Essays in Honour ofProfessor Alex Wayman

Edited byRAM KARAN SHARMA

MOTILAL nANARSIDASS PUnLlSHERSPR(VATE LIMITED .DELHI

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CONTENTS

VII

XIPr(fclC('Em('ll('ou'.1" B/c.l"l"ill.I;'.1"Biilgrtlphicll/ Skc!ch nl,41I'.\" IVIZI'lllIlI/

Bib/iograph.l'

xiiixxiii

7

3161

BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCHESA. ~1ISCELLANEOUS

l. The List of th\: A.\"U1]lSkrt-tlharma According toAsaga A1':DR BAREAU

2. The ~ven PrincipIes of thc Vajjian Republic:Thcir Differl;nt Interpretation:)HAJIME NAKAMURA

3. A Difficult Beginning: Comments on an EnglishTranslation of C.mdragomin's DesandstavaMICHAEL HAHN

4. A Study of Aspects of Rga N. H. SAMTANI

69

83

B. KARMA THEORY5. PrincipIe of Life According to Bhavya

SHINJO KAWASAKI6. TJle Buddhist Doctrine of Karma

HARI SHANKAR PRASAD7. A Critical Appraisal of Karmaphalaparik~a of

Nagarjuna T. R. SHARMA 97

105

19

C. DEPENDENT ORIGINATION8. Thc Rclationship bctween Patccasamllppda

and Dhttl AKIRA lfIRAKAWA9. Dependent Origination: Its Elaboration in

Early Sarvastivadin Abhidharma TextsCOLLETT COx10. Dependent Origination in Buddhist Tantra(,OORGE R. ELDER 143

JAINA PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCHES11. (Kevali)Bhuklil'icra of Bhavasena: Text and

Translaiion PADMAN}.8" S. JAINI 163

Buddhist Philosophical ResearchesVI

12.

The

Earliest Portions ofDasavaikiilika-.\'lraM.A. DHAKY 79

195

227

241247

2Rl

~rNDU PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCHES13. Buddhist and Mimal11..a Vi.:ws ,)n Lak~aQa

K. KUNJU~~I RAJA14. Grammarians and Phil,~S,1ph.:rs

KAMAI.I:SWAR IIHAnACHARYA15. Kashmir Sai\'ism (KS) and th.: V.:danta of

Sai1kara R C. DWIVEDI16. Siddhi-s in the Bhagavata PuraQa and in the

Yogaslltra-s of Patajali-A C'omparisonT. s. RUKM~~I

17. Languagl.~ and Mct:lphor in Indian StotraLitcrature R. K. SHARMA

8. Pittt/ V~rsus A.~l/i-An Ayurv.:dic P.;rspccti"cBHA(j\\,\~ D.~SH

19. The Doctrinc of'Aham-Artha' R.V. JOSHI

Co,i'rib/l'or~

t,

PREFACE

It is preeminently fit for the scholarly world to bring out aI::~'icitation volumc to honour Prof~ssor Alex Wayman. who hasdistinguishcd himself by an outpouring of scholarly works onBuddhisll1 for almost forty ycars; and who is now Professor ofSanskrit. cll1l:ritus. Columbia University. Nl:w York.

r am proud of my association with Pr"fessor Wayrnan datingback to 1957 as my distinguishcd satirthya whcn I join.:d theUnivcrsity of California. Berkeley, as a Fulbright studcnt. Thcre\\'1.' both studil.'d undl.'r Professor Murray Barnson Emenl.'au, aneminl.'111 linguist. clas~icist and Indologist; and thcn were awardcdour Ph.D.'s the same dat!: in 1959.

Prof. Wayman has h

THE DOCTRINE OF 'AHAM-ARTHA'19

R. v. JOSHI. De/hi

Tlle followers of Advaita and Vai~Qava Vecianta categoricaUydiffer on this doctrine. The Advaitin explains 'aharo-artha' or

cI-sense' in five ways:(i) that ego (aharl1kara) is 'I-sense'.(ii) that consciousness reftected in c;)nscience. is 'I-sense'.

(iii) that consciousness conditioned by conscience in the forroof ego is 'I-sense'.(iv) that the uniting eleroent of anmate and inaniroate (cit-acit-grantbi) is cl-sense'. It aroounts to that ego-consciouscness (ahaJi1kr:l-caitanya) modified by identical super-imposition (tdtmya-adhysa) is cl-sense'.

(v) that pure consciousness is not cl-sense'.The Advaitin declares the ego of Sa1ilkhya as 'I-sense' but

rejects the SaIhkhya theory of creation. This stand is not logical.Even if we accept for the sake of arguroent that the Advaitindoes not disagree with the SIhkhya theory of creation, the egoas propounded in non-dualism does differ froro the ego ofS1i1khya, because the ego in non-dualisro is diff~rent in eachindividual 'Self' while the egu in Sa1ilkhya is not different in eachindividual'Self'. The S~khya accepts a threefold ego of thenature of (i) a pure ego associated with goodness and virtue(sttvika) (ii) a dynamic ego with passion and pride (rjasika)ar,d (iii) an ego as experienced in ignorance and inertia (tama-sika).l Nevertheless. the ego in Sarhkhya is not destroyed duringprofound repose or dreamless sleep of an individual, otherwisethe ego of every individual will siroultaneously be destroyed.Therefore, the ego ofSIhkhya and the ego of Vedanta are not

identical.Thc Non-dualist a~pts cI-ness' (ahantva) in ego and not in-In a l:lter pa..sage it appears that the author uges the word 'consciencc'

for the a,'tabkaraIJa (Ed.).

248 Buddhist Phi/osophica/ Researcnes

'&If', otherwi~ on account of 'I-ness' thc pure 'Self' will bccomequalificd (saviS\:~a) and in that case the attribute 'I-ness' will haveto be acccpted in 'Self'. When 'I-ness' is acccpted in 'Self'. al1il1dividual 'Sclves' will be undcrstood as '1' (aham) because-'Self' is onc without a second. Our normal exp~ricnce in life ishowcvcr different. We understand individual 'Sclf' by'This','That', 'You' and 'He' and nt in thc forro or''. The objl:ctionis Ul1tcl1able so far as SaJilkhya is concerned because il1 Salkhyaall 'Puru~a' are diff.:rcnt from each other. 'Puru~' in SaJilkhyais without any modification (nirvikara) but not without attributes(11irdharmaka). As such therc is no defcct in Samkhya inaccepting '-ness' in 'self',2 while the Non-dualist acccpts '-ness'in ego and not in 'sclf'.3

Let us first examine thc non-dualistic view that conscience isego and ego is '-sensc', In non-dualism the sattvika part offiveclenlcnts as a result of ncscicncc, produces conscience dividednto (i) mil1d (manas). (ii) intellect (buddhi), (iii) ego (ahariJkar~)and (iv) citta (mind stuff) , A close pcrusal of the theory ofcrcatiot1 il1 Vedic and Paura~ic cosmology and thc thcory ofcrcation in the Mok~dharma pan'a of the Santi parva of theMahabharata indicates that conscicnce of non-dualism and rnindof the Upar:i~ads are equivalcnt terms,C Mind is considercd asendc.wed with several functions such as volition (samkalpa).dctcrmination (adhyavasaya). desire or fceling (abhimana).thinking. contcmplation. faith and knowing.6

The PauraJ)ic point of view that milld and senses originatefrom purc egotism associatcd with goodness and virtuc (sattvikaahamkara) dces not agrce with the ncn-dualistic vil:w whcreinmil1d originates from purc parts (sattvika aJilsa) of five elem{'nts.Wc ccme across several ncn-dualistic Sanskrit texts saying thatthl: principIe of intelligu'.ce is the ego, or arl cgC'-clement c,rigi-nating from thc principIe of intelligcncc is the ego. The Non-dualist maintains that the conscience, originating from fiveelcmcnts. is ego.

The matcrialistic schccl of Carvaka maintains thc cxistl.:nccof 'I-scnsc' till "cath. whilc thc Advaita Vl:diinta maintal1s that'I-s

249The Doclrine 01 'Ahaln-Artho'

2.nother individual 'Sclf' in non-dualismo Therefore the Non-dualist cannot maintain one and the same forro of 'Sclr tillliberation.

Th.~ Non-dualist solvcs this problcm stating that although theego, a product of nescicnce, is dcstroycd during profound rcpcse,it conti:1ues to cxist in causal form.' The causal form ofthc ego,obviously, could not ~ ncscicnce becausc nescienCe could neverbe the direct cause of conscience because Ncn-dualist acceptsconscicnce as a product of fivc elements. This helps us to provethat either ego or five elemcnts could be the causal forro of ego.Nescicnce is certainly not the causal forro of ego.

The destruction of 'I-scnse' during profound repose createsanother difficulty. In case in non-dualism 'I-scnse' is destroyedin each profound repose of an indi\idual 'Self' and a new '1-sensc' is produced. the Non-dualist sheuld accept that all im-pressions of our experience stored in sub-conscious mind arealso dcstroyed along with the destruction of the first 'I-sense'and the awakened man could not rcmcmber bis past experienceconsidering himself identical with the former 'I-sense'.

It may be argued that in the profound repose ego remainsmerged in the causal nescience and the ego-impression resideson the support of nescience. In the awaking state this verynescience transforms itsclf into consciencc and the impressionsremain in consciencc on the sUPPort of nescience. Thus thenewly created ego rccalls the objects of experience ofth~ Corroerego.

The reasoning is fallacious. We mar agree that the sccondego mar recollect the objccts of experience ofthe first ego butWe cannot agree that both these (gos are identical. We doexperiencc the idcntity of the two egos of ycsterday and today.This proves that 'I-sense' is not dcstroyed during profoundreposc. Secondly. when in non-dualism ego of all individual'&Ivcs' is destroycd in drcamless slecp and all imprcssionsrcmain in causal ncscicnce, natural!y a qucstion ariscs hcw theseimpressions reach a particular individual ego of a 'Self' from thiscausal nescience. To accept innumerable egos of innumerable'&lvt:S' as an entirely neW creation trom one causal ncscicnccwiII crcatc anothcr difficulty. Imprcssions residing in a particularegu n thc pre\ious dar would reach any ego the next morning,travelling through nescience during dreamless sleep. As a result~

250 Buddhist Philosophical Researche.s-

,X' should be able to remember the objects of the expe:ience 0(",y' beca use when 'X' and ,yo are awakened all neW ego s aresimilar beforc the multitudc of impressions residing in causalnescience and thcrc would bc no regulator to carry a certaingroup of imprcssions to a particular ego where this group didreside on the previous day.

The Non-dualist may argue that in spite of thc fact thatnescience is one, there is some partial difference in nescience.Therefore, during dreamless sleep. ego at the time of mergingitself in nescience, places its own impressions in a certain part 0("nescience. The next morning these very impressions automatic-ally reach that very ego when the same ego is produced from thatvery part of nescicnce. To avoid this indirect process of mergerand production, thc Vai~J:tava Vedanta proposes the identity 01:"'I-sense' and 'Self' in lieu of presumed innumerable parts ofnescience. It is an easier [conreption] than the merger andproduction of different egos in different parts of nescience due towhich the relevant centres carry the impressions to their ownreceptacles.

It will not be correct to interpret the Upani~dic text: 'Thenthe father is no father, mother is no mother, the worlds noworlds and Gods no Gods'7 in the sense of absolute negation 0("extemal world during profound repose because in reality theexternal world does continue to existo The closing of the eyes ofa pigeon towards an attacking cat does not negate the existenteof cato What the Brhadra:zyaka Upani,rad exactly means in thiscontext is this that one becomes complctely unaware of theexternal world in the state of profound repose. The negation isjust in the figurative sense. Likewise, all Sruti texts appearingto interpret the merger of ego during profound repose should betaken in the figurative sense that therein ~go continues to existoDuring awaking, one experienccs; '1 am fat'; '1 am aman'; '1 ama woman'. Such cxperience depends on the intellcct arising fromego.

The Satikara Bha~ya on the Brahmastra indicates thatintellcct has the minutcst size in the distinguishing property of'Self'8 and this limiting adjunct relation of 'Self' and intellccthaving no beginning exists till liberation.' Intellect as a potentialexists in the states of profound repose and deluge}O Conscienre,a limiting adjunct of 'Self' is designated by several terms such a~~

251The Doctrine 01 'Aham-ArtMmind, intellect, ego and mind stuff.ll The testimony of theBrahmastra Silkara-Bh$ya postulates that only that could beaccepted as a limiting adjunct of 'Sclf' which exists cven inprofound repose and dcluge. It thercfore becomes the demandof propriety that such a limiting adjunct is acc.:ptcd as an objectof 'I.Intctlect' or the feeling of '1' (aham-buddhi) because thisfimiting adjunct is nothing else but nesciente. Consequently.consciente is 'I-sense'. The merger of ego during profound reposeis the secondary meaning. In fact. onlythe operational functionof ego ceases during profound repose and not ego itself. Thenegation is of functions such as votition, desire. feeling ordetermination. This proves that the aca.ptance ofthe merger ofthe distinguishing property of 'Self' during dreamless sleep isinconsistent with the viewpoint of the Silkara Bhya. Even irit be argued that all intellects in the forro ofthe distinguishingproperty of 'Self' are not identirol with nesc;en~. We cannotafford not to accept that atl conditioned intellects are ditferentfrom each other and have no beginning at all. At the same timethe Non-dualist will be forced to accept the destruction oftheseconditioned intellects at the time of the deluge. The non~dualistic view that the merger of the limiting adjunct of the'Self' and the :1egation of 'I-sense' in the state ofprofound reposedoes not hold good.The untng element 01 anmate and inanimate in not c/-sense'

Madhusdana Sarasvati has explained in thc 16th century inllis Advata-Sddhi that 'I-sense' means uniting the ele~nts ofanimate and inanimate (cit-acit-granthi). This Sanskrit term hasbeen i:1terpretcd as an intricate knot. It rnakes one commiterrors after errors. The darkness cxtends. One thinks that heknows many things, while he remains most ignorant of what heis most assur~d of. The bondage and attraction of 'I-ncss' andcMine-ness', and the rcpulsion of separatcnes3 or otherncss,hostility, very curiously make him restless. He hangs oscillat~lybetw~cn thcm}2 The Sanskrit tcrm includes animate or con-sciousncss or the principIe of universal intelligencc by thc word'cit' and inanimatc (conscience) by the word 'acit'. This very '1-sensc' is known as ego whcn we hav~ the apprehension of '1'. '1-sensc' of the nature of cgo having the idea ofthe apprchensionof '1' or '1 ex:perience' is the substratum of 'Self' (cit). From the

252 Buddhist Philosophical Researchaapprehension '1 am the performer', 'I-sense' appears as thesubstratum of the state of being the peiformer (kartrttva) etc.attributcs residing in conscience (acit). This should not beunderstood as simple mutual relationship between animate andinanimate but there exists mutual identical superimposition(tadatmya-adhyasa) bctween the two. This very uniting elementof consciousness and conscience appearing identical due tomisapprehension is known as 'I-sense'. Hence 'I-sense' and egoare idcntical.13

This interpretation of 'I-sense' is questionable. One mayenquire what is exactly meant by 'uniting element'. Does itrepresent the nature of animate and inanimate? Or, does itrepresent the superiority of one over another? The secondquestion is what is the cause of the activity of '1' (pravrtti-nimitta). Neither consciousness nor ego could be accepted as thecause of the activity of ,p because we do not find usage of theword '1' in !bis sense. Our normal experience is that everybodyuses the word '1' keeping in mind 'I-ness' as the cause of theactivity of '1'. The meaning of the word '1' as either conscious-ness qualified by ego or ego qualified by consciousness does notappear appropriate because in that case we would be bound toaccept the relation of qualification and qualified (viSe~aQaviSe~ya-bhava sambandha). This sort of relation canoot be acceptedsimply bccause there does not ex.ist the relation of difference ornon-difference. In the former case the consciousness of differencewill continue to exist and an identical super-imposition would bean impossibility. In thc latter case it would be necessary toaccept mutual super-imposition otherwise it would be goingagainst the non-dualistic school of Ved anta. Truly, byacceptingthe relation of qualification and qualified through thc relationof non-difference the consciousness can manifest ego but it mustnot bc forgotten that an ego could never manifest consciousnessaccording to non-dualism wherein consciousness is without anyattribute (nirdharmaka). One might insist that an ego wouldappear to be associated with consciousness but in that case onewould immediately diJferl"ntiate ego from consciousness andsuper-imposition would be impossible. Ifthe idt~a ofthe Non-dualist is to suggest the appcarance of consciousness along withthc attribute 'I-scnsc' of the ego, the Non-duatist indirectlyagrees that 'I-ness', the cause of the activity of '1', is a property

25'J

The Doctrine 01 .Aham-Artlta'

of the ego and in that case 'You-sense' of an ego would not beacceptable in non-dualism. It is noteworthy that the meaning ofan ego as 'You-sense' is also accepted in non-dualism becausc itis meant for anothcr (parartha). In fact, the ego accomplishesthe purpose of consciousness. One will not fail to note that theattributt:s such as 'the state of bcing tbe performer and enjoyer'are admitted in an ego according to non-dualism and not inundifferentiated consciousness through an ego. It would there-fore be against thc non-dualistic view to hold that consciousnessappears along 'I-ness' of ego. Ego is not meant for a:1other andas such does not yield the idea of 'You-sense'. The idea ofidentical super-imposition of ego and consciousness is notcorrect because w~ all feel 'l. the sentient perform'. In suchexperience ego appcars as the locos of consciousness and super-imposition of consciousness remains impossible. The differencebetween ego and consciousness is obviously proved on the basisof the relation of container and contained.

It would not be out of place to examine the meaning of two'aham' words. viz. (i) aham. indeclinable ending in 'm' (ii) aham.declined from the noun 'asmat' or 'asmad' in nominative singularending in 't' or 'd', The primary sense of both these words hasbeen accepted by Madhusdana Sarasvati in tbe Advaita-siddhias ego. Neither of the two denotes the sense of 'Self' in thetradition of Advaita Ve danta. To determine the meaning weshould take into account the authority of Sanskrit grammar.The KJikti- Vrtti and the Padamajarr on the aphorism of Pa~ini'ahal Subhayor rus' (5.2.40) clearly indicate that one 'aham' isan indeclinable representing the iitfiection of nouns (vibhaktipratirpaka avyaya) , while the second 'aham' is declined fromthe noun 'asmad' by the substitute 'aha'. Both the wordsapparently appearing as identical are not identical so far as thcirmeaning is concerned." The indeclinable 'aham' denotes thesense of ego. and the declined 'aham' the sense of 'Self'. To takethese two words as synonyms would mean to violate the roles ofPaJ:)ini grammar. The non-dualist view is not correct becauseego has nowherc been accepted in the sense of the uniting elemcntof animate and inanimate.

I mar refer to the Skara Bhiiya that conscience. viz. mind.intellcct, ego and ego stuff has four mental functions: doubt,right knowledge, slumber and remembrance respectively.u The

Buddhist Pbilosophical Researche"254

evidence shows that ego going with egotism or pride is one ofthef.,ur aspects of conscienoe. Ego cannot go with any otherr,;maining three functions. To acoept the identical sense of aIl theabove-mentioned f:Jur words would mcan that the word 'asmad'could be used with any of th~ fur functions and ego could beapplicd to any ofthc fuur 011 thc ground of the uniting element(lf anmate and inanimatc. Since such is not the position, theuniting elemcnt of animatc and inanimate cannot be acoepted asthe meaning of 'I-s.:nse'. To claborate it further we m:ty t:!ke anexample of the statem(;nt, 1 am fat, thcre is an apprehension ofthe egoistic feeling of 'Self' on the inanimate substratum such asbody but We do not have any idea of gross ego. Therefore themeaning of ego and the meaning of 1hc declined 'Aham' word isnot one and the same. The indeclinable caham' always remainsin the same forro, whilc the declincd 'aham' has this forro onlyin nominative singular. In accusative and genitive. the forros ofcasmad' are 'maro' and cmaCla' respectively. There is no proofto-est~blish the identical meaning ofthe two caham' words. On theot"er hand, We have authority of Sanskritgrammar and dictionaryregarding the meaning of the indeclinable 'aham' in the sense ofego or egotism and the declined caham', cmam' and 'mama'denote an altogether different sense and that sense is 'Self'. Thenan-dualistic view of the uniting element of anmate and inani-mate as 'I-sense' is not correct on the ground that aIl statementssuch as '1, the sentient, pedorro the action and enjoy' prove anexistence of consciousness in 'I-sense'.

Existence 01' I-sense' in Su$uptiThe Sanskrit word Su~upti denotes the sense of profound

repose or dreamless sleep. It has been explained by Sakaracaryaas spiritual ignorance}8 It has already been observed !hataccording to non-dualism 'I-sense' is ditrerent from 'Self', Now,let me remind that 'I-sense' afilie nature of '1' does exist in thestates of awaking and dream but does not exist in the states ofprofound repose and liberation. while the eternal 'Self' exists inall thesc three states. This is the contention of the Non-dWtlistoThe Non-dualist argues that had tht're been 'I-seme' duringprofound rcpose. one would have had the idea of '1'0 Since Wenever have thc idea of '1' during profound repose. there is non-

.existence of 'I-seme'o Likewise. had 'I-sense' been existent in thc

The Doctrine 01 .A/zam-Artha' 255

~tate of liberation. ignorance would continue to existo Therc isof course no possibility of ignorance in liberntion. Thcrefore.non-ex.istent 'I-sense'. in the states of profound repose andliberation. is not the internal 'SeIf'. Consciousness existing inboth these states is considercd as 'Self' in Advaita Vedanta.

It has been made clear that according to Advaita Vedanta '1-Sense' is of the nature of ,}' i.e. the uniting cl~ment of anirnateand inanimate. The concept includes thc sentient 'Sclf' as theinsentient conscience of thc naturc of ego. There is mutualidentical super-irnposition betwcen conscicnce and ego. Duringtht: apprehension of -1' onc has the idea of ego as identical withconsciousness and of consciousness as identical with ego. Thisvcry uniting elernent of mutual idcnticaJ super-impositionbetw('en consciousncss and ego is accepted as 'I-sense' in AdvaitaVedanta. It is noteworthy in this connection that in non-dualismthe super-imposition of ego on consciousness is directo It is onlyafter this supcr-imposition that the attributes such as perform~Iand enjoy\:r existing in conscience ofthc nature of ego becomeimposed. NevertheJess. this superimposition of ego on conscious-ness has no limiting adjunct while the super-imposition of the~ttributes on consciousness is limited by the adjuncts. Since egoby its very nature ex.ists in thc states of awaking and dream. weexpericnce ,}' but in thc state of profound repose it exists in theform of causal nescience and therefore we do not experienceits existence. In the state of liberation. nescience. the materialcause of the ego, is destroyed and the ego ceases to exist eitherby its own forro or by causal formo Thus in liberation there is nopossibility of existence of the ego at alI.

The Visis~dvaita school of Ramanuja maintains that 'I-sense'is 'Self'. Elo is not included in 'I-sense'. 'Self' without ego is-I-sensc'. 'I-sensc' exists in the states of profound repose andliberation. In case 'I-scnse' is non-ex.istcnt during profoundrepose, Ramanujist argucs, onc would be forced to accept twodifferent 'I-sense' viz. (i) 'I-sensc', existing in thc awaking anddream states on the previous day (ii) 'I-scnse' existing in awaken-ing arter sfeep. Ths woufd amount to that the second 'I-sense'wou\d not be ab\c to reD1.cmbcr the objects experienced by tbefirst 'I-sensc'. This is our normal experience that he who experi-ences certaiD things iD 1ifc [Cmel11~lS tbem in tbe futU1C, js~n absolutc impossibility that the first 'I-sense' expericnces and

Buddhist Philosophical Researcher256the second remembers. Otherwise, the expeence of ,X' wouldbe remembered by 'Y'. lt is thereforc more reasonable to acceptonly one 'l-sense'. We notice the common experience as follows:1, who performed certain actions, am now performingthis action'.This recollection supports the idcntical characteristics of thc tWo'I-sense'. One and the same 'I-scnse' exists in the dormantcondition during profound sleep and continues to exist duringsleep and after sleep.17

It may be questioned that if an 'I-sense' exists during profoundrepose, why do we not experience it and why does it not becomeas object of OUT expcrience. Since it is ncver experienced duringprofound repose, it would be more appropriate to accept its non-existence. The simple logic is that happiness, unhappiness and'l-sense' manifest by the way of experience only so long theyexisto It is self-contradictory to maintain that they exist but donot become the object of our experience. The view of Ramanujaschool finds strong support ofNaiyayika who declares that 'SeIf'ofthe nature of 'I-s~me' remains unmanifest in dreamIcss sleep.

There is no such rule that all existing objects must become theobject of our per~ption. There are several such objects whichexist and are not perceived. 'l-sense' can also exist remainingunmanifest. The argument that by nature 'lnse' should mani-fest so long it exists is untenable because according to AdvaitaVedanta too 'l-sense' exists in the most subtle form and remainsunmanifest. In Cacto wherever there is some function of internator external senses, we exp~rience 'l-sense'. Ir it is argued that thefirst individual 'I-sense' is the substratum of the 'l-ness' of thesccond individual 'I-sense' and therefore the second individual.'1' understhnds the '1' of the first individuat. then the subtle furmcould also be accepted as the substratum of 'I-ness'. This wouldbe an additional proof for the existente of 'l-sense' duringprofound repose.The outstanding proof of the existence of 'I-sense' duringprofound repose is recollection. For instance, ORe recollects: '1,who pcrformed 3uch and such actions yesterday, am now awake-ned after sound stcep'. This experience attests the identity ofyesterday's and today's individual 'l-scnse' and its existenteduring profound repose. Truly, there is no experience during thestatc of profound repose because the attributive consciousness is~

The Doclr;ne o/ .Aham-Arlha' 2st

Buddhist Phi/O.foplca/ ResearcMI258

nescience co\!ld neither become the locus of impressions other-\\'ise it will be the knower. Therefore, the only plausible proposi-tion is that of Vai~ava Vedanta that the 'I-sense' exists duringprofound repose. Both the logicians and the followers of thcqualified non-dualistic school of Vedanta (Ramanuja) maintaintbis view. The only difference between these two philosophicaltraditions is that when the logician (Naiyayika) does not acce~!he manifestation of the 'I-sense' during dreamless profoundsleep but simply recognises its existence; the followers of !hequalified non-dualism accept both the existen~ as weU as !hemanifestation of 'I-sense' during profound repose.

Existence of'/-sense' in the state of /iberation1 now pro~ed to examine whetber -I-sens~' exists in the state

of liberation. It mar be kept in mind that the school of AdvaitaVedAnta total!y rejects tbe existen~ of 'Inse' in liberation. TheViSi~.tadvaita school of VedAnta, however, maintains the existen~as well as the manifestation of -I-sense' in the state of liberatioDcn !he basis of the authority of the Sruti texts:

(a) '1 shall obtain it after my transition from this world.'18(b) 'Like unto the moon which escapes from the mouth of

RAhu, 1 shall purify myself, my body, and, become free(by the aid of meditation) verily, attain-the uncreatedBrahmaloka.'l'

The above cited quotations denote an intensive desire of oncwho is desirous of liberation. The quoted text proves that libera-tion is definitely related to 'I-sense' of one who desires liberation.The main purport of the text is that we are all an object of enjoyement of the 'Supreme Self' as an object of enjoyment.1o

The Taittiya Upani$ad further states:(i) 'R.asam hyevayaIh labdhva nandi bhavati' (for any one

obtaining taste becomes de1ighted). 11.7.1.(ii) 'E$a hyeva anadayati' (for it is He (the Supreme Self) that

fills with bliss). Ibid.The textual Jiuthority supports that blissful Supreme Self alone

bestows bliss and one attains bliss by realising Supreme Self otthe nature of sentimcnt (Rasa).

A large number of such Upani~dic texts teachel us that in thestate of liberation one does attain the inexhaustible bliss and that

The Doctrine 01 ..4Mm-.4rtha' 2S9

one should not leave any stone Untumed to get cid of the bC'ndagcof a/l the three miseries of the mundane world. It is only withthis goal in mind that one adopts the listening, (;;)gnitive andrepcated meditation etc. as means of realisation. Noteworthy isthe fact that Non-dualist does also agrec to the cessation of aUthe miseries and the attainment of unsurpassed bliss of thecSuprt:me Self' in the state of liberation. liad such bliss been notmalfest in liberation, its attaining had little sense. But in casesuch bliss becomes manifest to a liberated 'Self', he must experi..enceasfollows:'lamenjoyingthebliss'. 'Iam endowedwith bliss'.

It may be argued that to accept the 'I-sense' and its manife~ta-tion in the state of liberation would amount to accept t he 'Selras ignorant and transmigratory in the state of liberation. on thesimple logic that so long as there is the 'I-sense'. the 'Self' isignorant and transmigratory. Therefore. it would be moreappropriate to a~pt. the Non-dualist says. ego as 'I-sense' which

260 Buddhist Phi/osophica/ Researche.i

identical with that ego which will discontinue who would like tonegate one's own cxistence. So long as the Non-dualist acceptsthe existence of a subtlc ego in liberation, one mar adopt themeans in order to liberate oneself, but when the complete nega-tion of an 'I-scnsc' in th~ state of liberation is acceptcd, whowould give an ear to the scriptures blowing the trumpets oflibcration.'l

It mar ~ advocated by thc 'Non-dualist' at this stage that the'I-sense' of the naturc of ego docs not distinguish betwcen'cognition-Self' and itself. It misapprehends itself as non-diffcrentfrom 'cognition-Self'. The answer is not satisfactory bccaUse the'I-sensc' of th~ nature of ego regards itself as non-diff~rent fromthe 'cognition-Self' o~ account of misapprehension. Then itcertainly understands the rcality of its existence in the state ofliberation. As such it should further believe in discontinuationof cognition in liberation, i.e. the cognition with which it earlicrfelt its own identity. To say that by misapprehending tbe existen-ce uf 'I-sense' of the nature of ego one would bclieve onc's ownexistente in liberation is not logical. The simple reason is that hewho ~lieves his cxistence in liberation by misapprehension hasnot in reality understood the real nature of liberation. Besides,in non-dualism the complete destruction of nesciente and ego isthe concept of liberation. Non-dualist argues that one activatesonesl:lf to the means of liberation on the misapprehension of theidea of the continuance of 'I-scnsc' in liberation but in fact in bisview 'I-sense' is destroycd as soon as the knowledge of non-dualism appears. This would remind us of an analogy of a per-son dcsirous to attain fi:lal liberation of the nature of blisssuddcnly finding rus head cut into pieces. Therefore, this type oflibcration of the nature of the destruction of ego could ncverbe accepted as the goal of life."

Thc Non-dualist further postu!atcs that being afflicted by thethrecfold miscries of the mundane world to which all mortalsare subject. the individual 'Self' might consider that so long asthere exists the sense of 'I-ness', it is impossible to get cid of themiseri~s,23 and thcrcforc one must destroy oncself, i.e. with des-truction of .I-sense'. Thus considering one's own destructiononc would adopt the means of liberation and the d~struction of'I-3ensc' thus desirable.

Th~ above view is rejected on the basis of the following Sruti

---

261The Doctrine 01' Aham-Artha'

texts which declare that the knower of the 'Suprcme Self' bccomes'Supreme Self' and that the liberated Sclf knows al! knowable.The Upani$adic evidence proves the existence of 'I-sense' as ofthe nature of knower. The textual passages in support are asfollows:

l. 'One passes bcyond dcath only aftcr realising Him. Thcrc isno other way to escape from the circle of birth and death.'2&

2. 'Whoever knows the 'Suprcme Brahman becomes cvenBrahman.'25

3. 'That man who knows this confronts not death nor discasenor does he meet with pain or sUffering. He observes ev~ry.thing, and attains everything in every way' Truly theknower of 'Self' becomes 'Self'.21

The abov~ cited Sruti tcxt clearly declares that the directknowledge of the Supreme Self is the best means to attainimmortality.1n case 'I-sense' is destroyed in the state of liberationas accepted in non-dualism, the direct knowledge ofthe Supreme.Self will become the cauSe of death because the knower ego willperish. This will contradict the Sruti tradition. To avoid thisinconsistency it is better to acccpt that the 'I-sense' exists in thestate of liberation.

Furthermore in non-dualism the 'attributeless cognition' isregarded as the 'Self' and that io the states of knowing aodthinking etc., attributes do not exist in 'attributeless cognition'.In addition to this, the 'Self' is regarded as eternally libcratcd.This is a self-contradictory view because in the absence of thestates of the knowing and thinking etc. attributes, the 'SeIPcould not listen to thc scriptures or contcmplate opon 'Supr~meSelf'; and so why would the etcrnally libcrated attributclcsscognition-Self desire lib.::ratioo at aIl. One may argue that inthe states of knowing and thinking, ctc. attributes are supcr-imposcd on the eternaIly liberated attributeless cognition-Self,and therefore one becomes desirous of libcration considcringoncself unhappy due to misapprehension and likewise bccomcsa listcncr and thinker when there is super-imposition ofthe statesof knowing and thinking.

1 am inclined to mention that in the above discussion thestandpoint of non-dualism is perhaps not correctly represcntcd.lo reality in oon-dualism superimposition is a function (vftt;r

262 Buddllist Pi/osopica/ Researclle;

an attribute of conscience. Therefore, conscience may be deemeda listener. tbinker, happyor unhappy and not the 'Self' of thenature of knower. It is not possible to prove that a 'SeIf' of thenature of cognition is entitled to liberation. It would be furtherincorrect to say tbat the knower 'I-sense' activates the 'cognitionSelf' to liberatioll on the simple ground that an 'I-sense' would notadopt any means of liberation as that would amount to its owndestruction. and that such an activity of an 'I-sense' would becompared to the activity of a pencn who is desirous to cut off bisown head in order to save the life of bis beloved wife from deathand who has been declared hopeless by the medical experts. Simi-larly, even ifthe cSelf' is liberated, the non-existent 'I-sense' inthe state of liberation would not get any reward of bis activity. Itmosto therefore, be admitted that the 'I-sense' does exist in thetate of liberation and only then could tbcre be some possibilityof the right to liberation.

In order to justify the non-dualiatic point of Yiew it is generallyexplained that acx:ording to non-dualism oonscience is four fold.The word '1' does not simply OJean conscience of the nature ofego but it stands for the consciousness oonditioned by conscience.Therefore, consciousness conditioned by consaence is 'I-sense' (i.c.antal,1kar~vacchinna caitanya is aham-artha). In the state ofliberation in spite of thc destruction of!he attributive conscienceor ego, the consciousness continues to existo As such there isno inconsistency in non-dualism and with the desire '1 wouldlike to be liberated' tfs very consciousness conditioned byconscience activates the means of liberation such as listening tothe religious discourses and reading the religious scriptures. Thereasoning of the Non-dualist does not remain good at the exami-nation on the to\tchstone of the following argumento One mayenquire who males efforts for liberation with such a pre-desire.i.e. 'I-the bound, would like to be liberated by such and sucbactions'. Is it conscience or consciousness? In the former case itwould be a frunless effort so far as conscienoe is concemedbecause consciente would itself be destroyed irl the state ofliberation. In the latter case the consciousness cannot be regard.ed as the locus of activity since it is considcred as attributeless inthe tradition of Advaita Vednta.

Tbe Non-dua1ist further makes an attempt to support bis pointof view on the foUowing tbree argu~nts:

263Tlie Doctrine 01 .ham-Artlkl'

:~:

(a)(b)

There js superimposition of the locus of tbc actiYity andconsen~-idcntity on consciousness.Ego. by superimpong jts identity on consciousness.regards jtself as th substratum of activity.Ego. on account of jts identical superimposition on the'attributeless consciousness' regards consciousness as the'substratum of fue activity' -is erroneous knowledgo;:. Tbeobject oftbis errolJeQus knowledge is consciousoess. Tobe such an object is tbe bondage of consciousness. and inthe state of liberation the conscious~ss be

:""1 " t . ';':-

"':i1~ ,o264 Buddlist Phi/oaophical Researcliei

In ibis context the point of view of SaIi1khya philosophyappears to be more reasonable. According to the Simkhyasystem the SeIf (Puru~) is unattached. pOTe consciousness andthe permanent changeless. Bondage and liberation are in r~lationwith causal matter (Prakrti). Both remain out of question~so faras pure consciousness is concemed. The outlook ()f SaIhkhya isjustified by the rcasoning that mattcr is bound and that intellectexists in the stak of bondage by its very nature and in the stateofliberation in the causal form.17 B::>ndage means a falsc unifica-tion of consciousnes~ with matter. and liberation means it disso-ciation in Sarilkbya. To acccpt bondage and liberation in cons-ciousness is not a very sound proposition because in non-dualismconsciousness is regarded as 'attributeless'. Neitber bondage norliberation could exist in the ego because tbe ego has no causalform in the state of liberation.

Testimony 01 tlre Upani"ads1 naw examine th testimony of the Chandogya and the Ka!ha

Upani~ads aJongwith the Bh8~yas of Salikaracrya and Rimanu-jacarya on the concept of 'I-sense-SeIf' theory. Taking intoconsideration the 'Science of Unconditioned Supreme Self'(Bhma-Vidya)t8 as propounded in the Chandogya Upani~ad. theNon-dualist establishes a difference betwetn the 'Iose' and the{Self' and a non-difference between the 'I-sense' and the ego. Thescielice has been explained in three stages in the ChandogyaUpani~d: .

1. From 'sa cva adhastat 7.25.1' to 'sa c;:va idaI sarvam',dcclaring the, unconditioned Suprcme Self' as all pcrvading.

2. From 'atha atai:t ahari1karadesa};l'. to 'aham eva edaIsarvam' anncuncing the 'I-sense' of the nature of ego asall pervading. lt is on tls evidc~ce that identity of 'I-sense'and ego has been interpreted by the followers of non-dualismo

3. From 'atha atai:t AtmadeSai:t' to 'Atvaiva adhastat' totmaiva idaJh sarvam 7.25.2. stating 'Self' as all pcrvading.

The main argument of the Non-dualist against the 'I-scnse-sclf'theory is that if 'I-scnse' and 'Self' were identical the instructionof an ego (aham artha adeSa) alon would be sufficient tia theprcsent contexto The instruction of a 'Self' (AtmadeSa) beaTS

1\"'.e 265~ DoctrJe 01 'Aam-Art1la'

"":

testimony to the fact that an cI-sense' and a 'Self' are notidentical., Let us carefully examine this Upanj~djc evidence. It is clearfrom the study of the Chandogya Upani~d that the 'uncondi-tioned Supreme Sclf', 'I-sense' and 'Self' all three have indepen~dently been spoken of as all pervading. It would tbereforc be notcorrect to consider thcm different; or else on tik: basis oftbesame Upani~adic testimony and same logic the 'unconditionedSupreme Self' and the 'Self' would also ~ regarded as different.while even in non-dualism they are both regarded as identical inessence. lfthe identity of the 'unconditioned Supremc Self' andcSelf' is accepted in spite of their separately being .-,inted out inthe text, the identity of 'I-sense' and 'Self' could not be denied.

A comparison of the Satikara Bha$ya and the Raminu ja Bhi$yaon the Chindogya Upani~ad quoted above clarifies a number ofpoints. 1 present below a brief romparative study of the twobha~yas for the ready reference ofthe readers. .

The Salikara Bhi~ya interprets the passage in question asfollows: 'Verily that extends below. jt extends from above. itextends from berund, it extends from before. it extends fromsouth, it extends from nrth,-of a ti uth it is all this.'.

Salikaracarya clcarly states in bis bha~ya ibat the 'DDcondition-ed Supreme Self' is meant by tbe word 'That', therefore, onemight be confused that the 'Self' is different from the 'uncondi-tioncd Supreme Self'.30 To avoid this confusionthe ChandogyaUpani~ad imparts the instruction of ego defined as egoistically inthe foIlowing way: 'Verily 1 cxtend from below, lextend fromabove, 1 extend from bebind, 1 extend from before, 1 extend fromsouth, 1 cxtend from n()rth,-of a truth 1 am aIl trus'.S1 .

Thc purport of the Salikara-bha~ya is very clear that theteaching of thc instructivo of ego is mcant to prove the identity'of the 'pcrccivcr individual Self' and the 'unconditiox:d SuprcmeSclf'. Onc should not thercforc confusc this instruction of ego toprove thc identity of thc 'unconditioncd Supreme Self' and themultitude ofthe body, mind, scnses and vital airs asan ordinaryman takes this multitude as '1', and tht:rtupon for want of dis-crimination regards the multitude as' I-Stnse'. To avoid tbis con~fusion thc Chandogya Upani~ad finally imparts the instructionof 'Sclf' defincd as psychicaIly: 'Verily, the 'Self' eXiends frombelow, the Self extends from above, the &If extends from behind.

ButMbist Philosoplcal Researche.t266

the Self extends from before, the Self extends from south, (heSelf extends from north,-of a truth the Self is all this. oa

The final instruction obviously covers the pure and eterna. .'Self'. The study of the Sai1kara-bbi$ya reveals that the 'un-conditioned Self' (Bhman) indirectly described as 'That', tbc'perceiver individual Self' or 'I-sense' drectly described as '1'.and the 'Self' directly described as 'Self' alI are one and the same.It is just to avoid any misunderstanding that the description is.threeCold. In no way can a differenoo between 'I-sense' and 'Sel~be proved by an impartal r~view of the Chandogya testimony.In the beginning of all these instructions we read, 'It extends.below', '1 extend below', and 'The Self extends below'. Had tM'unconditioned Self', 'I-sense' and 'Self' been different, the alI-pervasiveness of the three could not be rightly justified. Thereasoning, that the separate instruction is to establisb a diff~r-en~ between tbe 'I-sense' and tbe 'Self', is incongruous to thespirit of the Salikara-bhi$ya.

As:cording to the Rimanuja-bbi$ya tbe 'uncooditionedSupreme Self' is omniscient, and alI the sentient and insentientobjects of the universe exist in the Corm oC the inner Self. OMshould meditate upon the 'unconditioned Supreme Inner Sewthrough the feeling of '1', (aham buddhi), .e. '1 am everywhere'.By meditating on the Supreme Self in tbis form of one's ownindividual inner Self through tbe feeling of '1', one distinctlyrealises the difference betw~n individual Self and the SupremeSelf. The idea is elaborated by an illustration. When we say'The jar is blue', We do not distinguish blue quality (rom thesubstance. The instructit>n of 'I-sense-ego' is thus to makeanaspirant realize the separate existence of the 'Supreme Sel~within himself. We should not fcrget that ego stands here forfue feeling of '1' and the tnstruction oC ego means to denote thatone should meditate upon the 'unconditioned Supreme Sel~through the feeling of '1'. The Sanskrit word 'ahari1kara' ref~rredto in tbis context is derived from tbe root yKr to do preceded byby the noun 'aham' with the suffix 'gha' in the sense of abstractidea, meaning the production oC 'I-idea' known as ego.as

It mar be recalled that the feeling of '1' is produ~d only inrelation to the individua! Self. It is never produ~d in relation tothe 'Supreme Self' because the "Supreme Self' does nt becomethe object of the Ceeling of '1'. The testimony oC the Chndogya

267The Doctrinl': 01 .Aham-.41t1la'Upani$8d discusscd above is .oonclusive proof that the word'aham' (1), dcnoting individual Self, stands for the individualin~r Self. It is only through the individual inner Selfthat theSuprcme Inner Self beco~s realised. The 'Supreme Self' is thusthe inner self of the individual self, and the 'Supreme Self' ismeditated opon through tbe feeng of 'r because He is the innerself of the individual Self. The instruction of the 'Sclf' is there-fore meant to establish that the 'Supreme Self' is the inner Selfofthe individual Self, and that He becomes related through thefeeling of '1' alone. In this way according to Ramanuja there iscomplete identification among the 'unconditioned Supreme Self','I-seose' and 'Self' and that aU thcse threc stand for one and thcaamc Ultimate Reality.

Th~ Katha Upani~ad states that 'Our senses have been createdby God with a tendency to move outward. It is for this reasontbPot maR looks outside himself rather than inside. Rarely a wiseman, who is desirous of immortal lile, loob to bis inner Selfwith bis eye turncd inwardst.N Thc Ka~ha Upanifad tesrifics thatthe realisation of the individual inner Self is the only means toattain libcration. This ineans is indirect wbile the realisation ofthe Supreme Self is the direct means of liberation.

Dr. s. Radhakrishnan has rightly concluded in the PrincipalUpani$ads (London, 1933, pp. 93-94). 'There does not seem to beany suggestion that the individual egos are unreal. They aU ex.istthrough the Self and have no reality apart from it. The insistenceon the unity of the Supreme Self as the consrituent reality of theworld and of the individual souls does not Desate the empiricalreality ofilie latter.'

Meaning o/ Pratyak-tmara and Parok.tmanIt would be most hclpful to understand the doctrine of 'aham-

artha' as identical with 'Sclf' ifwe interpret t~se two technicalterms of Vedanta pllosophy. Both these terms have been used bythe followers of Advaita and Vai~oava Vednta alike. To begiowith. let me fecal! that Pratyak-Atman stands for Jiva-Atmao(individual Self) when we a~pt the compouod 'karmadharayaO,wlle the same word stand! for Paramitmao (Supreme Sclf of!he individual Self) if a 'tatPUCU$8 o compound is accepted. Etbercompound interprets the word 'Pratyak' in the seose of !he 'self'.Therefore. !he 'pratyaktvao provea tbat 'Sclc' is 'I-sense..

Buddhist Philosop1liCi!1 Researc/re"268Pral )'IIk mcans directed inwards. It stands for the individual

inncr ,St 11"', Parak mcans directed outwards or towards the outerworld (IIN (he senses). Pratyak is self-luminous and Parak isilluminctl hy another, The Sense of Pratyak is obviously oppoSedto thaf nI' Parak. In Advaita, cognition is regardcd as sclf-luminnUN, Therefore. 'Self' (lf the nature of cognition is PratyakAtmnn, Itllrak is explaincd as 'para m prakaSakataya acati','signirylllP It as 'paraprakasa', i.e. which is luminous bya30ther.On thc h,,"ili of this interpretation the Non-dualist again makesan attcmrl (o deny the identity of '-scnsc' and 'Self'. It is there-fore c~NCnljl,1 to re-examine the meaning oftheSe two terms alongthe trndltlcm ofVai~oava Vedanta.

Thc NIII,-dualistic int~rpretation is rejected on the followinggroundll:

1, Prll()'lIk would now be bracketed with pain, pleasure anddCNlrc because they are also self-luminous, so long theyCXINI,2~ C(,~"ilion is regarded as a characteristic of 'I-Sense'. Asau~lI. cognition is a 'dharma' (artribute or special charac-Icrif'li'-" mark) and ,'I-Sense' is a 'dharmin' (where theII,x'Cilll characteristic or properties of having the naturerc"J~). According to fue above interpretation cognition is(lcpcl,J~nt. Thercfore only the independent 'I-Sense' wouldIx: 'l' gl1rded as the individual 'inner Self' and not thedcpa:IIJ~nt cognition.

3. l'llc Nllyayika and t.he Vaise~ika totally reject any sclf-lum""us entity. According to thcm 'Self' (Atman) iskn"W" as 'inner Self' (pratyak-Atman). Neitherofthcse~i~ll~r "~hools of logicof Indian philosophy consider 'Self'I~ ""II'.luminous.

Thc 1,1.1. ,. Vti~l;1ava tradition intcrprets in the following way:(a) PrI' y"k literally means going backwards or dirccted

inwarJfI (pllllfpam acati). It denotes the 'Self' existing inside thebody, m/l/l. i:tteUect, ego and senSes and controlling themtogethcr. Nt.'edlcss to say that all schools of Vedanta ref~r to'Self' hy 1111" I~rm 'Pratyak-Atman'. Every human bcing has themcnt1,1 p,,/"t.,,'plion of '1' which denotcs 'Self' and nothing elSe.Thc ohjt.:11111'IhisshinesofitSelf, i.e.illuminates itself and trusvery I Jhjt'l;1 i~ known as the 'SeIf'..8 Furthcrmore, in case the

269.The Doctrine 01 .Aham-Artllat

'I-sense' is different from cSelf', Self' will not be accepted as'Pratyak' because it is onIy on account of Sclf arrogating thoughtthat 'Pratyak' is distinguished from parak',"

(b) park' litcraUy m~ans directed towards the outer world asthc senses. Any object, thcrefore, which attains another (\r isattained by another or illumines another is understood as 'Parak'(Param aitca prapnoti. parenopadiyate parasmai prakasate).Parak is therefore that which exists for another. AU the objectsof thc universe such as jar etc. exist for cl-sense'-Self' becausetheir ultimate result goes to 'l-sense-Self'. Hence Parak.18

Pratyagartha is obviously different from Paragratha andPrayagartha and '1' are identical, ojiva' is known as individual'Self' or 'tman' when conditioned by a body, known as con-s,-,iousness when it be::omes a substratum of knowledge, and asPratyak when there is feeling of '1' due to attributive consciousoncss (dharmabhtita jana).89 An individual inner Self marked as'A' is not considered as Pratyak foranother individual inner Selfmarked as 'B' because cA' is not experienoed as '1' by 'B'.Therefore Pratyak is an ob~ct of the feeling of '1'. This feelingof 01' is not different from 'I-sense'.

This thesis of Vai~~avism is Cully supported by th.. Vaise~ikaschool of Indian philosophy.'O The Vaise~ika Stitras of Ka~adaclearly indicate that the apprehension of Ceeling of '1' is relatedto one's own individual inner 'S~lf' and that 01' is neVer considercdas the 'Self' of another individual being. We comprehend theidea oC '1' as reIated to ote's own 'Self'. Ifthe body was 'Self'and the object of'l-appr~hension' was body, the body ofanotherbcing would also have been apprehended as '1'. Such is not ourexpericnce in lile. Therefore, the objeCt of our '14pprehension' issomething different Crom the body and that is 'Self'. ol-appre-hension' is always in connection with one's own individual 'Self'.The nature ofthe individual inner 'Self' is an object of o~'s ownperception but the nature of the 'Self' of another being is only anobject ofinferential knowledge, The distinction among differentindividual 'Selv~s' is thus obvious.

A comparative study of the commentary of akara Misra,the gloss of Jayanrayal;1a and the bha~ya of Chandrakanta onthe above ref~rred Vaise~ika Stitras of KaQda makes it quiteclear that since thc intuitional apprehension '1' arises in respectof one's own 'Self' .and since it does not exis~ in respect of other

270

'Self' jt js proper to regard ouc's OwD individual inner 'Sdf"'.'the primary referenoe. In case tbe primary referen~ were to tb' '.body. the intuitional apprehension should have been produocdby external senses because the body is not an object oc mental .perception. The apprehension 'This js '1' is mental because it isproduced without the operation of external senses. The appre-hension is neither inferential for want of logical reason. norverbally communicated for waut of authoritative texto It isfurther noteworthy that jt refers to one's own individual 'Self'and not to the 'Self' of another for the 'Self' of one man remainsbeyond the senses of another man.u

In the prima Cacle view an objection is raised by the Non-dualist against bis own point of view that rthe objects and theirrelative peculiar characteristics are supcrimposed on the individualinner Self', the substratum. on the simple logic that the substra-tum is never acoepted as an object of knowledge. Unless OMacquires the knowledge of substratum. the superimpositionremains out of question. It may thus be expiained that it is onlyafter the knowledge of substratum that superimposition of silveron the conch-shell is experien~.'1 The prima Cacle view isrejected jn the Sai1kara-bM$Ya. wherein the individual inner 'Self'(Pratyak-Atman) is not accepted as an absolute non-object ofknowledge. Accordingiy the individual jODer 'Self' does becomethe object of intuitional appreheDSon of 'I'u. One does experi-ence the idea of 'I-ness' in relation to the individuil inoer 'Self'.In case 'Self' was not an object of the apprehensioo of '1' andwas simply an object of the apprehension of conscienoe. we wouldhave called the 'Self' as 'Thii' and not as '1' because consciencebeing inanimate could only be designated by 'This' or 'That..

A study ofthe Skara-bha~ya shOWI that Pratyagartha andParagartha are two entirely dift'erent philosophical notions.Pratyagartha den:Jtes the idea o '1-De.>S' going towards theknower, while Pargartha is always .n object of the apprehensionof 'This' or 'That'. There is no objectivity of 'I..apprehension' inrelation to 'Pratyak-Atman' and it is further to be kept in mindthat the objectivity of 'l-appreheDsion' is always relatcd to theobjectivity of peroeption. Therefore. Pratyak-Atman is definitelyan object of 'l-apprd1ension'. To make it more comprehensiveit is stated that we do acquire !he knowledge of substratum whichis none else but Pratyak-Atman and ~ should be no hindrance

2nThe Doctrine o/. Aham-Artha'in accepting the superimposition of thc objects and their specialcharacteristic mark.'i in Pratyak-tman. Tbe SaIikara-B~y..on a clase perusal, makes it clear that even Sankaricarya has.

...,...

~ J

272 Buddhist Philosophical Researches

one may question what is thc locus of 'I-ness' in relatil)n to God(Isvara) as describcd in thc Upani$adic tradition." 'I-sensc'could ~rtain1y be 3cceptcd as an attribute of conscience and egowhcn God is conceiv~d as consciousn.::ss conditioned byconscien~ or as consciousno:ss conditioncd byan ego; but it is aknown fact that in Advaita Vcdanta G:Jd is regarded as cons.ciousncss conditioned by Mayl.4 It may be kept in mind thatthcre is no idea of 'I-ncss' in thC state of Maya. Truly, egoremains non-existent prior to godly suprem~ det~rmination suchas '1 wish to be many' and ego is produ~d only after the creationof !he principIe or intclligen~ (mahat), the first evolutionaccording to Sarl1khya philosophy..'

We are now lcft with no other aIternativ~ but to accept thatcl-ness' in G':Jd is not to bc imposed from outsidc but that itbeIongs to God from within. This cnables us to maintain thatego, a m'Jdification of causal matter (Prakrti) is not 'I-sense' but'~If' is 'I-seosc'. B.:sides, 'I-intellect' is God as evidenced byth,~ Upan~adic tradition..7 This v~ry knowledge is regarded asthe righ knowl~dg~ b.~causc misapprehension of any sort isimpossiblc in omrtiscient God. Therefore, cl-ness' as describedin God could not be an imposed one. By accepting an impositionofth.~ 'I-ness' on G()d, one indirectly accepts the existenre ofmisapprehension in God. On account of the non-existence ofego at thc time of godly supreme determination and on accountof the non-existence of ego in God, the apparent 'I-ness' in Godhas got to be ac~pted as belonging to the misapprehension ofGod.

1 should further elucidate the Advaita point ofview. The Non..dualist explains that in the intuitional apprehension of '1' tbeunitcd ego and consciousness appear as the basis of the mutualidenticaI su~rimpositin. 1 have already explained in detail thenotion of the uniting elem~nt of anmate and inanimate acceptedas the 'I-sensc' in non-dua1ism. Now it would be interesting toexamirte the Crvaka point of view in this rcgard. It is a well-known fact that all the six orthodox system of Indian philosophyrefute thc 'body-S~lf' concept of Carvaka and al! of them un.~animousIy agrce that body is neither 'I-sense' nor consciousness..Thercforc, it is not very scholarly to declare the body as 'Self"..Jn the falsc identification of 'Self' with thc body, as the Carvakamaintains, he has to accept 'I-intellect' in the body and thereiD.

---o~ J, I

:!The Doctrine o/ 'Aham-Artha' 273appcars the idcntification of a body with the ego and conscious-ncss. The 'Self' of the natur~ of consciousness appears idcnticalwith thc body duc to falsc knowledge.

The Non-dualist attacks against the Carvaka on the groundthat first and foremost Wc should not forgct that th~ '&If' of thenat~rl': of consciousncss ap~ars as ," du~ to false identity withc:Jnscience. The re fo re, this ver)' ," gctting idcntical with thebody appears as" am handsome', "am ugly', '1 am fat', '1 amof dark complexion'. This kind of apprehension is known asfalse idcntification with the body. To cradicate this Wr\.)ng notion,thc Non-dualist has first to establish differ~nce bctween "-sense'and the body and then has to r...m.Jve thc misapprehensi':Jn ofnon-difference betw.:en ego and consciousness and finally has toestablish non-identity of 'Self' and ego.

It has already bcen observed that 'I-sense' does not mean theuniting clement of animate and inanimate but it is 'Self' itself.The false idcntification with the body is not very different fromthe misapprehension of non-differcnce bctween 'I-sense' and'non-Self' (anatrnan): No misapprehension can logically be estab-lished at the root of thc false identification with the body asindircctly advocated by the Non-dualist in thc form of misappre-hension between consciousness and ego. Furthermorc, the celebra-tcd writer of thc ~~asiddhi accepts the objcct illuminatingknowledge as objectless or having no scope and without anysubstratum. He declares that this v.:ry knowledge is the principalcharacteristic of the 'Self'. The object illuminating knowledgeappears as an attribute of 'I-s;:nse' on the basis of the apprehen-sion, '1 know'. The difference between 'I-sense' and knowledge ascharacteristic (dharma) and as that which possess the character-istic (dharmin) is obvious. The misapprehension uf non-diff~renoebctwccn 'attributclcss Self' and 'I-sense' is an impossibility.

1 havc alrer.dy mentioned that the Non-dualist interprcts theword 'aham' (1) as conscicnce when there is falsc idcntificationwith the ego and superimposition of the ego as consciousnessconditoned by conscicncc whcn thcrc is false idcntification withthc body. This involv.:s a dcfl:ct, b~causc ther.: is only one mean-ing of'I-s.:;nse' and that m~aning is '&If'.

Upavar,\'a and VediintadesikaUpavar~a. a pre-Sakara author of several writings on

Bllddhist Philosophical Rescarches274

Mimamsa philosophy and bis followers accept complete identityof 'I-sense' and 'Sclr. They clcarly propound that the 'Self' is anobjcct of. I-appr.:hension'. Jayanta Bha!!a (9th ccntury), one ofthc most celebrated logicians of the old school of Hindu logicclearly refers to the tradition of Upavar~a in rus Nyaya-majari,and of the followers of Upavar~a who directly realiscd thc 'Self'as an object of the fecling of 'I-apprehension'. Sornc scholarshold that this Upavar~a was nune else but Baudhayana. We arestill not in a position to acccpt this view for want of valid evi-dencc. In my opinion trus Upavar~a was the younger brother ofVar~a, the teacher of Pa I.\ini , the most celebrated Indian gram-manan. Evidcntly by the time of Jayanta Bha!!a the tradition ofUpavar~a occupicd a prominent place in ancient Ind:an philoso-prucal thought. Jayanta Bha!!a clearly states that Upavar~a andrus followers ofthe Prva Mimamsa accept complete identifica-tion of' I-scnse' and 'Self'.48

The 'l-sensc-Self' theory has a support in the course of the longhistory of Indian philosophy. It has been supported by theCarvaka, Bauddha,. Naiyayika, Vaise~ika, Prva Mimamsakaand Vai~Qava Acryas with special reference to Ramanuja schoolof Vednta. The eviocnces from Ymuncarya and Vedanta-Desika produce ample testimony in favour ofthis theory.

Yamunacarya maintains that it is proved beyond doubt bylogic and verbal tt~stimony that 'Self' and 'I-sense' are identicaland that the 'Self' is knower .48 The two statements '1 know' and'1 do not know' indicate the existence of knowledge and igno-rance in 'I-cognition' in relation to the difference of time. This isour normal experience that by the rise of a particular knowledgein 'I-cognition' the previous ignorance is dispelled. The 'Self'misapprehends itsclf as body in the apprehension, '1 am fat', '1am weak'. This is certainly nescience in the form of false appre-hension with thc body. Nescience is possible only when \Veaccept 'I-ncss' and 'knowerness' Gatrttva) in the 'Self'. In theabscnce of 'I-ncss' and 'knowcrness' in the 'Sclr tae falsc identi-fication with the body remains an impossibility. Hence knowerSelf-'I-sense'.so

In fine, I put forward thc conclusive cvidcncc from Vedanta-desika, the well-known grcat Guru (mahdesika) who has fullysupported the 'I-sense-Sclf' theory on the basis ofthe following

arguments:

275The Doctrine 01 .Aham-Artha'

)4~I!~~I:1fm ~ ~ ~ qi~~~~~~~~ ~)~"I:"i ~n; I~ ",rwTf~fq' m~mWf""'~I~1m!fq.'t)4.~."""",~.~..".n'i:)~f+i.~qq:~: 11

l.

2.3.

'Self' (Atman) is the individual inner Self (Pratyak) andnon-Self is 'Parak'. The nature of individual inner 'Self' isself-luminous. whi!e 'Parak' illumines another or illuminesfor another. Pratyak is connected with the idea of '!' andParak to an object denoted by 'This' and 'That'. 'I-sense'exists for itself and the objects exist for the benefit of '1-sense', There(ore. 'I-sense' is 'Self',The 'Self' is regarded as eternal, animate and knower .blOur norma! experience is as follows: '1 am the knower'.bSThis attests that wherever 'I-ness' and 'knowerness' exist,the conscious 'l-sense-Self' also exists.The philosophical thinking maintains that the 'Self' ex-periences the mi series of the mundane world and desires toattain liberation in order to gel rid of the cycle of birthand death. Such an intensive desire impels 'Selft to followthe means of libe-ration. The experience of mi series, thedesire to get rid of them and the desire to enjoy theinexhaustible hliss in the state of liberation could belongto 'l-senset alone.Here are five questions from the Vedic literature, Theyareascribed to liberated persons' the Supreme Self, andpersons desirous of liberation. Vedantadesika attachesprimary importance to the authority of the Vedic testi-mony in support of the theorr of 'I-sense-Self'.

4.

(a) '1 am food (Taittiriya Upani~ad 111.13.6). Tbis is astatement of a liberated persono

(b) '1 beca[f1c Manu' (Brhadarar.tyaka Upani$ad 1.4.10).A statement of Vamadeva who is regarded as a lib~ra-ted person while alive.(c) '1 enter in all in the form of lifc.'63 A statemcnt ofSupreme Sclf.(d) 'I.go for refuge to all-Effulgent Sclf.'5( A statcm~nt ofone who is desirous of libcration.

(e) '1 was alone in the beginning' (thamekaJ: prathama-

Buddhisl Philosophical Researc1la

276

5.

6.

masam) Atharvaveda. Vedic testimony. AII the abovequoted citations testify identity of 'I-sense' and cSelf' .

We know by noW that according to Advaita Vedanta thegrnss ego is thc 'I-sense' and it is destroyed in the state ofprofound repose. Our experience is however different. Ittclls us when awaking from profound repose that one sleptso long happily but did not know anything. Hence theexistence of 'I-sense' in profound repose. Only'l-scnse.existent in profound repose could be Self and nothing else.According to non-dualisTI1. conseience does exist in pro-found repose. In the case where consciencc is the 'I-sense',one should have the apprehension '1 was non-existentduring profound repose'. Since such is never our experi-ence, it follows that 'I-sense' is 'Self'.In the tradition of Advaita Vedanta. the 'Self' is regardedas self-luminous (svayarilprakaSa) and eternal. As such,the 'Self' continues to illumine and exist in profoundrepose. In the case where the 'I-sense' is the 'Self' arguesthe Non-dualist, the 'I-sense' should have been existent inprofound repose. Nevertheless, such is not the case bccausethe 'Self' in profound repose does not remain aware of'1'. Therefore. self-luminous 'Self' is not 'I-sense'. Besides,awaking from profound repose it te lis us that one had noawareness even of oneself. Such an experie1Ce establishesnegation of 'I-sense' in the state of profound repose. Thenon-existence of 'I-sense' and self-lurninous Self in thestate of profound repose are two entirely different concepts

-Vedanta and they are not identical. maintains the Non-o

s"tltobaS\-w of Advaita Vedanta does not hold good on the\nnef .(1) The 'l-sense-Self' illumines itselfinthe.-"efen\1\\}' S.Uream. profound repose and swoon, onthesense- ~ Ofl;uch as oneness. the state of individualaccoun \ness \, (2) The illumination pcrtains to theUt1\1~PP tne statt.'I-scnse'. Thus the sclf-luminous '1-D\1f\t\g 'c of awaking, and dream on

.'edge. desirc. happiness and'ss .(dhafma-bhta jana).

'Sclf' docs not illuminc

t",'

211Tltt DoctrJe o/ .Aham-Artha'by attributive consciousness but by its own nature. The attribu-tive consciousness, over-powered by famas, bl:comes contractedduring profound repose. Truly, the 'I-st:nse-Self' being cndowedwith the attributes oneness, the state of individual inner 'Self' andconcord illumines by its own nature during profound repose butdoes not rcmcmbcr the various attributes of name, forro, varoaand sr:lm:l such as a Brahmaoa. a SannY[lsin on the simplcground that the attributivl: consciousness rl:mains hidden. Themeaning Qf the statement' 1 had no awareness even of myse!f' isas follows: I had no similar awarcness of myself during profoundreposc :lS 1 always have during the state of awaking. As 1 under-stand mysclf as a br:ihmaOa, or as a sannyasin or a Professor oran Ambassador during awaking on the basis of outer attributes.1 had no memory of any such attribute during profound repose.In this way, the objection of the Non-dualist against the exis-tence and illumination of 'I-sense' during profound repose andagainst the ident:ty of 'I-scnse' and 'Sel[' is clea:-ly rejected.

I thercfore conclude that the 'I-sense' and the '$elf' are identi.cal. The 'I-sense' is not the non-self as maintaincd by the Non-dualist. The 'I-sense' "xists in the dreamless profound sleep. Inthe statc of liberation, the 'I-sense', abandoning al! undesirablewordly f orms, names, shapes and attributes exists in its pure forroand as such 'I-sense' is properly entitled to study the scriptures,the best means of liberation. The identity of' I-sense' and 'Self'may thc:reforc be t:!citily ac~pted.

References

l. Isvarak"I:ta, Sali1khya-Karika, 25.1. The Atman-Puru~a or Sli1khya is in reality 'Nirgul:ta'. This view of

5a1khya is c\i,lent from thc Mdhyarnakavatara VI, 121 quotcd in thcPrasannapada cornmentary of Chandrakirti on Nfigarjuna's (Milla) MadhYil-makaka!"ik:i:cf. Murti, T.R.V., The Central Philosophy ofBuddhism, London,1955, p. :!!)3.

3. The problcm of Self and non-Self in Hindu and Buddhist tradition hil9ncver Lcas.:d to inlCrest r~jearch~rs, cf. Guha Abhyankumar, 'Jivatmanin me Brahm3.~tra', Calcutta, 1921; Mrs. Rhys Davills, 'Thc Birth of Indi~nPsychology and it, Development in Buddhism', London, 1936; Narahari,H.G., 'Atman in pre-Upani~llic Vedic Literature', Madra9, 1944; Gonda, J,'Notes on 8rahman', Utrccht, 1950; Lacombe, U. 'La Direl:tion Spirituellesell'n les traditil)n indienne",lians Direction spirituelle et Psychologie', (EtudesCarmilitaric~) Bruge., 1951; Biardeau Madeline, 'La Ph.ilosophie de MaQQana

278 Buddhist Phi/osophical ResearchesMi~ra vue a partir de la Brahma-Siddhi, Pars, 1969; L 'Atman-Brahman"dans.le Buddhism Ancien, BhaflAcharya Kamaleswar, Pars, 1973. .

4. Sengupta Mima, 'Thc Evolution of the SIi1khya School of Thought'.1959, Patna, pp. 70-80.

5. BrahmastJtra 2.4.12 (ed) Sivanand Saraswati, Risllikesh, 1949, pp. 523-24.6. Joshi Rasik Vihar, 'The Role of 1 ndian Logic in the Ooctrne of Causa.

lit y', Melanges d'lndianisrne a la Memoire de Loui!i Renou, Pars, 1965, pp.4O3-OS.

7. BrhadaraQyaka Upani$ad IV.3.22.S. Sailkara Bha$ya on the BrahmasQtra 11.2.29. (ed.) Saraswati Satyananda,.

Varanasi, Samvat 202S, pp. 50S-lO.9, Ibid., 11.3.30.

10. Ibid., 11.3.31, p. 512.11. Jbid., 11.3.32. 'Nityopalabdyanupalabdhiprasagai:t anyataraniyamo

vanyatha..12. Tripathi, Manassukharama Suryarama, 'A Sketch of the Vedanta

Philosophy', Bombay, 1910, p. 140.13. Lacombe, O. 'L' Absolu selon le Vedanta', Guenther, Pars, 1937, pp.

2S-35; op. cit. Trpathi Manassukharama, Suryarama, 'Sai1kara Vedanta.interprets the Vedanta unity by hannony betw=n Egotlsm and Altruism'.pp. J26-32.14. (a) La KaSika-Vrtti, (ed.) Yutaka Ojihara et Louis Renou, Pars, 196()..

67.(b) Tattva-mukta-kalapa of Vedantadesika, (Bha.vaprakASa pp. 40-41)

Vol. 11. (ed.) S. Narasimhachar, Mysore, 1940.1 S. ManobuddhiraharhkaraScittam karaQamantaram,

saMaYo niScaYo garvaJ:I smaraQam vi$aya imelSai1kara-BM$ya on BrahmasQtra, Op.Cit. Satyanand Saraswati.p. 544.

16. avidyatmika hi bijaSaktii:t avyaktaSabdanirdesyAParamesvarasrayA mAyamayi mahasU$uptif:1

oSailkara BM$ya on the Brahmastra (ed,) Sara;wati Satyanand.Varanasi, Samvat 202S, pp. 2S7-SS.

17. 'Even in the state of dreamless sleep, though there is no consciousnes.!of obj~ts. still the sense of '1' (ahamartha) p:rsists..

The Vedanta, Ghate, V.S., Poona, 1960, p. 25.IS. The Twelve Principal Upani$ads (Chandogya Upanipd (13.1) (ed.)

Mitra and Cowell, Vol. 111, p. 274.19. Op. Cit., Ibid., p. 274.20. cf. Mitra and Cowell, Taittiriya Upani$ad, 3.30, pp. 231-32; Ranade.

R.O., A Constructive Survey of Upanisadic Philosophy, Bombay, 1967p.257.21. aharnartha-vin~Scen mok$a ityadhivasyati,

apasarpedasau mok$akatMprastavagandhataf:'Sribha~ya p. 67 (ed.) Annangaracharya, Kanchipuram, 1956.

22. 'ahamityeva hi tasya svarpam' Sri YamunacMrya's Siddhitraya(Atmasiddhi p. 39) (ed.) Ramanujacharya. Madras, 1972.23. ". the mundane is itself the transmundane and the transmundane

279The Doctrine 01 '.4.ham-Artha'it itself the rnundane." Venkata Ramanan, NAgarjuna's Philosophy as Presen-ted in the MabA-Praji-PAramitA-Sastl3, Tokyo, 1966, p. 122.24. Tameva viditvAtimrtyumeti nAnyaJ: panthAJ: vidY\te 'naya,ya!

SvetAsvatara Upa~ (ed.) Swami Tyagishvaranand, Madras, 1957, pp,70-71.25. Brahmavid Brahmaiva bhavati/Mar:lc;1kya Upani~d 3.2,9,26. Cf. op. cit., Mitra and Cowell, (OtAndogya Upani~d) Vol. 111, pp.

247-48.27. SAri1khya-Kriki of Isvarakr$r:la 62 and 63; cf. Mukerji, J.N., The

Theory of Rea/ity, Calcutta, 1930, pp. ro.64, 97-98; Sengupta Anima, 'TheEvolution of the SAritkhya School of Thought', Patna, 1959, pp. 49-51.28. 'It is SanatkurnAra who teaches the doctrine of BhQman. BhOman is that

infinite happiness whkh arises by the vision of the divinity all around. AConstructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy, Ranade, R.O., Bombay.1968, p. 37.29. ChAndogya Upani$ad VII.2S,l, op.cit.. The Twelve Principal Upan~ds.

(ed.) Rajendralal MitR and E.B. Cowdl, Madras, 1932, Vol. 111, p. 245.30. ChAndogya Upani~d. Sakaridl1rya-granthAvali, Delhi, 1964, pp.

296-97. As regards die 'neti neti prakriya. of Advaita Vedanla, Mrs. RhysDavids has observed, 'this is as ir one were to oome abored asking for the~ptain and rejecting roatswain and poner as beins 'not he' were to go awaysaying 'there Is no captain', 'The Sel" : an over Iooked Buddhist Sirtlilc.JRAS, 1937, p. 260.31. op. cit. Olndogya._pp. 245-46; Cf. Tattva-muktikalpa' of Vednta-

deSika (BhAvaprakASa pp. 230-31) (ed.) S. Narasimhachar. Mysore, Vol. 11.1940.32. op. cit., ChAndoya... p. 246.33. ahari1karaQam ahamk1l'ab.34. Ka~ha Upani$8d 11.4.1; cf. Ranade. A Comtl1JCtive Surveyof Upani-

sadic Philosophy, p. 247.35. Finite Self (Ramanujist Idea of Self) (ed.) Don Maharaj, Vrindaban.

1963, pp. 14-20.36. 'svasmati praka.mrnnatvarOpam pratyaktvam'. Sribhi$ya, SOtrapra-

kAsikA, p. 94; op.cit. Finite Self, pp. 14-1~.37. 'aharnartho na cxda.tma pratyak~ nAtmanAm bhavet, ahambudhy

parAgarthAt pratyagartho hi bhidhyate! &ibha$ya, p. 67 (ed.) Annangaracarya.Kancipurarn, 1956. "$a sdhanAnu$tfljnena yadyaharneva na bhavi,yArniityavagacchet, apasarpedevasau rnok$ai:athAprastAvAt; tatacl. adhikirivira-hAdeva sarvam rnok$lSstram aprarnt)am sytllbid.. p. 71.

Cf. Yarnunacarya's Siddhitraya (Atmasiddhi, p. 39) (ed.) Ramanujacharya.Madras, 1972.38. Tattavrnuktakalpa of VedntadeSika (SarvArthasiddhi, Anandadyini

and BhAvaprakASa cornrnentaries on ve~ Nos. 6 and 7 of Ihe Jivasarachapter) (ed.) S. Narasimhachar, Mysore, 1940, Vol. 11, pp. 208-69.39. S1riraka-mirnlnsA-bha$ya, 1.1.1 (R1rnnl!jagranthamaIA) (ed.) Annan-

garacharya, Kanchipuram, 1956, p. 67.40. 'aharnili pratyaptmani bhAvA.t paratvabhAvat arthanlarapratyak$8b!

280 B"ddhist Philosophical Rcsearches

The Vai.Se$ika Stras of Ka~da, 111,2,14 (ed.) Ba.~u B.D. and Sinha Nandlal,All:lh:lbad, 1923.41. Ibid., Ba~u ahd Sillha, rr. 12~-25.42. J(,~hi, Rasik Vihari. \';liJity uf Krn)wlcdge in Indian Logic, Dr, V.Ragha\:ln Felicitation Votumc, I)clhi, 1975, pp. 180-86.-t~. 'na tavadayam ekantena avi$3yal), a~matrratitivi$ayatvat aparll5katvac.:a

pratyagiitmasiddhel:, ,Br:lhma~rltra Bha$ya (ed.) Mah:lm:lhopadhyaya Anlntakrishn3 Shastri,

B.'mbay, 19311.4-t. 'Hc Ithe Surreme S('Iul) .Icoired: Let me become many, let me be born:

T:littiriY:l Upani$ad 11.6.2.45. 'Jt.s intinitc~imal part bc..:ome~ the Qualit!ed Brahman, through it~

assllCiation with the unrcal prillciplc 01' May: Trirathi, ,tanassukhramSuryarama: 'A Sketch of thc Phil"~ophy ofVcdanta', Bombay, 1901, p. 73.4(1. Salhkhya-karikii of Isvarakr$l)a, 22.47. Chandogya Upani$3d, VI.3,2; 'Eighteen Principal Upanishads', (ed..)

Limaye V.P. and Vadekar R.D., Pouna, 1968,4!!, 'Tatra pratyak$a-rTlatmanam Aupavar5&!:I Prapcdire,

aham-pratyayagamyattvat svayOthya api ke.:ana/Nyayamajari uf Jayanta nha!!;!, (ed.) Madhvachaf)'a Adya, Varanasi,

1969, Vol. 11, p. 3.49. ".. .one can say that the one accepts or denies Aunan as much as the

othcr, hoth the Madhyamaka :tnd the Advaita Vedanta dcny Atman as:tseparate su~tan.tial entity inhabiting the body of each individual, and bothacccpt Atm:ln in the sense of essential nature of the individual as well as ofall things..., atman brahman mcallS thcre is hardly any ditTcrence bet",.een thct\\o." K. '.cnkat:t Ramanam, Nagarjun:!'s philo~ophy a~ prciCnted in Mah;l-Pr:tja-Paramitii-sii~tra, Rutland- Tokyo, 1966, p. 320.50. AtaiJ pratyak~-siddhattval ukla-nyygamanvayl, avidyayogataSc;1-

U11a illatiihamiti bhasatc,' The Siddhilraya of Yamunacarya, (ed.) Rama-nujacharya, Madras, IAtmasiddhi, pro 41-44), 1972.51. "'edanta-desika \ery clcarly accepls in the Adhikara~as:iravali that the

indi\ idu;1 inner 'Selr, (PratYilk) is 'I-scnsc'. (Pratyar,niitmahamarthil!:lJ,Adhikaral)as:lra\ali, p. 2.10 (ed.) ,\nnangaracharya, Kanchivaram, 1940; cf.atohamarth('l jatai\ a pratyag;itmeti niS;itam', Sribha$ya, p. 67 (ed.) Op.Cit.,1956.52. 'He is ctcrnal 3mong the cternals and intelligent among all lhat arc

intclligcnt.' Svcliis\alara Upilni5:1d. Icd.) SwiJ1T\i TYilgishwaralland, M adra 'i,1957 111.6.13).'3. 'cntcring tl1c~c objccts in lhc tilrm of lifc (Sclf) 1 shall be manirc~t ;11

variUll'i llames anu forms.' ChangogYil Upani$-1d, VI.3.~.5-t. ' ~ccking li~cratiun 1 gu fur rcfugc to thc Elfulgcnt unc, ",hu lurn'i lh.:

undcrstanding ,'tman,' Svela~\~tara Up;ni~ad, VI.I~.

CONTRIBUTORS

Prof. ANDRB'OAREAU \vho was born 1921 near Pars, retircd asProfcssor of Study of Buddhism at the College de France. Hch.'1S publishcd sevcral \\'orks and num\:rous articles and mono-graph!; on Indian Buddhism. cspccially on the Buddha's bl()-graphy, the hist()ry :Ind doctrincs of thc ancient schoolsof thc so-called Hinayana (L,.S' .\"ecte.S' bouddhiques du PetllV hicu/c', etc.).

Prof. KAMALESWAR BIIATTACHARYA Docteur es Lettcrs (Pa..i~).Directeur de Rcchcrchc (1 st class) at the Centre National dela Rccherche Scicntifiquc, Pari!;. was formcrly Vi!;itingProfcssor, University C'f Toronto (Canada), t'tc. Hc haspublishcd: Le.\" Re/i,~iollS brallmalliqrle.\" dalls l'anc;en CanlbodJ(('(1961); Recherches sur ' ,'ocobulaire des ill.\"criptions ,\"anskrilt'.\"du Ctllllbodge (1964; 2nd edn" 1991); L 'Atman-Brahlllon dall.fle Bo,ddl,isl"e allciell (1973); Thc' Dialcctical J.{ ctl,0d vIN.~rjmo (Vigrahavyavrtani) (1978; 3rd edn., 1990); Le.S'iddlllltalak,raf.'aprakara~'a du Tottl'acintamaf.'i de Galgesaav('c; Lc' Didhili dc' Ra,~lnmatha Sirom(/~'i el la Tika de Jagadl.\~aTorkala",kara (Jollrllal Asiatiqllc, 1977-), and numerousarticlcs on various topics of Indology, in French, English andSanskrit.

DR. BJIAGWAN DASH is holder ofPost-graduate qualifications inyurveda and Sanskrit, and Doctorate degree in TibclanMcdicine. He was Deputy Adviscr in yurveda t thc Govt.of India in the Ministry of Heal:h. In 1980, he took voluntaryrctircment from his Government job to pursuc his yurv~dicpracticc and carry out rcsearchcs in Ayurvcda and Tibctanmcdicine on both of which hc has alrcady \vrittcn 45 books.

Prof. COLLETT Cox i~ Associatc Profcssor in thc Dcparlmcnt ()fAsian Languagcs and Litcratllrc .lt thc Univcrsity "fWashington. Hcr ficld of rcscarch is Indian BuddhistAbhidharma and her recent \vork includcs publicatitms (InBuddhist cpistcmology, rcligiou~ pr.lxi!;. sotcriology, andhcrmlneutics. Shc is thc author of lJi.\'plllt'd DI,urmas: f."urlyB4ddhist Theor;es 011 E.~istence.