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PAUL MACDONALD, ET AL., Petitioners, vs. THE NATIONAL CITY BANK OF NEWYORK,Respondent.

[G.R. No. L-7991. May 21, 1956.]TOPIC:Obligations of the Partners to Third Persons Articles 1815 to 1827NATURE: an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of AppealsFACTS:1. STASIKINOCEY is a partnership doing business in San Juan, Rizal,

a. formed by Alan W. Gorcey, Louis F. da Costa, Jr., William Kusik and Emma Badong Gavino.b. Securities and Exchange Commission denied its registration

c. CARDINAL RATTAN aka CARDINAL RATTAN FACTORY is treated as a co-partnershipi. Defendants Gorcey and da Costa are considered general partners,ii. As it appears in the record,Cardinal Rattan is merely the business name or style used by the

partnership Stasikinocey.2. DefendantStasikinocey had an overdraft account with The National City Bank of New York, a foreign

banking association duly licensed to do business in the Philippines.a. The overdraft shows a balance of P6,134.92 against the DefendantStasikinocey or the Cardina

Rattan3. due to the failure of the partnership to make the required payment, the account was converted into an

ordinary loan for which a promissory joint note non-negotiable was executed on June 3, 1949 byLouis F. da Costa for and in the name of the Cardinal Rattan, Louis F. da Costa and Alan Gorcey.

4. This promissory note was secured on June 7, 1949, by a chattel mortgage executed by Louis F. da

Costa, Jr., General Partner for and in the name of Stasikinocey, alleged to be a duly registeredPhilippine partnership, doing business under the name and style of Cardinal Rattan

a. The following were covered by the chattel mortgagei. Fargo truck with motorii. Plymouth Sedan automobile;iii. Fargo Pick-Up FKI-16, with motor No. T-112800032,

5. The mortgage deed was fully registered by the mortgagee on June 11, 1949, in the Office of theRegister of Deeds for the province of Rizal, at Pasig and among other provisions it contained thefollowing:

(a) That the mortgagor shall not sell or otherwise dispose of the said chattels without the mortgageeswritten consent; and(b) That the mortgagee may foreclose the mortgage at any time, after breach of any condition thereof, the

mortgagor waiving the 30- day notice of foreclosure.6. Gorcey and Da Costa executed an agreement on the same day of the mortgage.

a. It purports to convey and transfer all their rights, title and participation in Defendantpartnershipto Shaeffer, allegedly in consideration of the cancellation of an indebtedness of P25,000 owed bythem and Defendantpartnership to the latter (which transaction is said to be in violation of theBulk Sales Law (Act No. 3952 of the Philippine Legislature).

7. Defendantpartnership then, through Defendants Gorcey and Da Costa transferredto DefendantMcDonald the Fargo truck and Plymouth sedan on June 24, 1949

a. The Fargo pickup was also sold on June 28, 1949, by William Shaeffer to Paul McDonald.8. Paul Mcdonald transferred the Fargo truck and the Plymouth sedan to Benjamin Gonzales.9. National City Bank of New York filed an action against Stasikinocey and its alleged partners Gorcey

and Da Costa, as well as Paul McDonald and Benjamin Gonzales, to recover its credit and to

foreclose the corresponding chattel mortgage.a. McDonald and Gonzales were made Defendants because they claimed to have a better right

over the pledged vehicle10. CFI favored the National City Bank of New York

a. It annulled the sale of the vehicles to Benjamin Gonzalesb. Da Costa and Gorcey were ordered to pay National City Bank of New Yorkjointly and severally

the sum of P6,134.92, with legal interest from the debt of the promissory note involved.c. It ordered Gonzales to deliver the vehicles in question to National City Bank of New York for sale

at public auction if Da Costa and Gorcey should fail to pay the money judgment

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d. It sentenced Da Costa, Gorcey and Shaeffers to pay to National City Bank of New York jointlyand severally any deficiency that may remain unpaid should the proceeds of the sale not besufficient

e. It sentenced Gorcey, Da Costa, McDonald and Shaeffer to pay the costs.11. Only Paul McDonald and Benjamin Gonzales appealed to the Court of Appeals

a. CA modified the CFIs ruling

ISSUE 1: W/N an unregistered commercial co-partnership which has no independent juridical personalitycan have a domicile so that a chattel mortgage registered in that domicile would bind third persons who

are innocent purchasers for value

HELD: NO. Sale was void to both McDonald and Gonzales1. Da Costa and Gorcey cannot deny that they are partners of the partnership Stasikinocey, because

in all their transactions with the Bank theyrepresented themselves as such.2. PetitionerMcDonald cannot disclaim knowledge of the partnership Stasikinocey because he dealt

with said entity in purchasing two of the vehicles in question through Gorcey and Da Costa.3. Behn Meyer & Co. vs. Rosatzin: where a partnership not duly organized has been recognized as

such in its dealings with certain persons, it shall be considered as partnership by estoppel and thepersons dealing with it are estopped from denying its partnership existence

a. The sale of the vehicles in question being void as to PetitionerMcDonald, the transfer fromthe latter to PetitionerBenjamin Gonzales is also void, as the buyer cannot have a better

right than the seller.4. It results that if the law recognizes a defectively organized partnership as de facto as far as third

persons are concerned, for purposes of its de facto existence it should have such attribute of apartnership as domicile.

ISSUE 2: W/N a letter authorizing one member of an unregistered commercial co-partnership to make allofficial and business arrangements with the National City Bank of New York was sufficient authority for thesaid member to execute a chattel mortgage in order to give the bank security for a pre-existing overdraft

HELD:1. In this case, Da Costa appears as a co-manager in the letter of Gorcey to the Bank and in the

promissory note executed by Da Costa it can be seen that even the partners considered him as

such, as stated in the affidavit of April 21, 1948:That we as the majority partners hereby agree to appoint Louis da Costa co-managing partner of Alan WGorcey, duly approved managing partner of the said firm,

2. the partner who executed the chattel mortgage in question must be deemed to be so fullyauthorized.

a. Section 6 of the Chattel Mortgage Law provides that when a partnership is a party to themortgage, the affidavit may be made and subscribed by one member thereof.

i. In this case the affidavit was executed and subscribed by Da Costa, not onlyas a partner but as a managing partner.

3. There is no merit in Petitioners pretense that the motor vehicles in question are the commonproperty of Da Costa and Gorcey.

a. Petitioners invoke article 24 of the Code of Commerce in arguing that an unregistered

commercial partnership has no juridical personality and cannot execute any act that wouldadversely affect innocent third persons.

i. It should be reminded that the bank is a third person with respect to thepartnership, and the chattel mortgage executed by Da Costa cannot thereforebe impugned by Gorcey on the ground that there is no partnership betweenthem and that the vehicles in question belonged to them in common.

4. The bank and the Petitioners are all third persons as regards the partnership Stasikinoceyand even assuming that the Petitioners are purchasers in good faith

a. the Bank having transacted with Stasikinocey earlier than the Petitioners, it shouldenjoy and be given priority.