Understanding Turkey’s Foreign Policy Through Strategic Depth

Joshua W. Walker

Post doctoral Fellow

Transatlantic Academy

The recent activism of Turkish foreign policy under the leadership of Prime Minister Recep

Tayyip Erdoğan and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has caused political waves

throughout Europe, the Middle East, and the broader region. Serious analysis of Turkey’s foreign

policy has focused for some time on Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu, chief foreign policy advisor to

Prime Minister since 2002 and Foreign Minister since May of 2009. The enormous respect and

deference paid to Prof. Davutoğlu within the AKP has made him THE most important architect

of Turkey’s foreign policy agenda and strategy since his rise to influence. As a former professor

of International Relations the views and ideas underlying his conception of the world and

Turkey’s place in it have been well-known to those who read his work in Turkish but rarely

examined outside this small circle given the lack of an English translation for his seminal 2001

book Strategik Derinlik, Turkiye’nin Uluslararasi Konumu (Strategic Depth, Turkey’s

International Position) on which a large portion of Turkey’s current foreign policy agenda can be

interpreted.

Davutoğlu’s Strategic Depth argues that a nation’s value in world politics is predicated on its

geo-strategic location and historical depth. Following the logic of Davutoğlu’s proclaimed

theory, Turkey is uniquely endowed both because of its location in geopolitical areas of

influence, particularly its control of the Bosporus, and its historical legacy as heir to the Ottoman

Empire.1 While traditional measures of Turkey’s national power tend to overlook the cultural

links fostered by a shared common history, Davutoğlu emphasizes Turkey’s connections to

the Balkans, the Middle East, and even Central Asia. In the same vein, Davutoğlu argues that

Turkey is the natural heir to the Ottoman Empire that once unified the Muslim world and

therefore has the potential to become a “Muslim super power.” Accordingly, Turkey is not

simply an “ordinary nation-state” that emerged at a certain point due to the play of circumstances

or the designs of the outside powers – like, for example, many new states in Central Europe in

the aftermath of the First World War. By contrast, Turkey is a regional power in its own right,

having strong traditions of statehood and broad strategic outreach. Thus, Davutoğlu concludes,

“it has no chance to be peripheral, it is not a sideline country of the EU, NATO or Asia.” 2

1 See Ahmet Davutoglu (unfortunately there is no English translation available at this time) Strategik Derinlik,

Turkiye’nin Uluslararasi Konumu (Strategic Depth, Turkey’s International Position) Istanbul: Kure Yayinlari, 2001. 2 Ahmet Davutoglu, Stratejik Derinlik , see also his article “The Clash of Interests: An Explanation of the World

(Dis)Order,” Perceptions 2:4 (December 1997-February 1998).

Rather than being peripheral, Davutoğlu and the AKP foreign policy agenda contends that

Turkey is a centrally positioned international player. For them, “Turkey is a country with a

close land basin, the epicenter of the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus, the center of

Eurasia in general and is in the middle of the Rimland belt cutting across the Mediterranean to

the Pacific. [Emphasis add]”3 Such geo-strategic vision reflects the newly-acquired self-

confidence on the part of the AKP who are supportive of a more proactive foreign policy –

particularly in what they call the Ottoman geopolitical space – and highly critical of Turkey’s

Cold War strategy for its myopic reluctance to embrace the country’s obvious advantages –

namely, its rich history and geographical location.

Beyond the academic discussions surrounding Turkey’s potential and place in the world,

“strategic depth” as applied to Davutoğlu’s emerging foreign policy agenda seeks to

counterbalance Turkey’s dependencies on the West by courting multiple alliances to

maintain the balance of power in its region. The premise of this agenda is that Turkey should

not be dependent upon any one actor and should actively seek ways to balance its relationships

and alliances so that it can maintain optimal independence and leverage on the global and

regional stage. This new reading of Turkey’s history differs markedly from the traditional

republican narrative that sought to sever all ties with the pre-Republican past and reject all things

Ottoman. The appeal of this interpretation has allowed Davutoğlu to work with many nationalists

and ardent secularists within the Turkish state who actively seek to embrace both Turkey’s

Ottoman past and former geopolitical space. In fact, they champion a deliberate revival of the

Ottoman past, “both as a matter of cultural enrichment, but also as a source of an enriched

Turkish identity as a political actor.”4 In this sense, the proposed strategic outlook is not merely

national but regional, and it shifts Turkey’s self-perception as being on the periphery to the

understanding that the country is in the very center of important historical developments.

Policy Implications of Strategic Depth

1. Refocusing Turkey’s Historic Alliances

a. Traditional allies like the United States and Europe are important, but new

emphasis needs to be paid to former estranged neighbors such as Russia and Iran.

b. New alliances with emerging powers like the Chinese and India help to “balance”

Turkey’s dependency on the West.

2. Greater Identification with Turkey’s former Ottoman Space

a. Renewed interest in engaging Muslim former colonies that might welcome

Turkey’s “return” to the Middle East with particular focus on Syria and Iraq.

3 Alexander Murinson, “The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy,” Middle

Eastern Studies 42:6 (November 2006). 4 Richard Falk, “Reconsidering Turkey,” Zaman, October 6, 2004.

b. Taking on greater responsibility for regional stability in the Balkans through

working with new allies such as Serbia and Russia in addition to its NATO

obligations.

c. Resolving of historic differences with Armenia to enhance greater cooperation

throughout the Caucus given Turkey’s “central” role.

3. Reaching Beyond the Ottomans

a. Emphasizing Turkey’s role in the Muslim world and historic relations with

Afghanistan and Pakistan while building stronger connections with places as far

away as Malaysia (Davutoğlu has a personal affinity given his tenure as a visiting

professor here) and Indonesia.

b. Engaging Central Asia and offering an economic model of development through

Turkish businesses, construction, education, and NGOs.