1

Journal for the Study of Greek and Latin Philosophical

Traditions

1st INTERNATIONAL ISSUE

Institute of Philosophy

Academy of Sciences

of the Czech republic v.v.i.

Praha 2010

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Redakce časopisu Aithér Filosofický ústav AVČR

Jilská 1 Praha 1 110 00

www.aither.eu

ISSN 1803-7860 (Online) ISSN 1803-7879 (Print)

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Table of contents

Foreword....................................................................................... 5

1. Pavel Hobza............................................................................. 9

Ethics or Epistemology? Parmenides' Verse B 8.34

Reconsidered

2. Chiara Chinello...................................................................... 41

Oedipus, the Tragedy of Self Recognition

3. Jakub Jirsa............................................................................. 69

Value pluralism, Sophocles' Antigone and liberalism

4. Alice Pechriggl .................................................................... 107

Tragic ways of thinking the political. Some considerations

beyond the work of Nicole Loraux

5. Tomáš Hejduk....................................................................... 139

Bernard Williams and Ancient Greek Tragedy

6. Kryštof Boháček................................................................... 173

Between Truth and Beauty

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Dear readers,

Let me introduce the first international edition of our

journal, Aither International Issue 2010.

Aither is a journal devoted to European philosophical

traditions, as they were constituted and formulated in their

classic form of Greek and Latin writings. The journal is

primarily designed for the study of philosophical texts in

their original form from ancient Greece to the early Modern

Times (Latin). As well as for analysis, commentary and

interpretation of these texts, the magazine is open to the

broadest studies of cultural backgrounds and contexts, that

may in any way help to clarify or reinterpret Greek and

Latin philosophical thought. Reviews are also welcome, as

well as polemical articles and critical reflections on the

topic. The publisher of the journal Aither is the

Philosophical Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences.

Aither has been published bi-annually since 2009. The

International Issue will be issued once every two years.

Therefore, every fourth issue of Aither is international. The

Aither International Issue publishes articles in English,

German and French.

For more information, see the section forauthors.

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The first international issue is dedicated to the Attic tragedy

and Greek archaic thought. Tragic authors are now

generally regarded as the necessary basis for an alternative

or classical philosophical theories of Plato and Aristotle. In

any case, they represent to us contemporary common sense,

on the basis of which it were possible to formulate such

unique philosophical positions. Increasingly, however, the

works of tragic thinkers are interpreted directly as philo-

sophical texts, expressing an autonomous philosophical

position. Articles in our number are showing that the tragic

writers have great intellectual potential also for today's

philosophical debate, and that they were prominent figures

of ancient discussions. Furthermore, it appears that the topic

of tragic thought or tragic philosophy affects a wider group

of thinkers, than just tragic poets from Athens. Lastly, it

turns out that the inclusion of tragic texts in philosophical

literature requires some reflection on the concept of

philosophy in general. Such a new reflection on the

traditional reading of the text of the poem of Parmenides –

the highly respected epistemologist of the tradition – offers

the first paper, which in accordance with the main focus of

number suggests an ethical reading of Parmenides.

As a virtual magazine, we invite you on the first journey

into the world of classic thought. We hope that you will

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enjoy it and that our magazine will become for you a

reliable and perhaps even a permanent and freely available

guide for the future. Therefore, in awareness of the lack of

such a specifically oriented electronic journal, we chose the

name of the fifth element. Quintessence is unavailable for

our physical world, but acts as its persistent framework

which can be taken into account at all times and used to

better understand the world and ourselves. We hope that

some of the brilliance of Aither you will see in our

magazine.

8

9

Pavel Hobza

Parmenides’ Verse B 8.34 and the Practical Meaning of

One of the most famous notions associated with

Parmenides is the relationship between thought and being.

Although in philosophical tradition this notion has been

understood as the notorious identity of thought and being,

the precise form of the relationship in Parmenides is a

matter of dispute, depending on syntactical construction of

Greek lines that seem to express this relationship, i.e. the

fragment B 3 () and

the line B 8.34 :

'

However, the interpretation of B 3 is essentially ambiguous

since could be taken either as a predicate or as a

subject. Although in B 8.34 could be taken to be as

problematic as in B 3, there is an important

difference between both lines. Whereas line B 8.34 occurs

within a clear context of the fragment B 8 that can – as we

shall see – help to settle its interpretation, the fragment B 3,

10

not taking up the whole hexametric verse, appears alone; we

are thus short of clues on which it would be possible to

decide how to construe it. Because of the rather problematic

nature of the fragment B 3i we should concentrate merely

on line B 8.34.

Now, although the precise form of the relationship

between thought and being in B 8.34 is a matter of dispute,

there seems to be no disagreement on its theoretical or

epistemological character. However, it is the aim of this pa-

per to undermine this general agreement on the theoretical-

epistemological character of the line. Whereas, on the usual

interpretation, (or ) is understood in theoretical

terms as the act of, or the capacity for, , in interpreting

the line we should rather proceed from the ordinary, rather

practical meaning of as found, e.g., in the archaic lyric

poetry, where it meant a character, attitude, or even moral

self. On this interpretation, the line is to be understood in

practical or even ethical rather than epistemological terms.

Hence, its main message is practical-ethical and only

secondarily it has theoretical-epistemological implications.

i Sometimes it is even suspected that B 3 is not an authentic

quotation from Parmenides. Cf. Gadamer 1996, p. 154: ‗Inzwischen hat

mich Mansonner überzeugt, daß Fragment 3 überhaupt kein

Parmenides-Zitat ist, sondern eine von Platon selbst stammende

Formulierung, die (...) Clemens Parmenides zugeschrieben hat.‘

11

I. Syntactical Considerations about B 8.34

As we have suggested, there is a problem of how

exactly to construe the line B 8.34 ('

). In general, there

are three main possibilities of how to construct it. They are

based primarily on the understanding of which can

function as predicate, subject, or attribute. The conjunction

can be also rendered in three ways: ‗therefore‘,

‗that‘ and ‗because‘. First of all, let us list some possible

constructions for each interpretational type:

A. ( as predicate)

1. Dasselbe aber ist Erkennen und das, woraufhin

Erkenntnis ist.i (Heitsch)

2. Penser et ce pourquoi la pensée est, sont la même chose.ii

(Cordero)

3. It is the same to think and the thought that [the object of

thought] exists.iii

(Tarán)

B. ( as subject)

i Heitsch 1974, p. 31.

ii Cordero 1984, p. 39.

iii Tarán 1965, p. 86.

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1. Das Selbige aber ist zu erkennen, und zugleich der

Grund, weshalb eine Erkenntnis seiend ist.i (Hölscher)

2. The same is to think and (is) wherefore [or ‚that‗] is (the)

thought [or ‚thinking‗].ii (Mourelatos)

C. ( as attribute)

Als Identisches kann es erkannt werden und weil die

Erkenntnis Bestand hat.iii

(Wiesner)

As to the (grammatical) suitability of the renderings

suggested, the type B (or C) is to be preferred on two

grounds: 1) Unlike type A, the grammatical construction

is used in its usual way: ‗it is (possible) to

think‘. 2) To interpret as subject fits better the

context of the fragment B 8 for in B 8.29 (only five lines

above our line) unambiguously appears in the

function of subject, being synonymous with . As

Hölscher puts it: ‗Es ist unwahrscheinlich, daß Parmenides

fünf Verse später, und wieder am Versanfang, dasselbe

Wort in einem anderen, unprägnanten Sinn gebraucht.‘iv

Or

as Mourelatos puts it: ‗The presumption is that

i Hölscher 1986, p. 25.

ii Mourelatos 1970, p. 165

iii Wiesner 1987, p. 176.

iv Hölscher 1986, p. 97-98.

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refers back to the subject under discussion in B 8 as a whole

– , ―what-is‖; it must therefore function as subject in B

8.34, not as predicate.‘i

However, type B is not immune to objections since

its grammatical construction is not quite plausible. On this

interpretation, the line consists of two clauses which are

dependent on:

‗' (subject)

(first predicate)

(second predicate).‘ii

The main problem of this construction is not that it requires

supplying from the preceding clause before

but that the meaning of supplied differs from

the original one. The first means ‗it is (possible) to‘

whereas the second one has to be understood in the sense ‗it

is the reason‘.iii

Taking into account both the problems and the

advantages of types A and B, Wiesner suggests a new

i Mourelatos 1970, p. 165.

ii Mourelatos 1970, p. 166.

iii Wiesner 1987, p. 174: ‗Sie macht ja ein Zeugma insofern

erforderlich, als vor dem Infinitiv zunächst als ―es ist

(möglich) zu ..., kann‖ erscheint, dann aber vor dem -Satz als

―ist der Grund, ‖ zum anschließenden ―weshalb‖ oder ―wherefore‖

überleiten soll.‘

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interpretation of the line listed as type C. But his

interpretation is also susceptible to objections; for the

present, it suffices only to mention that it is superfluous and

(grammatically and factually) rather forced to construe

as attribute (see our considerations further below).

To reiterate, apart from the differences within each

particular interpretational type (depending largely on the

understanding of , there are three main

possibilities of how to interpret our line which are based on

. As to the grammatical construction, each type is

somewhat problematic. Hence the interpreters are seeking

to account for each type by virtue of factual reasons. I even

suspect that in construing the line, Wiesner was primarily

led by the alluring factual (i.e. ontological) considerations:

For to construe as attribute and as

‗because‘ entails two reasons why being (what-is) can be

thought: 1) Being can be thought only as identical, i.e.

because it is identical. 2) Being can be thought because

there is thought. According to Wiesner, this reason is

supported by the fact ‗daß Erkennen nur mit dem Seienden

anzutreffen ist (B 8,35-36), d.h. einem realen, sachhaltigen

Objekt.‘i Yet, most scholars see in the line different factual

or ontological implications. The advocates of the type A

interpret it as stating the identity of being and thought

i Wiesner 1987, p. 176.

15

whereas the advocates of the type B interpret it as follows:

‗The two clauses are complementary. The first guarantees

the presence or the availability of a certain object. But it

posits no obligation for mind to seek it. The second posits

the obligation, but gives no guarantee of the object‘s

availability.‘i

Now, we seem to be moving in a circle since the

grammatical reasons are conditioned by the factual ones and

vice versa. How could we get out of this vicious circle? To

be sure, there is no perfect and indisputable solution of how

to understand our line since it is the destiny of all

interpretation to be captive in a circle – may we call it

vicious or hermeneutical. Nevertheless, despite (or rather

because of) the problems pertaining to the line B 8.34, we

should try to develop a new approach of how to interpret it.

Let us start by tentatively considering the best

grammatical construction. is best to be construed as

subject (see the reasons mentioned in favor of the type B).

However, unlike in the type B, we should avoid the

supplying of before, which seems too forced

and controversial. As to the rendering of which is

most problematic, von Fritz‘s remark is worth quoting: ―It

is true, as Fränkel points out, that in the overwhelming

i Mourelatos 1970, p. 168. Cf. also Hölscher 1968, p. 99: ‗es ist

das Denk-Mögliche und als solches der Grund für die Wahrheit des

Denkens.‘

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majority of the cases in which the word occurs in

Homer, it means either ‗because‘ or ‗that‘ (...). But, in spite

of this, it can hardly be denied that essentially and

originally is (‗on account of which‘). (...)

[I]ts origin from is so apparent that it is always

possible to revert to the original meaning. In Parmenides the

word occurs only once outside the passage

discussed, but in this case it certainly means ‗because of

which‘ or ‗therefore‘ (...).‖i In fact, for the meaning of

in our line, it is decisive how it is used ‗in the only

occurrence outside the passage discussed‘, i.e. two lines

above (in B 8.32), where – as von Fritz and the majority of

the interpreters concede – it has to be rendered as

‗therefore‘. Moreover, if we take into account that

Parmenides‘ poem belongs to oral culture and as such was

designed for listening to rather than reading, one may be

even prone to think that Parmenides used in B

8.32 (i.e. in a context where its meaning is unproblematic)

only in order to make its meaning clear, thus giving his

audience a clue of how to understand it two lines below.

Our considerations about the best grammatical

construction would, then, result in the following

preliminary rendering:

i von Fritz 1945, p. 237-238.

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PR (Preliminary Rendering)

What is in itself the same (i.e. ) is to think and

that is why there is thought.

The objection to this rendering is evident: it may be

grammatically most appropriate but factually it is very

problematic for it seems to be tautological. To say ‗Since it

is possible to think (being), there is thought‘ is trivial and as

such – we can suspect – it has nothing to do with the

elaborate and sophisticated argument of the fragment B 8.

Yet, before we reject this rendering on the grounds of its

triviality, we should consider whether it is not only the

translation into modern languages that is trivial and tauto-

logical. Since the alleged tautology of the line is based on

the conception of thought, we should first inquire into the

meaning of and its cognates.

II. The Meaning of

Since our understanding of and draws

largely upon Kurt von Fritz‘ brilliant study, let us start our

inquiry into this topic by summarizing and rethinking some

of his approaches and conclusions. His main contribution,

let us preliminarily remember, consists in proving that

whereas our concept of thought involves discursive activity

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as its constitutive element, the Greek word being

closely related to the sense of visioni is based on a passive

and receptive relation to the world.

Unlike the verbal form, the meaning of its

nominal cognate underwent extensive changes which

sometimes led even to the contradictory uses of this noun.

Whereas the original meaning of was ‗to realize or to

understand a situation‘,ii in Homer developed as

follows: ‗Since the same situation may have a different

―meaning‖ to persons of different character and circum-

stances of life, the notion develops that different persons or

nations have different . As these different meanings of

a situation evoke different reactions to it, and since these

reactions are more or less typical of certain persons,

sometimes implies the notion of a specific ―attitude‖.‘iii

In

opposition to many different another meaning of

gained ground: a notion of ‗the which penetrates

beyond the surface appearance [and] discovers the real truth

about the matter. There can, then, be no different in

this situation, as the in this case is obviously just

one.‘iv

In Hesiod further semantic shifts took place: ‗The

i Cf. von Fritz 1945, p. 223: ‗But in the stage of the semantic

development represented by the Homeric poems, the concept of is

more closely related to the sense of vision.‘

ii von Fritz 1945, p. 223.

iii von Fritz 1945, p. 223.

iv von Fritz 1945, p. 224.

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notion that different persons may have different has

been further developed in two opposite directions. On the

one hand, the same person may have a different at

different times. On the other hand, now can designate

not only a more or less permanent attitude, as in Homer, but

also a fixed moral character, so that the word is now often

connected with adjectives expressing moral praise or

blame.‘i

Having analyzed Homer and Hesiod with respect of

, von Fritz claims that ‗[w]ith the rise of philosophical

speculation in the narrower sense, common language and

philosophical terminology gradually begin to develop on

different lines.‘ii Nonetheless, that is I suggest the most

problematic move of von Fritz‘s analysis. For it is far from

evident to assume – as he does – a philosophical tradition or

line of thought based merely on such scanty evidence as

provided by Xenophanes, Heraclitus and Parmenides. We

cannot be even sure whether these thinkers were acquainted

with one another, let alone assume a continuous line of their

interdepending thoughts. So von Fritz appears to squeeze

these thinkers into narrow limits of an assumed philo-

sophical tradition that he takes to be determined by the

i von Fritz 1945, p. 225.

ii von Fritz 1945, p. 226-227.

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tendency of to be rare and exceptional among people.i

Although this notion of seems to obtain for

Xenophanes and Heraclitus in whom only few occurrences

of survived, it is not suitable for Parmenides. For in

his poem there is at least one occurrence of that is

unambiguously attributed to all men.ii

So if we want to understand how was used in

Parmenides, we should not close him up in a presumed or

prefabricated line of thought but, instead, situate him in a

wider contemporary language context (represented to us by

the surviving contemporary texts). Let us then shortly

survey the use of in the post-Homeric tradition as

found primarily in the archaic lyric poetry, which – on von

Fritz‘s account – represents the second (non-philosophical)

i Cf. von Fritz 1945, p. 230: ‗In any case, the notion that is

something exceptional which only few people possess becomes very

prevalent in the generation after Xenophanes, especially with

Heraclitus, though it can already be found in the poems of Semonides of

Amorgos. It is obvious that this implies a change in the character of the

insight which is supposed to be the result of genuine.‘

ii It is the notorious expression in B 6.6. This

is not rare and exceptional among men but rather widespread and

even ubiquitous. It is further significant that von Fritz takes this

expression to be mysterious and unintelligible: Cf. von Fritz 1945, p.

237: ‗But a very real difficulty, which has never been solved and

perhaps does not admit a perfect solution, is created by the fact that in

some instances Parmenides seems to assert that and are

always and necessarily connected with and and therefore with

the truth, which seems to imply that the cannot err.‘ For the

alternative interpretation of see the third and fourth

sections of our paper.

21

line of the semantic development of he is not

interested in. This survey reveals two main semantic trends

of : 1) The is sometimes attributed to gods,

thereby appearing to retreat out of range of ordinary

people.i To attribute the to gods does not however

necessarily involve denying it completely to ordinary men.

It is only more difficult for them to possess it. It is this use

of that the von Fritz analysis finds in Xenophanes and

Heraclitus. Yet, this meaning of is quite rare in our

extant texts. 2) As a number of occurrences of in our

extent texts suggests, meant above all a character or

even a kind of moral self. So the original Homeric notion of

as a character or attitude was not only preserved and

strengthened but also morally deepened and developed

towards a kind of men‘s moral fundament or self. The

frequent connection of with a moral attribute testifies

to this sweeping trend.ii

i Cf. Semonides: ' ' (fr. 1.3, Diehl);

Solon: ' (fr. 17,

Diehl); Theognis: (v.

142).

ii In Solon occurs eight times. Only once it is ascribed to

God (cf. preceding note), the other occurrences testifies to the meaning

‗character or attitude‘. Moreover, since it is used five times with a moral

attribute, it is possible to conclude that in Solon this (practical) meaning

of is emphasized by its connection with the moral domain; cf.

(fr. 3.7, Diehl); (fr. 4.7); (fr.

5.10); (fr. 8.6); (fr. 23.15). For a similar

account see Theognis; cf. (v. 74, cf. v. 88);

22

By the way, either semantic use of seems to

have quite different a relationship to the original verbal

form . For whereas in the former use might (as a

kind of divine insight or plan) be related to the act of,i

the in the latter use seems to be lacking all relations

with the verbal form, meaning just a moral character.

III. in Parmenides

Let us now look at how is used in Parmenides.

Preliminarily, it could be submitted that whereas was

– as the majority of its occurrences in the contemporary

texts suggests – usually used in moral-practical terms

(meaning a character or even moral self), Parmenides seems

to have used it quite differently. Since Parmenides‘ poem is

usually understood as an ontological exposition, it is sus-

(v. 89); v. 109); (v.

196); (v. 223) etc.

i This use of could be rendered either way (i.e. as an

insight or a plan/intention) corresponding to the original Homeric

meaning of as ‗realizing or understanding a situation‘, cf. von

Fritz 1945, p. 223-224: ‗A dangerous situation, or a situation which

otherwise deeply affects the individual realizing it, often immediately

calls forth or suggest a plan to escape from, or to deal with, the

situation. The visualization of this plan, which, so to speak, extends the

development of the situation into the future, is then also considered a

function of the, so that the terms and can acquire the

meaning of ―plan‖ or ―planning‖.‘

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pected that the meaning of is theoretical rather than

moral-practical. For as the expressions like

(‗Observe through your mind‘, B 4.1) or

, ‗hold

back your mind from this way of inquiry‘, B 7.2) suggest,

Parmenides seems to conceive of the meaning of in

theoretical terms. So there seems to be a considerable

difference in how was used in usual colloquial

language, on the one hand, and in Parmenides, on the other

hand. That deserves not only our attention, but also an

explanation.

First of all, it is a question why we are so easily

prone to understand in Parmenides in theoretical rather

than practical terms. For although in the expressions

mentioned above seems to have theoretical meaning, it is

not difficult to imagine another constructions (e.g. ‗Observe

by virtue of your character‘, ‗Hold back your character from

this way of inquiry‘). There are I suggest at least two rea-

sons for its theoretical construction: 1) The usual onto-

logical or theoretical understanding of Parmenides‘ poem

seems to play an important role in it. For if one expects to

find in the poem an ontological exposition, they are also

prone to understand as a basis of, or a capacity for,

this ontological or theoretical activity. 2) Probably a more

important reason for its theoretical construction involves

our assumption or even prejudice to construe by

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means of its connection to . As to , it is actually

to be construed in theoretical terms since it is an activity of

seeing, contemplating, or thinking. Moreover, in

Parmenides it seems even to be explicitly connected with

(cf. ‗without ... you won‘t find B 8.35-36).

Since is supposed to be an ontological (i.e. highly

theoretical) concept, the connection of to seems

to only stress the original theoretical meaning of .

Now, since there is an etymological or linguistic

connection between and , we are prone to

assume that – similarly to our words ‗to think‘ and

‗thought‘ – there must be also a functional or semantic con-

nection between both Greek words. As we have however

suggested at the end of second section of our paper, the

functional or semantic connection between and

is largely at odds with the contemporary usual and most

frequent meaning of . For if was then construed in

moral-practical terms as a character, it seems to have been

discharged of most of its connections to . So although

we can find it evident to functionally or semantically

connect to (in particular because of the con-

nection of our own words ‗to think‘ and ‗thought‘), in the

contemporary language it did not seem to hold. In any case,

in assuming the functional or semantic connection between

and , we could be inclined to render as an

act of, or a capacity for, , thereby understanding it in

25

theoretical terms. To reiterate, if means a character or

a moral self, it is rather difficult to see how it could bear

upon the verbal form, the meaning of which is the activity

of seeing or contemplating.

If the theoretical meaning of largely depends

on its functional or semantic connection to , we can

ask whether this connection is explicitly to be found in the

poem or whether it is only vaguely implied on the analogy

of our words ‗to think‘ and ‗thought‘. There is at least one

place in the poem where both words seem to occur in a very

close connection. This connection seems to be somehow

established in the line B 8.34; but since it is this line we are

dealing with and since we have not so far arrived at its

interpretation, we had now better pass it over. Another

place where the connection appears to be established im-

mediately follows lines B 8.35-36 that (by means of the

particle ) give reason for the line B 8.34: ‗For ()

without being () on which it (i.e. ) once revealed

dependsi you won‘t find contemplation ().‘ (B 8.35-

i I construe the clause in keeping

with Mourelatos‘ interpretation: ‗The key to the phrase is, I believe, not

in the participle (from a rare verb, the semantics of

which are unavoidably obscure) but in the phrases. The

usual translation assumes that has vaguely locative or instrumental

force. It has been overlooked that the together with can have

an idiomatic sense ―to depend on, to rely upon, to be under the authority

of‖.‘ (Mourelatos 1970, p. 171) The subject of the clause is

supplied from the preceding line, being just the attribute.

26

36) As these lines suggest, and (or )i are

linked by virtue of ii

since both and are

thought to be closely related to .iii

Although the theoretical implications of in

Parmenides‘ poem seems to be very strong and con-

spicuous, there still remain two questions to ask: 1) Do

i Although is sometimes distinguished from by the

reference to the grammatical fact that the nouns with the ending

designate the result of an action (cf. Stenzel 1989, p. 221), in

Parmenides and mean the same (cf. von Fritz 1945, p. 241,

n. 95). See also uses of in Xenophanes and Theognis: In

fragment B 23 Xenophanes says that God is totally different from

mortal beings in shape () and . The contrast with God‘s

outer shape makes it clear that means his inner nature or

character, and not (only) his thought. In three of all four occurrences (v.

435, 1083, and 1149) Theognis uses synonymously with

(meaning character). Only in v. 985 it seems to be used in the meaning

‗as swift as thought‘, but even this use of is more appropriately

to be understood in terms of the swiftness of spirit that can immediately

see even the most distant places and times (cf. von Fritz 1945, p. 224:

‗In this connection seems to designate the imagination by which

we can visualize situations and objects which are remote in space and

time.‘), and not in terms of the swiftness of thought as a particular act of

thinking.

ii See e.g. von Fritz 1945, p. 237: ‗Parmenides seems to assert

(my italics) that and are always and necessarily connected

with and ‘. Cf. also Wiesner‘s statement quoted in part above

where the connection between and is also just supposed

without being accounted for: ‗Der zweite Grund ―weil die Erkenntnis

Bestand hat‖ wird dadurch gestützt, daß Erkennen nur mit dem

Seienden anzutreffen ist (B 8,35-36), d.h. einem realen, sachhaltigen

Objekt.‘ (Wiesner 1987, p. 176).

iii Cf. 1) the relationship between and (‗without

you will not find‘) and 2) the dependence of (or ) as

the subject of the clause on .

27

really all occurrences of in the poem unambiguously

testify to theoretical meaning? 2) Even if there is a unique.

all uses of in Parmenides are completely lacking all

practical implications had in the contemporary

colloquial usage?

As to the first question, we can answer it in the

negative. For there is at least one occurrence of in the

poem that unambiguously testifies to the colloquial

practical meaning of as a character. It is the occu-

rrence of in the line B 6.6. But before embarking on its

interpretation, we should remember the context in which it

occurs. As the survey of the contemporary, primarily lyric

texts suggest, the main part of the fragment B 6 works up

the traditional views about men and their relation to gods,

which can be taken to be a kind of archaic anthropology.i

Given its almost stereotypical use in the lyrics, the archaic

anthropology could be considered to be a standard lyric

motive. As the fragment B 6 taking up the traditional lyric

vocabulary of the archaic anthropology states, in

comparison with the omnipotent and omniscient gods, men

appear to be not-knowing (cf. , B 6.4),

helpless (cf. , B 6.5), straying (cf. , B

6.5), deaf and blind (cf. , B 6.7) etc.

i Cf. Mansfeld 1964, p. 1-41.

28

Now, it is significant that within Parmenides‘

exposition of the archaic anthropology the word

occurs, being attributed to ordinary men who are helpless,

not-knowing, deaf and blind. Its relationship to ordinary

men is further stressed by the attribute (‗straying‘,

B 6.6) by which it is accompanied. In other words, (as

a ) is here explicitly understood as straying,

i.e. erroneous, labile, or changing. Now, if we take into

account our preliminary survey of the uses of in the

poem that largely accord with its usual theoretical

understanding, the use of in B 6.6 seems to be quite

unique, even anomalous. For – as we have seen – the usual

meaning of in the poem seems to be construed by

means of its connection to being, the appears to

exclude any kind of error or lability; indeed it is hardly

conceivable that what is essentially connected with the

unchanging steady being could be labile. So, on this

interpretation, the very notion of a straying or labile

has to be dismissed as a unique or even anomalous use of

in Parmenides.i

i Cf. von Fritz 1945, p. 237: ‗But a very real difficulty, which

has never been solved and perhaps does not admit a perfect solution, is

created by the fact that in some instances Parmenides seems to assert

that and are always and necessarily connected with

and and therefore with the truth, which seems to imply that the

cannot err.‘

29

Now, as to our first question, we can submit that

there is indeed one occurrence of in the poem that

unambiguously testifies to its colloquial practical meaning

(to be rendered as a character). For if, within the exposition

of the archaic anthropology, is attributed to ordinary,

i.e. helpless and not-knowing men, it is first to be expected

that it has practical rather than theoretical meaning. This

colloquial practical meaning further explains why the

can be straying, i.e. labile or erroneous. For it allows us not

to construe by means of its apparently essential

connection to being so that its straying or labile nature

would no longer be suspicious or even problematic.

Let us now turn to our second question, i.e. whether

other occurrences of in the poem could also have

some practical implications. To reiterate, our preliminary

survey, that is in accord with the usual interpretation of

suggested that in the poem should be construed

in theoretical terms. Nevertheless, if there is one

unambiguous practical use of in the poem (as it is in B

6.6), then excluding all practical implications from other

occurrences of would involve assuming two quite

distinct and incompatible uses of in the poem.

Although one usually tends to understand in this way,

it would be nevertheless more plausible to assume that there

is only one conception of in the poem. If so,

should have both theoretical and practical meaning. In other

30

words, each occurrence of should be understood as

having both theoretical and practical implications.

Moreover, if we considered the occurrence of

in the fragment B 6 to be unique or even anomalous, not

only its very occurrence would be strange and incidental

but, consequently, the whole exposition of the archaic

anthropology in fragment B 6 would become rather

superfluous and futile. However, given the central role of

fragment B 6 for Parmenides‘ (ontological) argumenti, we

have to take everything in the fragment to essentially

contribute to Parmenides‘ argument or his narrative

strategy.ii

i The first two lines are usually considered to essentially

contribute to an assumed ontological argument of the poem: Parmenides

first relates being to and (given the difficult syntax of the

first sentence, the precise form of the relationship is however a matter

of dispute among the interpreters) and second makes a vital contention

that whereas there is being, nothing is not (cf. B 6.1-2). Sometimes the

fragment B 6 or rather its first two lines are taken to constitute a part of

a continuous ontological argument containing the fragments B 2, B 3,

and B 6.

ii As we have suggested in the previous note, only the first two

lines of B 6 are usually considered to relevantly contribute to

Parmenides‘ intrinsic (ontological) argument, and the rest of the

fragment where there is the exposition of the archaic anthropology is

taken to be a mere poetical or metaphorical pendant to the intrinsic

(ontological) argument.

31

IV. Interpretation of B 8.34

After these general considerations about in

Parmenides‘ poem, let us return to the line B 8.34. In the

first section of our paper we have considered its most

plausible syntactical construction and arrived at the

following preliminary rendering (PR): ‗What is in itself the

same (i.e. ) is to think and that is why there is thought.‘

Yet, despite its syntactical plausibility, its (philosophical)

meaning appeared problematic. For, on this rendering, the

line amounts to saying ‗Since it is possible to think (being),

there is thought‘. So the line seems to be trivial or even

tautological. Yet, having clarified the meaning of and

in particular that of (or ), we can now translate

its rendering as follows:

B 8.34

What is in itself the same (i.e. ) is to contemplate

and that is why the mind/character () is true.

The line involves two statements: 1) being () is

to contemplate () and 2) the contemplation of being

makes mind/character true; as to the truthfulness of mind, I

32

take to be used in the veridical meaning.i The usual

interpretation assumes that the intimate connection

between and (seemingly supported, e.g., by the B

8.35-36 ‗Without being () (...) you won‘t find

contemplation ().‘) the truthfulness of mind would be

indeed trivial, for it is first assumed that there is a semantic

or functional similarity between and or

( so is thus understood as an act of, or a capacity for,

), so that – because of its connection to – is

secondly supposed to be always true and steady. But if, on

the contrary, the very nature of is labile and erroneous

(and as the expression in B 6.6 clearly

suggests it is), then the line puts forward a very nontrivial

and even revolutionary idea, i.e. that the truthfulness of

mind/character is possible only by means of the

contemplation of being. In other words, in order for the line

to be nontrivial, it has to presuppose the colloquial practical

meaning of .

i If we take the lability and erroneousness of the (as it is

corroborated by the expression ) seriously, we have to

construe in the veridical meaning. For if we interpreted it, e.g., in

the existential meaning, the line would read as follows: The very

existence of the is conditioned by the act of the contemplation of

being; so if someone is not able to contemplate being, they do not have

the , which entails its nonexistence. Yet since in B 6 is

unambiguously attributed to ordinary, i.e. helpless and not-knowing,

men, who confuse being and nonbeing (cf. B 6.8-9), the contemplation

of being cannot itself guarantee the existence of the , as it is usually

supposed.

33

Therefore the line has to be interpreted on two

levels:

1) The line makes sense only on the assumption that

the is by itself labile and erroneous. This meaning of

is not only clearly stated in B 6 but – as we found out

in the second section of our paper – it was its ordinary

colloquial meaning. Now, as we have suggested and as we

would see more clearly in connection with the second level

of interpretation, it might have been Parmenides‘ intention

to get over this exclusively practical meaning of

towards a more philosophically promising and relevant one.

Still, in interpreting the line we have to proceed from the

ordinary practical meaning. For it was this meaning which

Parmenides had at his disposal when he composed his poem

and from which he had to proceed by conceiving of in

a new way. Moreover, if we take account of his audience,

that was at that time constituted by listeners rather than

readers, it is hardly conceivable that Parmenides would

have utterly ignored its expectations and possibilities of

understanding and used one of his key philosophical terms

in a rather solipsistic manner. Indeed, it is hardly

conceivable that he (or any other author) would have run

the risk of being totally misunderstood by his audience.i

i Of course, it could be at once objected that Parmenides was a

philosopher who ignored the contemporary audience and

uncompromisingly elaborated his visions and arguments. Although

34

However, against the background of the ordinary

practical meaning of , the line not only becomes

intelligible, but also receives a new important dimension.

For whereas the line has so far been usually understood in

(theoretical) terms of epistemology (i.e. as somehow

relating or to ), its practical and even ethical

dimension now becomes evident. On this practical or

ethical interpretation, the first part of the line (‗What is in

itself the same is to contemplate‘) is to be understood as an

appeal to contemplating being, whereas the second one

(‗that is why the mind/character is true‘) states what one can

expect as the fulfillment of the appeal, i.e. truthfulness and

steadiness of one‘s own character. Hence, by contemplating

being, our mind/character becomes true and steady; in other

words, by contemplating being, we can hope to overcome

the lability and erroneousness of our character or even our

human nature.

2) As to the first level of interpretation, it largely re-

presents the way of how contemporary audiences would

have proceeded by interpreting the line. Yet, as we have

suggested, it might have been Parmenides‘ intention to

philosophers could be seen that way, in the case of Parmenides that kind

of philosophic arrogance is out of place. As we have suggested, his

audience was listeners rather than readers. Unlike the readers, who –

because of their repeated reading – have the time and possibility to

rethink their usual notions, the listeners have to immediately grasp the

meaning of what they are listening to.

35

achieve the essential link between and and,

consequently, construe in theoretical terms. It is the

lines B 8.34-36 that seem to testify to this effort: ‗What is in

itself the same (i.e. ) is to contemplate and that is why

the mind/character () is true. For () without being

() on which it depends (i.e. ), once revealed you

won‘t find contemplation ().‘ The theoretical

construction of or the functional connection between

and seems to be established by virtue of ; for

both and are here thought to be closely related

to .i

It is, however, significant that the connection of

and to (and thereby the theoretical

construction of ) is not argued for but rather

rhetorically or poetically invoked. One can be of course

inclined to refuse this interpretation as not philosophically

relevant, for philosophy is supposed to proceed by ar-

guments and justifications. Still, before doing so, we should

realize that, on the usual interpretation, the connection of

and to is also very vague, being merely

assumed, i.e. not only not argued for, but not explained

either. So, in comparison with the usual interpretation that

is based on a mere assumption, our interpretation provides

i Cf. 1) the relationship between and (‗without

you won‘t find‘) and 2) the dependence of (or ) as the

subject of clause on .

36

an explanation. If we take into account that we are dealing

with a poem, it is not so surprising that there are non-

argumentative narrative strategies and procedures there. At

any rate, it is also significant that in philosophical tradition

this interpretation, that is only secondary, has become not

only prevalent, but the only possible.

V. Conclusion

Unlike the usual approach that construes the line B

8.34 in terms of epistemology, we should proceed from the

ordinary practical meaning of as a character. In our

interpretation, the line is then to be understood both as an

ethical appeal and as Parmenides‘ effort to redefine or

extend the colloquial practical meaning of towards a

more theoretical or epistemological one. If we, on the other

hand, discarded the relevance of the ordinary practical

meaning of for the interpretation of the poem, we

would not only run the risk of misconstruing it but we

would not be able to correctly appreciate Parmenides‘

innovative genius and his contribution to philosophy; in

other words, we would miss how he established the fun-

ctional connection between and or how he

conceived in theoretical terms.

37

In our interpretation of line B 8.34, there further

seems to be an important (practical or ethical) alternative

between two sorts of human attitude or character () in

Parmenides‘ poem: the one , we can call philosophical,

is characterized by its truthfulness and steadiness (being

dependent on ), whereas the other, peculiar to ordinary

men as characterized by the archaic anthropology, is

straying, erroneous and labile. This interpretation may have

some consequences for the understanding of the poem as a

whole. For whereas it is usually seen as a kind of theoretical

treatise on ontology or epistemology, it now turns out to

have important practical implications. In fact, it is what one

would expect from the very fact that it is a poem composed

in Homeric hexameters and using the Homeric and the old

lyric vocabulary and phraseology (e.g., the motive of

archaic anthropology).

38

Bibliography:

Cordero, N.-L., 1984, Les deux chemins de Parménide,

Paris.

Fritz, K. von, 1945, ―Nous, Noein, and Their Derivatives in

Pre-Socratic Philosophy (excluding Anaxagoras): Part I.

From the Beginnings to Parmenides‖, in: Classical

Philology, p. 223-242.

Gadamer, H.-G., 1996, Der Anfang der Philosophie,

Stuttgart.

Heitsch, E., 1974, Parmenides. Die Anfänge der Ontologie,

Logik und Naturwissenschaft, München.

Hölscher, U., 1968, Anfängliches Fragen, Göttingen.

Hölscher, U., 1986, Parmenides. Vom Wesen des Seienden,

Frankfurt a.M.

Mansfeld, J., 1964, Die Offenbarung des Parmenides und

die Menschliche Welt, Assen.

Mourelatos, A. P. D., 1970, The Route of Parmenides, New

Haven, London.

Stenzel, J., 1989, ―Zur Entwicklung des Geistesbegriffes in

der griechischen Philosophie‖, in: H.-G. Gadamer, (ed.),

Um die Begriffswelt der Vorsokratiker, Darmstadt, p. 214-

245.

39

Tarán, L., 1965, Parmenides. A Text with Translation,

Commentary, and Critical Essays, Princeton, New Persey.

Wiesner, J., 1987, ―Überlegungen zu Parmenides B 8,34‖,

in: P. Aubenque (ed.), Études sur Parménide II. Paris.

40

41

Chiara Chinello

Oedipus, the Tragedy of Self Recognition

My intent in this article is to show how, according to

Ricoeur, the tragedy of Oedipus can be read as a tragedy of

self recognition. In order to do that, we need to view

Oedipus‘ story as a whole. This means that we should read

Oedipus Rex in light of Oedipus at Colonus. This will help

us to understand that two identities will be reached at the

end of the story, the identity of a man, Oedipus, and the

identity of a state institution, Athens. So this tale has

political value, as well.

We can read this story as a whole. As it is symbolic,

it needs two opposite developments to be understood; a

retrospective quest, which goes towards its origins and

towards the birth of tragedy in general, to reconstruct its

past and an anticipating quest, which permits a new

meaning to emerge. To follow these developments in the

story of Oedipus, we must use two different perspectives:

the archaeological interpretation, which goes back to the

past and reaches the unconscious by overcoming the border

of repressed instincts, and the teleological construction,

which offers the opportunity to solve the conflict of the

interpretations of the self by walking the path of truth. This

42

implies that we should follow two different magistri

through this path: Freud and Hegel. We are going to start

with Freud.

The Freudian interpretation of tragedy

According to Freud (1900), tragedy has its own source in

the same primitive heritage on which we draw liberally.

‗His destiny (that of Oedipus) moves us only because it

might have been ours […].‘ And then he adds: ‗King

Oedipus […] merely shows us the fulfilment of our own

childhood wishes.‘i This tragedy consists of a process of

revealing ‗that Oedipus himself is the murderer of Laius,

but further, that he is the son of the murdered man and of

Jocasta.‗ii The pleasure we feel seeing his misadventures

derives from two processes: the identification with Oedipus,

which the spectator experiences, and the distance that he

knows divides him from the character on stage. To

understand why we see ourselves in Oedipus as if we were

looking at ourselves in a mirror, we need to investigate this

primitive heritage and to find the reason for the pleasure we

feel by means of the enjoyment that takes place.

In his essay: Psychopatische Personen auf der

i 261.

ii 262.

43

Bühne, Psychopathic Characters on the Stage, Freud says

that the purpose of drama consists of:

opening up sources of pleasure or enjoyment in our

emotional life, just as, in the case of intellectual

activity, joking or fun open up similar sources, many

of which that [intellectual] activity had made

inaccessible.i

These sources are normally closed, having been

madeunreachable for our consciousness. But they have not

been erased. They are still there in our unconscious and,

sometimes, they find a way to reveal themselves. This is

possible thanks to the play, intended in both its meanings as

a piece acted on stage and as a child‘s game.

Freud explains that the performance has the same

function for adults as the play has for children. To be more

exact, we could say that they obtain an opposite effect:

while playing, children act as if they were adults, and they

are able to imagine their future; whilst seeing a drama,

adults relive that childhood feeling of being able to do

anything, and they are able to recall their past. In both

cases, what emerges is will power, a desire to reshape the

world and their destiny in their own image. Briefly, we

i Freud, S. (1905 or 1906). 305.

44

could say that spectators enjoy the drama because in this

way their narcissism is gratified. By identifying themselves

with the characters on stage, they become heroes. The

‗pleasure principle‘ here overcomes the ‗reality principle‘.

Moreover, drama allows some dangerous feelings to

emerge from our subconscious, without our being

compromised by them. Their catastrophic consequences are

suffered by someone else, and after all it is all an illusion,

which lets us watch what happens without any danger. So

this character identification is neither definitive nor

permanent; it is instead revocablei: when the ludus

scaenicus finishes, spectators put themselves back in their

own shoes again and restart their ‗normal‘ life. Drama gives

‗an enjoyable shape even to forebodings of misfortune.‗ii

Pleasure derives from the awareness of the aesthetic

distance which separates the audience from the violence

performed. It is an experience of suffering which can be

lived without dying, thanks to character identification.

Though tragedy shows all the aspects of suffering, it

involves a principle of compensation as well and the

possibility of pleasure. This is its greatest ἀποπία.

This is also true of Oedipus. In a letter to his friend Fliess,

dated October 15th

, 1897, Freud writes that Oedipus

i Cf. Lavagetto, M. (1985). Freud, Literature and Other. 359.

Torino: Einaudi. [In Italian].

ii Freud, S. (1905 or 1906). 306.

45

represents the fulfilment of a desire, which comes from our

own childhood. There is a difference between us and him,

as well. We are happier than he is, because we have

separated our sexual impulses from our mother and we have

forgotten our envy towards our father. The horror we feel

towards his story is caused by the primal repression of our

desires. The poet obliges us to face our inner selves, where

they still survive.

The desire is not attainable in itself: its only access

consists of semantics: the symbolism is the mathematics of

instinct. By means of symbols, desire and impulses are

articulated and acquire meaning which must be subjected to

constant interpretation. Only in this way do we not lose the

vital and changing afflatus of the longing for existence of

which they are expressions. As lava tends to solidify upon

contact with air, so does sentiment, which runs the risk of

being fossilized when emerging at the level of discourse;

the symbol is the only institution capable of preserving its

fluidity.

Pleasure in drama is related as well to the sacrifice

which men were obliged to make by the need to enter

society. They had to accept the reality principle and

sacrifice part of their narcissism. This process caused those

discontents of civilization which gave name to one of

46

Freud‘s most famous textsi. There is also something more.

Tragedies and their representations give vent to that primary

drive which, according to Freud, is as fundamental as Eros:

the death drive, Todestrieb or Thanatos. Tragedy offers an

advantage to society: this drive can be satisfied by means of

performance so that it does not need to be actualized.

Furthermore, the origins of drama should not be

forgotten: its birth belongs in a religious context. In the

beginning, dramatisations were performed during religious

ceremonies, and their origin probably can be traced back to

sacrificial rites.

In Psychopathic Characters on the Stage Freud says

that a hero is someone who rebels against God and the

presence of suffering in the world, ‗and pleasure is derived,

as it seems, from the affliction of a weaker being in the face

of divine might.‘ii So the origins of drama can be found in a

rebellion against God and society and in fact, according to

Freud, there are three kinds of drama: religious drama,

social drama and drama of character, which differ only in

the domain of action.iii

In Totem and Taboo, Freud says that

this rebellion against the Father-God led to a sense of guilt.

This tragic guilt is borrowed by the hero, who must suffer

and take the guilt out on himself ‗in order to relieve the

i Cf. Freud, S. (1930). 59-145.

ii Freud, S. (1905 or 1906). 89.

iii Cf. Freud, S. (1905 or 1906). 90-91.

47

Chorus from theirs.‗i He is that Father-God and his death

has to be reproduced on stage. This scene is hypocritical,

because in reality the members of the Chorus were those

who had committed the crime, who had rebelled against

authority; now they commiserate with the hero whom at the

same time they had condemned to suffer.

Κάθαπζιρ is not only an aesthetic phenomenon, it

also has religious and anthropological genesis, because it is

the expiation of a sin which was truly committed.

According to Freud, the sin being the father‘s killing and

the consequent violation of the incest prohibition. The

tragedy of Oedipus shows the origins of religion and

society. However, this tragedy also shows something more

interesting: it contains evidence of something else and its

way of proceeding is similar to that of psychoanalysis. The

spectators‘ reaction to it derives from acknowledging

themselves in Oedipus. They see that beyond God and fate,

their subconscious is hidden. They discover their identity by

watching this tragedy.

i Freud, S. (1913). 156.

48

Ricoeur’s mimesis 3 and its capability to rebuild

the world

Following Freud‘s analysis of the tragedy of Oedipus to

this point, we have explored the origins of drama and the

cause of the pleasure it generates. We have discovered that

in drama we find again our past as individuals and species;

we have recognized a part of our own story in Oedipus‘

story. Ricoeur goes further and interprets the story of

Oedipus as a tragedy of self-consciousness, as the

explication of the Delphic motto ‗γνῶθι ζεαςηόν‟, ‗know

thyself‘. Tragedy helps us to recognize our true identity and

to elaborate upon it. It is a symptom as well as a treatment.

Every tragedy teaches us who we are and which

consequences our actions will have. It teaches how to be

happy. ‗Every tragedy stages the relationship between

action and happiness or unhappiness, through virtue and

vices.‗i The pleasure we feel is the pleasure of learning and

the pleasure of recognition. This pleasure which derives

from fear and pity and which is what Aristotle called

κάθαπζιρ, leads to the level which Ricoeur calls mimesis 3ii.

He draws on the Aristotelian idea of narration as an

imitation of actions, mimesis, to explain how narration can

give a new meaning to the world in which we inhabit. To do

i Cf. Ricoeur, P (1984). Interview.

ii Cf. Ricoeur, P. (1984). 50.

49

so he uses Gadamers‘ Hermeneutic Circle, which he

transforms into another circle, the Circle of Mimesis.

According to Ricoeur, we can distinguish three kinds of

mimesis:

Mimesis 1, the field of ππᾶξιρ, always already

prefigured and pre-interpreted. At this level ethics is

not yet a rule, but it is an intuition of the models of

actions which constitute what Hegel calls

Sittlichkeit, the ethical substance of society. It

creates a normative dimension which becomes

paradigmatic to confront and value actions. Ricoeur

(1984) says that there are no stories which do not

arouse approval or disapproval when confronted

with a hierarchy of values, whose poles are

goodness and wickedness.

Mimesis 2, the level in which actions are configured

in a story; they receive an order, a new and deeper

sense. ‗C‘est dans la mesure où l‘action en tant que

telle a une dimension éthique, que le récit, qui en est

la mimèsis, a lui aussi une dimension éthique.‘i

Mimesis 3, where the story in the form of a text can

re-enter the world to be inhabited by readers and to

re-shape the world of actions. ‗What is

communicated, in the final analysis, is, beyond the

i Ricoeur, P. (1996). 656.

50

sense of a work, the world it projects and that

constitutes its horizon.‘i

At this stage, tragedy is able to enter the world of human

actions again, and to change it. ‗The thought experiments

we conduct in the great laboratory of the imaginary are also

explorations in the realm of good and evil.‘ii Once

have discovered themselves in Oedipus, they cannot avoid

rethinking their own life too. This aspect is not owned only

by tragedies; instead it is characteristic to every text. The

text offers its readers the possibility of finding themselves

within it. It helps them to see themselves as the starting

points of a series of actions. ‗Discourse in action and in use

refers backwards and forwards, to a speaker and a world'iii

.

Texts are written discourses which address themselves to a

cogito so that he could reshape his world. For this reason

they always contain an ethical connotation, which can be

enlightened by a science of interpretation: the hermeneutics.

The ethical aspect of hermeneutics is that it offers the

possibility to build a world which can be inhabited.

Between narration and life there is a gap emphasized by

symbols and metaphors. This gap prevents us from an

immediate apprehension of reality and helps us to discover

new meanings within it, thanks to the emergence of

i Ricoeur, P. (1984). 77.

ii Ricoeur, P. (1992). 164.

iii Ricoeur, P. (1976). 22.

51

meaning to which symbols and metaphors give hospitality.

Otherwise we would have a perfect coincidence between

reality and our apprehension of it and due to this univocity,

no ethics would be possible.

Comme un texte, l‘action humaine est une œuvre

ouverte, dont la signification est «en suspens». C‘est

parce qu‘elle «ouvre» de nouvelles références et en

reçoit une pertinence nouvelle que les actes humains

sont aussi en attente d‘interprétation nouvelles

décidant de leur signification.i

This assumption is possible because here Ricoeur

entwines Aristotle‘s conception of mimesis with the

Kantian conception of the aesthetic, which has a unifying

function given by the faculty of judgement. At the level of

the tragedy, mimesis 2 according to Ricoeur‘s

classification, the Kantian reflective judgement is at work in

order to give a new succession to the events which take

place but, by doing so, a new meaning is given to the story

as a whole and to those events as single happenings. They

assume a sense in relation to a subject who has to take

charge of those new implications and of those new

meanings. This is an ethical task. ‗Le récit, jamais

i Ricoeur, P. (1986). 220.

52

éthiquement neutre, est le premier laboratoire du jugement

moral.‘i

Hegel and the way of teleology

To understand how this is possible and to interpret

the drama of Oedipus properly, we need the help of another

magister: Hegel. We said that the tragedy of Oedipus is

symbolic, and its true meaning can be found only in light of

what comes next. Oedipus rex can be read as the ‗tragedy of

truth,‗ii if examined in the light of the subsequent Oedipus

Colonus. The Oedipus trilogy is really a tragedy of self

recognition, according to Ricoeur: Oedipus‘ guilt is his

ὕβπιρ, his claim to be in possession of truth. This ὕβπιρ of

truth is also owned by the spectators. The ὕβπιρ of truth

must be purified in order to obtain the real knowledge of

self. This can be reached only by means of poetic replica,

the only figure which is capable of keeping together the

ἀποπίαι, which constitute human identity and which cannot

be solved by choosing only one of the alternatives: Oneself

as another is the secret of human identity. This identity can

only be told by constructing a plot and that is what Oedipus

does: while he discovers the truth about his identity, he tells

i Ricoeur, P. (1990). 197.

ii Ricoeur, P. (1974). 112.

53

the story of himself and he becomes an adult. Hence this is

also what the spectators do while watching Oedipus‘ story.

The blind Tiresias is the real representative of truth, and for

this reason Oedipus persecutes him. The conflict played out

by this tragedy is the conflict between the human pretension

of owning the totality of truth and the accepted blindness of

the seer. Oedipus will end his days blind: he decides to

blind himself, because when he could see, he was not able

to see the real truth. By putting out his eyes, he lets his

inner and intellectual eye see the real light of truth. This

meaning of Oedipus Rex can be understood only in the light

of Oedipus at Colonus. The archaeological hermeneutics of

Freud is no longer sufficient, as it explores the symbolism

of this story to retrace the past of mankind. Here, we need a

new hermeneutics, the teleological hermeneutics, which

interprets one figure in the light of the next one. This means

that we should read the first tragedy considering the end of

the story, which is told in the second tragedy.

Thus there are indeed two types of hermeneutics. One

is oriented towards the resurgence of archaic symbols

and the other towards the emergence of new symbols

and ascending figures, all absorbed into the final

54

stage, which, as in the Phenomenology of Spirit, is no

longer a figure but as knowledge.i

Oedipus is not the voluntary author of his first

actions. He suffers his destiny. However, the end of his

story shows that there is still something that he can do: he

can carry upon his shoulders that unwilling guilt, by

acknowledging himself as the starting point of his actions.

He is able to acknowledge his responsibility in this

initiative. The initiative is the external proof that we can

start something new, that a new series of events can begin.

So Ricoeur can say: „la promesse (…) est l‘éthique de

l‘initiative.‗ii The initiative is ‗an intervention of the agent

action into the course of the world, an intervention that

effectively causes changes in the world.‗iii

The recognition, ἀναγνώπιζιρ, is defined by

Aristotle as a transition from ignorance to knowledge;

Aristotle himself sees the best example of it in the tragedy

of Oedipusiv

. Having arrived at Colon, Oedipus can de-

termine which crime he has really committed, he can

evaluate his acts. He now comprehends his innocence. ‗I am

charged with a crime, stranger;‗ says Oedipus, ‗yes, I am so

i Ricoeur, P. (1974). 114.

ii Ricoeur, P. (1986). 301.

iii Ricoeur, P. (1992). 109.

iv Aristotle, Poetics, 1452 a 33.

55

charged in spite of myself; let the gods know, I wanted

nothing of this (421-422).‗i No one else but Oedipus has

killed his father and married his mother, and he feels regret,

but he can also feel relief because of his ignorance and

innocence. According to Ricoeur, the tragedy of Oedipus is

the best example of a Bildungsroman: by following his

story, we can understand what the Freudian motto: Wo es

war, soll ich werden means.

This tragedy can also be read in the light of the

latest book by Ricoeur: The Course of Recognition.

Following the indications given by Ricoeur in this book, we

can say that Oedipus completes a course of recognition. At

the end of Oedipus Rex, Oedipus reaches the first level of

recognition; he discovers his natural ties, that is, he finally

knows who his real parents are and to which family he

belongs. Those natural ties which were denied to him are

now restored. Oedipus at Colonus, furthermore, shows

Oedipus being accepted in a social and political context,

entering this way the second and third level of recognition.

According to Ricoeur, recognition can be classified as a

relation of reciprocity, understood in the Kantian Critique

of Pure Reason‘s sense: ‗All substances, in so far as they

can be perceived to coexist in space, are in thoroughgoing

reciprocity.‘ The principle of reciprocal action can be

i Cf. Ricoeur, P. (2005). 78.

56

called, this way, a principle of community.i To complete the

the self recognition, the institutional recognition appears as

essential and necessary.

Oedipus, a political tragedy

My personal opinion is that this reading of Oedipus,

when put into perspective, gives us something more, which

we should investigate further. From my point of view, it is

not only Oedipus‘ identity which is discovered at the end of

the story. This tragedy also has political value. However, let

us take it one step at a time and see how the story ends.

Finally, Oedipus‘ suffering comes to an end. His condition

as a persecuted being and a reject from society finds a

conclusion. He eventually finds peace and is at last received

into a political community. His isolation ends. This can

happen because finally Oedipus understands. What happens

here is that Oedipus is now conscious of not being king. His

kingdom has led to only pity and suffering, being based on

ignorance of his true identity and arrogance of being master

of his destiny. His desire for totality has been put in doubt

and mortally wounded. His damned progeny is condemned

to perish and end without successors. Thebes is destined to

be torn apart by civil war. The desire for dominion and

i Ricoeur, P. (2005), 153.

57

complete possession, which distinguishes Oedipus‘ race,

will be humiliated and defeated. Here the real nature of man

and of political dimension emerges.

Man is essentially desire, but this desire has the

character of a subversive and potentially dangerous Trieb, a

drive full of aggression: ‗Men are not gentle creatures, who

want to be loved, and who at the most can defend them-

selves if they are attacked; they are, on the contrary,

creatures among whose instinctual endowments are to be

reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness‘ said Freud,

and further: ‗Homo homini lupus [man is wolf to man].

Who in the face of all his experience of life and of history

will have the courage to dispute this assertion?‘i

Civilization has been built in accordance with

utilitarian purposes: to guarantee the survival of humanity.

It has conveyed the burden of sublimation of impulses and

narcissism upon itself to uphold this guarantee. It offers

comfort and protection and rewards the sacrifice of the

impulse of aggression towards others made by the indi-

vidual by means of art, science, and religion; the

constructions of culture. According to Freud, civilization is

an order suspended over evil: the potential violence of indi-

vidualistic and amoral libido is suspended and sublimated,

but it is not overcome.

i Freud, S. (1930), 63.

58

Society consists of only the discovery that the greatest

strength of an individual could be overcome by the union of

the weaker people:

Violence could be broken by union, and the power of

those who were united now represented law in

contrast to the violence of the single individual. Thus

we see that right is the might of a community. It is

still violence, ready to be directed against any

individual who resists it; it works by the same

methods and follows the same purposes. The only real

difference lies in the fact that what prevails is no

longer the violence of an individual but that of a

community.i

Even the evangelical precept: love thy neighbour as thyself,

hides a perversion: that person whom I love by loving my

neighbour is myself. Therefore, altruism is a narcissistic and

selfish sentiment, a critique already applied to Christianity

by Nietzsche.

Can this really be the only key to understanding the

social phenomenon? According to Ricoeur, no, it cannot,

and to demonstrate this he uses the concept developed by

the young Hegel in Jena, that of man as desire for others‘

i Freud, S. (1932). 204-205.

59

desire, which is expressed in the political and social sphere

by the need for respect, the basis of the process of

recognition, thus, becoming: ‗the desire to live well with

and for others in just institutions.‘i The same Ricoeurian

attempt to integrate the archaeology of the subject by Freud

with the Hegelian teleology of self-consciousness can be

read as an effort to rediscover the presence of the other even

in the roots of man's desire to be, which constitutes identity.

But the political dream of a state where it would be

possible to live in peace and in accordance with law and

justice is neither death nor destined to be defeated even in

the tragedy of Oedipus. Oedipus has a heritage to deliver: a

dream of a new political dimension which is begun by

Theseus. Theseus offers the gift of hospitality to Oedipus

and requires nothing in return. Thebes is destined to

succumb because of its fratricidal hate. Athens will offer a

new political dimension of justice. When legal systems are

developed in human communities, there is the need to dis-

tinguish between different degrees of culpability, in order to

give just punishment, proportionate to the crime committed.

Athens can be proud of its Aeropagus and of its justice.

i Ricoeur, P. (1994). 180.

60

A new identity, which must be found through the

ἀπορία.

This is why in this case it is not only Oedipus who

finds his identity: it is also Athens. The identity of a

community is based on a temporal continuity projected

towards the future. We can make a parallel between the

identity of the individual and the identity of a society. Both

are founded on what we can call persistence of the self,

which assures the permanence of sameness both in

individuals and in societies and makes their stories continue

in the present tense. Both can be defined as a ‗narrative‘, as

they can be described as the story of a self who understands

himself by composing the events of his life in a narrative

structure. Athens discovers its identity by watching the

discovery of his true identity made by Oedipus. While

following Oedipus‘ story, Athens reaches a better

understanding of itself.

All this can be obtained only by means of enlarged

metaphors, which the tragedy is, since symbols, metaphors

and dramas give hospitality to that explosive event of

meaning called ἀποπία. The ἀποπία, far from being an

obstacle that makes it difficult to carry on philosophical

reflection, when not preventing completely its development

and forcing it to halt in front of its difficulties, instead,

according to Ricoeur, represents the heart of philosophical

61

discovery, the centre button of the activity of thought,

which allows philosophy to maintain its dynamic structure

and productivity. The ἀποπία is a real and genuine choice of

methodology, deliberately and constantly preserved as

stimulus to think and rejection of the possibility of lingering

in what can be considered as a final solution.

Tragedy provokes thought, since it invites thought

to hold the contradictions which it proposes. The possibility

of multiple possible interpretations of tragedies, sometimes

in conflict with one another and equally valid, must be

preserved as a constant supply of new beginnings for

philosophy. Philosophy is called to re-think critically the

contents of tragedy. Tragedy offers its contradiction to a

cogito, whose judgement is called into question. ‗A partir

de la donation, la position‘, Ricoeur (1959). The cogito be-

comes guarantor of the truth of the interpretation given to

the tragedy and the responsibility to look for it belongs to

cogito. The cogito is called to be responsible and to become

a theoretical structure of certitude. This cogito is no longer

the Cartesian cogito, already put into question by those

whom Ricoeur calls the masters of suspicion: Marx,

Nietzsche, and Freud. They have definitively discovered

and destroyed its pretension to be a real and self sufficient

foundation for knowledge. With their disruptive analysis,

ἀποπία appears as insuperable. However, we must not be

scared of it; on the contrary, we must stay within this

62

contradiction. Only this way can we discover the real

human nature, which is rooted in desire. This root can be

reached only by metaphors and drama.

Here we find a new conception of identity, accord-

ing to Ricoeur at last: it derives from a new model of

cogito, which he defines as brisé. Brisé means broken, in

fact it is just by being broken that it is able to meet the

other. This cogito brisé is able to remember but also to

forget, after the Freudian work of mourning. ‗The past is in-

destructible, but we cannot be destroyed by it,‘i said

Ricoeur in an interview. It is not about erasing, it is about

restoring. This new cogito is reconciliation. Its identity is

not a starting point but a goal attainable by composing the

incoherencies of memory. The ego of the ego cogito

requires an interpretation. As the word being, with which

Hegel's Science of Logic begins, this ego is as true as it is

abstract and empty. It requires filling: Erfüllung. Through

the appropriation of meaning within the symbol, we are

called to regain possession of our essence, which is our

effort to exist and our desire for being. We are distracted by

that situation of divertissement in which we are situated

from the very beginning of our being in the world. This

Erfüllung is given by actual experience, the works in which

our essence appears, as Hegel said. Becoming ourselves

i Mele, F. (2001). 78.

63

implies an ethical task, it is not an acquisition previously

possessed. All that we have said can be told for Oedipus,

who discovers his real being along his path.

Narrative helps this work using μίμηζιρ, in the

Aristotelian sense of μίμηζιρ ππάξεωρi, whose object is

action and which consists of construction. It organizes the

events into a system and permits the creation of a new

identity: the narrative identity, subjected to a constant

interpretation. Ricoeur speaks about mimesis 3: this is the

power which a text possesses to change the world. The

power owned by tragedy is that it can be told. Telling a

story helps the possibility to find a sense in what happens

and to disclose new possibilities. A new concept of imagi-

nation, the Kantian productive imagination, comes into

relevance here. It involves a fictional dimension, as an

opening to what is possible, and it opens the doors to the

expression of desire, to its representationii.

The narration of a tale and its construction in

intrigue help reason to find a way of interpretation through

the conflicts which actions always take with themselves.

Oedipus‘ tragedy can be put into a number of stories: ‗qui

offrent à l'expérience morale à la fois la singularité et

l'exemplarité de leur configuration.‗iii

The pleasure Oedipus

i Aristotle, Poetics, 50 b 3.

ii Cf. Ricoeur, P. (2002). 66.

iii Ricoeur, P. (1999).

64

offers is a pleasure of self knowledge and of a new

beginning. No more tyrannies: Athens is the land of

Εὐμενίδερ, and of democracy. Theseus is its king, but he

helps Oedipus, promising him refuge and a grave. Oedipus

will compensate for this unconditional offer by assuring

prosperity to Athens. The gods have decided that his body

will be sacred and will assure perpetual protection to the

city which is ready to receive him. He finally disappears,

letting his destiny and the place of his burial be known only

to Theseus, the only man who can understand the pain of

wandering, since he was a foreigner and a refugee too.

Conclusion

Following Ricoeur and his interpretation of

Oedipus‘ tragedy through Freud and Hegel, we have inter-

preted Oedipus as a tragedy of recognition. This recognition

is that of Oedipus, who finds himself by knowing his story

and by being hosted by Theseus, and that of Athens, which

finds its political identity: that of a fair and welcoming state

entity. These identities can be reached only by means of the

narration of their story: they are narrative identities which

carry upon their shoulders the responsibility for the con-

struction of a new world .

65

Aristotle considers the ‗as if‘ of metaphor an instrument

by which language can find another order in the world,

because the ‗reference of metaphorical utterance brings

being as actuality and a