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Forces of the future will be able tooverwhelm any enemy in extremis.

But despite extensive study of theimpact of new technologies, there hasbeen insufficient analysis on how suchinnovations will affect political over-sight. This dearth in the literature hasbeen particularly glaring with regardsto alliance and coalition warfare. Thepolitical leadership of any assemblageof democracies will want to exploitgreater speed in order to bring a waror peace enforcement operation to aquick and just conclusion. Given thatWestern democracies only rarely

Many advocates of a revo-lution in military affairsargue that technologicalbreakthroughs will bring

greater operational speed. Global com-munications systems spurred by theexplosion in microprocessing and digi-tal technologies will provide com-manders with unprecedented advan-tages. Given such advances, there hasbeen speculation that the Armed

Thomas-Durell Young is the European program manager for the Center for Civil-Military Relations at the Naval Postgraduate School and the coauthor of NATOAfter 2000: The Future of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance.

NATOCommand and Control for the 21st CenturyBy T H O M A S - D U R E L L Y O U N G

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conduct operations unilaterally, theimmediacy of this issue takes onadded importance.

Political oversight in alliancesand coalitions is effected by a formalstanding body like the North AtlanticCouncil or through ad hoc politicalconsultative forums. It becomes theprovince of multinational parties in ei-ther case. In the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization (NATO), decisionmakingby 19 nations often occurs at a lan-guid pace that may not be conduciveto high-speed maneuvers. This shouldcome as no surprise, given that gov-ernments are loath to surrender theirforces to foreign command withoutprovision for close political monitor-ing. The success of NATO as a long-standing military alliance and thegrowing worldwide application of itsbasic procedures make it worthwhileto revisit the current definitions andpractices of its command authorities,their compatibility with the expecta-tion of a revolution in military affairs,and the capacity of NATO to translatefuture political decisions into rapidmilitary action.

The Challenge of ChangeDelegation of command authority

to multinational commanders remainsone of the least developed areas of Al-liance force employment policy. Landoperations present singular problemsbecause ground commanders requiregreater authority than naval and aircommanders. The missions and opera-tional limitations of ships and aircraftare a function of their design. Navalvessels and planes can best be thoughtof as integral weapons and systems plat-forms that can be allocated to nonna-tional commanders for specific tasks.Hence for naval and air forces, only afew command authorities need betransferred to a multinational force.Land forces, on the other hand, arecombined arms teams that must be or-ganized for a specific mission. Thecross-assignment of units, the frequentneed to change missions rapidly to re-spond to a developing situation, andthe legitimate need for a commander toestablish supply and training prioritiesare among the more sensitive powersnations are reluctant to turn over to anAlliance commander.

The four official levels of NATOcommand authority—operational com-mand (OPCOM), operational control(OPCON), tactical command (TACOM),and tactical control (TACON)—havenot been revised since the early 1980s(see table 1). Their definitions are legal-istic and not readily understandable.Authorities do not cover importantpeacetime responsibilities appropriatefor multinational formations such as

training, readiness, and logistics. Be-cause of broad NATO interpretations ofcommand authorities, members oftenindulge in the practice of employingcaveats, creating even more ambiguousterms such as OPCON+ and OPCOM–.During peacetime, with the exceptionof I German-Netherlands Corps, multi-national commanders of formationsearmarked for NATO do not have com-mand authority per se. Rather, theywield coordination authority, whichdoes not allow any directive control.

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Table 1. NATO Authorities

Operational Command (OPCOM)The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, todeploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may bedeemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics. May also beused to denote the forces assigned to a commander.

Operational Control (OPCON)The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander mayaccomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deployunits concerned; and to retain or assign tactical control to those units. It does not include authority toassign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, includeadministrative or logistic control.

Tactical Command (TACOM)The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for theaccomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.

Tactical Control (TACON)The detailed and usually local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary toaccomplish missions or tasks assigned.

Coordinating AuthorityThe authority granted to a commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specificfunctions or activities involving forces of two or more countries or commands, or two or more services, ortwo or more forces of the same service. He has the authority to require consultation between the agenciesinvolved or their representatives but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In case ofdisagreement between the agencies involved, he should attempt to obtain essential agreement bydiscussion. In the event he is unable to obtain essential agreement he shall refer the matter to theappropriate authority.

Integrated Directing and Control Authority (employed only by commanding general, I German-Netherlands Corps)

This authority provides the commander with powers that are identical or similar to those vested in acommander of a national corps or with powers that are altogether new. Sovereign national rights (in thenarrowest sense) are excepted. The commanding general has the right to give instructions to allsubordinate military and civilian personnel and may issue directives to the binational and nationalelements of the corps and set priorities.

Source: NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.

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Three Faces of the New NATOCommanders have discovered

three trends that are reshaping howAlliance capabilities are employed.

Multinational forces. Integrationof multinational land forces wasalmost exclusively effected on thecorps level during the Cold War, theexception being Multinational CorpsNortheast (located in Stettin, Poland).To protect force structure and main-tain expertise on higher levels of com-mand, there exist multinational landformations declared to the Alliancedown to corps and even division lev-els. Sadly, there is no NATO policy, letalone a common approach, to estab-lishing command authority require-ments on specific levels of command.Moreover, there has been no con-certed effort among the 19 membersto ascertain if current definitionsmatch the mission requirements ofmultinational force commanders. Tobe sure, issues related to administra-tion (such as promotions and trans-fers), referred to in NATO as full com-mand, will always remain within thepurview of a sovereign state. Yet noone would seriously challenge the re-sponsibility of a national corps or division commander to meet thetraining and readiness standards setout by higher authorities. Commandarrangements and practices in NATOhinder the achievement of these goalsat present.

New missions. The range of possi-ble tasks for forces declared to NATOhas increased dramatically. Serving asreaction forces for non-Article 5 peacesupport operations is the dominantmission of most elements, as opposedto meeting less immediate collectiveself defense missions. These new oper-ations have two important characteris-tics. First, they almost exclusively tendto be executed within a multinationalformation. Second, while the missionsand mission essential tasks are not asdemanding as combat missions, theyare nevertheless rigorous in the con-text of political military issues. Nationshave found the ambiguity afforded bynuanced command authority defini-tions to be an advantage because they

Closely related to the issue of com-mand authorities is the question ofwhen forces should be transferred from

national command structures to amultinational land force commander.This decision has a major effect onwhen important matters such as train-ing and logistic requirements can be di-rected rather than merely coordinated.

After the Cold War, with its lux-ury of facing a single coherent and pre-dictable threat, vague NATO defini-tions and obscure practices did notkeep pace with geostrategic realities.The central region chiefs of army staff(CR–CAST) in the early 1990s becameacutely aware of the problem duringmultinational exercises. At the CentralRegion Chiefs of Army Staff Talks inMay 1994, General M.J. Wilmink,Commander, Land Forces CentralEurope, recounted an incident whenhe directed a subordinate contingentto reallocate assets to another national

force. The time required for the com-mander to gain approval from his na-tional authorities nearly cost the bat-

tle. Allied Rapid ReactionCorps experienced similarcrippling limitations in its au-thority to direct and task or-ganize forces during fast-mov-ing exercises. These troubles

presaged difficulties during the forcedeployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina in1995–96.

The use of Alliance forces inBosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovorevealed the severe weaknesses inNATO definitions and their use inpractice. General Klaus Naumann,Chairman of the Military Committee,stated in the aftermath of OperationAllied Force,

I think one has to make sure that a NATOcommander is given the maximum unityof command and the right to really see itthrough. Nations . . . should prepare tothink through to which degree they are re-ally willing to transfer authority to NATO.

Alliance forces in Bosnia and Kosovo revealed severe weaknesses in NATOdefinitions and their use in practice

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allow the appearance of multinational-ity without actually giving up author-ity for commanders to carry out as-signed tasks. While such arrangementsmight be politically appealing, they re-duce operational efficiency.

Reorganized commands. One of theleast recognized problems has beencaused by reorganization of the inte-grated command structure withoutaccompanying review and reform ofcommand authorities. The revision ofthe integrated command structureand the introduction, but not as yetfull acceptance, of the combined jointtask force concept have not resultedin a reconsideration of the number ofcommand authorities and their defi-nition to ascertain if they supportnew structures.

Conflict in CommandUnder the U.S. system there are

three distinct levels of command sup-ported by three different levels of com-mand authority: combatant command-ers in chief for combatant command,component commanders for opera-tional control, and service command-ers for tactical control. During theCold War, NATO developed commandauthorities that fit neatly into a similarlogical construct: supreme command-ers for OPCOM, major subordinatecommanders for OPCON (+/–), subor-dinate commanders for TACON (+/–),and national corps commanders forfull command.

These existing relationships haveproven inadequate for dealing withmissions, organizations, and new for-mations. The integrated military com-mand structure of NATO has been re-organized but is largely guided bypolitical, not military considerations.Thus levels of command and span ofcontrol over subordinated units do notclearly or logically match commandauthorities.

A CR–CAST working group deter-mined that command for a multina-tional force ought to be decided in abottom-up fashion, where the missionshould be the starting point for identi-fying appropriate authorities. For exam-ple, the group offered recommenda-tions to guide the selection ofcommand authorities for a multina-tional corps commander.

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Table 2. Recommended Mission Command Authorities

Article 5collective defense operational command

Non-Article 5 peace support operationspeace enforcement operational commandconflict prevention operational controlpeacemaking operational controlpeacekeeping operational controlhumanitarian aid operational controlpeace building operational control

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working group study, basing commandauthority requirements on the givenmission. If command authorities in aparticular operation fall short of whatis needed, replacing them should be aclear political decision as opposed tothe application of ambiguous com-mand definitions or idiosyncratic in-terpretations of their meaning. More-over, given recent evidence of thedifficulty of carrying out multinationalland operations, any reform of the cur-rent system of definitions and proce-dures should err on the side of address-ing singular requirements of landforces. In this respect, the need formultinational commanders to assignand change missions and task-organize

It recommended, for example, ahigher command authority (OPCOM)in collective defense and peace en-forcement. The group recognized thepossible requirement to carry outcombat operations, the most demand-ing tasking, and to allow the com-mander to protect the force. But whilethese recommendations appear logi-cal, thus far NATO has made littleprogress in implementing them. Al-

liance initiatives have fallen short ofmatching the operating realities ofthe emerging strategic environment.

Political decisionmaking is un-likely to change significantly. Althoughtechnology can provide sophisticateddecision support technologies, makingsuch decisions will remain an inher-ently human responsibility driven by

both foreign and domes-tic policy concerns. As-suming that digital com-munications continue toevolve, it appears thatcommunications be-tween the operational/tactical commander andnational political leadership will be-come more refined and instantaneous,making for more consultation, not less.

Assuming continued im-provement in the abilityof commanders to affectthe operational speed, itshould be clear that futuretensions loom large in the

critical and delicate area of civil-mili-tary relations.

New Wine in New BottlesThe basis for ascertaining com-

mand authorities should follow thekey recommendation of the CR–CAST

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subordinate formations must be ad-dressed. These are admittedly politi-cally sensitive issues, given that theyaffect the very constitution and em-ployment of armies. However, withoutacknowledging the peculiar nature ofmultinational land forces, any reformis likely to be incomplete.

Apropos the actual reform of com-mand authorities, considerationshould be given to the terms them-selves, which have proven less thanuseful in quickly and clearly conveyingintent. For example, the term comman-dement operationelle (OPCOM) as usedby the French is essentially defined asfull or national command, unlikeNATO where it is considered to be sub-ordinate to full command. Indeed thesimple use of terms such as commandcould be counterproductive. After all,

operational command implies authori-ties that all but constitute sovereignresponsibilities and even sounds all toosimilar to full command.

One solution is regarding com-mand authorities in the same manneras nations approach the employmentof force. The advantage of consideringthe delegation of command authoritiesin the same way as formulating rulesof engagement, for instance, is thatthose rules are mission specific andstructured to avoid doubt whether anaction is allowable.

But mission-oriented commandprocedures cannot be created out ofwhole cloth. They must be formallydeveloped, evaluated, and validated.Extensive politico-military seminars,command post exercises, computer as-sisted simulations, and perhaps even asmall part of planned field exercisesshould be conducted before imple-menting such radical reform.

Some work is already ongoing.The ABCA Armies Standardization Pro-gram—whose membership includesAmerica, Britain, Canada, Australia,and New Zealand—has existed overfifty years and has provided a forumfor the five armies to discuss areas ofmutual interest that affect interoper-ability. One of its aims is improvingcombined operations. For example,the program recently published a use-ful coalition operations and logisticplanning guide.

A recent meeting in Washingtonaddressed the issue of command defini-tions for coalition operations. ABCAarmies accepted a challenge to take thelead in formulating a methodologysimilar to the one suggested by theCR–CAST working group.

The jury is still out on reform andlikely to remain so for some time. It isclear that, if for no other reason, globaland instantaneous communicationsare likely to continue improving,thereby compressing levels of com-mand. If greater operational speed isalso realized through new technolo-gies, one can foresee serious civil-mili-tary challenges which will mostacutely affect alliances and coalitions.As yet, there remains no firm formalunderstanding among Alliance mem-bers on exactly which authorities amultinational force commander re-quires. This is a critical issue that mustbe addressed with deliberate action forthe difficult times ahead. JFQ

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