landed wealth they possessed.83 Intrinsically,the soldada system functioned like a trickle-down mechanism, through whichroyal monetary resources could be given to the royal vassals and other magnateswho in turn passed the wealth along to lesser caballeros and infantry.

Determining how long an army had to serve the king is difficult since theOrdenamiento de Burgos (1338) does not specify the required duration. In fact,it appears that in the fourteenth century, terms of service were not very clear-cut.By the thirteenth century, the most traditional expectation was that the recruitedforces served for a period of three months.84 Although such a period of timewould have been enough for most of Alfonso’s campaigns, it hardly would havesufficed for his siege at Algeciras or his Portuguese campaigns. Yet the thirteenthcentury Crónica latina makes mention of some forces serving the monarch ac-cording to their own fuero or charter (secundum forum suum),85 indicating the

82 CAXI, chap. 166, p. 280.83 CLC (Ayuntamiento de Burgos, 1338), 1:450–53; Ordenamiento de Alcalá (1348); El

Ordenamiento de las leyes que don Alfonso XI hizo en las Cortes de Alcalá de Henares, ed.Ignacio Jordán del Asso y Miguel de Manuel Rodríguez (1774, repr. Valladolid, 1975), pp. 81–86. The only difference between guidelines set in the Ordenamiento de Burgos and theOrdenamiento de Alcalá is that the latter stipulates that one mounted warrior be provided forevery 1,200 mrs. of the soldada’s portion to be used for the recruitment of ground forces, asopposed to 1,100 mrs.

84 Crónica latina de los reyes de Castilla, ed. María Desamparados Cabanes Pecourt (Valencia,1964), p. 119; Miguel Angel Ladero Quesada, “La organización militar de la corona de Castilladurante los siglos XIV y XV,” in La incorporación de Granada a la Corona de Castilla. Actasdel symposium conmemorativo del Quinto Centenario, ed. Miguel Angel Ladero Quesada(Granada, 1993), p. 208, argues that the Ordenamiento at Burgos (1338) assumed 90 dayswhenever it referred to terms of service.

85 Crónica latina, p. 107.

104 Nicolas Agrait

practice of variable terms of armed service across Castile.86 Alfonso X’s Espéculorefers to three months of service, but makes it explicitly clear that armies wereexpected to remain longer if the monarch needed them. In fact, any warrior wholeft was subject to severe penalties – ranging from being punished for desertion tobeing declared a traitor if the king was defeated or killed – depending on the out-come of the operation.87 The guiding principle, one that Alfonso most likely workedunder in his Ordenamiento de Burgos (1338) and later in his Ordenamiento deAlcalá (1348), was that military service to the king certainly had limitations,88 butthat the monarch was entitled to extend the duration of such service depending onthe circumstances.

If the sums described in the Ordenamiento were strictly meant for three monthsof service, then the costs of lengthier campaigns for both the royal and noble mili-tary commanders would skyrocket. As illustrated in table 1, in theory, a caballerowho served for one year roughly engaged in four terms of military service. Hewould have been entitled to 900 mrs. or 45 fls. for the first 90 days and then threetimes that – 2700 mrs. or 135 fls. – for the remainder of year. A heavily-armoredcaballero in turn would have received roughly 1,100 mrs. (55 fls.) for his first termand then an extra 3,300 mrs. (165 fls). The rest of the money would have gonetowards the paying one footsoldier and a crossbowman. As illustrated in table 2, alancer or spearman was paid 1 maravedí per day after the first term of serviceexpired. Assuming that this rate of pay also applied to the first term, then onespearman would have cost 90 mrs. for the first 90 days, 275 mrs. for the rest of theyear, amounting to 365 mrs. overall. In similar fashion, a crossbowman paid 1.3mrs. per day would have been entitled to 117 mrs. for the first 90 days, 357.5 mrs.for the remainder of the year, for a total of 474.5 mrs. To the original sum of 1,100mrs., the service of a caballero, one footsoldier, and a crossbowman for one wholeyear would have required an additional 3,332.5 mrs. or roughly 167 fls. Accordingto these estimations, the cost of an army for a year would be roughly four timeswhat is expressed in the Ordenamiento. Although this is an intriguing possibility,which the extant sources do not explicitly rebuff, it would appear to make longcampaigns like Alfonso’s siege of Algeciras prohibitively expensive. Yet this nine-teen-month campaign occurred and ended with a Castilian victory. A more likelyinterpretation is that the guidelines contained in the Ordenamiento referred to theoriginal costs of amassing and mobilizing armies. After their term was finished,Alfonso would have arranged for extended service. If his negotiations with theGascon forces who briefly served him at Algeciras in 1343 are any indication, hefully intended to provide further compensation for the troops, but he also expected

86 Powers, Society Organized for War, p. 120.87 Alfonso X, Espéculo (3, 5, 5), ed. Gonzalo Martínez Diez and José Manuel Ruiz Asencio

(Avila, 1985), pp. 198–99.88 In the ayuntamiento at Alcalá de Henares (1345), Alfonso acknowledged that military terms of

service were varied when he granted the request by caballeros across the realm not to have togive back compensation they had received for service at Algeciras aon que non sseruiessencon tanto como auian a sseruir nin todo el tiempo (even if they did not serve as much as theywere supposed to serve, or for the whole time); CLC, 1:480.


the financial outlay to be lower than when the troops first arrived. In this particularinstance, after paying the Count of Foix and his brother separately, he then paid 8mrs. for each mounted warrior and 2 mrs. per footsoldier per day for the month ofAugust – amounting to 248 mrs. (12.4 fls.) per mounted warrior and 62 mrs. (3.1fls.) per footsoldier.89 The lack of specific references to the numerical strength ofthe Gascon contingent makes it impossible to even speculate how much Alfonsopaid out. Even so, the compensation he provided the foreign soldiers, projectedover one year of service, would have amounted to 2,976 mrs., roughly 149 fls., permounted warrior and 744 mrs. (137 fls.) per footsoldier. While the former sumcertainly exceeds the 900 mrs. amount set down in the Ordenamiento, it is also lessthan the extra 3,600 mrs., or 4,400 mrs. in the case of a heavily-armed caballero, thattheoretically one year of service by a Castilian caballero would have cost. If Alfonsocould negotiate lower rates of pay for service for foreign troops, then it is safe toassume that he could avail himself of custom to dictate reductions to Castilian sol-diers and their commanders over whom he had a much greater degree of authority.Over the course of a campaign, he would not have found it unreasonable to order thetroops to stay, and then negotiate with their commanders what the acceptable com-pensation, invariably lower than for the original term of service, would be. The lackof a reference to a specific number of days may also point to Alfonso’s desire to freehis military planning from a specified period of service by his troops, and thereforenegotiate further extensions of service from a more advantageous position.

Table 1 Estimated Costs of Cavalry according to the SoldadaGuidelines set down in the Ordenamiento de Burgos (1338)

Type of Cost of one Estimated cost EstimatedSoldier term of over one year extra cost

service (90 (approx. 4 beyond firstdays approx.) terms of term over one

service) year of service

Caballero 900 mrs. 3,600 mrs. 2,700 mrs.

Heavily-Armed 1,100 mrs. 4,400 mrs. 3,300 mrs.Caballero

Source: Ordenamiento de Burgos (1338); CLC, vol. 1, pp. 450–53.

89 CAXI, chap. 304, p. 368.

106 Nicolas Agrait

Table 2 Estimated Costs of Infantry according to the Soldada Guide-lines set down in the Ordenamiento de Burgos (1338)

Type of Rates of Pay Costs for one Estimated Extra costSoldier term of costs over beyond

service (90 one year first termdays approx.) (approx 4 over one

terms of year ofservice) service

Spearman 1mrs./day 90 mrs. 365 mrs. 275 mrs.Crossbowman 1.3 mrs./day 117 mrs. 474.5 mrs. 357.5 mrs.

Source: Ordenamiento de Burgos (1338); CLC, vol. 1, pp. 450–53.

While it is tempting to assume, as Moxó did,90 that these measures were verysuccessful in generating more numerous and disciplined armies, it is impossibleto know how successful they actually were. There are no extant chancery recordsto indicate how much royal money was being disbursed and almost no records ofsoldada payments. The soldada references that have survived are too few forone to accurately infer or even estimate how much the average payment to avassal or magnate would have been. So far, I have uncovered only three: one toGuitart d’Albret, Viscount of Tartas, when he became Alfonso’s vassal, one forJuan Rodríguez de Cisneros, and another for Juan Manuel. The viscount joinedAlfonso’s service in 1332 and was granted a yearly soldada of 100,000 mrs.(5,000 fls.).91 If he were called by Alfonso for military service and he used thefull soldada he received in one year according to the guidelines set down in1338, he would have used around 33,340 mrs. to equip himself, leaving roughly66,660 mrs. to use for the recruitment of troops. Assuming he would bring hisown banner, this would yield around 5 or 6 heavily armored caballeros, 54 moremounted warriors, and 120 to 122 footsoldiers, half foot lancers and halfballesteros. In the case of Rodríguez de Cisneros, a document has survived indi-cating that he was to receive a soldada of 80,000 mrs. (4,000 fls.) in 1335.92 Hewould have been compelled to use 53,333 mrs. in order to recruit a retinue of 44mounted warriors, 4 heavily armored, and 96 footsoldiers, half of them foot lancersand half ballesteros. In his case, this amounted to only a fraction of the resourcesavailable to him since he owned substantial lands in northern Castile. Finally, in1333 Juan Manuel demanded that he receive 600,000 mrs. (30,000 fls.) in soldadapayments (up from his usual 400,000) and that he get an increased share of rentincome from royal lands totaling 300,00 (up from 180,000).93 If Alfonso had

90 Moxó, “Epoca de Alfonso XI,” pp. 398–99.91 CAXI, chap. 99, p. 234.92 RAH, Col. Salazar y Castro, MS. M–9, Sign. 9/816, fol. 50 recto.93 CAXI, chap. 107, pp. 241–42.


actually accepted his terms, Juan Manuel’s contribution to a royal host accord-ing to his soldada would have been 324 mounted warriors, 30–36 heavily ar-mored caballeros, and 720–732 infantry. If Juan Manuel also used the 300,000he received in rent income – as he was expected to in return for receiving theextra income from the crown lands – then his overall contribution would havebeen 486 mounted warriors, 45–58 heavily armed caballeros, and 1,080–1,098infantry, half foot lancers and half crossbowmen.

Since all three recipients were ricos hombres, it is sound to assume that theyhad plenty of other resources at their disposal in addition to their soldadas andwhatever else they received from the crown. A projection of the costs of theirretinues over one year using the values on tables 1–2 shows that they would haveneeded it. The viscount of Tartas’ cavalry and infantry contingents would havecost 265,931–272,010 mrs. (13,297–13,600 fls.) for one year, broken down into194,000 mrs. (9,700 flrs.) for 54 caballeros, 22,000–26,400 mrs. (1,100–1,320fls.) for 5–6 heavy caballeros, 21,535–22,265 mrs. (1,077–1,113 fls.) for 59–61foot lancers, and 27,995.5–28,944.5 mrs. (1,340–1,447 fls.) for 59–61 ballesterosor crossbowmen. Overall, an additional 216,400–220,800 mrs. (10,820–11,040fls.) would have been required after the first term of service. Juan Rodríguez deCisneros’ forces would have cost 216,296 mrs. (10,815 fls.) over one year with158,400 mrs. (7,920 fls.) for 44 caballeros, 17,600 mrs. (880 fls.) for 4 heavycaballeros, 17,530 mrs. (877 fls.) for 48 foot lancers, and 22,776 mrs. (1,139fls.) for 48 crossbowmen. An extra expenditure of 162,222 mrs. (8,111 fls.) wouldhave been needed after the first 90 days. As for Juan Manuel, if his theoreticalcontingent was recruited using 600,000 mrs. (30,000 fls.) in soldadas and all ofit served for one year, then he would have had to spend 1,252,800 mrs. (62,640fls.) for 324 caballeros, 132,000–158,400 mrs. (6,600–7,920 fls.) for 30–36 heavycaballeros, 131,400–133,590 mrs. (6,570–6,680 fls.) for a corps of 360–366spearmen, and 170,820–173,667 mrs. (8,541–8,683 fls.) for 360–366crossbowmen. The total sum would reach 1,651,020–1,642,695 mrs. (82,551–82,135 fls.) with an additional 1,051,020–1,042,695 mrs. (52,551–52,135 fls.)after the first term of service. If he used 900,000 mrs. (45,000 fls.), then hewould have spent 1,749,600 mrs. (87,480 fls.) for 486 caballeros, 198,000–255,200 mrs. (9,900–12,760 fls.) for heavy caballeros, 197,100–200,385 mrs.(9,855–10,019 fls.) for 540–549 foot lancers, and 256,230–260,500.5 mrs.(12,812–13,025 fls.) for 540–549 crossbowmen. The aggregate sum would havebeen 2,400,930–2,465,685.5 mrs. (120,047–123,284 fls.), with an additional1,802,250–1,850,842 mrs. (90,113–92,542 fls.) necessary to cover expenses af-ter the first term of service.

These projected sums easily outstripped the sums they received as soldadas.The royal disbursements were evidently meant to provide some compensationfor some of the military costs. The rest would have to come from other sources,one of which was the personal resources of the nobility. The viscount of Tartas,for example, was described by the Crónica as a magnate even prior to cominginto Alfonso’s service. Juan Rodríguez de Cisneros was one of the most power-ful figures in northern Castile and enjoyed substantial rent income from his

108 Nicolas Agrait

extensive land holdings.94 Juan Manuel, in turn, boasted in his Libro enfenidothat he could recruit 1,000 caballeros from his holdings,95 far above the quanti-ties he would have been required to bring by receiving 600,000 mrs. from thecrown. Even if one does not take into account these three magnates’ use of per-sonal resources, their contributions to the royal host – based strictly on soldadasums and without counting how much of their wealth they utilized – still wouldhave amounted to nearly 500 caballeros and an infantry corps almost 1,000 strong.Such numbers were quite significant for the time.

Besides these references, the other mentions of extraordinary taxation used topay soldadas do not mention specific sums. This renders impossible any attemptat calculating the size of Castilian armies by comparing the guidelines with anyglobal soldada figures. We are left only with the possibility of theoretical esti-mations. According to the Ordenamiento de Alcalá (1348) formula, an expendi-ture of one million mrs. would have been enough to recruit 540 to 600 mountedwarriors along with 54 heavily armored caballeros and an infantry contingent of1188 to 1200 soldiers, half of them spearmen and half ballesteros for three months.An outlay of two million would, of course, double those amounts. Yet thesefigures – as impressive as they appear to be considering the relatively small sizeof fourteenth-century armed forces – appear low. The 1,000 caballeros, 100heavily armored horsemen, and infantry contingent of over 2,000 men wouldhave been far cry from the 13,000–14,000 caballeros who were supposed tohave composed Alfonso’s host at Salado,96 although the latter figures would haverepresented a spectacularly huge military outlay. One way in which Alfonso couldhave assembled such a large army is by marshaling an amount of funds muchlarger than those reflected in the sources. This, however, would appear unlikelyconsidering the deficits that plagued his regime.97 Since the royal soldadas pro-vided only a fraction, though larger than in previous reigns, of the resourcesneeded to recruit armies, the rest would have come from what we could termtoday the “private” resources of the magnates, lesser nobility and non-noble ca-balleros, the ecclesiastical hierarchy, the military orders, and the Castilian cities.

94 According to the Libro Becerro de las Behetrías, ed. Gonzalo Martínez Díez, 3 vols. (León,1981) [hereafter LBB], he had rent income from the merindades of Monzón, Campos, Carrión,Liébana y Pierna, Castrojeriz, Santo Domingo de Silos, and especially Saldaña. LBB, 1:223–24, 226–30, 239–40, 314–15, 319, 321–24, 341, 350, 601; 2:14–18, 21–33, 38–39, 48–49, 56–58, 63, 77, 88–96, 231–32, 598–99, 633–34, 642–43, 645, 648, 653.

95 Juan Manuel, Libro enfenido, chap. 6 in Obras Completas, ed. José Manuel Blecua, 2 vols.(Madrid, 1982), 1:162.

96 Robert Ricard, “La relation portugaise de la bataille du Salado (1340),” Hesperis 43 (1956),pp. 19–20, 22.

97 Fiscal deficits were a problem for Alfonso from very early in his reign. In the ayuntamiento atCarrión (1317) it was determined that the royal treasury had revenues of 1.6 million mrs. butthe expenses of running the realm ascended to 9.6 million mrs. during peace time. A new levywas granted but probably amounted to only 5 million mrs. due to the general instability in therealm. Budget deficits would continue to haunt him throughout the rest of his rule. CAXI, chap.10, pp. 180–81; Hilda Grassotti, “Los apremios fiscales de Alfonso XI,” in Historia económicay de las instituciones financieras en Europa, ed. Manuel J. Peláez (Málaga, 1990), p. 3437;O’Callaghan, Cortes of Castile-León, p. 143.


Since the recruitment of any force would have been an effort combining royaland private funding, Alfonso’s reforms appear to have consisted of increasingthe amount that the royal coffers contributed to the overall equation.

Despite not knowing exactly how much these new policies cost the royal trea-sury, it is simply undeniable that warfare in Castile, as in the rest of westernEurope, was becoming more and more expensive.98 Besides the issues of recruit-ment and pay of troops, commanders also had to deal with the logistical issues offoodstuffs, equipment and transportation. In many instances, but especially inAlfonso’s operations at Algeciras and Gibraltar, the necessary naval presenceundoubtedly sent costs skyrocketing.99 The Castilian monarch was faced with aparticularly difficult dilemma: his military commitments kept increasing whilehis tax revenues continued to falter. His response was twofold. First, he contin-ued to demand the collection of certain traditional taxes specifically related towarfare. These included tributes such as yantares, acémilas, galera, fonsadera,the quinto real, and parias. Second, he increasingly relied on the revenue gath-ered from extraordinary levies imposed with the approval of Castile’s cortes.

Yantar in its origins was the feudal duty of the monarch’s vassals and otherunderlings to provide food and lodging when he visited them. By the twelfthcentury, a yearly monetary payment to the crown had come to substitute for the

98 Grassotti, “Los apremios fiscales de Alfonso XI,” p. 3445; Philippe Contamine, War in theMiddle Ages, p. 91; Michael Prestwich, “War and taxation in England in the XIIIth and XIVthcenturies” in Genèse de l’état moderne. Prélèvement et redistribution. Actes du Colloque deFontevraud, 1984, ed. J.P. Genet and M. le Mené (Paris, 1987), p. 184.

99 The expenditures of assembling, outfitting and maintaining a fleet were substantial. DuringAlfonso’s reign, the references to how much each vessel cost per month fluctuated between16,000 mrs. (800 florins) for a Genoese mercenary galley (CAXI, chap. 212, p. 309) to 9,000mrs. for an Aragonese galley (“Accounts of Juan Ferrández Muñoz, master of the import of thefleet for Pedro IV of Aragon (1346),” in Madrid, Arch. Museo Naval, Col. Sanz Barutell, Ser.Barcelona, MS. 355, fols. 213–19). These figures are problematic for there were constantdisagreements as to how much money was owed (“Letter from Alfonso XI to Pedro IV [Gibraltar,August 30, 1349],” in Francisco de Moxó Montoliú, “Cartas reales de Alfonso XI a Pedro IVen el Archivo de la Corona de Aragón,” Anuario de Estudios Medievales 18 [1988], p. 287,doc. 34). Furthermore, the extant sources are silent about the costs of the round ships and othersupport vessels that also formed part of Castile’s fleets. These ships surely cost less than thegalleys because they either were smaller, requiring fewer oarsmen, or relied on sails for pro-pulsion. Considering these variables, I believe that a more solid estimate is that each ship cost7,000–13,000 mrs. on the average per month of service in wages, foodstuffs and other materi-als. By March 1343, Alfonso had amassed a combined Genoese, Castilian and Aragonese fleetat Algeciras that numbered nearly 100 vessels, with 50 Castilian and Genoese galleys, 10Aragonese galleys, 40 round ships outfitted for combat, and an undetermined number of sup-ply and support ships (CAXI, chap. 287, p. 357–58). The galleys alone—assuming a cost of9,000 for the Aragonese and Castilian galleys (45) and 16,000 mrs. for each of the, presum-ably fifteen, Genoese vessels—would have accounted for about 645,000 mrs. (32,250 florins)per month, and 7,740,000 mrs. (387,000 florins) over one year. The costs then for one monthwould have fluctuated between a minimum of 645,000 mrs. to 1,170,000 mrs. (58,500 florins)per month, and 7,740,000 mrs. (387,000 florins) to 14,040,000 mrs. (702,000 florins) over oneyear. To place these costs in some context, the royal budget for 1317 amounted to 9,600,000mrs. (CAXI, chap. 10, pp. 180–81).

110 Nicolas Agrait

actual provision, under the assumption that the king would grace the payingcommunity with his presence at least once. Despite its steady diminishment inreal value due to inflation and the numerous royal exemptions for individuals,and for areas and institutions under ecclesiastical authority, the collection ofyantares across Castile could still produce notable sums for the monarchy. Dur-ing Alfonso’s reign, it became customary for the king to receive this tribute evenif he did not visit specific localities, as long as he was on a military campaign.This principle would later be confirmed during Pedro I’s reign (1350–69).100

Since access to beasts of burden was a sine qua non for any military operation’ssuccess, the burdensome task of gathering pack animals, feeding them, and ulti-mately paying for them was traditionally solved in Castile through the tax orprivilege of acémila. This tribute was generally assigned as a specific duty to atown after it had been granted a fuero by the crown and consisted of the provi-sion of beasts of burden and/or money to pay for renting them for military cam-paigns. The crown staunchly clung to the privilege of collecting acémilas, evenin areas that had passed from secular to ecclesiastic hands.101 Although it is diffi-cult to determine with certitude how the collection of this tax occurred in eacharea, it is safe to assume that, when called upon, local authorities would haveadministered acémila levies. Those obligated to pay the tribute would have con-tributed in coin or with an actual beast of burden. What individual taxpayersowed was generally determined by their income levels.102

While in theory the acémila tax should have provided the necessary beasts ofburden for a royal expedition, in practice it was a much more complicated mat-ter, especially during and in the aftermath of Alfonso’s reign. While this dutywas supposed to apply to everyone, many places had been granted exemptions.The nobility, especially the magnates, were also free from this duty althoughthey probably collected it in their possessions for use by their own retinues.There were other restrictions placed on the use of this particular privilege. Cer-tain places had to pay acémilas to the king only when he had assembled the royalhost and personally commanded it. Others could also demand that the host inquestion be conducting an operation specifically against the Muslims before pay-ing.103 Alfonso’s many expensive military ventures prompted him to raise thecontribution rates for this duty, and even to collect it in areas that had been

100 CLC (Cortes de Valladolid, 1293, 1325), 1:109, 384; “Letter from Pedro I to his steward(Valladolid, July 18, 1352),” in CDPI, vol. 3: pp. 83–84, doc. 736.

101 Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poder real, p. 46. I have so far found no evidence elsewhere ofsuch a formal levy specifically geared towards the acquisition of beasts of burden. In England,the royal prerogative of purveyance applied only to foodstuffs. Norman Housley, “EuropeanWarfare c. 1200–1320,” in Medieval Warfare. A History, ed. Maurice Keen (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1999), pp. 128–29.

102 CLC (Cortes de Valladolid, 1351), 2:126–27, 130–31.103 “Letter from Fernando IV prohibiting the collection of acémilas from the vassals and depen-

dents of the archbishop of Toledo unless the king is personally leading his host against themoors (Valladolid, June 15, 1307),” in Antonio Benavides, Memorias de Don Fernando IV(Madrid, 1860), 2:565–66, doc. 385.


previously exempt. During 1342 and 1343, he suspended the bishop of Segovia’sexemption in order to help fund the siege of Algeciras.104 Royal collectors underhis orders also imposed the tax during this period on those under the authority ofthe bishop of León, whose privileges exempted them.105 The most certain con-clusion regarding the diverse conflicts and difficulties related to the collection ofacémila is that whenever the monarch demanded it from a community, he gener-ally received a good amount, if not all, of what he asked for. For the local popula-tion, it was preferable to provide beasts or cash rather than incur the king’s wrath.

Galera, or galley, was the obligation of certain Cantabrian towns to provideoutfitted ships to the monarch whenever he assembled a fleet. This duty appearsto have existed since the late thirteenth century. Santander, for example, had tofurnish a nao (round ship) and a galley whenever the king was on campaign andin need of naval support.106 The city of Laredo, in lieu of paying other tributes,provided the crown with an armed galley outfitted with 60 oars and 60 menequipped for fighting for at least three months.107 In similar fashion, Castrourdiales,in return for exemption from all other royal taxation, was obligated to supply around ship or galley for three month’s service.108 After 1344, Algeciras’s ship-yards were under the obligation of providing the monarch with two outfittedgalleys whenever a royal fleet assembled in Seville.109 How widespread and ef-fective this mechanism was during Alfonso’s reign is hard to discern. In fact,when galera is mentioned it is in the context of royal grants of exemption fromit.110 Furthermore, it is important to note that this tribute was a parallel but sepa-rate practice from that of impressing ships in times of war.111 Considering thehigh costs of building and outfitting ships, galera appears to have been a conten-tious issue between the monarchy and the individual towns. It would appear thatneither side could take this obligation, or exemption from it, for granted.112

Akin to galera, fonsadera (scutage), consisting of monetary payments to themonarch in lieu of military service, was specifically related to warfare and only

104 “Privilege to Segovia from Alfonso XI acknowledging that Segovia pays 6,000 mrs. annuallyin return from exemption from acémilas and fonsadera with the exception of the years 1342and 1343 (Valladolid, November 3, 1351),” CDPI, 2:266–69, doc. 532.

105 “Alfonso XI orders that fonsadera not be collected at Mansilla since the town, along with therest of the archbishopric of León, has agreed to pay acémilas to the royal collectors (Algeciras,July 8, 1343),” in CDACLXI, p. 454, doc. 3081.

106 LBB, 2:180–81, 108.107 Ibid., pp. 567–68, 328.108 Ibid., pp. 569–70, 330.109 Pedro López de Ayala, Crónica del Rey Don Enrique, Bk. 1, chap. 7 in Crónicas, ed. José Luis

Martín (Barcelona, 1991), p. 441.110 “Alfonso XI confirms a privilege to Avilés from Fernando IV which stated that they were

exempt from fonsadera and galera (Madrid, August 16, 1329),” in Colección diplomática delArchivo del Excmo. Ayuntamiento de Avilés (siglos XII-XV), 1155–1495, ed. Eloy Benito Ruano(Avilés, 1992), pp. 129–31, doc. 81.

111 “Alfonso XI confirms a letter to San Sebastián from Fernando IV ordering that no more shipsbe impressed for the royal fleet (Valladolid, 1318),” in Colección de documentos medievalesde las villas guipuzcoanas (1200–1369), pp. 135–36, doc. 134.

112 Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poder real, pp. 45–46.

112 Nicolas Agrait

supposed to be collected when the kingdom was at war. There are very few ref-erences regarding the procedures utilized in the imposition and payment of thistribute, but there are some indications that the sums collected either had beenpreviously established in a local fuero, negotiated with local authorities, or de-termined through the execution of padrones on the goods of those obligated topay.113 While the crown received and utilized a good portion of this income, aprecedent was set in the thirteenth century by Alfonso X and later affirmed dur-ing Alfonso XI’s reign of allowing the local nobility and caballeros or the Mili-tary Orders114 to collect and receive the fonsadera instead of handing it over tothe royal treasurers. While this probably assured a more efficient collection, inmany localities it eliminated royal control over the fonsadera.115 Regardless, theCastilian monarch imposed its collection in 1330,116 1332,117 1340,118 1343–44for the siege of Algeciras,119 and 1349.120 The scanty evidence that has survivedindicates that by the end of Alfonso’s reign, those localities, other than those thatwere part of the royal patrimony, still paying this tribute to the king were usuallyunder ecclesiastical jurisdiction.121 Even so, fonsadera remained an importantresource for the Castilian monarchs, even if indirectly, because rather than fallinto disuse it continued to be collected and used by secular lords, caballeros or

113 See note 59.114 “Privilege granted by Alfonso XI to the Order of Calatrava (Gibraltar, August 10, 1349),”

Madrid, Archivo Histórico Nacional [hereafter, AHN], Sec. Ordenes Militares, Cpta. 5, vol. 1,doc. 44.

115 CLC, 1:313 (Ayuntamiento de Carrión 1317), 362 (Cortes de Medina del Campo, 1318), 421(Madrid, 1329); “Alfonso XI grants Infante Fadrique, master of the Order of Santiago, exclu-sive rights of all fonsadera collected in the Order’s possessions (Gibraltar, August 10, 1349),”AHN, Sec. Ordenes Militares, Cpta. 413, doc. 56.

116 “Letter from Alfonso XI ordering the city of León to collect fonsadera for the year 1330(Segovia, September 28, 1331),” in CDACLXI, p. 356, doc. 2989.

117 “Letter from Alfonso XI to the city of León (Burgos, August 10, 1332),” in CDAML, pp. 134–35, doc. 92.

118 “Letter by López Ferrández, from the royal chamber, to Cuéllar, ordering the town council topay the sum collected from fonsadera to Juan González de Roa or Ferrán Pérez de Saldaña(February 20, 1340),” in Colección diplomática de Cuellar, ed. Antonio Ubieto Arteta (Segovia,1961), pp. 193–94, doc. 93; “Letter from Alfonso XI to León asking for fonsadera (Madrid,January 25, 1340),” in CDACLXI, pp. 427–30, doc. 3058.

119 “Letter from Alfonso XI to all places under the jurisdiction of the bishopric of Burgos to payfonsadera (Algeciras, February 1343),” in Luciano Serrano, ed., Cartulario del Infantado deCovarrubias (Valladolid, 1907), pp. 195–97, doc. 164; “Letter from Alfonso XI asserting thatanyone who agreed to collect fonsadera in León on behalf of Yuzaf Leví, royal tax colector,was to collect the fonsadera due in March 1344 one year early (Algeciras, September 1343),”in CDAML, p. 186, doc. 134.

120 “Pedro I orders the collectors of fonsadera that in the event that León did not pay fonsaderaduing Alfonso XI’s siege of Algeciras, they be exempted from the 1349 fonsadera levy insti-tuted by the king during the siege of Gibraltar (Valladolid, May 14, 1351),” in CDPI, 1:140–41, doc. 104.

121 Ignacio Alvarez Borges, El feudalismo castellano y El Libro Becerro de las Behetrías: lamerindad de Burgos (León, 1987), p. 108.


urban councils to further fund their contingents during royal military campaigns.122

The Castilian royal treasury also benefited from the collection of the quintoreal or a 20 per cent share of all the spoils recovered from mounted border raidsand pillage in Muslim lands, whether it be goods, coinage, or captives.123 Themanner in which the quinto was accumulated – essentially a share upon an amountof booty undefined until it was actually recovered – made its amounts impos-sible to predict. Regardless, the king, besides profiting from it as a source ofincome, utilized the quinto as an enticement for Castilian towns along theGranadan border to engage in military activity by granting shares of it, or ex-emptions from royal collection, to individuals, cities or groups. References, how-ever, to specific quinto real sums are very few. In 1294, for instance, Sancho IVreceived 36,000 mrs. from Seville and its surrounding areas,124 yet there are noother references to the rest of the border region. Despite the shrinking frontier,Alfonso remained keenly interested in the plunder collected by the frontier towns.With regards to Murcia, he reaffirmed in 1333 that its citizens pay a royal sev-enth instead of a fifth of their booty,125 although he continued to collect it.126 Thefollowing year, he intervened to resolve a dispute that had arisen over how thespoils from a recent raid should be divided. The specific issue was whether someChristian mounted warriors, after chasing, defeating and recapturing some cattlestolen by Muslims, were entitled to keep the animals as compensation for theirlosses or return them to their Christian owners. Alfonso confirmed the ruling ofa local official that the caballeros were entitled to keep the beasts since, as cus-tom and law dictated, they had recovered the livestock in enemy territory throughtheir own effort and expense.127 At times, the king earmarked whatever sumsmight be collected in border raids to defray local defense costs such as when heplaced the castle of Tiscar under the authority of Ubeda.128 Alfonso also utilizedthe promise of exemptions from the quinto to encourage military service.129 Even

122 “Privilege from Alfonso XI to the caballeros of Cuenca (Cuellar, May 20, 1322),” cit. in CabañasGonzález, La caballería popular en Cuenca , p. 37; Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poder real,pp. 41–45, 299.

123 Partidas, 2, 26, 6.124 “Accounts of Juan Mateo de Luna, chamberlain of the frontier”; AHN, Códice 985b, fol. 2r.;

Asunción López Dapena, ed., Cuentas y gastos (1292–1294) del Rey D. Sancho IV el Bravo(1284–1295) (Córdoba, 1984), p. 666. This appears to indicate that military raids along theborder were quite productive, even if the crown only received 36,000 mrs., accounting perhapsfor 180,000 mrs. or higher. Such a sum, even taking into account the expenses related to orga-nizing and conducting the raids, would have been quite significant at the local level.

125 “Royal letter to Mayr Aben Mudur (Valladolid, February 27, 1333),” in CODOM6, pp. 272–74,doc. 236.

126 “Letter from Alfonso XI to Murcia (Valladolid, May 2, 1333),” in CODOM6, pp. 278–79, doc. 241.127 “Royal decree from Alfonso XI to the alcaldes of Murcia (Burgos, May 2, 1334),” in CODOM6,

pp. 312–13, doc. 270.128 “Alfonso XI’s concession of the castle of Tiscar to the council of Ubeda (Valladolid, November

28, 1335),” in Colección Diplomática de Quesada, ed. Juan de Mata Carriazo Arroquia (Jaén,1975), pp. 40–44, doc. 24.

129 “Letter from Alfonso XI confirming the freedoms granted by Alfonso X to the armadores atCartagena, Guardamar, Alicante y Murcia (Tordesillas, June 24, 1347),” in CODOM6, p. 469,doc. 412.

114 Nicolas Agrait

though its sums were not as significant or reliable as others, Alfonso’s adminis-tration evidently continued to consider the quinto real an important resource.130

Another source of income linked to the wars with the Muslims were the pariasor payments to the Castilian crown from the Granadan emirate during times ofpeace, a practice extending back to the twelfth century.131 The Muslim emirpledged vassalage to the Castilian king who in turn guaranteed the Granadansthe liberty of running their own affairs. The parias, however, were a notoriouslyunreliable source of income. Although they could be substantial and were slatedto be paid every year, there were many reasons – war, Castilian instability orweakness, or Granadan unwillingness – why the payments were suspended. Thedislocations that marked Alfonso’s minority and the open warfare between Castileand Granada during the first five years of his adult rule very likely ensured that noparias were sent by the Granadans to Castile. However, Alfonso secured a trucewith Muhammad IV (1325–33) in 1331 in which he was to receive a yearly sum of12,000 doblas or roughly 246,000 mrs. (12,300 fls.).132 It is clear that again thesewere irregular payments since hostilities broke out again two years later. The sumof 12,000 doblas133 came to be standardized during the last two decades of Alfonso’sreign since similar arrangements were agreed upon after Alfonso’s failed Gibraltaranoperation of 1333,134 and his capture of Algeciras in 1344.135

Due to the irregular nature of the quinto real and parias and the continuingtrend of traditional tributes like the galera, fonsadera, and yantar to diminish inreal value, extraordinary levies, such as monedas foreras, servicios or ayudas(aids), alcabalas, shares of ecclesiastical income, and in some instances the saleof royal lands, became crucially important for Alfonso’s military activities. Eventhough the fiscal burden upon his subjects increased, Alfonso was able to securethe necessary funding for all of his successful campaigns.

Yet the king, as much as he may have desired to, could not arbitrarily imposetaxes upon the realm. Abiding by the principle of consent – in essence that no

130 Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poder real, pp. 50–52.131 Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poder real, pp. 47–48; Valdeavellano, Curso de historia de las

insituciones españolas (Madrid, 1968), pp. 410, 609.132 CODOM6, pp. 186–92, docs. 166–68; CAXI, chap. 91, pp. 227–28. I am utilizing an approxi-

mate exchange rate of 20.5 mrs. per dobla for 1330 calculated by Peter Spufford et al., Hand-book of Medieval Exchange, p. 159.

133 According to Ladero Quesada, the dobla was worth about 20 mrs. by the end of the thirteenthcentury. Although inflation may have diminished the value of the maravedí vis-à-vis the dobladuring the first 30 years of the fourteenth century, using this ratio one can calculate that theparias agreed to by Alfonso in 1331, 1333, and 1334 each would have totaled around 240,000mrs. This was a significant sum yet probably not particularly heavy for a kingdom such asGranada. The benefit to the royal treasury was also limited since the bulk of it was earmarkedfor frontier defense. Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poder real, pp. 111, 225.

134 M. Alarcón y Santón and Ramón García de Linares, eds. and trans., Los documentos árabesdiplomáticos de Archivos de la Corona de Aragón (Madrid, 1940), pp. 61–63, doc. 30; CAXI,chap. 126, p. 257.

135 Giménez Soler, Don Juan Manuel, p. 642, docs. 572–73; AMV, Manual de Consell, A4, fol. 30in Torremocha Silva, Algeciras entre la Cristiandad y el Islam, pp. 358–59, doc. 28; CAXI,chap. 336, pp. 386–90.


one could be deprived of property without just cause and that the consent of thegoverned was necessary for any new taxation – the monarch was required to calltogether a full meeting of the cortes or a partial assembly often known as anayuntamiento. These parliamentary meetings would then serve as platforms forthe king to request extra funds, outline their necessity, and obtain consent. While intheory the representatives gathered at these assemblies could rebuff royal requests,they never did so. The real discussion centered on how large each particular collec-tion would be. The representatives certainly complained about the negative eco-nomic impact that extra taxation would have on them and at times successfullypleaded to reduce the amounts requested, but they consented in the end.136

Moneda forera was originally a levy granted to the king with the consent ofthe cortes in return for royal assurances not to alter the composition or value ofCastile’s coinage. Devaluing the coinage was a means of raising revenue withroyal prerogative, but which caused disruptive inflation. By the late thirteenthcentury, it had become customary for the moneda to be collected every sevenyears, perhaps without the need to consult the realm’s representatives.137 Underthis seven-year timetable, Alfonso received this tribute in 1318138 and 1325.139 It,however, could also be an extraordinary tax, although in these cases the kingneeded to secure the specific consent of the cortes. Alfonso collected extraordi-nary monedas in 1329,140 1336,141 1341–42,142 and 1343.143 He also arranged fora new levy in 1349 to help fund his second Gibraltan operation but he died be-fore it could be fully collected.144

Though moneda forera was a particularly important levy, at what rates it wascollected and its overall contribution to the royal treasury remain elusive. Thistribute itself was a per capita tax from which few were exempt.145 By 1294, it wasbeing collected at the rate of 8 mrs. per taxpayer in Castile, Extremadura andAndalusia, and 6 mrs. in León. This rate must have remained stable for in 1350,

136 O’Callaghan, Cortes of Castile-León, pp. 130–32.137 Alvarez Borge, El feudalismo castellano, p. 106; Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poder real, p.

55; O’Callaghan, Cortes of Castile-León, pp. 133–34; Valdeavellano, Curso de historia, p.603.

138 CAXI, 182, chap. 12; “Letter from Alfonso XI and his regents (Medina del Campo, September10, 1318),” in Angel Barrios García, ed., Documentación medieval del Archivo Municipal deAlba de Tormes (Salamanca, 1982), pp. 97–99, doc. 29.

139 CAXI, chap. 40, p. 199; “Letter from Alfonso XI to Murcia (Valladolid, December 12, 1325),”in CODOM6, p. 64, doc. 53.

140 “Letter from Alfonso XI ordering that all his vassals across the realm pay moneda forera(Valladolid, December 12, 1329),” in González Crespo, Colección documental de Alfonso XI,pp. 273–76, doc. 146; CAXI, chap. 80, pp. 222–23; “Royal letter from Alfonso XI to the monedaforera collectors in Murcia (Villareal, June 30, 1330),” in CODOM6, pp. 172–73, doc. 152.

141 CAXI, chap. 155, p. 274; “Letter from Alfonso XI to the moneda forera collectors in Murcia(Real sobre Lerma, October 15, 1336),” in CODOM6, pp. 371–72, doc. 327.

142 “Royal decree from Alfonso XI to the council of Murcia (Madrid, January 25, 1341),” inCODOM6, pp. 436–37, doc. 384.

143 CAXI, chap. 282, p. 354.144 “Royal communication to the councils in Murcia (Gibraltar, August 10, 1349),” in CODOM6,

pp. 498–501, doc. 436.145 Alvarez Borge, El feudalismo castellano, p. 106; O’Callaghan, Cortes of Castile-León, p. 135.

116 Nicolas Agrait

Pedro I decreed that the minimum amount of income to be obligated to paymoneda was 60 mrs. and, specifically in case of Murcia, anyone who achievedthis income level was required to pay 8 mrs.146 The global sums, especially forAlfonso’s reign, are even more difficult to calculate. Ladero Quesada has arguedthat even through the travails of Alfonso’s minority, each moneda still yielded asignificant 1,000,000 mrs., though down from 1,500,000 during Sancho IV’s reign.147

The 1343 moneda, for example, was approved in a meeting between the king andthose towns that had sent contingents to the Algeciran operation. Though numer-ous, they certainly would have been less than in a full assembly of the cortes.

Equally or even more important than moneda forera for Alfonso’s administra-tion were levies known as servicios or ayudas, extraordinary grants of taxationapproved by the cortes or ayuntamientos. The term servicio was first used in themiddle of the thirteenth century. It was generally a tax on movable property,unless it was determined to be the equivalent of a moneda when it would be ahead tax.148 Similar to monedas, servicios were particularly attractive to the royaltreasurers because they were not subject to the traditional fueros. As such, the taxesextended to a greater section of the realm149 and the sums collected would not beset in any previously extant documentation, but instead periodically negotiated.150

By Alfonso’s reign, these extraordinary levies had become frequent enoughto be considered habitual. Due to his many military expenses and the instabilitythat marked the early part of his reign, he came to rely even more heavily onservicios. They were authorized to be collected in 1314 at the cortes held inValladolid and Medina del Campo (5 servicios);151 1315 at Burgos (3 ayudas);1316 for Infante Pedro (1 servicio worth 1,000,000 mrs.); 1317 at Carrión (5

146 “Letter from Pedro I to the bishopric of Cartagena and the Murcian kingdom specifying theprocedures for the collection of moneda forera (Seville, September, 1350),” in Colección dedocumentos para la historia del reino de Murcia, vol. 7, Documentos de Pedro I, ed. AngelLuis Molina Molina (Murcia, 1978) [hereafter, CODOM7], pp. 17–20, doc. 15.

147 Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poder real, p. 223.148 O’Callaghan, Cortes of Castile-León, p. 135; Valdeavellano, Curso de historia, pp. 610–11.

There were instances in which some localities agreed to pay a certain amount instead of hav-ing local officials or tax collectors investigate and draw up a new padrón of tax payers. “AlfonsoXI confirms that Bejar and its environs will pay 3,000 mrs. per servicio (September 3, 1322),”in Angel García Barrios et al., eds., Documentación medieval de los Archivos de Bejar yCandelario (Salamanca, 1986), pp. 65–66, doc. 30.

149 My personal survey and database of the Libro Becerro de las Behetrías, a document that re-flected established northern Castilian practice rather than any innovation by Pedro I’s admin-istration, reveals that 89% of all fiefs listed were subject to servicios, making it as universal aform of taxation as was possible in fourteenth-century Castile. It is not unrealistic to assumethat the Andalusian, Extremaduran and Galician areas not listed would have been liable atsimilar rates.

150 Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poder real, pp. 57–58.151 “Letter of Alfonso XI to the archbishop of Toledo, granting a partial exemption to the servicios

approved by the cortes at Valladolid (Valladolid, August 10, 1314),” in González Crespo,Colección documental de Alfonso XI, pp. 48–49, doc. 14; “Letter from Alfonso XI to the taxcollectors of Candemuño and Infantado de Covarrubias (Dueñas, April 28, 1314),” inDocumentación de la catedral de Burgos, (1254–1293) (1294–1316), ed. F. Javier PeredaLlarena, 2 vols. (Burgos, 1980), 2:319–21, doc. 469.


servicios);152 1318 (5 servicios);153 1320 (7½ servicios for those recognizing theregency of Infante Juan Manuel154 and 6 for those recognizing the regency ofInfante Felipe);155 1323 (5 servicios for Infante Juan); 1324 (5 servicios col-lected by Juan Manuel);156 1325 when Alfonso started to rule as an adult (5servicios);157 1329 (4 ayudas);158 1332 (1 kingdom-wide servicio,159 and 4 servicioscollected from those under the authority of the Order of Santiago in Toledo andCuenca);160 1336 (5 servicios),161 and 1337 (1 undefined servicio);162 1339 (un-specified servicio) at the ayuntamiento at Madrid;163 1340 (unspecified reducedservicio) when Alfonso held an ayuntamiento at Llerena;164 and 1349 (2 servicios)165 for the Gibraltaran expedition.166

The lack of fourteenth-century fiscal sources renders problematic any effortto ascertain in any great detail the collection and administration of servicios.There are no references regarding servicio collection rates during the reign ofAlfonso, except for Juan Manuel’s levy in 1321 that was gathered at 6 per cent(60 out of every 1,000 mrs. of personal wealth both in terms of property andincome) with an exemption for anyone having less than 8 mrs. in assets.167 Fromthe sparse information regarding the inner workings of servicio collection that

152 CAXI, chaps. 8, 10, pp. 179–81.153 “Letter from Alfonso XI and his regents (Medina del Campo, September 10, 1318),” in Angel

Barrios García, ed., Documentación medieval del Archivo Municipal de Alba de Tormes, pp.97–99, doc. 29; “Letter from Alfonso XI to the master of the Order of Calatrava (Valladolid,October 26, 1318),” AHN, Sec. Ordenes Militares, Cpta 429, doc. 191; CAXI, chap. 12, p. 182.

154 CAXI, chap. 27, p. 191.155 GCAXI, chap. 27, p. 334.156 CAXI, chaps. 29, 3, pp. 193, 195.157 “Letter from Alfonso XI to all locales affected by the levy of Mayorga, regarding the servicios

approved by the cortes of Valladolid (Valladolid, February 17, 1326),” in González Crespo,Colección documental de Alfonso XI, pp. 146–49, doc. 91; CAXI, chap. 40, 199.

158 “Letter from Alfonso XI ordering all his realm’s vassals to pay moneda forera (Valladolid,December 12, 1329),” in González Crespo, Colección documental de Alfonso XI, pp. 73–76,doc. 146; CAXI, chap. 80, p. 223.

159 “Royal decree from Alfonso XI to the Murcian council (Burgos, May 30, 1322),” in CODOM6,p. 234, docs. 203.

160 “Letter from Alfonso XI to the master of the Order of Santiago (Valladolid, March 10, 1332),”RAH, Col. Salazar y Castro, MS. M–128, fols. 303v.–305; cit. in Grassotti, “Los apremiosfiscales de Alfonso XI,” pp. 3445–46.

161 “Letter from Alfonso XI to the archbishop of Toledo regarding the collection of four servicios(Lerma, December 5, 1336),” in González Crespo, Colección documental de Alfonso XI, pp.414–15, doc. 242; CAXI, chap. 154, p. 273

162 “Letter from Alfonso XI to the collectors of the servicio at Montiel (Mérida, December 20,1337),” in CODOM6, pp. 402–03, doc. 358.

163 CAXI, chap. 196, p. 298.164 CAXI, chap. 254, p. 831.165 “Letter from Alfonso XI to all officials and councils in Murcia, notifying them of the collec-

tion of a moneda and two servicios for the war against Granada (Gibraltar, August 10, 1349),”in CODOM6, pp. 498–501, doc. 436; CLC (Cortes de Valladolid, 1351), 2:63.

166 Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poder real, pp. 65–70.167 CAXI, chap. 27, pp. 191–92.

118 Nicolas Agrait

has survived, a standard tax rate utilized in Castile cannot be determined. In fact,the lack of source material would appear to indicate there indeed was no custom-ary rate of taxation.168

Even so, the few references available indicate that the sums collected fromservicio levies were very significant. Infante Pedro, for example, received aservicio in 1316 from those under his authority that amounted to a cuento or1,000,000 mrs.169 In the ayuntamiento held at Carrión in 1317, Alfonso’s trea-sury was declared to have revenues of only 1,600,000 mrs., yet the expendituresof administering the realm ascended to 9,600,000. Even though one has to beskeptical of these figures due to the lack of corroboration from other documenta-tion, it is evident that the monarchy’s rent income had diminished to intolerablylow levels. The king and his regents were granted 5 servicios. If – and this is byno means certain – these new taxes were intended to cover the whole of the royalbudget deficit, they would have had to be 1,600,000 mrs. each. Due to the gen-eral instability of the realm, the actual sums collected were significantly lower,adding up to less than 5,000,000 mrs.170 Even though it is a problematic figure, ifone assumes that the average yield of one servicio, regardless of its extent, wasbetween 500,000 and 1,000,000 mrs., then the global amounts gathered byAlfonso’s tax collectors during his adult rule could have reached between 12–24million mrs. These monies were used almost exclusively to fund military activi-ties ranging from the defense of the frontier, to incursions into foreign territories,to the conquest of Muslim holdings. Even when only taking into account thepotential revenues that could be drawn from servicios, their contribution toAlfonso’s treasury was indispensable.

The continuing demands of Alfonso’s campaigns led him to go beyondmonedas and servicios to expand the alcabala, an indirect tax charged on thesale of certain items that dated back to the previous century.171 The appeal of thealcabala for Alfonso was twofold: it had great income potential since it tappedinto trade, which despite Castile’s economic depression was still vibrant, andcontrary to other tributes detailed in the fueros, he wielded more control over itscollection. While in theory the amount collected by the royal agents should havebeen a veintena or 5 per cent,172 it would appear that during Alfonso’s reign itwas only collected at the rate of 3.33 per cent.173 Although exact figures are not

168 O’Callaghan, Cortes of Castile-León, p. 143.169 CAXI, chap. 8, p.180.170 CAXI, chap. 10, p. 180–81; Grassotti, “Los apremios fiscales de Alfonso XI,” p. 3437;

O’Callaghan, Cortes of Castile-León, p. 143.171 Salvador de Moxó, La alcabala; sobre sus orígenes, concepto y naturaleza (Madrid, 1963), p.

33; Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poder real, p. 180; Torremocha Silva, Algeciras entre laCristiandad y el Islam, pp. 58–59. Making money from trade was not new. England during thefirst half of the fourteenth century became more and more dependent on the customs andsubsidies related to overseas trade. W. M. Ormrod, “The crown and the English economy,1290–1350,” in Before the Black Death, ed. Bruce M. S. Campbell (Manchester, 1991), p. 169;idem., “The Domestic Response to the Hundred Years War,” in Arms, Armies and Fortificationsin the Hundred Years War, eds. Anne Curry and Michael Hughes (Woodbridge, 1994), p. 88.

172 Moxo, La alcabala, p. 39; Torremocha Silva, Algeciras entre la Cristiandad y el Islam, p. 59.173 Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poder real, p. 189.


extant, this tribute clearly raised very large sums for the royal treasury. In 1333,the monarch imposed alcabalas in the Andalusian region to raise funds for fron-tier defense and specifically to recruit three thousand extra caballeros to serve atborder outposts.174 Alfonso reimplemented this tribute in Andalusia in 1338,175

earmarking some of the funds for the upkeep of local castles and other fortifica-tions such as Tiscar, Quesada and Albanchez, which were administered by thetown of Ubeda.176 Looking for ways to raise the necessary funds for his Algeciranoperation, Alfonso imposed the first kingdom-wide alcabala in 1342.177 Threeyears later, he persuaded the ayuntamiento at Burgos to allow for its collection inthe following six years.178

Alfonso also turned to the Church for financial support for his campaigns,especially when directed at Muslim targets. While the ecclesiastical tributes werecollected locally, the monarchy was expected to ask for papal permission beforeassuming it had access to them. In reality, the intolerable delays caused by com-munication problems, diplomatic demands and protocols, and royal, ecclesiasti-cal, and papal bureaucratic procedures drove the Castilian kings to acquire, orattempt to acquire, the sums in expectation of a positive papal response. Eventhough this practice led to conflicts between the crown and the Papal See, it isevident that the Castilian monarchs more often than not were successful in ac-cessing these ecclesiastical funds. Church monetary support took many forms,such as loans and ayudas,179 but some of the most important were crusadingbulls, which in addition to being powerful recruiting tools, also permitted Alfonsoto collect shares of ecclesiastical rents such as tercias reales and décimas.

During Alfonso’s reign, one of the best ways to provide additional impulse toany military operation was to have it declared a crusade by the Papacy. Theprocurement of a crusading bull was particularly attractive because it conveyedan indulgence to those who participated,180 and also allowed for the preachingand gathering of alms to help defray military costs. But, what exactly made acrusade different from other campaigns? While any ecclesiastical or secular leader

174 CAXI, chap. 128, pp. 258–59; “Royal letter to the council of Murcia (Seville, November 23,1333),” in CODOM6, pp. 294–96, doc. 258.

175 “Alfonso XI orders the collectors of alcabalas in Murcia and Lorca to deliver 80,000 mrs. toGonzalo Rodríguez de Avilés (Sigüenza, July 25, 1338),” in CODOM6, p. 422, doc. 371.

176 “Letter from Alfonso XI to the collectors of alcabalas in Ubeda (September 15, 1338),” inColección documental del Archivo Municipal de Ubeda, p. 188, doc. 67.

177 CAXI, chap. 262, p. 337.178 “Royal notebook from Alfonso XI to all the councils in Murcia detailing how the alcabalas

were to be collected (Alcalá de Henares, February 2, 1348),” in CODOM6, pp. 482–84, doc.424; CLC (Ayuntamiento de Burgos, 1345), 1:488–89.

179 “Letter from Alfonso XI ordering the seizure of the necessary goods from the bishopric ofAvila to cover the amount he solicited for the Gibraltan operation (Gibraltar, 1349),” in GonzálezCrespo, Colección documental de Alfonso XI, pp. 595–97, doc. 339.

180 Goñi Gaztambide, Historia de la Bula de la Cruzada de España (Vitoria, 1958), p. 133. Theissue of the remission of sins for crusades in the Iberian Peninsula can be at times ambigu-ous. Urban II appears to have implied that the plenary indulgence was only available to thosewho died while fighting the Muslims in Spain, as opposed to those who received it if theyjourneyed to Palestine (Jonathan Riley-Smith, The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading

120 Nicolas Agrait

could proclaim or call for a crusade, sanction from the Papal See was necessaryfor the operation to be an official crusade and benefit from the additional pres-tige. Furthermore, the Islamic presence in the Iberian Peninsula had promptedUrban II (1088–99) to forbid Spaniards from going on crusade to the Holy Landunder the rationale that their efforts should be directed at the Muslims at hand.With the Papacy’s intended purpose of reestablishing the Christian religion inthe Iberian Peninsula by ridding it of Muslims, crusades in Spain were equatedwith their counterparts in the East.181 When applied to Alfonso’s diverse wars, itis evident that the principal requirements for an operation to be considered acrusade were: 1) that the enemy be Muslim; and 2) that the king receive officialsanction from the Roman pontiff. During Alfonso’s rule, crusading bulls weresought and granted in 1317,182 1319,183 1329,184 1340,185 and 1342.186 All thesecampaigns were either against Granadan or Marinid armies or fortresses, in con-trast to the military march into Navarre in 1335, the conflict with Portugal in1336–38, or the pacification of the Castilian aristocracy. There are very sparsereferences to the overall sums amassed during the diverse crusade collections,making it very difficult to determine how much of an aid it actually was.187 In theonly document I have located, García de Sotocueva and Sancho Ochoa deBaracaldo, crusade collectors for the Infantes Pedro and Juan in 1319, acknowl-edged their receipt of 17,130 esterlines coronados from the Vizcayan city of

[Philadelphia, 1986], pp. 28–29). This was not necessarily standard practice, however, for theOrder of Santiago was granted the privilege of preaching the crusade and gathering alms inorder to provide for the defense of its frontier castles (“Letter from Fernando IV to JuanOsores, master of the Order of Santiago [Seville, July 1, 1303], confirmed by Alfonso XI[1316],” AHN, Sec. Sigilografía, Caj. 8, doc. 3). In 1386, Clement VII (1378–94) gave acrusading bull including a plenary indulgence for all those who served in the defense of theOrder of Santiago’s frontier outposts and suggested that it was more a confirmation than a newgrant (AHN, Sec. Ordenes Militares, Cpta. 116, doc. 4). Joseph F. O’Callaghan, Reconquestand Crusade in Medieval Spain (Philadelphia, 2003), p. 209, determined that crusaders inIberia did not need to achieve martyrdom in order to achieve absolution of sins since merely toparticipate or help economically was enough to be granted an indulgence.

181 José Goñi Gaztambide, Historia de la Bula de la Cruzada, pp. 46, 60–63.182 Register Vaticanus, 68, ep. 1694, cit. in Goñi Gaztambide, Historia de la Bula de la Cruzada,

p. 285; CAXI, chap. 11, p. 181.183 GCAXI, chap. 19, p. 310.184 Reg. Vat., 87, ep. 2477, cit. in Goñi Gaztambide, Historia de la Bula de la Cruzada, p. 299.185 “Epistola ad Benedictus XII (1334–42) pro Alphonso, regi Castellae et Legionis, conceditur ut

per certos archiepiscopos et episcopus praedicteur Crux in regnis, comitatibus et terris …conceditur ad trienium decima omnium reddituum ecclesiasticorum regnorum et comitatuumpraedictorum sub certis modificationibus … (Avignon, March 7, 1340),” Reg. Vat., 128, nº 14as printed in Jean Marie Vidal, ed., Benoit XII (1334–1342). Lettres Communes (Paris, 1902),p. 278, doc. 8103. There were three subsequent epistles related to this one which consisted ofannouncements to the various ecclesiastical, regular and military order authorities across Castile.Reg. Vat. 128, nos. 15–17 as printed in Vidal, p. 278, docs. 8104–8106.

186 CAXI, chap. 273, p. 347; “Bull from Clement VI (1342–52) to Alfonso XI (October, 1343),” inLuciano Serrano, “Alfonso XI y el Papa Clemente VI durante el cerco de Algeciras,” Cuadernosde los Trabajos de la Escuela Española de Arqueología e Historia de Roma 3 (1912), p. 33,doc. 7.

187 Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poder real, pp. 207, 209.


Guetaria.188 How large this contribution is depends on the worth of these esterlinescoronados. One possibility is that these coronados were silver coins minted dur-ing Sancho IV’s reign, making the sum roughly 1,713–2,855 mrs. (86–143 fls.).189

Another is that the document refers to a silver coin produced either in England oralong the territories held in northern France by the English crown. In this case,Guetaria’s contribution to the crusade could have been between 8,780–10,547mrs. (439–527 fls.).190 Regardless of which figure is more exact, it is clear thatthe city’s contribution was substantial. Furthermore, although it is dangerous toestimate from one reference how much an individual crusade collection across thekingdom could amount to, the significant contribution provided by this one mer-cantile town – especially when considering that crusades would be preached inhundreds if not thousands of towns and villages – indicates that these collectionsundoubtedly yielded large monetary sums. Crusading bulls were, therefore, im-portant tools for financial as well as for recruitment and prestige purposes.

The tercias reales consisted of approximately a 2/9 share of ecclesiasticalrent income specifically set aside for the construction, repair and supply of churchbuildings across Castile.191 During Alfonso’s reign, the Papacy conceded the terciasto infante Pedro in 1317 in order to fund his expeditions against Granada.192 Asan adult, Alfonso also collected them by permission from the Papacy in 1328–32193

as well as in 1340,194 1343195 and 1349.196 Towards the end of his reign and after-wards, it is clear that the Castilian monarchs took for granted that they would receive

188 Colección de documentos medievales de las villas guipuzcoanas, pp. 136–37, doc. 135.189 If one assumes that these coins were Castilian in origin and since Alfonso did not issue new

coinage during the first fourteen years of his reign, the esterlines coronados could be silvercoins minted during Sancho IV’s reign in 1286 matching Alfonso X’s worth, or a set of thoseproduced in 1305 during Fernando IV’s reign under the same name. Sancho IV’s coronadoswere generally worth one-sixth of a maravedi but could be worth one-tenth, depending on thecoin. Fernando IV’s coronados amounted to one-tenth of a maravedi. Octavio Gil Farres, Historiade la moneda española. 2nd ed. (Madrid, 1976), pp. 343–44. By the 1350s, according to theLBB, coronados were worth one-sixth of a maravedi. LBB, 1:125; 3:124.

190 If the esterlines coronados were English or northern French silver coins, they could have beenequivalent to 4 dineros carlines from 1358. Assuming that a sueldo carlín was worth either 10or 12 dineros esterlines—an assumption that is by no means certain and impossible to deter-mine for sure—then the sum of 17,130 esterlines coronados would be equivalent to between439–520 Aragonese florins which in turn yield 8,780–10,547 mrs. Earl J. Hamilton, Money,Prices and Wages in Valencia, Aragon and Navarre 1351–1500 (1936, repr. Philadelphia, 1975),pp. 140–41.

191 Torremocha Silva, Algeciras entre la Cristiandad y el Islam, p. 59; Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidady poder real, 191.

192 CAXI, chap. 11, p. 181; Reg. Vat. 68, ep. 1694; cit. in Goñi Gaztambide, Historia de la Bula dela Cruzada, p. 285.

193 “Bull from Pope John XXII (1316–34) to the archbishop of Seville, bishop of Córdoba andbishop of Jaén, granting Alfonso XI the décimas as a subsidy for the war against the moors(Avignon, April 8, 1331),” CDACLXI, pp. 354–55, doc. 2987; Reg. Vat., 87, ep. 2477, cit. inGoñi Gaztambide, Historia de la Bula de la Cruzada, p. 299.

194 “Epistola ad Bendictus XII de approbatione indictionis Cruciatae et impositione decame probello contra reges Granatae et de Benamarin, aliosque Sarracenos (Avignon, XII kalendasanno sexto [May 10, 1340]),” Reg. Vat. A.A. Instr. as printed in Vidal, Benoit XII, p. 306, doc.8355; CAXI, chap. 242, p. 318.

122 Nicolas Agrait

the tercias and therefore set down clear procedures regarding their collection.197

The décimas (tenths) was a ten per cent share of the total of ecclesiasticalrents. It evolved over time into a specific amount paid to the royal treasury, witheach diocese contributing a determined amount. Usually awarded in conjunctionwith the tercias reales, the décima differed in that its collection and disburse-ment was left to ecclesiastical fiscal institutions while the former implied theimposition of the royal fiscal apparatus.198 During Alfonso’s reign, the Papacygranted décimas during times of conflict with Granada in 1317,199 1328,200 1340,201

and 1343.202 Like tercias reales, the décimas had great revenue potential.The lack of sources do not permit us to figure out how much each collection

of tercias reales and décimas yielded exactly. However, we do know that whenInfante Pedro was granted the privilege to gather them in 1317,203 it was underthe condition that the overall sum collected would not exceed 150,000 florins orroughly 3,000,000 mrs.204 The fact that the agreement was capped at such a highamount clearly suggests that the income derived from tercias and décimas couldbe and was usually very substantial. It is therefore no surprise that the Castilianmonarchy constantly attempted to tap into it.

Even with these revenue streams, Alfonso was regularly driven to procureempréstitos or loans from diverse entities both inside and outside Castile. De-spite his treasury’s financial troubles, all the evidence indicates that Alfonso didnot rely on forced loans, although the mechanism for such collections was al-ready established,205 but rather negotiated his empréstitos. To amass the necessary

195 “Alfonso XI, regi castellae, scribitur ut ratificatio conditionum habitarum pro concessionedecimarum et duabus partibus decimarum per litteras regias extra tempus termini ipsi impositvaleat ac si facta fuisset infra (Avinione, XI kalendas novembris, anno secundo [October 22,1343]),” Reg. Vat. 137, fol. 127, nº 335 as printed in Eugene Déprez and Guillaume Mollat,eds., Clement VI (1342–1352). Lettres closes, patentes et curiales. Interessant les pays autresque la France publiées ou analysées d’après les Registres du Vatican (Paris, 1960), p. 41, doc.308; Serrano, “Alfonso XI y el Papa Clemente VI ,” p. 33, doc. 7.

196 “Alfonso XI orders the officials and councils of Cartagena to arrange for the collection of the terciasreales as ordered by Clement VI (Gibraltar, September 15, 1349),” in CODOM6, pp. 502–03, doc. 438.

197 Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad y poder real, pp. 195–201.198 Torremocha Silva, Algeciras entre la Cristiandad y el Islam, p. 59; Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad

y poder real, pp. 203–05.199 Reg. Vat., 68, ep. 1694; cit. in Goñi Gaztambide, Historia de la Bula de la Cruzada, p. 285;

CAXI, chap. 11, p. 181.200 “Letter from Alfonso XI to the administrators of the tercias reales, décimas and crusading bull

granted by John XXII in 1328,” in García Fernández, “Regesto,” p. 34, doc. 146; Reg. Vat., 87,ep. 2477; cit. in Goñi Gaztambide, Historia de la Bula de la Cruzada, p. 299.

201 Vidal, Benoit XII , p. 306, doc. 8355; CAXI, 318, chap. 242.202 See note 195.203 CAXI, chap. 11, p. 181.204 Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional, MS 13.097, fols. 5–20, 56–71; cit. in Ladero Quesada, Fiscalidad

y poder real, pp. 198–99.205 “Privilege granted by Alfonso XI to Valladolid (Valladolid, January 24, 1332),” in Fernando

Pino Rebolledo, ed., Catálogo de los pergaminos de la Edad Media (1191–1393). Transcripcióny notas críticas (Valladolid, 1988), pp. 248–56, doc. 50. In this particular document, he ex-empts Valladolid specifically from empréstitos (probably meaning forced loans) implying thatsuch obligatory levies were not uncommon measures across Castile.


resources to relieve the siege of Gibraltar in 1333, he secured unspecified loansfrom caballeros in Valladolid, and merchants at Burgos, as well as from othergroups in both Madrid and Toledo.206 Later in the same year, he used the grantingof alcabalas by the Andalusian towns essentially as collateral to gather the nec-essary sums to pay for additional frontier defense soldiers.207 When hostilitiesbroke out along the Castilian–Navarrese border two years later, Alfonso had toborrow, probably from groups within Valladolid, to pay for the first month of theoperation.208 During the siege of Algeciras, Alfonso’s ever-increasing financialwoes caused him to ask for loans from Portugal, the Papal See and France. Thoughthe Portuguese king refused his request, he obtained a loan of 20,000 florins –receiving the actual sums from the Italian banker Guido Maravalla and promisingto repay them within one calendar year – from the Papacy209 in 1343. He alsosecured an even larger loan of 50,000 florins paid in two installments from hisFrench counterpart.210 From domestic sources, he received loans in the form ofgrain supplies from the archbishoprics of Córdoba and Seville with the latter alsoproviding an empréstito amounting to 333,700 mrs. for the siege effort. In theyears following the conflict, Alfonso arranged to pay for these debts by using hisshare of the tercias reales and décimas.211 In 1343, he was forced to borrow fromsome of the towns in the region of Extremadura, and later on from some Genoesemerchants when the Count of Foix and his Gascon contingents demanded payment.212

Finally, in times of dire necessity, Alfonso was forced not only to temporarilyconcede the rents from royal lands but to sell them outright. In December 1349,he sold the areas of Orozco and Llodio to Fernán Pérez de Ayala and the localityof Bailén to Pedro Ponce de León for 140,000 mrs with the purpose of financinghis second attempt at capturing Gibraltar. The following month, he sold the vil-lages of Valdemoro and Morata to Fernán Pérez de Portocarrero,213 and Palmaand Villalba in the Niebla region to Alvar Pérez de Guzmán for the sum of 130,000mrs.214 Leonor de Guzmán, Alfonso’s mistress, also participated by buying the

206 CAXI, chap. 111, p. 245.207 CAXI, chap. 128, p. 258–59; “Royal letter to the council of Murcia (Seville, November 23,

1333),” in CODOM6, pp. 294–96, doc. 258.208 CAXI, chap. 143, p. 268.209 “Legal document granted by Clement VI stipulating a loan in favor of Alfonso XI (Avignon,

June 14, 1343),” “Alfonso XI ratifies the document granting him said loan (Algeciras, July 4,1343),” in Serrano, “Alfonso XI y el Papa Clemente VI,” pp. 27–32, docs. 4, 6.

210 CAXI, chap. 303, p. 368.211 “Letter from Alfonso XI the archbishop of Seville (Seville, February 5, 1345),” “Alfonso XI

asks the archbishop of Seville to get permission to collect the first year of décimas he had beengranted by Clement VI to fund the siege of Algeciras (Madrid, October 6, 1345),” “Letter fromAlfonso XI to the collectors of tercias reales in the bishopric of Córdoba ordering them to givethe Cordoban bishop 200 cahíces of wheat and 100 cahíces of barley, which had been lent toAlfonso during the siege of Algeciras (Seville, April 27, 1346),” in García Fernández, “Regesto,”pp. 92, 94, 96, docs. 411, 420, 430.

212 CAXI, chaps. 303–04, p. 368.213 RAH, Col. Salazar y Castro, MS D–10, fols. 249–50; MS M–49, fols. 79v.–81r.214 “Deed of the sale of Niebla and Villalba to Alvar Pérez de Gúzman (Gibraltar, January 10,

1350),” in Ignacio López de Ayala, Historia de Gibraltar (Madrid, 1782), IV–V, doc. 2; cit. inGarcía Fernández, “Regesto,” p. 106, doc. 474.

124 Nicolas Agrait

village of Beteta and its tower in the area of Cuenca for 200,000 mrs.215 Eventhough it raised large sums for his operations, this fund-raising method was par-ticularly damaging because it ultimately strengthened those magnates who couldpurchase the lands at the crown’s future economic and political expense.

Considering that during any military operation expenditures started immedi-ately and very likely continued to escalate until the campaign was finished, it comesas no surprise that Alfonso and his commanders regarded the financial aspects ofwarfare to be of fundamental importance and devoted much attention to the acqui-sition and administration of the necessary resources. Although the references tofinancial difficulties abound in the chronicle and documentary sources, Alfonso’simpressive military victories, especially those in the latter part of his reign, were inno small part due to his ability to secure the necessary financial support throughvarious means. The experience of having one of his campaigns, the siege of Gibraltarin 1333, falter due in large part to lack of financial support no doubt spurred him tonot permit it to occur in any future ventures. In fact, the failure of his secondattempt at capturing Gibraltar was the result of an outbreak of bubonic plagueamong his troops and not because of the lack of funding.

It is always difficult when studying Alfonso’s reign not to look at his impres-sive military record and his reputation and conclude that his reforms must havebeen unqualified successes as well.216 This rather triumphalist view, however, isnot entirely complete for it does not provide for the possibility that Alfonso’spolicies may not have been implemented as he intended, or that the Castiliansources may not be available or suitable for determining the product of his re-forms. For instance, even though Alfonso pacified his kingdom enough to modifyCastilian military and legal structures,217 the conflict between his sons Pedro Iand Enrique of Trastámara burst into a civil war that did not end until 1369.218 Inthe midst of fighting over who was the legitimate monarch, there likely was littletime to seriously think about reform. In addition, the extant source material inCastile for the middle of the fourteenth century is ambiguous at best regardingthe actual execution of his reforms. The Ordenamientos of 1338 and 1348 andthe royal decrees to diverse towns to draw up new padrones of who was requiredto provide mounted service, are very detailed indeed, but remain prescriptivedocuments. Their implementation can only be approached indirectly. Pedro I’scontinuing struggles to get the towns to update their lists of eligible caballerosmay point to the great deal of resistance to Alfonso’s reforms during and after hisreign.219 There are similar problems with the documentation related to the soldadas.

215 AHN, Sec. Concejos, Memorial del pleito de Orozco, nº 533–36; cit. in Grassotti, “Los apremiosfiscales de Alfonso XI,” p. 3459.

216 Moxó, “Epoca de Alfonso XI,” pp. 398–99.217 Ibid., pp. 385–87.218 One of the best treatments of this civil war is Clara Estow, Pedro the Cruel of Castile, 1350–69

(New York, 1995).219 “Letter from Pedro I to the council of Cartagena, ordering that the new padrón be given to Juan

Rodríguez de Valladolid and those obligated to own a horse who did not have one be given fourmonths to acquire it (Elche, December 2, 1364),” in CODOM7, pp. 173–74, doc. 115.


So far, there are only two references – for the Viscount of Tartars and for JuanRodriguez de Cisneros respectively, since Alfonso never acquiesced to JuanManuel’s exorbitant demands – to soldada agreements between the crown andindividual magnates. The new guidelines set down by Alfonso indicate that enoughresources were being disbursed as soldadas for it to be worth the royal treasury’seffort to assert further control over them. Yet the fiscal records that would showhow large the soldada sums were and who exactly were the recipients of thesemonies have not survived for the reigns of Alfonso or Pedro I. Finally, the veryfew reliable references to the size of armies during Alfonso’s rule make it diffi-cult to see whether the changes in the nature of caballería popular did result inan increase in the number and availability of urban caballeros.

Another significant issue to consider is how radical the changes wrought byAlfonso upon the Castilian military system actually were. His modificationsactually reflected continuity rather than fundamental change. His decrees tochange the caballería popular were indeed new, but by his reign this institu-tion had been in decline and had become more and more the exclusive fran-chise of the lesser nobility and the urban elites. In this case, Alfonso’s contri-bution was to take the final step of doing away with the voluntary aspect ofcaballería popular that may no longer have been as present as in previousyears. In similar fashion, the guidelines instituted for the spending of royalsoldadas were definitely a step in a new direction, but they represented theexpansion and modification of practice already present by the reign of SanchoIV, if not before. As for the financial aspects, Alfonso did expand the monarchy’sreliance on extraordinary levies like alcabalas and servicios, and augmentedthe royal treasury’s already central role in the underwriting of military opera-tions. Yet this trend was already evident during the reign of his father FernandoIV. It is important to note, however, that this does not in any way diminish theconsequence of Alfonso’s contribution. He very consciously provided the im-petus for the culmination of previous developments, and streamlined those pro-cedures he felt were the most important. Alfonso, therefore, appears to havebeen less a revolutionary and more of a clever, level-headed monarch whosuccessfully utilized the tools available to him.

Even so, Alfonso’s reform program outlasted him since the procedures he setdown continued to influence military practice in Castile. The soldada systemsurvived the Castilian civil war of 1366–69 and persisted in the ensuing reigns.His son Enrique II of Trastámara affirmed its use in 1379. He also decreed thatthose who received such funds had to swear an oath to not commit fraud in theirrecruitment of troops and not be derelict in service.220 The practice continuedthroughout the fourteenth221 and fifteenth centuries under the name ofacostamiento and was even utilized, though to a much lesser extent, for recruiting

220 “Decree from Enrique II (Burgos, 1370),” in Alfonso Díaz de Montalvo, Ordenanzas reales deCastilla, Book 4, Title 3, Law 16; Los códigos españoles concordados y anotados, vol. 6, ed.Gregorio Lópes (Madrid, 1872–73), 387–88.

221 CLC (Ordenamiento de Guadalajara, 1390), 2:461.

126 Nicolas Agrait

the armies that ultimately served to conquer Granada.222 Caballería popular re-mained in existence as urban caballeros continued to serve in Castilian armies.In 1385, Juan I (1379–90) affirmed the principle of obligatory mounted serviceat the popular level through the approval of a new set of guidelines outliningwhat equipment and weaponry was required of each individual according to per-sonal wealth.223 Five years later, the Ordenamiento of Guadalajara again addressedthe preparedness of popular caballeros by requiring yearly military reviews inall the realm’s regions.224 These urban militias, with some changes, survived intothe fifteenth century and were a source of manpower for the final stages of theReconquest.225

To conclude, this close analysis of Alfonso’s reform policies should permit usto place him the proper European context. The notion that the Castilian militarysystem, and by extension Castile, was thoroughly different from England andFrance should be discarded. The soldada system, especially after theOrdenamiento of 1338, was very similar to the indentures in England and thelettres de retenue in France. All three types of arrangements were in essencecontracts between monarchs and their sub-commanders in which the latter wouldrecruit a certain number of troops in return for a specific monetary sum.226 Themain difference was that in England and France, the documents were much moredetailed, while the Castilian soldada arrangements were modified as a whole inthe Ordenamiento de Burgos (1338). With regard to military finance, Castile,very much like its European counterparts, had to pursue a revenue-increasingprogram in order to underwrite the continually escalating costs of campaigns.Since ordinary revenues were not enough, Alfonso, like the English monarchs,227

was forced to rely on extraordinary levies negotiated with the parliamentary bodiesin his realm. In the end, with the notable exception of the procedures and institu-tions related to the urban militias which remained unique, military practice dur-ing Alfonso’s reign had much more in common with than different from Englandand France.

222 Miguel Angel Ladero Quesada, Castilla y la conquista del reino de Granada, 2nd ed. (Granada,1993), pp. 171–72, 174–75, 177–80, 200–01.

223 CLC (Cortes de Valladolid, 1385), 2:315–16.224 Ibid., (Cortes de Guadalajara, 1390), 2:460–61.225 Ladero Quesada, Castilla y la conquista del reino de Granada, pp. 201–09.226 Christopher T. Allmand, The Hundred Years War: England and France at War c. 1300-c. 1450

(Cambridge, 1988), p. 94; Contamine, War In The Middle Ages, p. 153; Michael Prestwich,Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages. The English Experience (New Haven, 1996), pp. 91, 95.

227 Prestwich, “War and taxation in England,” p. 185.

7

Sir Thomas Dagworth in Brittany, 1346–7:Restellou and La Roche Derrien*

Clifford J. Rogers

In terms of battlefield successes, the years 1345–47 were the most impressivein all of British military history. English troops were fighting in three theaters inFrance (Aquitaine, Brittany, and the north), and also on the Scottish border, andin all four areas they won remarkable victories against heavy numerical odds.The most famous of these is of course Crécy, where Edward III defeated an armywhich included Philip VI of France and three kings more (James of Majorca,John of Bohemia, and his son Charles, “King of Germany,” as the Emperor-electwas known before his imperial coronation). But the triumphs of Edward’s lieu-tenants, on their own smaller scale, were perhaps even more impressive. AtNeville’s Cross, the Scots were severely defeated, and King David II was cap-tured. In the south of France, Henry of Lancaster twice defeated the main Frenchforces in the theater, first at Bergerac, then at Auberoche. In the latter engage-ment, Henry captured the Count de l’Isle, Philip VI’s principal general in thetheater, “who was then like a king in Gascony.”1 In Brittany, English forces un-der Sir Thomas Dagworth won two extraordinary victories over the army ofCharles of Blois, the Valois-supported claimant to the Breton ducal coronet. Thesecond and larger of these two engagements, the battle of La Roche-Derrien in1347, resulted in the capture of Charles himself, and – contrary to the assertionof the most recent historian of the action – radically altered the course of theBreton civil war in favor of the Anglo-Montfortian cause. Truly this was a mili-tary “annus mirabilis.”

Such extraordinary success in war has of course inspired much interest amonghistorians. Jonathan Sumption’s massive history of the Hundred Years War hasrecently provided us with new narratives of all these fights, and other historianshave provided full treatments of Crécy, Neville’s Cross, and Bergerac.2 General

*My thanks to Kelly DeVries, Michael C. Jones, and Andrew Ayton for useful suggestionsregarding this article.

1 Jean Froissart, Chroniques, livres I et II, ed. P. Ainsworth and G. T. Diller (Paris, 2001), p. 462.2 Jonathan Sumption, The Hundred Years War, vol. 1: Trial by Battle (London, 1990). Crécy:

Recent treatments include Kelly DeVries, Infantry Warfare in the Fourteenth Century(Woodbridge, 1996), ch. 13, and Clifford J. Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategyunder Edward III, 1327–1360 (Woodbridge, 2002), ch. 11; note also David Nicolle, Crecy1346. Triumph of the Longbow (Oxford, 2000) and Andrew Ayton and Sir Philip Preston (eds.),The Battle of Crécy, 1346 (Woodbridge, 2005). Neville’s Cross: Clifford J. Rogers, “The Scot-

128 Clifford J. Rogers

explanations for the astounding military effectiveness of the English in this pe-riod have tended to focus on three elements. It has long been understood that theyew longbow of the fourteenth century was a superb weapon in the hands of askilled yeoman archer, and that these troops brought a major advantage to theEnglish armies of the time.3 The tactical skill of Edward III and his captains, andthe particular effectiveness of the tactical formation first employed at DupplinMoor (1332) and Halidon Hill (1333), have also traditionally been given a majorplace in explaining their victories. More recently, credit has also been given tothese men for outstanding generalship at the operational and strategic levels ofwar, which was key in enabling them to fight their battles on fields and accordingto tactics of their own choosing.4

Another important factor, one which has not yet been given quite the empha-sis it is due, is the sheer toughness, individual prowess, and fighting spirit of theEnglish in this period. These qualities are very well illustrated in the small andalmost unknown battle of Restellou in June 1346, where just 180 soldiers underSir Thomas Dagworth defeated a force around twenty times as numerous – prob-ably the heaviest odds ever overcome by any of Edward III’s troops, and indeedone of the most impressive performances in all of military history. The samecaptain’s victory at La Roche-Derrien the following year is also exceptionallyremarkable, even among the English victories of the fourteenth century, becauseof the circumstances in which it was fought. It shares with Auberoche the dis-tinction of being one of the very few battles in which King Edward’s men lackedthe advantage of the tactical defensive, and it is the only one of all those men-tioned above in which the longbow does not seem to have played a major role.5 It

tish Invasion of 1346,” Northern History, 34 (1998), 51–69; The Battle of Neville’s Cross, ed.D. Rollason and M. Prestwich (Stamford, 1998); Michael Penman, “The Scots at the Battle ofNeville’s Cross, 17 October 1346,” Scottish Historical Review, 80 (2001), 157–80; DeVries,Infantry Warfare, ch. 15. Bergerac: Clifford J. Rogers, “The Bergerac Campaign (1345) andthe Generalship of Henry of Lancaster,” Journal of Medieval Military History 2 (2004). ForAuberoche, see particularly the somewhat older but (on this battle) sound work of A. H. Burnein The Crecy War (1955; reprint, London, 1990), pp. 105–13, as well as Sumption.

3 Although the lethality of the longbow was recently challenged by one prominent scholar, Ihave argued that that the traditional view of its effectiveness was fully justified. See KellyDeVries, “Catapults are not Atomic Bombs: Towards a Redefinition of ‘Effectiveness’ inPremodern Military Technology,” War in History, 4 (1997), 454–70; Clifford J. Rogers, “The Effi-cacy of the Medieval Longbow: A Reply to Kelly DeVries,” War in History, 5 (1998), 233–42.

4 Including in my own work. On Edward III, see War Cruel and Sharp and “England’s GreatestGeneral,” MHQ 14 (Summer 2002), 34–45; “Bergerac Campaign” on Lancaster; see also “‘AsIf a New Sun Had Arisen:’ England’s Fourteenth-century RMA,” in MacGregor Knox andWilliamson Murray (eds.), The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050 (Cambridge,2001), pp. 15–34.

5 Kelly DeVries has also claimed this concerning Morlaix in 1342 (not mentioned above), butprobably incorrectly. Although Geoffrey le Baker emphasizes the ferocity of the hand-to-handfighting (Chronicon, ed. E. M. Thompson [Oxford, 1889], pp. 76–7), that is hardly sufficientreason to presume that the bowmen who formed the majority of the English army were “usingweapons other than their longbows” (DeVries, Infantry Warfare, p. 144), especially consider-ing that the initial French charge was defeated “at once” (Henry Knighton, Knighton’s Chronicle,ed. and tr. G. H. Martin [Oxford, 1995], pp. 42–3) upon charging into an “ambush of archers”(Istore et croniqes de Flandres, ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove, 2 vols. [Brussels, 1879–80], 1:462).

129Sir Thomas Dagworth in Brittany

was fought almost entirely at close quarters and in full or partial darkness, cir-cumstances which did not allow for effective archery.

These considerations make these two engagements especially worthy of study,yet neither one has received as full an analysis as it deserves. Furthermore, re-cently discovered manuscript chronicle accounts of both fights now make it pos-sible to understand them better than was previously possible. This article, takingadvantage of those new sources, will provide detailed treatments of both fights,and so give historians a broader foundation on which to build their understand-ing of how the Plantagenet realm became, for two generations, the most admiredmartial kingdom of Europe.

The Breton civil war of the fourteenth century began in 1341, following thedeath of Duke Jean III. Years earlier he had arranged for the ducal succession topass to his niece, Jeanne de Penthièvre, and her husband, Charles of Blois, whowas the nephew of Philip VI of France. In the year before his death, however, hechanged his mind and decided that the title should go to his nearest male relative,his half-brother Jean de Montfort. Montfort, after Jean III’s death, acted rapidly toseize effective control over the duchy. When it became clear, however, that PhilipVI intended to back his own nephew’s claim over Jean’s, Montfort turned to Ed-ward III for help. Edward, King of England and claimant to the French throne aswell, was by this time in the midst of his great war with France, the first stage of theHundred Years War. He was naturally more than willing to back Montfort, who inreturn did homage to Edward, as King of France, for Brittany. Edward had alreadybeen accepted as King of France in two of the six most important provinces ofFrance (Flanders and Aquitaine); adding Brittany to the list would have been atremendous accomplishment. Even control of just the western and southern re-gions of the peninsula, where support for Montfort was strongest, promised greatadvantages, for these were the zones of the province most important for maintain-ing seaborne communications between England and Gascony.6 Furthermore – con-trary to what some historians have argued – Montfort’s claim to the Breton ducalthrone rested on the same foundation as the Plantagenet’s claim to the Frenchcrown. Jean was the nearest male relative of the deceased duke; Edward had like-wise been, in 1328, the nearest male relative of the deceased Charles IV of France.

In 1342–43, Edward III supported the Montfort party with increasingly largearmies, one of which he led himself. A truce was made at Malestroit in early1343, solidifying the already fairly well-established pattern that northern andeastern Brittany generally held to Blois, while the western and the southern areassupported Montfort. The pro-French faction suffered a major loss when Olivierde Clisson defected to the English side, but when he was captured and executedin 1344 (despite the Anglo-French truce) the initiative, overall, returned to Blois.7

By June 1346 the French were so strong that they were able to mount simultaneous

6 Jonathan Sumption treats these matters ably in Trial by Battle, pp. 370–7, 384–6.7 Though in 1345–46 the English did capture La Roche-Derrien, sack Lannion, and win a sig-

nificant skirmish in the same area. See Grandes chroniques de France, ed. Jules Viard, 9 vols.(Paris, 1920–53), 9:260–9.


sieges of Lesneven, Brest, and La Roche-Derrien.8 The English government, strug-gling to find sufficient resources to meet a threatened invasion from Scotland, tosupport Henry of Grosmont’s operations in Aquitaine, and to assemble an armyof royal scale for Edward III to lead on the campaign that would culminate in thebattle of Crécy, could spare very few men to meet the challenge posed by Blois’soffensive in Brittany.

The published primary sources do not offer much detail concerning the Bretontheater in 1345–46. Historians have, however, generally concluded from the thinchronicle narratives that are available that King Edward’s captain Sir ThomasDagworth won two large skirmishes, or small battles, against Charles of Blois inthese years. The first of these actions is said to have taken place on 17 June 1345next to the hamlet of Cadoret in eastern Brittany. The second is variously de-scribed as having taken place at, or in the vicinity of, St.-Pol-de-Léon, or elseoutside La Roche-Derrien, either on 3 or 9 June 1346, or 25 May 1347.9 A morecareful look at the evidence already published indicates that there was in factonly one minor battle between Dagworth and Blois prior to the major engage-ment at La Roche-Derrien of July 1347, and that it took place in 1346, not 1345or 1347. Taking into account also the new testimony of the St. Omer Chronicle,we can now further conclude that it took place in the very center of Brittany, nearRestellou, rather than near Cadoret, St.-Pol-de-Léon, or La Roche-Derrien.10

That Dagworth defeated the French claimant to the Duchy of Brittany on 9 June1346 (and not 25 May 1347) is certain. The date was specified in a dispatch theEnglishman sent to King Edward shortly after the event, which formed the basisfor two separate descriptions of the fight in variants of John of Tynemouth’s Historiaaurea, both of which have now been published.11 There are enough matching de-

8 Historia aurea, in Michael C. Jones, “Sir Thomas Dagworth et la guerre civile en Bretagne auXIVe siècle: quelques documents inédits,” Annales de Bretagne LXXXVII (1980), p. 637.Hereafter cited as Historia aurea (Jones).

9 3 or 9 June 1346; Cadoret 17 June 1345: Dom Pierre-Hyacinthe Morice, Histoire ecclesiastiqueet civile de Bretagne, 2 vols (Paris, 1750–56), 1:275 (after Walsingham). 9 and 17 June: Arthurle Moyne de la Borderie, Histoire de Bretagne, 6 vols. (Rennes, 1905–14), 3:497, 502. 25 May1347: V. H. Galbraith, “Extracts from the Historia Aurea and a French Brut (1317–47)” En-glish Historical Review, 43 (1948), p. 213 n. 5. Near St.-Pol: Sumption, Trial by Battle, p. 496.At St.-Pol: Burne, Crecy War, p. 88. Outside La Roche: Jones, “Dagworth,” p. 628.

10 Bibliothèque de l’agglomeration de St.-Omer, MS707 (hereafter cited as St. Omer Chronicle),fos. 227–227v. I am completing an edition and translation of this chronicle, which should be inprint soon.

11 In Jones, “Dagworth,” pp. 637–9 at 637; hereafter cited as Historia aurea (Jones) (“die venerisproxima post festum Penthecostes anno Xo m0 ccc0 xlvjto scilicet ix die junii”) and Galbraith,“Extracts,” pp. 213–14: “Anno Domini 1346 … die Veneris proxima post festum Pentecostes.”Henceforth, citations to this excerpt will be given as Historia aurea (Galbraith). Galbraithheads this section “1347” and thus gives the date of the combat as 25 May 1347, apparentlybecause the chronicle mentions that Dagworth had been appointed captain of the English inBrittany, an office which Dagworth did not receive until 10 January 1347. But Dagworth wasappointed lieutentant of Bohun, who was the lieutenant of the king, in January 1346, andapparently by the principle of transitivity was in April 1346 already terming himself (in a grantof lands to the dame de Clisson) as royal lieutenant. Jones, “Dagworth,” 628; note also HistoriaRoffensis (British Library, London, Cottonian MSS, Faustina B V), fos. 92v–93.


tails that there can be no doubt that this was the same engagement as the onedescribed by the St. Omer Chronicle. It is also mentioned briefly in the Historiaroffensis and the manuscript epitome of William Packington’s lost chronicle.12

There is no mention in any English chronicle of a similar victory a year ear-lier. The modern historians who have noted this putative battle of “Cadoret” in1345 have done so largely on the basis of a single sentence in the ChroniconBritannicarum: “On the Friday before the Nativity of St. John the Baptist, therewas a battle in landa Cadoreti in which lord Thomas Dagworth, of the count ofMontfort’s party, obtained the victory, and Charles of Blois’s side was defeatedand succumbed.” Although la Borderie’s sloppy quotation makes it appear thatthis text is immediately preceded in the chronicle by the year, MCCCXLV, infact there should have been an ellipsis between the two, and the portion thehistorian omitted suggests that in fact the chronicler intended to describe an eventin 1346 rather than one of 1345.13 Surprisingly, historians do not appear to havenoted that the very same sentence appears in the Chronicon briocense, where,however, it immediately follows the year, “Anno 1346.”14 The day given in theseBreton chronicles does not quite match that of the Historia aurea – 9 June was aFriday before the feast of St. John, but the Friday immediately before the holyday was the 23rd. Still, it is much more likely that the sketchy Breton chroniclemade this small error than that Dagworth defeated Blois on the 9th and then

12 St. Omer Chronicle, fos. 227–227v. Historia Roffensis, fos. 92v–93: Dagworth, “a worthy manand a martial knight, well schooled in war,” having been left in command in Brittany byNorthampton, “twice in one day defeated Charles of Blois with a large French army, anddefeated an extremely strong knight in a duel, capturing him. He [then] returned to England,and crossed to France with the king” for the Crécy campaign. (An edition of this text is beingprepared by Dr. Mark Buck.) The “epitome of Packington’s chronicle” (BL, Cottonian MSS,Tiberius A VI, fos. 196–196v), also briefly mentions this combat, apparently also making useof Dagworth’s dispatch: “Adonqes fuist un noble chivaler Dengleterre qi fuist appelle monsrThomas de Dagworth maunde en Brutaigne pour maynteigner et defendre l’estat le Roi illeoqeset garder villes et chasteux qe le Roi avoit conquis; le quel sire Thomas avoit le vitorie deplusours poyntz de guerre et se contient s[i] noblement que merveille; et descounfit sire Charlesde Bloys q’estoit illeoqes maundetz par le Roi de Fraunce. Et le dit sire Charles avoit en sacompaignie ml homes d’armes et le dit sire Thomas forsque ijc, les queux, a ceo que fuist dit,touz furent mahaynietz ou naufrez mes nul de eaux fuist tuwe.”

13 La Borderie, Histoire de Bretagne, 3:497, 497n. Sumption, Trial by Battle, pp. 458–9 andJones, “Dagworth,” pp. 627–8, take the same line, though Jones rightly describes the entry as“non daté.” The full entry reads: “MCCCXLV. Eadem civitas Corisopitensis fuit obsessa perDominum Joannem Comitem Montisfortis, sed non fuit capta. Obiit Dominus Johannes deMonteforti apud Henbont, frater boni Johannis Ducis Britanniae & filius Arturi VI. Kal. Octobris.Die veneris ante Nativitatem S. Joan. Baptist. fuit bellum in Landa Cadoreti, in quo DominusThomas Dagorne tenens partem Comitis Montisfortis obtinuit, & pars Caroli de Blesis fuitdevicta & succubuit. MCCCXXX. Guido Briocensis Episcopus. MCCCXLVI. [rectoMCCCXLVII] Bellum apud Rocham-Deriani, ut in Chronicis latius continetur.” Note that, ifthis is taken as being sequential – aside from the interjection about 1330 – the battle of LandaCadoreti is described as taking place in the June after an event of September 1345, i.e. in June1346. Dom Pierre-Hyacinthe Morice, Mémoires pour servir de preuves à l’historieecclésiastique et civile de Bretagne, 2 vols. (Paris, 1742–49), 1:8.

14 Morice, Preuves, 1:43.


again two weeks later.15

Granted that the Chronicon briocense and Chronicon Britannicarum wereindeed referring to the same battle as the one described in the Historia aurea andthe St. Omer Chronicle, i.e. the fight of 9 June 1346, the next question is where ittook place. The St. Omer Chronicle says that it was “in a very strong passagebehind [or next to, or near] a town called Restellaiu [or Restellain].”16 One version

15 It is of course possible that the Breton chronicles’ date is correct, but this is very unlikely. Asnoted above, the Historia aurea’s account is specifically stated to have been based on a cam-paign dispatch written by Dagworth himself, and the date is given in two forms, both as “AnnoDomini 1346 … die Veneris proxima post festum Pentecostes,” and, in the superior versionsignaled by A. E. Prince and later printed by Jones, as the “ix die junii” in 1346. Historia aurea(Galbraith), p. 213; A. E. Prince, “The Strength of English Armies in the Reign of Edward III,”English Historical Review, 46 (1931), pp. 364–5; Jones, “Dagworth,” p. 637; note also Tait’sobservations in Chronica Johannis de Reading et anonymi Cantuariensis, 1346–1367, ed. J.Tait (Manchester, 1914), p. 234.

16 St. Omer Chronicle, fo. 227: “.J. jour avint que li engles coururent parmi la terre de Bretaigne;mais li dux, qui chou ne pooit souffrir, assambla ses os et les sieui par pluseurs journees tantqu’il s’embati en .j. pas moult fort d’empres une ville que on apelle Restellaiu; la se mirent agarant. Mais quant ce vit li dux, conseil prinst aveuc .j. chevalier d’Alemaigne qui fu nommesmonsigneur Renault de Viviers, et aveuc le Galois de le Heuse et monsigneur Renault de Dinainque a piet descenderoient li dessus dit et seure leur courroient. Et al autre leis les envairoit lidux o ses gens d’armes. Lors se mirent a piet environ .iiij. xx hommez d’armes et lor coururentseure. Mais li dux ne les sieui pas ainsi comme ordenes estoit. Et quant chou virent li engles adeffense se misent fort et roit. Et tant dura le mellee que li breton ne les porent endurer, ainsfurent desconfit. Et y fu prins me sires Renauls de Dinain, le Galois de le Heuse, me siresFoukes de Basillers, me sire Thomas Percheval; et monsigneur Renault de Viviers passa toutoultre ses anemis et revint en son sauf.”


of the Historia aurea says that Dagworth was “about half way” on his way toreprovision certain, unspecified, English-held towns in Brittany when he unex-pectedly met the French. This chronicle could be read as implying that the townsin question were in north-western Brittany, and that the starting point wasQuimperlé.17 The other version of the Historia aurea says only that Dagworthhad begun to make his way “towards a certain place called Leon” when he sud-denly saw Blois’s army.18 All of this fits very well with the hypothesis thatDagworth met the French near Restellou, just south of Callac on the road leadingnorth-east from Carhaix, about half-way between the southern and northern coastsof Brittany.19 The terrain at Restellou also helps explain the astounding successof Dagworth’s tiny force of 80 men-at-arms and 100 archers in fighting off aBreton army reported by the English at 1,000 to 1,500 men-at-arms, 2,000crossbowmen, and numerous light infantry.20 These numbers are within the realm

17 Historia aurea (Jones), p. 637: “Karolus de Blois … conflasset exercitum ut auderet simul etsemel obsidere villas et castella de Brest, de Lesenfenne, et de Roche Diryan. Idem dominusThomas statuit adire villas alias que pertinebant regi Anglie ut in eis poneret escas et armacontra insultus dicti Karoli si contingeret eum eas adire. Et dum iret quasi media via obviavitinopinate dicto Karolo …” Brest, Lesneven, and La Roche-Derrien are all along or near thenorthern coast in the western half of Brittany, and the other English-held towns most threat-ened would be those in the same area as the siege forces. The same text (p. 638) says that afterthe battle, Thomas drew back (retraxit) towards Quimperlé, implying that was his point ofdeparture for the operation.

18 Historia aurea (Galbraith), p. 213: “versus locum quemdam Leon nominatum iter arripiens…” Iter arripere, in medieval Latin, means “to begin a journey.” J. H. Baxter, Medieval LatinWord-List (Oxford, 1934), s.v. “arripio.” (Emphasis added.)

19 And about half-way between Quimperlé and St.-Pol-de-Léon, though if that were Dagworth’sdestination one would expect him to have gone north-west, rather than north-east, from Carhaix.The same would be true for Morlaix, another likely candidate for reprovisioning (Morice,Histoire, 1:274).

There is a Réhello a short distance north of Cadoret, and from only looking at the namesthis pairing might seem to be the Restellaiu and landa Cadoreti of the chronicles. However,the positioning of these places in eastern Brittany makes no sense in relation to an effort byDagworth to reprovision towns threatened by a Breton army besieging Brest, Lesneven and LaRoche-Derrien, as stated by the Historia aurea. Also, if the French were at Réhello and theEnglish on the hilltop above Cadoret – or even in the extremely unlikely event that Dagworthwould have fought in the narrow vale of Cadoret itself – it would have been the English rightflank, not the left, that would have been open for Blois to attack in the last phase of the battle(see below).

20 Both versions of Historia aurea give Dagworth 80 men-at-arms and 100 archers; the “Packingtonepitome,” however, says he had 200 [men-at-arms]. (Above, note 12.) The numbers in theHistoria closely match the size the retinue Dagworth indented to provide when he was ap-pointed Northampton’s lieutenant for Brittany in January 1346, which specified he would have80 men-at-arms (himself, 14 other knights, and 65 esquires), 120 archers, and 80 bidouers,a.k.a. “servaunt’ bayonays.” Jones, “Dagworth,” p. 628; Complete Peerage of England, Scot-land, Ireland, Great Britain, and the United Kingdom (microprint ed., Gloucester, 1982), 4:28,note c.

The Packington epitome also gives the figure of 1,000 men-at-arms for Blois’s force (above,n. 12); Historia aurea (Jones version) says 1,500 men-at-arms and 2,000 crossbowmen and6,000 brigands (light infantry) and “tarasonum” and 30,000 infantry, Bretons and others. (Inthe Galbraith version, the brigands and tarasonum are given as “Carcassonensium etBiterrensium,” without the number.) The figure of 30,000 is clearly a gross exaggeration. The


of credibility, but even if they are much exaggerated, it remains clear that theEnglish were outnumbered many times over.21 It appears that Duke Charles andhis army had been pursuing Dagworth for some time before catching up withhim, and so probably would have approached Restellou from the south. If wepresume that they came into sight of Sir Thomas’ position when they reached thehigh-point of the Landujen Roc, near Le Rest, it becomes easier to see how theEnglish could have mounted a successful defense. From Le Rest, around 210mabove sea level, the Roc slopes down relatively gently at first, then drops moresharply (at about a 25% average grade) to the bed of a tributary of the Hyère, ataround 124m. Restellou sits on the crest of a hill that nestles into the fork be-tween this stream and the Hyère itself. The slope down from Restellou to thestream, a distance of about 700m, is not terribly steep, rising only about 50m.The four roads from the water to the crest converge on Restellou, which is thussomething of a road junction. The village is actually split into two segments,Restellou Tanguy on the west, Restellou Braz on the east, with a gap of about100m between the two.22 Dagworth probably put his men-at-arms in a single lineto hold this gap, with his archers occupying the buildings and the flanks; thisformation, the line of the roads, and the natural lie of the land, would tend tofunnel a French attack inward, exposing the attackers to enfilading fire from thesheltered archers. Like the funnel-shaped woods at Agincourt, it would also tendto squeeze together assaulting lines, potentially causing severe disruption.

Recognizing the difficulty of a frontal assault on this position, and wanting tomake best use of his vastly superior numbers, Duke Charles divided his armyinto two attack forces and a reserve. The first battalion, an elite element com-posed of 500 men-at-arms selected for their fighting spirit, and including manyforeign soldiers, was to dismount and move head-on against the English, withthe support of numerous crossbowmen and light infantry. The leader of this forcewas Guillaume “le Galois” de la Heuse, an experienced soldier who had recentlybeen given substantial Breton estates (worth 500 l.t. annually) by Philip VI, fromthe lands which had been seized from Aumary de Clisson.23 Supremely confident

number for the brigands is likely quite inflated, but not impossible. The other numbers matchwell with the 1,800 men-at-arms, 2,000 crossbowmen, and 600 archers reported by Dagworthto have been in Charles’ army at La Roche-Derrien a year later. In Robert of Avesbury, Degestis mirabilibus regis Edwardi tertii, ed. E. M Thompson (London, 1889), p. 388. Hereaftercited as Dagworth, “Report.”

21 The only cross-checks on the numbers given in Historia aurea are that the St. Omer Chronicle(fo. 227) has the attack led by the Galois de la Heuse as including just 80 men-at-arms, whileHistoria aurea says his force comprised 400 men-at-arms, plus infantry. The latter numberseems credible, considering the leaders of the attack; the former seems much too small. If thesix named leaders were all bannerets, a force of 500 men-at-arms would be about what onewould expect: see Philippe Contamine, Guerre, état et société à la fin du moyen âge. Etudessur les armées des rois de France, 1337–1494 (Paris, 1972), p. 43; cf. also p. 44. Even thenumbers given by the Packington epitome indicate a 5:1 ratio of forces.

22 This would then be the “strong pass” in which the St. Omer Chronicle (fo. 227) says the Englishformed up to defend themselves. On some modern maps the spelling is “Resthellou,” with an “h.”

23 First division: Historia aurea (Jones), p. 637, (Galbraith), p. 213; and the St. Omer Chronicle.Lands: J. Viard, and A. Vallée, Registre du trésor des chartes (Paris, 1979–84) III, part 2, no.5765. They were to be held directly from Duke Charles.


of success, given the small numbers opposing him, le Galois promised to captureDagworth and deliver him, bound, to Duke Charles. The second element, 400mounted men-at-arms and supporting infantry led by several Breton magnates,was to circle around behind the English and, striking from the rear, ensure thatthe English could neither win nor escape. Blois himself seems to have kept theremainder of his force in hand as a reserve, though one account implies he was incharge of the encircling force.24

Had these two attacks been coordinated effectively, there is little chance thatthe English could have beaten them off. It seems, however, that the first battalionmade its attack well before the second force had reached its position.25 In orderto stay out of view from Dagworth’s hilltop, the encircling battalion would havehad to take a surprisingly long route, likely via Duault, St.-Servais, Kerbournet,and Callac, a distance of some 13km, about five times as far as the direct ap-proach. A further delay was occasioned when this detachment ran into the wagon-laager holding the English horses, which had been sent to the rear whenDagworth’s men took up their fighting positions, and paused to collect the valu-able mounts.26 Thus, de la Heuse and his men had to fight Dagworth without thesupport they expected. Even so the Frenchmen had the benefit of superior num-bers, but thanks to the advantages of the terrain, the defensive, and the longbow,the English were able to repulse his attack with heavy losses, particularly amongthe light infantry. Also among the casualties were two of the most experiencedsoldiers on Blois’s side, le Galois and Pagan de Fontenay, the captain of Rennes,both severely wounded and captured.

Just as this attack was ebbing down the south face of the hill, the secondbattalion finally made its onslaught from the other side. The English, who hadsuffered many wounds but few or no deaths in the first combat, proved equallysuccessful in throwing back this assault. Their hilltop position was very impor-tant in this phase of the fighting. In addition to the advantages inherent in strik-ing or shooting downhill, against an enemy short of breath from a brisk climb inarmor, the hill separated the two Breton forces, making communication, and socoordination, between them very difficult. The Historia aurea, based onDagworth’s own dispatch, says the fighting went on for many hours; doubtlessthe English were often rushing back and forth over the crest, fighting off anattack from one direction and then hastening to meet the next offensive on theother side. Eventually the French lost the heart to continue the struggle, andDagworth’s men were left holding the battlefield, and also several importantprisoners who had been too badly hurt to withdraw.27

24 Historia aurea (Jones), pp. 637–8. Blois in command of encircling force: St. Omer Chronicle,quoted above, n. 16.

25 St. Omer Chronicle, above, n. 16. One version of the Historia aurea, however, says “omnessimul et semel invaserunt dictum Thomam ante et retro” (Jones, p. 638); the other does notinsist on simultaneity: “Duo isti exercitus ante et retro in virtute magna pugnare ceperunt.”Historia aurea (Galbraith, p. 213).

26 Historia aurea (Galbraith), p. 214 n.3; (Jones), p. 638.27 In addition, Gui de Rochefort “and many other knights and nobles” were killed. Historia

aurea (Galbraith), p. 213 n. 10, from Bodleian MS 240.


Their day was not yet done, however. Duke Charles gradually managed tocollect most of the survivors around his personal standard, an over-sized banner.As evening drew near, he formed his men into three divisions, positioned in frontof, behind, and on the left flank of the English position. The presence of the last-mentioned element, on the eastern face of the hill, would have made it mucheasier to coordinate the attacks of the other two; it was commanded by Charles inperson.28 The situation must have seemed nearly hopeless to Dagworth’s men,despite their incredible successes thus far. On the other hand, however, they hadnowhere to run: they were surrounded by the French on three sides, and theHyère foreclosed escape to the west.

Having sent their horses to the rear, Blois’s three divisions launched a fierce,simultaneous attack. Somehow the English again emerged victorious from thefighting that ensued. The chronicles offer no real insight into how this was ac-complished – the Historia aurea says simply that it was an obvious case of divineintervention.29 The modern historian can note a number of factors working infavor of Dagworth’s men. They still held the high ground, and the buildings ofRestellou would have strengthened their defense. Their earlier victories had boughtthem time to rest, bind their wounds, and retrieve arrows fired in the earlierfighting, and also must have greatly disheartened the French. The Englishlongbowmen were far superior to the French infantry. Even taking all these pointsinto consideration, however, it is hard to imagine anyone could have expected anEnglish victory beforehand. Yet the result was entirely clear-cut. After Blois’sfinal effort was repulsed, and Dagworth led his men – nearly all of whom werewounded, though deaths were few – back to Quimperlé to recover, he wrote areport of the combat to King Edward, “saying that all in all, he had never seenmen who were better in a difficult situation than those who were with him, norhad he heard tell of their equal anywhere.”30 Considering what his 180 men ac-complished at Restellou, Sir Thomas’s praise for their fighting qualities seemsmore than justified.

Although the sources are very thin for the subsequent period, it appearsthat the engagement at Restellou, small-scale though it was, led to the break-up of the French sieges at Lesneven, Brest, and La Roche-Derrien, buying acrucial respite for the Montfortians, and apparently even allowing Dagworthto temporarily leave the duchy so that he could participate in the Crécycampaign.31 But while Charles of Blois had been knocked down, he had not

28 Historia aurea (Jones), p. 638; (Galbraith), p. 214 and ibid. n.1.29 Historia aurea (Galbraith), p. 214; (Jones), p. 638 (“evidenti miraculo”).30 Historia aurea (Jones), p. 638 (“nullus miles vel generousus occisus fuit ex Anglicis”); 639

(“dicens quod in necessitate meliores homines in suo statu quemlibet considerando quam quicum eo fuerant numquam vidit nec audivit loqui de talibus in ullo loco.”)

31 It has normally been assumed that he did not participate in the Crécy campaign, for a numberof reasons. First, given that he fought in Brittany in early June, there would only barely havebeen time for him to return to England early enough to join the king’s expedition, especially ifhe first waited for instructions to do so. Second, he was at that time the acting royal lieutenantfor Brittany, and so one would not expect him to leave the duchy. Third, there was no evidence,documentary or chronicle, to say that he was at Crécy.


been knocked out. The quantitative superiority of the forces at his disposal hadhardly been dented.

In the spring of 1347, once again Blois collected a large field army and broughtit beneath the walls of La Roche-Derrien. With around 4,400 soldiers, not count-ing the numerous local infantry, this army was far larger than the sum total of allof the Anglo-Breton garrisons in the peninsula. Indeed, again without countingthe common infantry, it was on a par with the force King Edward himself hadcommanded while he was in the duchy in 1343, which had included the earls ofNorthampton, Devon, Gloucester, Warwick, Pembroke, Derby, Salisbury, Suf-folk, and Oxford, among other captains.32

It is fairly clear that Sir Thomas Dagworth, Northampton’s brother-in-law andnow Edward III’s lieutenant in Brittany, had no desire to do battle with this im-posing host. Even to raise a field force of 1,000 skilled fighters was quite beyondhis power. The best he could manage was 300 men-at-arms and 400 archers. Hedoubtless would much have preferred to let the siege continue indefinitely, hop-ing that it might collapse when Blois ran out of money or supplies.33 But Bloishad brought up nine large siege engines, trebuchets presumably, which castmassive stones over the walls. One of these missiles, weighing over 300 pounds,smashed though the walls of the residence of Sir Richard Totesham, the garrisoncommander, and nearly crushed his wife and newborn child. Despite the pres-sure of this fire and of frequent assaults on the walls, Totesham refused to con-sider surrendering the town for several weeks. Around mid-June, however, he

The St. Omer Chronicle (fo. 217), however, lists him among the bannerets in that expedition(stationed in the Prince’s division, which bore the brunt of the fighting) and the Historia Roffensisconfirms this, noting (fo. 63) that after his first defeat of Blois “ad Angliam remeavit cum regein Franciam transiturus.” The testimony of two entirely independent chronicles, both well-informed on military matters, one French, one English, is not lightly to be dismissed in theabsence of positive evidence to the contrary. Furthermore, although the timing was tight, it wasnot impossibly so, especially since the contrary winds faced by Edward III while waiting toembark would have been favorable winds for Dagworth’s return. And while Edward would nothave wanted to leave Brittany unattended, he would also have been very eager to hear first-hand how a small band of Englishmen had succeeded in defeating a much larger French forcewith a vast superiority in men-at-arms, since he himself was hoping to do the same on a largerscale. The value of Sir Thomas’s presence and the circulation of his war stories for the moraleof the royal army would have been tremendous. Finally, his absence from the financial recordsof the campaign is certainly not decisive evidence of his absence from the campaign itself. TheEarl of Northampton, whose protégé and military right-hand man Dagworth was, is recordedas having served with two bannerets in his retinue, one of whom could possibly have been SirThomas.

32 Andrew Ayton, Knights and Warhorses: Military Service and the English Aristocracy underEdward III (Woodbridge, 1994), p. 261, based on pay records, estimates Edward’s forces onChristmas of 1342 at 3,600–3,700 men, plus Bretons and several hundred men serving unpaidin return for charters of pardon. For Blois’s strength, see below.

33 The English were famous for being willing to fight against long odds, but in this case thedisparity was too great. Granted this assumption, there is no “mystery” as to “why Sir ThomasDagworth delayed so long in going to the relief of the sorely stricken town.” Cf. Burne, CrecyWar, p. 91.


was compelled to accept a surrender treaty. He promised to surrender the townand castle if not relieved within eight days, the lives and goods of his men andthe townspeople to be spared.34

Although it was proceeding well from the French standpoint, the siege of LaRoche-Derrien was nonetheless a difficult operation. Any siege force had to guardagainst surprise attacks, either sallies by the garrison or relief attempts fromoutside, and it was difficult to be ready at all times and in all directions. Theparticularities of the terrain in this location made this problem particularly acute.But surrender agreements such as the one Charles negotiated normally providedfor a truce between the garrison and the besiegers to last during the waiting

34 Grandes chroniques, 9:300.

KeyND Chapel of Notre DameH HospitalCD Castel-DuPJ Porte de JumentContours in meters, at 10m intervals

Scale of 500 meters


period.35 This would have allowed Blois to concentrate on preparing to meet anyattempt to raise the siege which Dagworth might make.

To make the siege effective, Blois had needed to encircle the town, so that thedefenders could not escape, and reinforcements or supplies could not reach themfrom outside.36 This had required him to occupy a front of roughly 6 km, a sig-nificant dispersion inherently involving the risk of defeat in detail. What madethis especially perilous in the case of La Roche-Derrien was that the river Jaudyencircled the town along roughly half its circuit (the western half), and two othersignificant creeks split the “pie” of the encircling area as well: one from Pommerit-Jaudy to the Jaudy just east of the town, the other running from Langoat to LaRoche-Derrien. Thus the circuit was cut into two halves by the Jaudy, and eachhalf was split again by a smaller creek, so that there were naturally four sectors.Two of these were occupied by large forces, two by smaller detachments.37

One large force held the quadrant south-west of the town, from Langoat to theJaudy bridge (which led into the town), in the fields known as the “Place-Vert.”38

This sector included the ruins of a large earthwork fortification, in modern timescalled the Castel-Du or Château Noir, with banks some 150 yards by 100 yards,and up to 18 feet high.39 This fortification would have anchored and strength-ened the defense of this part of the field, but it was not large enough to shelter allthe troops in its sector, nor would placing all the troops in the area inside the

35 Assuming that this was the case here, the truce agreement probably specified – as the treaty forthe surrender of Berwick had done in 1333 – that the intermediate truce would not forbid thegarrison from aiding the relief army once it appeared. Cf. Foedera, Conventiones, Litteraeetc., ed. Thomas Rymer, revised edition by A. Clarke, F. Holbrooke and J. Coley, 4 vols. in 7parts (London, 1816–69), II, part 2, 863–5.

36 Grandes chroniques, 9:299; Jean Froissart, Oeuvres, ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove (1870–77; re-print, Osnabrück, 1967), 5:169 (“toute la ville et le chastiel ossi”) contra Burne, Crecy War,pp. 90–1. If Dagworth could inject reinforcements and supplies into the town, it might havecounted as “relief” in terms of abrogating the surrender treaty. Cf. Rogers, War Cruel andSharp, pp. 66–8.

37 Though to be precise, if the Grandes chroniques are correct, the border between the south-eastern force and its north-eastern neighbor was the main road leading to the Porte de Jument,rather than the creek somewhat further north.

38 Grandes chroniques, 9:298; “vallem viridem” in Chronique de Richard Lescot, religieux deSaint-Denis (1328–1344), suivie de la continuation de cette chronique (1344–64), ed. JeanLemoine (Paris, 1862), p. 77.

39 Burne, Crecy War, pp. 90–1, 96; La Borderie, Histoire, 3:503n, writes: “la Place Vert semblerépondre à une pièce de terre dite aujourd’hui Castel-Du, dans une situation correspondante,en la paroisse de Langoat: pièce de terre tenant environ un hectare, de forme à peu prèstriangulaire, entourée d’un douve et d’une énorme retranchement en terre …”; but Morice, Ithink rightly, refers to “la Place verte, du côté de la riviére de Jaudi …” (from which theCastel-Du is separated by around 400 meters), Morice, Histoire, 1:276. The Grandes chroniques(9:298) says this company was stationed “en I lieu qui est apellé la Place Vert, en la paroisse deLangoet, oultre l’yaue qui est appellée Yaudi.” It adds that Blois “ordena et commanda à ceulzqui là estoient … qu’il ne venissent point à nulle autre compaignie …” Note the use of là ratherthan dedens (and similarly on pp. 302–3, “au lieu qui est dit la Place Vert”; though on the otherhand on p. 301 it does refer to those “en la Place Vert”; and on p. 303 it is noted that the menthere “ne savoient riens de tout ce qui estoit fait en l’ost du duc, car il estoient assez loing del’ost du duc, et estoit la riviere et la ville de la Roche Derian entre eulz”).


earthworks as a “garrison” have been a sensible deployment.40

The other main force, under Charles of Blois himself, occupied the groundjust east of the Place Vert, across the river Jaudy, extending from the chapel ofNotre-Dame-de-Pitié along the bank to the Porte de Jument, which opened ontothe Guingamp road.41 Each of the two main divisions also had a smaller forcelinked to it on its north. The defeat of either of these minor elements would nothave been disastrous, and they were in any case strongly positioned, each withone flank protected by one of the main forces and the other flank anchored onthe wide northern segment of the Jaudy. It was thought that the English weremost likely to strike the force at the Place Vert.42

Blois rightly anticipated that Dagworth would attempt a night or dawn attackto compensate for his badly inferior numbers43 – discounting the local levies, theAnglo-Breton force was outnumbered by over five to one – and to minimize theadvantage which Blois would gain from holding to the tactical defensive, whichthe strategic situation allowed the Duke to do. The French could even predict,roughly, when the English attack would be made, since, as noted above, they hadnegotiated a contract obliging the defenders to surrender the town if not relievedwithin eight days of the agreement.44 (This was a very common occurrence inmedieval warfare, especially in cases where a siege was to be used as bait todraw an enemy into battle.)45 Duke Charles evidently also guessed, rightly, thatDagworth would limit his initial main effort to just one sector of the siege lines,and furthermore that Sir Thomas might try to improve his odds by first staging ademonstration against a different portion of the camp, both to cause confusion

40 Contra Burne, Crecy War, p. 90, and La Borderie, Histoire, 3:503. Dagworth says the French had4,400 soldiers, not counting the numerous common footsoldiers, whom by implication (subtract-ing Dagworth’s figures) Froissart numbers at around 9,000. If we reduce that latter figure bymore than half, and say there were just 8,800 men under Blois in total, that suggests a total ofaround 2,500 in the contingent at Place Vert, by an extremely rough estimate. A fort the size ofthe Place Vert would only require about 400 to 500 men to man the walls completely, at onesoldier per yard of frontage. Furthermore, a substantial number of troops would have had to havebeen stationed outside the ruined fort in order to block the English from reinforcing or resupply-ing La Roche-Derrien. If 2,500 fighting men were crammed within the embankments (which, ifLa Borderie’s figure of “a bit under a hectare” for the enclosed area is correct, would allow lessthan 2 m x 2 m of ground for each soldier, with no additional room allowed for servants, latrines,assembly spaces, etc.) they would have taken far longer to simply exit into the open fields andform up than it would have taken for a body of cavalry to brush past them and enter the town –especially if the relieving force used a few men to block the exits from the earthwork.

41 The current chapel is a construction of the 18th century, but the granite cross it contains sug-gests the site is much older. Until 1999, the grounds included an ancient yew supposed to havebeen planted by du Guesclin. Local tradition (as reported on the town’s website) says thechapel was built on the site of the capture of Charles of Blois, but it is on ground too low-lyingto serve as a windmill site, or to be called a “montaigne”; cf. Grandes chroniques, 9:304.

42 Grandes chroniques, 9:298, 301, 305.43 St. Omer, fo. 227v: “Quant li dux sot que si anemi venoient, bien pensoit que de nuit le venroient

assallir.”44 Grandes chroniques, 9:300.45 E.g. cf. War Cruel and Sharp, pp. 64–7; Anonimalle Chronicle 1333–1381, ed. V. H. Galbraith

(Manchester, 1927), pp. 35–6.


and to draw troops away from the target of his real assault.46 To prevent this tacticfrom succeeding, Blois planned to have whatever portion of his line was at-tacked fight strictly on the defensive (an easier task than attacking, especially indarkness). His own force, by far the largest of his divisions, would go to the aidof the threatened sector if it were not attacked itself. But he strictly ordered themen stationed in the Place Vert (and presumably those in the smaller contingentsas well) to hold their positions during the night, regardless of what they mightsee or hear happening elsewhere. “If Sir Thomas Dagworth comes to us, we canhandle him well enough without any help,” he explained, “while if he comesagainst you, you will barely be able to take him on without assistance.”47

To further minimize the damage a surprise attack could inflict, Blois hadhad his camps surrounded by a trench and an earthen embankment. Field forti-fications of this sort would provide a great advantage to the troops fightingfrom behind them, if properly manned, but were not substantial enough topose a major obstacle to a determined assault in and of themselves.48 Ratherthan strengthening these defenses further, however, Blois had directed his labor-ers’ energies to creating a cleared zone more than a mile wide around the perim-eter of the camps. Within this area, all ditches were filled, and all hedges razed.49

At first glance this seems somewhat of an odd step. It would not help preventthe surprise night attack Blois expected. Indeed, it would make such an attackmore likely to achieve surprise. Hedges and ditches would have channeled theadvance of an army onto the roads (especially if it were marching by night),which could realistically be warded by sentinels in a way that extensive openfields could not. The French action makes more sense when we take note of theGrandes chroniques’ observation that Blois’s primary objective was not simplyto keep his army intact long enough to conclude the siege and capture the town;rather, he was using the siege essentially as “bait” to draw Dagworth into a battle.50

(This was essentially the same strategy Edward III had employed successfully inhis siege of Berwick in 1333, leading to the Battle of Halidon Hill, and

46 Grandes chroniques, 9:298–93, 303.47 Grandes chroniques, 9:303. Note that the first half of the sentence should free Blois of the

blame he has sometimes been given for not having any thought that Dagworth might approachby some other route – e.g. François Plaine, “La journée de La Roche-Derrien (18 juin 1347),”Association bretonne, session de Guingamp (1875), p. 244. Charles recognized and allowedfor that possibility, though he did not consider it probable.

48 Dagworth in his dispatch, in Avesbury, Gestis, p. 388, makes them sound more formidable(“graundes forteresces de fosses entour luy”), but two facts indicate otherwise: (1) none of thechronicles mentions them either in describing Blois’s preparations or in narrating the fighting,and (2) Dagworth’s initial attack was able to get past them and inflict substantial damage onthe men in the camp.

49 Dagworth’s dispatch (ibid.) says half a local league, which would be about 2200 meters. RonaldZupko, French Weights and Measures before the Revolution (Bloomington, 1978), s.v. “lieue,”assuming the standard league of 3 Roman miles (4.411 km).

50 Grandes chroniques, 9:300: “les noz eussent prise la ville s’il eussent voulu … [mais le duc] nevoult prendre la ville jusques atant que messire Thomas Dagorn … venist, et qu’il fust pris …”See also Richard Lescot, Chronique de Richard Lescot, religieux de Saint-Denis (1328–1344),suivie de la continuation de cette chronique (1344–64), ed. Jean Lemoine (Paris, 1862), p. 78.


unsuccessfully with the siege of Tournai in 1340, and which he was indeed atthis same time using to try to draw the French into a battle outside Calais.)51 IfBlois had fortified his troops too strongly, the result might be Dagworth accept-ing the loss of La Roche-Derrien rather than attacking. So the French commanderwanted to leave the English room for a “fair” fight (one where they would nothave any advantages of terrain to defend their archers) so that they would bewilling to give battle, but not likely to win it against his superior numbers.52

It was not a bad plan, in principle, especially considering that in the event of anight attack Blois’s primary concern was to avoid defeat, rather than to achieve vic-tory. All he had to do was drive off the attackers. As long as he could manage thatmuch, the Anglo-Montfortians would still be left with the need to give battle bydaylight, in the open fields, or accept the loss of the town.53 The fact that in the endBlois could not achieve even this limited defensive objective, that his plan did fail,disastrously, is a testament to the extraordinary fighting spirit and skill of Dagworthand his men, including the garrison and militia of the town under Richard Totesham.

On the nineteenth of June, the day before the battle,54 Dagworth’s forces ad-vanced unopposed to the abbey of Bégard, just fourteen kilometers from La Roche-Derrien.55 The monks had fled long since, but the remaining servants were notharmed by the Anglo-Breton army.56 Under his direct command Sir Thomas hadsome 300 men-at-arms and 400 archers, aside from a substantial number of localfootmen, reportedly numbering in the thousands.57 It was not much to throw intothe balance against Blois’s 1,600–1,800 men-at-arms, 2,600 archers andcrossbowmen, and numerous light infantrymen, many of them local peasants

51 See War Cruel and Sharp, chs. 4, 9, 12.52 If Blois did succeed in bringing on a battle, it would be to his advantage for the terrain to be

clear, to prevent the English from defending their archers with a hedge, and to allow him morefreedom to deploy his superior numbers. (Dagworth’s report on the battle, p. 388: “par quemez archiers ne puissent trover lor avauntage sur luy et sur sez gentz, mes covient a fin forcede combatre en pleins champes.”) Blois’s intent was not to “provide a good ‘field of fire’”; thatwould not have been to his advantage, given the superiority of the English longbowmen, whichhad recently been demonstrated at Crécy.

53 Note Froissart, Oeuvres, 5:169: the Anglo-Breton leadership, learning of the siege of the town,“ne l’euissent, pour leur honneur, jamais laissiet.”

54 Assuming the date in Dagworth’s dispatch is correct, though the funeral monument of Guy deLaval indicates the battle was fought on the 18th. La Borderie, Histoire, 3:505n.

55 Froissart, in what Lettenhove calls his fourth redaction, suggests that they were undetected aswell as unopposed (“riens ne savoit messires Carles de Blois de lor convenant.” Oeuvres,5:172), but Dagworth says “savoient luy et sez gentz par lor espies ma venue sur eaux, etfusrent en lost armez tout la nuyt.” In Avesbury, Gestis, 388. Most likely the French knewsomething of the English movement, but did not realize how close they had come – otherwiseBlois would probably have kept his whole army under arms, not just the troops at Place Vert.See below, n. 64.

56 Grandes chroniques, 9:300.57 Dagworth’s dispatch (in Avesbury, Gestis, p. 389) says he had 300 men-at-arms, but two

chronicle sources (Thomas Burton, Chronica monasterii de Melsa, ed. E. A. Bond. 3 vols.[London, 1866–68], 3:64 and Corpus Christi College, Oxford, MS78, fo. 176 – the latter pos-sibly due to a misreading of Packington’s chronicle [cf. British Library, Cottonian MSS, TiberiusA VI, fos. 196–196v], confusing the battle of La Roche-Derrien with the fight a year earlier)say 200. The difference may be the 100 men-at-arms under the Celtic Breton knight Garnier de


armed with staff-slings.58 On the other hand, taking into account the quality ofthe English troops, the potential advantage of surprise, the inevitably fractureddeployment that the terrain imposed on the French, and the help Dagworth couldexpect to receive from the troops of the garrison (which included 80 more men-at-arms),59 the situation was not entirely hopeless. He had reason not to overesti-mate the importance of his enemy’s numerical superiority. Aside from his ownearlier victory over Blois, and his probable personal experience at the battle ofCrécy, Dagworth certainly knew men who had helped overcome even greaterodds at Dupplin Moor in 1332.60 Doubtless he had received full reports of Henryof Lancaster’s recent victories over much larger numbers at Bergerac andAuberoche in Aquitaine. Both Dupplin Moor and Auberoche had begun withsurprise night or dawn attacks on enemy encampments, and whether inspired bythose examples or simply compelled by the logic of the situation, Dagworthplanned something similar61 – just as Blois expected.

Cadoudal whom Froissart says arrived only after the first phase of the battle (see below).Dagworth does not mention the local infantry, but the St. Omer Chronicle says he had some3,000 infantry, “both archers and others,” suggesting a force of some 2,600 local foot. (Froissart,in his “second redaction,” says 8,000 foot. Oeuvres, 5:169.) If we place any credence in thestatement of the St. Omer Chronicle that over 2,000 of Dagworth’s men were killed in thepursuit after their defeat in the first stage of the battle, that likewise implies a total infantrystrength of several thousand. Given the substantial portion of Brittany – especially CelticBrittany – still loyal to the Montfortist cause, a contingent of local footmen on this scale iscertainly not impossible.

58 Dagworth, “Report,” in Avesbury, Gestis, 388, says Blois had 1,200 knights and esquires and600 “other men-at-arms” of lower status, plus 600 archers and 2,000 crossbowmen. This matcheswell enough with Froissart’s 1,600 “armures de fer” (including 23 bannerets and 400 knights)and 12,000 total foot. Oeuvres, 5:167, 169, 172. Melsa, 3:64, says Blois had 2,000 men-at-arms (equitum); the figure of 1,000 men-at-arms given by CCCO MS 78, fo. 176 seems to bea major understatement. Again, it may be from a misreading of Packington.

Sumption, Trial by Battle, p. 574, gives his force as “1,200 men-at-arms, 2,000 crossbowmenand some 600 other infantry in addition to an enormous number of volunteers from the sur-rounding region armed with sticks and stones who came to join him after his arrival.” Thisappears to be based on Dagworth’s numbers, though it is a mystery what happened to the 600non-noble men-at-arms Dagworth mentions in addition to the 1,200 knights and esquires. (InAvesbury, Gestis, 388: “avoit en sa companye mil CC. des nettez gentz darmes, chivalers etesquiers, et DC. dautres gentz darmes, et des archiers du pais DC., et MlMl balisters, et decomune jeo ne savoi la nombre.”) It should also be noted that Blois’s common infantry prob-ably included substantial numbers whom he had brought with him, not only the locals whojoined him with their staff-slings (Sumption’s “sticks and stones”: “fondes pendenz à bastons”in the Grandes chroniques, 9:299.)

59 St. Omer Chronicle, fo. 227v.60 Assuming he did indeed serve on the Crécy chevauchée (see above, note 31), it would have

been in company with Richard Talbot (Steward of the King’s Household) and Thomas Ughtred,both veterans of Dupplin. Even if he did not fight at Crécy, the number of Edward’s fightingbannerets was not all that great, and it seems likely Dagworth would have known these twoand Walter Mauny, another Dupplin man, one way or another, especially considering thatDagworth was the lieutenant and brother-in-law of the Earl of Northampton, King Edward’sConstable – who had also defeated a much larger Bloisian army at Morlaix in 1342. (OnDagworth’s marriage to Eleanor de Bohun, see Jones, “Dagworth,” 626.)

61 Froissart, Oeuvres, 5:173.


The Frenchman, however, had thought it most likely that Dagworth woulddirect his main assault at the Place Vert. The troops there were on full alert,armed and drawn up for a fight. Sir Thomas’s scouts apparently reported, how-ever, that the enemy forces on the far side of the Jaudy were less ready to resistan attack.62 He may not have known about Blois’s orders for the men at the PlaceVert to hold their positions, but by striking near the river and blocking the crossing,he could hope to keep reinforcements at bay in any case. Before launching hisattack on Charles’s main body, however, he arranged a feint. The army left Bégardaround midnight, traveling just north of east to cross the Jaudy and join the mainroad which linked La Roche to Guingamp.63 Once the force came near the town,the servants and wagoners of his army were dispatched to take up positions oppo-site the north-eastern sector of the French lines, between the lepers’ hospital andthe mill, under cover of darkness.64 At the same time Dagworth’s elite fighting-

62 He says in his dispatch (Avesbury, Gestis, 388) – and Sumption, Trial by Battle, 574, acceptshis testimony – that the French “knew of my coming against them through their spies, and theywere collected and in arms all the night.” This last may have been true of the men at Place Vert,where Dagworth was expected to make his attack, but it is clear from the Grandes chroniques(and from the initial success of the English attack) that in the eastern sector of the French camponly the watch was fully ready for combat, the bulk of the men still not being “parfaitementarmez” when Dagworth struck, despite having at least some warning from the watch. (“l’ostqui estoit en la Place Vert … s’estoit appareillié à combatre vertueusement encontre ledit messireThomas Dagorn. Mais ledit messire Thomas sceut par aventure comment il estoient fors; si setourna vers l’ost du duc. Et le duc et sa compaignie cuidoient qu’il s’en alast de l’autre part etne se gardoient pas de lui … avant qu’il fussent parfaitement armes, les anemis les assailirent…” Grandes chroniques, 9:301.) It is hard to imagine how Dagworth’s relatively small armycould have “fought their way through the siege works” (Sumption, Trial by Battle, p. 574), hadthe French indeed been fully armed, drawn up, and waiting for them. Indeed, Lescot, p. 79 saysthat the watch had to wake the soldiers who were sleeping, as well as calling them to arms.

However, it should be noted that the St. Omer chronicle, fo. 227v, supports Dagworth on thispoint: “Quant li dux sot que si anemi venoient bien pensoit que de nuit le venroient assallir. Etpour chou fist commander par tout lost que tout fuissent en armes.”

63 Grandes chroniques, 9:301: “par la grant voie qui va à la Roche Derain” east of the Jaudi; thiscan only be the Guingamp road.

64 Sumption, Trial by Battle, p. 574, says the diversionary attack was made on the west, but this isnot correct. According to the Grandes chroniques, p. 301, he “savoit bien quel part le duc estoit,et là mist plusseurs charroy et plusseurs varlez … entre le moulin et la maladerie,” and the actionbegan when “commencierent à crier les varles qui estoient vers la maladerie.” (In Lescot, p. 79,“entre le moulin et la maladerie” becomes “inter molendinum ad ventum et leprosariam.”) Thefact that this was said to be “là” where “le duc estoit” clearly means it was east of the river. Themaladerie was probably located near where the current cemetery is, along the Guingamp road,which led into the Porte de Jument, the eastern boundary of the Duke’s sector. Dagworth’s ap-proach to Roche-Derrien was along this road; the stream which divides the southern from thenorth-eastern sector runs a short distance east of it. Thus the varlets were on the boundary be-tween the Duke’s sector and the next one to the east; the intent was presumably to pull troopsaway from the Jaudy crossing which linked the two largest elements of the French force, a linkwhich Dagworth hoped to cut.


men quietly split off to the west, to within striking range of Blois’s own force.65

The action was begun by the diversionary force, which suddenly began a greatclamor as if making an attack. It was half-way between midnight and dawn, onan exceptionally dark night.66 The lords of Beaumanoir67 and Derval, who werein charge of the watch, moved in that direction to investigate the uproar. This wasa foolish move. Blois did intend that his main division would go to the aid of thesmaller forces if they were attacked, but, especially given that the probability ofa diversionary attack by the English had specifically been noted already, thewatch should not have abandoned its initial positions until after the troops of themain division had been given time to rouse and arm themselves.68 As it was, themen of the watch did still detect the English strike force and sound the alarmbefore Dagworth launched his assault, but only barely.69 At first the Anglo-Montfortians had all the advantages of surprise, and wrought considerable havoc.70

It is not clear whether Dagworth meant to push this fight to the end, or whetherit was supposed to be a hit-and-run operation to improve the odds for a set-piecebattle the next day, as Froissart suggests.71 In any case, the struggle continueduntil the whole French army was aroused.72 The troops west of the river heldsteady in their positions, but the men in Blois’s division alone easily outnum-bered Dagworth’s soldiers. The Anglo-Montfortians did enjoy one major advan-tage: before the fight, their commander had given them a watchword so that theycould identify one another in the darkness. They were instructed to speak it onlysoftly, and to immediately kill anyone who gave it in a loud voice, who could bepresumed to be a Frenchman who had overheard it.73 Although this certainlyhelped them greatly in the fighting, in the end the attackers were overwhelmed

65 Froissart says in what Lettenhove terms his first and second redactions that Dagworth took onlyhalf his men with him for the night attack, but it seems very unlikely that he left behind any of hisbetter troops, though he might well have left behind the men he did not think could be counted onin a night-fight. He would have needed to do as much damage as he could while he had someadvantage from surprise and darkness, and so would have employed all the force available, ratherthan holding any substantial number back to fight under less advantageous circumstances later.In his “fourth” redaction, which for Roche-Derrien is the best and most detailed, he simply saysthat “part” of the force was designated for the attack, while some men stayed behind. Oeuvres,5:168, 169, 173.

66 Dagworth, “Report,” p. 389; Grandes chroniques, 9:301, 304; Lescot, p. 79 (“nox obscurissima”).67 The Grandes chroniques, 9:301, says “Robert, ayol du seigneur de Biaumanoir,” presumably this

means the grandfather of the lord of Beaumanoir at the time the chronicle was being written, notthe grandfather of the lord of Beaumanoir killed at the battle. St. Omer Chronicle says: “Et cellenuit fist le gait uns chevaliers que on apelloit le signeur de biaumanoir.”

68 The Grandes chroniques, 9:301, note that some of the knights of the watch – the author circum-spectly refrains from blaming Beaumanoir and Derval specifically – “ne faisoient pas bien leurdevoir, si comme l’en dit, car il ne veilloient pas bien.”

69 Grandes chroniques, 9:301; cf. Lescot, p. 79. Burne is thus mistaken to say that the French hadno sentinels out. He also fails to mention the use of the diversionary attack. Crecy War, p. 93;likewise DeVries, Infantry Warfare, p. 190.

70 Froissart, Oeuvres, 5:173, 170.71 Oeuvres, 5:173, 167–8.72 Froissart, Oeuvres, 5:170, 173; St. Omer Chronicle, fo. 227v.73 Grandes chroniques, 9:300–01.


by weight of numbers as more and more of their enemies piled into the combat,bearing blazing torches.74 Dagworth himself was captured, severely wounded:he was a man of “to hy a corage to fly,” a fact that would later result in his deathin a skirmish in 1350.75 His surviving troops broke and fled; the French pursuedfor some distance, striking down hundreds of them.76

That would have been the end of the battle, had it not been for Garnier, sire deCadouadal, a Breton-speaking knight loyal to the Montfort party.77 This martialnobleman was considered a particularly skillful warrior. In 1342, while EdwardIII was besieging Vannes, he had been one of two Breton lords assigned to guardthe eastern approaches into the duchy against a French offensive, with a “greatnumber of men-at-arms.”78 Presumably having proceeded to the rendezvous fromhis lands around Ploërmel, he had arrived too late to participate in the initialattack on Blois’s camp. But after the fugitives from La Roche-Derrien rallied attheir base at Bégard, he arrived there with 100 fresh, picked men-at-arms.79

It is very difficult to persuade defeated men who have lost their leader toresume the offensive. Sir Garnier, however, managed the trick, arguing that theFrench would now be careless and off their guard, thinking that they were done

74 Grandes chroniques, 9:302; Froissart, Oeuvres, 5:173, 168; Lescot, p. 79 (torches). The St.Omer Chronicle, fo. 227v, says that troops piled into the fight from all over the army, but thetestimony of the Grandes chroniques regarding the troops at the Place Vert should be pre-ferred.

75 Grandes chroniques, 9:301–2. Corage: Leland’s notes of the missing portion of the Scalacronica,in Thomas Gray, Scalacronica ed. and trans. Sir Herbert Maxwell (Glasgow: James Maclehose& Sons, 1907), p. 117. Wounded: Froissart, Oeuvres, 5:173.

76 The Grandes chroniques, 9:302, note his capture and indicate that this temporarily brought anend to the battle, which had to “begin a second time” (“commença derechief”) when Englishreinforcements arrived. Since the reinforcements are said to have rescued Dagworth as he wasbeing led to the Duke’s tents, this is clearly a reference to the same phase of the battle asdescribed in the St. Omer Chronicle, fo. 227v: “Et quant li engles virent le force de leursanemis croistre a la fuite se misent. La en ot mort pres de .ij.m. Et quant li jours fu esclarchis etle cache fu remese [sic] li dus o tout ses haus barons se retraisent vers lors tentes aveuc pau degent …” At this point the chronicler has Dagworth rescued by the garrison’s sally. Like Froissart,he has conflated the two rescues into one; Froissart notes only Cadoudal’s; the St. Omer chroni-cler notes only the garrison’s.

77 Froissart, Oeuvres, 5:173 (“ensi que tous desconfis, et furent sus un estat que de tantos départir.”)78 Account of the lieutenant of the bailli of the Cotentin (appendix VII to Lescot), p. 229: “plusieurs

aliez de Bretaigne ovecques ledit Roy [Edward] qui guetoient les passages, c’est assavoirmonseigneur Olivier de la Chapelle et monseigneur G. de Cadoudal, chevaliers, qui estoient àgrant nombre des gentz d’armes, pour quetier ceulx qui de par le Roy [Philip] nostre sirevenoient en Bretaigne, et estoit ledit monseigneur Olivier à Pillemiq, près de Nantes, et l’autreen la forest de Villequartier, près de Dol et de Pontorson.” Also: “ledit Cadoudal espioit pourentrer ou chastel de Pontorson et du Mont Saint-Michiel.” One should always take Froissart’stestimony with a certain skepticism, but this documentary evidence shows that he knew enoughto make a very credible identification of the leader of the second strike, and other sources,including the Grandes chroniques and the St. Omer Chronicle, agree that Dagworth was res-cued by a new offensive after he had been captured and his men defeated, which fits very wellwith Froissart’s narrative (except that the St. Omer chronicle has this rescue performed by thegarrison in its sally, conflating two events into one.)

79 Ploërmel: Froissart, Chroniques, ed. Ainsworth, p. 628n. Arrival, men-at-arms: Froissart,Oeuvres, 5:174, 170.


with fighting for the night. There was still good cause to hope that Dagworthcould be rescued, and the battle won.80 This reasoning was sound, but underthese circumstances logical thinking is often insufficient to move men to action.That this Breton knight succeeded says as much about the quality of Dagworth’smen as it does about his own leadership.

Just as Cadoudal predicted, the French, after capturing Dagworth, thoughtthey had won the battle. No watch was organized, and many of the soldiers hadremoved their armor to recover from their efforts. Some were sleeping, or cel-ebrating their victory with wine and food.81 Sir Thomas was being led towardsBlois’s tent by his captors when the rallied Anglo-Breton forces struck again.82

The surprise was greater than before, and despite their small numbers the attack-ers were able to rescue their commander and inflict a great deal of damage.83 Inthe chaos and darkness, numbers of Frenchmen were killed by their own com-rades.84 Once again, however, the French numbers were so far superior that thebattle eventually turned against the Englishmen. Duke Charles personally di-rected the counterattack. Dagworth was forced to surrender a second time, re-portedly captured by Blois himself.85 Small groups of Englishmen continued thefight in scattered pockets, but the situation looked grim for them.86

It was now almost dawn, and growing light enough to see. The French troopswest of the river, in accordance with their orders, still had not moved from theirinitial position.87 Neither, thus far, had Richard Totesham and the garrison of LaRoche-Derrien, for similar reasons. For all they knew, the commotion might be agrand deception, intended to lure them out into an ambush and deliver their strong-hold into enemy hands. Once the glow on the horizon was bright enough forthem to discern that the fighting had been real, however, Totesham decided tothrow everything he had into a bold attempt to reverse the outcome of the battle.88

Considering that he had already arranged to surrender on favorable terms if notrelieved, this was a risky and admirable choice. Had he failed, it might in retro-spect have seemed a foolish step. But he did not fail.80 Froissart, Oeuvres, 5:174.81 Froissart, Oeuvres, 5:175, 170–1.82 Both the Grandes chroniques (9:302) and the St. Omer Chronicle (fo. 227v) describe Dagworth

being rescued as he was being led back to the Duke’s tents. The Grandes chroniques sets thisepisode after this first capture, and have him rescued by the “autre bataille” which re-openedthe combat thereafter. St. Omer does not mention that he was captured twice, nor that theEnglish were defeated twice, but sets this episode after the French have defeated and pursuedthe English, and has the garrison as the rescuers. The Grandes chroniques is in general thebetter account, and it seems that here the St. Omer chronicler has conflated two separate phasesof the battle.

83 Froissart, Oeuvres, 5:175, 171.84 Grandes chroniques, 9:302.85 Grandes chroniques, 9:302; note also Lescot, p. 79. Froissart leaves out this second defeat and

the garrison’s intervention.86 Grandes chroniques, 9:302.87 Grandes chroniques, 9:302–3.88 Dagworth, “Report,” in Avesbury, Gestis, p. 389: “la garnison de Rochedirian … issoient,

quant il fust cler jour et nous purroient conustre, et vindrent vers nous sur lez enemys multchivalrousment”; Grandes chroniques, 9:302.


Out of the town’s gates suddenly poured a river of fresh men-at-arms, ar-chers, and urban militiamen, 500 “strong and determined fighters” in all. Thelarge majority of the townsmen were loyal to the Montfortian party,89 andTotesham, remarkably, had built on this to the point where they were willing tomake a dangerous assault on their erstwhile lord, and indeed against their ownneighbors from the countryside, who had flocked in to assist the French be-cause of the heavy impositions the garrison had placed on them during itsperiod of free dominance.90 Rather than the more typical spears, lances orswords, the new entrants to the fighting wielded fearsome short-hafted axes.91

An axe is a relatively awkward weapon, not well suited to deflecting or parry-ing an enemy’s blows, but by the principles of leverage and concentration offorce it hits with greater impact and cuts deeper than a sword-blow. For thesereasons, it was the axe rather than the sword that was often used by kings inlate-medieval battles: because of their great value as live prisoners, princescould afford to sacrifice the greater defensive value of a sword in favor of themore lethal strike of the axe.92

The troops spilling out of the town carried with them some extra axes andarmor, with which they rearmed the numerous English prisoners they rescued.93

(The prisoners from the earlier actions would have been taken to the “rear” aftertheir capture, which means the garrison would have met them shortly after exit-ing the town.) Thus reinforced, they crashed forward against the same fraction ofthe French army that had already been through two stiff fights. The men of Blois’sdivision had been in combat for a quarter of the night already, and must havebeen exhausted. They were unable to check this new onslaught. The attackerscut their way from one end of the camp to the other.

Duke Charles, seeing that the tide had turned against him, began to retreat. Ifhe had been able to link up with his still-unbloodied troops at the Place Vert, hewould likely have been able to restore the situation. But the troops west of theriver continued to hold their positions, as they had been strictly ordered to do,and Charles could not make his way to them through the English. Instead he fell

89 Froissart, Oeuvres, 5:167 (three quarters of them).90 Grandes chroniques, 9:299.91 Grandes chroniques, 9:302. There is no mention in the sources of the use of bows, though it

was by now light enough for that to have been feasible. This is probably because of the close-quarters, intermixed nature of the fighting.

It is worth noting that La Roche-Derrien has had a population of around 800–1,000 be-tween 1825 and now. The garrison was probably around 240 men in total (the 80 men-at-armsnoted by the St. Omer Chronicle, and two archers for each). To make up the total of 500 would,thus, have required the participation of virtually every man of military age in the town.

92 E.g. Bedford at Verneuil (Jehan de Waurin, Recueil des croniques et anchiennes istories de laGrant Bretaigne, à présent nommé Engleterre, ed. William Hardy. 4 vols. [London, 1868–1891], 3:114); Robert Bruce at Bannockburn; Peter of Cyprus at Alexandria in 1365 (Guillaumede Machaut, The Capture of Alexandria, trans. Janet Shirley, introduction and notes by PeterEdbury [Aldershot, 2001], p. 94); Henry V and Alençon at Agincourt (Anne Curry, ed., TheBattle of Agincourt: Sources and Interpretations [Woodbridge, 2000], pp. 52, 168).

93 Grandes chroniques, 9:303.


back onto the high ground by the lepers’ hospital.94 Hard-pressed, he and theremainder of his men set their backs to a windmill and fought for their lives. Acrowd of soldiers surrounded the Duke, clamoring for his surrender, but he re-fused to surrender to an Englishman.95 In the end, however, bleeding from noless than seven wounds,96 he was nonetheless brought down by Nicholas Lovayn,esquire, with the help of one John of “Isplyngrode.”97

What happened next is not entirely clear from the sources. The Grandes chroniquessay that “when [Blois’s] surviving men learned that their lord had been captured,

94 Grandes chroniques, 9:304: “montaigne des mesiaux.” I take “mesiaux” to be a form of“meseau,” lepers, and so a reference to the “leprosarium” mentioned by Lescot, p. 79, presum-ably the same as the “maladerie” of the Grandes chroniques, 9:301. Plaine, “Roche-Derrien,”p. 253n, reaches a similar conclusion.

95 Sumption, Trial by Battle, p. 575, writes that Charles “fought savagely, and was woundedseven times before he finally gave himself up to a Breton knight who made his way throughthe mêlée to take his surrender. No nobleman of the fourteenth century would willingly sur-render to a man too far beneath him.” There are several problems with this. First, it appears tobe based on the Grandes chroniques and the continuation of Lescot, but does not quite accu-rately reflect what the chroniclers say. They actually quite clearly describe the Duke as un-willing to surrender to any Englishman: nationality, not status, was the issue. (Grandeschroniques, 9:304: “ja à Anglois il ne se rendroit, et qu’il avoit plus chier à sourffrir mort”; cf.Lescot, p. 79: “quia Anglicus non erat.”) Second, although the Grandes chroniques are overallour best source for La Roche-Derrien, it is questionable whether this particular story shouldbe given even as much credit as Sumption allows it. The “Bernard du Châtel” of the (related )Grandes chroniques and Lescot narratives is not otherwise known to have existed, nor isLescot’s editor’s suggestion that Tanneguy du Châtel might be the captor referred to credible,considering the small scale of the fief-rente Edward granted to him in 1349. Jean le Bel,Chronique de Jean le Bel, ed. Jules Viard and Eugène Déprez, 2 vols. (Paris, 1904–5), 2:354.Furthermore, we have documentary evidence that it was in fact Nicholas Lovayn and John ofIsplyngrode who were rewarded for Blois’s capture, with the specific statement concerningLovayn that it was he who “nuper cepit de guerra” Charles of Blois. (Lescot, 80n, and below,n. 97). Thus, on this one point, the essence of the Grandes chroniques’ story is clearly wrong,so its account of the whole episode should be treated with great caution.

96 Grandes chroniques, 9:304; later sources increase it to seventeen.97 “Kolkino de Lovayn, scutifero,” received £1,166 13s. 4d., i.e. 1,750 marks, in November 1348

“by the king’s gift, both for good service done by him on behalf of the said lord king, and forthe capture of Charles of Blois, whom he recently took as a prisoner of war while on the king’sservice in Brittany.” In September 1351, another disbursement was made to “Nicholao Loveyn,militi,” apparently the same person, “in part payment of £1,066 13s. 4d. [1600 marks], part of[infra] the sum of 3,050 marks which the lord King granted him for the capture of Charles ofBlois.” In addition, also in 1351, “Johanni de Isplyngrode” received a payment towards the1,000 pounds the King had granted him “for the effective work which the said Johannes re-cently did, in praiseworthy fashion, in respect to the capture of Charles of Blois.” These en-tries from the Issue Rolls are quoted in Lescot, p. 80n.

Sumption apparently follows Lemaine (the editor of Lescot) in taking Lovayn to be a mercenaryfrom Louvain in Brabant, but it is virtually certain that he was, rather, a relative of Sir John Lovayn,a tenant in capite with lands in Suffolk and Essex who served under the younger BartholomewBurghersh in 1346–47 and died at Calais. George Wrottesley, Crecy and Calais from the PublicRecords (London, 1898), pp. 154, 78, 86, 280. Sir Nicholas also served as a captain in the 1359–60Reims campaign (Ayton, Knights, p. 266), and was granted the marriage of the daughter of SirJohn Hardreshull, a leading Brittany veteran, in 1349. He used the profits of the ransom toacquire extensive lands in Surrey and Oxfordshire from the St. John of Lageham family. G. E.Cockayne (ed.), Complete Peerage, 13 vols. (1910–59; reprint, London 2000), 11:350.


they fled like men entirely without hope.”98 This is probably oversimplified, how-ever. The numerous troops west of the Jaudy had not yet been engaged, and if theyhad all escaped unscathed, it is hard to see how the total casualties on the Frenchcould have been as extensive as they were – with around half the total number ofmen-at-arms killed, in addition to a “great number” captured. Furthermore, Dagworthin his dispatch says that “we fought with the enemy in four batailles, each after theother.”99 It is not quite clear what this means, because the word bataille can meaneither a “battle” in the sense of an engagement, or a “battle” in the sense of a divisionof an army. In either case, it could mean that after Blois’s capture, the other threeFrench divisions still continued to hold their positions and were defeated one at atime, presumably starting with the north-eastern contingent, then the men at PlaceVert, and finally those in the north-western quadrant. This would be the most naturalreading of his statement, but it too poses a problem. At the start of the battle, the forceat Place Vert was thought to be strong enough, if only barely, to defeat the English byitself. How could Dagworth’s men, after suffering the numerous casualties that mustinevitably have accompanied the chaos of a long mêlée in darkness against a numeri-cally superior foe, and after having fought to the brink of exhaustion, have defeatedthese still-unbloodied French forces, especially if the latter were seconded by thesmaller contingent to their north, as the growing daylight should have allowed?

To further obscure the situation, if by “battle” Dagworth means “engagement,”he could be counting the fight against Blois’s division as two or even three“battles.” For example, it would not be entirely unreasonable to describe the firstattack on Blois’s camp as a “battle” the English lost; the attack by Cadoudal’sforce as the second “battle,” and the offensive by the garrison as the third. Thefourth would then be an attack on one of the other divisions, presumably thenorth-eastern contingent (small enough to be defeated easily, and immediatelyto hand); but that, like the Grandes chroniques’ version, would still leave theforces west of the Jaudy escaping without casualties, and the near–100% casual-ties suffered by the French bannerets100 a puzzle. So the difficulty, in other words,is that if the troops west of the Jaudy did fight, they should have won (and theGrandes chroniques’ statement about the remaining French taking flight afterBlois’s capture would be misleading); if they did not fight, then the French lossesseem too high, and Dagworth’s statement about four “battles” cannot be inter-preted in the most natural way.

Finally, it should be noted that Sumption – clearly not at the top of his game in his study ofthese events – misstates the value of the reward given to Dagworth in exchange for Blois. Itwas indeed 25,000 écus, as Sumption says, but the privy seal authorization itself (printed in LeBel, Chroniques, 2:353) equates this sum to £4,000 and 1,250 marks, or a total of £4,833 6s.8d., not Sumption’s £3,500. This was, moreover, in addition to the 3,050 marks (£2,033 6s.8d.) promised to Lovayn and the 1,000 pounds granted to Isplyngrode. The total Edward paidfor Blois was thus £7,866 13s. 4d., still a “very moderate price,” as Sumption says, but at morethan twice the cost he gives.

98 Grandes chroniques, 9:304–5: “Quant ceulz de sa gent qui estoient eschapez vifs sceurent queleur signeur estoit pris, si se departirent comme touz desesperez.”

99 Report, in Avesbury, Gestis, 389: “et eusmes a feaire od les enemys, avant qil feust solaillevaunt, a iiij. batailles, chescun apres aultre.”

100 See below.


The most likely explanation of all this is that after Blois’s capture, most of theFrench soldiers did begin to fly, but that the most noble among them, motivatedby their honor and sense of duty, continued to hold their positions, deciding thatit would be better to be captured than bear any imputation of cowardice, or theblame for the defeat. We know from Dagworth’s dispatch that eventually hismen took “a great number” of French knights and esquires prisoner, though ap-parently not as many as they killed.101 Normal English practice in this period wasnot to take any prisoners until the battle had effectively been won, and it is virtu-ally certain that they followed that same rule in this fight.102 Thus, it seems mostlikely that the men-at-arms in Blois’s own division fought with remarkable cour-age to the bitter end, and that the large majority of them were killed. After thelast phase of this fight, with the capture of Blois and the men around him, theEnglish were able to reform and move against the remnants of each of the otherthree contingents in turn. These steadfast few, divided as they were, could mostlyhave been captured without their putting up too much of a fight – especiallysince the English archers would have by that point been able to contribute effec-tively with their bows.103 Of the less valorous, some may have fled right into thearms of the Anglo-Breton infantry force which, according to Froissart, followedbehind Garnier de Cadoudal’s men-at-arms when they set off from Bégard.104

The above reconstruction of the last phase of the battle could account for theexceptionally high proportion of the French leadership that was killed or cap-tured at La Roche-Derrien. The list of the principal prisoners and slain includesnearly all the bannerets in the army, 105 and reads like a roll-call of the greatest

101 Report, in Avesbury, Gestis, 389: the prisoners included “chivalers et esquiers a graunt nombre.”Grandes chroniques, 9:304: “il en tuerent plus qu’il nen pristrent.”

102 The situation effectively demanded it – the English, badly outnumbered and relying on sur-prise to make up for their inferiority, could not have spared the time to capture prisoners, northe men to guard them, while the fighting continued. Furthermore, the Grandes chroniques,9:301, explicitly state that the English had been ordered to kill (not “kill or capture”) anyonewho didn’t return the password in a low voice.

103 We can roughly estimate the breakdown of the men-at-arms in the French army as follows,starting with Dagworth’s figures of 1,200 knights and esquires and 600 non-noble men-at-arms. The force at Place Vert was thought to be comparable in strength to Dagworth’s men,potentially aided by the garrison – so, say, 400 knights and esquires plus 200 non-noble men-at-arms. Blois’s own division was substantially stronger, say by 50%, which would be 600noble and 300 non-noble men-at-arms. That would leave 100 knights and esquires and 50 non-noble men-at-arms for each of the two minor forces. If around two-thirds of Blois’s own men-at-arms were killed, in addition to some of those in the north-eastern contingent and a fewfrom the other two, that would account for the 600–700 men-at-arms Dagworth says werekilled, and fit with the Grandes chroniques’ statement (9:303) that more than half the men inBlois’s army were slain (allowing for a little hyperbole).

104 Oeuvres, 5:170, 174–5. Froissart has Garnier’s men strike not long before dawn, so the battlewould have been over before these infantrymen could have reached the field.

105 In some cases it is not clear which of these men were of banneret rank; but if Froissart iscorrect that there were 23 bannerets in the army (Oeuvres, 5:169, though 5:168 could be readas saying 23 was the number of bannerets among the slain or captured) – and the ratio of 23bannerets to 1,600–1,800 men-at-arms is somewhat high for a French force, but not out of line(cf. Contamine, Guerre, état et société, 42–3 [12 bannerets out of 1,115 men-at-arms at amuster; 6 bannerets out of 495 knights and esquires from Artois]; also Ayton, Knights and


noble houses supporting the Blois party.106 The viscount of Rohan,107 the lord ofChâteaubriant, the lord of Malestroit, the lord of Rostrenen, the lord of Rougé,the lord of Vauguion,108 the lord de la Jaille, the lord of Goulaine,109 Aumary deClisson,110 Sir William de Rieux, Sir Geoffroy de Tournemine, and Sir Ralph deMontfort were killed. In addition, it seems likely that slain included the “actinghead” of the powerful Rays family, and perhaps also a leading member of theMachecoul clan.111 Charles of Blois, the lord of Rochefort, the lord of Beaumanoir,the lord of Lohéac,112 the lord of Meillac, the lord of Tinténiac, and a son of thelord of Vauguion were captured.113 Hardest hit were the great houses of Laval,Derval, and Quintin. The lord of Laval was killed along with his brothers Raesse

Warhorses, 264n, for an English force including 34 earls and other bannerets out of 1,373men-at-arms) then surely this list must include nearly all of them.

106 The following list of those killed and captured derives, except as noted, from the Grandeschroniques, 9:303–4; Lescot, pp. 79–80; Dagworth’s dispatch, in Avesbury, Gestis, 389; GiovanniVillani’s Cronica Nova, 13:XCIII, and the St. Omer Chronicle, fos. 227v–228. The text of thelast-mentioned reads: “Mort y furent a celle journee li baneres que nous vous nommerons.C’est a savoir monsigneur de Laval, et monsigneur Jehan sen frere, le signeur de Castel Briant,le viscomte de Rohem, le signeur de Malestrait, le signeur de Brintin[?], le signeur de Derval,et monsigneur Jehan son fil, le signeur de Roistelain, monsigneur Willame de Frieus, monsigneurde la Jaille, le signeur de Machican, monsigneur des Rais et le signeur de Loihai.”

107 Alain VII. The Grandes chroniques note that he was “one of the richest men of Brittany.”Plaine (“Roche-Derrien,” p. 259n) writes that Anselm and the other genealogists followDagworth in claming wrongly that he was killed, and that he did not die until the battle ofMauron. It is not only Dagworth, however, who lists the viscount of Rohan among the dead:the Grandes chroniques and Lescot agree. Plaine gives no support for his contrary claim.

108 Grandes chroniques; Lescot, 80. Plaine omits, for reasons unstated.109 According to Plaine, “Roche-Derrien,” appendix.110 Froissart, Oeuvres, 21:16–17. He had recently defected from the Montfortist side.111 The St. Omer Chronicle reports the lords of Raiz and Machecoul among the slain bannerets.

The sire de Rays at the time, Girard V Chabot, was however an infant. (Cartulaire des sires deRais, ed. R. Blanchard, in Archives historiques de Poitou, 28 [1898], p. xcviii.) It seems nearlycertain that a knight of the family would have served as a banneret at the battle in place of thechild, to lead the family’s clients and vassals, and it was likely this person who was killed. Asomewhat similar situation applied to the Machecoul. Girard de Machecoul had died in 1343;his heir Louis was not too young to fight (having married in 1341), but may well for whateverreason not have been personally present at the battle. Jean de Machecoul, uncle of the latter,could be the man in question; the evidence cited by Blanchard as suggesting his death in 1343(ibid., p. cxxxix) is not conclusive. (“L’exqucion nostre frère monsor Johan” need not refer tothe execution of a will, and note the omission of “feu.”)

112 Lohéac, a former Lieutenant for Brittany of Edward III’s, listed by Dagworth as captured, isgiven among the slain by St. Omer, but it seems incorrectly. See Michael Jones, “Les capitainesanglo-bretons et les marches entre la Bretagne et le Poitou de 1342 à 1373,” La ‘France Anglaise’au Moyen Age (Paris, 1988), p. 374.

113 In addition, Grandes chroniques, 9:304 notes “messire Chevin Biauboisel” among the baronskilled. Viard suggests (ibid., note) this may be Thibaud de Boisbouexel; Plaine has Thibaut deBoisboissel. Plaine adds Robert Arel, Michel Chamaire (a French esquire), and Georges deLesven to the prisoners. Villani mentions also “il signore di Rualla, e il figliuolo”; the orthog-raphy is obscure. Similarly, Villani mentions the death of “il visconte di Durem e il fratello e ilfiliulo”; if Durem is Derval, this adds his brother to the list of the reported slain.


and Jean, and his heir was captured.114 The lord of Derval and his only son wereboth killed. The lord of Quintin and his son Guillaume were both killed; his otherson, Jean, had his nose cut off. The Grandes chroniques and Dagworth’s dispatchare in agreement that around half the other noble men-at-arms in the French armywere slain.115 The scale of the catastrophe for the Blois party could hardly havebeen greater. “No men-at-arms ever accomplished such a fine feat as these Bretonsand Englishmen,” commented Froissart, “who defeated there in one morning sucha great number of noblemen: it should be attributed to their great prowess andskill-at-arms.”116

Jonathan Sumption writes that “the battle of La Roche-Derrien did not trans-form the military balance in Brittany because the English had too few men tocontemplate sweeping over northern and eastern Brittany.”117 The latter portion ofhis statement may be true, but it must be remembered that before the battle, theFrench did have enough men to contemplate sweeping over southern and westernBrittany. As Sumption himself observed, “the destruction of any significant pro-portion of Dagworth’s small army would have brought the whole of western Brit-tany (except Brest) into [Blois’s] hands.”118 After the battle, even with the dispatchof substantial assistance from King Philip, the Blois partisans had all they could dojust to hold their own.119 Between the start of the Breton civil war and the battle ofla Roche-Derrien, the Montfortists’ position had never been truly secure. But fromthat point forward, it would never truly be in jeopardy, not even after the defeat atCocherel in 1363. It took the Battle of Auray in 1364 to finally settle the civil war,but Edward III’s protégé Jean de Montfort would never have had the chance to winthat engagement, and rule as uncontested Duke of Brittany, had Sir ThomasDagworth not, indeed, transformed the military balance in Brittany in 1347 withthis astounding victory against the odds.

114 Gui de Laval and son: Dagworth. Brother Jean: St. Omer, Villani. Other brother, “messerRossello”: Villani. Plaine says Gui IX, sire de Laval and his son, Jean, killed. According to L.de Mas Latrie, Trésor de chronologie, d’histoire et de géographie (Paris: Victor Palme, 1889),col. 1623, however, it was Guy X who was killed at La Roche; he did have brothers Jean(seigneur de Pacy) and Raesse, who were co-lords of St.-Père-en-Rays (Archives historiquesde Poitou, 28 [1898], p. xxviii), so Mas Latrie seems to be correct. Guy XI died young the nextyear, possibly due to wounds sustained at La Roche.

115 Grandes chroniques. Including over 200 of 400 knights, according to Froissart, Oeuvres, 5:168–9. Plaine (“Roche-Derrien,” p. 257) cites no support for his claim that the total number killedwas only 300 to 400 at most. 116 Froissart, Oeuvres, 5:171: “Onques si belle aventure n’avintà gents d’armes qu’il avint là as Englès et as Bretons, que de desconfire sus une matinée tant denobles gens: on leur doit bien tourner à grant proèce et à grant apertise d’armes.”

117 Trial by Battle, p. 576.118 Ibid., p. 574.119 Cf. Froissart, Oeuvres, 5:171: “Si fu la guerre de la contesse de Montfort grandement embellie …”

Note also Michael Jones, “Dagworth,” p. 630: the battle “eut un effet anéantissant sur lesfortunes de a faction Penthièvre,” and “la capture de Blois et beaucoup de nobles importants, etle massacre de beaucoup d’autres, changèrent d’une façon décisive l’équilibrie des forces dansle duché.”

8

Ferrante d’Este’s Letters as a Source for Military History

Sergio Mantovani

Historians have devoted very little attention to Ferrante d’Este, Duke Ercole I’ssecond son. If he went down in history, it was because of his participation in Giuliod’Este’s plot against his half-brother Alfonso, which ended up with Ferrante dyingin prison in 1540 and Giulio being freed 19 years later. Besides this, only poor andfragmentary information can be found about Ferrante. But he deserves more.

Born in Naples in 1477, while his mother Eleonora d’Aragona was paying avisit to her father King Ferrante, Ercole’s son spent most of his youth there,coming back to Ferrara at the age of 11. In 1493 he was sent to France to live atCharles VIII’s court, from which he returned in 1497, after having accompaniedthe king’s descent into Italy in 1494. Some months later, Ferrante managed toenter the service of Venice as a condottiero and the following year went to Tuscanywith his company in order to defend Pisa against Florence. The campaign turnedout to be a failure and d’Este with the rest of the Venetian army left Pisa in April1499. After this inglorious experience, Ferrante’s military career came to a stopand, until the already-mentioned plot against Alfonso, he led a courtly life withfew events of any importance.1

AbbreviationsAG Archivio GonzagaASE Archivio segreto estenseASFi Archivio di Stato, FlorenceASMa Archivio di Stato, MantuaASMi Archivio di Stato, MilanASMo Archivio de Stato, ModenaASP Archivio di Stato, PisaPNR Casa e stato, Carteggio principi estensi, Ramo ducale,

Principi non regnantiSPE Sforzesco potenze estere1 There is very little on Ferrante, but some information can be found in Edmund G. Gardner,

Dukes and Poets in Ferrara (London, 1904), ad vocem; Paolo Portone, “Este, Ferrante d’,” inDizionario biografico degli italiani, 43 (Roma, 1993), pp. 337–39; Thomas Thuoy, HerculeanFerrara. Ercole d’Este and the Invention of a Ducal Capital (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 16, 248.

156 Sergio Mantovani

Only Lewis Lockwood has devoted some attention to Ferrante, studying hisrole as a musical amateur,2 yet d’Este also had some role as a patron of literature,for the poet Antonio Tebaldeo dedicated two of his rhymes to him.3 But what Ferrantewanted most was to become a condottiero, as he wrote to his father shortly after hisreturn from France: “I do not want to train myself in anything […] but the professionof arms.”4 Many of his letters, at least those which still exist, deal with militaryaffairs, that is the French campaign of 1494–95 and the Pisan war. Thiscorrespondence can be of great value for historians. Let us go into it.

First of all, we have to distinguish between the letters of the French periodand those written while within Pisa and its surroundings. The first group consistsof fewer pieces, which furthermore are of less interest than the others. HereFerrante was a cold and detached witness, probably well informed thanks to hiscloseness to the French army, but he often confined himself to reporting KingCharles’s movements.5 When the French vanguard took by storm and plunderedthe papal town of Toscanella, near Viterbo, Ferrante wrote the following:

the day before yesterday, [the French wanted] the Most Christian King’s vanguard toquarter within a big papal town called Toscanella […] [the inhabitants] refused to do itand were unwilling to give them victuals. In order to drive the French off [the inhabit-ants] shot at them, killing three of the French, who entered the town by force and, afterkilling 400 people, plundered it.6

Not a word more than needed. But when, during the Pisan war, the Florentinecondottiero Paolo Vitelli conquered Buti and punished the enemy gunners andhandgunners by cutting off their hands, the Este called that “bad war.”7 The sec-ond group of letters, indeed, is much richer than the first, with a large number ofdetails about what was happening and sometimes biting commentary. Why isthis so? First, we have to bear in mind that in the French descent Ferrante led asecondary role, while within Pisa he was one of the principal commanders andhad to defend himself against numerous charges, as we shall see.

Still, if Ferrante was much more involved in what happened near Pisa, and

2 Lewis Lockwood, Music in Renaissance Ferrara 1400–1505. The Creation of a Musical Cen-ter in the Fifteenth Century (Cambridge, Mass., 1984), pp. 125, 141, 200, 209, 267.

3 Antonio Tebaldeo, Rime estravaganti, ed. Jean-Jacques Marchand, III/1 (Modena, 1992), pp.163, 165.

4 ASMo, ASE, PNR, 133, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, Ferrara 21 August 1497.5 See, for instance, ASMa, AG, 1186, Ferrante d’Este to Isabella d’Este, Asti 12 September

1494, Ponzano Magra 4 November 1494, Florence 17 November 1494, Rome 28 January1495, Siena s.d., Aversa 21 May 1495; ASMo, ASE/PNR, 133, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este,Casale Monferrato 7 October 1494, Lucca 7 November 1494, Siena 3 December 1494, Rome28 January 1495, Aversa 21 May 1495.

6 “l’altraieri, volendo alogiare l’antiguardia del Chr.mo Re ad uno castello ben grosso del R.mopapa, nominato Toschanela […] non li volsero alogiare, né dargli victuaria, et per cazarlitrassero alcuni colpi d’artellaria et amazorono da tre persone de questi franzesi, li quali perforza entrorno dontro ala terra e, amazati da quattrocento persone, la gitorono a sacho.” ASMa,AG, 1186, Ferrante d’Este to Isabella d’Este, Acquapendente 9 June 1495.

7 “mala guerra.” ASMo, ASE/PNR, 134, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, camp at Pisa suburbs21 August 1498.

157Ferrante d’Este’s Letters

this could explain why his letters from there are by far more detailed and inter-esting, that does not give an explanation for the cold messages of 1494–95. Ercoled’Este was an exacting reader and needed to be kept up to date by his ambassa-dors, and we can consider Ferrante among them; thus, it is likely that the duke’ssecond son provided much more information than what remains in the archivestoday. He sometimes preferred not to put news in black and white but to entrustthe bearer to report it orally,8 probably for fear that his messages would fall intothe wrong hands. Many letters could also have been destroyed by d’Este’s fatheror relatives because they were compromising: his correspondence, even thatconcerning Pisa for some periods, is sometimes too fragmentary to ascribe thegaps to the incomplete survival of archival materials. We know that Ferranteacquainted his relatives with King Charles’s preparations for the Italian expedi-tion,9 and sometimes used a cipher.10 Therefore we can presume that what stillexists of Ferrante’s letters is only a part of those he originally wrote.

However, we have to concentrate on what we do have. One of the first ques-tions could be: how accurate and truthful was Ferrante? Considering that hisaccounts were often first-hand, and composed immediately after the events de-scribed, d’Este is a good source, especially as far as the Pisan war is concerned.Ferrante was likely sincere, especially since he had good reason not to lie to hisrelatives, as the addressees had other means of information. This does not meanthat he did not express his own point of view; quite the contrary. We can beginfrom what he wrote about actions. While there are some Este accounts of thebattle of Fornovo,11 there is nothing from Ferrante, who was present on the field.As far as the French descent is concerned, his letters offer only short second-hand descriptions.12 But things change when it comes to the Pisan war. Hered’Este was much more involved, and once a raiding party was under his com-mand. Let us read first how he himself described the successful action, and thenhow a Venetian officer, paymaster (ufficiale pagatore) Vincenzo Valier did it,according to Marin Sanudo’s I diarii.

These Magnificent provveditori, in order not to leave the enemy at peace, after decidingthat almost all cavalry and infantry here would go to seize the town of Montopoli,appointed the Magnificent Messer Vincenzo Valier […] and myself as commanders in

8 See, for instance, ASMa, AG, 1186, Ferrante d’Este to Francesco Gonzaga, Lyons 5 July 1495;Ferrante d’Este to Isabella d’Este, Lyons 6 July 1495, Poggibonsi 18 June 1495; ASMo, ASE/PNR, 133, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, Lyons 27 March 1495, Naples 5 May 1495.

9 ASMa, AG, 1186, Ferrante d’Este to Francesco Gonzaga, Lyons 21 March 1494; Ferranted’Este to Isabella d’Este, Lyons 21 March 1494, Lyons 8 May 1494; ASMo, ASE/PNR, 133,Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, Tours 11 January 1494, Lyons 25 March 1494.

10 ASMo, ASE/PNR, 133, Tours 11 January 1494, quoted, Siena 16 June 1495.11 Diario ferrarese dall’anno 1409 al 1502, ed. Giuseppe Pardi, Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, II

ed., XXIV/7 (Bologna 1928), pp. 159–60; Luciano Chiappini, “Una relazione inedita sullabattaglia di Fornovo (1495),” Atti e Memorie della Deputazione Provinciale Ferrarese di StoriaPatria, s. III, vol. XIII (1973), pp. 173–81.

12 Some of them can be read in ASMa, AG, 1186, Ferrante d’Este to Isabella d’Este, camp atPontremoli 2 July 1495; ASMo, ASE/PNR, 133, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, Pontremoli1 July 1495, camp at Pontremoli 2 July 1495.


order to carry it out. And so, after leaving from here as secretly as we could, yesterdayat dawn we arrived before the aforesaid place, those men having heard that we werecoming in order to damage them. We had been discovered by the people of Pontedera,nearby which we had needed to spend the night, almost on the town moats. They firedmany artillery shots at us, and by the grace of God no one was wounded, which wasalmost a miracle, us being so near. The aforesaid Messer Vincenzo Valier’s sleeve wastouched by an arquebus shot. Because of this, since we had been discovered, those ofMontopoli had about five hours to make preparations and, while waiting for us, took upa defensive position. Here we launched an attack in good order. Notwithstanding that itis a walled town, as Your Excellency must already know, and very strong, and althoughwe had carried no artillery with us, we took it by storm around mid-day, after cutting topieces some peasants who were inside – and many had assembled there besides those ofthe town, which we sacked and partly burned. The majority of people, because of thetime they had at their disposal, took shelter with the best of their goods in the rocca,which we did not try to attack as we had no time. In my opinion having destroyed andtaken this town was no little thing, and the enemy will judge it as a great misfortune.This having been the first task with which the Magnificent provveditori entrusted me,for my part I did not fail, as we could not be certain of victory. While we were fightingI did not spare myself from jeopardizing my own life, dismounting from my horse andapproaching the walls, having the ladders brought and the gates set on fire, and every-thing I found necessary. While we were fighting, Count Ludovico della Mirandola withmany horses appeared not far away, in order to see if he could make us get out of thereso the city could be relieved. I did not want at all for the attack to be stopped, in ordernot to allow the foes to regain their nerve. Fearing dishonour and shame, I immediatelymade a squad of some 150 light horsemen, crossbowmen and stradiotti gather in orderto drive back Count Ludovico in case he came near. Yet, he did not come. And once wehad taken the town, evanuit ab oculis nostris [he disappeared from our sight]. I am quitesatisfied with my company, which in this action served me so well that I could not havewished for better. The other companies did their duty. Thank God few of our men werekilled and wounded.13

And now Sanudo’s account:

He [Vincenzo Valier] set off from Pisa on the 26th of December along with don Ferrante[d’Este], Filippo Albanese, Annibale da Doccia, some 140 men-at-arms lightly equippedwith their sallets, Giovanni Greco and other commanders of 500 mounted crossbowmenand stradiots. They rode the whole night in order to get to Montopoli; and so as to crossthe river [the Arno] easily they waded across it near Pontedera, where many artilleryshots were fired at them. One grazed the aforesaid provveditore’s arm, which blackenedand became a little infected and swelled much, causing a strong pain for a long time;still, he did not have serious injuries. If the shot had hit the arm, it would have been cutoff […] They reached Montopoli two hours before daybreak; that place is rich andprosperous and forever Florentine, 20 miles away from Florence. At dawn they as-saulted from two sides: from the first the infantry captain, Gorlino, and he [Valier] withmounted men, from the second the other captain; they fought for about two hours be-cause those within the city defended themselves vigorously. In the meantime CountLudovico della Mirandola with some 100 horses was seen in the distance and it seemed

13 See Appendix VII. ASMo, ASE/PNR, 134, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, Pisa 28 December1498.


that he wanted to relieve the city; the provveditore himself went towards him with manystradiots and other horse, and the other withdrew and could not be reached […] Ourmen went in both through the gate, after setting fire to it, and with ladders, while on theother side Captain Gorlino had entered. As the infantrymen immediately begun looting,ours were driven back from there; afterwards they tried again and with this entrancerepelled the enemies who withdrew into the rocca, many of them being wounded anddead. Seeing that the rocca was strong because of its situation, and the men dispersedowing to longing for money, they decided to loot and burn the city, and did so as long asthey could; they left with booty and captives, and between plundering and setting firegreat damage had been done.14

As we have just seen, Ferrante’s narration and Valier’s differ little from eachother. The other sources add something to the picture,15 but most of what hap-pened can be drawn from these two accounts. Yet, even though d’Este used asober style, not wanting, as he himself wrote in the same letter, to praise himselftoo much, it is fair to point out that he omitted some details. For instance, heleaves out that one assault was repelled because of bad discipline, while this isevident in Valier’s statement. But it is also true that the paymaster reflects theVenetian point of view of the taking of Montopoli, for he hardly mentionsFerrante’s presence. As far as the latter is concerned, he, always wanting to winhis father’s approval, stresses his role as the chief commander of the attack, whichhe really was.

When Ferrante did not take part in engagements, he seems to be well-informedand accurate, even though extremely critical of others’ strategy. In September 1498the Venetian army tried to conquer the Sasso della Dolorosa, a hill then manned bythe enemy forces, but was taken in the rear by Paolo Vitelli’s relief force and routed.Ferrante criticized the Venetian commanders for not leaving troops to cover theiradvance.16 If we have to reproach d’Este for something, it is for his inaccuracy inreporting dates: he sometimes made mistakes when writing some days after, so it isbetter to compare his accounts with other contemporary sources.

Ferrante’s letters provide some typical examples of warfare. If pitched battleswere rare – in fact d’Este was never involved in one during his 10 months nearPisa – sieges and skirmishes were not. The letters mention some war materialsthat the Venetian army carried in action, such as ladders17 and kite-shaped shields

14 Marin Sanudo, I diarii, 2, ed. Guglielmo Berchet (Venice, 1879), coll. 300–1.15 ASFi, Dieci di Balia, Missive, 63, fol. 41r-v, to Guidone Manelli, 27 December 1498; ASFi,

Dieci di Balia, Missive, 64, fol. 49r, to Luigi Stufa and Antonio Giacobini, 28 [December]1498; fols 54v–55r, to L. Stufa and A. Giacobini, 30 December 1498; ASFi, Dieci di Balia,Missive, 65, fol. 7r, to the priore and the vessillifero of San Miniato, 28 December 1498;ASMi, SPE, Firenze, 949, Taddeo Vimercati to Ludovico Sforza, 27 December 1498; ASMi,SPE, Lucca, 1595, [Francesco Litta] to Ludovico Sforza, 29 December 1498; ASP, Comune,Divisione C, 25, Lettere degli Anziani, 5, fols 150v–151v, to the ambassador within Venice, 29December 1498; Pietro Bembo, Historiae (Venice, 1742), p. 135; Piero Vaglienti, Storia deisuoi tempi 1492–1514, ed. Giuliana Berti, Michele Luzzati, Ezio Tongiorgi (Pisa, 1982), p. 65.

16 ASMo, ASE/PNR, 134, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, camp at Pisa suburbs 11 September1498.

17 ASMo, ASE/PNR, 134, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, camp at Pisa suburbs 11 September1498, quoted, Pisa 13 November 1498.


called targoni,18 and often few guns,19 evidently in order not to be impeded byheavy pieces. One way of defending themselves against the enemy, frequentlyemployed but neglected by historians, was to divert rivers,20 as Ferrante did withthe Serchio in July 1498.21 We have already encountered Paolo Vitelli cutting thehandgunners’ hands at Buti and Ferrante’s comment upon it. Such violence is tobe seen as common towards this kind of soldier because they were both hard toreplace and feared.22 and it is clear that it was welcomed by governments if Flo-rence approved of it23 and no chroniclers criticized Vitelli.24 We also have to bear inmind that stradiotti were paid for each enemy head brought to the Venetian offic-ers,25 and, just to mention a d’Este instance, during the War of Ferrara GuizzardoRiminaldi, captain of Duke Ercole’s mounted crossbowmen, had some foes be-headed and impaled their heads.26 If Ferrante criticized Paolo Vitelli, it was notbecause of his violence, but because it was directed against the Este’s allies.

Another aspect for which Ferrante is of great value is his description of dailyproblems faced by armies. The letters are a vivid portrait of life within a camp:brawls, thefts, lack of money, quarrels. War was not King Arthur and the RoundTable, nor were Ferrante and his men knights in shining armour. It is clear thatsoldiers were used to violence, both at war and in peace: for instance we can readtwo letters in which Duke Ercole’s son asked his father for mercy for two sol-diers guilty of murder.27 But soldiers were often driven to violence by lack ofmoney; for this reason they procured what was necessary by force. Ferrante him-self described some housebreakings of his men within Pisa,28 which, as the Pisangovernment wrote, had been turned by the soldiers into a ladronia (a den of

18 ASMo, ASE/PNR, 134, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, camp at Pisa suburbs 11 September1498, quoted.

19 ASMo, ASE/PNR, 134, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, Pisa 13 November 1498, Pisa 28December 1498, quoted.

20 Michael Mallett, Mercenaries and Their Masters. Warfare in Renaissance Italy (London, 1974),p. 171.

21 ASMo, ASE/PNR, 134, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, Pisa 16 July 1498.22 Mallett, Mercenaries and Their Masters, p. 157; Michael E. Mallett and John R. Hale, The Mili-

tary Organization of a Renaissance State. Venice c. 1400 to 1611 (Cambridge, 1984), p. 143.23 ASFi, Dieci di Balia, Missive, 59, fols 111v–113r, to the commissari at the camp, 22 August 1498.24 For contemporary Florentine chroniclers, see Luca Landucci, Diario fiorentino dal 1450 al

1516, ed. Iacopo del Badia (Florence, 1883), p. 183; Bartolomeo Cerretani, Storia fiorentina,ed. Giuliana Berti (Florence, 1994), pp. 256–57.

25 Marin Sanudo, Commentarii della guerra di Ferrara tra li Viniziani ed il duca Ercole di Estenel MCCCCLXXXII (Venice, 1829), pp. 114, 123; Mallett, Mercenaries and Their Masters, p.198; Mallett and Hale, The Military Organization of a Renaissance State, p. 73.

26 Mario Equicola, Annali della città di Ferrara, Ferrara, Biblioteca Comunale Ariostea, ms. Cl.II, 355, sub annum 1483; Bernardino Zambotti, Diario, ed. Giuseppe Pardi, in Rerum ItalicarumScriptores, 2nd Edition, XXIV (Bologna, 1928), p. 152; Ugo Caleffini, Diario (1471–1494),ed. Giuseppe Pardi, vol. II (Ferrara, 1938), p. 150.

27 ASMo, ASE/PNR, 133, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, Lyons 10 May 1496; ASMo, ASE/PNR, 134, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, Ferrara 28 March 1498.

28 ASMo, ASE/PNR, 134, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, Pisa 28 December 1498, Pisa 19February 1499.


thieves).29 If Ferrante was not an adamant disciplinarian, and maybe his soldierswere worse than the others, many admitted that unruliness was caused by out-standing payments.30 As a fifteenth-century Venetian officer wrote: “it is notpossible to serve well without being paid.”31 D’Este was well aware of this:

Every day we hear some rumors of many committed thefts: breaking workshops open,going into the merchants’ warehouses in order to rob. I myself am not only against suchthings but if I knew that some of my men were involved, I immediately would havethem hanged, even though Your Excellency knows what trouble can happen when sol-diers are not paid. Hunger makes the wolf come out of the woods.32

The violent behavior of soldiers was a serious problem: communities wereoften harried by them and could not avoid it.33 That is how Ferrante’s mother,Eleonora d’Aragona, described soldiers’ violence in 1482:

If Your Excellency [Ercole d’Este] does not call these soldiers who are quartered within theBarco to order, so that they can be punished for killing, robbing, plundering and beatingYour subjects, I foresee an evident threat upon this people. I say this because of those mur-ders which happened after Your Excellency’s departure. Yesterday they killed a respectableman here within Caldirolo because of a pig which they had stolen, and so much pity hadnever been seen […] the tears and listening to the victim’s brothers and relatives, all of thembloodstained and angry, who came before me in order to complain. This morning sometwenty men-at-arms with a good number of infantrymen went to Baura […] and lootedthat town, robbing wine, beds, drapes and everything those poor men had at home.34

“Cum natura sit stipendiariorum facere quae comoda et utilia eis sunt, nullo habitorespectu ad beneffitium vel maleffitium aliorum” [By their nature mercenary sol-diers do what suits their own interests, without respect to the benefit or harm toothers] thought the Venetian Senate,35 but it was not easy to stop such behavior. Notthat commanders liked it, as Ferrante himself wrote, but they knew very well that, if

29 ASP, Comune, Divisione C, 25, Lettere degli Anziani, 5, fols 143r–144v, to the ambassadorwithin Venice, 5 December 1498. See also Michele Lupo Gentile, “La Repubblica di Pisadurante gli anni 1497–1499,” Bollettino Storico Pisano, n.s., a. IX (1940), p. 37.

30 See, for instance, ASMi, SPE, Lucca, 1595, Francesco Litta to Ludovico Sforza, 22 November1498; ASP, Comune, Divisione C, 25, Lettere degli Anziani, 5, fols 117r–118v, to the ambassa-dor within Venice, 1 October 1498; fols. 119v–120v, to the ambassadors within Venice, 4 Octo-ber 1498; fols 136r–137r, to the ambassador within Venice, 19 November 1498; fols 143r–144v,to the ambassador within Venice, 5 December 1498, quoted; cc. 152v–153v, to the ambassadorwithin Venice, 4 January 1499; c. 158r-v, to the ambassador within Venice, 15 January 1499.

31 “non è possibile bene servire et non essere pagati.” Giangiorgio Zorzi, “Un vicentino allacorte di Paolo II (Chiereghino Chiericati e il suo Trattatello della Milizia),” Nuovo archivioveneto, n.s., 30 (1915), p. 428.

32 “la fame caccia el lupo fuora del boscho.” See Appendix VI. ASMo, ASE/PNR, 134, Ferranted’Este to Ercole d’Este, Pisa 20 December 1498, quoted.

33 Mallett, Mercenaries and Their Masters, pp. 191–92; Marino Berengo, “Il governo venezianoa Ravenna,” in Ravenna in età veneziana, ed. Dante Bolognesi (Ravenna, 1986) pp. 51–53;Maria Nadia Covini, L’esercito del duca. Organizzazione militare e istituzioni al tempo degliSforza (1450–1480) (Milan, 1998), pp. 416–23.

34 Luciano Chiappini, Eleonora d’Aragona. Prima duchessa di Ferrara (Rovigo, 1956), p. 52.35 Berengo, “Il governo veneziano a Ravenna,” p. 47.


not paid, soldiers had to procure what was necessary. Even the more renownedcondottieri, like Bartolomeo Colleoni, had problems in keeping their soldiers undercontrol.36 Moreover, we have to remember that soldiers often despised peasants andcity-dwellers. When his men were accused by Pisans of causing damage to houses,vineyards and trees, Ferrante replied that for peasants it was the

custom to cry always when they have soldiers at home […] jealous of anyone looking attheir goods, fearing that someone would steal them with their eyes. They complainedeven to me although, as far as I have understood, […] they can protest only because ofsome notched pieces of wood.37

He could not completely deny what his men had done, yet he diminished theirmisdeeds: of course condottieri preferred to defend their soldiers, being awareof the problems lack of money could cause. Sympathy was first for comradesand then for others.

Civilians were not the only ones hit by soldiers’ violence: brawls betweencompanies of the same army were not uncommon. The following is a graphicdescription of one of them:

When one of my men-at-arms under the aforesaid Rizzino [Rizzino da Asola, one of Ferrante’scapisquadra] came here in order to find quarters, he put himself in the billet of MesserGiovanni Diedo […], who was happy to let him stay for Rizzino’s sake, until yesterday, hesaid. Yet yesterday evening at about six o’clock, Messer Giovanni wanted the aforesaidman-at-arms to come out and gave signs of wanting to throw him out by force. The man-at-arms being unwilling and Rizzino saying that he would wait to be provided with anotherbillet, Messer Giovanni was unwilling to delay, and pushed him out, saying that he wantedhim to leave immediately. They came to blows with weapons and the members of theirhouseholds joined them. Some of my men who knew Rizzino stepped in in order to dividethem and restore peace, but being understood wrongly, they themselves were caught in themiddle as the others were fighting with stones, pole-arms and arrows. Thus everyone wascompelled to withdraw along with his own companions, fighting continuously. MesserGiovanni, seeing that he and his men were getting the worst of it, shouted “Marco, Marco”;some fools of my men, I have not been able to find out who, began crying out “Ferrante”; butit was just two times [or: but there were just two of them]. The whole camp, the infantry andeveryone, took up arms, supporting Messer Giovanni against my men. I, having heard theclamor while supping, stood up immediately, and had a horse freed from its hobble bysomeone, I do not even know who he was, that I found at the door of my billet. Fearing thatgreat dishonor would follow, wearing a padded “aketon” and brandishing an unsheathedsword, I raced to where they were fighting and then began separating my men and pushingthem into our own quarters. Coming there myself was not without great danger, as continu-ously passatori and spears passed beside me, yet thank God I returned safe and sound. […]Of Messer Giovanni’s men two famigli were wounded, but not seriously, and one boy se-verely, yet he is still alive. Of my men, Rizzino’s lips were hit by a blow from a stone, and

36 Bortolo Belotti, La vita di Bartolomeo Colleoni, II ed. (Bergamo [1933]), pp. 204–5.37 “usanza loro de gridare sempre quando hanno soldati ad casa […] gelosi de chiunque guarda

li beni loro temendo non se gli portino via cum li occhii. Facevanno etiam ad me qualchelamento, per quanto habia mai potuto intendere ni trovar per loro medemi non si potevandolere si non de qualche incisione de legname.” ASMo, ASE/PNR, 134, Ferrante d’Este toErcole d’Este, camp at Pisa suburbs 18 August 1498.


some teeth were broken; one of my mule- drivers had a foot transfixed by an arrow andGalassio della Sala had a leg weakened and battered by some stones […]38

This letter suggests how it was not easy to find room for soldiers: cities wererarely big enough to quarter them and perhaps governments preferred to keeparmies away in order to avoid plundering. One of Ferrante’s letters provides a vividshort description of what a city could be when occupied by an army: “many peoplelack water, and the little there is, is putrid and bad-smelling; the streets are full ofdead horses, rubbish and dung; there would be need of miners in order to cleanthem. There is neither a square nor a large space to pitch tents and pavilions.”39

It is evident from the above that condottieri had to deal with concrete prob-lems, but they were involved with something more abstract as well. Honor andglory were not empty words and it was not uncommon that some got into con-flict with others after setting their sights on being the first in command. WhileFerrante was within Pisa, the Florentine army had two commanders in chief:Paolo Vitelli as capitano generale, and Ranuccio da Marsciano as governatore,and this dualism and the bad relationship between them did not help the state.40

There are many other cases: for instance, Brandolino Brandolini, being in dis-pute with Erasmo Gattamelata, was forced by the Venetian government to giveup his office to the other and retire;41 during the war following the Pazzi con-spiracy a dispute over precedence arose within the Florentine army betweenSigismondo d’Este, his brother Ercole’s lieutenant, and Costanzo Sforza,governatore delle genti,42 and the same happened some years later, during theWar of Ferrara.43 Ferrante behaved the same way: despite the fact that he was ayoung and relatively inexperienced condottiero, he did not want to stay underMarco Martinengo, governatore of the Venetian army.44 When the latter leftTuscany at the end of 1498, d’Este wished to succeed him in command, “eagerto improve myself within this profession.”45 It is not uncommon to find wordslike honor in Ferrante’s correspondence: once he wrote that someone had black-ened his name because he was “malignant, lying, envious and an enemy of myglory.”46 Another time, lacking in money, he complained that it was shameful

38 See Appendix IV. ASMo, ASE/PNR, 134, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, camp at Pisa sub-urbs 28 August 1498.

39 See Appendix III. ASMo, ASE/PNR, 134, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, camp at Cascina31 July 1498.

40 Giuseppe Nicasi, “La famiglia Vitelli di Città di Castello e la Repubblica fiorentina fino al 1504,”Bollettino della Regia depitazione di Storia Patria per l’Umbria, XVII (1911), pp. 293.

41 Giovanni Eroli, Erasmo Gattamelata da Narni. Suoi monumenti e sua famiglia (Rome, 1879),pp. 97, 317.

42 Lorenzo de’ Medici, Lettere, 4 (1479–1480), ed. Nicolai Rubinstein (Florence, 1981), pp.217–18, n. 15.

43 ASMa, AG, 1230, Pietro Spagnolo to Federico Gonzaga, Ferrara 15 December 1482.44 ASMo, ASE, PNR, 134, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, Pisa 7 July 1498.45 “desideroso crescere in questo mestiere.” ASMo, ASE, PNR, 134, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole

d’Este, Pisa 14 December 1498.46 “maligno, bugiardo, emulo et nemico ad la gloria mia.” ASMo, ASE, PNR, 134, Ferrante d’Este

to Ercole d’Este, Cáscina 31 July 1498.


that he, a son of the Duke of Ferrara, was forced to remain as poor as the othercondottieri.47 We have to remember that status and appearances were often ofgreat importance in that world. A duke or a marquis was likely to obtain a bettercontract than a noble of lower rank, even one more experienced. As for appear-ances, soldiers did not despise them. On the contrary: under Duke GaleazzoMaria Sforza, for instance, parades and iconography played a key role in order toshow the might of the Milanese army.48

Another point which needs examining carefully is what the youngest com-manders felt about the “watch and wait” warfare which armies adopted. Not thatthey did not like it – after all they had been brought up seeing their fathers andrelatives fight that way – yet it was not easy to cover themselves with glory ifpitched battles and chances to clash with enemies were rare. So the youngestcondottieri may have been eager to fight and carve out a career for themselves.From July 1498 until April 1499 Ferrante and paymaster Valier were two of themost warlike within the Venetian army: as for d’ Este, perhaps it was because ofhis temper, or maybe he was not yet accustomed to that kind of warfare. On hisarrival at Pisa he found the opposing armies at a standstill; hence there was nochance to engage in battle, and for this reason he often complained. Ferrantewanted the provveditore to give him a billet near the enemy, “so that we cansometimes see each other face to face”;49 some days later, while fortifying theSerchio valley, north of Pisa, he wrote: “let the enemies come as they wish.”50

When the Venetian commanders decided to withdraw to Pisa, he declared him-self offended by the fact that “with great disgrace we take flight before the foes,”51

even though, it is fair to point out, the Florentines outnumbered Ferrante and therest of the army, and he was well aware of this. If d’Este was longing to meet theenemy, so was paymaster Valier, who took part in several raids and actions,52 andit was he who wanted to cut off the hands of Calci’s defenders when the townsurrendered in November 1498.53 This does not mean that all young command-ers and civil officers were impulsive and eager to fight, but raids and battles werethe quickest ways to distinguish themselves and perhaps it was those who neededit more than the others – that is, the youngest and least-known members of anarmy – who urged action.

47 ASMo, ASE, PNR, 134, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, Pisa 24 November 1498.48 Covini, L’esercito del duca, pp. 312–328.49 “acciò qualche volta se possiamo videre in facia.” See Appendix I. ASMo, ASE, Carteggio

principi estensi, Ramo ducale, Principi non regnanti, 134, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este,Pisa 13 July 1498.

50 “venghanno li nemici al loro piacere.” ASMo, ASE, Carteggio principi estensi, Ramo ducale,Principi non regnanti, 134, Ferrante d’Este to Ercole d’Este, Pisa 16 July 1498, quoted.

51 ASMo, ASE, Carteggio principi estensi, Ramo ducale, Principi non regnanti, 134, Ferranted’Este to Ercole d’Este, camp at Cáscina 31 July 1498, quoted.

52 Sanudo, I diarii, 1, ed. Federico Stefani (Venice, 1879), coll. 1008–9; 2, coll. 103, 121, 135–36, 148–49, 300–1, 374–75, 399.

53 Sanudo, I diarii, 2, col. 136.


To sum up, Ferrante d’Este’s letters, still almost completely unexplored, de-serve much more attention, as they are a valuable source for military historywithin Renaissance Italy. It is true that Ferrante was never one of the most distin-guished condottieri of his age (he was still young when he was sentenced to lifeimprisonment), yet his messages portrayed effectively what warfare could meanand what commanders had to face within wartime. His letters make us under-stand what he and his comrades thought and felt and are extremely useful inorder to reconstruct the events of the Pisan war from July 1498 until May 1499.In them we find not heroic deeds, but complaints, lack of money, brawls, quar-rels: that is to say, the condottieri’s daily life.

Appendix

Selected Letters of Ferrante d’Este(Punctuation and accents added)

I To Duke Ercole I d’Este, Pisa 13 July 1498

Illustrissimo et Excellentissimo Signore mio et patre observandissimo. Per lamia ultimate scripta ad Vostra Excellentia portata ad essa per el correre suo,quale partite da qui ad li 7 del presente, quella haverà inteso quanto sin alhora gliera di novo. Da poi in qua altro non è sequito. Né creda la Excellentia Vostrach’io habia dormito et che non sia stato vigilante et solicito per acquistare honoreet gloria, sì al Lei, per essere io servitore et factura sua, como ad me proprio.Quella sapia ho tenuto bona praticha et intelligentia per mezo de fidatissimi hominiet spie, per modo sicuramente me dava l’animo pigliare o per forza o d’acordo,quando me fosse presentato, el luoco di Pesscia, dischosto da qui circa decioctoo vinti miglia, bono castello importantissimo, quale fa de li homini trecento dafacti. Ad questo exequire era bastante la mia compagnia cum giuncta de trecentocavalli legieri et fanti mile, per essere paese dovi non si ponno così commodamenteadoperare cavalli. Haveva ordinato giungervi al improviso per accogliere et serrarefuora di quello luoco più gente fosse stato possibile, maxime ad questa stagioneeschonno quasi tutti ogni die fuora; né dubito puncto cum li cavalli legieri etfanti n’haveria excluso la maiore parte, chel pensiero non me fosse reuscito,tanto più non essendogli gente forastiera, como gli era. Holo conferito cum loMagnifico providetore, richesto l’aiuto de le gente bisognerianno. Me ha dictodovesse soprasedere alquanto. Di continuo aggregiandonelo io cum bono modo,me dixe poi de lì a tri giorni, commendando el parere mio, me daria centocinquantacavalli legieri, fanti nissuni per non havere el modo. Gli ho facto intendere inquesta manera non potersi exequire; hame risposto resti et dimore pur qui sin adtanto me ordinarà altro. Inteso questo, per non stare in otio ho pregato assai laMagnificentia sua cum grandissima instantia ad darmi uno allogiamento pressoli inimici como hanno de li altri, acciò qualche volta se possiamo videre in facia.Me dice non essere al presente ad propposito et che resti puro qua. Non scio adche fine el lo faci. Ad me convene tenermi ad quanto me commette. La compagniamia è allogiata quivi vicina sin su le porte di questa cità, de casali in casali per lavale di Sergio. Per essere doppo chel se seria molto bene potuto exequire questopensere mio, de novo arrivato ad Pesscia el conte Rainucio da Marzano cum ducentohominidarme, dubitandosse non vengha ad nostri danni, et non possendo entrare sinon per la via de Librafacta, passo forte et munitissimo per pisani, ho ordinato, desaputa del providetore prefato che de lae da Librafacta assai inanzi se mettino lescholte ogni nocte, et così guardie de die. Et quando altro se sentisse, subito senotificharà ad quelli de la fortileza, quali sonno advertiti, in qualunche modo sennoschoperti li nemici, de far certi segnalli, et cum artlaria. Alli qualli se sta cumattentione, et tutti serimo in ordine in arme cum le gente del paese. Darase campanne

a martello: venghano li nemici al loro piacere, qui li è da rispondere.Qua dimoro Signore mio apparechiato ad fare de le facende per quanto posso;

sonno commissionato romanermine como ho dicto. Credo però fare qualchecorrarie, non de grande importantia ad mio iuditio come seria stata questa diPescia. Il tutto per mia iustificatione mi è parso notificare ad la Excellentia Vostra,et acciò mai non potesse essere imputato de negligentia se ad quella paressenotificarlo ad Vinetia ad la Illustrissima Signoria aut che per me se gli notifichasse,me ne remetto al suo prudentissimo parere. Senza consulta di Vostra Excellentiaper quelli rispecti gli ponno cadere in consideratione non l’ho voluto notificarealtramente. Aspectarò adunque da essa risposta como circa ciò et in simili casiho ad governarmi.

L’altrheri ad Cassina se missero in ordine circa quatrocento fanti de li nostri cumli caporali loro, armati tutti per andarsine per forza ad li inimici vicini livi circa duamiglia, et questo per non esserli dati denari. Gli fu da fare assai: se gli intromisseroquelli conducteri de le gente d’arme cum bone parolle per revocharli insiema cum laMagnificentia del providetore. Ritornaronno cum promessa d’havere denari. Heri segli ne dete, pur non sonno stati così ben contentati, che circa ducento fanti, alchunicum havere riceputo la pagha et altri senza, se ne sonno fugiti dal canto de nemici,dovi se intende però essere difficultà grandissima ad havere denari et maiore non èqui. Nondimeno questa fugita non me piace per non essere niente ad favore de lanostra impresa, come la Excellentia Vostra può molto bene considerare.

Li inimici tuttavia ingrossanno, né altro se fa sin qui. Non me sbighotischo ného paura. Tengho per sicuro quando mai altro non acquistassimo, essendo linemici molto più a numero de nui, conservarimo almancho quanto se tene alpresente. Non si è pur perduto circum circa a dodeci miglia de questo territoriouno spicho de frumento, né uno filo de feno. El racolto è abondantissimo: gliseranno victualie ad quelli del paese et alle gente siamo per deciocto mesi. Io,per non ritrovarmi sprovisto quando pur me convenesse invernare qua, ho factogià tagliare de le carra di strame circa ducentocinquanta; tuttavia lo facio conducereet ho luoco da reponerlo. Vado providendomi al meglio so et posso per haverepochi denari. La spesa grande cadauno se travaglia; la neccessità non potria peròfarne più industriosi come siamo.

Da poi sonno quo ho havuto per subvenire ad li soldati ducati cinquecentocum promissa ad la mostra haverò ad fare de proximo me serà supplito per unopagha in tutto. De la qualle mostra non sonno però molto aggregiato da certipochi giorni in qua, et io poi se ha ad fare né posso fugirla l’aggregio per uscirnepresto. Sonno ad ordine; spero non mancharò al numero integro de li cento hominid’arme, quantunque habia havuto pocho tempo per li vinti acresciuti et pochidenari, maxime dovendoli fare così tosto.

L’è stato tractato per li inimici cum el castellano de Butti, quale se tene perpisani, et è stato doppio però, chel castellano quanto se tramava tutto ha notificatoal providetore passato et al presente. Ha durato qualche die. L’ordine era: questanocte passata le gente de nemici dovevanno accostarse per ricepere la forteleza,et per li nostri era provisto accoglierle in mezo et tagliarle in pezi. Sonno venutepur questa nocte et gli era Paulo Vitelli, quale ha tardato ad farsi inanzi et



comparere sin sul fare del giorno. Dovi viduto et schoperto de li nostri essere inaguato se n’è ritornato ben presto a drieto ad man salva cum li suoi. Nè è sequitoaltro. Per questo rispecto de accogliere li nemici ad Butti et per essere stata malintesa la cosa da chi governa se l’è romasta l’impresa di Pesscia. Reinscrescemise sian perdute tutte due.

La desgratia mia, Signore, reputo essere chel providetore passato non sie qui:cum esso haveva assai meliore gratia non ho cum questo altro, del qualle nonsolamente io ma quanti conducteri sonno di qua restino mal satisfacti. Nondimenonon mancho né mancharò de governarmi bene seco et de ubedirlo como debo. Inbona gratia di Vostra Excellentia humilmente basandoli la mano di continuo meraccomando.

Pisis, die 13 Julii 1498.(ASMo, ASE/PNR, 134)

II To Duke Ercole I d’Este, San Frediano a Séttimo 28 July 1498(The words between * and * were decoded by the Ferrarese chancellery)

Illustrissimo et Excellentissimo Signore mio et patre observandissimo. Per lamia de 26 ho scripto ad Vostra Excellentia adrizata ad quella per el correre suopartito da Ferrara et venuto ad me cum littere sue de 18 et 21 praesentis, allequale fece risposta. Haverà prefata Vostra Excellentia inteso quanto sin ad quellodie era successo; da poi in qua è sequito che heri me ne venni ad allogiare qui adSeptimo, dovi *non gli trovai* alcuno de li conducteri. *De le loro squadre*dovevano allogiarli *cum le mie mancava* etiam assai del numero de li*provisionati* et *stradioti* ordinati, per modo ad iuditio di ogniun gli era *malsecuro*. N’andai in persona ad farlo intendere ad *proveditore. Lui* rispose sefacesse al melio si potesse perché era tarde, et che domatina se seria in consiglioad *Cassina* per fare qualche altra bona deliberatione. Per dicta nocte siamostati vigilanti et armati, né altro è intervenuto. Hozi si è stato in consiglio: dalcanto mio è stato racordato non potere *sicuramente stare qui* cum così pochonumero di gente, quantunche para chel luoco sii assai forte per essere de incomodoad li nemici transferirsegli, *nondimeno* el non è murato. Gli è un altro maiorerispecto, che li nemici sonno *più* a numero de *nui*: hanno de li *homini*d’arme 700, *provisionati* 3000 boni et bone et assai *artiglierie*. Nui altrisiamo in *pochi* a loro comparation et tanto *pochi* è quasi vergogna dirlo.Siamo, ad mettersi tutti insiema, 350 hominidarme et *provisionati* 1000 *malcontenti* et *male* paghati. In questa oppinione de starli *mal* sicuri concorreogniun, *nondimeno il proveditore* ha determinato et voluto ch’io gli dimore, etappresso me ha dato la compagnia de messer Zoanne Dedo et de Brazo da Perosa,et *provisionati* 300 in tutto, como ho dicto *mal* paghati et *mal contenti*,dato etiam bocche *de artiglierie*, cioè falchoni. *Non* ho potuto havereguastatori per fare de le provisione opportune. Ho voluto per non desordenarmiacquiescere ad la voluntà de *proveditore* poiché non l’havimo potuto


remmovere, *nondimeno* se gli è facto intendere quasi per un mezo protestonon se doveria *stare qui* ad questo modo. Dovi se tutti se unissano anchora*non* gli seriamo ben sicuri per el rispecto dicto d’essere *pochi* ad compara-tione de li nemici che tuttavia ingrossanno. Per conclusione l’ha voluto ch’io gli*stia*, et io, premisso el mio parere et del conte Albertino, sonno obediente.*Illustrissimo Signore mio*, qui sonno le cose in *grande disordine*. Questo*proveditore* ad questa *impresa* gli va cum modo chel pare che *venetiani*non curino s’è la ruina, et cum tanta avaritia non si potria dire più, per modo cheogniuno fa iuditio che *venetiani*, quali han pur el modo di spendere, sianquodammodo contenti lassar *la impresa* et non curarsine si ben perdessero le*gentedarme* hanno di qua. Et messer Zoanne Dedo, qual è gentilhomo di Vinetia,me ha riferto *il proveditore* haverli dicto voria che queste *gentedarme* fosserorotte per liverarla più presto. Ultra di questo el se dubita de *pisani* che habien*prattica* cum el *duca de Milano* de darsegli, aut de pigliare altra forma deaddattamento al facto loro; et *il proveditore*, in certo ragionamento havuto colconte Albertino, gli ha dicto dubitarsi di tal *prattica* et non si tene sicuro nécontento de *pisani*. Io, Signore mio, me ne dimoro qui vigilante, facio tuttequelle provisione scio et posso. Sii certa Vostra Excellentia non perdarò maivilmente se dovesse ben morire. El maiore pensere habia sie quando la *prattica*dicta havesse effecto dubito d’essere accolto in mezo et svalizato, tuttavia perquesto non mi perdo d’animo et farò sempre el debito mio. Ho voluto del tuttodare aviso ad Vostra Excellentia acciò intenda in che termine sonno le cose nostre.Alla quale humilmente basandoli la mano sempre me ricomando. *Il proveditoreet messer Vincenzo Valero* sonno discordi tra loro, et non se intendino nienteben insiema.

Datum ex felicibus castris Serenissimi Dominii Venetiarum existentibusSeptimi, die 28 Julii 1498.

(ASMo, ASE/PNR, 134)

III To Duke Ercole I d’Este, Cáscina 31 July 1498

Illustrissimo et Excellentissimo Signore mio et patre observandissimo. Per lamia de 28, scripta da Septimo, adrizata al commissario de Castelnovo che la mandiad Vostra Excellentia, quella haverà inteso quanto sin ad quello die era sequito etcomo per parere di ogniuno *non dimorava securamente lie*. Heri *il proveditore*,muttato propposito, me commisse ch’io me dovesse riducere cum la compagniamia in *Cassina*. Mandai prima et conduxi meco el conte Albertino ad *SuaMagnificentia*. Fossimo in ragionamenti et argumenti per questo, et cum bonomodo gli feci intendere non era bene *includerse* tante *gente d’arme* dovi sonnotutte l’altre et li *fanti* che *venetiani* hanno ad questa *impresa*, exceptumalcuni pochi romasti ad guardare *Vicopisano*. Abandonando *il loco de Septimo*facilmente li *inimici*, che sonno *più potenti de nui*, gli possino andare allogiareet serrarci in *Cassina*, non essendo nui *bastante*, né volendo experimentare la


fortuna *a fare facto d’arme*. Racordandogli era molto melio firmarsi tutti quantiin *Septimo*, lassando forniti *Cassina* et *Vico* de *fanti* per conservarsegli.Et cum altre provisione et *artiglierie*, ultra chel sitto de *Septimo* sii forte,melio l’haressimo fortificato. Et *quando non havessemo potuto* stare al contrastopotevamo *passare Arno* et salvarsi nui cum *Pisa* et quanto se tiene, perché,como ho dicto, *siamo poche gentedarme* per vincere *li inimici* et per acquistareet *non serarse qui in Cassina* ad ponersi *in assedio* da nui stesso, dovi cumdifficultà vi potrano capire *tante gente cum carastia de aqua*, et *quella pocha* gliè frazida et puzolente, cum le stratte *tute piene de cavalli* morti, *de immonditia*et *ledame*. Gli bisognerian guastatori assai ad *netarle, né g’è piaza né loco grande*per piantare padiglioni et tende. Queste et altre bone ragione adduxi ad *proveditore*,remettendomi sempre ad chi haveva meliore parere, apparechiato obedire et exequirequanto per *Sua Magnificentia* me seria commandato. Rispuosemi havere havutoconsideratione al tutto, tandem volere ch’io gli vengha, et così, *Illustrissimo Si-gnore mio*, gli sonno venuto subito cum tutta la compagnia mia, allogiata cum lamaiore confussione et incommodità sii stato possibile, et una gran parte per le stratte,cum giuncta d’uno pessimo tempo di aqua. Né alcuno si voleva restringere de li suoilogiamenti, et in questo *il proveditore* se n’è passato molto de legieri, pur gli sonnoallogiato. Questi altri conducteri dimonstrano *gran malcontenteza et pocho animo*,et ogniun grida se vadi ad allogiare in *Pisa*. De li *fanti ne fuge* ogni dì etquantunche *il proveditore* habia cominciato far dare *dinari, nondimeno* va cum*avaritia* et non vole dare si non *tri ducati per valente* che si trovi.

*Illustrissimo Signore mio* questa sera *ho de bon loco* essere stato per *ilproveditore* adimandato in consiglio tutti questi conducteri, et de quelli d’assaimancho *conducta* di me, sin ad li contestabili de le fantarie, et deliberato deredursi in *Pisa*, tutto senza saputa mia et senza essere adimandato. Il che existimosii proceduto per *qualche suspicione* hanno di me, aut per *mala impressione*de questi conducteri, quali invident glorie mee, o sia per essersi vociferato et quasiacertato che la compagnia del Illustrissimo Signore don Alphonso era per giungereal opposito nostro. *La quale consulta* senza essere adimandato io facta cum lialtri, quanto me sii de graveza pensilo Vostra Excellentia, tanto più che a principiosonno intervenuto ad quanto se deliberava, et se sonno stato absente gli è statorichesto el conte Albertino, et sequito el mio parere, sì per lo allogiare facto in valledi Sergio, come ad Septimo. Che ora me sienno usati de questi termini, ultra checum grande vituperio voltamo le spalle ad *inimici* andando ad *Pisa*, me nedoglio et agravo. Ho voluto notificare il tutto ad Vostra Excellentia acciò intendaquanto seque, et la obedientia mia verso *il proveditore*, et il rispecto me ha.Remettendomi sempre ad la voluntà di quella se gli piace farlo intendere ad*venetiani* vel ch’io gli ne scriva. Ad *proveditore* non dirò altro si non gli andaròad verso et obedirò. Altro non mi occorre.

Ad la Excellentia Vostra humilmente basandoli la mano di continuo miraccomando.

Datum ex felicibus castris Illustrissimi Dominii Veneti Cassine, die ultimoJulii 1498.



IV To Duke Ercole I d’Este, camp at Pisa suburbs, 28 August 1498

Illustrissimo et Excellentissimo Signore mio et patre observantdssimo. Mepare et per mio debito et ad mia iustificatione de qualunche graveza me potesseessere data avisare la Excellentia Vostra di omne occurrentia. Essendo vaccato elluoco havea cum mi el quondam Brunoro da Porto, fratello di messer Nicolò,atrovandosi qui un gentilhomo di Azola per nome Rizino, quale già era stato cummesser Marco Martinengho, havendo havuto licentia in scripto, lo tolsi ad meiserviti per essere dispostissimo de la persona, praticho nel mestieri, et li deti elluoco haveva Brunoro de cinque coraze. Quando se vene ad allogiare qui unomio homo d’arme sotto esso Rizino, se pose nel logiamento di messer ZoanneDedo, conductero de 100 cavalli et gentilhomo di Venetia, quale fu contentolassarglilo dimorare per amore de Rizino, diceva sin al dì d’heri. È accaduto purheri da sera, circa le 24 hore, che volendo el prefato messer Zoanne dicto homod’arme se ne uscisse alhora, et subito signandoli per forza volernelo cacciare,stando renitente l’homo d’arme et Rizino cum dire aspectasse gli fosse providutod’un altro allogiamento, et non volendo lui messer Zoanne differire, anzi spengerlofuora dicendo voleva se ne uscisse subito subito, furonno alle mane cum l’arme,et li patroni et famegli de l’uno et de altro. Sopragiungendoli alcuni altri de li meiche cognoscevanno esso Rizino, se posero in mezo per dividere et pacificare lacosa. Non intendendola altramente furonno molestati essi mezani si como li altrieranno alle mane, et cum saxi, arme inastate et passatori, per modo fu neccessarioad cadauno ritirarsi cum li suoi menando le mane continuamente. Vedendossimesser Zoanne cum li suoi per havere la pegiore, gridaronno “Marco, Marco”;alcun bestiale de li mei, che non ho potuto intendere che sia stato, se pose adgridare “Ferrante,” et non fu si non per due voce. Tutto el campo et fantarie etogniuno presto fu in arme dal canto de messer Zoanne et contra li mei. Io subito,sentito el rumore essendo ad tavolla ad cena, mi levai; fecimi pastare un cavalloda uno, non so che fusse, trovai inanzi alla porta del mio allogiamento, et perdubio non sequisse grandissimo schandalo corsi in zippone, cum la spada nudain mano, lae dovi eranno apizati insiema, et mi pose ad dividere et cacciare li meine li logiamenti loro. Et el mio andarvi non fu senza periculo grandissimo, perchécontinuo me passavanno acanto passatori et lanzate; pur Dio merce ne sonnoreuscito salvo. Sedai la questione, dovi in quello menare de mane non se glivolse intromettere né lo Magnifico providetore, né conducteri che gli sia. Laudatone sia Dio et reingratiato. Cognosco veramente sel si perseverava seria stata unapessima giornata per li mei, perché havevanno tutto el campo contra di loro. Elmale sequito è stato pocho per quello ch’io dubitava. De quelli de messer Zoannesonno stati feriti dui famegli, levemente però, et uno suo ragazo a morte, pur nonè anchora morto. De li mei è stato ferito Rizino d’una saxata nelle labra et rottoqualche dente; uno mio mullatere anchora passato un piè cum uno passatore; etGalasso da la Salle fiachata et tempestata una gamba cum saxi, né gli ha male da


periculo. Altro non gli è stato de feriti né de morti […]


V To Duke Ercole I d’Este, camp at Pisa suburbs, 11 September 1498

Illustrissimo et Excellentissimo Signore mio et patre observandissimo. QuestoMagnifico providetore, facta deliberatione de intervenimento et consulta di quantine sonno in questo exercito, exceptuandone me, heri mandoe el capitaneo de lefantarie cum gran numero de fanti et appresso cum molti cavalli legeri perprhendere el bastione tenenno li nemici sul Monte Doloroso. Et fece richederead tutti li conducteri, fuora che ad me, un mullo ad cadauno per portare schale ettarchioni lae. Partironno queste gente de nocte tutte insiema et furonno conductesin al dicto bastione et lassaronno el castello di Calce a dreto, quale è fornito perli nemici. Arrivaronno al bastione, né gli fu ordinato altre gente appresso, né sulpiano per fargli spalle. Lo combattetoro per spatio de una hora, et sempre heberola pegiore. Dovi che havendolo presentito Paulo Vitelli, o per spie o per segnallidi quelli del bastione, se mosse cum quasi tutto lo exercito et cum bono ordine sene vene alla via de Calce per tagliare el camino ad esse gente nostre. Et così,essendo loro male governate che non posso dire altramente, lassando per forzal’impresa del bastione ad hore due de giorno, se callaronno verso li nemici albasso sin quasi sul piano, et haverian potuto prhendere altra via et salvarsi per limonti sopra quello de Luchesi. Furanno alquanto ad le mane, ma li nostri heberola pegiore, et el capitaneo de le fantarie, che è Jacomo da Tarsia, fu ferito in unacossa de partesana, né credo gli serà periculo di morte. Ferito anchora, levementeperò, uno contestabile de fanti per nome Gorlino. De fanti pochi morti perchépocho si stete alle mane; tuttavia gli può essere perdita de quatrocento fanti incirca, et de qualche cinquanta cavalli legeri et de quelli mulli portaronno le schalleet tarchoni. De che reputo havenni guadagnato uno per non haverlo inteso, che,se l’havesse saputo et me fosse stato richesto, ge l’haveria dato, et perduto comoli altri. Habuto l’aviso qui le gente nostre predicte essere rotte, se mettessimo inordine cum tutte le gentedarme, et fu tarde perché li nemici hebero tempod’avantagio di menare via et le persone prese et li bottini al loro piacere, ultrache eranno più a numero de nui et in luoci più sicuri. Il tutto è sequito al modo hodicto, cum victoria de li nemici ed damno de li nostri, per pocho ordine de chi hagovernato queste gente per lassarsi Calce loco nemico a dreto, et per non haverglimancho ordinato spalle de alcune gente d’arme. Non può essere che non medoglia et reincrescha de questa perdita appresso l’altre, che è un ingargliardiretanto più l’animo de li adversarii. Me doglio anchora se ordina de queste facendecum saputa di ogniuno et non mia, appresso li altri torti me sonno facti, como honotificato ad Vostra Excellentia. Né scio ad che dimorare più qui cum tantasuspitione senza causa. Manchino pur adesso le suspitione del conte Albertino,né si può già dire lui havere hora rotto questo disegno. Prego et supplico prefataVostra Excellentia, alla quale per altre mie ho notificato el tutto sin a qui, si degni


darmi remedio et consiglio como ho ad governarmi et non patire tanta gravezadel honore mio, che veramente può reputare suo per essergli io servitor et figliolo.

Nanzi la perdita di queste gente fu preso Vichopisano, como avisai VostraExcellentia, poi anchora hebero la rocha li inimici. Altro non è sequito. È statopurtroppo questo a nostri damni et vergogna de chi gli ha colpa. Dominica passataentroe in questa cità el Magnifico messer Dominico Maripero, quale eraprovidetore sopra l’armata de mare ad questa impresa, et hora la IllustrissimaSignoria l’ha deputato collega et compagno al Magnifico messer Petro Duodo, etseranno ambi insiema qui. Io gli andai al incontro, l’honorai et accompagnai adcasa, dovi più volte anchora l’ho visitato, né mancho del debito mio. Sin a qui traepsi providetori pare sia bona intelligentia et sonno boni amici per essere anche,per quello intendo, coniuncti de affinità insiema. L’ha facto prefato messerDominico Maripero conducere qui per Arno tre galee che gli sonno anchora, etdice havergli mile boni homini per servirsine ad questa impresa. Non scio sesianno tanti: quelli gli sonno sonno tutti marinari et galeoti de nation schiavona.Altro non mi occorre per hora d’avisare Vostra Excellentia, in bona gratia de laqualle humilmente basandoli la mano di continuo me raccomando.

Ex felicibus castris Illustrissimi Dominii Veneti in suburbis Pisarum, 11septembris 1498.


VI To Duke Ercole I d’Este, Pisa 20 December 1498

Illustrissimo et Excellentissimo Signore mio et patre observandissimo. Hointeso per la littera di la Excellentia Vostra de 14 quanto quella se resente per elscrivere mio havendogli significato de partirmi da qui per la extrema necessità inche me ritrovo, et ho viduto quanta graveza per questo me ne da, cum le minacieet commandamento me fa de contenermine. Rispondendo dico può la prefactaVostra Excellentia tenere per certo quando io havesse pensato non solamenteoffendere la mente di quella, ma pur de farla alquanto corozare, me ne seriacontenuto et più presto voria patire mile morte che portare un minimo despiaceread l’animo suo. Ad quello ho scripto el bisogno non me gli ha lassato metterefreno, né ho saputo nì scio dovi me ricorrere sì non ad la Excellentia Vostra, laqualle appresso Idio m’ha generato al mondo et dato l’essere. Quella sa ad chemodo sonno conducto cum la Serenissima Signoria. De provisione per la per-sona mia non mi corre altro sì non per una coraza de caposoldo. Pensi lei quellone posso cavare stasse qui più de dui mesi inanzi se habia una pagha, et poi nonla danno anche compiuta. Quanto alla parte me declara Vostra Excellentia defare la spesa secunndo l’intrata, io non potria havere assutigliate le cose mie piùho. Se forsi paresse ad quella tenesse troppo bocche in casa, la certifico non gliho persona de che non ne sente qualche utilità per valermine per cavalli lezeri, etl’haria facta male se non havesse havuto tale avantagio. Per conclusione, Si-gnore mio, io non saperia mai trovare remedio ad potere vivere qui non havendo


più como ho cum li 100 ducati el mese me da la Excellentia Vostra, nondimenopiù presto voglio morire cha portarli caricho in desubedirla. Questi conducterotisonno qui la fanno malissimo. Ad me convene pur vivere altramente per honorevostro et mio. Siamo qua in cità frustata cum el paese da la guerra, carastiagrande gli è d’ogni cosa. Io facio acomparare sin al sole. Ogni die si sente qualcherichiamo de mile robbarie se commettino: de rompere buteghe, entrare in fondachidi merchatanti ad robbare. Io non solamente sonno per non tenere mano ad talecose, ma se intendesse introvenirli alcuno di mei, subito lo faria impichare.Quantunche la Excellentia Vostra sapia che male se gli può providere quando èsoldati non sonno paghati: la fame caccia el lupo fuora del boscho. A dì passatianchora alcuni sachomani de mei hominidarme et d’altri et fanti sachegiaronnola piaza di questa cità dovi si tene il pane ad vendere; fu data imputationel’havevano facto sotto spalle di Galasso da la Sale et di Baptista da la Mirandula.Benché io non me ne habia mai potuto ben certificare per la verità, et ne ho factadiligente investigatione, ne fu tolto pane che valesse da quatro in cinque ducati.È parso ad questi Magnifici providetori sienno cassati de la mia compagnia dictiGalasso et Baptista, et io ho voluto acquiescere ad la voluntà loro, come debo.Significo questi inconvenienti alla Excellentia Vostra acciò possa dare iudiciocomo vivenno li altri ad questo soldo. Dal canto mio sequa ciò si voglia: medeportarò talmente non mi potrà essere data imputatione per la verità presso laSerenissima Signoria, nì Vostra Excellentia, la qualle devotamente prego sì comomio signore et benefactore che le si degni providere per modo non habia adpatire, né dimorarli cum vergogna sua et mia. In la cui bona gratia humilmentebasandoli la mano me ricomando sempre.

Pisis, die 20 decembris 1498.


VII To Duke Ercole I d’Este, Pisa 28 December 1498

Illustrissimo et Excellentissimo Signore mio et patre observantissimo. Sonnostato alquanto suspeso di non volere scrivere questa ad la Excellentia Vostra,dubitando quella non existimi voglia troppo attribuirmi et laudarmi da me stessonel caso sequito. Tuttavia, pensando anche epsa potria darmi graveza se non gliscrivesse de le occurrentie di qua, assicurato da la verità como ne è verissimotestimonio per questo paese, non ho voluto romanere ch’io non gli scriva.

Questi Magnifici providetori per non lassare li nemici in quiete, factadeliberatione che quasi tutte queste gente da cavallo et da piè sonno qui andassaroad pigliare el luoco di Montopoli, deputaronno capi acciò exequire lo Magnificomesser Vincentio Valero, gentilhomo venetiano paghatore qui, et me. Et così,partiti da qui più secretamente potessimo, heri se presentassimo nanzi al dictoluoco sul farsi del giorno. Havendo havuto noticia quelli homini andavamo allidamni loro, essendo nui stati schoperti da quelli da Pontadera, dove fu di bisognopassassimo la nocte a canto a canto, quasi su le fossa di la terra, et ne salutarono


cum assai colpi d’artlaria, la qualle per Dio gratia non ha offeso alcuno, che paresie stato miracolo, essendosegli tanto accostati vicini como eravamo. Et fu tocchatomesser Vincentio prefato d’una botta d’archibuso in una manicha del vestitohaveva indosso. Per questo essere nui stati schoperti hebero spacio quelli deMontopoli per circa cinque hore de providersi, et così aspectandone se poseroalle diffese, dovi che gli facessimo ordinatamente dare la battaglia. Et essendoterra murata, come debe sapere Vostra Excellentia, et assai forte, quantunchenon havessimo conducto cum nui artlaria veruna, nondimeno l’havessimo perforza circa le 18 hore, tagliati a pezi primo impetu qualche villani gli erano entro,et ve n’eranno congregati molti ultra quelli del luoco, qual mettessimo a sacho eta focho in parte. Assai quasi per la maiore parte de li homini cum el melio di beniloro mobili per el tempo hebero si salvaronno ne la forteza, alla qualle, per nonservirne il tempo, non parse experimentare le forze ad combatterla. Non pocho èstato ad mio iuditio l’havere qui distrutta et expugnata la terra, la cui iactura linemici ponno existimare grandissima. Per essere stata questa una de le primecure habianno dato li Magnifici providetori sopra le spalle mie, dal canto mionon gli ho manchato, non potendossi havere per certa la victoria. Mentre si davala battaglia non ho sparmiato in exponere la vita mia sin al scendere da cavallo etaccostarmi a piede alle mura, facendogli portare schalle et mettere fuoco alleporte, et tutto quello mi pareva expediente. Comparse mentre si daxeva la battagliamolto da longe el conte Ludovico da la Mirandula cum molti cavalli, ad effectose l’havesse potuto on ardito de farne levare de lie et succorrere la terra. Io nonvolsi per niente si desistesse da la battaglia per non lassare rigagliardire li homini.Dubitando di vergogna et schorno feci mettere subito in squadra circa 150 cavallilezeri, balestreri et strattioti per rispondere al conte Ludovico sel s’accostava. Némai vi vene, et presa la terra evanuit ab occulis nostris. Io me ho ad contentaresummamente di la mia compagnia, la qualle in questo facto me ha tanto benservito non haveria saputo desiderare melio. Et l’altre anchora cadauna ha factoel dovere. Dio merce, pochi ne sonno remasti morti, et feriti de li nostri. Del tuttone reingratio Dio nostro signore. Et ho voluto avisarne Vostra Excellentia allaquale humilmente basandogli la mano me raccomando sempre.

Pisis, 28 decembris 1498.


Note: Provisions for the Ostend Militiaon the Defense, August 1436

Kelly DeVries

One of the most significant defeats of the Hundred Years War was that ofPhilip the Good’s attempted siege of Calais on 9–28 July 1436. Largely neglectedby modern historians of the war who seem more concerned with the Anglo-French conflict alone and not what seems to have been a “side event,”1 at thetime, especially in England, the Burgundian failure to capture their French townwas important news. As a morale booster for the English, especially after somany recent setbacks in the Hundred Years War, including the abandonment oftheir lengthy alliance with these same Burgundians the year previously at theCongress of Arras,2 the propagandistic value of the defeat was enormous. This isevident not only in the numerous official accounts of the siege written at thetime, but especially in the “unofficial” sources that have survived, most notablyseveral vernacular poems deriding the defeat and decrying those who carried outthe siege that became popular a very short time after the Burgundian failure wasannounced in England.

1 The 1436 siege of Calais has been largely neglected by all of the major historians of the Hun-dred Years War: Edouard Perroy, The Hundred Years War, trans. W.B. Wells (New York, 1951);Alfred H. Burne, The Agincourt War: A Military History of the Latter Part of the HundredYears War from 1369 to 1453 (London, 1956); Philippe Contamine, La guerre de cent ans, 3rded. (Paris, 1977); Jean Favier, La guerre de cent ans (Paris, 1980); Christopher Allmand, TheHundred Years War: England and France at War c. 1300–c. 1450 (Cambridge, 1988); AnneCurry, The Hundred Years War, 1337–1453 (Oxford, 2002); and Anne Curry, The HundredYears War, 2nd ed. (Houndmills, 2003); despite the English victory and the importance thishad in England in restoring military confidence after the debacle of the Congress of Arras.Even Richard Vaughan, Philip the Good: The Apogee of Burgundy (London, 1970) downplaysthe defeat’s significance. I will address the siege’s importance in two forthcoming articles:“The Effect on the Hundred Years War of Philip the Good’s Failures at Compiègne (1430) andCalais (1436),” and “Calculating Profits and Losses during the Hundred Years War: WhatReally Forced Philip the Good from the War?” in Ivana Elbl and Lawrin Armstrong (eds.),Money, Markets and Trade in Late Medieval Europe: An International Workshop in Honour ofJohn Munro (forthcoming, Leiden: 2005).

2 The Congress of Arras is still best discussed in Joyceline Gledhill Dickinson, The Congress ofArras, 1435: A Study in Medieval Diplomacy (Oxford, 1955), but also see the articles on thepeace conference in Denis Clauzel, Charles Giry-Deloison, and Christophe Leduc, ed., Arraset la diplomatie européenne, xve-xvie siècles (Arras, 1999).

Especially targeted for derision were the Flemings who constituted the major-ity of those fighting in the Burgundian army at Calais. Several Middle Englishpoems, later assigned names such as “The Englishman’s Mocking Song Againstthe Flemings” and “An English Ballad Against the Flemings” by their moderneditors, circulated through the English towns, celebrating the defeat of Philip theGood’s Burgundian forces that besieged Calais and the role in that loss playedby Flemish soldiers.3 That the Flemings indeed may have been to blame is estab-lished in a letter written a few days after the siege by Philip to his brother-in-law,Charles, the Duke of Bourbon4 – on the other hand, how effective can a siegelasting only nineteen days be? This, however, may not have been the main rea-son for the specific derision directed at the Flemings in popular English media.The fact that the Flemish economy relied largely on the availability of Englishwool, and that the Flemings now not only stood in military opposition to thosewho supplied this wool but had lost to them, certainly influenced these poems.5

The treachery of Philip the Good at Arras was also important, but that the Flemingshad followed their duke in this betrayal, despite their economic necessity to dootherwise, seems to have been of even greater significance to the English.

Furthermore, following the defeat at Calais, Philip had abandoned the Flemings,returning to Burgundy and not to the southern Low Countries. This left Flandersopen to immediate vengeful military action. Within days of the raising of thesiege of Calais, Humphrey, duke of Gloucester, who had succeeded to the lead-ership of the English troops in France after the death of his brother, John ofBedford, the previous year, and who had arrived to take command at Calais onlyto see the flight of the besiegers, led his own raid into western Flanders. Takingadvantage of the Burgundian confusion after Calais, Gloucester burned severalvillages south of Dunkirk and around Ypres. The English fleet also raided alongthe Flemish coast as far north as the Zwin estuary and the island of Cadzandbefore both army and navy returned to Calais.6

3 I have found four of these poems, one in Ralph A. Klinefelter, ed., “‘The Siege of Calais’: ANew Text,” Publications of the Modern Language Association 67 (1952), 888–95, and threemore in Rossell Hope Robbins, ed., Historical Poems of the XIVth and XVth Centuries (NewYork, 1959), pp. 78–89, these latter two originating in The Brut, or the Chronicles of England,ed. F.W.D. Brie (London, 1906–08). However, Roger Nicholson, of the Department of En-glish, University of Auckland, New Zealand, who has worked on them, assures me that thereare at least two more of these poems that are as yet unedited, one in London, Lambeth PalaceLibrary, ms. 6, and a second in Oxford, Bodleian Library, Digby ms. 102. All were writtenwithin a few months of the end of the siege.

4 A translation of this letter is found in Vaughan, Philip the Good, pp. 81–82. The original isedited in Marie-Rose Thielmans, ed., “Une lettre missive inédité de Philippe le Bon concernantle siège de Calais,” Bulletin de la commission royale d’histoire de Belgique 115 (1950), 285–96, although she mistakenly has Philip the Good sending the letter to his other brother-in-law,Arthur de Richemont.

5 See, for example, Eileen Power, The Wool Trade in English Medieval History (Oxford, 1941)and John H.A. Munro, Wool, Cloth, and Gold: The Struggle for Bullion in Anglo-BurgundianTrade, 1340–1478 (Toronto, 1972). For a history of Flanders in the fifteenth century see DavidNicholas, Medieval Flanders (London, 1992) and Henri Pirenne, Histoire de Belgique, vol. II:Du commencement du XIVe siècle à la mort de Charles de Téméraire (Brussels, 1903).

6 Vaughan, Philip the Good, pp. 82–84.

177Note: Provisions for the Ostend Militia

178 Kelly DeVries

Thus in August 1436 the citizens of the county of Flanders found themselvesin the ironic position of defending their countryside and towns from the verypeople on whom their livelihood chiefly depended. Philip the Good and theBurgundian army would not be coming to their aid, as a number of letters fromthe ducal court to the Ghentenaars and others in Flanders insisting that theFlemings must defend themselves suggest.7 Initially, at least, the Flemings wouldremain true to their Burgundian overlord. But this was an expensive endeavor.Without an “official” Burgundian army in the southern Low Countries, as theBurgundian troops had dispersed after leaving Calais, the burden of Flemishdefense especially fell on the local militias. Payment for those forces fell on thetowns and villages that raised those militias.

Of course, this was not an unusual event for the Middle Ages. There seemslittle doubt that militias often defended their localities, although histories of suchdefense are rare; perhaps this is because of the scarcity of sources, or perhapsthese sources have not been utilized to the extent they could be by military histo-rians.8 One of the areas of special interest in the study of militias needing furtherinvestigation is the economic support, largely for provisions, for these militiasby their funding localities. The sources for such expenses, if they can be found,are often hidden in town expense records and not in more commonly accessedmilitary historical sources.

It is within this context that several references to the payment of Ostend’smilitia – the heere of the following document – defending the coastline outsideof the town during the period of crisis following the defeat of the Burgundianforces at Calais are made in the small town’s registers. Although Ostend hadgained the status of “city” two centuries previously, and held a market around amarket hall, in 1436 it was still populated principally by fishermen. Nor does thetown seem to have been enclosed by walls; at least, no urban fortifications arerecorded in any of the medieval sources, while early modern engravings of Ostendshow only later bastions and other fortifications.9 Instead, this militia unit wasstationed on a “dune,” presumably one of the dikes that had been built only fortyyears previously to protect the town from the sea, but also undoubtedly servingas an earthen fortification that utilized the natural coastal terrain.

The numbers in this militia unit are not revealed in these references, althoughin the initial reference they are referred to “aldermen and some of the burghers;”yet, the small amounts of provisions – foodstuffs and ammunition – indicatesthat there were probably not many. Later, the numbers may have increased, asthe amount of the foodstuffs for the “sailors and sergeants” are much larger thanthose in the first records. (The diversity of these victuals will be discussed below.)Also, in every reference to the supply of these provisions, the reason that theOstend militia was stationed on their “dune” during the month of August 1436

7 V. Fris, “Documents Gantois concernant la levée du siège de Calais en 1436,” in MélangesPaul Frédéricq (Brussels, 1904), pp. 245–58.

8 An exception to this is Theresa M. Vann’s “The Militia of Malta,” Journal of Medieval Mili-tary History 2 (2004), 137–48.

9 Luc François, Bibliographie van de geschiedenis van Oostende (Ostend, 2000).


was that “the English fleet lay before the town.”The following records for the provisioning of the Ostend militia standing watch

during August 1436 were transcribed by Ed Vlietinck and originally appeared in“Le siège de Calais et les villes de la comté flamande,” Annales de la sociétéd’emulation de Bruges 40 (1890), 97, 99:10

Item den VIIIen dach in den oest als de inghelsche vlote hier voor de stede lach, zowas ghesleten up de dune bii den heere, wet ende eenneghe vander poorters, an spiseende an dranke ouer al XIII lb. VIII s.

Item den VIIIen dach in den oest als dinghelsche vlote hier voor de stede lach zowaeren ghesconken den goeden lieden die ons biistandichede daden XVI tonnen biers;coste elke tonne III lb. XII s. betaelt LVII lb. XII s.11

Item betaelt van zesse tonnen cleen biers ghesleten ter seluer tiid; ouer elke tonnebetaelt XX s.; VI lb.

Item betaelt van brode ghesend den goeden lieden die ons biistandichede daden tervoornoemder tyd ende by onse poorters ghesleten ooc, ouer al VIII lb. IIII s.

Item betaelt Pieter Lammaerd van poudre en van ghescote by hem gheleuert ter seluertiid, ouer al IIII lb. V s.

Item den XXIIIen dach in den oest als onze zeelieden ende serganten sceipten ommeoestwaert te vaerne up dInghelsche vlote, betaelt van vitaille dese nauolghende nommen.

Eerst van XXIIII tonnen biers, ouer elke tonne XLVIII s.;Item van VI hoeden broots, ouer elc hoed LIIII s.;Item van II cupin botre, ouer elc cupin VI lb.;Item van baken ende van case, VII lb. IIII s.;Van smare ende van kaersen, XXXVI s.; bet al XCIIII lb. XVI s.

These texts are translated as:

Item, on the eighth day of August, when the English fleet lay before the town, so wasconsumed on the dune by the aldermen and some of the burghers,12 in food and in drinktotalling XIII lb. VIII s.

Item, on the eighth day of August, when the English fleet lay before the town, so wasgiven to our allies XVI tonnes of beer, each tonne costing III l. XII s., paying a total ofLVII l. XII s.

Item, paid for six tonnes of small beer consumed at the same time; paid for eachtonne XX s., VI l.

Item, paid for bread sent to our allies at the abovementioned time and consumed alsoby our townsmen, overall VIII l. IIII s.

Item, paid Pieter Lammaerd for powder and shot delivered by him at the same time,in total IIII l. V s.

10 Vlietinck’s purpose in including these records in his article is to discuss the participation inand reaction to the loss at Calais by the Flemish towns and townspeople. I have neither foundthe original documents that he has used nor others from Ostend at the time, but must admit notlooking as hard as one might. Ostend’s archives are not well catalogued and some documentswere undoubtedly lost during World War I when the town was heavily bombarded. I wish tothank James M. Murray of the University of Cincinnati’s Department of History.

11 Vlietinck notes parenthetically that “le texte porte LXVIIlb XIII s.”12 As is often the case with documents, notarial terms such as these are difficult to translate with

accuracy. Murray suggests that it is odd to know who this refers to precisely.

180 Kelly DeVries

Item, on the twenty-third day of August as our sailors and sergeants shipped all east-ward to sail up to the English fleet, payment for victuals the following by name:

First, for XXIIII tonnes of beers, for each tonne XLVIII s.;Item, for VI measures of bread,13 for each measure LIIII s.;Item, for II tubs of butter, for each tub VI lb.;Item, for bacon and for cheese, VII lb. IIII s.;For fat and for candles, XXXVI s.; paid for all XCIIII lb. XVI s.

Beyond those points mentioned above that are specific to the Ostend militiaserving in Flanders at this time, there are several general observations about latemedieval militia that can be derived from these logistical records.

First, interestingly, the victuals mentioned in the 8 August documents consist onlyof bread and beer, although the latter is further divided into bier and cleen bier,translated as “small beer.”14 The 23 August documents report a greater diversity infoodstuffs, adding butter, bacon, and cheese to the provisions of bread and beer.This could simply show the movement of the Ostend militia to ships, but more thanlikely indicates that the militia serving in early August, less than two weeks aftersuch service was required following the failure of the siege of Calais–and probablyonly a very short time after they had actually been called to defend the town–carried their more durable provisions, including such things as butter, bacon, andcheese, with them, while the less durable, and at the same time more quickly con-sumed, foodstuffs, such as bread and beer, would need to be replenished more often.

Second, fat and candles are referred to only in the 23 August records. Thesewould both be used for illumination, the existence of candles seems logicalenough, and fat being included in the same accounting line presumably used forlamps. Again, there may be a simple reason for the inclusion of these items, andalso that they are solely mentioned in the later records. These items could beused either to light the camp of the town’s militia, a necessity important to defen-sive units away from the lights of the town, or on a vessel at sea. The mostobvious explanation for the presence of fat and candles is that the militia stayedon watch throughout the night. In addition, it can be surmised that supplies ofsuch items were probably carried with the militia in their initial muster and wouldalso need to be less frequently resupplied than the foodstuffs, which may be whythey were missing from the 8 August accounts.

Third, the only provider of supplies named in the documents is PieterLammaerd, who in the 8 August accounts is paid to deliver “powder and shot” tothe Ostend militia standing guard on the dune. His singular presence as a namedsupplier probably can be explained simply: he was likely the only supplier ofsuch military necessities in Ostend, while the victuals listed in the same docu-

13 Usually hoeden are measures of grain. However, I have translated this as measures of bread, asI cannot conceive of baking bread on board ship.

14 The history of medieval beer-making has recently been undertaken in Richard W. Unger, Beerin the Middle Ages and the Renaissance (Philadelphia, 2004), and more particularly in theLow Countries by the same author in History of Brewing in Holland, 900–1900: Economy,Technology, and the State (Leiden, 2001).


ment undoubtedly could be supplied by several individuals, and thus their namesare not recorded. Of course, another reason for the mention of his name is thatLammaerd may not have been from Ostend. Indeed, there is no indication that hecame from the town then being protected, and this may be the reason why pow-der and shot were not delivered to the militia until after they had already beenmustered and set up camp. By this time there were certainly several suppliers ofgunpowder and ammunition for gunpowder weapons throughout the Burgundianholdings.15 Yet, these suppliers were most frequently found in larger urban areasthan Ostend, and Lammaerd may have lived elsewhere in Flanders, most likelyin Ghent or Bruges. He may even have come from as far away as Lille, as this iswhere the largest Burgundian arsenal of gunpowder weapons was located, and itis logical that a large number of gunpowder and ammunition merchants wouldhave been located near to such a repository.16 Unfortunately, the largest source ofarchival records of Burgundian gunpowder weapons, Joseph Garnier’s L’artilleriedes ducs de Bourgogne d’après les documents conservés aux archives de la Cote-d’Or, which is particularly rich for Philip the Good’s reign, does not mentionLammaerd;17 therefore, until further research reveals more about this man more thanwhat is said about this supplier of gunpowder and ammunition is only conjecture.

It should not come as a surprise that the Ostend militia possessed gunpowderweapons, either larger artillery pieces or smaller hand-held weapons, the records donot specify which. Gunpowder weapons had been held in Low Countries’ urbanarsenals since at least the 1340s; and while there had certainly been a centraliza-tion of many if not most of these weapons since the occupation of the southernLow Countries by the Valois Dukes of Burgundy,18 this was far from a control ofthese guns. Contemporary Burgundian governmental documents show that in 1436gunpowder weapons were mostly kept in local arsenals,19 while, as would be seenin their use by urban soldiers in the rebellions that would follow this date, inBruges in 1436–38, Luxembourg in 1443, Ghent in 1449–53, Utrecht and Gueldersin 1455–56, and Liège in 1445 and1465–68, others were still under control of theurban militias.20 Thus a ready supply could be used by Ostenders and other LowCountries’ militias for defense purposes, as seen in the records above.

Fourth is the idea that the change from “alderman and some of the burghers”

15 This will be addressed completely in Robert D. Smith and Kelly DeVries, The GunpowderArtillery of the Valois Dukes of Burgundy, 1363–1477 (Woodbridge, 2005).

16 See Smith and DeVries, The Gunpowder Artillery; A. Fromont and A. de Meunynck, Histoirede canonniers de Lille, 2 vols. (Lille, 1892); and A. de la Fons-Meliococq, De l’artillerie de laville de Lille aux XIVe, XVe et XVIe siècles (Lille, 1854).

17 Joseph Garnier, L’artillerie des ducs de Bourgogne d’après les documents conservés aux ar-chives de la Côte-d’Or (Paris, 1895). Nor is there the mention of any variation of the name.

18 See Kelly DeVries, “Gunpowder Weaponry and the Rise of the Early Modern State,” War inHistory 5 (1998), 133–39.

19 Garnier, L’artillerie des ducs de Bourgogne, pp. 150–65.20 Smith and DeVries, The Gunpowder Artillery; see also Kelly DeVries, “The Rebellions of the

Southern Low Countries’ Towns during the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries,” forthcomingin Power and the City in the Netherlandic World, 1000–2000, ed. W. TeBrake and W. Kibler

182 Kelly DeVries

(den heere, wet ende eenneghe vander poorters) serving as militia in the 8 Au-gust documents to “sailors and sergeants” (zeelieden ende serganten) as themilitiamen on 23 August may indicate a change in personnel from less to moreprofessional soldiers. It seems that the earlier militia were drawn from the town’smore prominent citizens, but does not denote any martial talent, while the laterones, certainly in the case of the sergeants, if not also the sailors, seems to do so.Does this mean, then, that the Ostender soldiers who had served with Philip theGood at Calais perhaps had not returned to the town between 28 July and 8August, but had by 23 August? If so, then it must be assumed that Philip’s armystayed intact longer after the failure at Calais than previously thought, and thereis no evidence to support this.

Perhaps the difference in militia designation can be more easily explained assuggesting two different types of urban militias, land and naval forces. Althoughfew historians of medieval soldiers, or even medieval navies, discuss such navalmilitia, it seems logical that these troops existed, especially in coastal towns, andalso especially with piracy so prevalent. J.F. Verbruggen has found that suchtroops existed earlier in Flemish military history, while Neils Lund has foundthem in medieval Denmark, Michael Powicke has confirmed their existence inmedieval England, and N.A.M. Rodger has done the same for the sixteenth andseventeenth century.21 This is further suggested in the 23 August records with theuse of the words sceipten omme oestwaert, securely meaning “shipped all east-ward” and denoting travel on the sea for the “sailors and sergeants.” It is thusprobable that the militias mentioned in the later document were simply othersoldiers than those mentioned in the earlier document and does not preclude thepossible continued service of the “alderman and burghers” on the dune protect-ing Ostend from the landing of an English force.

Finally, much more difficult to understand is who Ostend’s “allies” (den goedenlieden die ons biistandichede daden, literally “the good people who are assistingus”) were and why the Ostenders seem to be paying for some of their victuals,beer and bread, in the 8 August records. Does this mean that some of these werealso serving as militia on the dune or elsewhere in protection of Ostend andneeded to be supplied with foodstuffs during their service, a logical assumptionif a threat to that town might also be judged a threat to some of the other, smallervillages in the region? Or is it possible that Ostend was simply supplying those“allies” because they were not able to do so on their own? Curiously, the docu-ment refers to the beer as “given” (ghesconken) and the bread as “sent” (ghesend),and that the expense for these items were paid by the Ostenders, a suggestionthat no payment for these was to be received from the “allies.” There is also no

21 J.F. Verbruggen, Het leger en de vloot van de graven van Vlaanderen vanaf het ontstaan tot in1305 (Brussels, 1960), pp. 118–22; Neils Lund, Lið, leding og landeværn: Hær og samfund iDanmark i ældre middelalder (Roskilde, 1996); Michael Powicke, Military Obligation inMedieval England: A Study in Liberty and Duty (Oxford, 1962), and N.A.M. Rodger, “TheNew Atlantic: Naval Warfare in the Sixteenth Century,” in War at Sea in the Middle Ages andRenaissance, ed. John B. Hattendorf and Richard Unger (Woodbridge, 2003), pp. 233–36.


mention of “allies” in the 23 August document, although this should not be takenas suggesting that Ostend no longer had them. While these questions must re-main unanswered without further research, it is quite interesting that militiasserving in one location may have been made up not just of men from a singletown, especially in the case of smaller towns and villages.22

Nor can it be answered as to why there is a difference in beer prices betweenthe two dates, without a greater knowledge of the economics of beer-making inFlanders at this time.23

Although many of these points might be assumed without having the Ostenddocuments of payments for supplies to their militia on 8 and 23 August 1436, itis nevertheless important to have some evidence for their veracity. There are nodoubt that records of other militias are in other archives and that they similarlywill enrich our understanding of the “grass-roots” of medieval military history.Let this be an encouragement for their discovery, study, and discussion.

22 To my knowledge no one has written about such militia administration during the MiddleAges, although such a topic deserves consideration.

23 John H.A. Munro, expert in the economics of the Low Countries during the fifteenth century,has suggested that as a result of the currency fluctuation in Flanders during and due to theHundred Years War, it may be folly to try and derive any conclusive information from thenoting of prices during this period. Nor did the more proficient economic administration of theBurgundians change this. See Munro, Wool, Cloth and Gold.

Journal of Medieval Military History~Vol. 3

Documents

Transcript of Journal of Medieval Military History~Vol. 3