JCO CRITICALITY ACCIDENT

Masashi Kanamori

Nuclear Emergency Assistance & Training Center

Japan Atomic Energy Agency

11601-13 Nishi-jusanbugyo, Hitachinaka, Ibaraki 、 JAPAN

311-1206

1

CONTENTS

■ Outline of the criticality accident

■ Criticality accident

■ Emergency environmental radiation monitoring

■ Criticality termination work

■ Countermeasures taken by the related organizations

■ Environmental radiation monitoring after the accident

■ Radiation doses

■ Lessons from the accident and re-arrangements of emergency preparedness in Japan

2

Outline of the criticality accident

3

Outline of the criticality accident

■ Criticality accident occurred on September 30, 1999, at the JCO 　　 conversion facility at Tokai-mura.

■ The facility was in the operation for the re-conversion of enriched uranium.

■ The excursion continued for nearly 20 hours ,and the total number of fissions during the criticality accident was estimated to be 2 x 1018.

■ 167 residents were asked to evacuate , and about 310, 000 residents were asked not to leave their homes.

■ This accident was rated as level 4 on INES scale.

4

5International Atomic Energy AgencyああInformation Series / Division of Public Informationああ

08-26941 / Eああ

Photo Credits: Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission,Genkai Nuclear Power Plant, Genkai, J apan/ Kyushu Electric Power Co.,J . Mairs/ IAEA

NO SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE (Below Scale/ Level 0)

• Overexposure of a member of thepublic in excess of statutory annuallimits.

• Minor problems with safetycomponents with significantdefence- in-depth remaining.

• Low activity lost or stolen radioactivesource, device or transport package.

AnomalyLevel 1

• Significant failures in safety provisionsbut with no actual consequences.

• Found highly radioactive sealedorphan source, device or transportpackage with safety provisions intact.

• Inadequate packaging of a highlyradioactive sealed source.

• Radiation levels in an operating areaof more than 50 mSv/ h.

• Significant contamination within thefacility into an area not expected bydesign.

• Exposure of a member of the publicin excess of 10 mSv.

• Exposure of a worker in excess of thestatutory annual limits.

IncidentLevel 2

• Near accident at a nuclear power plantwith no safety provisions remaining.

• Lost or stolen highly radioactivesealed source.

• Misdelivered highly radioactivesealed source without adequateprocedures in place to handle it.

• Exposure rates of more than 1 Sv/ h inan operating area.

• Severe contamination in an areanot expected by design, with alow probability of significant publicexposure.

• Exposure in excess of ten times thestatutory annual limit for workers.

• Non- lethal deterministic health effect(e.g., burns) from radiation.

Serious IncidentLevel 3

J CO accident

• Fuel melt or damage to fuel resultingin more than 0.1% release of coreinventory.

• Release of significant quantities ofradioactive material within aninstallation with a high probability of significant public exposure.

• Minor release of radioactive materialunlikely to result in implementation ofplanned countermeasures other thanlocal food controls.

• At least one death from radiation.

Accident withLocal Consequences

Level 4

TMI accident

• Severe damage to reactor core.• Release of large quantities ofradioactive material within aninstallation with a high probability ofsignificant public exposure. Thiscould arise from a major criticalityaccident or fire.

• Limited release of radioactive materiallikely to require implementationof some planned countermeasures.

• Several deaths from radiation.

Accident withWider Consequences

Level 5

• Significant release of radioactivematerial likely to requireimplementation of plannedcountermeasures.

Serious AccidentLevel 6

Chernobyl accident

• Major release of radioactivematerial with widespread health andenvironmental effects requiringimplementation of planned andextended countermeasures.

Major AccidentLevel 7

Defence- in-DepthRadiological Barriers

and ControlPeople and EnvironmentINES Level

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF INES LEVELS

INESTHE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL EVENT SCALE

International Atomic Energy AgencyああInformation Series / Division of Public Informationああ

08-26941 / Eああ

Photo Credits: Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission,Genkai Nuclear Power Plant, Genkai, J apan/ Kyushu Electric Power Co.,J . Mairs/ IAEA

NO SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE (Below Scale/ Level 0)

• Overexposure of a member of thepublic in excess of statutory annuallimits.

• Minor problems with safetycomponents with significantdefence- in-depth remaining.

• Low activity lost or stolen radioactivesource, device or transport package.

AnomalyLevel 1

• Significant failures in safety provisionsbut with no actual consequences.

• Found highly radioactive sealedorphan source, device or transportpackage with safety provisions intact.

• Inadequate packaging of a highlyradioactive sealed source.

• Radiation levels in an operating areaof more than 50 mSv/ h.

• Significant contamination within thefacility into an area not expected bydesign.

• Exposure of a member of the publicin excess of 10 mSv.

• Exposure of a worker in excess of thestatutory annual limits.

IncidentLevel 2

• Near accident at a nuclear power plantwith no safety provisions remaining.

• Lost or stolen highly radioactivesealed source.

• Misdelivered highly radioactivesealed source without adequateprocedures in place to handle it.

• Exposure rates of more than 1 Sv/ h inan operating area.

• Severe contamination in an areanot expected by design, with alow probability of significant publicexposure.

• Exposure in excess of ten times thestatutory annual limit for workers.

• Non- lethal deterministic health effect(e.g., burns) from radiation.

Serious IncidentLevel 3

J CO accident

• Fuel melt or damage to fuel resultingin more than 0.1% release of coreinventory.

• Release of significant quantities ofradioactive material within aninstallation with a high probability of significant public exposure.

• Minor release of radioactive materialunlikely to result in implementation ofplanned countermeasures other thanlocal food controls.

• At least one death from radiation.

Accident withLocal Consequences

Level 4

TMI accident

• Severe damage to reactor core.• Release of large quantities ofradioactive material within aninstallation with a high probability ofsignificant public exposure. Thiscould arise from a major criticalityaccident or fire.

• Limited release of radioactive materiallikely to require implementationof some planned countermeasures.

• Several deaths from radiation.

Accident withWider Consequences

Level 5

• Significant release of radioactivematerial likely to requireimplementation of plannedcountermeasures.

Serious AccidentLevel 6

Chernobyl accident

• Major release of radioactivematerial with widespread health andenvironmental effects requiringimplementation of planned andextended countermeasures.

Major AccidentLevel 7

Defence- in-DepthRadiological Barriers

and ControlPeople and EnvironmentINES Level

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF INES LEVELS

INESTHE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL EVENT SCALE

Criticality accident

6

Criticality accident

■ Criticality accident occurred on September 30, 1999, at 10:35 am, at the JCO conversion facility which was in the operation for the re-conversion of enriched uranium.

■ The three workers had used the powdered uranium (U3O8), which is 18.8 ％ enriched-uranium, and dissolved them in the stainless steel

container. Concentration of uranium nitrate solution is about 370gU / l.

■ On September 30, 1999, at 10:35 am, the 7th solution in a stainless steel container was poured into the precipitation tank and the solution exceeded the critical mass limit lead to the criticality accident.

■ The precipitation tank was not geometrically safe for criticality. So criticality accidents would occur if much more than the criticality mass was poured.

7

■The excursion continued for nearly twenty hours ,and the total number of fissions during the criticality accident was estimated to be 2 x 1018.

■ Exposures were mainly from direct radiations, some rare gases and radioactive iodine were released into the environment, but the effect was small.

■The two workers who received doses of 16 ~ 25GyEq and 6 ~ 9GyEq died. Another worker whose dose was estimated to be between 2 ~ 3GyEq is still living.

■ As the tank and the building were not damaged, most of the fission products were confined in the tank.

■167residents within a range of 350 meters from the criticality tank were evacuated. About 310, 000 residents within a 10km range were asked by the governor not to leave their homes.

8

(30 September,1999)10:35 The 7th solution in a stainless steel container was poured into the

precipitation tank and the solution exceeded the critical mass limit, so criticality accident occurred.

10:43 JCO notified to fire station of Tokai-mura, saying “This is JCO, 3 workers were down at the conversion facility (“facility”was abbreviated.), please take them to the hospital in ambulances immediately.” (In Japanese, the pronunciation of “conversion” is the same as that of “epilepsy”.)

10:46 The rescue team(3persons) arrived at JCO, but they did not know the situation of the accident, so they had any protective measures for radioactive materials.

11:15 JCO notified to STA, saying “Criticality accident possibly occurred.”

9

Time series at the initial stage after the criticality accident

11:34 JCO notified to Tokai-mura government.

11:40 JCO detected 0.84mSv/h(γ) at the site boundary and informed to STA.

11:52 Sufferers(3 workers) were moved to the hospital by the ambulances.

12:15 Tokai-mura government set up Accident Response Headquarters.

13:55 STA recommended Ibaraki-ken, government that residents near the site remain indoors .

14:30 STA set up Accident Response Headquarters.

15:00 Central government set up Accident Response Headquarters.

15:00 The Mayor of Tokai-mura recommended that residents living within a 350 m of the JCO plant evacuate.

10

Tokai-mura

1km３０ｋｍ

JCO Co Ltd.

JAEA

JR Tokai Sta.

National Route 6

Joban Freeway

CriticalityCriticality accidentaccident

11

JCO Tokai Works

National Route 6

JCO Tokai worksJCO Tokai works

12

13

Precipitation tankPrecipitation tank

14

Precipitation tankPrecipitation tank

15

Ｗ

A

B

C

Wall

Floor

Situation of work near the tankSituation of work near the tank

16-25 GyEq

6-9 GyEq

2-3 GyEq

16

Sketch of precipitation tank drawn at initial stage of the accident

JNC TN8440 2001-018 JCO 臨界事故の終息作業について　より引用

17

Memorandum based on the hearing results Memorandum based on the hearing results of operator(8:30of operator(8:30 ～～ 10:00p.m.)10:00p.m.)

18

Emergency environmental radiation monitoring

19

Radiation doseRadiation dose

● ： neutron

　　○：　 γ

Radiation dose around the site

20

空間線量の時間変動 from 安全委

Radiation dose around the siteRadiation dose around the site（（ Sep.30,10Sep.30,10 ：： 00 00 ーー Oct.1,7Oct.1,7 ：： 0000 ））

1.0

0.1

0.01

9/30 10/1

21

Points of monitoring postsPoints of monitoring posts

2 km

4 km

6 km

8 km

10 km

JCO

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

22

23

The installation place of 60Co irradiation institution

γ-ray measurement results (10:45a.m.)γ-ray measurement results (10:45a.m.)

24

The installation place of 60Co irradiation institution

The 4The 4thth γ-ray measurement results γ-ray measurement results

25

The site boundary and circumference surveillance zone of processing plant

Dose measurement resultsDose measurement results

26

Neutron measurement results (17:05p.m.)Neutron measurement results (17:05p.m.)

27

Neutron measurement resultsNeutron measurement results

28

Criticality termination work

29

Stages of criticality termination work

The termination work was performed in three stages: [1] Polaroid photography and preparation,

[2] water drainage,

[3] addition of boron solution.

30

Policy of dose control in criticality termination work

■The basic concept was prepared based on the ICRP recommendations and Japanese regulations.

■Based on the Japanese regulations, the radiation dose limit for employees is 50mSv and the dose limit for emergency exposure situations is 100mSv.

■ It seemed difficult to manage doses under 50mSv, so doses up to 100mSv

were considered acceptable.

■The Nuclear Safety Commission agreed with this policy of doses objectives.

31

View of conversion-buildingView of conversion-building(about 11:00p.m.)(about 11:00p.m.)

33

0.001

0.01

0.1

1

10 12 14 16 18 20 22 0 2 4 6 8 10 12

Time 　

γ- D

ose

Eq

uiv

alen

t R

ate

(mS

v/h

)

at γ

are

a m

onit

or in

1st f

ac.

9/30 10/1

Ar Pursing

B Pouring

Progress of the accidentProgress of the accident

Draining

Accident occurred.

34

35

Draining of the cooling water from the tankDraining of the cooling water from the tank

36

Route of boric acid to the precipitation tankJNC TN8440 2001-018

37

Pouring of boric acid to the precipitation tank

38

Piling up sandbags for shieldingPiling up sandbags for shielding

39

Countermeasures taken by the related organizations

40

Time series of criticality accident including countermeasures taken by the related organizations

(30 September,1999)

10:35 　 Criticality accident occurred.

10:43 JCO notified to fire station of Tokai-mura

11:15 JCO notified to STA.

11:34 JCO notified to Tokai-mura government.

11:40 JCO detected 0.84mSv/h(γ) at the site boundary and informed to 　　　　　　 STA.

11:52 Sufferers(3 workers) were moved to the hospital by the 　　　　　　 ambulances.

41

12:15 Tokai-mura government set up Accident Response Headquarters.

14:30 STA set up Accident Response Headquarters.

15:00 Central government set up Accident Response Headquarters.

15:00 The Mayor of Tokai-mura recommended that residents living within a 350 m of the JCO plant evacuate.

17:05 Radiation dose (n) of 4.0mSv/h was detected near the site boundary.

20:30 Central government set up Local Accident Response Headquarters at JAERI site.

21:00 Accident Response Headquarters(Head: Prime Minister) was 　　　　　　 established.

42

22:30 Ibaraki-ken, government recommended that residents within　　　　　　 a 10 km of the site remain indoors .

23:15 It was concluded that the cooling water was drained from the jacket surrounding the precipitation tank.

( 1 October,1999)

2:35 ～ 6:04 The work to drain the cooling water from the jacket of the precipitation tank was carried out.

6:15 The removal of the cooling water from the jacket of the precipitation tank was carried out by forcing the Argon gas.

6:30 The radiation dose (n) was lowered to the undetectable level.

8:19 ～ 8:39 Boric acid was poured to the precipitation tank.

43

44

Countermeasures for residents

Evacuation:■On September 30, at 3:00PM, the Mayor of Tokai-mura recommended that

residents living within a 350 m of the JCO plant evacuate.

■The number of persons to evacuate is 161persons(Tokai-mura) and 6persons(Naka-machi).

■Evacuation continued till October 2, at 6:30PM.

Sheltering:■On September 30, at 10:30PM, Ibaraki prefectural government

recommended that residents within a 10 km of the site remain indoors .

■The number of persons to remain indoors is about 310,000persons(Tokai-mura, Cities and towns near Tokai-mura)

■Sheltering continued till October 1, at 2:30PM

45

Evacuation for residents（ Sep.30 ,15 ： 00 - Oct.1,18 ： 30 ）

Evacuation１６１ Persons(Tokai-mura)

46

Sheltering(Sep.30, 22 ： 30 - Oct.1,14 ： 30 ）

Sheltering310,000persons

47

Environmental radiation monitoring after the accident

48

Radiation doses(n,γRadiation doses(n,γ ）） after the accident

μSv/h

49

Environmental radiation monitoringEnvironmental radiation monitoring

• Neutron, γ-rayNeutron, γ-ray (described above)(described above)

• γ-dose rate by released radioactive materials: 0.24 μGy/h γ-dose rate by released radioactive materials: 0.24 μGy/h (West 8(West 8 ｋｍ）ｋｍ）

• Detected activated products (AP) and fission productsDetected activated products (AP) and fission products (FP) : (FP) : Na-24, Mn-56, Sr-91, I-131, I-133, I-135, Cs-138Na-24, Mn-56, Sr-91, I-131, I-133, I-135, Cs-138

• AP/FP concentration in environmental samples: AP/FP concentration in environmental samples: 　　 　　 negligible valuenegligible value - maximum concentration of I-131 at the site boundary:- maximum concentration of I-131 at the site boundary: 　　　　　 　 (1.6-44)x10-9 Bq/cm3 << 1x10-5 Bq/cm3 (limit value)(1.6-44)x10-9 Bq/cm3 << 1x10-5 Bq/cm3 (limit value) - maximum concentration of I-131- maximum concentration of I-131 in Vegetables (excluding in Vegetables (excluding

root crop and potato) : root crop and potato) : 　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 0.037 Bq/g <<2 Bq/g (Indices about ingestion restrictions 0.037 Bq/g <<2 Bq/g (Indices about ingestion restrictions

of food and drink prescribedof food and drink prescribed by nuclear safety commission)by nuclear safety commission)

50

Environmental monitoringEnvironmental monitoring

51

Radiation surveyRadiation survey of residentsof residents

52

１）　１）　 Some rare gases and radioactive iodine were Some rare gases and radioactive iodine were released into the environment, but the effect released into the environment, but the effect was small.was small.

２２ )) Exposures were mainly from direct Exposures were mainly from direct radiations.) radiations.)

Results of monitoring Results of monitoring

53

Radiation doses

54

Estimation of radiation dose Estimation of radiation dose

・・ Estimation of radiation dose of 3 workers Estimation of radiation dose of 3 workers

　　　　 - - premonitory symptom ((vomiting, , diarrhea, , nausea, , trouble oftrouble of consciousness)) - - decrease of lymphocyte - check of - check of chromosome - measurement of Na-24 value in - measurement of Na-24 value in blood

・・ Estimated radiation dose of 3workersEstimated radiation dose of 3workers

Worker-A: 16-20 GyEqWorker-A: 16-20 GyEq Worker-B: 6-10 GyEqWorker-B: 6-10 GyEq Worker-C: 1-4.5 GyEqWorker-C: 1-4.5 GyEq 55

Doses results (1)Doses results (1)November 8, 2000

CategoryCategory PeoplePeople NotesNotes

EmployeesEmployees 172172

EmployeesEmployeeswhose dosewhose dosewas actuallywas actuallymeasuredmeasured

EmployeesEmployeesinvolved in tasksinvolved in taskswhen the accidentwhen the accidentoccurredoccurred

33

16~25GyEq or more(Died on December 21,16~25GyEq or more(Died on December 21,1999) 1999) 6.0~9GyEq(Died on April 27, 2000)6.0~9GyEq(Died on April 27, 2000)2~3GyEq(Discharged from the National Institute2~3GyEq(Discharged from the National Instituteof Radiological Sciences on December 21, 1999)of Radiological Sciences on December 21, 1999)

EmployeesEmployeesinvolved ininvolved indrainage of water,drainage of water,etc.etc.

1818Detected by whole-body counters, individualDetected by whole-body counters, individualdosimeters, etc.dosimeters, etc. Their collective range was Their collective range was 3.8~48mSv(effective dose equivalent).3.8~48mSv(effective dose equivalent).

EmployeesEmployeesinvolved ininvolved ininjection of boricinjection of boricacid into the tankacid into the tank

66Detected by dosimeters, etc. Detected by dosimeters, etc. Their collective Their collective range was 0.7~3.5mSv(effective dose equivalent).range was 0.7~3.5mSv(effective dose equivalent).

Other employeesOther employeesat the site duringat the site duringthe accidentthe accident

4949Detected by whole-body counters and film badges.Detected by whole-body counters and film badges. Their collective range was 0.6~48mSv(effective Their collective range was 0.6~48mSv(effective dose equivalent).dose equivalent).

EmployeesEmployeeswhose dosewhose dosewaswasestimatedestimated

9696

Estimated according to location-based radiation Estimated according to location-based radiation dose evaluations and the individual behavior survey dose evaluations and the individual behavior survey conducted by JCO.conducted by JCO. Their collective range was Their collective range was 0.06~17mSv(effective dose equivalent).0.06~17mSv(effective dose equivalent).0.06~16.6

6.0~10

16~20 or more

0.6~47.4

1~4.5

56

Doses results (2) Doses results (2) November 8, 2000

57

CategoryCategory PeoplePeople NotesNotes

Persons involved in Persons involved in disaster-related tasksdisaster-related tasks

260260

PersonsPersonswhose whose dose was dose was actually actually measuredmeasured

Government-Government-relatedrelatedorganizations(Stafforganizations(Staffof JAERI and JNC)of JAERI and JNC)

5757→→5656

Of 206 whose dose was measured by filmOf 206 whose dose was measured by filmbadges or TLD, exposure was detected on 56.badges or TLD, exposure was detected on 56.Their collective range was 0.1~9.2mSv(effectiveTheir collective range was 0.1~9.2mSv(effectivedose equivalent).dose equivalent).

Fire-fightersFire-fighters(involved in rescue(involved in rescuetasks related to thetasks related to theaccident)accident)

33Detected by whole-body counters.Detected by whole-body counters. TheirTheircollective range was 4.6~9.4mSv(effective dosecollective range was 4.6~9.4mSv(effective doseequivalent).equivalent).

PersonsPersonswhose whose dose was dose was estimatedestimated

Self-governmentSelf-governmentbodies relatedbodies relatedpersonspersons

167167Estimated by the behavior survey. Estimated by the behavior survey. TheirTheircollective range was 0.0002~7.2mSv(effectivecollective range was 0.0002~7.2mSv(effectivedose equivalent).dose equivalent).

State relatedState relatedpersonspersons 88

Estimated by the behavior survey. Estimated by the behavior survey. TheirTheircollective range was 0.49~2.1mSv(effectivecollective range was 0.49~2.1mSv(effectivedose equivalent).dose equivalent).

InformationInformationmedium relatedmedium relatedpersonspersons

2626Estimated by the behavior survey. Estimated by the behavior survey. TheirTheircollective range was 0.014~2.6mSv(effectivecollective range was 0.014~2.6mSv(effectivedose equivalent).dose equivalent). 57

CategoryCategory PeoplePeople NotesNotes

ResidentsResidents 234234

Persons whose dose was actually Persons whose dose was actually measuredmeasured 77

Detected by whole-body counters.Detected by whole-body counters. Their Their collective range was 6.7~16mSv(effective dose collective range was 6.7~16mSv(effective dose equivalent).equivalent).

Persons Persons whose dose whose dose was was estimatedestimated

Living or Working Living or Working personspersons 199199

Estimated by the behavior survey. Estimated by the behavior survey. Their Their collective range was 0.01~21mSv(effective dose collective range was 0.01~21mSv(effective dose equivalent).equivalent).

Momentary staying Momentary staying personspersons 2828

Estimated by the behavior survey. Estimated by the behavior survey. Their Their collective range was 0.01~3.8mSv(effective collective range was 0.01~3.8mSv(effective dose equivalent).dose equivalent).

Doses results (3) Doses results (3) November 8, 2000

58

Lessons from the accident and re-arrangements of emergency preparedness in Japan

59

Lessons learned from the criticality accident

■ Initial responses and communications

■ Authority, responsibility and decision making

■ Radiation measurements and medical responses

■ Regulatory Systems

60

Establishment of the various systems

■ The Special Law of Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Disaster was enacted in December 1999 ．

■ The Basic Plan for Emergency Preparedness was revised clarifying roles and responsibilities of the related organizations.

■ An OFC would be designated in a case of emergency as the base for implementing responses.

■ JAEA/NEAT is expected to assist the staff of the OFC as the designated public organization.

61

Legislation in the Special Law of Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Disaster

■ Assignment of Off-site center

■ Designation of the special nuclear disaster preparedness officer

■ Implementation of nuclear emergency exercises

■ Nuclear emergency plans for nuclear industries

■ Establishment of adequate radiation monitoring systems

62

Actions defined by law

Article-10: Disaster preparedness manager shall inform the competent minister, governor and local authorities of the defined incidents.

Article-15: In the case of a nuclear disaster the competent minister

shall report the situations to the Prime Minister who will in turn declare a disaster.

Article-10 Article-15

0.05-0.1 μSv/h(normal dose rate)

5 μSv/h10 min

500 μSv/h10 min

63

Organizational arrangements for nuclear emergency response

■ The organizational arrangements in nuclear emergency preparedness in Japan are provided by the Laws.

■ OFC would play an important roll in the negotiations with the related organizations.

■ The government have established the NEAT to fulfill these activities effectively for assisting the OFC.

64

Organizational arrangements for nuclear emergency response

　　

Local Nuclear EmergencyResponse Headquarters

The Joint Council of Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures

Headquarter of cities, towns,

villages

ＮＥＡＴ　Ｃｅｎｔｅｒ

License Holder

Technical support

Organization related to disaster preparedness

　　　　　　 Police 　　　　　　　　　　 JNES　　　　　　 Fire Station 　　　　　 NIRS　　　　　　 Self-Defense Forces NUSTEC

Headquarter of prefecture

Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters

Chairman: Prime Minister

Off-site Center

Nuclear SafetyCommission

Cabinet Office METI MEXT Ministry of Defense Fire and Disaster Management Agency National Police Agency

●

●

●

●

●

●

65

advice

NEAT

Off-site center

information

information information

Specialists

Nuclear Company

instruction

EvacuationSheltering

Public

Monitoring

　　 Central Government

advice

RadiationProtection

Nuclear Safety Commission

Local Government

Specialists

66

Off site center （ 22 places in Japan ）　　

NEAT Center （ Ibaraki Prefecture ） is technical assistance base of JAEA

Fukui branch office of NEAT Center (Fukui Prefecture)

Off-site center and NEAT center

67

Exercises planned by central and local governments

■ Many kinds of exercises and drills are conducted by the related organizations.

■ These exercises are integrated as a full-scale national exercise which is planned and carried out every year.

■ This scheme is shown in the figure on next page .

■ The staff of NEAT attends these exercises and provide technical support by dispatching specialists and providing special vehicles, etc.

68

Full-scale National ExerciseAnnual exercise for all the relevant parties

One selected prefecture, with evacuation of residents, Decision maker (utterance based)

Scenario, narrative based stimulated

Annual Prefectural Exercise (one prefecture a year, organized by the prefecture)

Mainly decision making process in the Off Cite Center, partial exercise

Disaster specialists drill who have to lead OFC activities

Drill for the relevant transport groups

Exercises for the facilities regulated by MEXT

Basic training for every function of the full scale National Exercise

Exercise for large scale earthquake on DP Day

Partial National exercise

Prefectural Exercise

OFC Drill

Disaster specialist Drill

Transport Accident Drill

MEXT ExerciseMEXT Exercise

Basic Training,

DP Day government exercise

Over view of annual exercises in Japan

DS ： Disaster specialist

Ministries NISACabinetPurpose and Feature Local Gov.OFC

69

Legal role of JAEA at nuclear emergency

　■　 Designated Public Organizations - Basic Law on Emergency Preparedness

　■　 Dispatch of experts and Supplying special equipments　 ‐ Basic Plan for Emergency Preparedness

　■　 NEAT Center is the disaster response support base facilities of JAEA-Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures Manual

70

Future issues

■ Functions of Emergency related organizations will continue to be tested in emergency exercises.

■ We are continuing to improve the systems in emergency preparedness and response in Japan.

■ The knowledge gained by the various organizations mentioned above can then be shared with other Asian counties.

■ The IAEA plays an important roll in providing funds and opportunities.

■ It is also important to further our research on such issues as RDD and consolidate our recovery phase programs.

71

Thank you for your attention.

72