Japanese Methods of Prisoner of War Interrogation 1946-06-01

7/28/2019 Japanese Methods of Prisoner of War Interrogation 1946-06-01

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERSSUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERSKP-0. 500 1 June 1946

Published for the information of all concerned.By command of Genera1 MacARTHUR : -

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P. J. MUELLER,Major General, United States Army,Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL :C. A. WTLLOUGHBY, Major General, G.S.C., \Asst. Chief of,Staff, 6-2.

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ALLIED TRANSLATOR AN DSUPREME COMMANDER FOR

RESEARCH Rl

SUBJECT : JAPANESE METH0I)S OF PRISONEROF WAl t INTEREOGAl'ION

I. G. No. 6950

DATE OF ISSUE 1 June 1946 NO. 134

SUMMARY :

1. This report, based on material available to ATIS, GHQ, to19 Kovember 1943, prme~lts vidence that the Japanese Armyhad s high regard for intelligence obtained through tho interro-gation of prisoners of war; that iiltegogatio~lw t l ~conducted atboth the front and rear areas ; thttt interrog:ation techniquesvaried from khc gentle to the cruel ; that prisoilers were inter-rogated for the purpose of obtnilling tacticd, technical, an dpropaganda i~iformntion and that interrogation was debailedand thorough.2. The report also givm examples of material obtaiilcd iuactual i~~terrogatioae.

RF/WM/jg I. G. WALKERColonel, C a v t yDistributioil H Commanding

SOIJRCES : Captured Documeuts.Statements by Prisoners of War.


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CONTENTS ,pageSection I. TIME AND PLACE OF INTERROGATION . . . . . . . . . 1 1. Geilerd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I

2. Interrogation in Forward Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3. Interrogat iol l in Rear Axas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

11. T E C H N I Q U E S O F I N T E R R O G A T I O N . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5. I~ltcrrogationwithout Torture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6. Iilterivgation with Torture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S

111. M A T T E R S O F I N T E R R O G A T IO N . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 5 7. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 8. Typw of Informalion Sought by Illterrogators : . . . . . . 5

a. 1nfom1:rtion Collcerilli~gTactics and Operations . . '. . 5 b. Informati011 of Technical Value . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 c. Information Useful as Propaganda . . . . . . . . . . 6

9. Examples of Intelligence Obtained iu Actual Interrogatio~ls . 6 IV . CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10


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Section I. TIME AND PLACE OF INTERROGATION

1. GENERALThe importance of ii~terrogating r'sonert!

immediately upou capture is emphasized invarious Japanese Army directives.

a. Extract from i~ mimeographed fileciltitled " Interrogation of PsW " (undated,issuing authority not stated) by CO, ODA-MURA Co."I~lformation obtJ11ed from PSI' isessential in determining the enemy's plail,strength, tactics, organization and equipment.Interrogation is clcarly presented in ' FieldService Regulations.' It is classified into :

- " Information while under detention." Imniediate interrogatio~lduring opera-

tione." Irnmcdiatc i~lterrogatioi~of severely~vounded."(ATIS Eilcrny Publication No. 255, page 1).

b. Extract from Service Reg~lat~ionsndPropaganda Strategy of 115 Infantry Regi-ment, dated Julie 1943." Necessary examination of PsIV must beconducted r r t the place of ctbpturc and theresults will be sent back to Regimental HQ.. ...Prohibit further examination of PsJVat the place of capture other than for specialpurposes.')(ATIS Current Trauslzbtiolis No. 83, page 8).

c. Extract from regulsttious (undated,issuiilg authority not stated, but internalevidence indicates that t,hcy mcre issued by16 Army. JAVA, 1943).

" As soon as pfisoners of war tire captured,they ehould.. . ..be examined.. ....."(ATIS Research Report No. 86, page 5).

2 . INTERROGATIONI N FORW ARD AREAS

Examination in forward areas was forimmediate operational information.

a. Extract from handwritten ~lotebookentitled " R 1 (sic) Service M " concerningilltelligence and fifth colulnil operations intotal uar (undated, writer and unit notstated, col~tents presumably copied frommanual)." PsW ct~pturcdat the front line shouldprefcrtbbly be interrogated at the spot onmatters requiring the pi il ti ag out of the:bctual ground."(ATIS Eiiemy Publictrtioil No. 271, page2


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Section II. TECHNleUES OF lNTERRO6ATlON

4 . GENERALThe general interrogatory pattern to achieve

t,be aforementioned objectivm is epitomizedin a series of captured Japanese manuals.The iilterrogatioil officer is iilstructed toapproach the prisoiler of war sympatheticallyin order to illstill in him a feeling of security,to overcomc his hostility, to take advantageof his youth by ueing flattery, and, withwomen, to profit by their ~ ia tura l hyness.

a. Extract from a captured bookletentitled " Illstructions on How to Inter-rogate " published in Daily Iiltelligence Ex-tracts, HQ 10 Air Force, 18 August (yearnot given).

" Main point i i l t e r r ~~ t i o~ lf of prisonerof war is to secure truth of everythingprisoner of w B knows, but prisoner may beptriotic. Needless to say, prisoners of warinsist on their rights and duties ill :kccord-ai~c e with internationd law, and it isdifficult to make them say anything agaivsttheir ~latioilal iiltereats. On the whole,iilterrogatioil of prisoilers of war is not likethat of criminals. For a disposition, tangible.proof is needed, but i t is almost impossible tojudge authenticity, for there are no limits ti,the scope of his knowledge, and if he says ' Idon't know ' force may not be used. to get astronger statement from him."(ATIS Research Report No. 86 (Suppl. No.11, Page 3).The seeming iiljui~ctioalagainst duress ismerely a verbal coixcessio~l o propriety; infact, Japanese orders are distinguished by thefact that the rule and how to circumvent therule are simultaileously stated. Thus theinterrogating officer is iilvited to use" originality and zeal. . . to secure truth andfull details." Lest the m ea nh g of " origi-ninlity and neal" be misconstrued, themanual coiltiilues with the adumbratioil that" you must nol gec excited even with theP$W who are arrogailt and always answer' I don't know.' Always remain calm. Youmust be care'ful when using ii~vectiw,rebukcs or torture, for it wiII cause him tolie and make a fool of you."(ATIS Research Report No. 86 (Suppl. No.11, Page 3) .

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5. INTERROGATION WITHOUT TORTURE

To obviate situations which require com-pulsion against prisouers, the iilterrogatiilgofficer is urged to exhaust all psychologicaln~sm. The specific psycllological approachis preceded by the well-reasoned techniqueof segregating prisoners to prevent theirfabricating spurious information. begre-gation embraces the additional advailtageof permitting the iilterrogator to ascertaii~the reliabilily of the prisoners. Kllowilinformation, articles and papers on theprisoaer's person arc to be applied as ad-ditional chec h. The coilfusioil and distressattendiiig a ntwly-captured prisoiler grantsthe interrogator ail opportunity to elicitreplies with greater ease, inasmuch as theprisoner hris not the composure to dissemble.The examining officer is wanled that " ifthe prisoiler looks repeatedly and inquisi-Civcly at the interrogator's face and stealsa glance at his eyes, this is a sign that thePW is concealing vittkl knowlodgc+."(AY'IS Enemy Publicatioi~No. 271, page 23) .

To overcoiue the pri80ner's reluctailce todivulge information, the interrogator is ,en-joined to underlniile his morale. Varyingthe trpproach according to the nationalityof the prisoaer, the questioacr is iustructedto employ the followiilg tech~liques

a. Extract from captured booklet " In-structions oil How to Interrogate " publishedill Ddly Inhlligence gxtracts, HQ 10 AirForce, 18 August (year ]lot given)." Infuse anti-war sentiments. Military ob-jective of ENGLAND and AMERICA is anti-religious. They do lot seek peace or freedom.Recall ciljo yable existen cc of pre-war days.Show corruption of public morals, deficiei~cyof materials and frequellcy of strikes in theirown country. With British troops -heri-call atrocities to women in England. WithAmerican troops-state of vromen's anti-warmovement in AMERICA.. ....Arouse hatredand weariile~sof war, e.g., do you knowwhere your wife now lives... that districtwas heavily bombed by GERMANY receutly.Do you know to what area she has beenevacuated ? BRITAIN is retreating from


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INTERROGATION WITH TORTURE

00 to 00 ; if she is on defeated you willbe able to return to your wife and child,who are saying ' come quickly.' Take thisline particularly with thoae who have a wife,and children."(ATIS Research Report No. S( i (Suppl. No.11, Page 3)-It is further suggested that the demortili-zation of the prisoaer may be facilitatedwhen a PW who has been previously cap-tured or one-who is of the same nationalityand is already in the enemy's hands call belnadc to contact him.6 . INTERROGATION

WITH TORTUREIf the prisoner persists in his obduracy,

thi-ats of grave physical discomfort$ shouldbe made. With utter disregard for the pro-hibition of brutality, it is proposed, euphc-mistiwlly to be sure, that " skillful methods "be applied. " Skillful methods )' are notdefined, but torture is succinctly described.111 quaint Japanese circumlocution, brutaldirectives are disguised in the form ofapparently factual statements.

a. Extract from captured booklet eatitled" Instructions on How to I ~ l t e r r o ~ t epub-lished in Daily Intelligence Extracts, Hq.10 Air Force, 18 August (year not given)." Measures to be normally adopted.... .. .Torture (GOMON) emnbraccs, beating, kicking,rtud till coilduct iilvolviag physical suffer-ing. I t is the most clumsy methodand 0111~to be used when all else fails.(Specidly marked in lext.) When violenttorture is used, change interrogatioil officer,and it is bencficial if u new officer questionsin sympathetic fashion." Threat's. As a hint of pllybical discom-forts to come, e.g. murder, torture, starving,deprivation of sleep, solitary coafiuement,etc. Mental discomforts to come, e.g., il lnot receive same treatment as other prisonersof war ; in evelit of exch:rilge of prisoners hewill bc kept till Itist ; he will be forbidden tosend letters; will be forbiddell to inform hishome he is a prisoaer of war, etc."(ATIS Research Report No. 86 (Suppl. No.I), pige 3).

b. Extract from handwritten ilotebooktitled " R l (sic) Servicc M " concerningintelligeuce and fifth columu operations iutotal war (undated, writer and unit notstated)."During tlie que'stioniug, if the PW com-plains repeatedly that he is thirsty and de-mands water, this is a sign that he is in agony

such as one experieilces just before confes-sing matters of a vital uature." Ii~terrogationshould preferably be cou-ducted in such a manner. that the PW isled on to talk. However, when the situatioildemands speed, methods in which pain isinflicted on the PW may be u8ed as well.I11 either case, consideratiou must be givento future use and influences."(ATIS Enemy Publication No. 271, page 26).

Japanese sources tifford too few in sta ~~cesof the actual application of their iuterroga-tory technique, but those that are availablerequire no footnotes. Iu a Japanese diarycaaptured at KWAJALEIN, the diarist dc-scribes all iaterrogation of three Americanair PsW, climaxed by :I beating administ6redto till officer who would not " reply as asked"uiltil " that damned officer fiadly let out ascream."(JICPOA Tr:inslation, Item No. 6437 (dateuaknown), page 3) .

c. Extract from stntemeilt of Prisoner ofWar ( JA (USA) 100060,)captured tit KORA:KO, 22 April 1944." At KORAKO, about 20 March 1944, PWsaw a US airman tied to a tree and ques-tioned by Lt. SE T0 (since killed). A~lswerswere ui~satisfiictory. Japs in area lined upand beat Allied PW with clubs. He wasrevived after becoming ui lco~~scious~ l dwasagain beateu. Following day : JapaneseW0, nicknamed SAMPANG (crooked legs)by Javanese, made three at tm pts to beheadAllied I'W. Head did not come off.Another Japanese named INOUYE cut offthe hcad after third attempt. Several Java-nese witnessed the deed."(ATIS Iilterrogatioil Report No. 416, SerialNo. 667, page 4).d. Extract from statement of Dr. I. G .BRAUN, Missioll Hospital at AMELE, nearMADANG, NEW GUINEA." One officer said that the .policy was. totie up the captured airmen, quustion thempleasailtly until they mould give no furtherinformation, and the11 require them to kneelwith a broomstick inside the knee-joints. Hestated that after one or two hours of this' most of them would talk.' After the seconclinterrogation was finished, they would bebeaten and executed,usually by decapitation."(Report of AC of S, G-2, ALAMO Force,dated 8 May 1944).

Particulrirly revoltilig tortures to extractinformation are described as follows :

e. Extract from COIS Eastern Fleet, Ab-stract of Enemy Information No. 6 (dated 8August 1944).


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JAPANE4E METIIODS OF PRISOXER OF W-4R INTERROGATION

" The victim's storntrcls is filled with waterfrom a hose placed in .the thmrvt. A plailkis t,heil placed across the distended stomach,and Japanese, onk on each end, then ' see-saw' thus forcii~gout the water from thestomach. Mawy of the victims die underthis torture." The victim's thumbs are tied togetherand he is hitched by them to a motor carwhich proceeds to pull him r~rouild in ncircle nuti1 ho falls exhausted. This is re-peated at two-or thrm-day intervals.'' When KEMPEI officers become physi-cally tired flvm the beating-up of a victim,a secoild victim is brought in. Each victimis given R stick and they are set to belabor-ing each other."(ATIS Research Report No. 72 (Suppl. No.11, page 23).f. Cruel treatment of PsW of all branches. of our service has been tlloroughlyproven in our War Crimi11:d Tr ids. How-ever, there i s some illdicatioi~ that harshand brutal trea$ment.was applied more to

air than $0 groulid troops. In additiou. tothe statement of Dr. I. G. Braun citedabove, there is other evidence that airmenwere siugled out for harsher treatment.Hiroshi FUJII, formerly a doctor at theOMORI PW Camp, stated at an interviewin Sugamo Prisoil that :" . ...in cont~.aveiltionof ail order issued -verbally by Col. SAKABA, tho C%mpCom-mandant, that Special POW B-29 air crew&were not to receive medicd t~strtment,hesecretly performed :nl operation on a SpecidPOW for hemorrhoids.. ." Special POWs, B-29 crew members, re-ceived ollly hdf rations or two-thirds rationson orders of Col. SAKABA ......" .....When he requested the Colollel toallow hilrl to fill out death certificate (for aSpecial PW ,this was refused by SAKABAonthe g~wuilds hat special prisoilers need not betreated the ssme as other POWs. "

(Report No. 489 of Investigatioa Jlivision,Legal Section, GHQ,, SCAP).


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Section I l l . MATTERS OF INTE RROGATIOM

7. GENERALEvideilcc concenli~lgma tt e~s f iilterroga-

tion and the comparative thoroughness withwhich illformation was obtained is drawnchiefly from two sources: documents con-taining lists of subjects for iilterrogatioa anddocuments recording actual iinterrogations ofprisonem of war. Available trailslations ofcaptured enemy material indicate that inter-rogations were thorough.8. TYPES OF INFORMATION

SOUGHT BYINTERROGATORS'

Informatioil sought by interrogators fallsinto lhree classes; in order of importaiioe,these are a. information concenling tacticsm d operations, b. information of technicalvalue, and c. information u~efu l as pro-pagmds.

a. A syilthesis of lists taken from Japa-nese Army instructional publicatiours shamethe following to be the subjects upon whichtactical and operatioil'al i~lformation wasdesired :

( 1) Location of units( 2 ) Orgailizatioil and equipment of unitc,( 3 ) L~tes t rders received by units( 4 ) Recent supply situation( 5 ) Formation under which units operate( 6 ) Identification of persolll~el( 7 ) Last bivouac area( 8 ) Combat situation( 9 ) Functionillg of line of communica-tioils(10) Projected operations(11) Couditioil of roads, tracks, airfields(12) Routes, distances, times(13) Methoas of travel

(ATIS Interrogation Report No. 66-L, SerialNo. 562, pages 22-23 and ATIS EnemyPublication No. 255, pages 2-4).

b. Topics upon which information of atechnical nature was to be obkiaed included :( 1) Characteristic weapons( 2 ) Newly issued materiel( 3 ) Unusual equipment( 4 ) Cominullicationg lletwork( 5 ) Points elnphasized in training

( 6 ) ~ti nda rds equired in traiiling( 7 ) Resulk achieved in training(ATIS Enemy Publication No. 255, pages3-4).

c. The importailce of acquiring informa-tion useful as propaganda against the AlliedNations is forcefully emphwized in +Japanesedocuments dealing with prisoiler of war in-terrog,?tion. I t is in thig phase of examina-tion procedure that some of the most inter-esting reflectioils of Japanese psychology areto be found, Zogether with evidence re-vealii~g a peculiar and sometimes amusiilgfaihvre to understand the ways of theOccident. More importallt than these, how-ever, is the disclosure of evidence aubstai~titrt-i i ~ gour kilowledge of certdil Japanese waraims, chiefly the intent to incite and promotedissensioil among the United Nations.(1) Extract from a " Memorandum on

the Gathering of Material for Foreign Pr o paganda fiom PsW" iesued by 4 Air ArmyC of S, 4 September 1943.

"Followi~lgare examples of the sort ofpropaganda material useful for spreadingdisunity betweell Arnericvrn and Australia11forces and bretikii~gdown their will to fight :" (a) Doubts cast upon the war aims of

American and Australian forces.(b) Dissension- and friction between

American and Australian troops inthe field.

(c) Discrimhlation against natives,Chinese, Nisei, and native trocips.(d) Enemy losses, especially perwnnel

losses.(e) Current situation ns regards shipssunk and aircraft destroyed.( f ) Supply situation, causes of illnessa~ld ondition of sick. Also situa-

tion regarding relief of front linetroops.

(g) Enemy opinioil of Japanese nightattacks and jungle warfare.(h) Fighting spirit of enemy troops.( i ) Enemy opinion of battle action ofJapanese Air Force and fleet.( j ) Activities of PW up to time ofcapture.(k) Extent of i~~tercept ionof field

broadcasts.


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JAPANESE METISODS OF PRISONER OF WAR Ilr'TERROGAITION(1) Effect of our own propaganda,

especially in regard to dissensionbetween American and Australiantroops, native revolts an d the ex-tent to which all types of home-front unrest in AMERICA (orAUSTRALIA) have affected thefront line troops.

(m) Sad plight of nurses and thewomen's auxiliary army."

(ATIS Enemy Yublication No. 225, page 1).I t is clear from the foregoing examples

that some of the leads used in interrogationfor propaganda purposes were the re~lult freaaonabb accurate, though by no meanscomplete, knowledge of coilditions amopgthe Allies. Other leads, obviously, werevague and inaccurate, beiilg no more thanthe offshoots of rumor or the results ofmere supporsitioa, if not of absolute misill-formation. In particular, the reference tothe ('sad plight of nurses and the women'sauxiliary army " arouses curiosity, not onlybecause of its quaii~ twordi~lg, ut also be-cause of its probable meanii~g.

I t is not the objective of this paper to in-vestigate the ways in which this materialwas employed as propaga~~dar the extentto which its use proved effective. What isof present importance is the fact that thegathering of such ii~formation was con-sideked a vital phase of prisoner interrogation.9. EXAMPLES OF INTELLIGENGE

OBTAINED IN ACTUAL INTERROGATIONS

Four documents which record actualiilterrogatioils of prisoners of war providestartling evideilce of the thoroughlless ofquestioning and the significa~lce of theillformatioil elicited. It must be made clear,however, that them documents cannot becoilsidered completely typical, nasmuch as fewothers are available for comparison. I t mustalso be mentioned that the surprising detail ofthe testi~noily may be the result of morethan a skillful elicitation of information bypurely legitimate methods. Nowhere dot*heserecords mention the means by whichprisoners were stimulated to divulge valuablefacts, but in the light of our knowledge ofinstructiolls given to iilterrogators, it isjustifiable to assume that torture may havebeen employed, or at least that threats weremade. But i t is also justifiable, sinceevidence is lacking, to assume that theprisoners, in violatioll of their traiilii~ginstructions, spoke freely. The possible

reasons for such ~uninhibitecl disclosures ofvital knowledge are numkrous : a desire toimpress the ellemy with Allied superiority,a failure to appreciate the ability of theenemy to use their statements, a hope ofcomforts or concessions to be granted inreward for their testimony, an apathy towardthe war and everything coiiilected with it,or a panic fear resulting from capture.Whatever the reasons may have been, theinformtttion was given with what seems attimes to be a11 unilecessary completeness.

s. The first of thew documents is the(' Interrogtttiol~Report of an American NavyFlier Shot Dotvu land Captured (24 Septem-ber 1944) near CEBU." A brief of thecontents indicates the extent of the interroga-tion. The comparative detail with which theiaformation was given can best be illustratedby an excerpt from the report itself.

(1) A brief of the conteilts includes thefollowing :

(a) A history of the prisoner, witha record of his training and histransfers.

(b) A record of the tactical move-meuts of the prisoner, with in-formatioil regarding operations

. participated in and losses andmovements of carrier forces.(c) Information regarding the or-

gauizatiou of Task Force 38,under the followillg headings :1. Composition of 3 Fleet2. Orgaaization of the LEX-

INGTON3. Number of airplanes and

personnel on a carrier4. Names of American wrriers6. American carrier cayouflage

(with sketches).(d) Information on matters pertain-

iilg to mesaage security, withreference to frequency used, callwords, terminology.

(ATIS Enemy Publicatioil No. 402, page A).(2) Extract from ultrasecret telegram NO.282342 containing additional iilfonnation

from pilot ensign of carrier LEXINGTON(interrogation conducted at HQ), %;thwestArea Fleet, date of r h o r t 20 October 1944.

" (a) Recent movemellts and or-ganization of the task force :1. Commartder of Task Force 38 is

Adm MITSCHER. Four gou ps are com-posed of two regular aircraft carriers andtwo coin~~tedruiser carriem each, total-ing 16 ships, plus destroyer escorts.

2. The following types of ships (at-


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EXAMPLES OF INTELLIGENCE OBTt\lNED IN ACTUAL INTERROGATIONStached to 3 Fleet) are assigned to . thegroups :

Groups 1 and 2- two to threebattlmhips and three to four cruisers.

Group 3- four to five battleshipsand four to five cruisers.

Group P- 110 batkleships, four tofive cruisers.3. Adm HALSEY-- CommandiugOfficer of PHILIPPINES Area NavalForce."

(ATIS Enemy Publication No. 402, page 2).(Note : Examination of independent sources verifiesthe substantial accuracy of information obtained byJapanese methods of interrogation)

b. The second of these documeilts is amimeographed booklet eatitled "Tactics ofthe US Air Forces (KUGUN) in theSOLOMONS Area." I t bears the followingnotation: " I11 view of the present battlesituation, this booklet requires immediatedistribution. I t was prepared from inter-rogation of an Allied PW. Reliability ' A.' "The significance of the words, " immediatedistribultionyJ' s clear enough, but an ex-amination of the contents makes it oillymore evident that the material was of highimportance. Although it is impracticablehere to quote ex%ensively rom the document,it is possible to present a list of the maintopics in the table of contents and to quotean excerpt which will convey the extent ofthe detail. I t must be emphasized that the~nformationgiven under each topical head-ing in the table of contents is strikinglydetailed and frequently accompanied by dia-grams, maps, and sketches.

(1 ) Extract from mimeographed bookletentitled " Tactics of the US Air Forces(KUGUN) in thc SOLOMONS Area" (issuedby 6 Field MP Unit and reproduced byOperations Section, 6 Flyiilg Division, dated7 February 1944).

" (a) Formations and Co-ordinated Opera-tions.Fighter and bomber formations.Ratio of fighters aild bombers incombination. Combined use of different types of fighter planes. Co-ordinated attack by different typcs of bombers. Co-ordinated attack of ground and carrier based bombers. 4Essentids in co-ordinated operatioilswith the fleet.Co-ordinated operations with tlieAir Force in NEW GUINEA.(b) Bomber Tactics.Measurm against Japanese fighters.

Low, medium, and high altitudebombing.Bombing by waves.Attacking ships.Attacking against AA fire.Time and routes of attacks onRABAUL. .Destruction of RABAUL.Attack by medium bombers.

(c) Fighter Tactics.Missioils of fighters. ,Attack by fighter planes.Weaknesses of Japapese figh&ersasseen by t'he US Air Force.Attacking formations.Attacking bombers.

(d) Action of the Air Force before andafter La~ldi~i~gcperations.Reconnaissance before landing.Bombardment before landing.Coucealment of laildiilg plans.Co-ordillation with the laildiagforce during landing.Bombing after a successful landing.

(e) Guerrilla Tactics.Lo; altitude surprise attacks.Use of fighters as decoys when a ttacking.Su qr is s attack from behind moun-tains or hills.Battle of nerves at night.Surprise attack at night from ex-tremely low altitudes.Night 1.idingfrom several directionsat the same time.Attack against returning enemyplanes.Confusing enemy radar.Deceiving the enemy with lights."

(ATIS Enemy Publication No. 173, pagesB and C).

(2 ) Extract from mimeographed bookletentitled "Tactics of the US Air Forces(KUGUN) in the SOLOMONS Area" (is-sued by 6 Field MP Unit and reproducedby Operations Section, 6 Flying Division,dated 7 February 1944)."Reconnaissance before laiiding : TheNavy's PB4Y and VDI (photographing unit) .make a detailed recoiinaissance of the area*where the landing is planned. Reconnais-sance is begun two to three months beforethe planned operation. Weather permitting,reconnaissance is carried out every day.Reconnaissailce is carried on in t.he mowingfor 30 to 40 minutes, when it is clear.Altitude is from 22,000 to 34,000'ft. Recon-nd s~an ce s continued until approximately .one week before the actnal operation. The


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JAPANESE METHODS O F PRISONER OF WAR INTERROGATIONenemy position and enemy terrain are in-vestigated in det'ail." Enemy plans are 'based on this 1.econ-

naissance and information from intelligenceorgai~izationsdispatched beforehand." Details of the activities of the iiltelligenceorgai~izationsare few. Mcn are landed near

the iilvasion point by submarine. They seekinformation 011 enemy strecgth, dispositionof air forces, coilditioll of terrain a'udshipping.. ....."(ATIS Enemy Publication No. 173, page 14).

c. The third document in the sameEnemy Publictttioll is a mimeographedbooklet entitled " Interrogation 'Report (No.7) of an Allied Prisoner of War." It con-tains data on airfield construction andsurvey forces, aiqplane maii~tenance,grouildforces and Marines in the SOLOMON8Area, enemy ,airplane communication, mc-teorological 0bse~vatio11, billets, rest andallowa~lces,hospital ships, circumstni~cesofPW's crash, etc.(ATIS Enemy Publication No. 173,, pagcs17-32).

d. The fourth document m o n g these ex-amples of actual interrogations is a mimeo-graphed file 6f iiltelligence reports on theinterrogation of American aircrew prisonersof war. A11 extract from the brief of thispublication indicates the @copeof the in-terrogation. All extract from one of theinterrogations is of interest partly ns 'ail ex-ample of actual question-and-answer, butmostly because of two parenthetical remarksby th e recorder of the interrogation. Tllefirst of these throws light upon the condi-tion of the priaoner during examillation andsuggests the possibility that other thau gentlemethods were being employed to extractiaformation. The secoild is interesting bothbecause it is a reflection of Japailcse psy-chology and because it provides a basis forconjecture concer~l ing he significaace oft,he clause, " We tried to make him guess."

(1) Extract from brief of Enemy Publica-ti011 No. 280, presenting contents of mimeo-graphed file of i~ltel ligei~ce eports 01 1. i~lterrogationof American aircrew prisonersof war (issued 16 December 1942 to 3 June1943 by GO Gp (SHUDAN) Staff Section).'" Informatioa contailled in interrogation-reports includes circumstai~ces of capture;.

personal history and trailling of PsW ; routetaken from AMERICA to SWPA ; conditionof airfields ; typcs, numbers and capabilitiesof American planes in use or being built ;organizatio~lof Fifth Air Force ; methods ofbombing and effectivel~ess f RABAUL AA

fire and searchlights ; coilditioils i n AMEB- ICA alid public a tt i t~~ deoward thc war; Auskalia~l-American elatioi~s, tc." (ATIS Enemy Publication No. 280, pagc A). (2) Extract from " Allied PW Iutcrmga-tion Repoil," dated 23 Febru:ny 1943, 81

Navy Garrison Unit (KEIBI) GO ForceStaff Section. (The prisoner was capturedon the shore south of RABAUL HANA-BUKI (TN : I'AVURVUR) Mt. by DestroyerMAKINAMI.)" Q. What did you th i l~k of doing

after bailing out from pourairplane ?" A. I thought of escaping. However,after being inken a PW, I wantedto be sent back.

" Q. If we were to return you, wherewould you go, AMERICA orPORT MORESRY ?

"A. AMERICA. (PW eobbed for awhile.)

Q. n o the troo p ]now at MORESBYlike war ?

" A. All of them hak war."Q. How about you ?"A. Naturally, I hate war." Q. Do you hate the Japanese ?('A. As I have never spoke11 to a

Japanme, I do not know. I donot even know if they are strongor weak.

" Q. Are any citations given to air-crews who return from RABAULair raids ?

"A. Thosc who perform especiallymeritorious deeds are given medals.

' l 4. Are there ally who have receivedsuch medals ?" A. There are those who probablyreceived them, but I have neverreceived any." Q. Do you believe that AMERICAwill win ?" A. I don't kilow about the future.(Naturally we do not km w w h ttho fut~lre holds. We tried tomake him guess, but he persisted ;he did not know.) "

(ATIS Enemy Publication No. 280 pages16-17).

Further evidence of the thorouglmew withwhich i~lterrogatio~l carried out can beas fou11d in the following: ATIS Enemy Publication No. 76, pages 6-7

ATIS Bulletin No. 1283, Item No. 4, pages3-5 (mimeographed p'amphlet entitled " 111-formatioil on Enemy High-Speed (PT)


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EXAMPLE3 OF INTELT;1CGE?ICE O BT A IN E D IN ACTUAL INTERROGATIONSBoat," presenting data obtained from crew- 9-14members) ATIS Enemy Publication No. 145, Part IATIS Bulletin No. 1250, pages 1-2 (Allied (" Intelligence Reports, Maps, and SketchesPW gives informa$ion on P51) Operations in NEW GUINEA, April 1943

SOPAC Translation No. 0685, pages 7-15 to August 1943"), pages 35-46 ("Records(report on interrogation of 'US aviator) of American and Australian Prisoners ")

SEATIC Tra~lslationReport No. 17, Item ATIS Bulletin No. 2068, Item No. 8, pages* No. 609, pages 17-19 15-22 (mimeographed record of interrogationSEATIC Trta~lslationReport No. 19, gages of American Iilftultry Officer).


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Section V. CONCLUSIONS

1. The Japanese Army had a high regardfor inteUigei~ceobtained through the iuter-rogation of prisoners of war.

2. Interrogatioil was conducted at thetime and place of capture for the purposeof obtaining information of immediate ope-ratioual importance. Later and more detailedinterrogation was carried on in rear areas.

3. Interrogation techlliques proceeded fromthe gentle to the cruel, with the distinctcondoaement of torture and with a tendencytowards greater harshuess in treatment ofairmen.

4. Prisoners were interrogated for thepurpose of eliciting information of tacticaland operational value, infomati011 of stechnical nature, and illformtition useful aspropaganda.

5. Interrogation was detailed andt,horough.

a

Cruel treatment of PsW of all branchesof our sen4ce has beell thoroughly proven .in our War Crimizld Trials. However, thereis some illdicatioll that harsh and brutalt.reatment during illterrogatioa, often endingwith decapitation, was appIied more to airthan to ground troops. Our air forces initial-ly turned the tide and assisted all of our .operation s by gainii~gair superiority and cog-tributed greatly toward obtaining Navalsuperiority ; both of which were so essentialto the succees of our amphibious operations.Perhaps the brutd treatment of captured airme11 is at least partially explained by Japa-nese realization of this and a desperatede~ireo obtain all possible illformation withwhich to combat it: Evidence indicatesthat such treatment cemmenced i n the earlySouthwest Pacific Campaigns-

Japanese Methods of Prisoner of War Interrogation 1946-06-01

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