Joint Session - NERC€¦ · •Greg Ford –Georgia Systems Operations Corporation ......
Transcript of Joint Session - NERC€¦ · •Greg Ford –Georgia Systems Operations Corporation ......
Joint SessionOperating, Planning, Critical Infrastructure Protection
Committees
June 5, 2018 | New Orleans, LA
*All presentations are posted with the written consent of the presenters.
Standards Efficiency
Review and Standards
Grading ProjectHoward Gugel, Senior Director of Standards and Education
OC/PC/CIPC Joint Meeting
June 5, 2018
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Advisory Group
• Matt Goldberg – ISO-NE
• Greg Ford – Georgia Systems Operations Corporation
• Carol Chinn – Florida Municipal Power Agency
• John Pespisa – Southern California Edison Company
• Amy Casuscelli - Xcel Energy, Inc.
• Randy Crissman – New York Power Authority
• Ken McIntyre – NERC Executive Sponsor
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Role
• Define project scope and develop review criteria
• Solicit input for requirement candidate list
• Solicit candidates for review teams
• Evaluate review team product to ensure scope conformation
• Consider modifications to scope based on feedback
• Control parking lot list of items out of scope for this project
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Considerations
• 2016 and 2017 Standards Grading
• Incorporate experience from “Paragraph 81” effort and Independent Expert Review Panel
• Evaluate compliance history
• Formulate and vet candidate list
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Schedule
• Create project page on NERC website - Complete
• Advisory Team finalize scope, criteria, and approach – Complete
• Solicit industry experts for review teams – Complete
• Present scope and approach to Standards Committee –Complete
• Assemble review teams Complete
• Review teams submit draft SARs for comment (2018 Q2)
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Schedule
• Industry ballots on proposed retirements/modifications to standards (2018 Q3 – 2018 Q4)
• Propose balloted standards to NERC Board of Trustees – 2018 Q4 to 2019 Q1 (changes to standards to include consolidation, modification, and retirement)
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• Modeled after Independent Expert Review Panel template
Content
Quality
• Standing Team
Chairs of Operating Committee (OC), Planning Committee (PC), and representatives from NERC and Regions
Meetings facilitated by Chair of the Standards Committee (SC)
• Informed by stakeholder input
• Grades are input into PRs and attached to RSDP
Standards Grading
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• BAL-005
• BAL-006
• CIP-014
• FAC-003
• FAC-010
• IRO-001
• IRO-006
• IRO-008
• IRO-010
• IRO-014
• IRO-017
• MOD-020
• MOD-025
• MOD-026
• MOD-027
• MOD-031
• PER-001
• PRC-002
• PRC-015
• PRC-016
• TOP-002
• TOP-003
Standards Eligible in 2018
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• Standards Efficiency Review is focused on retirements
• Standards grading is a metric Informs periodic reviews
Allows before/after comparison
Difference
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Loss of Solar Resources during
Transmission Disturbances due to
Inverter Settings – IIOverview of Level 2 NERC Alert
Ryan Quint, Senior Manager, Advanced Analytics and Modeling
NERC Joint PC/OC Meeting
June 5, 2018
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Background: Blue Cut Fire Disturbance Report & Alert
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Canyon 2 Fire Disturbance Aggregate Solar PV Response
~15 minutes
-682
-74
-1011
Fault 1:682 – 0 = 682 MW
Fault 2:1011 – 74 = 937 MW
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Background:Canyon 2 Fire Disturbance
• Event occurred on October 9, 2017 Not a qualified event
Entities volunteered to work with ERO
• NERC/WECC event analysis
• NERC Inverter-based Resource Performance Task Force (IRPTF) technical support
• Published disturbance report in February 2018
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Second Level 2 NERC Alert:Industry Recommendation
• Published May 1
• Initial acknowledgement by May 8
• Responses to questions by July 31
• Distribution: BAs, GOs, GOPs, PCs, RCs, TPs, TOPs
• Drivers: Mitigating actions to ensure reliability
Data collection to understand extent of condition
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• Review the October 9, 2017, Canyon 2 Fire Disturbance Report for more detailed, technical information
• Key findings and recommendations: No erroneous frequency tripping
Continued use of momentary cessation (MC)
Ramp rate interactions with return from momentary cessation
Interpretation of PRC-024-2 voltage ride-through curve
Instantaneous voltage tripping and measurement filtering
Phase lock loop synchronization issues
DC reverse current tripping
Transient interactions and ride-through considerations
Recommendations
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Generator Owners of solar PV resources who are receiving this Industry Recommendation should:
• Recommendation 1a: Ensure dynamic model(s) accurately represent performance of solar PV
facilities.
Refer to the Modeling Notification published on this topic.
If inverters solar facility use MC, update dynamic model(s) to accurately represent MC.
Provide model(s) to TP, PC, RC, TOP, and BA
If no model(s) change required, written notification that previously provided model(s) accurately captures behavior of facility
Provide updated model(s) or written notification of no change to TP, PC, RC, TOP, and BA as soon as possible but no later than July 31, 2018.
Generator Owner Recommendations
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Modeling Notification: Momentary Cessation
• Existing models largely DO NOT accurately represent installed resource performance Identified issue that must be addressed
for models in planning and operations studies
Developed notification to help industry in modeling efforts
Guidance provided as part of second NERC Alert
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Generator Owners of solar PV resources who are receiving this Industry Recommendation should:
• Recommendation 1b: Work with inverter manufacturer(s) to identify changes that can be made
to eliminate MC to greatest extent possible, consistent with equipment capability.
Generator Owner Recommendations
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Generator Owners of solar PV resources who are receiving this Industry Recommendation should:
• Recommendation 1b (cont.): For inverters where MC cannot be eliminated entirely, identify possible MC
settings changes that result in:
a. Reducing MC low voltage threshold to the lowest value possible.
b. Increasing MC high voltage threshold to highest value possible, at least higher than the NERC Reliability Standard PRC-024-2 voltage ride-through curve levels.
c. Reducing recovery delay (time between voltage recovery and start of current injection) to smallest value possible (i.e., on the order of 1-3 electrical cycles).
d. Increasing active current ramp rate upon return from MC to at least 100% per second, unless specific reliability studies have demonstrated otherwise.
Provide proposed changes, and accompanying model, to TP and PC.
Provide proposed models, according to TP/PC procedures for modifying existing facilities, as soon as possible but no later than July 31, 2018.
Make proposed changes to equipment settings once TP/PC approves changes (based on Recommendation 6b).
Generator Owner Recommendations
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Generator Owners of solar PV resources who are receiving this Industry Recommendation should:
• Recommendation 2: Ensure inverter restoration from MC not impeded by plant-level control
ramp rates.
o Could add short delay before plant-level controller resumes sending power commands to individual inverters after voltage recovers
• Recommendation 3: Coordinate with inverter manufacturer(s) to set inverter voltage trip
settings using the following principles:
a. Region outside “No Trip Zone” of ride-through curves of PRC-024-2 does not state that it is a “Must Trip Zone”.
b. Inverter voltage trip settings should be based on physical equipment limitations to protect the inverter, as necessary. PRC-024-2 curve defines baseline level of voltage trip settings rather than specifying required trip settings.
c. Refer to Figure 2.4, Pg. 15 of the Canyon 2 Fire Disturbance Report for additional guidance on recommended transient overvoltage ride-through.
Generator Owner Recommendations
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Generator Owners of solar PV resources who are receiving this Industry Recommendation should:
• Recommendation 4: Consult with inverter PV panel manufacturer(s) to implement inverter DC
reverse current protection settings based on equipment limitations, such that resource will not trip unnecessarily during BPS high voltage transients.
• Recommendation 5: Provide responses to questions in NERC Alert to RC, BA, TOP, PC, and TP as
soon as possible but no later than July 31, 2018.
Generator Owner Recommendations
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Transmission Planners, Planning Coordinators, Transmission Operators, and Reliability Coordinators who are receiving this Industry Recommendation should:
• Recommendation 6a: Track, retain, and use updated dynamic model(s) of existing resource
performance supplied by GOs to perform assessments and system analyses to identify any potential reliability risks related to instability, cascading, or uncontrolled separation as soon as possible but no later than December 7, 2018, with notification to Regional Entity that these studies are complete.
For updated models received after July 31, 2018, assessments and system analyses should be performed within 120 calendar days.
TP, PC, TOP, and RC Recommendations
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Transmission Planners, Planning Coordinators, Transmission Operators, and Reliability Coordinators who are receiving this Industry Recommendation should:
• Recommendation 6b: Track, retain, and analyze proposed dynamic model(s) supplied by GOs
that indicate proposed changes (based on Recommendation 1b) to eliminate MC to the extent possible.
Based on analysis, approve or disapprove potential changes based on reliability risks related to instability, cascading, or uncontrolled separation as soon as possible but no later than December 7, 2018, with notification to Regional Entity that these studies are complete.
For updated models received after July 31, 2018, assessments and system analyses should be performed within 120 calendar days.
TP, PC, TOP, and RC Recommendations
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For TPs, PCs, TOPs, and RCs…
For GOs...
Reporting Instructions
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Data Submission Worksheet
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• Q1-Q6: Plant and Inverter Information EIA-860 Solar PV Plant Name, Plant Code, and Nameplate Capacity (MW)
Inverter manufacturer name(s), model number(s), and quantity
• Q7a-b: Individual Inverter Information Individual Inverter nameplate MW and MVA rating for each make and
model of inverter (MW)
• Q8: Existing inverter settings use MC?
• Q9a-d: MC Setting Information (if yes to Q8) Existing low voltage MC voltage threshold
Existing high voltage MC voltage threshold
Existing time delay before inverter begins injecting current after MC
Existing active current ramp rate when recovering from MC
Data Submission Questions
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• Q10: Can inverters COMPLETELY ELIMINATE use of MC?
• Q11: If No to Q10, can you MAKE CHANGES TO the MC settings?
• Q11a: If No to Q11, explain rationale.
• Q12a-d: Modifications to MC Settings (if yes to Q11) Proposed low voltage MC threshold
Proposed high voltage MC threshold
Proposed time delay before inverter begins injecting current after MC
Proposed active current ramp rate when recovering from MC
• Q13: Which models provided to TP, PC, RC, and TOP
• Q14: Complete "Voltage Protection" tab tables
• Q15: Verification of information sharing to RC, BA, TOP, PC, TP
• Q16: Additional comments
Data Submission Questions
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• Although this NERC Alert pertains specifically to BES solar PV resources, the same characteristics may exist for non-BES1 solar PV resources connected to the BPS regardless of installed generating capacity or interconnection voltage.
• Owners and operators of those facilities are encouraged to consult their inverter manufacturers, review inverter settings, and implement the recommendations described herein.
• While this NERC alert focuses on solar PV, we encourage similar activities for other inverter-based resources such as, but not limited to, battery energy storage and wind resources.
1 These resources do not meet the Bulk Electric System definition, and are generally less than 75 MVA yet connected to transmission-level voltage.
Clarification for Non-BES Resources connected to the BPS
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Large BES Solar Resources
Operating PV
> 75 MW
Unofficial - Illustration Purposes Only
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Operating PV
> 1 MW
BPS-Connected Solar Resources
Unofficial - Illustration Purposes Only
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Relevant Materials
• Disturbance Report: https://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/ea/October%209%202017%20Canyon%202%20Fire%20Disturbance%20Report/900%20MW%20Solar%20Photovoltaic%20Resource%20Interruption%20Disturbance%20Report.pdf
• NERC Alerts Page: https://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/bpsa/Pages/Alerts.aspx
• Level 2 NERC Alert – Loss of Solar Resources II: https://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/bpsa/Alerts%20DL/NERC_Alert_Loss_of_Solar_Resources_during_Transmission_Disturbance-II_2018.pdf
• Data Submission Worksheet: https://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/bpsa/Alerts%20DL/Data_Submission_Worksheet-IId.xlsx
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Ryan Quint
Senior Manager, Advanced Analytics and Modeling
Office (202) 400-3015
Cell (202) 809-3079
State of Reliability ReportStatus and Key Findings
David Till, Senior Manager, Performance Analysis
OC/PC/CIPC Joint Meeting in New Orleans
June 5, 2018
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SOR 2018 Collaboration
• Thanks to the technical committees and their subcommittees, task forces, and working groups such as PAS, RS, EAS, SMWG, and IRPTF for developing SOR 2018 from CY2017 events and data!
• PAS in its special SOR leadership role had unrestricted access to edit SOR 2018 until the document was brought “in house” for NERC Publications’ review for tone and style .
• NERC OC/PC/CIPC reviewed the document early and suggested revisions. (Comments were acknowledged by email.)
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• NERC provided the final draft copy to the OC/PC/CIPC on June 1 for review, and an OC/PC email vote for endorsement by noon, June 8.
• NERC sent the same embargoed copy to its Board of Trustees and MRC for comment on June 1; responses are being received.
• NERC’s Board of Trustees will vote on acceptance June 12.
SOR 2018 Collaboration Status
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Key Finding 1: Increased Resilience
Wind Event vs. Water Event
Hurricane Ike - 2008 Wind Hurricane Harvey – 2017 Water
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Category 5 Events
• Hurricane Harvey’s water flooded Houston and would not quit.
• Hurricane Harvey’s winds hit South Texas. 85 substations damaged
225 transmission line outages
Over 850 transmission line structures downed/damaged
Over 6000 distribution poles downed/damaged
• Hurricane Irma was the largest impact storm to ever hit Florida. A record 4.45 million customers out of service for Florida Power & Light
Previous record was 3.24 million during Hurricane Wilma in 2005
Irma restoration took only 10 days versus 18 days during Wilma
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• Drones hastened restoration following both Harvey and Irma with unexpected versatility.
• Mutual Assistance agreements provided essential equipment and material for both Harvey and Irma restorations.
• Florida and its utilities shortened Irma restoration time with strong, prior investment in system hardening.
Event Analysis Key Findings & Recommendations
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• Continuing collaborative work between industry, vendors, and regulators to assure that inverter technology provides maximum reliability
• Blue Cut Fire event resulted in frequency miscalculation Alert
• Canyon 2 Fire resulted in sub-cycle, overvoltage operation (inverter output cessation) Alert
• Inverter-based Resource Performance Task Force continuing to identify and mitigate issues
Key Finding 2: Inverter-based Generation Presents Emerging Risk
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• In 2017, there were no reported cyber or physical security incidents that resulted in a loss of load.
• Nonetheless, grid security, particularly cyber security, is an area where NERC and the industry must continually improve defenses as threats continue to rapidly evolve.
Key Finding 3: No Loss-Of-Load for Cyber or Physical Security Events
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Key Finding 4: 200 kV+ Transmission Outages Less Frequent
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Continued Decline in Average Transmission Outage Severity
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• Risk of UFLS activation monitored in Arresting Period
• Risk of second frequency event monitored in Stabilizing Period
• Frequency Response results acceptable in 2017; varied by interconnection
Key Finding 5: Frequency Response
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Key Finding 6: Misoperation Rates Continuing to Decline
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Key Finding 6: Misoperation Rates Continuing to Decline
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GMD Data RequestNERC Rules of Procedure Section 1600
Ian Grant, Tennessee Valley Authority
Joint OC/PC/CIPC Meeting
June 5, 2018
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• In 2016 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) directed actions to continue addressing risks from geomagnetic disturbances (GMD) Implementation of GMD Vulnerability Assessments (TPL-007-1)
Revisions to TPL-007-1 (TPL-007-2 filed in January 2018)
Additional research
Data collection
• NERC developed a Rules of Procedure Section 1600 data request with GMD Task Force (GMDTF) and stakeholder input
• NERC, EPRI and GMDTF are conducting a research plan to meet Order No. 830 research objectives
FERC Order No. 830
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• Order No. 830 directs NERC to collect GMD data to “improve our collective understanding” of GMD risk Includes GIC and Magnetometer
data
• NERC is to make data available to the public
Data Collection and Availability
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• Data will be collected for GMD events that meet or exceed KP-7 Low burden on reporting entities: 200 events per 11-year solar cycle
NERC will designate specific collection periods (date/time)
• Transmission Owners and Generator Owners with GIC and/or magnetometer data are applicable reporting entities Reports are not required for entities that do not collect data
Non-U.S. entities are not obligated to participate but are encouraged
Reporting on behalf of applicable entities is acceptable (e.g., EPRI)
• NERC will make data available to researchers
GMD Data Request Overview
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• September 2017 | Draft Presented at GMDTF Meeting
• December 2017 | Planning Committee Authorized Posting
• January – March 2018 | 45-day comment period Comments were provided by over 30 stakeholders
• Comments, responses, and revisions to the GMD Data Request are posted on GMDTF Project Page
Development Steps
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• Seeking PC endorsement of the GMD Data Request in June
• Next steps pending PC endorsement of the GMD Data Request August 2018 | Request NERC Board Approval
Q3 2018 | GMDTF and NERC Staff begin developing a Data Reporting Instructions (DRI)
• NERC staff will continue development of information technology application for collecting GMD Data
Data Request Status
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• NERC Rules of Procedure (RoP) Section 1600 Within the United States, NERC and Regional Entities may request data or
information that is necessary to meet their obligations under Section 215 of the Federal Power Act, as authorized by Section 39.2(d) of the Commission’s regulations, 18 C.F.R. § 39.2(d). (P 1601)
• Data Request Elements Describe why the data is needed, its use and collection method
Identify functional entity(ies)
Estimate the burden on reporting entities
Establish reporting criteria or schedule
• Process 45-day public comment period on NERC’s request
NERC Board approval required to issue data request to entity(ies)
Data Request Background
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In addition, the Commission directs NERC, pursuant to Section 1600 of the NERC Rules of Procedure, to collect GIC monitoring and magnetometer data from registered entities[*] for the period beginning May 2013, including both data existing as of the date of this order and new data going forward, and to make that information available.
-Order No. 830 P 89
*does not apply to non-U.S. Entities
What Data Will Be Requested
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…as a general matter, the Commission does not believe that GIC monitoring and magnetometer data should be treated as Confidential Information pursuant to the NERC Rules of Procedure. (P 89)
…Notwithstanding [the Commission’s] findings here, to the extent any entity seeks confidential treatment of the data it provides to NERC, the burden rests on that entity to justify the confidential treatment. (P 95)
Order No. 830 on Data Confidentiality
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• Critical Energy Infrastructure Information is defined in NERC RoPSection 1501 as
specific engineering, vulnerability, or detailed design information about proposed or existing Critical Infrastructure that (i) relates details about the production, generation, transportation, transmission, or distribution of energy; (ii) could be useful to a person in planning an attack on Critical Infrastructure; and (iii) does not simply give the location of the Critical Infrastructure.
• Data reporting requirement provides only general location information Nearest tenth of a degree ~ 5-7 mile resolution
Basis for Data Confidentiality Approach
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[The Commission] also direct NERC, pursuant to Sections 1500 and 1600 of the NERC Rules of Procedure, to collect and make GIC monitoring and magnetometer data available. We determine that the dissemination of GIC monitoring and magnetometer data will facilitate a greater understanding of GMD events that, over time, will improve Reliability Standard TPL-007-1. The record in this proceeding supports the conclusion that access to GIC monitoring and magnetometer data will help facilitate GMD research, for example, by helping to validate GMD models.
- Order No. 830 P 93
Purpose of Collecting GMD Data