THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES

A STUDY OF THE

ETHICS OF SPINOZA

HENRY FROWDE,

M.A.

PUBLISHER XO THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

LONDON, EDINBURGH

NEW YORK

A STUDY OF THE

ETHICS OF SPINOZA(ETIIICA

ORDINE GEOMETRICO

DEMONSTRATA)BY

HAROLD

H.

JOACHIM

FELLOW AND TUTOR OF MKRTON COLLEGE, OXFORD

OXFORD AT THE CLARENDON PRESS1901

OXFORDPRINTED AT THE CLARENDON PRESSBY HORACE HART,M.A.

PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY

urn.

PREFACEis a work which presents many perto the interpreter. Barren abstractions, plexities tortured into the form of 'geometrical demonstra-

The

Ethics

tions

'

by a pedanticit:

logic,

larger portion of

appear to constitute the and the remainder has been

taken

for poetry pure and simple. It has seemed to annihilate the first with a few catchwords easy

of criticism, dismissing the second as the dreams of

a mystic.that the

In the following exposition I have tried to interpret the Ethics as a whole. I have assumed''

imagination which breathe through its pages are as in a great thinker they must be in the service of a mind, which is pe-

poetry

and

'

'

'

dantic' only in its endeavour to think clearly and The so-called mysticism must, reason logically. I am convinced, be read as part and parcel of''

Spinoza's metaphysical views the earlier parts of the Ethicsin the light of the

;

and the God of must be interpreted'

'

whole work.difficulties;

In the course of

my

exposition

themselves

many upon me

but I

and criticisms forced have endeavoured so to

arrange their discussion that it may interrupt the statement of Spinoza's views as little as possible.

*7

/?

A

'

vi

PREFACEWhereseemed important, I have traced the relation between the theories of Spinozait;

historical

and those of Descartesattempt to give

but I have

made no

philosophy. sketch to be of value, and for a complete exposition I

a general sketch of the latter's It would have to be more than a

have no space.

In the desire to avoid needless obscurity I have sometimes passed over the views of well-known

commentatorswill

in silence,

and

I

hope this omission

not be attributed either to ignorance or to

conceit.

WhereverIlist

it

was'

possible for

me

to trace

a creditor'

have acknowledgedof

my

debts,

and

in

the appendedtionsI

References and Abbrevia-

have mentioned those commentaries which

have helped me most. In common with all English students of Spinoza, I am greatly indebted to the works of Sir FrederickPollock, the late Principal Caird,

and the

late Dr.

Martineau

;

and

my

obligation does not

end whereBut, so far

myas I

interpretation differs from theirs.

aware, no English book appeals only to readers who wish to make a special study ofSpinoza's philosophy and I venture to publish this attempt at a critical exposition of the Ethics in the hope that, whatever its shortcomings, it may;

am

a gap. I owe the interpretation of two of Spinoza's geometrical illustrations (below, p. 32 note 2 andhelp tofill

p.

223 note 2) to the kind help of

my

colleague,

PREFACE

vii

Mr. A. L. Dixon, Fellow and Tutor of Merton and I am glad to have this opportunity College of thanking my friend, Dr. Robert Latta, Professor:

of Moral Philosophy in the University of Aberdeen, who read nearly the whole of this book before it

was and

printed,

and made many valuable suggestions

criticisms.

TABLE OF CONTENTSPAGES

INTRODUCTIONThe Tractatus deIntellectus

1-13Emendatione.

The Geo-

metrical Method.

BOOK

I.

THE GENEEAL NATURE OF REALITYCHAPTER1.

.

14-97

I

MEANING OF THE ANTITHESES(i)(ii)

:

Substance and ModeSubstance and Attribute

14-1717-27

2.

INFINITE

AND INDEFINITE

27-35

CHAPTERREALITY AS A WHOLE OR GOD1.

II

36-6436-38' '

SUBSTANCEIS'

IS'

GOD

2.

THE ENS PERFECTISSIMUM OR REALISGOD INCLUDES ALL AFFIRMATIVE BEING SIMUM::

SUBSISTS OF INFINITE ATTRIBUTES3.

.

.

.

38-4 1

SOME

OF GOD'S ONE, UNIQUE, WHOLE, SIMPLE, INDETERMINATE, ANDIS

PROPERTIES.

GOD

CONCRETE

41-45

CONTENTSPAGES4.

NATURE, VALIDITY, AND VALUE OF SPINOZA'S ARGUMENTS TO PROVE THAT GOD EXISTS OF NECESSITY

45-5858-64

5.

THE CAUSALITY OF GOD

CHAPTER

III

GOD AND HIS ATTRIBUTES (NATURA NATURANS)1.

65-72

THE ATTRIBUTES AS LINES OF FORCE,' OR FORMS IN WHICH GOD'S OMNIPOTENCE MANIFESTS ITS FREE CAUSALITY TO AN INTELLIGENCE'

.

.

65-67

2.

THE ATTRIBUTE OF EXTENSION.DESCARTES

SPINOZA AND67-69

3.

THE INFINITY OF ATTRIBUTES. THE ATTRIBUTE OF THOUGHT. GOD IS SELF-CONSCIOUS..

69-72

CHAPTER

IV..

GOD AND HIS MODES (NATURA NATURATA)1.

73-97

DEGREES OF PERFECTION OR REALITY

.

.

73~74

2.

FORMAL STATEMENT OF THE ORDER OF THE MODAL SEQUENCE(i)

74~82

Immediate and Mediate infinite and eternal modesParticular things

(ii)

3.

MODAL SYSTEM OF THE ATTRIBUTE OF EXTENSION. WHOLE AND PARTS

....I

82-93 93~97

4.

MODAL SYSTEM OF THE ATTRIBUTE OF THOUGHT

APPENDIX TO BOOKDIFFICULTIES AND CRITICISMS

98-II9'

NOTE ON NATURA NATURATA PRESENTATION'

AND THE WORLD OFII9~I22

CONTENTS

xi

BOOKTHE HUMAN MIND

IIPAGES 123-219

CHAPTERSOUL AND BODY1.

I

123-145I23-I25.

INTRODUCTION

2.3.

4.

THE HUMAN MIND AS THE IDEA OF THE BODY CONSCIOUSNESS AND SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS SOME DIFFICULTIES.

125-I32

.

I32-I34I34-I45

CHAPTER THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE1.

II

146-185

'idea' and 'ideatum'

146-152

2.

the three stages of human progress as a development of knowledgeImaginatio (ii) Ratio(i)

....

152-185

152-170 170-180180-185

(iii)

Scientia Intuitiva

CHAPTER

III

THE EMOTIONAL NATURE OF MAN'

....

186-219

PREFATORY NOTE ON THE TRANSLATION OF THE TERM AFFECTUS l86 1. METHOD OF TREATMENT I87-I90 2. THE 'CONATUS' I9I-I93 3. WILL AND DESIRE I93~I99'

4.5.

ACTION AND PASSION'AFFECTUS' AND 'IDEA.' PASSIVE EMOTIONS

I99~2CO

THE THREE PRIMARY201-208.

6.7.

DERIVATIVE AND COMPLEX PASSIVE EMOTIONSACTIVE EMOTIONS

2o8-2l8 2l8-2I9

APPENDIX TO BOOKESSENCE AND EXISTENCE'

II

FREEDOMIDEAS

THE CONATUS 'CUPIDITAS' TELEOLOGY EMOTIONAL AND COGNITIVE22O-237

'

xii

CONTENTS

THE IDEAL LIFE

BOOK III FOR MAN

..... .

PAGES 238-309

CHAPTER I MEANING OF A STANDARD OF MORAL VALUECHAPTER':

238-254

II

MAN AS A MEMBER OF THE 'COMMUNIS ORDO THE BONDAGE OF MAN NATURAE. . .

255-263

1.

THE STRENGTH OF THE PASSIVE EMOTIONS, AND THE RELATIVE POWERLESSNESS OF THE ACTIVEEMOTIONS255-261

2.

THE LIFE OF MAN AS INTELLECTUALLY AND MORALLY IN BONDAGE

261-263

CHAPTER III THE MORAL LIFE AS THE LIFE OF REASON1.

.'

.

264-291264-268

INDIVIDUALITY IN THE GRADE OF

'

RATIO'

.

2.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LIFE OF 'VIRTUE,' OR 'FREEDOM'

REASON,*268-273..

3.

APPLICATION OF THE ABOVE PRINCIPLES

273-280280-29I

4.

THE POWER OF REASON

CHAPTER IV THE IDEAL LIFE AS CONSCIOUS UNION WITH GOD1.

292-309

INTRODUCTION

292-294'

2.3.

THE CONCEPTION OF ETERNITY THE ETERNITY OF THE HUMAN MIND

'

,

.

.

294-298298-306

.

.

.

4.

REVIEW

306-309

REFERENCES AND ABBREVIATIONS1.

DESCARTES.

Desc. Medit.

= Renati=

Des Cartes Meditationes de Prima PhiloDes Cartes Principia Philosophiae.

sophia. Renati Desc. Princ.

is given, the reference is to the Latin edition of Descartes' works, published at Frankfort in

Where

the page

1692. Desc. Epp. Renati

=

Des Cartes Epistulae.2.

SPINOZA.of Spinoza.

WlL=VanTr. P.

Vloten and Land's edition

Two

volumes.

The Hague,Politicus.

1882.

Tdle = Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione.

= Tractatus

Tr.

Th.= Tractatus

Theologico-Politicus.

Ph. D. = Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae (Spinoza's version). The section-numbers referred C. M. =Cogitata Metaphysica.

Epp. = Epistulae.

to are those of Bruder's edition of Spinoza.

E.=Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata. K. V. = Korte Verhandeling van God, de Mensch, enWelstand.

deszelfs

K. V.

S.

= Sigwart's3.

German

translation

of

the

Korte Ver-

handeling.

COMMENTATORS ON SPINOZA.TJeber die beidcn ersten

Avenarius= Richard Avenarius,

PhasenParis,

des Spinozischen Pantheismus, &c.

Leipzig, 1868.

Brunschvi eg = Professor Leon Brunschvicg, Spinoza.1894.

xiv

REFERENCES AND ABBREVIATIONS

Busolt=Dr. GeorgBusolt, Die Grundziige der Erkenntnisstheorie und Metaphysik Spinoza's. Berlin, 1875. Caird = Principal John Caird, LL.D., Spinoza. Edinburgh,1888.

Camerer=Theodor Camerer, Die Lehre1877. Elbogen Dr.

Spinoza's.

Stuttgart,

=

Ismar Elbogen, Der Tractatus de

intellectus enien-

datione, &c.

Erdmann,%

Breslau, 1898. ii=Dr. J. E. Erdmann, Grundriss der Geschichte dervol.

Philosophic

Erdmann, V. A.

=

ii. Berlin, 1878. Dr. J. E. Erdmann, Vermischte Aufsatzc.

Leipzig, 1846.

Grzymisch = Dr. Siegfried Grzymisch, Spinoza's Lehren von der Breslau, 1898. Ewigkeit und Unsterblichlceit. Joel = Dr. M. Joel, Zur Genesis der Lehre Spinoza's. Breslau,1871.

Loewe = Dr. Johann Heinrich Loewe, Die&c. (with

Philosophie Fichte's,

an appendix on Spinoza's conception of God).

Stuttgart, 1862.

Martineau = Dr. James Martineau,edition.

A

Study of Spinoza.

Third

London, 1895.Second edition.

Pollock = Sir Frederick Pollock, Spinoza: his Life and Philosophy. Sigwart, Tr.

= Dr.

London, 1899.

Christoph Sigwart, Spinoza's neuentdeckterGotha, 1866.C.

Tractat von Gott, &c.

Sigwart, Sp.

=Dr. H.

W.

Sigwart, Der Spinozismus,als

&c.

Tubingen, 1839. Thomas = Dr. Karl Thomas,Konigsberg, 1840.

Spinoza

Metaphysiker,

&c.

Zulawski=Dr. Jerzy Zulawski, Das Problem der KausalitatSpinoza.

hex

Bern, 1899.

INTRODUCTIONJ

The

early

and unfinishedis

Tractatus de

Intellectus The

Trac-

Emendatione

invaluable to students of the Ethics. inte uectus As a fragment of a treatise on Method, it supplements EmendaBut it has greater Spinoza's theory of knowledge.

claims on our attention than

this.

on Method

is set

in a framework,

For the treatise which exhibits the

central ideas of Spinoza's philosophy with remarkable The writer of the Ethics comes before the clearness.

world with a finished system

:

but the writer of the

Tractatus allows us to see this system in the making, and shows us the motives which inspired it.

Philosophy is for Spinoza certain, demonstrable, and demonstrated knowledge. It is a system of necessary truth, whose consummation is the complete understanding of ourselves, and our place in the universe the most that we are or can be. In other words,philosophy is for him the complete knowledge of ethics scientifically demonhuman nature and life But it is also a great deal more. It is the strated.''

ideal

humanis

life

:

for,

which

This conception of philoknowledge, which is perfect life sophy is developed in the opening pages of the Tractatus as the outcome of Spinoza's personal experience \ Experience he tells us has taught him that nonesatisfactionas thefull1

philosophy, of our nature.

we enjoy

in the complete understanding the only permanent

of the

VV1L. i. pp. 3-5. The tone Tdle is that of a manpassed

stress of the

struggle,Cf.

and

at-

tainedp. 46.

peace.

Avenarius,

who hasSPINOZA

through

the

B

2

THE ETHICS OF SPINOZA

of the objects which men usually set before themselves can yield complete satisfaction of desire. Pleasure, power, wealth all fail to serve as a source of permanent, unbroken enjoyment. And they fail because of their nature. It is their nature to be perishable and finite but permanent happiness can flow only from what is;

To set one's heart permanent and unchangeable. on something eternal and infinite this feeds the mind an object of this kind can never with unmixed joy be the source of sorrow and disappointment V So long as our mind is set on the pursuit of finiteitself' :

impossible to fix our thoughts seriously Yet, so far as they go, these objects indeed the only goods satisfy desire and are goodobjects, itis

on anything

else.

'

'

'

'

which experience affirms

to us.

Are we then

to sacrifice

a certain for a chimerical good ? But further reflection shows that this is not the alternative that confronts us.

Wesole

are in search of something completely good, as the 2 remedy for the fatal disease of unsatisfied desirethis

:

and

the good

'

'

itself

is

certain

andit is

real,

and in no

waybut

chimerical.this

Our attainment of

'uncertain'

uncertainty diminishes with increased reflection. The end, then, is not chimerical, nor does its attainment necessarily involve the sacrifice of goods

we

pleasure of the supreme

power, riches, incompatible with the pursuit it becomes incompatible and good a hindrance only if we make these objects 'ends' But to surrender these desirable for their own sake.alreadyis

possess.

The pursuit

of

not in

itself:

as the ultimate ends of life is to surrender certain evils,

and not

to sacrifice goods. For pursue any of these objects as your ultimate end, and you will inevitably be led to despair and destruction. But it is not necessary1'

Sed amor erga rem aetemamtristitiae

est

expers.'S. 2. 7,

W1L.3.

i.

p.

5i.

;

cf.

et

infinitam sola laetitia pascit

K. V.2

animum, ipsaque omnis

Cf. the simile,

VV1L.

p. 4.

INTRODUCTION(nor indeed feasible) to mortify all desires of the in order to strive after complete happiness.'

3flesh,'

then, is in outline the nature of this supreme of desire, attainment of which must afford perfect object

What,

and permanent satisfaction?perfect knowledge, or in reality, there or 'bad,' no 'perfection' or 'imperfection.'is

To

is

good Everything'

no

'

'

a necessary consequence of the of the universe or the laws of nature.' Butit is as'

what

order

'

human

knowledge knows only in part, sees things only from certain points of view and not in their unbroken andnecessary coherence.

And

for that knowledge,

'

'

good

and

'bad,' 'perfect' and 'imperfect,' express adaptation or non-adaptation to purpose. Since the purpose is not in the things, but in our view of them and since our;

views are only partial and therefore many, good bad,' perfect imperfect,' are relative terms and relative to such an extent that the same thing may rightly be' ' '

'

'

'

:

called both 'good'fect'

and 'bad,' both 'perfect' and 'imperin accordance with our varying points of view *. Now, in searching for the 'supreme good,' we are''

Good considering things as objects of human desire. is that which satisfies the desires of human nature' ;

;

absolutely good ('the supreme good'), that which comrelatively good (a true pletely satisfies those desires good ') that which leads to this satisfaction.

But a

'

'

good

of this kind

is

a state or condition ofstate' is

human

nature

itself.

A

'good,

one which

we

conceive to be far stronger 2 and more stable than our for all we know to the contrary own, and which

within our powers of attainment. A 'good,' in fact, a better state of ourselves. The supreme good for a man is to attain to such a development that he if possible in common with his fellows may enjoyis

is

'

'

1

cf.

E.

See below, Bk. III. ch. iv. praef., K. V. S. 1.6,

1

;

and7-9.

2

Multo firmiorem

more

self-

sufficient or self-dependent.

b a

4

THE ETHICS OF SPINOZA

a permanent realization (in his own person and in theirs) of ideal human nature, i. e. of that state which he conceives as the best human state. And to anticipate 1

we cannaturestand

say in general terms that this ideal state of human is 'that in which we know the union of man's

of nature.' To know and underwould be to understand (and therefore to love) this, the eternal and necessary order of things. And full consciousness of this (and of our place in that order) would be perfect and permanent satisfaction of our desire 2 This being the ultimate aim of all our efforts, we have next to consider the means. Of these the first and most

mind with the whole

.

important

is

to clear our intellect from error.

Passing by,

for the present, all other needs, we must turn our attention to the discovery of a method for removing the pre-

liminary obstacles to the attainment of truth a method to remedy the defects of our intellect, or to render it fit so to understand things that we may attain our supreme good.:

'

'

1

W1L.loco,

i.

p. 6.

'

Quaenamesse

au-

tern ilia sit

natura

ostendemuscogni-

compulsion of unreasonable passion as 'mentis libertas seubeatitudo.'If Spinoza's design had been completed, we should have in the Tdle the Logica to purge the mind

suo

nimirum

tionem unionis, quani mens cum tota Natura habet.' Footnote of Spinoza's 'Haec fusius suo locoexplicantur.'

This conception of the supreme good for man is the same as that elaborated in the Ethics(cf. E. v. praef., and Descartes, introductory letter to the PrinBoth in the Ethics and cipia|.

2

that

of erroneous ways of thinking, it may be fitted to attain;

the perfect state and we should have in other treatises the Medicina for the body, the Theory of Mechanics for increasing the conveniences oflife,

the TJieories of

the Tdle, the supreme good for man is the attainment (by oneself and others) of such dein

Moral Philosophy and of the Education of the Young for the formation of a suitable political society, and the Theory of Physics for

velopment of ourthereforeto

human

nature

as will enable us to 'know,''love,'

andi.e.

God,

an adequate knowledge of our corporeal selves and materialthings.(Cf.I.e.,

Nature. In both works this knowledge is conceived as freeing the

V V1L.andE.

i.

p.

6.

Descartes7 S.)

ii.

Lemma

mind from the external

or alien

INTRODUCTIONAt

5

this point l the treatise on Method proper begins. Its details belong to Spinoza's theory of knowledge; and we need not treat of them here. But his conception

of the general nature of the

method

is

all-important

for the understanding of the Ethics. The aim of the method is to fit the intellect for the

attainment of the best knowledge of things. What then is the best knowledge in what form of apprehension do we most fully understand? If the object to be known is self-dependent (and in that sense causa sui 2 ), we must, in order to understand if the essential nature it, grasp it solely by its own'

'

'

'

'

'

'

'

:

object

ofis

its

dependent, 'proximate' cause.

is

we mustFor

grasp by knowledge to understand a thing

it

toits

know whybeing.

of

what it is to see the necessity The method therefore must prepare theit is

intellect for

knowing under

this

form of apprehension'

the form whereby we understand things per solam suam essentiam vel per cognitionem suae proximae causae.'

And our task in this treatise is to lay down the method or way of thinking under this form of apprehension 3.

For let us be quite method of knowledge'

clearis

what a method'

is.

The'

that knowledge reflected on itself the thinking of our thinking, cognitio reflexiva or idea ideae.' If this were not so, we should neverattain to

any knowledge

at all

;

to the infinite process before

we should be committed we could begin to know.

first,

"We should require a new method to test the truth of the and again a third to test the second, and so on. The case may be roughly illustrated from man's productiveactivities.

a

To beat iron we require a hammer to make hammer we need another hammer and so on (it might And yet men, by the use of be thought) ad infinitum.;

the simple tools with which nature provided1

them

(e. g.1.

VV1L.

2i.

p. 7.

VV1L.3

i.

p.

30

;

see below, p. 53, note

lb. pp. 10-16.

6

THE ETHICS OF SPINOZAmaterial),

hands and raw

have advanced step by

step,

through the perfecting of more complicated tools, to the most elaborate artistic products. So, the mind by thecareful

employing of

its tools

(the true thoughts

which

its

inherited power has enabled it to fashion *) can advance step by step to a more perfect understanding.

We1

how:

ideas arise in our

are not here concerned with the question as to mind at all.' It is enough for us

at present that the mind has ideas, some of true i. e. it thinks and can think truly. Thetreatise

on Method

is

which are aim of the to trace reflectively the way in which:

we apprehend

in true thinking for the clear consciousness of the course of our thinking when we apprehend things

through their essential nature or through their proximatecausethis itself is theshall

method we'

are seeking.

understand this more clearly, if we consider for a moment the nature of an idea/ An idea is an act Now an to have an idea of thought is to think. The idea must be distinguished from its ideatum.' true idea of Peter, e.g., is not Peter himself: it is the''

We

:

'

'

'

'

And

objective essence' of Peter, i. e. Peter as he is for thought. the idea of Peter, qud an act of thought, has a dis-

tinctive being of its

own which can''

in turn be the object

of another thought the ideatum of another idea which presents the first idea objectively,' or is its essentia obiec'

Every idea thus exhibits a double character. As presentative of an original, it is the objective essence of its ideatum and, as an act of thought, it possessestiva.'' '

'

;

1

'

So the intellect by

its

inborn

vestigations yet further;it

and thus

power (by which I mean that which is not the effect in us ofexternal causes) fashions for itself instruments of understanding:these give it strength for further works of understanding; from thelatterit

advances step by step until it reaches the pinnacle of wisdom.'i.

VV1L.tur.'

p.

n.':

In the footnote read 'non causu-

gains other instrumentsits

but it is VV1L. omit 'non a necessary emendation of Paulus, adopted by Saisset and Bruder;

or the

power of pushing

in-

cf.

Elbogen, p.

13,

note

3.

INTRODUCTION' '

7

a peculiar nature of its own (a 'real,' or formal essence), which may in turn become the 'ideatum' of another idea 1 This latter process may be repeated indefinitely, as is matter of common experience. Thus we all recognize.

know,' and so on ad infinitum. But we and this is the important point that also recognize has no need to wait for the completion of knowledge

we know know that wethat'

that

we

know,' and again

'

know

that

we

On the contrary this indefinite process. reflection itself postulates as its starting-point regressive and condition the first idea or act of thought. In otherthisinfinite:

words applying this to our present purpose all methods postulate the knowledge of which they are the methods all reflection on the truth of an idea postulates the first;

idea or act of thinking. cannot advance a step in unless we can start with an idea which is knowledge,itself true

We

and the guarantee of its own truth. The test of truth must be given in the act of thinking it cannot be applied externally by a separate act of thought. Our:

knowledge or certainty of truth is our knowing truly. Jf I think truly, I shall eo ipso be conscious that my thought is true for to think truly is to have in idea the real nature of the object of thought to have obiective the essentia formalis of that which we are thinking. If I have a true idea, or think truly, I am, in the very act of thinking, convinced of the truth of my thought and this conviction is but my way of feeling (being conscious of) the essentia formalis of the object of my thought 2' ' ::

.

A

method, then, postulates as

its

starting-point true

knowledge or a true thought of some kind. And the bost method will be that which reflects upon the truest1 On this subject, and on an ambiguity in the expression esse'

nihil sit praeter ipsam essentiam obiectivam ; id est, modus, quo

obiectivum ideae,' see below, pp. 70 ff.2