Jetstream 41 ice incident - regional-services.com · Jetstream 41 ice incident Above and inset: a...

During the cruise at FL 180, theaircraft had encounteredoccasional light icing from highlevel cloud that covered much ofthe flight planned route. Most ofthe sector had been in and out ofIMC with little or no ice build-up,and only the occasional icewarning. The ice warning had notilluminated for some time and,now it was fully dark, visual cluesto icing conditions were limited.The light density of the cloudprovided little reflection from thestrobes to indicate potential icingconditions. The crew noticed thatthe engine EGTs had dropped 30-50 degrees C without input to thepower levers. This prompted acheck of the wings via the iceobservation light. Since there hadbeen no cockpit ice warning, theCrew was surprised to findextensive, heavy rime ice over thewing leading edges and propspinner. The "late selection ofeng/prop ice protection" drill wascarried out, starting with the LH

engine. Both engines in turnsuffered ice ingestion with RPMdrop, followed by recovery. TheRH engine slowed to about 12%before recovery, a cycle that tookapproximately 4 seconds. Themonitoring of the engine panelwas complicated by a double IECfailure which occurred when thefirst eng/prop ice protectionselection was made. Thisconfused the gauge scales andreadings at a time when theindications were fluctuating due topower loss. Once engine powerlevels had returned to normal, the

IEC's were reset, and the paxreassured that icing had been thecause of temporary power losswith a normal recovery now inprogress. The power loss was notwholly unexpected consideringthe heavy icing, but neverthelessthis was an anxious moment thatserved to remind us that winter isaround the corner. With hindsight,we could have been more pro-active with monitoring for icing,given the forecast (a front movingsouth). But the accretion wasunusually aggressive and rapidgiven the lack of clues both in and

outside the cockpit. I wonder howcomplacent we have become,given the benign icingenvironment of this summer justgone. Perennial lessons are to be

© BAE Systems 2009. All rights reserved. The information contained within this newsletter is of the nature of general comment only and doesnot constitute a warranty or condition of any contract. BAE Systems accepts no liability for the misuse or misinterpretation of such information.pwk_0424 Produced by the Graphics and Media Team, BAE Systems Regional Aircraft, PrestwickTel: 01292 675825 Email: [email protected]

CONTINUED ON PAGE 02

BAE Systems Regional Aircraft’s Flight Safety magazine for its Jet and Turboprop fleets customers • March 2009

JETSETS

The report

A timely reminderJetstream 41ice incident

Above and inset: a J41 encountered a temporary power loss incident due to ice

Below is a report that wereceived from the UK FlightSafety Committee concerning aJetstream 41. It is a timelyreminder that even very wispyclouds can be full of ice, andthus dangerous.

Making the right decisionfor a rejected take-off

Turn to page 06

Do I stop or do I go?

Turboprops and airframe ice

A recent incident highlights the importance of understanding icing conditions See page 04

JETSETS02 March 2009

Welcome>

This is the third issue ofJETSETS that I have editedand we are looking forcomment from you as to thecontent you would like to seein future issues. My contactaddress is at the end of thiseditorial, and I welcome anysuggestions. One positiveoutcome has been thepublication of one of thearticles in FOCUS, the officialpublication of the UK FlightSafety Committee (UKFSC),and they have also indicatedinterest in publishing otherarticles in a future edition ofFOCUS.

What feedback we’ve hadshows that JETSETS hasbeen well received, and toencourage more dialogue BAESystems are introducing acompetition, details of whichcan be found on page nine.

In this issue we have areport on a late selection of

re-learned here, not least thaticing is difficult to predict andwaiting to catch you out!

FeedbackThe crew carried out the correctcheck list items and this solvedthe problem. Also, crews shouldconsider using the weather radareven if the clouds do not show upas reflective, if there is ice on thenose of the aircraft this may showas an arc on the radar screen.Although this happened to a J41crew it could occur to other types– the last sentence agrees withthe old adage ‘there are no newproblems, just new people tohave them’. For this reason it isimportant to learn for the mishapsof others.

FROM PAGE 01

engine anti ice, and anotherarticle on turbo prop airframeicing. There is a discussion onattitude upsets which I hope ispertinent to all aircraft. Wehave a follow up article onoxygen masks; in researchingflight deck use of these maskswe were helped by members ofthe European Regional AirlinesAssociation Safety Group andUKFSC who provided some ofthe responses.

At the last OperatorsConference we were asked toprovide tailscrape data for the146/RJ. This was provided toall Operators, but theinformation has also beenincluded in JETSETS.

Finally, having discussedlanding overruns in the twoprevious issues, I have gone tothe start of the flight andincluded a discussion on RTOs.

I do hope that you findJETSETS interesting, and would

welcome any comment. As Isaid in the last editorial, thisissue is available on the BAESystems web site:(www.regional-services.com)as a complete edition, or asindividual articles if you onlywant to read one aspect. Theprevious issues are alsoavailable although you willneed to be registered to gainaccess to the portal. JETSETSis to be found by following thelinks: Services/Flight Safety/Flight Safety Material.

Colin Wilcock Product Integrity [email protected]

Jetstream 41 IceIncident

The Flight Operations SupportDepartment.BAE Systems Regional Aircraft,Prestwick International Airport,Ayrshire, Scotland, KA9 2RW.Tel: +44 (0)1292 675225 Fax: +44 (0)1292 675432E-mail: [email protected]

JETSETS is also available on ourweb site www.regional-services.com.Here it is split up to make iteasier for you to download anindividual article.

17th and 18th March Annual Flight Ops Conference

For our BAe146, Avro RJ and Turboprop Operators

Western House Hotel and Ayr Racecourse near Prestwick.

This conference covers Flight Ops Integrity, operational issues, performance software, fuel management, manuals and publications.

It will be supported by Honeywell, European Aeronautical Group, navAero, and Oxford Aviation Academy.

7th, 8th & 9th April BAe 146/Avro RJ Performance and Dispatch Course

BAE Systems, Prestwick.

Late April BAe 146/Avro RJ Performance and Dispatch Course

Dubai, for all comers.

8th, 9th & 10th Sept BAe 146/Avro RJ Performance and Dispatch Course

BAE Systems, Prestwick.

e-mail [email protected] for details of these events.

Flight Ops Support events calendar 2009

JEt and Turboprop Support, Engineering,Training and Safety.

THERE ARE NONEW PROBLEMS,JUST NEW PEOPLETO HAVE THEM

‘’

Contact details

JETSETS 03March 2009

In the last JETSETS there wasan article which discussed theapparent reluctance by crewsto don an oxygen mask. Afterthis article had been publishedwe contacted some operators tosee what their experience hadbeen. This led to sufficientfeedback to allow someconclusions to be drawn.

Rather than us asking leadingquestions, the operators wereencouraged to providefeedback from within their ownexperience and their replieswere analysed. The feedbackobtained covered personalexperiences of smoke or fumesin the flight deck, discussionswith the crews after such anevent, and comments fromthose involved with trainingprocedures or flight safety. Thecomments revolved aroundproblems associated indonning masks, issues withprocedures during such events,or communication problems.These comments broadly fellinto either a mask design issueor issues which could behighlighted during training.

Mask and Goggle DesignThere are two basic types ofmask design: one in whichthere are two separate piecesconsisting of a mask withseparate goggles, and an all inone design. From theresponses it would appear thatthe all in one design is lesscommon in BAE Systems types,but it is both easier and quickerto don and is the morecomfortable to wear of the twodesigns. Comments about thetwo piece design were that theyare generally not liked by thecrews due to being uncomfortableand crews were reluctant toremove them from theircontainers as they were difficultto restow. The donning of thesemasks would also appear to

take longer mostly due todifficulties in putting on themasks and goggles with furthercomplications with headsets,straps and spectacles (if thecrew member wears them) allof which involves the erodingof precious time in a smoke or

fumes event.Both types could become

contaminated with tea, coffeeor other liquids because oftheir location in the flight deckand so required frequentcleaning if they were to behygienic to use. Perhaps theyshould be cleaned more often?

By far the most commonresponse was thatcommunication was difficultwhilst wearing the mask. This

could impede the crews`ability to communicate,especially if they were alsocarrying out emergency drills,and some crews said they werereluctant to use the PA becauseof the poor quality of thespoken word via the mask

microphones. We did trycontacting the maskmanufacturers but, so far, havereceived no reply.

When To Don MasksThe Emergency and AbnormalChecklist calls for oxygen masksto be donned immediately in theevent of smoke or fumes, oraircraft pressurisation problems.The instruction to don the mask isto prevent the incapacitation ofthe crew due to the inhalation offumes, or onset of hypoxia, whichmay occur without any obvioussymptoms to the crew. However,there were also some commentsfrom operators which suggestedthat in some cases of smoke orfumes in the flight deck, forinstance with an electricalcomponent failure, thetroubleshooting of the problembecame more difficult as thesense of smell was removed dueto the donning of the oxygenmask. Reluctance to don a maskmay also be a factor if the crewbelieve that they know the sourceof the problem particularly if it issomething which they may befamiliar with, or they are notexperiencing any symptoms.

Emphasis on TrainingMany of the responses were fromthose involved with crew trainingor safety procedures so thefeedback included first handexperience of watching crewsuse the masks. Training usuallyinvolves a clear cut case ofsmoke in the flight deck and thecrews donning the oxygen masks,or an emphasis on the drillsassociated with a smoke or fumessituation. Some of the training inthe past included “touch drills”where the crew would indicatethe point at which they would putthe mask on but not physicallydon it. Clearly not putting on themask during training induces badbehaviour patterns.

The feedback shows thatwhere there has been anemphasis on making the crews

Oxygen Masks - a follow up

Above and inset: the two basic types ofoxygen mask designs

CONTINUED ON PAGE 04


As a follow up to the article inthe last JETSETS where Idiscussed problems that had ledto turboprop loss of control inice, the Norwegian AccidentInvestigation Board have justissued a report that covers justsuch an incident.

During the climb, the crew ofan ATR observed a build up ofice on the aircraft which was notan abnormal occurrence overthe terrain in question. Allde/anti-ice systems were on andworking and there was nosignificant turbulence. Thecommander stated that theygradually went into heavy rainwith large drops that spatteredthe front windshield (SAT was -10ºC). He saw significant iceformation on the evidence probe

outside his window, andassessed the icing as more orless the same as the worst casehe had experienced in thecourse of his six yearsexperience of flying this aircrafttype. He stated that the ice builtup extremely rapidly. The side

windows iced up, while theinflatable rubber de-icing bootsappeared to keep the leadingedge of the wings free of ice.From the cockpit it was notpossible to see whether therewas ice further back on theupper and lower sides of thewing. Neither pilot rememberedafterwards if they saw ice on thepropeller spinners. The aircraft

climbed more or less normallyuntil passing about FL 125. Afterthis the ability to climbdeteriorated significantly, andwhen the approached FL 140 theclimb was marginal. To maintainthe climb the speed wasreduced from 160 KIAS to 150 to

155 KIAS. The autopilot was inuse in IAS mode. Minimumspeed in ‘standard’ icingconditions for the relevant masswas 143 KIAS, and the crewwere of the opinion that they hadmaintained a sufficient marginabove this speed. The rate ofclimb did not improve, and thecrew suspected mountainwaves. The fasten seat belt sign

was switched on. The aircrafthad reached FL 140, but beganto descend. PF put his hands onthe stick and felt the stick shakercome on and, just before hecould disconnect it, the autopilotdisconnected automatically. PFbelieved that he rememberedthat the aileron miss trim warninglight came on. A second or twoafter this the aircraft suddenlyrolled uncommanded 45º rightand 7 - 8º nose low. PF pushedthe stick forward and selectedfull power. He struggled toregain control of the aircraft andtried to roll wings level. Theaircraft rolled from right to leftbefore it gradually rolled wingslevel. When the wings were leveland the airspeed had reached

Turboprops andairframe ice

put the mask on in order tobecome more familiar with itsoperation donning the maskbecomes second nature in anemergency and also reduces thetime taken to put the mask on.

To identify what guidancecould be offered on thissubject it was necessary toobtain first hand experiencefrom operators, for which weare extremely grateful. Thecomments covered a widerange of reasons as to whythere may be reluctance todon masks. However, theoverwhelming agreement wasthat the greater risk would bethe consequences of notdonning an oxygen maskimmediately.

Many of the problemsmentioned in the study couldbe resolved for instance withthe all in one masks, or withimproved communicationswith the masks on, or byintroducing more frequenttraining to allow the crews tobecome more familiar withthe masks.

By highlighting these issuesit is hoped that you candiscuss the options availablewithin your own organisationand that this will assist inmaking aircraft operations assafe as possible.BAE Systems would stillwelcome any comment on theuse of the masks. Commentscan be sent to: [email protected]

Conclusion

FROM PAGE 03

Oxygen masks - a follow up

Above and inset: turboprop operators need to be aware of icing conditions that maycause heavy accretion which could exceed the capabilities of the ice protectionsystems


146/RJAn aircraft lost an over wingpanel during flight. Followingthis it was decided to issuesome guidance to assist crewsin carrying out an in flighthandling assessment. Thiswas issued as FOSIL 146-RJ-010-08 at the end of Octoberlast year. Low Speed Handlingadvice was also issued, viaFOSIL, for all our turboprops.

146/RJWe have had two reports ofdifficulties in extracting thenew Abnormal andEmergency Checklist from itsholder. BAE Systems haveissued an FCOM Bulletin onthis subject.

ATPDuring ground testing of thefire extinguisher switches anextinguisher was firedinadvertently. I am sure thatyou are all aware of thepossibility of the plastic coverslipping so that if it is raisedthe lip on the back of thecover will depress the switchand discharge theextinguisher. These plasticcovers need to be fully home,and not allowed to slip downtowards the windscreen.

J41An undercarriage trunion wasfound damaged on a Jetstream41 although there had been noreported heavy landing.FOSIL Jetstream 41-014-08was issued to amplify theadvice in the MOM coveringlandings. This information willbe put in the MOM at a laterdate

approximately 175 KIAS, PFpulled the stick back to arrestthe descent. The crew estimatedthat they had lost just over 1,000feet, and felt that the situationhad been resolved. However, theaircraft then rolled left in a

similar manner to the previousuncommanded roll. The samerecovery procedure was againutilised – this time with nofurther upsets. A post incidentreview of the ATC tapes showsthat the initial height loss wasaround 1,500 feet.

Following the accident thatoccurred to an ATR at Roselawn,Indiana (reported in the lastissue of JETSETS), we added

Recentincidents

advice to our turbo propmanuals to cover freezing rainand unusual icing conditions.The advice given in all themanuals was similar, and is asfollows:

Freezing rain, freezing drizzle

and unusual icing conditionsmay cause heavy accretionwhich could exceed thecapabilities of the ice protectionsystems. Such ice can alsoaccrete on the unprotectedsurfaces. This ice cannot beshed and it may seriouslydegrade performance andcontrol of the aircraft.

Prolonged operation inaltitude bands where

Above: an ATR 42 similar to the aircraft involved in the Roselawn accident

temperatures are near freezingand heavy moisture is visible onthe windscreen, should beavoided.

If the aircraft exhibits airframebuffet onset, unexpected loss ofspeed, uncommanded roll orunusual roll control wheelforces, immediately reduce theangle of attack (AOA) and avoidexcessive manoeuvring, until theairframe is clear of ice.

If ice is seen forming behindthe protected surfaces, orunusual roll trim requirements orautopilot trim warnings areencountered, then:• Leave icing conditions as soon

as possible.• If flap is extended, do not

retract the flap until the airframe is clear of ice.

• Hold the control wheel firmly and disengage the autopilot (if in use).

• Increase the airspeed as much as configuration will allow, but not above VRA.

• Do not engage the autopilot until the airframe is clear of ice.

Above: ice accretion on a J41 wingduring normal operation of the airframede-icing boots

Above: ice accretion on a J41 wingfollowing a simulated failure of theairframe de-icing boots

Above: rime ice accretion on a J41 tailas seen during the aircraft’s JAAcertification programme


Landing overruns have beendiscussed quite extensively in thepast two issues of JETSETS, and Iwould now like to look at theother end of the flight – the take-off. As with landing overruns,each year rejected take-offs(RTOs) kill people and damageairframes.

The aim of this article is todiscuss some of the factors thatyou should consider beforecommitting aviation in case thetake-off results in an RTO. Eachof us will have carried out RTOsin the simulator, but how manyhave carried out an actual RTOfrom V1 on a limiting runway? Notmany, I would hazard a guess,although several may havecarried out RTOs at lower speedssay in response to a CONFIGWarning. Nevertheless your nexttake-off could end in an RTO!Historic data would indicate thatyou can expect to have to reject atake off about every five years onshorthaul.

During certification eachmanufacturer spends a lot oftime, money and effort in trying toachieve the best figures they canto maximise the performance oftheir aircraft. The best efforts ofthe test pilots are then factored bythe certifying authority to try andensure that the performance isachievable by any pilot, and inaircraft that are no longer new.These are the performancefigures that you see every day inthe RTOW Tables, and theseTables are produced in various

formats as required by eachoperator. In the main the Tablesgive the maximum weight (massfor the purists) that can be liftedfrom a runway given the actualOAT, pressure altitude andheadwind. Most Tables will alsoshow the various V speeds.

You may be familiar with mostof the speeds, and how they arederived but, for those that may bea bit rusty, I will review them.

These speeds are a key elementin enabling you to makedecisions during the verydynamic situation of a failureduring the take off roll, and V1, VRand V2 will be very familiar to allof you. However, there are someother less well known V speedsas well.

Vmcg (minimum control speed onthe ground). Vmcg is the

minimum speed at which you willbe able to control the aircraft(without reducing power on thelive side) if an engine fails on theground using rudder alone and afoot force that does not exceed150 lbs (69 kg). This is to allowthe take-off to be continued andthe aircraft kept straight by use ofrudder to oppose the asymmetricthrust from the live engine(s). Theregulations allow for a 30 foot (9 m)

Do I stop or do I go?Making thecorrectdecision fora rejectedtake-off

BRAKES OFF

TODRV lift off

35ft

1/21/2TORR

V1 Vr

V2

Above: TODR and TORR

Take-off Distance Required (TODR)Greater of1.15 x distance to 35ft (all engines) or

1 x distance to 35ft (engine fail).

Take-off Runway Required (TORR)Greater of1.15 x distance to 1/2 airborne distance to 35ft (all engines) or

1 x distance to 1/2 airborne distance to 35ft (engine fail).

(JAR 25 -113)


lateral excursion after enginefailure, and Vmcg is mainlydependent on the live engine(s)thrust. During the certificationtests the nose wheel steering isnot used, but it would beavailable to you (although it mustbe used with care as you may nothave used it at high speedbefore).

Vef (the speed at which anengine is assumed to fail). Vefmust not be lower than Vmcg

Vmbe ( the maximum speed atwhich there is sufficient brake

energy to stop the aircraft) V1must not exceed Vmbe

V1 The maximum speed in thetake-off at which the pilot musttake the first action (e.g. applybrakes, reduce thrust, deployspeed brakes and spoilers) toreject the take-off. V1 is also theminimum speed at which you cancontinue to take off following anengine failure. If the enginefailure occurs after V1 the take-offmust be continued. This impliesthat the aircraft must becontrollable on the groundfollowing the engine failure.

So V1 must be greater than Vefplus the speed gained with thecritical engine inoperative duringthe time interval between enginefailure and pilot action (this isdefined by the regulatoryauthorities as two seconds - not alot of time for you to recognise thefailure and react!).

Vmu (Minimum unstick speed)Vmu is the speed at which theaircraft can safely lift-off theground, and is found by draggingthe tail on the runway forgeometrically limited aircraft (YouTube contains some footage of

Vmu tests with sparks comingfrom the tail of the test aircraft).The speed at which the aircraftfirst lifts off is Vmu, and thereforelift off is not possible before Vmu.

Vr (Rotation speed) Vr ensuresthat, in the event of an enginefailure, lift off is possible and V2is reached at 35 feet Vr must alsobe greater than Vmu.

Vmca (minimum control speed inthe air) Vmca is the speed atwhich, when the critical enginesuddenly fails it is possible tomaintain straight flight with anangle of bank not exceeding 5deg and with rudder forces notexceeding 150 lbs (69kg). Vmcaalso may not exceed 1.2 Vstall

V2 (Take-off safety speed) V2 isthe minimum speed that must bemaintained up to accelerationaltitude. By maintaining V2 youensure that the minimum climbgradient will be achieved, and theaircraft will be controllable. V2 isalways greater than Vmca.

In general all these speeds arenot readily available to you, andso you must respect the speeds

Above: Accelerate Stop Distance Required (ASDR) - the distance to accelerate to V1 and stop (engine failed)

ACCELERATE-STOP DISTANCE

FULL BRAKING EFFECT

BRAKES RELEASERECOGNITION ACTION

V1

Vef

STOP

Notes• Start of distance is defined as brake release.• Engine failure occurs at Vef, rejected at V1.• Stop is made using brakes and ground idle with one engine failed.• The interval between Vef and V1 accounts for the failure recognition and pilot’s reaction to activate

the first retarding device plus mandatory time delay (2 seconds).

Above: scheduled take-off speeds

V1 - Take-off Decision Speed, the maximum speed in the event of engine or other failure at whichthe pilot must take the first action to stop the aircraft. It is also the minimum speed followingengine failure at which the take-off can be continued.Minimum V1 is a speed such that Vef is equal to Vmcg.Maximum V1 is a speed equal to VR.

VR - Rotation Speed, the target speed at which the pilot initiates a change of attitude of the aircraftwith the intention of leaving the ground.The minimum VR that may be scheduled is not less than: a) V1 b) 1.05 Vmca.

V2 - Take-off Safety Speed, the minimum initial climb out speed one engine inoperative.The minimum V2 that may be scheduled is not less than: a) 1.10 Vmca b) 1.20 Vms.In addition V2 shall not vary significantly from the speed at which the aircraft, being flown with theassumed operating technique, reaches a screen height of 35ft following engine failure.

35ftV1 Vr

V2

Vmcgmin control speed

Vmcmin controlspeed in air

(JAR 25 -109)

(JAR 25 -107)


that you do have. For instance ifyou want to reduce V1 you canonly do so if it is allowed inyour performance manualotherwise you could selectinadvertently a V1 lower thanVmcg.

Having discussed all thespeeds, what other factorscome into the equation? Thereare two factors that will help toensure the success of an RTO.Firstly is the correct decision.By this I mean a timely decision

by V1. This usually involves achange from ‘stop minded’ to‘go minded’ as V1 is

approached, and I used tosignal this to myself when I wasPF by removing my hand from

the power levers at V1. It isworth noting that all the testingand calculation assumes that an

engine has failed: if this hasn’thappened then there will bemore thrust than was allowed

for in the calculations; however,this should be absorbed in thesafety factors that have beenapplied. Once the decision tostop has been made thestopping must be conductedwith determination. Duringdevelopment testing the testpilot will apply full brake anduse the nose wheel steering toassist directional control. Whendid you last experience full anti-skid action? Anti-skid operationfeels harsh and snatchy - youwill feel the brakes catching,and releasing as the systemsenses a skid. Full brakepressure will give you maximumAbove: depiction of airspeed to develop ‘STOP or GO’ mindset

AIRSPEED V1 Vr0

STOP or GO . . . . . . . . STOP or GO . . . . . . . . . . STOP or GO GO. . . . . .

LOW SPEED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . HIGH SPEED

80

HISTORIC DATA WOULD INDICATE THATYOU CAN EXPECT TO HAVE TO REJECT ATAKE-OFF ABOUT EVERY FIVE YEARS ONSHORTHAUL

‘’

This diagram illustrates the change from being ‘stop minded’ at low speed, where astop will usually be called for any malfunction, to becoming ‘go minded’ as theaircraft accelerates, where a stop wlil only be called for a major malfunction such asengine failure.


In the Recent Incident Sectionof JETSETS there is referenceto FOSILs and so, by way ofexplanation, this short articleintroduces them.

Flight Operations Supportintroduced the FOSIL about 18months ago as a method ofgetting information to the seniorpilot echelon of each of ourOperators. FOSILs are sent out

Flight Operations SupportInformation Leaflets (FOSIL)

to all known Operators, usuallyto the Chief Pilot and Head ofTraining, via e-mail. However,we hope that this information isalso passed to crews.

Information that needs to beseen by all crews is stillpublished by way of Notices toAircrew (or FCOM Bulletins forthe 146/RJ) which go to alloperators.

AGL Above Ground Level

AO Angle Of Attack

AMSL Above Mean Sea Level

ATC Air Traffic Control

ATIS Automated Terminal Information Service

CAA Civil Aviation Authority

CAT Clear Air Turbulence

cm centimetre(s)

CONFIG Configuration

CWP Central Warning Panel

ECS Environmental Control System

FCOM Flight Crew Operating Manual

FDR Flight Data Recorder

FL Flight Level

FOSIL Flight Operations Support Information Leaflet

ft feet

hPa hectopascals

IAS Indicated Airspeed

IEC Integrated Engine Computer

IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions

KIAS Knots Indicated Airspeed

km kilometre(s)

kt Knot(s)

lbs Pound(s)

LDA Landing Distance Available

LDR Landing Distance Required

m metre(s)

MSA Minimum Safe Altitude

MOM Manufacturers Operations Manual

NTSB National Transportation Safety Board (USA)

OAT Outside Air Temperature

PF Pilot Flying

PM Pilot Monitoring

PNF Pilot Non Flying (now PM – Pilot Monitoring)

psi pounds per square inch

QRH Quick Reference Handbook

RLW Regulated Landing Weight

RPM Revolutions Per Minute

RTO Rejected Take-off

SOP Standard Operating Procedure

VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions

Abbreviations

braking – make sure you really‘stand on the brakes’. On someaircraft this requires more footmovement than you mightimagine, and so do take theopportunity, whilst stationary, toapply full brake pressure, andget a ‘feel’ for it. Do not attemptany form of cadence braking(i.e. you trying to cycle thebrakes on and off by feel). Makesure that the engines are at theminimum setting and that any liftdump devices are extended.Following most RTOs you maybe able to relax the braking asyou reach a halt with runwayremaining; on a limiting runwayyou will need to keep full brakeuntil you reach the end of therunway and bring the aircraft toa halt (bear in mind that onsome runways, stopway hasbeen included in the calculation,and so you may roll over theactual runway onto thisstopway). Your brakes will behot – possibly too hot to taxi tillthey’ve cooled. The prop guyswin here since they have largeand effective brake fans on thefront of any working engine.

It would seem that the vastmajority of RTOs are initiated atspeeds below 80 kt, and only avery small number are initiatedat speeds above 120 kt. Theoverruns nearly always occurfollowing a high speed (usually

A good understanding ofthe speeds involved in thetake-off calculations andthe factors affecting theaircraft’s performance willhelp you in arriving at thecorrect decision. A goodpre-take-off brief isessential in ensuring thateveryone on the flight deckunderstands what isrequired, and what actionswill be taken. Expect thatyou will have to carry outan RTO on every take-off sothat you will be prepared in

Conclusion

taken to be over 100 kts) RTO. So what is going to cause anRTO? I am sure that eachoperator has their own SOP, butthe following will almostcertainly be included:• Engine failure, a CONFIG

Warning, instructions from ATC, tyre failure, or systems warnings.

It is vital to keep an open mindas to the nature of the failure –don’t automatically assume anengine failure (for instance, theyaw caused by a tyre burst in acrosswind might well feel likean engine failure).Anecdotal evidence shows thata large number of take-offs arecontinued successfullyfollowing an indication ofaircraft system faults, but theseoften are not widely reported.Although such take-offs canresult in diversion or delay thelandings are usually uneventful.

Some of the lessons learntover time include:• Many of the RTO overruns

were initiated from above V1.• RTOs on wet or snow/ice

contaminated runways were more likely to lead to an overrun.

• Most RTOs do not involve the actual loss of an engine.

• A proportion of the overruns involved wheel or tyre failure.

the event you actually dohave a problem. Whetherthe decision is GO or STOPthe correct actions must becarried out purposely withdetermination.

The illustration on page 8is an attempt to illustratethe change over that shouldoccur as the aircraftaccelerates. Initially thedecision is more weightedtowards a STOP decisionand as V1 is approachedthe decision becomes moreweighted towards a GO.


Every year there are reports ofupsets that cause crews to losecontrol of their aircraft, and insome cases these upsets lead tofatal accidents. For many yearsthere have been upset trainingprogrammes in use by variousairlines. The FAA has a verycomprehensive programme whichcovers an explanation of thecauses and recovery as well asrecommending simulatorexercises. The FAA programme isavailable on their web site. ThisJETSETS article is intended tooffer some discussion on upsets,and to offer advice on recoveryfrom them.

Many of you may rememberback to your basic training, andvaguely recall having to recoverfrom unusual positions (some maysay attitudes) whilst oninstruments. This was usually part

of your Instrument Rating training,was done on a relatively smallaircraft, and you were preparedfor the upset. However, there arestories in the aviation press thatdiscuss upsets or loss of controlincidents that have occurred tolarge transport aircraft, andgenerally the crews of theseaircraft will have had little priorchance to practice recovery.

An upset is generally acceptedto be where any of the followingconditions occur unintentionallyduring flight:• Pitch attitude of more than 25

degrees nose up.• Pitch attitude of more than 10

degrees nose down.• Bank angle of more than 45

degrees.• Any flight within these

parameters at airspeeds inappropriate for the conditions.

Recovery from the upset willdepend on the severity of thedeparture from normal flight, andthe difficulty experienced by thecrew will be exacerbated bysurprise and disorientation. Theupset is likely to have been initiatedby one of three mechanisms.

1 Environmentally Induced:Turbulence, CAT, mountain wave, windshear, thunderstorms,microburst, wake turbulence and airframe icing.

2 Systems Anomalies Induced:Flight Instrument failures, Autopilots or Flight Controls.

3 Pilot Induced Instrument: crosscheck, inattention and distraction from primary cockpitduties, vertigo and spatial disorientation, and incorrect use of aircraft automation.

If you think back to your flyingtraining you may remember that avery early exercise that you weretaught was recovery from a spiraldive. This would have beeninitiated by your instructor whowould start a bank, and let thebank increase and the speed

increase until at some stage hewould give you control and tellyou to recover. The recovery was:• Power to idle.• Roll wings level. Note: roll first

and then: • Pitch to straight and level flight.

You probably were also shown arecovery from a nose highsituation in which you put thepower on whilst rolling wingslevel.

This early training should giveyou a lead into upset recovery.The difficulties that will face you if

A reminder on upset recovery procedures

Don’t getupset!

Above: high altitude engine failure on a China Airlines 747 resulted in a departurefrom controlled flight

Above: a TWA 727 suffered an upset involving a rolling decent


With the main oleos fully extended the limiting pitch attitudes for the3 types are:

• 146-100/RJ70: a pitch attitude of 14º for aircraft fitted with tail bumpers, and 16º without the bumper fitted.



The tail bumper was removed from production aircraft after April 2004.

With the oleos compressed to the normal static value at maximumtake-off weight the limiting pitch attitudes for the three types are:

• 146-100/RJ70: a pitch attitude of 9.7°.• 146-200/RJ85: a pitch attitude of 8.3°. • 146-300/RJ100: a pitch attitude of 6.9°.

BAe 146 and AVRO RJ - limiting attitudes for take-off or landing

Bumper clearance with oleos compressed

At lift-off

12 Degrees

an upset happens to you are thelack of familiarity with unusualpositions, since you as airlinepilots concentrate on providing asmooth service to your customersand do not usually see extremeattitudes, and the shock anddisorientation you will experience.However, your early training willstill help you to recover thesituation. Of prime importance isthe need to take time to assessthe situation. You will probablyhave to rely on the attitudeindicator unless you are luckyenough to be in VMC. Whatneeds to be assessed is:• Speed• Pitch• Bank Angle

From your early training you knowthat if the speed is increasing youreduce power, and if it is reducingyou increase power. In other words,correct energy management is veryimportant. Therefore to recoverfrom an upset:• Analyse the situation, and

confirm your analysis. If the auto pilot is engaged at this point you should leave it engaged until you’ve analysed the situation. If the autopilot is not engaged, or has disengagedor is malfunctioning, you shouldattempt to centralise the controls.

• Disengage autopilot and auto throttle.

• Adjust power as necessary (make sure that ‘power on’ is part of the stall recovery for your aircraft type as some typesmay have different procedures for recovery if the aircraft is stalled).

• Roll to wings level (it may be advantageous to apply a small amount of rudder to assist the roll, but do bear in mind that excessive rudder could cause adeparture from controlled flight). Use the attitude indicatorfor rolling wings level (unless you are certain that it has failed)because your senses may well be giving you false information.

• Recover to straight and level flight – again on the attitude indicator.

There is an overridingconsideration: an approach to thestall is controlled flight whereasan aircraft that has stalled is out ofcontrol and must be recovered.Therefore, if the aircraft hasstalled, it will be necessary torecover from the stall beforetrying to initiate a recovery fromthe upset.

Unfortunately there is not oneset of inputs which will recoverevery situation. Therefore youranalysis of the upset is critical toregaining control of the aircraft,but by understanding thepossibilities you will be betterplaced to recover to level flight.Upset incidents have occurred inthe past such as the high altitudeengine failure on the ChinaAirlines 747 which resulted indeparture from controlled flight.During the upset the aircraft lostabout 30,000 feet and pulledaround 5 g before control wasregained and a safe landingmade. A TWA 727 also sufferedan upset involving a rollingdescent (thought to be caused bya slat malfunction) through about34,000 feet, very high speed(reportedly supersonic!) and g.Again the crew managed to landthe aircraft safely. Closer to homeone of our Jetstream 41s wassubject to an upset, whichinvolved a speed well in excess ofVmo and high g. This aircraft wasalso recovered by the crew. Themessage from all these events is:

Aircraft series Extended oleoswith tail bumper

146-100/RJ70

146-200/RJ85

146-300/RJ100

16°

14°

12°

14°

12°

10°

9.7°

8.3°

6.9°

What are the generallyaccepted conditions that wouldbe classified as an upset?

The first 2 correct answers drawnon 1 May 2009 will each win acopy of Handling the Big Jets.Send your answer [email protected] with either a postaladdress or an e-mail contact.

Good Luck!

As a reward for reading thismagazine, BAE Systems hasdecided to run a smallcompetition. To allow time foreveryone to get a chance to seethe magazine the prize will bedrawn in May. The prize will be acopy of David Davies bookHandling the Big Jets. Althoughthis book was published sometime ago it is still considered tobe a definitive text on the subject.The author was the Chief TestPilot in the British Air RegistrationBoard who were responsible forthe certification of civil aircraftonto the British Register.To win the book answer thefollowing question:

Extendedoleos

Compressedoleos

Jetsets competition

Don’t Give up - keeptrying to recover theaircraft.

Above: simulator exercises in recoverytraining are recommending by the FAA


FACT FILE REGIONAL AIRCRAFT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WORLDWIDE SUPPORT OF APPROXIMATELY 900 AIRCRAFT

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Humour

JETSNIPSA light hearted look at the aviation industry

I'm a controller at an Air TrafficControl Centre. On a particularlyrough day on the scopes...C: American twenty-fortynine, turnright 30 for noise abatement.P: AHHHH Center what kind ofnoise abatement can you have atFlight level 330???C: The sound of two airlinerssmashing together...P: Roger, we're turning 30 right...expediting

Oh! I have slipped the surly bonds of gate timesAnd held rigid by impossible air traffic controllers;Upward I’ve climbed and joined the congested skiesOf fixes, missed approaches and done hundred thingsMy passenger did not care for — delays, turbulence, and heldIn the holding pattern low on fuel. Waiting there,I’ve chased the schedules, and flung Myself against management and union rules.Up, up the long ascent in seniority list.I’ve topped and gone to the next aircraftHoping that I do not get furloughed.And, while with worried mind I’ve trodThe difficult sanctity of regulation,Waiting for the FAA inspector who is God.

ATP high flight

Brian Caver, in honour of Phillip Valente,Captain American Eagle Airlines

• When I grow up I want to be a pilot because it's a fun job and easy to do. That's why there areso many pilots flying around these days.

• Pilots don't need much school. They just have to learn to read numbers so they can read theirinstruments.

• I guess they should be able to read a road map, too.

• Pilots should be brave so they won't get scared if its foggy and they can't see, or if a wing or motor falls off.

• Pilots have to have good eyes to see through the clouds, and they can't be afraid of

Pilot - “Folks, we have reached our cruising altitude now, so I am going to switch theseat belt sign off. Feel free to move about as you wish, but please stay inside theplane till we land...it's a bit cold outside, and if you walk on the wings it affects theflight pattern.”

Any landing you can walk away from is a good one. It’s a bonus if you can also usethe aircraft again.

BOTH OPTIMISTS AND PESSIMISTSCONTRIBUTE TO THE SOCIETY. THEOPTIMIST INVENTS THE AEROPLANE, THEPESSIMIST THE PARACHUTE

‘’George Bernard Shaw

The entrance to thecockpit of this aircraftis most difficult. Itshould have beenmade impossible.- Flight Journalmagazine, April 2000,regards the XF10F-1,Grumman's firstattempt at a swingwing fighter.

It’s best to keep the pointed end goingforward as much as possible.

Why I want to be a pilotthunder or lightning because they are much closer to them than we are.

• The salary pilots make is another thing I like. They make more money than they know what to do with. This is because most people think that flying a plane is dangerous, except pilots don't because they know how easy it is.

• I hope I don't get airsick because I get carsick and if I get airsick, I couldn't be a pilot and then I would have to go to work.

Purported to have been written by afifth grade student at JeffersonSchool, Beaufort, SC. It was firstpublished in the South CarolinaAviation News.

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