Journal of Islamic Studies 2008 GhaneaBassiri 71 96

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATION

OF CONCEPTIONS OF JUSTICE IN

CLASSICAL KAL2M: A STUDY OF 6ABDAL-JABB2RS AL-MUGHNI AND IBN

AL-B2QILL2NIS AL-TAMHID

KAMBIZ GHANEABASSIRI*Reed College

Despite widespread acknowledgement of the significance of justice inIslamic thought, there have been relatively few systematic studies ofIslamic conceptions of justice.1 In Islamic Studies, justice has usuallybeen treated tangentially in relation to theories of government.2

However, as we shall see in this essay, a significant part of earlyMuslim discourses on justice, namely the discussion of 6adl3 in scholastic

* I would like to thank Steven M. Wasserstrom, Maurice A. Pomerantz,and J. Vahid Brown for commenting on an earlier draft of this article. Anyshortcomings in the article are due to me.

1 The most notable and systematic remains Majid Khadduris The IslamicConception of Justice (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984). Givenhow little scholarly attention Islamic conceptions of justice have received, it isnot surprising that Khadduris book is primarily descriptive. After surveyingvarious conceptions of justice in almost all dimensions of Muslim scholarship,Khadduri concludes that Muslims maintain that a higher standard of justicemust be found, consisting of a higher order of norms and virtues which man-kind aspires to realize on Earth and that the debate on justice never reallycompletely stopped among Muslims (pp. 2278). See also, two works byLawrence Rosen, The Anthropology of Justice: Law as Culture in Islamic Society(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) and The Justice of Islam:Comparative Perspectives on Islamic Law and Society (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1999).

2 For a bibliography of these works, see Patricia Crone, Gods Rule:Government and Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 41446.

3 In Arabic, the words most often used to refer to justice are 6adl and itssemantic variant, 6ad:la. Qis3 and inB:f are also used to refer to justice, but, morespecifically, they connote equity. Other words, such as m;z:n (scale orbalance), and Aaqq (truth, reality, rightness, or desert), depending on thecontext in which they are used, could also be translated as justice. 6Adl is the

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theology (kal:m), was more concerned with shaping individual epis-temologies than affecting political institutions.

In a brief but learned article on conceptions of political justice in earlyIslam, Franz Rosenthal commented indirectly on the dearth of scholar-ship on Islamic conceptions of justice by observing that theoreticalconceptions of justice were for the most part irrelevant in Muslimsocieties. However, he cautioned that,

this seeming lack of interest must not be mistaken for a lack of concern, among

Muslims in general, with the tremendous practical importance of justice and

injustice in human political and social affairs. On the contrary, the existence of

justice and the need for it in order to maintain any social organism was taken

so much for granted that except in restricted philosophical circles, no further,

more profound study of the problem of justice was felt to be required.4

In what follows, I build on Rosenthals observation and seek toshow that in the influential works of 6Abd al-Jabb:r (d. 415/10245)and Ibn al-B:qill:n; (d. 403/1013) conceptions of justice were foundedon theories of knowledge that gave prominent place to intuition5 andinternal human experiences. For these two mutakallims (scholastictheologians), justice was not an abstract ideal but rather a matter ofeveryday knowledge. Their inquiries into what is just were thus built onexpositions of how an individual knows and how individual epistemol-ogies define humans relation to God, the world, and one another.6Abd al-Jabb:r and Ibn al-B:qill:n; presumed that individuals decide

what is ethical on the basis of how they interpret their intuitions andinternal experiences in relation to God. 6Abd al-Jabb:r interpretedintuitions and internal experiences as divine creations embedded inhuman nature as a means of deciphering what is good (Aasan) orjust (6adl). He thus defined justice as a type of necessary knowledge(6ilm @ar

evidence humans utter dependence on their Creator. He thus concludedthat only God knows what is just and that justice is whatever Godcommands.

Neither 6Abd al-Jabb:r nor Ibn al-B:qill:n; developed a systematictheory of social or political justice; rather, they sought to effect justice insociety by affecting the way individuals interpret their intuitions andinternal experiences in relation to God. Since intuitive knowledge islocated in the individual, the individualrather than political and socialinstitutionswas the primary unit through which they analysed justicein society. For this reason 6Abd al-Jabb:r placed great emphasis upon thedissemination of knowledge by teaching proper methods of reflection(naCar):

Know that what is entailed by the religious obligations of the religiously

obligated person (takl;f al-mukallaf) is divided into two parts. One of them isknowledge (6ilm), the other is action (6amal) . . . As for action, it is of two kinds.The first is to teach (ta6l;m) and expend every effort in it. One should persevere indoing this as though it were possible to enable the one being given knowledge

of the principles of religion (uB

to my reading of early kal:m texts to understand the significance ofjustice in Muslim society (in this case, the society under Buyid rule). It isoften argued that discussions of justice in works of kal:m have littleto do with social and political justice and that they are concernedexclusively with justice (6adl) as an attribute of God. This is true, if weread these texts, as Rosenthal did, for systematic theories of social orpolitical justice. However, such a reading overlooks the fact that thenotion that God is just has not been a subject of controversy in Islam.Indeed, Muslims unanimously agree that God is just and good; as Ibnal-B:qill:n; reminds us, whoever believes that God is not always justand good cannot be considered a Muslim.7 What made discussionsof divine justice controversial and worthy of theological analysis in earlyIslam were the implications that varying conceptions of justice asa divine attribute held for order in society. For this reason, one couldfruitfully mine discussions of 6adl in kal:m for insights into the social andpolitical significance of conceptions of justice in early Islam. Differentconceptions of justice played a crucial role in the sectarian differentia-tions made in early Islamic history. Insofar as people were believed tobe individually responsible for their actions, the way in which theydetermined how to act justly also determined the degree to which peopleof opposing views were willing to accept them into the Muslimcommunity as individuals capable of acting justly.

BIOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUNDS

6Abd al-Jabb:r and Ibn al-B:qill:n; were the main proponents oftheir respective schools of scholastic theologyBasran Mu6tazilism andAsh6arismduring their lifetime. They were contemporaries and bothserved as judges under Buyid rule.

Ab< l-Easan 6Abd al-Jabb:r al-Hamadh:n; al-Asad:b:d; s al-Mughn;f; abw:b al-tawA;d wa-l-6adl (That which makes suffice in discussionsof divine unicity and justice), which is my source for his thought, isour richest extant source for Basran Mu6tazili theology. 6Abd al-Jabb:rwas born some time between 320/932 and 325/937 in Asadabad, a townlocated slightly southwest of Hamadhan (Iran). He was best knownby his administrative title, q:@; al-qu@:h (the Chief Judge) for theregion encompassing Rayy, Qazwin, Abhar-Zanjan, Suhraward, Qum,

7 Ab< Bakr b. al-B:qill:n;, Kit:b al-Tamh;d (ed. Joseph McCarthy, Beirut:al-Maktaba al-Sharqiyya, 1957), 219.

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and Damawand, under the Buyid vizier al-4:Aib Ism:6;l b. 6Abb:d(d. 385/995).8 He died around 415/10245.

Ab< Bakr MuAammad b. al-B:qill:n;s9 date of birth is not known,though most likely it was within the second quarter of the fourth/tenthcentury. We do know that he was born and raised in BaBra. At one pointhe joined the court of the Buyid prince 6A@ud al-Dawla (d. 372/983).For later traditionalists, the fact that he worked for the Buyids, whowere Shi6i, was a source of concern. Al-Q:@; 6Iy:@ (d. 544/1149), in hisbiography of Ibn al-B:qill:n;, mentions that when his teachers refusedto join 6A@ud al-Dawlas court because, as Daylami Shi6is (raw:fi@),they were considered to be among the unbelievers and the religiouslycorrupt, he said to them:

This is what Ibn Kull:b, al-MuA:sib; and others from that time said[Thecaliph] al-Ma8m

this matter. The proof of what they ought to have done would have been made

manifest to them. You, O Shaykh, also tread their path until what occurred to

AAmad occurs to the jurists (fuqah:8) and until they pronounce the doctrineof the createdness of the Qur8:n and negate [the possibility of the] beatific visionof God (ru8y:)! I am going even if you do not go.

With this passionate speech, he gained the consent of his teacher:

If God has opened your bosom to this, go!11

In an effort presumably to inform his Buyid patron of correct beliefs,Ibn al-B:qill:n; wrote al-Tamh;d f; l-radd 6al: l-mulAida al-mu6a33ilawa-l-r:fi@a wa-l-khaw:rij wa-l-mu6tazila (Laying out the refutationof the atheist heretics, the Shi6a, the Kharajis, and the Mu6tazila),12

which is my source for his conception of justice. Al-Tamh;d, along withIbn F

a definition of an act (fi6l), which foregrounds 6Abd al-Jabb:rs discussionof justice as an attribute (Bifa) of an act rather than an abstract ideal.This indicates not only how deontic but also personalistic13 and practicalhis conception of justice is.6Abd al-Jabb:r defines an act as follows:

Know that what is meant by our description of an act as an act (fi6l) is that it isfound occurring from an agent (f:6il) capable of exercising power over it (q:dir6alay-h), and everyone who knows it as such knows it as an act of his. Whoeverdoes not know it in this manner does not know it as an act. (al-Mughn;, vi. i. 5)

6Abd al-Jabb:rs definition of an act draws an essential connectionbetween the agent of an act and her ability to perform the act. This issignificant for understanding 6Abd al-Jabb:rs conception of justicebecause, as we shall see, he argues that the justness of an act is deter-mined by whether its agent deserves praise for performing it or blamefor failing to perform it. Justice is thus not an ideal for which one strivesbut rather a practical aspect of everyday action.

Categories of acts

6Abd al-Jabb:r divides acts into two broad categories: acts that carryno attribute (i.e., they are neither good nor bad) and acts that carry anattribute, such as goodness or badness. Neutral acts have no attributeover and above their existence . . . e.g., the acts of a person who is

13 Based on studies of religious courts in rural Morocco, Lawrence Rosen hasargued that justice in Islam is personalistic. It is not a fixed ideal that underpinssocial institutions or relations; rather, it is an ideal arrived at through personalnegotiations that take place within the parameters of what is culturally andreligiously accepted as permissible. This function of justice, he has furtherargued, reflects the general way in which Arab Muslim culture functions.The metaphor he used to describe this culture is the bazaar in which all pricesare negotiable and only fixed on a case-by-case basis through the personalinterchange of the buyer and the merchant. (See Rosen, Anthropology of Justice,esp. pp. 17 and 21; Justice in Islamic Culture and Law in Ravindra S. Khare(ed.) Perspectives on Islamic Law, Justice, and Society (Lanham: Rowman &Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 3352; Justice of Islam, esp. 15460.) My readingof 6Abd al-Jabb:r and Ibn al-B:qill:n; suggests a different interpretation. Forthem the individual is the primary social unit through which justice is realized insociety. Justice is nonetheless a universal concept that underpins their particularconceptions of God and Gods relation to humanity. Their emphasis on thecentrality of the individual for how justice is religiously conceived and soughtin society should not be construed to mean, as Rosen would have it, that justiceis a negotiated reality in Muslim societies.

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unaware (s:hin) or asleep (n:8im). 6Abd al-Jabb:r describes the value ofacts as an attribute over and above the existence of the act (z:8ida 6al:wuj

Good acts, however, are distinguished from one another, because thegoodness of breathing differs ethically from the goodness of acting justly.Among good acts 6Abd al-Jabb:r (ibid) generally distinguishes permis-sible (mub:A), commended (nadb and tafa@@ul), and obligatory acts(w:jib). Permissible acts are those whose agents are necessarily knownnot to deserve blame (e.g., breathing); as such, they could be consideredas mere good acts. A recommended act is necessarily known to bea good [act] that has an attribute over and above its goodness by whichits agent deserves praise (madA), such as beneficence (iAs:n), but theomission of commended acts, such as supererogatory acts of worship(naw:fil), are necessarily known not to deserve blame (ibid, 37). 6Abdal-Jabb:r cites inB:f (fairness or equity) as an example of the thirdcategory of good actsobligatory acts (w:jib). Obligation is a valueover and above the goodness and praiseworthiness of an act. An actis obligatory, according to 6Abd al-Jabb:r, when it is necessarily knownthat if it is undertaken by an agent he deserves praise and if notundertaken he deserves blame (ibid, 43).

6Abd al-Jabb:rs definition of justice

Following discussion of the place of just acts in the context of actsin general, 6Abd al-Jabb:r offers this definition of justice:

Know that the act which is distinguished by this attribute (Bifa) [i.e., 6adl] is everyact that is done either to benefit (yantafi6) or harm (ya@urr) the recipient ofthe act in a way (wajh) that is good (yaAsun). As for what a doer (f:6il) amongus does to benefit himself or to repel harm from himself, it is not described as

such. Therefore, it is not said that Zayd by eating or drinking or doing what

is religiously obligatory (w:jib) or commended (nadb) is being just. When hebenefits or harms someone else in a way that is good, it is said that he is being just

to him and that what he did was just. For this reason, it is not said that a judge

acted justly between the adversaries unless what he did to them was good and

equitable (inB:fan), by effecting either a benefit or harm. (ibid, 48)

It may seem odd that 6Abd al-Jabb:rs definition of justice assumesthat assessing the goodness of a harm or benefit brought to others is notsubject to dispute, when this is precisely the vexing question of ethics.For 6Abd al-Jabb:r, as seen above, the goodness and badness of acts, theirpraiseworthiness or blameworthiness, are all matters known necessarily(bi-6ilm @ar

can explain why something is known necessarily; knowledge that isexplainable can be acquired. Since the necessity of necessary knowl-edge cannot be explained, its content can only be communicated bylisting what constitutes it. 6Abd al-Jabb:r does this by dividing thecontent of necessary knowledge into two categories: knowledge that isnecessarily known by a means (3ar;q) and knowledge that is necessarilyknown without a means. What we know by a means is knowledge ofparticulars (mufaBBal) gained through perception (idr:k), either throughthe senses or by finding ourselves (wujida anfusan:) in a particular stateat a particular time, such as finding oneself in the state of being willingat the moment one wills to do something or the state of reflectingwhen one reflects upon something. Necessary knowledge that is gainedwithout a means is known through intuition (6aql), and it is generaliz-able (mujmal). As examples of this type of necessary knowledge, 6Abdal-Jabb:r lists (ibid, xii. 66) knowledge of the rules of logic (e.g., twocontradictory statements cannot both be true) and knowledge of ethicalattributes of acts (e.g., injustice (Culm) and lying are bad).6Abd al-Jabb:rs categorization of ethical knowledge as intuitive

knowledge begs further inquiry into his epistemology and is significantfor establishing the personalistic nature of his conception of justice.As we shall see below, intuition (6aql) and perception (idr:k), for 6Abdal-Jabb:r, are creations of God in humans that obligate them to God(takl;f). As such, when 6Abd al-Jabb:r says one intuitively knows thegoodness or badness of an act, he gives divine validation to individualintuitions and internal feelings involved in making such a judgment,and in this way he universalizes his personal intuitions of the natureof the God-human relationship.

6Abd al-Jabb:rs conception of knowledge

6Abd al-Jabb:r defines knowledge as follows:

Know that knowledge (6ilm18) is an entitative ground (ma6n:) which necessitates(yaqta@;) tranquillity in the self (suk

convinced one of itself in accordance with what it actually is (6al: m: huwabi-hi w:qi6). (ibid, 13)

6Abd al-Jabb:rs definition of knowledge, through the notion of ma6n:,ontologically relates the world outside of humans to internal experiencesof conviction and tranquillity of the self. Ma6n: literally signifiesmeaning in Arabic, but it has a technical definition in Mu6tazil;theology. As Richard Frank has argued, ma6n: in Mu6tazil; theologysignifies the intrinsic causal determinant of a thing being-so.20 In short,as suggested by George Hourani, ma6n: could be rendered into Englishas a ground or, as I prefer, an entitative ground for the attributesand characteristics of a thing.21 According to 6Abd al-Jabb:r, the ma6n:of our knowledge of a thing, though not equivalent to the reality ofthe thing, corresponds to it as it really is. The ma6n: of what is known(ma6l

for its existence to be generated (l: yaj

a faculty (quwwa) nor an instrument (:la) nor a sense (Aass) (ibid,xi. 3759). He writes:

6Aql is a term referring to an aggregate of specific knowledges (al-6ul

When we are afraid we act to remove the fear from ourselves. In religiousterms, the kh:3ir warns us of the divine blame and punishment that ourwrongdoings will earn us even though we might not see (our) wrong-doing punished or blamed in the here and now.29 As such, the kh:3irmotivates (d:6in) us to look for God and to act ethically and fulfil ourreligious duties.

[Since] the obligation to reflect to know God follows upon the fear (khawf) of

not doing so and since this fear is necessarily a fear of the harms connected to

religion (d;n), such as punishment, sin, etc., and since this matter is not arrangedin the 6aql of the compos mentis person as a result of habit (6:da) . . . then therehas to be a sign (am:ra) that occurs inside him for him to fear them thusnecessitating him to reflect. This sign is the warning (tanb;h) of the motivator(al-d:6;) or the incidental thought (al-kh:3ir). (ibid, 3867)

The incidental thought is not something humans learn through habitor experience, like a craft. Rather, it is a sign that incites fear of divinepunishment internally, thus obligating humans to reflect upon themselvesand the world in order to attain knowledge of religious duties so as toavoid divine punishment for disobedience.

Given this significance of reflection (naCar), 6Abd al-Jabb:r concludesthat God obligates humanity to reflect and to acquire knowledge (ibid,487). Given what we know through the kh:3ir about the necessity ofreflection for self-preservation, 6Abd al-Jabb:r also concludes that thedivine obligation of reflection and knowledge is a good act in the sensethat it brings about goodness (ibid, 492f.). Thus, humans ought to acceptit rationally and willingly.

We know that the religiously obligated person (mukallaf), when he reflects,

gains cognition (6arafa) of divine unicity and justice (al-tawA;d wa-l-6adl) andknows that he deserves blame and punishment for disobedience and praise and

reward for obedience [to God] and that he deserves these through the power

of Godwho is sublime and essentially powerful (q:dir li-nafsi-h)for whomit is impossible to be prevented from doing what rightfully deserves to be done

(l: yaj

he knows in regard to the benefit and the harm found in the states of obedience

and disobedience respectively. Thus, according to what we have explained, Gods

necessitating (may He be praised) these cognitions (ma6:rif) as graces30 (al3:f)has to be a good act. (ibid, 493)

In this summary of the purpose of human knowledge and reflection, wefind that 6Abd al-Jabb:rs epistemology ultimately culminates in a viewof the essential situation of human beings to be that of religiouslyobligated persons who stand before an All-Powerful, Just, and GraciousGod. This is learned through reflection, which is incited by our incidentalthoughts (kh:3ir), and facilitated by human intuition (6aql). From 6Abdal-Jabb:rs point of view, there is no doubting this understanding of theworld (i.e., of God and the cosmos) because it is validated througha personal conviction and a self-assured tranquillity that as he showsthrough his deontology, conforms to the reality of things as they are.

Understanding 6Abd al-Jabb:rs epistemology allows us to appreciatehow personalistic his conception of justice is. Goodness and badness,and by extension justice and injustice, for 6Abd al-Jabb:r, are intuitivelyknown. That is, we intuitively know whether or not an act that harmsor benefits another does so in a way that is good or bad, and thuspraiseworthy to undertake or blameworthy if not undertaken. For 6Abdal-Jabb:r, such ethical assessments are forms of necessary knowledge andin fact necessarily elude explanation. They are universally and imme-diately known by all compos mentis persons. The validity of intuitiveethical assessments are doubly assuredfirst, as divine creations which,along with the kh:3ir, guide humans toward their religious obligationsand, second, as internal experiences of conviction and self-assuredtranquillity experienced through the ma6n: of a known thing when onefeels like one truly knows.6Abd al-Jabb:r believed in the universality and verity of his intuitions

of what is good and just to such an extent that he asserted that whoeveropposes them is lying. There is no need to engage them in a discussion;rather, he wrote (ibid, 42): We only need to strive to remove theirmorally corruptive denials (yajibu an najtahida f; iz:lati-hi 6an al-ink:ral-f:sid). This statement is evidence for the sectarianism of thosetheologians who defined the rightful Muslim community (umma)according to their theology (kal:m). 6Abd al-Jabb:r viewed those who,

30 6Abd al-Jabb:r defines grace as that on account of which an acting agent(f:6il) is more likely to perform [what he or she is obligated to perform], even ifhe does not choose to perform the act because of another [personal] objective(ghara@). This [his not performing the act] does not preclude it from beinga grace (al-Mughn;, xii. 493).




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like Ibn al-B:qill:n;, opposed his theological understandings as sourcesof moral corruption (fas:d) in society. Similarly, Ibn al-B:qill:n;regarded his Mu6tazil; opponents as: the sect (firqa) most harmful tothis Muslim community (umma) and the most insolent of sects withrespect to God.31

IBN AL-B2QILL2N>S CONCEPTIONOF JUSTICE

Ibn al-B:qill:n; rejects 6Abd al-Jabb:rs notions that justice is knownintuitively and that the ethical attributes of acts are ontologically deter-mined. He advocates divine subjectivism, arguing that justice andgoodness can only be determined through the divine commands revealedto humanity.

We condemn most fervently the notion that the 6aql32 by itself is a way toknowledge of the badness (qubA) or goodness (Ausn) of an act or its prohibition,permissibility or obligatoriness. We say that these assessments (Aukm) are allonly proven by the revealed religion (al-shar6), without any consideration of the6aql. (al-Tamh;d, 105)

Despite his differences with 6Abd al-Jabb:r, Ibn al-B:qill:n;s concep-tion of justice, like 6Abd al-Jabb:rs, is personalistic. Like 6Abd al-Jabb:r,Ibn al-B:qill:n; does not discuss justice as a theoretical ideal but as anattribute of an act. Unlike 6Abd al-Jabb:r, he does not view justice asan intrinsic attribute of an act but rather as an attribute ascribed to actsby divine commandments and prohibitions (in other words, by IslamicLaw). Also, like 6Abd al-Jabb:r, Ibn al-B:qill:n;s conception of justiceis founded upon his understanding of what constitutes necessary knowl-edge and intuition. For him too, necessary knowledge is a divine creationthat directly links humans to God, but he interprets this divine crea-tion differently. While 6Abd al-Jabb:r argues that necessary knowledgeis proof that God has created in humans the innate ability to know andreflect, Ibn al-B:qill:n; finds in necessary knowledge proof of humansutter dependence on God. The fact that we find in ourselves knowledge,in the attainment of which we play no role, demonstrates for Ibnal-B:qill:n; that we cannot know anything, much less make sound

31 al-Tamh;d (ed. McCarthy), 257.32 Unlike 6Abd al-Jabb:r, Ibn al-B:qill:n; does not have a technical definition

of 6aql. Depending on the context, his use of 6aql in al-Tamh;d can be translatedas intellect, reason, or intuition.




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ethical assessments, without the direct involvement of God. Hence, while6Abd al-Jabb:rs epistemology results in an understanding of humansas beings existentially obligated to God (mukallaf), Ibn al-B:qill:n;sepistemology results in the understanding of humans as existentiallydependent subjects of a divine master.

Ibn al-B:qill:n;s rejection of deontological conceptions of justice

Given 6Abd al-Jabb:rs deontological conception of justice, he focuseson the nature of acts rather than their consequences.33 He argues thatknowledge of the ethical attributes of acts is both intuitively andontologically determined. We intuitively know that an act that undulyharms another is unjust, and we can be certain of our intuition becauseontologically the ma6n: (or entitative ground) of our knowledge ofthe act necessitates a conviction (i6tiq:d) in us that is experienced astranquillity of the self (suk

of acts demand different ethical assessments, thus demonstrating thatacts cannot be intrinsically good or bad:

Do you not see that a movement (Aaraka) which is a movement by itselfhas always to be a movement wherever it is found? This necessitates that dogs,

lions, and other animals that do not reason (l: ya6qil) would have to be unjust,perpetrators of badness (qubA), and deserving of blame and censure. They wouldhave to be sinners and indecent beings for their infliction of pain upon others

according to this point of view. General agreement (ittif:q) on the absurdity ofthis is proof of the invalidity of what you say. (ibid, 342)

It may seem ironic that the point Ibn al-B:qill:n; wants to make in thispassage depends on his audiences intuition that animals cannot be heldmorally responsible for their actions. However, as the last sentence of thequote shows, for Ibn al-B:qill:n;, the common sense that necessitatesour not holding animals morally responsible for their actions is definednot by intuition but by social convention or a general agreement.35

By defining common sense as a kind of consensual rather than intuitiveknowledge, Ibn al-B:qill:n; recognizes the possibility of common-senseethical assessments but categorically denies humans an inherent meansof determining what is just, independent of divine revelation.

Ibn al-B:qill:n;s affirmation of divine subjectivism

In place of intuitive and deontological ethics, Ibn al-B:qill:n; affirmsdivine subjectivism, and does so dramatically.

If someone says, Is it possible for God to inflict pain (yu8lim) on children withoutany compensation (6iwa@), to command the killing and the infliction of pain onanimals for no beneficial reason, to make some animals subordinate to others, to

impose continual punishment for discontinuous crimes (al-ajr:m al-munqa3i6a),to make obligatory for His servants what they cannot bear, to create in them that

for which they shall be punished, and other such things?, it is said to him,

Certainly! That is just when it is one of His actions (ajal! dh:lika 6adlun minfi6li-h). It is permissible and commendable according to His wisdom (Aikmati-h).If he says, How could that be permissible and good from Him and all of it bad

when issued from us?, it is said to him, That is bad and considered unjust

when issued from us only because the Lord of living and non-living entities

(m:lik al-a6y:n wa-l-ashy:8) forbade us from doing it. If He had not deemed

35 The issue of consensus is discussed by Ibn al-B:qill:n; in terms of taw:tur,ittif:q, and ijm:6, and it plays a significant role in his theology. For furtherdiscussion of this issue, see GhaneaBassiri, Window on Islam, 1206.




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it bad and forbidden it, it would not have been bad when it occurs from us.

(ibid, 341)

Again, it may seem ironic that while Ibn al-B:qill:n; categoricallyrejects the notion that ethical assessments could be intuitive, he presumesthat his audience would intuitively regard these examples as unjust.Otherwise, the dramatic effect of his rhetoric would be lost on the reader.What is at issue for Ibn al-B:qill:n; is not whether or not these actsare actually just but that individual intuitions and internal experiencesshould not limit God or Gods revelation. Human intuition and internalfeelings cannot be determinants of the justness of divine acts orrevelations.

Though Ibn al-B:qill:n; strongly affirms divine subjectivism, hisrhetorical reliance on human intuition in the above passage suggeststhat intuition and internal experiences are not absent from hisconception of justice. He simply interprets human intuition differentlyfrom 6Abd al-Jabb:r, on the basis of a different understanding ofGods relation to humans. While 6Abd al-Jabb:r reasons from hisintuitions and perceptions that God has created intuition (6aql) andperception (idr:k), along with accidental thoughts (kh:3ir), in order toguide humans toward religious obligation (takl;f), Ibn al-B:qill:n;interprets the divine creation of intuition and perception in humansas evidence for humanitys dependence on God. As such, he understandsGods relation to man in terms of a Rulers relation to His subjectrather than a Creators relation to a mukallaf (divinely obligatedperson).

The Creator, Mighty and Exalted is He, is the Overwhelming King (al-m:likal-q:hir); everything belongs to Him and is in His grasp. No one commands,permits, or forbids Him. Therefore, it is not necessary for all [the acts] that we

mentioned as being bad if issued from us to be analogously bad if issued from

Him. (ibid, 343)

Gods actions, as the Lord of everything, are different from humanactions because no one rules over God in the same way that God rulesover humans. It follows from this that as the Overwhelming King of allthings only God can determine what is good and bad, just and unjust.

Ibn al-B:qill:n; s definition of necessary knowledge

For Ibn al-B:qill:n;, Gods sovereignty over humans is demonstratedthrough his understanding of 6ilm @ar

to 6Abd al-Jabb:rs, still demonstrates his distinct understanding ofhumans dependence on God.

[Necessary knowledge] is knowledge that is necessarily necessitated (yulzamu

luz

My concern here is not with the ways in which the two theologiansestablished the validity of the Qur8:n as a source of divinely revealedcommands. Rather, my aim is to show how necessary knowledge servesas a theological argument for Ibn al-B:qill:n;s assertions that justiceis whatever God commands.

Since necessary knowledge is necessarily known, it cannot beexplained, so Ibn al-B:qill:n;, like 6Abd al-Jabb:r, provides a list ofwhat he believes constitutes necessary knowledge. He divides necessaryknowledge into six parts. The first five are each associated with what weperceive (idr:k) through our five senses respectively (ibid, 9). The sixthis a rather vast category that encompasses what he calls knowledgeinvented (mukhtara8) in the self a priori (ibtid:8an), in other words,knowledge that is known prior to sense experience. This category ofnecessary knowledge includes knowledge of: ones existence, ones stateof health, pain and pleasure, will (ir:da) and impotence (6ajz), shynessand courage, and reverence (birr) and recalcitrance (6uq

for revelation to occur as a divinely necessitated personal experience.Despite its extraordinariness, Ibn al-B:qill:n; considers this to be a formof necessary knowledge, the experience of which demonstrates thatmiracles or interruptions in the usual order of affairs are possible.

It would be easy to fault the logic of what Ibn al-B:qill:n; claims here,but for our purposes the logical validity of his claim is beside the point.What is of interest to the topic at hand is his method of argumentation.Ibn al-B:qill:n; seeks to validate revelation by pointing to externallyunverifiable, internal experiences. Ibn al-B:qillan; does not give us aspecific example of a divinely invented report in a person that is unheardby others. However, given that he categorizes this form of knowledge asnecessary knowledge, it must mean that he is referring to an externallyunverifiable, internal experience that is common to all humans. Giventhat God creates all knowledge, it seems that for Ibn al-B:qill:n;,an externally unverifiable, internal experience, such as a gut feeling ora premonition, demonstrates that God can communicate with individualhumans without anyone else knowing. Revelation then, as one form ofsuch experiences, though truly extraordinary, is validated by a common-place notion for Ibn al-B:qill:n;: human intuitions and internal experi-ences are in actuality divine creations that directly connect God tohumans. What distinguishes the divine creation of unverifiable internalexperiences in us from the revelation that established the prophecies of[the Prophet], Ibn al-B:qill:n; explains, is the fact that [the Prophets]experiences were accompanied by the splendid verses [of the Qur8:n],undeniable miracles, and [other] clear proofs that are out of the ordinary,uncustomary, and outside of the natural order (tark;b al-3ab;6a)(ibid, 132).

For Ibn al-B:qill:n; there is no question as to whether or not Godcan reveal knowledge to someone without the awareness of others;his concern is with the trustworthiness of the person who claims to havereceived divinely revealed knowledge.

The agreement of the speakers of our language that all fire is hot and burns and

that all humans have such and such a composition is deduced through everyone,

among trustworthy people (B:diq

This personal knowledge is generalized, not by ontology or universalhuman intuition as 6Abd al-Jabb:r would have it, but by general agree-ment among people, based upon trustworthy reports of its recurrence.

Personal knowledge is thus generalized by the second of Ibnal-B:qill:n; s three types of intuitive knowledgeknowledge of thevalidity of recurring and widely distributed reports (taw:tur). This isa concept used by scholars of Aad;th to distinguish the most soundProphetic traditions from less sound or weak ones. A Aad;th is consi-dered sound when it is repeated by trustworthy persons from a variety ofplaces and found recurring during each generation from the Prophetslifetime onward. What Ibn al-B:qill:n; asserts here is that the fact thatone knows, for example, that Greenland exists, based on recurring andwidely distributed reports, even though one has never seen Greenland,is based on the fact that we intuitively and necessarily recognizethe validity of consensual knowledge concerning it. By identifying thevalidity of what is known through taw:tur as a form of necessaryknowledge, he articulates a way in which personal knowledge can beuniversalized without any form of empirical investigation. In this way heestablishes the validity of the revelation to the Prophet and its recordas preserved in the Qur8:n.36

As for knowledge of the appearance of the Prophet (Gods blessing be upon him)

in Makka and Madina and of His calling him to Himself, this knowledge

occurs necessarily (min jihat al-i@3ir:r) because Muslims, Jews, Christians,Zoroastrians, Sabeans, Dualists, Atheists, and every sectarian deviant agrees that

the Qur8:n that is recited in our miAr:bs and inscribed in our books arose fromthe capacity of the Prophet (God bless him and grant him peace). In regard to its

advent, there is no disagreement among them. (ibid, 133)

In other words, the Qur8:n is necessarily known, by way of taw:tur,to be an accurate record of divine revelation from which humans candiscern Gods commands and prohibitions in order to determine whatis just and unjust.

Once Ibn al-B:qill:n; has shown that divine commands can berevealed and that their soundness can be assessed through recurring andwidely distributed reports, he has also to show that humans in all placesand at all times can understand the intention and meaning of divinerevelation. Ibn al-B:qill:n; does this by asserting that we intuitivelyknow that what a speaker intends is understood by the person for whom

36 This argument also validates Aad;th as a valid corpus of divinely inspiredknowledge, even though Ibn al-B:qill:n; does not specifically mention Aad;thin this context.




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the speech is intended. In other words, humans intuitively know thatwhat one intends can be communicated through speech. He also assertsthat by speaking, a speaker intends for the recipient of the speech toacquire knowledge of his ability to speak. Anyone familiar with the earlyhistory of Islam will immediately recognize in this an argument againstMu6tazil; attempts to disassociate any anthropomorphic ideas fromGod by denying that the Qur8:n was conveyed by God to the Prophet.This denial led to the Mu6tazili claim that the Qur8:n is Gods createdspeech.37

Ibn al-B:qill:n;, like Ash6aris in general, would not have understoodhimself as an anthropomorphist. What was at stake for him was theeternal nature of revelation. As uncreated divine speech, the commandsand prohibitions of the Qur8:n remain valid for all times and can alwaysbe used to determine what is good and bad, just and unjust.

If the speech of God, Exalted is He, was createdand it is agreed that it is not of

the genus of corporeal bodies (ajs:m)then it would have to be an accident(6ara@). If it were an accident, it would necessarily become extinct at some pointbecause of its state of contingency (min A:li Aud

validity of divine revelation (i.e., the Qur8:n) as an accurate recordof Gods commands that ought to be used to determine what is goodand just. Rejecting intuitive and deontological conceptions of justice,Ibn al-B:qill:n; argues that revelation is the only source for determiningwhat is just. Through his inquiry into how humans know, he seeksto demonstrate humans utter dependence on God for knowledge ofall ethical precepts. He interprets necessary knowledge as a form ofknowledge that is impelled or forced upon humans by their Creatorand Lord. He thus understands humans standing vis-a`-vis God in termsof a rulersubject relationship and asserts that justice is whatever theRuler commands for His subjects.

CONCLUSION

For 6Abd al-Jabb:r and Ibn al-B:qill:n;, who were the main representa-tives of the Basran Mu6tazili and Ash6ari schools of kal:m at the turnof the fifth/eleventh century, justice was not defined as an abstractideal subject to independent theoretical inquiry; rather it was a branchof epistemology. The significance of epistemology for their conceptionsof justice is clearly illustrated by the fact that they opposed one anothersconception of justice by opposing one anothers definition of intuitionand necessary knowledge. For each of them, accepting the validity ofthe others epistemology necessarily resulted in accepting his conceptionof justice. For both 6Abd al-Jabb:r and Ibn al-B:qill:n; the way inwhich humans interpret the intuitions and internal experiences that Godcreated in them define the way in which they understand their relation-ship to God. The fact that theological disputes in their times wereindexed by different interpretations of intuition or necessary knowledgeand internal experiences suggests that how individuals interpret theirrelationship to God through intuitions and internal experiences wasnot considered to be only a personal matter but also one of communalsignificance.

Both theologians viewed those who disagreed with their under-standings of knowledge and justice as sources of moral corruption insociety; insofar as they misunderstood how one knows what is just,neither mutakallim could trust his opponents to act justly in society.It follows from this that the primary means of religiously acting insociety to effect justice, as 6Abd al-Jabb:r indicates in the above-citedpassage, was to affect the way individuals reflect upon themselves andthe world, or more specifically, to affect the way in which they conceivetheir intuitions, internal experiences, and sense perceptions in relation




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to God, the world, and other humans. The fact that 6Abd al-Jabb:rs andIbn al-B:qill:n;s conceptions of justice are founded on analyses ofindividual epistemologies, intuitions, and internal experiences has impor-tant implications for understanding the relationship between Islamicthought and its sociopolitical context. The prevailing tendency is to readMuslim conceptions of justice in terms of theories of government and thepolitics of the state. However, in the case at hand, two influential Muslimthinkers conceptions of justice are founded upon distinct understandingsof individual epistemologies and internal experiences. If my readingis accurate, then a certain theoretical modification may be in order. Theworks of these two mutakallims support the centrality of the individualas the locus of knowledge through which humans are related to God,to one another, and to the world. It may be helpful to keep this classicalkal:m theory in mind when we engage in larger discussions of howjustice has been conceived in Islamic history.

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Journal of Islamic Studies 2008 GhaneaBassiri 71 96

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