JOINTEX13 4A1 - Defence Research and Development Canada · The JOINTEX13 4A1 Advanced Command and...

JOINTEX13 4A1 Advanced Command and Staff Training Survey Results

Megan M. Thompson Kelly Piasentin Angela R. Febbraro DRDC – Toronto Research Centre

Defence Research and Development Canada Scientific Report DRDC-RDDC-2015-R198 September 2015

IMPORTANT INFORMATIVE STATEMENTS The data collected as part of this study was approved either by Defence Research and Development Canada’s Human Research Ethics Board or by the Director General Military Personnel Research & Analysis’ Social Science Research Review Board.

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2015

© Sa Majesté la Reine (en droit du Canada), telle que représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2015

Abstract

Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) involvement in complex JIMP (Joint, Interagency, Multinational, Public) or CA (Comprehensive Approach) missions such as the Vancouver 2010 Olympics and the G8 and G20 Meetings identified gaps in planning and execution at the operational level of integrated joint operations. In response, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) mandated JOINTEX, conceived of as a series of bi-annual exercises to develop and practice integrated operations at the operational level. The JOINTEX13 4A1 Advanced Command and Staff Training course (ACST) was a week-long series of briefings and discussions designed to increase understanding of important aspects of joint operations, with a goal of improving the operational effectiveness of participating organizations in subsequent phases of JOINTEX13. In support of the JOINTEX13 lessons learned process, pre- and post-ACST surveys were administered to assess changes in respondents’ level of understanding of various aspects of joint operations as a result of JOINTEX13 4A1 ACST, as well as their development of professional networks. At the beginning of the ACST course, the majority of participants indicated having a moderate level of understanding of the various aspects of integrated operations, with the highest levels occurring for members of the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC), First Canadian Division (1 Can Div) and of units that are directly controlled by 1 Can Div. Participation in the ACST resulted in small, but statistically significant, increases in levels of understanding of most aspects associated with joint-level operations. Our analyses also showed the impact of prior CA/JIMP experience and education courses on understanding. For instance, increases in understanding were evident for respondents who had not previously deployed on a CA/JIMP mission; however, even greater increases in understanding occurred for those who had previously deployed on a CA/JIMP mission. While the overall level of post-ACST understanding was greater for participants who completed the Joint Command and Staff Program (JCSP) or other National Staff College (NSC) equivalent, greater increases in understanding occurred for those who had not yet attended the JCSP/NCS. We discuss the implications of these findings and conclude with suggestions for future activities and research in this area. The current report expands on the initial summary of results presentation that was provided to the JOINTEX13 4A1 ACST organizers in the fall of 2013.

Significance to Defence and Security

This research represents the first systematic assessment of the educational value of JOINTEX ACST, and provides information vital to understanding the role of such education and justification for the very large investment of time, people and effort required to mount such intensive activities. Results indicated that JOINTEX13 4A1 ACST achieved its objectives. Participation in the week’s activities resulted in small but statistically significant increases in levels of understanding of several aspects of joint-level operations. In particular, greater increases in understanding occurred for those respondents who had previously deployed on at least one CA/JIMP mission compared to those who had not, and for those who had not yet attended the JCSP/NSC equivalent, relative to course graduates. Overall, there was a slight to moderate development of professional networks during JOINTEX13 4A1 ACST.

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Follow-up recommendations include: assessing the impact of JOINTEX13 4A1 ACST on understanding and performance in subsequent phases of JOINTEX13, developing objective knowledge and effectiveness measures and combining these with self-reports, and structuring some activities to promote professional networking, perhaps especially for civilians.

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Résumé

La participation des Forces armées canadiennes (FAC) à des missions complexes IIMP (interarmées, intégrées, multinationales et publiques) ou à AE (approche exhaustive), comme lors des Jeux olympiques de Vancouver en 2010 et des réunions du G8 et du G20, a permis de cerner les lacunes dans la planification et l’exécution au niveau opérationnel des opérations interarmées intégrées. En réaction, le chef d’état-major de la Défense (CEMD) a ordonné la tenue des JOINTEX, conçus comme une série d’exercices semestriels visant à préparer et à mettre en pratique, au niveau opérationnel, des opérations intégrées. Le cours avancé de commandement et d’état-major (CACEM) du JOINTEX13 4A1, d’une durée d’une semaine, consistait en une série de breffages et de discussions conçus pour mieux faire comprendre les aspects importants des opérations interarmées, et ce, dans le but d’améliorer l’efficacité opérationnelle des organisations participant aux étapes subséquentes du JOINTEX13. À l’appui du procédé des leçons retenues du JOINTEX13, on a réalisé des sondages avant et après le CACEM pour évaluer le changement dans le niveau de compréhension des répondants à l’égard de divers aspects des opérations interarmées à la suite du CACEM du JOINTEX13 4A1, ainsi que la constitution de réseaux professionnels. Au début du CACEM, la majorité des participants avaient indiqué un niveau de compréhension modéré des divers aspects des opérations intégrées, les plus hauts niveaux étant rencontrés chez les membres du Commandement des opérations interarmées du Canada (COIC), de la 1ère Division du Canada (1 Div C) et des unités directement contrôlées par la 1 Div C. La participation au CACEM a donné lieu à une augmentation modeste, mais significative sur le plan statistique, du degré de compréhension de la plupart des aspects relatifs aux opérations de niveau interarmées. Nos analyses ont également montré l’incidence sur la compréhension d’une expérience antérieure en IIMP/AE et de cours de pédagogie. Par exemple, l’augmentation de la compréhension était évidente chez les répondants qui n’avaient pas participé à une mission IIMP/; toutefois, on a observé une augmentation bien supérieure de la compréhension chez ceux qui avaient déjà participé à une mission IIMP/AE. Bien que les participants qui ont suivi le Programme de commandement et d’état-major interarmées (PCEMI) ou un autre équivalent du Collège de commandement et d’état-major (CCEM) fassent montre d’un niveau global de compréhension supérieur, ceux qui n’avaient pas encore suivi un cours du PCEMI ou du CCEM ont affiché une augmentation plus élevée de la compréhension. Nous discutons des répercussions de ces constatations et nous concluons par des suggestions d’activités et de travaux de recherche futurs dans le domaine. Le présent rapport traite plus en détail de l’exposé du résumé initial des résultats qui a été donné aux organisateurs du CACEM du JOINTEX13 4A1 à l’automne 2013.

Importance pour la défense et la sécurité

Cette recherche représente la première évaluation systématique de la valeur éducative du CACEM du JOINTEX et fournit de l’information cruciale pour comprendre le rôle de ce genre d’enseignement et pour justifier le très gros investissement en temps, en effectifs et en effort requis pour mettre sur pied des activités d’une telle intensité. Les résultats montrent que le CACEM du JOINTEX13 4A1 a atteint ses objectifs. La participation aux activités de la semaine a donné lieu à une augmentation modeste, mais significative au point de vue statistique, du degré de compréhension de plusieurs aspects des opérations de niveau interarmées. Plus particulièrement,

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on a constaté une plus forte augmentation de la compréhension chez les répondants qui avaient déjà participé à au moins une mission IIMP/AE, comparativement à ceux qui n’avaient pas participé, de même que chez ceux qui n’avaient pas encore suivi un cours du PCEMI ou un équivalent du CCEM par rapport à ceux qui avaient suivi ces cours. Dans l’ensemble, la constitution de réseaux professionnels durant le CACEM du JOINTEX13 4A1 s’est poursuivie de façon discrète à modérée.

Parmi les recommandations de suivi : évaluer l’incidence du CACEM du JOINTEX13 4A1 sur la compréhension et le rendement lors des étapes subséquentes du JOINTEX13; élaborer des mesures objectives de la connaissance et de l’efficacité, et les combiner aux autoévaluations; structurer certaines activités pour promouvoir le réseautage professionnel, peut-être surtout chez les civils.

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Table of Contents

Abstract ........................................................................................................................................ i Significance to Defence and Security ............................................................................................... i Résumé ...................................................................................................................................... iii Importance pour la défense et la sécurité ....................................................................................... iii Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................ v List of Tables .................................................................................................................................. vi Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................... vii 1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 1

1.1 The Contemporary Canadian Armed Forces Context ..................................................... 1 1.2 Joint Training ................................................................................................................... 2 1.3 JOINTEX ......................................................................................................................... 2

2 Method ...................................................................................................................................... 3 2.1 Participants ...................................................................................................................... 3 2.2 Procedure ......................................................................................................................... 5

2.2.1 Day 1: Pre-ACST Survey ................................................................................. 5 2.2.2 Day 5: Post-ACST Survey ................................................................................ 6

3 Results ....................................................................................................................................... 6 3.1 Pre-ACST Understanding of Aspects of Joint Operations .............................................. 6 3.2 JOINTEX13 ASTC: Changes in Perceptions .................................................................. 8

3.2.1 Changes in Level of Understanding of Aspects of Joint Operations ................ 8 3.2.1.1 All Pre-Post ACST Respondents (N = 49) ........................................... 8 3.2.1.2 1st Canadian Division Red Patch Units (N = 18) .................................. 8 3.2.1.3 Changes in Understanding levels as a Function of Prior CA JIMP

Deployment Experience ....................................................................... 8 3.2.1.4 Changes in Understanding Levels as a Function of Prior Joint-

level Education: the Joint Command and Staff Program or National Staff College Equivalent Attendance ..................................... 9

3.2.2 Changes in Perceived Effectiveness of Canadian WoG Missions .................. 11 3.3 Development of Professional Networks During JOINTEX13 4A1............................... 11 3.4 Ratings of Effectiveness of JOINTEX13 ACST Course Delivery Components ........... 12 3.5 Participant Comments and Recommendations .............................................................. 13

4 Conclusions and Recommendations ....................................................................................... 14 References ..................................................................................................................................... 19 Annex A JOINTEX13 4A1 Advances Command and Staff Surveys ......................................... 23 Annex B Participant Comments and Recommendations ............................................................ 31 List of Symbols/Abbreviations/Acronyms/Initialisms .................................................................. 33

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List of Tables

Table 1: Home Organization and Rank Demographics. .................................................................. 4

Table 2: Deployment Experience by Rank. ..................................................................................... 4

Table 3: Pre-ACST Level of Understanding of Aspects of Joint Operations. ................................. 7

Table 4: Changes in Level of Understanding of the Various Aspects of Joint Operations. ............ 9

Table 5: Understanding of the Aspects of Joint-Level Operations: Pre-ACST Differences and Changes in Level of Understanding as a Result of JOINTEX13 ACST for Those Respondents Who Had or Had Not Taken the JCSP/NSC Equivalent. ......................... 10

Table 6: Development of Professional Networks as a Result of JOINTEX 4A1. ......................... 12

Table 7: Post-ACST Course Delivery Effectiveness Ratings........................................................ 13

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Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Mr. Steve-Fritz-Millet for providing us with the opportunity to support the development of JOINTEX13 within the Canadian Armed Forces and Lieutenant-Colonel Ron Puddister, Deputy Exercise Director, JOINTEX13, Land Force Doctrine and Training System, who was the sponsor of this research study.

We are indebted to each of the respondents who took the time and effort to complete our surveys during a very busy week.

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1 Introduction

1.1 The Contemporary Canadian Armed Forces Context

The last decade has involved an operational tempo not seen since Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) participation in World War II. Missions have included a large commitment in Afghanistan as well as contributions in Haiti in the aftermath of humanitarian crisis, the Vancouver 2010 Olympics, the G8 and G20 Meetings, and in Libya (DND, 2012). These missions required an increased and more explicit coordination between the CAF and Other Government Departments (OGDs), notably the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Canadian Border Services (CBS), as well as local police departments and emergency services (Brister, 2011; Buchan, 2011; Hateley, 2011; Nossel, 2011). Within the CAF, this more explicitly integrated approach, variously termed the Comprehensive Approach to Operations (CA), Joint, Interagency, Multinational, Public (JIMP), or Whole of Government (WoG), has been referred to as an important enabler of current and future operations, and a key means to ensure mission success in an increasingly complex mission environment (Leslie, Gizewski & Rostek, 2008).

Despite many successes, the CAF’s participation in and lessons learned from these missions over the last 10 years has also illustrated the complexities and challenges associated with large-scale integrated missions (e.g., Government of Canada, 2008; Olson & Gregorian, 2007). For instance, it has been acknowledged that, even though the CAF regularly trains and conducts exercises at the formation and Task Group levels, these exercises are less complex than what would occur in an integrated mission (CDS Exercise Planning Guidance for JOINTEX I dated 26 Mar 10; Updated CDS Tasking Order for JOINTEX I dated 27 May 11). Moreover, it has been suggested that current CAF exercise planning doctrine does not adequately address the operational level of integrated operations (Officer Scheduling Exercise / OSE: Exercise Planning Guidance / EPG for JOINTEX I).

During this same period, the CAF has been undergoing significant organizational transformation, notably with the standing up of three new operational commands in 2006: Canada Command, Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM), and Canadian Operational Support Command (CANSOCOM). Recently, the activities of these three commands were consolidated under a single headquarters command structure: the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC). CJOC is now responsible for the conduct of all CAF domestic, North American, and international operations, in concert with national and international partners such as OGDs, international military forces and multinational organizations (CJOC BG 2012-035; http://www.cjoc.forces.gc.ca/wwh-qqc/mission-eng.asp). The objective of CJOC is to better coordinate the various activities of the three commands while reducing the number of personnel involved at the strategic headquarters level (CJOC Backgrounder, http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=4195; Leslie, 2011). CJOC’s mission, then, is to anticipate and conduct CAF operations and to develop, generate and integrate joint force capabilities for operations (CJOC BG 2012-035; http://www.cjoc.forces.gc.ca/wwh-qqc/mission-eng.asp).

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http://www.cjoc.forces.gc.ca/wwh-qqc/mission-eng.asp

http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=4195

http://www.cjoc.forces.gc.ca/wwh-qqc/mission-eng.asp

1.2 Joint Training

Joint training is viewed as an important way to better ensure a requisite level of coordination in a complex, integrated mission scenario. Joint training is hypothesized to be critical in developing a shared understanding of the roles and responsibilities and to encourage information sharing among units that will work together before hitting the stress and high risk of operations (e.g., Jenny, 2001; Mockaitis, 2004; Spence, 2002; Thompson & Gill, 2010). However, integrated training events are particularly time-consuming, difficult to schedule, and expensive to conduct. In addition, there have been few systematic assessments of such integrated training to help determine their utility. Together, there has been very little empirical justification of the value of these events outweighing their various costs.

Our past research efforts have been among the first to address this issue and have supported the utility and value of these training activities (see Thompson, Febbraro & Blais, 2011; Thompson, Febbraro & Holton, 2012; Thompson, Piasentin, Febbraro, Holton, Gill & Eustace, 2013). For instance, results of an initial study conducted within EXERCISE MAPLE GUARDIAN (Thompson et al., 2011) underscored the value of tactical-level training for complex, integrated missions. In this case, OGD participants noted that the training provided an invaluable opportunity to meet and get to know their military counterparts prior to deploying and that it provided a useful introduction to military procedures, chains of command, and acronyms prior to landing in theatre. However, civilian participants also noted that they would have valued a detailed ‘reading-in’package that contained information concerning the roles and responsibilities of their counterparts, so as to be better prepared to fully participate in the training.

A subsequent study explored the value of providing such organizational knowledge in the form of a two-day educational seminar hosted by the CAF and developed in concert with Canadian Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) (Thompson et al., 2012). The result was the Civil-Military Seminar, which was designed to provide a series of information briefings on the roles, responsibilities and organizational objectives of the various military and civilian organizations that might be called upon to work together in a humanitarian crisis. After the briefings, civilian and military participants had the opportunity to put this new knowledge of the other organizations to use in a day-long humanitarian crisis simulation. Feedback concerning the seminar was generally very positive, with both NGO and military participants finding the seminar to be beneficial in terms of developing a greater understanding of the roles and responsibilities, terminologies, and objectives of the other players that might work together in a complex mission context. A third study, which focused on the strategic level of operational planning, similarly supported the value of joint training exercises (Thompson et al., 2013). In all three studies, the interactions that occurred at the integrated training events were also expected to facilitate future collaboration between teams.

1.3 JOINTEX

Such integrated training is a central objective of JOINTEX, a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) mandated series of bi-annual exercises designed to develop and practice integrated operations at the operational level (CDS Exercise Planning Guidance for JOINTEX I dated 26 Mar 10; Updated CDS Tasking Order for JOINTEX I dated 27 May 11). JOINTEX13 was the first instantiation of this mandate and was designed to train a Canadian-led Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force Headquarters (CJIATF HQ) in the planning and conduct of coalition,

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full-spectrum operations in a JIMP environment (see http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-exercises/jointex.page) JOINTEX13 involved five discrete stages. The first three stages included an initial professional development seminar for General Officers and Flag Officers (Stage 1), a proof of concept event demonstrating that the CAF had the distributed technical capabilities to deliver such training in a synthetic environment (Stage 2), and a wargame (Stage 3) (Officer Scheduling Exercise (OSE): Exercise Planning Guidance (EPG) for JOINTEX I).

Stage 4 JOINTEX13 activities were the first to involve a wide range of participants in the primary training audience, and thus are the subject of the current research. The initial phase of these Stage 4 activities—JOINTEX 4A1—involved a week-long Advanced Command and Staff Training (ACST) event and consisted of educational briefings and discussions that were designed to increase participants’ understanding of the various areas of joint operations, prior to conducting a joint exercise. In essence, JOINTEX 4A1 was designed to be a professional development activity that provides personnel from participating organizations with an important foundational level of awareness, knowledge and understanding in order to better prepare them to perform effectively in the subsequent Command Post Exercise (CPX) and the culminating Final Training Exercise (FTE) of JOINTEX13 (Officer Scheduling Exercise (OSE): Exercise Planning Guidance (EPG) JOINTEX for I).

Our research team at DRDC Toronto was approached by JOINTEX13 4A1 ACST organizers to develop a self-report participant feedback mechanism on the value of the ACST course, in support of the lessons learned process for JOINTEX1. To this end, we sought to systematically assess participants’ initial level of understanding of the various aspects of joint-level operations, changes in level of understanding as a result of attendance at JONTEX13 4A1, and the extent to which JOINTEX13 4A1 afforded participants the opportunity to further develop professional networks with others that they would be expected to work with in future stages of JOINTEX. The results presented in this report represent an in-depth analyses of the initial findings provided to JOINTEX13 4A1 ACST organizers in the Fall of 2013.

2 Method

2.1 Participants

Ninety-two individuals completed an initial pre-ACST survey and 73 people completed a post-ACST survey, 19 of whom did not complete the pre-survey. Forty-nine individuals completed both surveys.

As Table 1 indicates, a range of organizations were represented in the survey, with 36 (39% of the sample) from 1st Canadian Division Headquarters (1 Can Div) / Red Patch Units / Special Operations Forces (SOF), 15 from CJOC, 13 from the Army and Air Force, respectively, seven from other Ottawa-based CAF organizations (e.g., Chief of Military personnel / CMP), six from the Navy, and two from OGDs2.

1 E-mail: DRDC Involvement in Evaluation of JOINTEX13 Stage 4A1, Mr. Steve Fritz-Millet to Dr. Megan Thompson, October 17, 2012. 2 Organizational groupings were developed in consultation with JOINTEX 4A1 trainers.


http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-exercises/jointex.page

http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-exercises/jointex.page

Table 1: Home Organization and Rank Demographics.

Organization N % OGD 2 2% 1 Can Div / Red Patch Units / SOF 36 39% Navy 6 7% Army 13 14% Air Force 13 14% CJOC 15 16% Ottawa-based CAF organization 7 8% Total 92 100 Military Rank Non-Commissioned

Master Warrant Officer 1 1%

Chief Warrant Officer 2 2% Junior Officers Lieutenant 2 2% Captain/Lieutenant (N) 9 10% Senior Officers Major / Lieutenant Commander 43 49% Lieutenant Colonel / Commander 26 30% Colonel/Captain (N) 4 5% Total 87 100%

As Table 1 also summarizes, 73 members of the military audience were Senior Officers, 11 were Junior Officers and two were senior Non-commissioned Officers (NCOs)3. Years of military service ranged from one to 40 years (M = 22.1). In addition, 35 of the 92 respondents (38%) had completed the Joint Command and Staff Program (JCSP) or other National Staff College (NSC) equivalent program or course, for instance a senior staff course or program taken in another country, and therefore had some prior introduction to joint operations.

Seventy-three respondents (i.e., 79% of those who completed the pre-ACST survey) reported that they had previously deployed on at least one mission where the CA/JIMP concept was employed. Forty-five of these respondents had domestic deployment experience (ranging from 1–6 missions), 70 had international deployment experience (1–8 missions), and 42 indicated that they had deployed both domestically and internationally. Table 2 presents the breakdown of number of CA/JIMP deployments by rank, showing that NCOs had the highest number of CA/JIMP deployments by far, with most Junior and Senior Commissioned Officers having an average of between two and four tours. As might be expected, Junior Commissioned Officers had the least number of tours.

Table 2: Deployment Experience by Rank.

Rank N Number (%) with deployment experience

Average number of deployments

Master Warrant Officer 1 1 (100%) 11.0 Chief Warrant Officer 2 2 (100%) 8.0 Lieutenant 2 0 (0%) 0 Captain/Lieutenant (N) 9 4 (44.4%) 2.0 Major / Lieutenant Commander 43 35 (81.4%) 2.9 Lieutenant Colonel / Commander 26 26 (100%) 3.8 Colonel/Captain (N) 4 2 (50%) 2.7

3 Two respondents did not indicate their rank.


Respondents who had previously deployed on a CA/JIMP mission reported having had, on average, a “moderate” level of interaction with other CAF units during those missions4. Perhaps not surprisingly, the least amount of interaction was reported with Naval personnel (M = 2.1, or “a little”) and the highest amount of interaction occurred with members of the Land Force (M = 4.3, or “a great deal”). In addition, the average level of interaction that occurred with OGDs, NGOs / International Organizations (IOs) or members of the local population during previous missions was rated as “moderate” (average ratings of 3.2, 3.2, and 3.3, respectively).

Most pre-ACST survey respondents reported feeling “somewhat” to “completely” prepared for JOINTEX 4A1.5 On average, members of 1 Can Div / Red Patch Units reported feeling more prepared (i.e., mean closer to 4/5 or “very”) than did personnel from the Navy, Army, or Air Force6, whose mean scores were closer to 3/5 or “somewhat” prepared. Those who had not yet deployed on a CA/JIMP mission also tended to report a more moderate level of perceived preparedness for JOINTEX 4A1, i.e., “some what prepared”.

2.2 Procedure

The questions in the two self-report surveys were developed in consultation with JOINTEX 4A1 trainer, Mr. Steve Fritz-Millet. The use of a pre- and post-ACST survey methodology enabled us to document the average level of understanding of the various capabilities that are part of a Joint Headquarters or its mission (e.g., the Joint Support Component, the contributions of civil partners and other countries’ militaries, the contribution of Space, Cyber, Intelligence and Targeting capabilities, and the role of local populations) at the beginning and end of the ACST and also allowed us to directly compare self-reported changes in the understanding regarding these capabilities over the course of the week.

Completion of the surveys was voluntary and participants were informed that they could skip any questions. Participant-generated Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) ensured anonymity and also allowed for the linking of pre- and post-ACST surveys. Participants could complete and return their surveys to either the DRDC researchers, JOINTEX 4A1 course staff, or to a drop box located outside of the auditorium where briefings took place.

2.2.1 Day 1: Pre-ACST Survey

Personnel arrived at the CAF base auditorium for JOINTEX 4A1 to find the pre-ACST survey on their seats. Immediately after initial introductions had taken place, the lead DRDC researcher briefly introduced the research team and outlined the research objectives and participant instructions, which were also included on the first page of the survey for participants to retain in case of further questions.

The pre-ACST survey gathered information concerning:

1. participant demographics;

2. past CA/JIMP experience;

4 Scale range: 1 = none, 2 = a little, 3 = moderate, 4 = a great deal, 5 = extensive. 5 Scale range: 1 = not at all, 2 = a little, 3 = somewhat, 4 = mostly, 5 = completely. 6 Recall that cell numbers by environment are small: Navy: n = 6; Army: n = 12; Air Force n = 12.


3. pre-JOINTEX 4A1 level of understanding concerning the various aspects of CJAITF and operational level warfare;

4. level of preparedness for JOINTEX 4A1 ACST; and

5. attendance at the JCSP or NSC equivalent.

2.2.2 Day 5: Post-ACST Survey

Prior to outbriefings and JOINTEX 4A1 ACST wrap up, the post-ACST survey was distributed. This survey contained questions concerning:

1. level of understanding concerning the aspects of CJAITF;

2. opportunities for networking with other aspects of CJAITF; and

3. an opportunity to add any comments.

3 Results

3.1 Pre-ACST Understanding of Aspects of Joint Operations

On average, respondents (N = 92) indicated a moderate pre-ACST level of understanding of the various aspects of, and organizations involved in, joint operations (see Table 3). Participants who completed both surveys (N = 49) tended to have the same average level of understanding of the various components of joint operations, reporting only slightly lower averages than the full pre-survey sample.

For the purposes of some analyses, we divided participants into two groups based on whether or not they had deployed on a CA/JIMP mission: the “Novice” group represented participants with no prior CA/JIMP deployment experience and the “Experienced” group represented those who had deployed on at least one prior CA/JIMP mission. Perhaps not surprisingly, the Experienced group tended to account for the moderate level of understanding, relative to the Novice group. To explore this issue further, and to even the playing field given the unequal sample sizes, in some cases we also made comparisons of the complete “Novice” group (n = 19) with a random sample of equal numbers drawn from the “Experienced” group. While all ratings were lower for the Novice group compared to the Experienced group, a direct comparison of average scores from the 19 Novice participants to a random sample of 19 participants who had deployed on a prior CA mission yielded only two statistically significant differences (p < .05) in terms of their pre-ACST ratings. Specifically, Experienced participants (M = 3.0) reported significantly greater understanding of the CA/JIMP concept than did Novice participants (M = 1.8), as well as greater understanding of the role of local populations in joint operations (with mean ratings of 3.0 vs. 2.2, respectively).

Due to the low numbers of respondents in each of the Army, Navy and Air Force groups, we combined the responses from respondents in these three environments with those from members of other CAF organizations (e.g., CMP), who we anticipated would generally have less knowledge of joint operations and lower initial understanding levels than members of 1 Can Div / Red Patch Units (who have been more exposed to the concept of joint operations to date). As Table 3 also indicates, the results of these analyses revealed that initial levels of understanding


were higher for 1 Can Div / Red Patch Units than for the other CAF environments for all 14 aspects of joint operations, and were statistically significantly higher for 11 of the 14 aspects (all p`s < .05).

Table 3: Pre-ACST Level of Understanding of Aspects of Joint Operations.

Pre-ACST level of understanding of…

All Pre-ACST Survey

Respondents (N = 92)

Pre-Post Survey


Random Subset of CA/JIMP

Experienced (N = 19)

CA/JIMP Novice

(N = 19)a

1 Can Div / Red Patch Units

(N = 36)

Air, Land, Navy, Other

CAF (N = 32)

M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)

CA/JIMP concept 3.0 (1.5) 2.8 (1.2) 3.0 (1.1) 1.8 (0.9) 3.5 (1.0) 2.6 (1.1)

Operational Art 3.1 (1.1) 2.8 (1.0) 2.9 (1.2) 2.4 (1.0) 3.4 (0.8) 2.7 (1.1) Operational level of war in a general sense 3.3 (1.0) 3.0 (1.1) 3.2 (1.1) 2.8 (1.1) 3.7 (0.8) 2.8 (0.9)

Operational level of war in the Canadian context 3.2 (1.0) 2.9 (1.0) 3.0 (1.1) 2.8 (1.0) 3.6 (0.8) 2.7 (1.0)

Role of CJIATF HQ 3.2 (1.1) 2.9 (1.1) 3.4 (1.4) 2.6 (1.0) 3.9 (0.9) 2.5 (0.8)

Contribution of Air component 3.2 (0.9) 3.0 (0.8) 3.1 (1.1) 2.8 (0.9) 3.4 (0.8) 3.1 (1.0)

Contribution of Land component 3.5 (1.0) 3.2 (1.0) 3.3 (1.0) 2.7 (0.9) 3.9 (0.7) 3.1 (1.0)

Contribution of Maritime component b 2.9 (1.5) 2.7 (1.4) 2.8 (1.6) 2.3 (1.9) 2.9 (1.5) 3.3 (0.7)

Contribution of SOF component 2.6 (1.0) 2.4 (0.9) 2.5 (1.1) 2.2 (1.0) 2.8 (0.9) 2.5 (1.0) Contribution of Joint Support component 2.9 (0.9) 2.7 (0.9) 2.5 (0.8) 2.4 (1.0) 3.0 (0.8) 2.5 (0.7)

Contribution of civilian partners 3.1 (0.8) 3.0 (1.0) 3.0 (0.9) 2.5 (0.9) 3.3 (0.8) 2.7 (0.9) Contribution of International Military forces 3.3 (0.9) 3.2 (1.0) 3.3 (1.1) 2.8 (0.9) 3.6 (0.8) 3.1 (0.9)

Contribution of Space, Cyber, Intelligence and Targeting 2.9 (1.1) 2.6 (1.0) 2.8 (1.1) 2.5 (1.1) 3.1 (1.0) 2.5 (1.0)

Role of local populations 3.0 (1.0) 2.8 (1.1) 3.0 (1.1) 2.2 (0.9) 3.4 (1.0) 2.6 (0.9)

Notes. Responses were made on a 5-point scale: 1 = none; 2 = a little; 3 = somewhat; 4 = a great deal; 5 = extensive.

Bold-faced font indicates statistically significant differences between 1 Can Div and the combined Air, Land, Navy, and other CAF groups at p < .05. a tests of statistical significance were made between this Novice group and a random sample of 19 respondents from the Experienced group. bDue to technical difficulties, questions referring to the Maritime component did not appear in the pre-survey. Although participants were alerted to this and instructed to add this category, not all people did, hence the small cell n’s for responses concerning the contribution of the Maritime component [Pre-ACST survey respondents (n = 20); those who completed both surveys (n = 12); CA/JIMP Experienced (n = 16); CA/JIMP Novice (n = 4); 1 Can Div (n = 9); Air, Land, Navy, Other (n = 4)].


3.2 JOINTEX13 ASTC: Changes in Perceptions

3.2.1 Changes in Level of Understanding of Aspects of Joint Operations

3.2.1.1 All Pre-Post ACST Respondents (N = 49)

A crucial metric in educational activities of this kind is the extent to which it results in increased understanding, in this case regarding the various aspects of joint operations. Results revealed that increased understanding did indeed occur as a result of participation in JOINTEX 4A1. As Table 4 shows, across all 49 respondents who completed both pre- and post-ACST surveys, virtually all areas showed small, but statistically significant, increases in levels of understanding, with the greatest increases in understanding occurring with regards to the role of CJIATF HQ and the contributions of the Maritime and SOF components, where increases reflected a full point increase in understanding (i.e., increases from three to four or from “somewhat” to “mostly” of understanding). Indeed, the only areas that did not achieve statistical significance pertained to the understanding of Operational Art and the contributions of International Militaries.

3.2.1.2 1st Canadian Division Red Patch Units (N = 18)

Comparison of pre- and post-ACST survey results for members of 1 Can Div / Red Patch Units also indicated that, in addition to higher pre-ACST understanding levels relative to other organizational groups, increases in understanding levels still occurred as a result of JOINTEX 4A1, with statistically significant increases occurring with respect to the roles of the Maritime and SOF components, and the contribution of Space, Cyber, Intelligence and Targeting.

3.2.1.3 Changes in Understanding Levels as a Function of Prior CA JIMP Deployment Experience

We had anticipated that those who had not yet deployed on a CA/JIMP mission (i.e., CA/JIMP Novices, N = 11) might report significant increases in understanding of the aspects of joint-level operations given that this group arguably had the most to gain from the ACST. Although the low number of respondents precludes definitive conclusions, as shown in Table 4, the average post-ACST survey ratings in each area for this group were higher than the average pre-ASCT ratings. Six of the 14 areas yielded statistically significant increases in understanding: understanding of the CA/JIMP concept; the contributions of Air, Land, and SOF components, as well as civilian partners; and the role of local populations.


Table 4: Changes in Level of Understanding of the Various Aspects of Joint Operations.

Pre-Post Survey



(N = 18)

CA/JIMP Novice (N = 11)

CA/JIMP Experienced

(N = 38)

Level of Understanding of … Pre

M (SD) Post

M (SD) Pre

M (SD) Post

M (SD) Pre

M (SD) Post

M (SD) Pre

M (SD) Post

M (SD) CA/JIMP concept 2.9 (1.2) 3.4 (0.9) 3.6 (0.9) 3.8 (0.7) 1.6 (0.7) 2.7 (0.8) 3.2 (1.1) 3.6 (0.8) Operational Art 2.8 (1.0) 3.0 (0.8) 3.2 (0.7) 3.2 (0.5) 1.9 (0.9) 2.6 (0.5) 3.0 (0.9) 3.2 (0.8) Operational level of war in a general sense 3.0 (1.1) 3.5 (0.8) 3.7 (0.8) 3.8 (0.6) 2.6 (1.2) 3.0 (0.6) 3.2 (1.0) 3.6 (0.7) Operational level of war in the Canadian context 2.9 (1.0) 3.4 (0.7) 3.5 (0.8) 3.7 (0.6) 2.5 (1.0) 3.0 (0.6) 3.1 (1.0) 3.5 (0.7) Role of CJIATF HQ 2.9 (1.1) 3.7 (0.8) 3.8 (0.9) 4.1 (0.8) 2.6 (1.0) 3.1 (0.7) 3.1 (1.1) 3.9 (0.7) Contribution of Air component 3.0 (0.8) 3.5 (0.9) 3.3 (0.7) 3.5 (0.8) 2.5 (0.7) 3.2 (0.6) 3.1 (0.8) 3.6 (0.8) Contribution of Land component 3.2 (1.0) 3.6 (0.7) 3.8 (0.7) 3.8 (0.9) 2.5 (0.8) 3.2 (0.8) 3.4 (0.9) 3.7 (0.7) Contribution of Maritime component a 2.7 (1.4) 3.5 (1.0) 2.5 (1.0) 3.8 (1.0) 2.7 (2.1) 3.0 (1.0) 2.7 (1.2) 3.7 (1.0) Contribution of SOF component 2.4 (0.9) 3.3 (0.8) 2.6 (0.8) 3.4 (0.9) 2.0 (0.9) 3.0 (0.8) 2.5 (0.9) 3.4 (0.8) Contribution of Joint Support component 2.7 (0.9) 3.2 (0.9) 3.0 (0.8) 3.4 (0.7) 2.3 (1.1) 3.0 (1.1) 2.8 (0.9) 3.2 (0.9) Contribution of civilian partners 3.0 (1.0) 3.5 (0.8) 3.3 (0.8) 3.8 (0.7) 2.3 (1.0) 3.0 (1.0) 3.2 (0.9) 3.7 (0.7) Contribution of International Military forces 3.2 (1.0) 3.4 (0.8) 3.6 (0.8) 3.6 (0.8) 2.6 (0.9) 3.1 (0.9) 3.3 (1.0) 3.5 (0.7) Contribution of Space, Cyber, Intelligence and Targeting 2.6 (1.0) 3.2 (1.0) 2.9 (0.7) 3.7 (0.9) 2.1 (0.9) 2.5 (0.7) 2.8 (1.0) 3.4 (1.0)

Role of local populations 2.8 (1.1) 3.2 (1.0) 3.3 (1.0) 3.4 (0.8) 1.9 (0.9) 2.5 (0.8) 3.1 (1.0) 3.4 (0.8)

Note. Responses were made on a 5-point scale: 1 = not at all; 2 = a little; 3 = somewhat; 4 = mostly; 5 = completely.

Bold faced font indicates statistically significant differences in pre- vs. post- survey understanding levels of at least p =.05. a Sample sizes were as follows: all pre-post survey respondents (n = 12); 1 Can Div / Red Patch Units (n = 4); Novice (n = 3); Experienced (n = 9).

Following this same logic, we had anticipated that deploying on at least one prior CA/JIMP mission (i.e., CA/JIMP Experienced, N = 38) would provide an advantage in understanding joint operations coming into the JOINTEX 4A1 ACST. We therefore expected that increases in understanding over the course of the ACST might not be as great for the Experienced group compared to the Novice group. As Table 4 indicates, however, statistically significant increases in understanding occurred in 11 areas for the Experienced group and, indeed, in more areas than was the case for the Novice group.

3.2.1.4 Changes in Understanding Levels as a Function of Prior Joint-level Education: the Joint Command and Staff Program or National Staff College Equivalent Attendance

As the JCSP or NSC equivalent courses are intended to provide some introduction to joint-level operations, we sought to determine the impact of this educational introduction. We explored this question in two ways for those who completed both the pre- and post-ACST surveys. First, we compared the pre-ACST understanding levels of those respondents who had completed the JCSP or an NSC equivalent (N = 17) with a random sample of 17 of the 30 respondents group who had not taken the JCSP or an NSC equivalent (and completed both surveys). As might be expected, the results summarized in Table 5 revealed higher average levels of understanding on 13 of the


14 aspects of joint-level operations for those who had completed the JCSP/NSC (M’s: 2.9–3.8), relative to those who had not taken these courses (M’s: 2.2–3.0), and t-tests confirmed that 11 of these differences were statistically significant (all p’s < .05).

Second, and of particular interest was whether there would be increases in understanding levels for these two groups as a result of their participation in the ACST. Results of paired pre-post t-tests, also presented in Table 5, first revealed that the overall level of post-understanding was greater for those who completed the JCSP/NSC compared to those who did not complete JCSP/NSC (M’s = 3.5–4.0 for the JCSP/NSC students vs. M’s = 2.7–3.5 for those who had not taken the JCSP/NSC).

Moreover, the results also highlight that the overall extent of learning that occurred during JOINTEX was greater for those who had not completed the JCSP/NSC. Specifically, for those who had completed the JCSP/NSC, increases in understanding occurred in all aspects of joint operations, save for operational art and the contribution of the Land component (which remained the same), with increases in the understanding levels of five aspects being statistically significant (all p’s < .05). At the same time, for those who had not taken the JCSP/NSC, increases in understanding occurred in each aspect of joint-level operations over the ACST. Indeed, statistically significant increases in understanding occurred for nine of the 14 aspects of joint operations.

Table 5: Understanding of the Aspects of Joint-Level Operations: Pre-ACST Differences and Changes in Level of Understanding as a Result of JOINTEX13 ACST for Those Respondents Who

Had or Had Not Taken the JCSP/NSC Equivalent.

Pre-ACST Understanding Levels

Changes in Understanding Levels Pre- Post-ACST

Level of understanding of…

Completed JCSP/NSC equivalent (N = 17)

No JCSP/NSC (Random

subset, N = 17)


No JCSP/NSC (Random subset,

N = 17)

M (SD) M (SD) Pre M (SD)

Post M (SD)

Pre M (SD)

Post M (SD)

CA/JIMP concept 3.4 (1.2) 2.3 (1.0) 3.4 (1.2) 3.8 (0.8) 2.3 (1.0) 3.1 (1.0) Operational Art 3.5 (0.7) 2.2 (0.8) 3.5 (0.7) 3.5 (0.6) 2.2 (0.8) 2.8 (0.6) Operational level of war in a general sense 3.8 (0.7) 2.6 (0.9) 3.8 (0.7) 3.9 (0.7) 2.6 (0.9) 3.0 (0.6)

Operational level of war in the Canadian context 3.7 (0.7) 2.5 (0.8) 3.7 (0.7) 3.9 (0.6) 2.5 (0.8) 3.1 (0.5)

Role of CJIATF HQ 3.4 (0.9) 2.7 (0.9) 3.4 (0.9) 4.0 (0.7) 2.7 (0.9) 3.4 (0.7) Contribution of Air component 3.5 (0.6) 2.7 (0.7) 3.5 (0.6) 3.9 (0.6) 2.7 (0.7) 3.2 (0.6) Contribution of Land component 3.8 (0.8) 2.8 (0.7) 3.8 (0.8) 3.8 (0.8) 2.8 (0.7) 3.4 (0.8)

Contribution of Maritime component a 3.0 (1.0) 3.0 (1.9) 3.0 (1.0) 3.7 (1.2) 3.0 (1.9) 3.6 (1.1)

Contribution of SOF component 2.9 (0.8) 2.2 (0.7) 2.9 (0.8) 3.5 (0.7) 2.2 (0.7) 3.2 (0.7)

Contribution of Joint Support component 3.2 (0.7) 2.5 (1.0) 3.2 (0.7) 3.5 (0.6) 2.5 (1.0) 3.2 (1.0)


Pre-ACST Understanding Levels

Changes in Understanding Levels Pre- Post-ACST

Level of understanding of…


No JCSP/NSC (Random

subset, N = 17)


No JCSP/NSC (Random subset,

N = 17)

M (SD) M (SD) Pre M (SD)

Post M (SD)

Pre M (SD)

Post M (SD)

Contribution of civilian partners 3.4 (0.7) 2.7 (0.0) 3.4 (0.7) 3.9 (0.8) 2.7 (0.9) 3.3 (0.8)

Contribution of International Military forces 3.5 (0.6) 3.0 (0.9) 3.5 (0.6) 3.7 (0.8) 3.0 (0.9) 3.2 (0.7)

Contribution of Space, Cyber, Intelligence and Targeting 3.1 (0.8) 2.5 (1.0) 3.1 (0.8) 3.7 (0.8) 2.5 (1.0) 2.9 (1.1)

Role of local populations 3.2 (1.0) 2.5 (1.0) 3.2 (1.0) 3.5 (0.8) 2.5 (1.2) 2.9 (0.9)

Notes: Responses were made on a 5-point scale: 1 = not at all; 2 = a little; 3 = somewhat; 4 = mostly; 5 = completely.

Bold-faced font indicates statistically significant differences between those who completed JCSP/NSC equivalent and those who did not at and between pre- and post-understanding (p < .05). aPre-post respondents who completed JCSP/NSC equivalent (n = 3); random subset of pre-post respondents who did not complete JCSP/NSC equivalent (n = 5); random subset of pre-post respondents who did not take JCSP/NSC equivalent (n = 5).

3.2.2 Changes in Perceived Effectiveness of Canadian WoG Missions

The pre-ACST survey respondents rated Canadian WoG operations (both domestic and international) as being “somewhat” effective. Similar average WoG effectiveness ratings were evident for 1 Can Div / Red Patch Units and for members of the Army, Navy and Air Force. Interestingly, those who had not yet deployed on a WoG mission also rated Canadian WoG missions as being “somewhat” effective, a rating that was similar to the average for respondents who had deployed on at least one such mission.

Twenty-eight respondents completed the pre- and post-ACST question assessing the perceived effectiveness of Canadian WoG missions, allowing for a direct comparison of these effectiveness ratings before and after the ACST. Paired t-tests indicated that there was no change in the perceived effectiveness level of Canadian WoG missions (M’s = 3.3 vs. 3.1, ns) as a result of ACST attendance.

3.3 Development of Professional Networks During JOINTEX13 4A1

The results presented in Table 6 indicate that, on average, across all respondents who completed the post-ACST survey (N = 73), the week’s participation had developed their professional networks across the groups represented at JOINTEX 4A1 ACST to a moderate extent. Not surprisingly, level of professional networking was lowest with the SOF component (M = 2.0) and highest with 1 Can Div Headquarters (M = 3.1).


Average results were quite similar across the various groups attending JOINTEX 4A1 ACST. For instance, mean ratings for networking by home organization tended to fall in the 2.5–3.0/5 range, suggesting that between a slight and a moderate amount of networking took place across the groups. On average, members of 1 Can Div / Red Patch Units appeared to have the highest levels of networking (means 3.0–4.0, or between moderately and a great amount of networking), which is perhaps not surprising as they were the largest group attending this JOINTEX activity, and indeed are the focus of future operational-level integrated missions.

Table 6: Development of Professional Networks as a Result of JOINTEX 4A1.

Has the ACST developed your professional networks within…

All Survey II Respondents

(N = 73)

OGD (N = 2)


(N = 18)

Air, Land, Navy,

Other CAF (N = 18)

CA/JIMP Experienced

(N = 38)

CA/JIMP Novice (N = 11)

M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)

1st Canadian Division Headquarters 3.1 (0.9) 4.0 (0.0) 3.0 (1.0) 3.1 (0.8) 3.2 (0.9) 3.2 (0.8)

Air Component 2.7 (0.9) 2.5 (2.1) 2.8 (0.9) 2.7 (1.0) 2.8 (1.0) 2.5 (0.9)

Land Component 2.7 (0.9) 2.5 (2.1) 2.8 (0.7) 2.6 (0.8) 2.8 (0.8) 2.8 (1.0)

Maritime component 2.6 (0.9) 2.5 (2.1) 2.7 (1.0) 2.4 (0.9) 2.7 (0.9) 2.6 (1.0)

SOF Component 2.0 (0.9) 2.0 (1.4) 2.1 (1.0) 1.8 (0.8) 1.7 (0.8) 2.1 (0.8)

Joint Support Component 2.6 (0.9) 2.5 (2.1) 2.7 (0.8) 2.2 (0.9) 2.1 (1.0) 2.6 (1.0)

Civilian partners 2.7 (0.9) 4.0 (0.0) 2.8 (1.2) 2.2 (0.9) 2.7 (1.1) 2.3 (1.1)

Space, Cyber, Intelligence, and Targeting 2.6 (1.0) 2.5 (2.1) 2.8 (1.1) 2.1 (0.9) 2.7 (1.1) 2.3 (1.1)

Note. Responses were made on a 4-point scale: 1 = not at all; 2 = slightly; 3 = moderately; 4 = greatly.

Also not surprisingly, networking was lowest with the SOF component (means 1.7–2.1 or just above “slightly”). Interestingly, lower networking was reported to have occurred with members representing the Joint Support component (means -2.1–2.7, or between slight and moderate levels). The amount of networking engaged in by those who had previously deployed on a CA/JIMP mission was about the same as the amount for those who had not previously deployed on a CA/JIMP mission. Finally, while the number of OGD respondents at this JOINTEX activity was quite low, the mean ratings for the OGD representatives were slightly lower than the majority of those for the military groups in terms of the development of professional networks (mean ratings for OGDs indicated between “slight” and “moderate” development of networks), except in the case of 1 Cdn Div HQ and Civilian Partners which had averages of 4.0 or “Greatly”.

3.4 Ratings of Effectiveness of JOINTEX13 ACST Course Delivery Components

Respondents who completed the post-ACST survey rated the effectiveness of the various learning methods used in the ACST, specifically the Subject Matter Expert (SME) briefings, the Specialist Breakout Syndicate Discussions and the Primary Training Audience (PTA)-driven critical reflection time. Mean scores for each, presented in Table 7, show that each component of the course delivery was perceived as being at least moderately effective by all post-ACST


respondents, as well as by the subset of respondents who completed both surveys. For both samples, the SME briefings were given the highest ratings (M`s = 3.8 and 3.9, respectively), relative to both the Specialist sessions (M`s = 3.2) and the PTA-driven critical reflection time (M`s = 3.0).

Table 7: Post-ACST Course Delivery Effectiveness Ratings. All Post-ACST

Respondents Pre-Post Survey

Respondents M (SD) N M (SD) N

SME briefings 3.8 (0.7) 70 3.9 (0.7) 48 Specialist Breakout Syndicate Discussions 3.2 (0.8) 56 3.2 (0.8) 39 PTA-driven critical reflection time 3.0 (0.8) 61 3.0 (0.8) 42

3.5 Participant Comments and Recommendations

Comments or recommendations for future ACST or other JOINTEX activities were provided by 20 respondents. Major themes and specific recommendations are summarized in this section, whereas all comments and recommendations suggested by participants are provided in Annex B.

It was clear in the written comments that the JOINTEX13 ACST was well received and considered to be quite well done. In particular, high praise was given to the SME presenters, whose candid contributions were considered invaluable. For instance, one respondent commented “Keep the briefs with commander of force missions talking openly with CHATAM house rules…Was excellent.” Another respondent indicated “The best presentations were the more focused ones—specifically dealing with the joint aspect (e.g., how the elements work together). Those that were more along the lines of overviews of responsibilities…not so much.”

While the joint aspect was clearly represented in the ACST, some participants recommended that future course iterations include a wider range of presenters that reflect other aspects of the JIMP construct; specifically, the multinational, interagency (DFAIT, CIDA, RCMP, High Commissioner / Ambassador) and public (international organizations) aspects of coalition operations. It was also noted by an OGD participant that “issuing terms of reference for OGD partners would help us to more easily understand where we fit in to the broader picture and what is required from us.” Similarly one CAF participant recommended “OGD briefs needed for CAF audience (ex: DFAIT/CIDA decision-making processes, etc.).”

Other recommendations for the future included the following, by one participant: “More scenario read in for major players, vice PD briefs, Command intent and CPG up-front, Guided discussions in smaller groups, vice death by PPT. Def’n & exposure to what Calian provides so as to assist ex play. CJIATF. Clear definition of what ‘Div time’ is on the schedule for all informed net themes of presentation—common themes were good, but not enough variety (SJS pres a throw away) after Bouchard briefing.” Another respondent recommended that there was a “Need [for] senior Div staff to spend more time explaining the mechanics of how the Div HQ functions. This would include an explanation of lines of communication as well as of the division of labour between Div staff and line units, as well as comms infrastructure that enables Joint operations and planning, Battle Rhythm, reports and returns due to HQ, etc.”


Another consistent theme was that there needed to be more notice given and administrative instructions for augmentees to the training. There were also two comments that the activity had “the most training value for the Primary Training Audience or 1 Can Div. and that there was less focus on other portions of the training audience.”

A final comment, presented here for consideration in the formulation of a CJOC way ahead, was: “The combined Air Forces has a CJFACC. The combined maritime forces has a CFMCL. Why does the land force not have a CJFLCC?? Is this doctrine sound or simply following the Afghanistan model??”

4 Conclusions and Recommendations

This research is the first systematic assessment of the educational value of JOINTEX13 4A1 ACST. This information is vital to understanding the role of such education and for justifying the very large investment of time, people, and effort required to mount such intensive activities. Our results begin to document the worth to the CAF of continuing to make such investments to support operational effectiveness in complex missions.

Results from this study largely indicated that the JOINTEX 4A1 ACST achieved its objectives. That is, across the respondents who completed both surveys, participation in the week’s activities resulted in small but significant increases in levels of understanding of the operational level of war with respect to:

• the CA/JIMP concept;

• the operational level of war generally and within the Canadian context;

• the role of CJAITF HQ;

• the contributions of the Land, Air, SOF, and Joint Support components;

• the contribution of civilian partners;

• the contribution of Space, Cyber, Intelligence, and Targeting; and

• the role of local populations.

Interestingly, and somewhat unexpectedly, those who had previously deployed on at least one CA/JIMP mission (i.e., the Experienced group) appeared to particularly benefit from the ACST, relative to those who had not yet deployed on a CA/JIMP mission (i.e., the Novice group). In this case, statistically significant increases in reported level of understanding occurred over the course of the week with respect to:


• operational level of war generally and in the Canadian context;

• the role of CHIATF HQ;

• the contribution of the Air, Maritime, SOF, and Joint Support components;

• the contribution of civilian partners;

• the contribution of Space, Cyber, Intelligence, and Targeting; and


• the role of local populations.

Indeed, we had originally anticipated that the ACST might be most informative for the Novice group. That is, with limited prior knowledge and no relevant practical experience, we felt that any information would be of great use to this group of people, resulting in the greatest increases in understanding. While noting the limitations of the small sample size (N = 11) in terms of drawing definitive conclusions, the results showed that this group of respondents also reported significant increases in their level of understanding of:


• the contributions of Land, Air, and SOF components;

• the contribution of civilian partners; and

• the role of local populations within a CA/JIMP mission.

Thus, while our expectations were generally confirmed with respect to this novice CA/JIMP group, it is interesting that the experienced CA/JIMP group had significant increases in understanding in more areas than the novice group.

We also explored the impact of prior CA/JIMP education on initial understanding and changes in level of understanding across the ACST. Perhaps not surprisingly we found that those people who had previously attended the JCSP or NSC equivalent indicated higher pre-ACST understanding levels, relative to those who had not attended such professional development courses. Perhaps even more importantly, however, while both groups reported significant increases in understanding levels as a result of participation in the ACST, the overall level of post-understanding was greater for those who attended the JCSP/NSC compared to those who had not, although the overall extent of learning that occurred during JOINTEX was greater for those who had not completed the JCSP/NCS. While the education results are interesting, it is worth noting that 15 of 17 respondents in the JCSP / equivalent group had also deployed on at least one prior CA/JIMP mission and this experience would also have contributed to the higher initial levels of understanding for this group. On the other hand, the majority of individuals who had not attended the JCSP/NCS had also deployed on at least one prior CA mission. If the majority of both groups had CA/JIMP deployment experience, then this tends to suggest that JCSP/NCS attendance provides an additional level of understanding of joint-level operations. Unfortunately, the current sample sizes do not allow us to directly determine the relative importance of education or experience alone versus the effect of education and CA/JIMP deployment experience together, and so this is a question left for future research to pursue. In general, however, these results may suggest that possessing at least some practical knowledge of CA (either from prior direct experience, education, or both) might be optimal for deriving the greatest value from the information presented in the ACST. Future research will be required to replicate these findings, and to identify any additional factors that might underlie relationships between deployment experience or prior education and increased post-ACST understanding.

Finally, the results generally revealed that participants felt that a slight to moderate development of professional networks (i.e., the 2.5–3.0/5) with other organizations had occurred during JOINTEX 4A1 ACST, and this was true regardless of home organization. Perhaps not surprisingly, the highest average levels of networking appeared to occur with members of 1 Can Div / Red Patch Units, the largest organizational group attending this JOINTEX activity and the PTA for JOINTEX13 ACST. Also not surprisingly, reported networking was lowest with the


SOF component. Slightly more surprising were the low levels of networking that reportedly occurred with the Joint Support component. The amount of networking engaged in during JOINTEX 4A1 was similar for both the Novice and Experienced groups. The low number of OGD respondents at this JOINTEX activity obviously makes conclusions particularly ill-advised at this time. However, the anticipated future importance of the integration of OGDs into joint operations warrants at least a mention of the results from the two OGD representatives. Overall, the mean ratings of these representatives were slightly lower than the majority of those for the military groups in terms of the development of professional networks (mean ratings for the OGDs indicated between slight and moderate development). Again, while it is too early and the sample is too small to draw conclusions, it may be that additional work may be warranted to increase opportunities for networking among the participating military units as well as between the military and OGD components in future JOINTEX activities.

Two other findings are also of note here. First, on average, respondents rated Canadian WoG domestic and international operations as being moderately effective, and these results were consistent across organizational groups regardless of whether the individual had previously deployed on a CA/JIMP mission. Further, this perception did not change over the course of the ACST. Certainly this perception of moderate effectiveness is consistent with the international interagency research and the lessons learned reports of CA missions, which have concluded that, despite individual successes, there is room for improvement in comprehensive operations (DeConing, 2008; Morcos, 2005; Olson & Gregorian, 2007; Patrick & Brown, 2007; Reitjens, 2008).

Second, respondents who had previously deployed on a CA/JIMP mission indicated that those missions were characterized by a moderate level of interaction with members of other organizations, with the least amount of interaction reportedly occurring with members of the Navy, the most with members of the Land Force, and a moderate level of interaction with members of OGDs or with members of local populations. The question remains as to whether this moderate amount reflects the optimum level of interaction among these groups for future missions.

Indeed, there is some discussion concerning what might be the optimal interaction level with the variety of diverse organizations that populate crowded JIMP mission spaces (e.g., Simms, 2011). For instance, some organizations may always request an arms-length relationship, especially with militaries, and in fact will require this distance to remain safe in hostile territory (Holton, Febbraro, Filardo, Barnes, Fraser & Spiece, 2011; McHarg & Coppock, 2011; Banerjee, 2011), while others, such as national-level OGDs, may well require more synchronization of purpose and methods with military partners. Misunderstandings and mismatches in these needs and perceptions among organizations can lead to tensions (Holton et al., 2011; DeConing, 2008; Morcos, 2005; Olsen & Gregorian, 2007; Patrick & Brown, 2007; Spence, 2002; Stephenson & Schnitzer, 2006; Winslow, 2002). In order to deal with this ambiguity, Fritz-Millet (2011) proposed an initial continuum of interaction that might be useful to characterize the various levels of interaction required to meet the needs of various organizations operating within a CA mission, including mutual situational awareness but avoidance in the case of some NGOs, through to collaboration among at least some WoG agencies. He suggested that the use of such a continuum might be particularly useful for militaries to use in order to characterize and understand the level of interaction that would typically occur with different agencies in the mission area. This understanding would reduce interagency tension and conflict in a mission area. Future research should also assess the role of such tools in facilitating interagency understanding and interaction.


The results of the current research are generally positive and this study represents only one of a handful of studies that have investigated the role and importance of this type of interagency training. However, it is only a beginning and it remains largely exploratory. One limitation is that it is based exclusively on self-reported levels of understanding of the various aspects of joint-level operations. While these self-reports may accurately reflect actual understanding levels, certainly there are times when self-reports can be suspect (Schwarz, 1999), especially if respondents try to answer questions in order to be viewed favourably by others (termed a social desirability bias, see Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee & Podsakoff, 2003). For instance, in the current research, this bias could manifest itself as higher self-reported understanding levels than is actually the case. However, research also demonstrates that such biased responding is less likely to occur when an anonymous questionnaire approach is used study (Mabe & West, 1982), as was the case in this study. As well, given the tight timeline for developing the inaugural course using various briefers, there was no opportunity to learn about the content of the briefs prior to the course. As such, we were unable to develop an objective knowledge measure of performance for this study. However, it is clear that assessing actual understanding of the aspects of joint-level operations via the use of objective knowledge measures would benefit future research in this area. Similarly, understanding the impact of such education should entail an assessment of the influence of activities such as JOINTEX 4A1 ACST on understanding and performance in subsequent phases of JOINTEX13 that focus on realistic operational-level exercises.

To the extent that providing or structuring opportunities for the development of professional networks is a goal of future JOINTEX 4A1 ACST, efforts should be made to continue to assess the level and effects of networking opportunities. Although the small number of OGD respondents in this study precludes making conclusions at this time, it was noted that the two OGD participants reported lower levels of network development than military personnel reported. Given the importance of interagency interactions to effective joint operations, future research might continue to monitor levels of network development and seek ways to increase networking opportunities between the military and OGD components in future JOINTEX activities.


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Thompson, M., Febbraro, A. & Blais, A-R. (2011), Interagency training for the Canadian comprehensive approach mission in Afghanistan. In M. Rostek & P. Gizewski (Eds.), Security operations in the 21st century: Canadian perspectives on the comprehensive approach (pp. 203–214), Montreal, QC & Kingston, ON: McGill and Queen’s University Press.

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Annex A JOINTEX13 4A1 Advances Command and Staff Surveys


Annex B Participant Comments and Recommendations

1. Presentations from multinational partners ie US, UK Forces, UN, would be valuable to understanding the coalition paradigm.

2. Presenters should be given guidance to structure their presgentations to focus their comments on how their specific observations impact the various staff ?? branches and processes (including OPP) vice generic observations.

3. A well balanced selection of presentations on the joint environment.

A well balanced program ref effectively ?? The time available to span the combined, joint, and interagency ??. Excellent speaker line-up - starting from the top. The value-added, unfortunately, has very much been for the core Div Staff when considering re PTA as a whole. ?? to need for Re mechanisms associated with bringing in Augmentation and early warning has contributed to this partial success.

Admin instruction for augmentees needed a bit earlier for booking of R&Q. Candidness of senior-level speakers was encouraging/appreciated - linking the concepts to the exercise of the tactical/operational level would be the follow on activity. Excellent exercise synopsis on Friday, AM by Col Chedder / Mr. Pentney - helped to focus the group on the next stage of the exercise.

Attended day 1 only.

Briefers need to adapt to the audience and avoid acronyms and overly specialized training. Excellent support during the ACST for admin, transport, etc.

Days were too long for such reflection. Should have been 0900 hrs so that you could do some exercise and be fresh for each day. I don’t believe this was much value in the “Level 2 / Secret” classification. Most discussion (all that I was privy to) in the general forum was safe enough for UNCLAS.

Excellent SME briefs focusing on Joint perspectives. As part of WofG, even though DFAIT engages RCMP for tasking, recommend them be included in briefings - would highlight security tasks. A brief from a country HC/AMB and his perspectives. Overall well done for 4A.

Issuing terms of reference for OGD partners would help us to more easily understand where we fit in to the broader picture and what is required from us. Other than that, this has been a great week of PD.

Keep the briefs with commander of force missions talking openly with CHATAM house rules…Was excellent. Especially getting the perspective from three different components.

Merci d’impliquer les Affaires etrangeres, tres utile pour nous tous!

More scenario read in for major players, vice PD briefs. Comd intent and CPG up-front. Guided discussions in smaller groups, vice death by PPT. OGD briefs needed for CAF audience (ex:


DFAIT/CIDA decision-making processes, etc.). Def’n & exposure to what Calian provides so as to assist ex play. CJIATF Order needed to be issued before 4A to ?? discussion. Bring in major IO (ex: Red Cross) to discuss mil/IO interface. Issue joining instructions for augmentees well ahead of seminar (not Fri prior). Clear definition of what “Div time” is on the schedule for all informed net themes of presentation - common themes were good, but not enough variety (SJS pres a throw away) after Bouchard briefing.

Need senior Div staff to spend more time explaining the mechanics of how the Div HQ functions. Lines of communication, planning ops and issuing orders to brigades, division of labour between Div staff and Div line units, comms infrastruture that enables Joint operations and planning, Battle Rhythm, reports and returns due to HQ, etc.

Overall well done and useful in broadening perspectives.

Stage 4A format is a good one for a person that is unknowledgeable in Joint matters. An intro is good, but more is required to train a staff officer, as an augmentee, on the Joint environment.

The best presentations were the more” focused” ones - specifically dealing with the joint aspect (eg: how the elements work together). Those that were more along the lines of overviews of responsibilities…not so much. I’m a pretty junior level officer and I’ve already been exposed to that sort of thing. Definitely, definitely, definitely get Dr. Olivie to speak at future activities.

The combined Air Forces has a CJFACC. The combined maritime forces has a CFMCL. Why does the land force not have a CJFLCC?? IS this doctrine sound or simply following the Afghanistan model?? Enjoyed the public affairs brief with the CP & TVA reporters. The PAO did not add a lot to the brief considering the context of the session - to get the journalist perspective on military operations.

There needs to be more time to discuss processes to include: lines of communications, rehearsal of concept drills. This week would have been more valuable had we blended PD with training (applying processes through Rehearsal of Concept Drills).

Very good briefings. I still have plenty of questions about our doctrine or lack of in this area. I am sure during jointex that it will become clear as we practise the concepts and chain of command. I hope that CJOC plays during the Ex as it will be worth the effort and an opportunity that should not be passed up in my view. Future activities should include continued up-dates on cyber as this field is always rapidly changing.

Well done!

Wrapping up briefs with a campaign design / plan primer vignette to bring it all together would help. Briefings by Senior Comds with operational experience was invaluable.


List of Symbols/Abbreviations/Acronyms/Initialisms

1 Can Div First Canadian Division ACST Advanced Command and Staff Training CA Comprehensive Approach to Operations

CAF Canadian Armed Forces CANSOCOM Canadian Operational Support Command CBS Canadian Border Services CDS Chief of Defence Staff CEFCOM Canadian Expeditionary Force Command CFMCL Combined Forces Maritime Compoenent CHATAM Chatham House Rules CIDA Canadian International Development Agency CJFACC Combined Joint Force Air Component Commander CJFLCC Combined Joint Force Land Component Commander CJIATF HQ Canadian Joint Inter-Agency Task Force Headquarters CJOC Canadian Joint Operations Command CMP Chief of Military Personnel CP Canadian Press CPG Commander’s Planning Group CPX Command Post Exercise DAIP Directorate of Access to Information and Privacy DFAIT Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade DIV HQ Division Headquarters DND Department of National Defence DRDC Defence Research & Development Canada DRDKIM Director Research and Development Knowledge and Information Management EPG Exercise Planning Guidance FTE Final Training Exercise HC/AMB High Commisisioner / Ambassador JCSP Joint Command Staff Program JIMP Joint, Interagency, Multinational, Public IOs International Organizations M Mean (or average) NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations


OGDs Other Government Departments OPP Operational Planning Process OSE Officer Scheduling Exercise NCO Non-Commissioned Officer NSC National Staff College PAO Public Affairs Officer PD Professional Development PIN Personal Identification Number PPT PowerPoint PTA Primary Training Audience RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police R&D Research and Development R&Q Rations & Quarters SD Standard Deviation (around the mean) SME Subject Matter Expert SJS Strategic Joint Staff SOF Special Operations Forces TVA French language television network (Canadian) UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UNCLAS Unclassified US United States

WoG Whole of Government


DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA (Security markings for the title, abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the document is Classified or Designated)

1. ORIGINATOR (The name and address of the organization preparing the document. Organizations for whom the document was prepared, e.g., Centre sponsoring a contractor’s report, or tasking agency, are entered in Section 8.) DRDC – Toronto Research Centre Defence Research and Development Canada 1133 Sheppard Avenue West P.O. Box 2000 Toronto, Ontario M3M 3B9 Canada

2a. SECURITY MARKING (Overall security marking of the document including special supplemental markings if applicable.)

UNCLASSIFIED

2b. CONTROLLED GOODS

(NON-CONTROLLED GOODS) DMC A REVIEW: GCEC DECEMBER 2012

3. TITLE (The complete document title as indicated on the title page. Its classification should be indicated by the appropriate abbreviation (S, C or U) in

parentheses after the title.) JOINTEX13 4A1 : Advanced Command and Staff Training Survey Results

4. AUTHORS (last name, followed by initials – ranks, titles, etc., not to be used) Thompson. M.; Piasentin, K.; Febbraro, A.

5. DATE OF PUBLICATION (Month and year of publication of document.) September 2015

6a. NO. OF PAGES (Total containing information, including Annexes, Appendices, etc.)

47

6b. NO. OF REFS (Total cited in document.)

29 7. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (The category of the document, e.g., technical report, technical note or memorandum. If appropriate, enter the type of report,

e.g., interim, progress, summary, annual or final. Give the inclusive dates when a specific reporting period is covered.) Scientific Report

8. SPONSORING ACTIVITY (The name of the department project office or laboratory sponsoring the research and development – include address.) DRDC – Toronto Research Centre Defence Research and Development Canada 1133 Sheppard Avenue West P.O. Box 2000 Toronto, Ontario M3M 3B9 Canada

9a. PROJECT OR GRANT NO. (If appropriate, the applicable research and development project or grant number under which the document was written. Please specify whether project or grant.)

9b. CONTRACT NO. (If appropriate, the applicable number under which the document was written.)

10a. ORIGINATOR’S DOCUMENT NUMBER (The official document number by which the document is identified by the originating activity. This number must be unique to this document.) DRDC-RDDC-2015-R198

10b. OTHER DOCUMENT NO(s). (Any other numbers which may be assigned this document either by the originator or by the sponsor.)

11. DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY (Any limitations on further dissemination of the document, other than those imposed by security classification.)

Unlimited

12. DOCUMENT ANNOUNCEMENT (Any limitation to the bibliographic announcement of this document. This will normally correspond to the Document Availability (11). However, where further distribution (beyond the audience specified in (11) is possible, a wider announcement audience may be selected.)) Unlimited

13. ABSTRACT (A brief and factual summary of the document. It may also appear elsewhere in the body of the document itself. It is highly desirable that the abstract of classified documents be unclassified. Each paragraph of the abstract shall begin with an indication of the security classification of the information in the paragraph (unless the document itself is unclassified) represented as (S), (C), (R), or (U). It is not necessary to include here abstracts in both official languages unless the text is bilingual.)

Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) involvement in complex JIMP (Joint, Interagency, Multinational, Public) or CA (Comprehensive Approach) missions such as the Vancouver 2010 Olympics and the G8 and G20 Meetings identified gaps in planning and execution at the operational level of integrated joint operations. In response, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) mandated JOINTEX, conceived of as a series of bi-annual exercises to develop and practice integrated operations at the operational level. The JOINTEX13 4A1 Advanced Command and Staff Training course (ACST) was a week-long series of briefings and discussions designed to increase understanding of important aspects of joint operations, with a goal of improving the operational effectiveness of participating organizations in subsequent phases of JOINTEX13. In support of the JOINTEX13 lessons learned process, pre- and post-ACST surveys were administered to assess changes in respondents’ level of understanding of various aspects of joint operations as a result of JOINTEX13 4A1 ACST, as well as their development of professional networks. At the beginning of the ACST course, the majority of participants indicated having a moderate level of understanding of the various aspects of integrated operations, with the highest levels occurring for members of the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC), First Canadian Division (1 Can Div) and of units that are directly controlled by 1 Can Div. Participation in the ACST resulted in small, but statistically significant, increases in levels of understanding of most aspects associated with joint-level operations. Our analyses also showed the impact of prior CA/JIMP experience and education courses on understanding. For instance, increases in understanding were evident for respondents who had not previously deployed on a CA/JIMP mission; however, even greater increases in understanding occurred for those who had previously deployed on a CA/JIMP mission. While the overall level of post-ACST understanding was greater for participants who completed the Joint Command and Staff Program (JCSP) or other National Staff College (NSC) equivalent, greater increases in understanding occurred for those who had not yet attended the JCSP/NCS. We discuss the implications of these findings and conclude with suggestions for future activities and research in this area. The current report expands on the initial summary of results presentation that was provided to the JOINTEX13 4A1 ACST organizers in the fall of 2013.

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La participation des Forces armées canadiennes (FAC) à des missions complexes IIMP (interarmées, intégrées, multinationales et publiques) ou à AE (approche exhaustive), comme lors des Jeux olympiques de Vancouver en 2010 et des réunions du G8 et du G20, a permis de cerner les lacunes dans la planification et l’exécution au niveau opérationnel des opérations interarmées intégrées. En réaction, le chef d’état-major de la Défense (CEMD) a ordonné la tenue des JOINTEX, conçus comme une série d’exercices semestriels visant à préparer et à mettre en pratique, au niveau opérationnel, des opérations intégrées. Le cours avancé de commandement et d’état-major (CACEM) du JOINTEX13 4A1, d’une durée d’une semaine, consistait en une série de breffages et de discussions conçus pour mieux faire comprendre les aspects importants des opérations interarmées, et ce, dans le but d’améliorer l’efficacité opérationnelle des organisations participant aux étapes subséquentes du JOINTEX13. À l’appui du procédé des leçons retenues du JOINTEX13, on a réalisé des sondages avant et après le CACEM pour évaluer le changement dans le niveau de compréhension des répondants à l’égard

de divers aspects des opérations interarmées à la suite du CACEM du JOINTEX13 4A1, ainsi que la constitution de réseaux professionnels. Au début du CACEM, la majorité des participants avaient indiqué un niveau de compréhension modéré des divers aspects des opérations intégrées, les plus hauts niveaux étant rencontrés chez les membres du Commandement des opérations interarmées du Canada (COIC), de la 1ère Division du Canada (1 Div C) et des unités directement contrôlées par la 1 Div C. La participation au CACEM a donné lieu à une augmentation modeste, mais significative sur le plan statistique, du degré de compréhension de la plupart des aspects relatifs aux opérations de niveau interarmées. Nos analyses ont également montré l’incidence sur la compréhension d’une expérience antérieure en IIMP/AE et de cours de pédagogie. Par exemple, l’augmentation de la compréhension était évidente chez les répondants qui n’avaient pas participé à une mission IIMP/; toutefois, on a observé une augmentation bien supérieure de la compréhension chez ceux qui avaient déjà participé à une mission IIMP/AE. Bien que les participants qui ont suivi le Programme de commandement et d’état-major interarmées (PCEMI) ou un autre équivalent du Collège de commandement et d’état-major (CCEM) fassent montre d’un niveau global de compréhension supérieur, ceux qui n’avaient pas encore suivi un cours du PCEMI ou du CCEM ont affiché une augmentation plus élevée de la compréhension. Nous discutons des répercussions de ces constatations et nous concluons par des suggestions d’activités et de travaux de recherche futurs dans le domaine. Le présent rapport traite plus en détail de l’exposé du résumé initial des résultats qui a été donné aux organisateurs du CACEM du JOINTEX13 4A1 à l’automne 2013.

14. KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS (Technically meaningful terms or short phrases that characterize a document and could be helpful in cataloguing the document. They should be selected so that no security classification is required. Identifiers, such as equipment model designation, trade name, military project code name, geographic location may also be included. If possible keywords should be selected from a published thesaurus, e.g., Thesaurus of Engineering and Scientific Terms (TEST) and that thesaurus identified. If it is not possible to select indexing terms which are Unclassified, the classification of each should be indicated as with the title.) Whole of Government Training; Comprehensive Approach to Operations; JOINTTEX

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