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Independent Study Project

Department of Japan

JAPAN AND THE UNITED NATIONS

The Struggle for a Permanent Seat with the Security Council

Talyn Rahman

BA Japanese and Management

140078

Word Count: 10,365

School of Oriental and African Studies (University of London)

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This dissertation was submitted in partial

fulfilment of the requirements for the

degree of BA Japanese and Management of

the School of Oriental and African Studies

(University of London).

Acknowledgement forwarded to Dr Yuka

Kobayashi for all her help and advice.

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Contents

ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................................................................ 4

TABLES ........................................................................................................................................................................ 4

1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................. 6

2. BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................................................... 6

3. JAPAN’S ASPIRATION: THE BUILDING PROCESS OF JAPAN’S DESIRE FOR A PERMANENT SEAT ....................... 7

Japan’s changing attitude in the United Nations ....................................................................................................... 7

1950-1960: On the road for a ‘respected’ Japan ................................................................................................... 8

1970s: The quest for a role .................................................................................................................................... 8

1980s: Money equals power? ................................................................................................................................ 9

1990s: Taking Control .......................................................................................................................................... 10

2000: Securing National Interest ......................................................................................................................... 11

4. JAPAN’S OBSTRUCTION: AND SO, THE STRUGGLE BEGINS .............................................................................. 12

Article 9 ‘peace clause’ of the Constitution ......................................................................................................... 12

The Government .................................................................................................................................................. 13

The Public ............................................................................................................................................................. 15

United States of America: Friend or Foe? ............................................................................................................ 16

Russia: The Territorial Bully ................................................................................................................................. 18

China: Beyond Rivalry .......................................................................................................................................... 18

Korea: Asia versus Japan ...................................................................................................................................... 20

5. JAPAN AS THE IDEAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBER ........................................................................................ 21

Soft Power............................................................................................................................................................ 21

Non-nuclear Policy ............................................................................................................................................... 22

Mixed Identity ...................................................................................................................................................... 23

Permanent Seat for Cash ..................................................................................................................................... 23

The Other Candidates .......................................................................................................................................... 24

Identity Crisis ....................................................................................................................................................... 24

6. JAPAN’S OPTIONS TO BECOME A PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ................................. 24

Reform ................................................................................................................................................................. 25

Entry as a Quasi Member ..................................................................................................................................... 25

Entry as a Full Member ........................................................................................................................................ 26

Entry as a Special Member .................................................................................................................................. 26

7. CONCLUSION: Breaking out of the Struggle .................................................................................................... 27

8. BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................................................. 28

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ABBREVIATIONS

AA African and Asian (group)

DPJ Democratic Party of Japan

JCP Japanese Communist Party

JSDF Japanese Self-Defence Force

LDP Liberal Democratic Party

LON League of Nations

MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs

ODA Official Development Assistance

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PKO Peacekeeping Operations

PM Prime Minister

POW Prisoners of War

SC Security Council

SDF Social Democratic Party

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nations

US United States

WWII World War II

TABLES

Fig.1. UN and PKO Contributions Page 14

Fig.2. Japan General Election 2005 Page 19

Fig.3. Public view on how to strengthen Japan’s permanent bid candidacy Page 20

Fig.4. Financial assessment of the Security Council and candidate countries Page 30

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JAPAN AND THE UNITED NATIONS

The Struggle for a Permanent Seat

with the Security Council

Talyn Rahman

6

1. INTRODUCTION

“Japan has better qualifications for permanent membership than other countries”

–Boutros Boutros-Ghali1

Japan’s initial membership to the United Nations (UN) in 1956 was nothing short of a monumental

moment. Entering the UN eleven years after its founding was Japan’s chance to re-establish itself as a

peace-loving, respected country. The scars Japan endured from losing World War II (WWII) had only proved

to the world that Japan was ready to actively participate in the protection of international security. It soon

became apparent that Japan was very conscious of how the world perceived it. International and domestic

circumstances had pushed Japan to alter its attitude of the UN; as a result Japan quickly became consumed

with the idea of becoming a permanent member of the Security Council (SC). As quoted above by the

former UN Secretary- General Boutros-Ghali, Japan’s qualifications as a permanent member have proved to

be worthier than that of Germany, Brazil, and India, who share Japan’s aspiration. Through Japan’s special

qualities, which will be examined later, Japan has demonstrated that it is possible to create a better world

without military means.2 Yet nearly five decades since its membership, this brings to question why Japan

has and is still struggling to secure its seat with the SC.

The idea of Japan’s ‘struggle’ refers to Japan’s fight to move toward its ultimate objective to become a

permanent member of the SC and the obstructions that stall its progress. As this thesis will examine,

Japan’s obstruction is identified by two levels: domestic and international. Examining each factor will

illustrate how Japan’s domestic and international struggle is having a direct impact on its candidacy. Further

to Japan’s aspiration and obstruction for permanent membership, it is important to examine what Japan

has done for the UN to have been praised so highly by Boutros-Ghali.3 Criticisms made by other

international members regarding Japan’s candidacy will also be analysed to see what effect this has had on

Japan’s progress. Japan’s strategy in approaching the candidacy is flawed, which is why Japan has been

struggling for so long. Critiques have often studied Japan’s actions and current position in the bid for a

permanent seat; however Japan’s strategy in strengthening their candidacy is yet to be fully examined. The

establishment of Japan’s aspiration and obstruction will lead us to critically explore Japan’s best options to

becoming a SC member.

2. BACKGROUND

The UN was initially founded after WWII in 1945 based upon the aims and qualities of its 1919

predecessor. The establishment of the UN was heavily reliant on the experience of the League of Nations

(LON). As the LON was tainted with various defects and weaknesses,4 the UN became a second attempt for

nations to collate in upholding international peace and security on an economic, social, and political

1Aurelia George Mulgan, “International Peacekeeping and Japan’s Role” Asian Survey Vol.35, No.12 (Dec 1995), p.1115 2 Addressed in speech by PM Junichiro Koizumi “Kokuren Shinjidai”, September 21, 2004 at the 59th session of the General

Assembly 3 As quoted on top of this page. 4 Paul Taylor and Devon Curtis, “The United Nations” in John Baylis and Steve Smith, The Globalization of World Politics, 3rd ed.

(2005), p.406

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foundation. For many countries, including Japan, the UN was a symbol of peace and a means of voicing

their opinion on an international level. Becoming a UN member was an important step for Japan to

participate in the maintenance of international peace and justice.

Similar to the LON, the UN mainly comprised of the victors of war, in this case, the members of ‘The

Alliance’. The former Alliance (United Kingdom, United States, France, China and former Soviet Union5) by

default became principal caretakers’ of the UN, known as the Security Council. Primarily, as one of five

main organs of the UN structure the SC play a powerful role in which appropriate procedures or methods

for the sustenance of international peace is decided upon. Like all members, the SC is bound by the articles

written in the UN Charter, which acts as a form of constitution in governing the UN. Nevertheless, Sadako

Ogata considered SC members to have a position of power due to the sheer influence they have in the UN

as permanent members.6 Although non-permanent members of the SC practically have “equal footing” as

that of permanent members,7 the difference that sets them apart is the right of veto. The function of veto

gives members of the SC power to unilaterally block resolutions or decisions. Once a veto is raised, no

further action can be taken regardless of the level of support shown by member states. The veto system

was once a substantial tool in balancing power and protecting the interest of the UN’s founding members,

although many criticisms have been made of its exploited use by permanent members.

The veto is problematic because it is often used for one’s national interest. National interest refers to a

country’s own goal whether the ambition is military, economical, or cultural.8 Within the UN, permanent

members of the SC have the right to impede on actions that may harm their national interest with the use

of veto. Any form of influential power, even becoming a UN member was intentionally denied to Japan and

other members of the former-Axis Powers9 as UN entrance was blocked by veto as a reprimand to their war

crimes.10

The condition of joining the UN is to be a peace-loving country. Access was formerly refused to

Japan because the ‘Allied’ nations did not consider the former Axis Powers as “peace-loving states”.11

3. JAPAN’S ASPIRATION: THE BUILDING PROCESS OF JAPAN’S DESIRE

FOR A PERMANENT SEAT

Japan’s changing attitude in the United Nations

Japan’s political strategy in handling the UN has a pattern in fluctuating every decade. The Japanese

idea of what exactly the UN is still remains vague, some describe the entity as “a tool for international

diplomacy”, others as “a bridge” between the North and South.12

Japan’s changing attitude in the UN

changes in response to international reactions which consequently led Japan to pursue an indefinite

5 The dissolution of the Soviet Union came about in 1991 ending the Cold War between USA. The country is now recognised as the

Russian Federation; however this thesis will refer to it as Russia. 6 Sadako Ogata, “The Changing Role of Japan in the United Nations” in Joshua D. Katz and Tilly C. Friedman-Lichtschein, Japan’s

�ew World Role. (1985), p.29 7 Kokusaiho Gakkai, Japan and the United �ations: Report of a study. (1958), p.86 8 Refer to Hans Morgenthau, Politics among �ations. (1993) for a full conceptual understanding of national interest. 9 Besides Japan, Italy and Germany were also major members of the Second World War Axis Power. 10 Saidan Houjin Nihon Kokusairengo Kyoukai, A Concise Guide to the United �ations. (1997), p.17 11 Satoshi Yoshikawa, “Kokuren Jouninnriji Koku Iri no Dadousei”, Kenpo Rongi. No.1 (1994), p.40 12 Liang Pan, The United �ations in Japan’s Foreign and Security Policymaking, 1945-1992. (2005), p.342

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political role. With the lack of satisfactory feedback Japan received from important nations, Japan’s

aspiration to become a SC member developed progressively as a result of the attitudes parried from UN

members.

1950-1960: On the road for a ‘respected’ Japan

Entering the UN was a major milestone for Japan to re-join the world through what seemed like a

respectable international entity. The loss of two wars not only damaged Japan’s self-image but caused

them to be forcibly excluded from international society. The victors of war lacked trust and respect for

Japan, resulting in Japan’s military being stripped of power and the country becoming bound to a

Constitution that renounced the rights to wage war. The Japanese people adored the UN as a symbol of

world peace and justice. Slogans like UN-centralism, UN-first, and national prestige13

became popular in

Japanese politics even before 1956. Entering an internationally collated entity was to be Japan’s fresh start

to eradicate its war-beaten image14

and mending international relationships.

Realists believe that countries must rely on their own military to protect their national interest.15

Considering that Japan’s military was removed, Japan had to seek another route for protection. Post-war

Prime Minister (PM) Shigeru Yoshida had persuaded the public that the UN was Japan’s solution in gaining

security,16

which launched the idea of seeking protection from the UN.17

However, the UN’s security

function was not as Japan expected because the UN appeared rather weak in the course of the Cold War.18

This was Japan’s first taste of UN dissatisfaction due to Japan’s misconception of the UN structure.

To gain respect from its global neighbours, Japan realised that active participation in major UN

security agendas would prove Japan as a peace-loving nation. In order to demonstrate their worth as a

valued member, Japan initialised talks of banning nuclear arms testing. Diplomats stressed the horrors of

being victimised by two nuclear bombings and even interfered with UK and US plans to improve their

nuclear arms19

during the 60s. However Japan only engaged in heavy talks of disarmament with the SC,

putting aside all other UN issues to secondary importance. Japan used the UN as a tool to keep to issues

that were perceived as future threats to Japanese security. This marked the beginning of Japan’s

involvement in the ‘bigger picture’ of international relations.

1970s: The quest for a role

Japan’s efforts to raise its international status through political power reached its limits around

1966.20

Having established itself as a respected member amongst other nations, Japan’s focus in the UN

grew from restoring its image to seeking a role. By the70s, Japan had a high level of economic prosperity.

13 Ibid. pp.344-345 14 Akashi Yasushi, Kokusai Rengo. (1985), p.6 15 Baylis and Smith, Globalization of World Politics, p.5 16 Drifte, Permanent SC Seat, p.13 17 Kokusaiho Gakkai, Japan and the U� report, p.202 18 The Cold War conflict between SC members US and Soviet Union destabilised the UN from its founding till the late-80s. The

rivalry between the two superpowers was based on nuclear superiority. Pan, U� in Japan’s policymaking, p.342 19 Ogata, “Changing Role of Japan”, p.34 20 Ibid. p.301

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Japan was being perceived as the world’s “Number Two” nation since its economic growth accounted 10%

of the world’s economy.21

Economically surpassing most Western developed countries in such a short

amount of time, the international community began to entitle Japan as a “new kind of great power”22

due

to its economic strength; however the Japanese themselves either did not acknowledge this or completely

disregarded it.23

A country with substantial economic influence is perceived as a ‘soft power’ nation.24

Japan’s soft

power originates from its technological and financial power, enabling it to have considerable influence in

world trade and aid. However, with the absence of militaristic ‘hard power’ due to Article 9 (which will be

explained in Chapter 4), recognition as a soft power nation made Japan feel somewhat uncomfortable.

Instead Japan desired acknowledgment for its diplomatic skills. Consequently, Japan became involved in UN

activities like peacekeeping operations (PKO) to withdraw itself from its soft power image. PKO is

considered one of the most important activities in the maintenance of international peace deriving from

the UN Charter.25

Due to certain imposed restrictions, Japan could only offer non-military intermediary

services like medical care or supervision to PKO.26

Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) had high

hopes to send military personnel to areas where intermediary action was required; however UN members

ignored Japan’s militaristic ambition to expand their peacekeeping services and ensured to take advantage

of Japan’s soft power strength.

The UN expected Japan, the third largest economic power, to take on its financial weight especially

after the chronic financial crisis the UN suffered in the 1960s.27

At this stage, Japan had little or no voice in

securing a definite role in the UN. Japan lacked its own distinct international identity and its foreign

diplomacy was swamped with UN matters. Regardless of Japan’s continuous financial contribution to the

UN, Japanese officials felt that “[Japan] has no more ability to make its voice heard than a country with a

population of 50,000”,28

illustrating the lack of political power Japan as an important nation.

1980s: Money equals power?

Up to this point, member states only acknowledged Japan as an important benefactor. Although

Japan was discontented with the economic label, this international reaction pioneered Japan’s “checkbook

diplomacy” strategy.29

This strategy was formulated to allow Japan to openly use economic aid in gaining

recognition and defining a more solid role as the UN’s leading benefactor. By mid 1980s, Japan was second

only to the US in contributions to UN PKO30

as a means of fulfilling its international responsibilities. In due

time, however, Japan’s money-throwing tactic soon created domestic and international condemnation.

21Bert Edström, Japan's Quest for a Role in the World, (1988), p.76 22 Ibid. p.90 23 Commented by Nakajima Mineo, in Nihon Bunka Foramu, “Hannichi ron no Kokusaiteki haikei” Shimpojiumu Hannichi Kanjo no

Kozo: Ajia no Hannichi ron (1975). p.111 24 The terms ‘soft’ and ‘hard power’ originally derives from Joseph Nye Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (1994). 25 Tetsuo Maeda, PKO: Sono Souzouteki Kanosei, (1991), pp.5-6 26 Other Japanese intermediary roles included observing elections, providing bureaucratic advice and guidance, transportation,

construction and, rescue and repatriation of war refugees. Maeda, PKO, pp.48-50 27 Pan, U� in Japan’s policymaking, p.312 28 Ken Ishida, ‘Nihon kara mita Kokuren kaikakuron no sanchouryu’ in Chiba Daigaku Hougaku Ronshu 23, Vol.3 (1998), p.126 29 Richard D. Leitch, Jr., Akira Kato and Martin E. Weinstein, Japan’s Role in the Post-Cold War World, (1995), p.74 30 William L. Heinrich, U� Peace-keeping Operations: A Guide to Japanese Policies (1999), p.17

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Firstly, Japan’s economic contribution was condemned for having no particular responsibility in

shaping or implementing decisions in specialised UN agencies.31

Secondly, Japan was losing its credibility

because the world perceived it as taking a back seat in active participation. The US criticised that Japan

“avoid[ed] sweat” with their checkbook strategy because PKO required physical involvement,32

which

naturally embarrassed and irritated the Japanese. Also, being one of the only new-comer to donate large

sums to the UN, Japan expected first-class treatment. To further aggravate their frustration, the Kuwait

government cut Japan from their full-spread ‘thank you’ list for the contribution of their liberation.33

Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi believed that it was logical for Japan to earn the rights of permanent

membership due to its high financial contribution,34

but instead it suffered “deep disappointment”.35

The notion to seek power was stimulated by the tiresome second-class treatment Japan was

receiving. “International respectability”36

could only be sought through a position of power, and in the UN,

influencers were members of the SC. The Cold War conflict between the US and former Soviet Union

demonstrated that tension between SC members made the UN dysfunctional. MOFA official Takahiro

Shinyo commented that “it did not really matter whether we [Japan] did nothing or whether the UN did not

function…” so long as the SC did something.37

This proved that not only were the SC gatekeeper’s of the UN

but they also possessed dominant power over the UN’s functionality. Japan’s position in the international

community would be subordinate unless it was a key player in the UN and the position of power belonged

with permanent members of the SC, which introduced Japan’s path to permanent candidacy.

1990s: Taking Control

In order to gain plausible recognition from the SC, it was not until the 1990s that Japan attempted

full participation in the UN. Japan was not only keen to become the number one benefactor of the UN but

desired a key role in PKO. The difference between Japan’s current attitude and its previous from earlier

periods was Japan’s assertive nature to strengthen its record as a major UN member. Japan needed a

strong case to promote itself internationally in order to gain more support for the permanent bid.

Taking control of its soft power strength, Japan maximised its economic power to intrigue the

international community. For instance, Japan intentionally raised its contribution from 12.4% to 15% to

insist that it deserved “right of entry” for permanent membership.38

Though the checkbook strategy

backfired, Japanese diplomats decided that steering aid “to places where it will bring long-term benefits

back to its [Japan] donor”39

would secure support from developing nations. By 1996, its contribution to PKO

accounted for more than 15% of the total peacekeeping budget, which is half of US input40

as seen in fig.1

below. When Japan felt the SC was ignoring its efforts, popular slogan “taxation without representation”41

31 Immerman, “Japan in the UN”, p.186 32 Heinrich, U� PKO, p.19 33 Ronald Dore, Japan, Internationalisation and the U� (1997), p.xiii 34 Reinhard Drifte, Japan's Quest for a Permanent Security-Council Seat: A Matter of Pride or Justice? (1999), p.27 35 Pan, U� in Japan’s policymaking, pp.298-299 36 Leitch et al, Role in Post-Cold War, p.75 37 Takahiro Shinyo, “The conditions of the permanent membership in the United Nations”, Japan Echo, no.2, (1993), p.58 38 Drifte, Permanent SC Seat, p.165 39 Leitch et al, Role in Post-Cold War, p.83 40 Heinrich, U� PKO, p.80 41 Drifte, Permanent SC Seat, p.157

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incited domestic support for permanent membership.

UN and PKO contributions (in percentage) for January 1994

* To be increased to 13.95 in

1995, to 15.43 per cent in

1996 and to 15.65 per cent

1997

Source: MOFA, fig.142

Consequently, Japan started to play a more constructive role as a non-permanent SC member. Its

mediatory efforts in the Iran-Iraq war of 1987-8 not only strengthened its relationship with the US but

renowned Japan for its intermediary role in PKO.43

Furthermore, Japan established an objective to be

elected as often as possible to the UN’s most prestigious committees including the SC and the Economic

and Social Council (ECOSOC). Being elected as provisional general secretary of such committee’s ensured

Japan its international voice would be acknowledged by all members. By the end of the 90s, political and

economically elite nations perceived Japan a “big power” and “should be treated as such by the world”.44

2000: Securing National Interest

It had taken Japan the best of five decades to finally earn respect from the world. As experience

had shown, Japan was at an advantage when promoting its soft power strength. By 2000 the world had

become reliant on Japan’s financial assistance.

Through means of trading, foreign-direct investments, and Official Development Assistance (ODA),45

Japan successfully positioned itself in Asia. To expand its international credential, Japan established good

relationships with African and Latin American states by initiating development schemes to endorse learning

and technology in a cost efficient manner.46

Working in partnership with developing countries galvanised

support for its permanent candidacy which was important in convincing the SC of its worth. Asian countries

(except China) became reliant on Japan to represent them in UN meetings to the extent that it became

42 Source taken from Reinhard Drifte, Japan’s Foreign Policy for the 21st Century, (1998), p.140 43 Drifte, Permanent SC Seat, p.49 44Mushakoji Kinhide, “In search of a new diplomacy”, Japan Quarterly (1973), p.260 45 Official Development Assistance is a form of grant or loan given to less developed countries. The donor’s objective is non-

commercial although interest gained from the loan is marginal compared to normal market rates. 46 Drifte, Permanent SC Seat, p.145-149

UN Budget share PKO Special Contribution share

USA 25.0 31.7

Japan 12.4* 12.5

Germany 8.9 8.9

Russia 6.7 8.5

France 6.0 7.6

UK 5.0 6.3

China 0.7 0.9

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customary for Japan to collect “viewpoints of its major Asian partners”.47

Clearly, Japan’s weight in

international politics is now so big that doing nothing would materially affect others.

Besides support from member states, reforming the UN is a pre-condition to Japan’s permanent

bid. Having gained international respect, Japan’s national interests could only be protected by removing the

original members of the SC from power. Former UN Minister Gennady Udovenko reinforced that the “war

established” SC cannot reflect the present and urged that Japan was its leading candidate.48

Despite tactical shifts in securing a more prestigious role in the UN, Japan’s aspiration for permanent

membership had always symbolised the desire for authority and world recognition. Japan’s more pressing

objectives in relation to the bid are to obtain veto, continue financing its own projects and acquire inside

information on permanent members.49

Unfortunately, achieving these goals is beyond Japan’s soft power

ability. In order to obtain a permanent seat, Japan must now overcome obstructions which inhibit its

aspiration.

4. JAPAN’S OBSTRUCTION: AND SO, THE STRUGGLE BEGINS

Japan’s Domestic Obstruction

The theme of Japan’s domestic obstruction surrounds the argument of whether to reform the

Japanese Constitution. The UN Charter states that all members are required to assist “in any action [the

UN] takes in accordance with the present charter”.50

Without an army, however, Japan cannot participate

in fuller PKO which involves military action. Political decision over reformation is heavily torn between the

people and the domestic government.

Article 9 ‘peace clause’ of the Constitution

“…the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of

force as means of settling international disputes…other war potential, will never be maintained…”

Article 9, Chapter II51

Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution has had immense significance in political practices of Japan. Many

criticised that Article 9 severely restricts Japan’s involvement in the UN, affecting its confidence in obtaining

a permanent seat. The peace clause is viewed as a “modern unequal treaty”52

given that the Japanese were

demanded to renounce the right to wage war, obtain nuclear arms, and preserve an army. The purpose of

the article was to prohibit the establishment of a militaristic Japan. Even former PM Yoshida believed that

47 Drifte, Foreign Policy, p.144 48 Statement by Ukraine Foreign Minister of the UN General Assembly Gennday Udovenko from UNU Nexions, “Okureru anpori

kakaku ni kenen hyoumei”, (1998) 49 Glenn D. Hook, et al. Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security. 2nd ed. (2005), p.371 50 United Nations. Charter of the United �ations and Statute of the International Court of Justice (1995), p.5 51 Minoru, Oda., and Yoichi, Komori. Kenpo Kyujo wo Kataru, (2006). p.2 52 Ian Neary, The State and Politics in Japan (2002), p.53

13

Japanese people were “naturally given into aggression”.53

While surrendering its militaristic rights would

allow Japan to occupy “an honoured place in international society”,54

forcing the Japanese to adopt an anti-

militaristic culture has caused problems with their entry into the SC.

Firstly, the Japanese Self-Defence Force (JSDF)55

cannot legally be involved in high risk PKO,

including enforcement actions which require the use or handling of weapons. Confining the JSDF as

“pacifist watchdog[s]”56

is a highly unsatisfactory role for a country that wishes for permanent membership.

Although Britain does not classify PKO as a defining criterion for permanent membership, France remarked

that Japan must participate in all UN activities to gain their support for its candidacy.57

No doubt criticisms

from the SC push MOFA in expanding peacekeeping roles in which the JSDF can partake. However, even

despatching the JSDF to Mozambique (May 1993 - Dec 1995) was “largely ignored” because the operation

lacked risk factor.58

Article 9 is harnessing Japan’s capabilities to fully adhere to the UN Charter’s

peacekeeping principles as limitations to reinterpret Article 9 restrict Japan from sending military officials

to volatile areas.

Secondly, Article 9 removed Japan from having a ‘can do’ attitude in its peacekeeping efforts.

Japan’s negative attitude caused by Article 9 has given the government scope to blame the Constitution for

their lack of action.59

Furthermore, the government remains sceptical of their army owing to their war

crime and insist the role of the JSDF should remain small.60

However 39% of the public, who believe Japan’s

candidacy is inhibited by the Constitution,61

are becoming more impartial to the idea of reinterpreting the

conditions of Article 9 with the understanding that the JSDF would co-operate as part of a UN military

force.62

The Constitution cease to be a taboo and reinterpretation of the Constitution is in fact viewed as

one of the biggest trial for modern Japan.63

Until a method of redrafting Article 9 is uniformly decided upon,

the government has no choice but to approach the candidacy with a “neutrality without military”64

policy.

The Government

“We desire to obtain a seat quickly in the United Nations”

-Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida65

The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) have collectively been

Japan’s dominant party. The principle guideline of the Yoshida Doctrine, initiated by LDP leader Yoshida,

continues to influence political policies. On the basis of the Constitution, the Yoshida Doctrine highlights

53 Chu Shimizi, Chikujou �ihonkoku Kempou Shingiroku (1962), p.14 54 Dore, Internationalisation and U�, p.53 55 In practice, the JSDF are strictly in place to defending Japan from external threat. JSDF have limited capabilities to operate

overseas and have only recently been allowed to partake in PKO. 56 Mulgan, “International Peacekeeping”, p.1106 57 Ibid. p.1113 58 Heinrich, U� PKO, pp.26-7 59 Maeda, PKO, pp.42-3 60 Heinrich, U� PKO, p.85 61 MOFA, “Gaimusho: Kokuren kaikuni kansuru ishiki chosa” http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/un_kaikaku/i_chosa.html 62 Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Re-emerges as a ‘�ormal’ Military Power (2004), p.64 63 Kenpo Mondai Kenkyukai. Kenpo to Watashitachi, (1976), p.93 64 Kokusaiho Gakkai, Japan and the U� report, p.200 65 Proceedings in the House of Councillors, 13th Session, No.5, 23 January 1953, p.7

14

the importance of abiding the Constitution and the Three Principles of Nuclear Disarmament,66

which are

heavily practised by the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Japanese Communist Party (JCP). Yet

Yoshida’s instigated relationship with the US offends the ideals held by socialist parties but attracts the

attention of the democrats.

Guided by pacifism, JSP and JCP are adamant to eradicate extended peacekeeping involvement of

the JSDF. In deliberation to Article 9, left-wing diplomats regard the existence of the JSDF to be

unconstitutional.67

Unlike the JSP and JCP who seem attached to pacifist guidelines, mainstream democratic

leaders believe that the path to permanent membership is for Japan to return being a ‘normal’ country.

Ichiro Ozawa of the LDP described ‘normal’ as the right to participate in “any form of UN-sanctioned and

UN-centred multilateral military operation, from PKO to full combat peace enforcement and essentially war

fighting”.68

By ‘normalising’ the country, Japan can fully engage in high risk peacekeeping missions, which is

otherwise forbidden by Article 9. Furthermore, regarding peacekeeping as an “honourable military

occupation”,69

MOFA and the democrats wish to expand in activities away from humanitarian assistance,

which will balance out Japan’s soft power strength.

As the following table illustrates, given the overwhelming popularity enjoyed by the democrats, the

idea of normalisation may have an upper-hand. The LDP’s mission to “establish Japan’s own constitution”70

is favourably intriguing certain SC members for support, but persistence for pacifism supported by minority

parties is confusing Japan’s international ambition. Regardless of being dominant, parties are weak without

gaining public support for their policies. Political indecision and disunity between party principles is putting

considerable strain on Japan’s overall UN aspiration.

Japan General Election 2005

296

31

113

9 741118

Liberal Democratic

Party (LDP)

New Komeito Party

(NKP)

Democratic Party of

Japan (DPJ)

Japanese

Communist Party

(JCP)Social Democratic

Party (SDP)

People's New Party

(PNP)

New Party Nippon

(NPN)

New Party Daichi

(NPD)

Others

66 Outlined by LDP PM Eisaku Sato, the ‘Three Principles of Nuclear Disarmament’ specifies the ban of producing, possessing and

obtaining nuclear arms on Japanese soil. This principle has guided Japan’s disarmament policy. 67 Shunji Yanai, “UN Peace Operations and the Role of Japan: The Japanese View” in Alex Morrison and James Kiras, eds., U�

Peace Operations and the Role of Japan (1996), p.76 68 Hughes, ‘�ormal’ Military Power, pp.49-50 69 Morrison & Kiras, Peace Operations,p.87 70 Kosuke Takashi,”Japan to become ‘Britain of the Far East’”, Asian Times (2005)

15

Source: Adapted from Asahi Shimbun (Sept 05), fig. 271

The Public

“Millions of us in Japan love our Article 9”

Peace Activist Hitoshi Katsumori72

Public view on Japan’s role is divided between severe self-criticism of a militaristic Japan and the

need for Constitutional reinterpretation for military flexibility. In relation to fig.3, support is clearly aimed

towards peacekeeping activities that lack risk and maximise upon Japan’s soft power efficiencies. 64.1% of

the public agree that Japan should join the SC as a permanent member under these conditions.73

Prerequisites in becoming a permanent member through non-militaristic means are heavily supported by

the majority of the public. Although fig.3 suggests that 49% want Japan to remain a pacifist country, the

remaining 51% who are unaccounted for may want Article 9 removed or reinterpreted in order to

remilitarise Japan.

Source: Translated by author from MOFA 2005, fig.374

Regardless of popular recognition to modernise the Constitution, Japanese peace activists are

working together to strengthen the principles of Article 9. Comparing recent opinion polls to those from

71 Asahi Shimbun. “Minshuto Shindaihyou ni Maehara shi 2hyosa de Ken shi wo yaburu”, (2005) 72 Lecture by Hitoshi Katsumori on “A Revival of Japanese Militarism and a Crisis for Article 9 of Japan’s War Renouncing

Constitution”, Ohio University 73 This figure is presented in MOFA, “Kokuren Chosa” 74 Ibid.

16

1949, the number of people who want Japan to remain a pacifist nation has risen by 9%.75

This increase

suggests that general support for Japan’s candidacy will lose momentum if it was to relinquish its pacifist

position. Over the years, organisations supporting Article 9 prevented the government from constitutional

revision. From an activist point of view, constitutional reform will alter the main aims behind Japan’s

candidacy.76

Also, campaigns demonstrate that Article 9 in fact upholds UN’s vision for world peace, thus

pressurise policy makers to prevent Japan from giving up its pacifist qualities.

Besides forming domestic pressure groups to resist a government-led revision, activists are banding

together with international campaigners to spread the meaning of Article 9. Through movements like the

Global Article 9 Campaign, which comprises of 60 Japanese societies, activists are creating an international

network to protect Article 9 from permanent removal.77

Activists like Akira Kawasaki state that Article 9 will

“act as an international peace mechanism” once the world recognises the potential behind the Japanese

Constitution.78

By striving to globalise Article 9 to other governments and institutions, the Japanese public

will continue to obstruct government initiative to normalise Japan.

JAPAN’S INTERNATIONAL OBSTRUCTION

The nature of Japan’s international links with permanent members and Asian countries relate

closely to its historical misdeeds. It is important to analyse the reasons why permanent members China,

Russia and the US have stalled Japan’s progress for the bid. Equally as important is the understanding of

Asian response towards Japan. The examination of how each country obstructs Japan’s aspiration will

enable us to understand why Japan’s cautious approach in international relations directly affects its

candidacy.

Permanent Members: THE SECURITY COUNCIL

United States of America: Friend or Foe?

“…a way should be found to assure permanent representation in that [Security] council for Japan, whose

resources and influence are of major importance in world affairs”

-US President Richard Nixon79

Bilateral relationship between Japan and the US has stimulated Japan’s confidence in securing a

permanent seat. Partnership with one of the most influential members of the SC has given Japan strength

to exercise political power because the presence of the US gives Japan clout. Japan-US relationship is

75 Kokusaiho Gakkai, Japan and the U� report, p.50 76 Kastumori, Hitoshi. “Crisis for Article 9” 77 Akira Kawasaki, "Article 9's Global Impact". Foreign Policy in Focus (2007) 78 Ibid. 79 Ogata, “Changing Role of Japan”, p.31

17

particularly close with the binding of their security alliance. The ‘Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and

Security’ alliance was originally signed to defend each country when under attack; however restrain s of

Article 9 has enabled Japan to receive guaranteed safety from the US without reciprocation. Protection

under America’s “nuclear umbrella”80

led Japan to focus its efforts in developing its economic power and

slowly overshadow America as the UN’s lead benefactor. Japan’s “wider responsibility”81

to the world is no

doubt credited to its ties with the US. But critiques illustrated that Japan’s relationship with the US is

leading Japan into “entrapment in US military strategy”,82

which directly influences Japan’s own diplomacy.

Security Alliance terms which consent American to set up military bases in Okinawa is discomfort to

Japan. Firstly, American nuclear arms stored in Okinawa breach conditions of Article 9. Secondly, 70% of US

bases in Okinawa are regarded as a burden for Japan.83

Despite these actions causing the Japanese some

distress, the government is powerless to take action against America considering that the Americans do not

require consultation with the Japanese government on the management of US military in Japan.84

Japan is

obliged to keep the US content as a repayment for being Japan’s security guarantor. In UN meetings, Japan

tends to vote similarly to the US and support American objectives. For example, playing the obedient ally,

Japan complied in assisting with the war in Iraq85

by expanding the JSDF for PKO under American pressure.

Additionally, Japan now ranks fifth in the world in defence spending, having been encouraged by the US to

develop Japanese weaponry and expanding its military.86

The phrase “when the United States sneezes

Japan catches a cold”87

characterises Japan as being a weak member of international society with their lack

of control in managing its own security and illustrating Japan’s heavy reliance on the Security Alliance.

There is no doubt that America overshadows Japan in the alliance. Japan needs to demand “an

equal partnership in maintaining the security of Asia”88

in order to develop its own voice. However the

dangers of rivalling with the US can put Japan at a disadvantage of losing its only form of defence,

illustrating the fear of entrapment already embedded within Japan’s foreign policy.89

Furthermore, America

is only happy to support Japan’s candidacy if it means that the US could improve its position in Asia.

Therefore, the US would not hesitate to “knock it [Japan’s candidacy] down”90

if Japan became an obstacle

in pursuing its own interest. In order to sustain American interest in Japan’s permanent bid, it is easier for

Japan to “simply placating Washington’s request”91

rather than rival a strong supporter that has the power

to completely jeopardise Japan’s chance in obtaining a permanent seat.

80 Hughes, ‘�ormal’ Military Power, p.22 81 Leitch et al, Role in Post-Cold War, p.182 82 Ibid. p.65 83 Ibid. p.48 84 Neary, State and Politics,p.35 85 A commercial broadcast by Chairman Iba from Japanese Communist Party, entitled “Dou miru nihon no kokuren anpori jounin

rijikoku iri: sansei daga jouken ga hitsuyou” (2005) 86 The Economist. Pocket World in Figures. 8th ed. (2008), p.101 87 Leitch et al, Role in Post-Cold War, p.160 88 Tetsuya Kataoka and Ramon H. Myers, Defending an Economic Superpower. (1989), p.107 89 Hughes, �ormal’ Military Power, p.65 90 Pan, U� in Japan’s policymaking, p.256 91 Robert M. Orr, The Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid Power. (1990), p.113

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Russia: The Territorial Bully

In 1997, President Yeltsin promised to support Japan’s bid for the first time, but Russian attitude

toward Japan’s candidacy has been ambiguous and opportunistic since then. As one of the five members of

the SC, Russia’s hindrance for Japan’s permanent bid had primarily been over the argument of the

‘Northern Territories’.92

Looking into history, Russia and Japan have always perceived each other through “territorial

glasses”.93

In brief, the main dispute surrounds the ownership of four islands located near Hokkaido known

as Kuril Islands. In the interest of satisfying their own interests, the constant struggle in reclaiming the

islands has had paralyzing effects in insuring a stable future based on partnership and co-operation. Instead,

each country remains insistent on “fishing rights”94

over the islands regardless of whether owning the

northern islands would benefit their nation economically or socially. In fact, Japanese ownership of Kuril

Islands have been regarded to “not [be] vitally necessary”95

for Japan’s national interest, as Japanese

habitation is minute and no financial contribution is made towards Japan’s economy. Yet for the sake of

exercising power over Russia, Japan has no less become imprisoned by the situation with Russia’s constant

change in its position in the dispute.

This issue in turn has created tensions that affect other aspects of Russo-Japanese relations. No less,

the lack of clear insight for negotiation from the Japanese has had implications in Japan’s permanent bid

and international security. In relation to Northern Territories, one of the reasons to why the US Security

Alliance is vital to Japan’s security is for the protection against Russian “nuclear blackmail”.96

Such blackmail

is indicated by Russia developing nuclear weapons as a scare tactic. For example, Russian announcement to

test its 50-megaton H-bomb was publicised to simply intimidate Japan’s non-nuclear policy and weaken its

diplomatic tactic for nuclear disarmament. 97

To further pressurise Japan’s decision over Kuril Islands,

dumping nuclear waste into the Japanese sea and becoming Asia’s biggest arms export is no less straining

Japan’s tact in diplomacy within its own continent. Japan has a responsibility to Asia in promoting and

sustaining non-proliferation, but constant grievances from Russia with its careless display of nuclear status

is faltering Japan’s position for the bid. While Russia continuously tests Japan’s diplomatic stamina, Russia

will reject to support Japan’s candidacy unless territorial issues have been resolved in Russia’s favour.

China: Beyond Rivalry

“Only a country that respects history, takes responsibility for [the past] and wins the trust of people in Asia

and the world can take on greater responsibilities in the international community”

92 Dispute over Kuril Islands, codenamed ‘The Northern Territories’ was established by one of the weakest post-war PM Suzuki

Zenko. Northern Territories was officially commemorated on the first signing of the Japanese-Russian Agreement on February 7th

1955 93 Leitch et al, Role in Post-Cold War, p.128 94 James E. Goodby, Vladamir I. Ivanov and Nabuo Shimotamai (eds.), “�orthern Territories” and Beyond. (1995), p.155 95 Ibid. p.105 96 Kataoka and Myers, Defending Economic Superpower, p.80 97 Pan, U� in Japan’s policymaking, p.73

19

- Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao98

Much of Japan’s difficulty in strengthening its bid has been roused up by anti-Japanese sentiment

held by the Chinese. With a long history of animosity, Japan’s historical tyranny against China and other

Asian neighbours has caused a fresh emergent of friction. Recent protests of Chinese opposition to Japan’s

membership bid are being directed towards Japan not taking responsibility for its war crimes in WWII.99

By

highlighting Japan’s aggressive past, Japan’s candidacy is losing its positive image.

Japan’s bid for permanent membership has stimulated mass protest in China due to Japan’s

inefficiency to apologise for their war crimes. Despite countless apologies made by Japanese diplomats and

most notably by Emperor Akihito in 1995, ten million Chinese protestors have signed online petitions to

obstruct Japan’s bid.100

The problem with Sino-Japanese relations is not the fact that there is no apology,

but rather that the Japanese ‘apology’ does not use terms the Chinese are willing to accept. Instead, the

Chinese are slandering Japanese apologies as being vague and insensitive.101

The Chinese have been

angered by trips to Yasukuni Shrine made by Japanese right-wing politicians, who have been blamed for

remembering war criminals as heroes. Yasukuni Shrine was made to remember those who died in wars,

including soldiers that were typified as Class A war criminals, but for China, Yasukuni Shrine is a symbol of

Japanese aggression. Visitation to the shrine by DPJ leaders Junichiro Koizumi and Abe Shinzo have been

criticised for showing sympathy towards criminals and diminishing any truth behind previous apologies.102

The Japanese media also sympathise with Chinese views of the situation and have discredited their own

government for their contradictory actions.103

Asahi Shimbun pointed out that the government’s words of

“deep remorse”104

for historical reconciliation is a façade.105

Similarly, Yoimiuri Shimbun openly claimed

that they will slander the government’s image if rituals made by democratic leaders were to continue.106

This brings to question how China can forgive Japan if Japan’s own people are refusing to accept actions of

their own government. Personal attacks from the Japanese media are not only strengthening China’s plan

to jeopardise Japan’s candidacy but is weakening Japan’s overall ‘peace-loving’ image.

Under these circumstances, China wished for Japan to remain a pacifist country and conceives

plans in pressurising Japan not expand the JSDF. The Hong Kong Standard urged that the Chinese “do not

oppose the Japanese people, we [the Chinese] oppose a small group of militarists who want to resurrect

Japanese domination”.107

Even though Japan has restraints to normalise the country, it is natural for China

and other Asian nations to feel threatened by the idea of a militarised Japan. While anti-Japanese

demonstrations continue to weaken Japan’s position for permanent membership, Japan’s efforts in keeping

an amiable relationship is proving to be a struggle.

98 Quote taken from Justin Curry, “Japan rejects ‘scary’ China’s war demands”, The Guardian, (2005) 99 War crime is widely defined in this thesis. The Tokyo Tribunal recognised Japanese war crimes to vary between biological human

experimentation, cannibalisation and mass murder. For more details, see Toshiyuki Tanaka, Hidden Horrors: Japanese war crimes in

World War II. (1996), pp.72-3 100 People’s Daily Online, “Nihon no jounin rijikoku iri - Netto ue de 1000man nin ga hantai” (2005) 101 Ibid. 102 Asahi Shimbun, “Jounin riji koku iri towareru ‘Haisenkoku’ no saihou” (2005) 103 Asahi Shimbun. “Nicchu Masatsu”. Media conference with Deputy Foreign Minister Hitoshi Tanaka. 104 Jane Yamazaki. Japanese Apologies for World War II, (2006), p.165 105 Asahi, “Haisenkoku” 106 Stated in David Pilling. “Japan’s top daily forces war reappraisal”, Financial Times (2006) 107 Hidenori Ijiri, “Sino-Japanese Controversy since the 1972 Diplomatic Normalisation” in Christopher Howe, ed., China and

Japan: History, Trends and Prospects. (1996), p.70

20

Non-Members: ASIA

Korea: Asia versus Japan

"We do not think Japan has the qualifications to become a UN Security Council member,

and we will try to make sure it does not become one"

- South Korean Ambassador Kim Sam-hoon108

Like China, North and South Korea have one of the strongest opposition campaigns against Japan’s bid

for permanent membership. According to Kosuke Takahashi, strong anti-Japanese sentiments from the

Koreans derive from Japanese colonial rule and have taken to the streets to express their antagonism.109

Memories of Japan’s violent occupation of Korea are comparable to the brutality caused to Chinese civilians.

Similarly, Korean opposition could be settled with a firm apology for the invasion, occupation, and sexual

enslavement of ‘comfort women’ for Japanese soldiers. However Koreans have also remarked that

“apology is too easy”.110

In fact, apology made by PM Miyazawa brought about “crowds of angry Koreans

storm[ing] the streets”, rejecting the apology to be “spacious” and “deceitful”.111

Rather than seeking an

apology, Koreans instead demand war compensation. Banding support from domestic groups like Young

Korean Academy and the Korean YMCA, Korea has shown great enmity towards Japan’s candidature and

initiated partnership with China to strengthen their campaign.

Additionally animosity between Korea, China and Japan is increasingly worrying neighbouring countries.

Singapore and Malaysia expressed concern that tensions in East Asia will lead to “accidents” and “cause

governments to lose control”.112

With ongoing riots held by China and Korea, painful memories of Japanese

cruelty are resurfacing within other Asian countries that experienced similar violence.113

Nevertheless these

countries have grown to bury negative feelings for Japan’s past mistakes due to trade, technology, financial

assistance from Japan.114

It is feared that any instability in Northeast Asia could adversely affect Southeast

Asia, as continuous political and civilian unrest in Asia is detaching Japan from its Asian community.115

Further to Japan’s ‘less obvious’ position in Asia, Leitch remarked that “to many Asians, the Japanese

seem arrogant and chauvinistic”116

due to Japan’s more persistent relationship with America. According to

Chosun, Japan representing Asia in the UN will irritate Asian people117

because Japan is not considered

‘Asian’. Taking advantage of Japan’s weak position in Asia, the development of nuclear arms in North Korea

is having a pessimistic effect on Japan’s non-nuclear policy. Not only can Korea’s nuclear missile reach

Japan, the emergent of Korea’s possible nuclear threat is directing Japan towards stronger America

liaison.118

Although Korea finds it difficult to criticise Japan’s need to modify its Security Alliance with its

108 Korea Net. “Seoul opposes Tokyo’s UNSC bid” (2005) 109 Kosuke Takahashi, “Roh reopens Japan’s war wounds”. Asian Times. (2005) 110 Yamazaki, Japanese Apologies, p.65 111 Ibid. pp.62-63 112 Eric Teo Chu Cheow, “Southeast Asian worry about North East Asia’s feud”, Japanese Institute of Global Communications 113 Chosun Nippo, “Nihon no shounin rijikoku iri wo shienshita Bush daitouryou” (2007) 114 Ibid. 115 Kenneth W. Thompson. China, Taiwan, Japan, the United States, and the World (1998), p.97 116 Leitch et al, Role in Post-Cold War, p.103 117 Chosun Nippo, “Bush daitouryou” (2007) 118 Yoimuri. “Kita chousen ni hikakuka he no gutaiteki koudou yokyuu… nichibei shunoukaidan” (2006)

21

American ally,119

from an Asian point of view, Japan is neglecting the needs of its neighbours. There is no

doubt that Korea is taking every measure to weaken Asian support for Japan’s candidacy. With the gradual

loss for respect as an Asian nation, Korea’s promise to “make sure”120

Japan will not become a permanent

member is destabilising Japan’s support in the Asian region.

5. JAPAN AS THE IDEAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBER

Positive attributes to Japan’s permanent member candidacy

Having established Japan’s aspiration and obstructions for candidacy, this chapter will now examine

what makes Japan an ideal member in relation to expectations led by the new century. Qualities which

reinforce Japan’s candidature will be balanced with criticisms that obstruct Japan’s progress.

Soft Power

Japan’s merit for permanent membership relies upon Japan’s ability to provide strong economic

and technological support. As exemplified in the fig.4, Japan is a dominant candidate in regards to its

financial power amongst existing permanent members and those who wish to seek permanent

membership. Domestic and international diplomats make it a point to stress Japan’s worthiness for

permanent membership purely based on their soft power efforts.121

Constitutional restraint for military

development subsequently facilitated Japan’s connection with other nations in an alternative fashion.

By playing on their soft power efficiency, economic contribution through ODA has positioned Japan

favourably amongst countries that lack presence in the UN. Taking Africa as an example, co-operation

between Africa and Asia (AA) is improving overall humanitarian developments in Third World countries.122

Funds towards the fight against AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria have allowed Japan to gain overwhelming

support from its African partners. Japan has also actively begun to support Islamic countries in the Middle

East through economic and technical assistance,123

and proposals have been made in extending PKO

budgets for 2008.124

Economic activities of foreign countries are vital to Japan’s existence as a dominant

and independent actor in the UN.

119 Takahashi, “Roh reopens wounds” 120 Quote stated under sub-heading on p.27 121 As suggested by Gennday Udovenko, UNU Nexions, “Okureru anpori” 122 MOFA, “Africa shokoku gaishou to no shushokukai ni okeru Kawaguchi daijin aisatsu” (2004) 123 Ogata, “Changing Role of Japan”, p.36 124 MOFA. Misako Kaji statement from http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/speech/un2007/un0705-3.html

22

Source: Translated by the author from MOFA (2007), fig.4125

Non-nuclear Policy

Increase spending on foreign aid is further promoting Japan’s reputation as a non-nuclear power.

By concentrating efforts on humanitarian foreign aid, Japan is demonstrating that nuclear and weaponry

development is not positively contributing to international security. Samuel Huntington proposed that

economic power is more important in determining the primary or subordination of states than military

power because military conflict is becoming less of an option in settling disputes.126

While the Cold War

epitomised the constant threat of a nuclear war, risks of an accidental nuclear war are heightened now

more than ever considering that India, Pakistan and possibly North Korea have become nuclear states.

From the experiences of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, Japan stands firm in rejecting nuclear ownership

endorsed by powerful countries. Japan’s military limitation has also helped it develop a “more

sophisticated understanding” of the world, thereby gaining the ability to suggest a possible solution

without resorting to military means.127

From an UN perspective, Japan is in an ideal position to keep watch

on peacekeeping activities which is unlikely to be one-sided or imposed by militaristic means, thus neutrally

monitor SC activities.

125 MOFA, “Gaimusho: Naze nihon ha jounin rijikoku to naru bekika”. (2007) 126 Quoted in Drifte, Foreign Policy, p.2 127 Hanns W. Maull. “The future of UN Peacekeeping and the roles of Germany and Japan” in Morrison, Alex, and Kiras, James, U�

Peace Operations, p.57

23

Mixed Identity

Japan’s ability to communicate with other nations is another attribute that has enhanced Japan’s

candidature. Gradually Japan has acquired an identity that appeals to that of Western, Eastern and

Southern neighbours. America views Japan as a Western ally even though geographically Japan is

positioned in the Far East.128

The idea of a mixed identity derived from Japan adopting Western institutions

and practices merging with Eastern social customs.129

Steven Holloway described Japan as having acquired

a “Scandinavian or neutralist flavour” reflecting its unbiased stance in international relations.130

The

creation of an identity which reflects both Eastern and Western ideals has allowed Japan to become the

first non-Western country to join the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) of

the UN in 1964,131

emphasising Japan’s mixed identity as a unique trait. With its mixed identity, Japan can

“bridge” East and West, and North and South countries,132

a trait which China lacks as a permanent

member.

Criticisms of Japan’s candidature

Permanent Seat for Cash

While Japan’s economic strategy continues to persuade poorer nations that it deserves permanent

membership, the method by which Japan’s money is being spent has put the country in a difficult position.

Firstly, Japan’s continuous efforts in providing funds have raised arguments that Japan is using their

financial power as a means for rationalising its candidature. China accused Japan of buying their way into

the SC by funding more money to UN projects than required.133

Also, MOFA diplomats openly admitted that

their contribution towards the UN is “still too meagre”134

and should raise their contribution for the right of

entry.135

Japan may be ready to shoulder a greater financial burden; however the reality to how their

money is spent is out of Japanese control. A statement by MOFA minister Misako Kaji declared that Japan is

considering to cut funding for PKO unless control over the management of UN funds is given to them.136

Recent reports of financial corruption and fraud in PKO have forced Japan to halt its objective on continuing

a role as the UN’s main benefactor,137

which ultimately threatens Japan’s soft power authority in the UN.

128 Immerman, “Japan in the UN”, p.187 129 Leitch et al, Role in Post-Cold War, p.67 130 Drifte, Permanent SC seat, p.153 131 Neary, State and Politics, p.65 132 Yasuhiro Ueki, “Japan’s UN Diplomacy: Sources of Passivism and Activism,” in Gerald Curtis, ed., Japan’s Foreign Policy After

the Cold War, (1993), p.350 133 Drifte, Permanent SC seat, p.167 134 Kataoka and Myers, Defending Economic Superpower, p.29 135 Ibid. p.29 136 MOFA, “Permanent Mission” 137 MOFA. “PKO Procurement at Public Meeting of the SC”. (2006)

24

The Other Candidates

Secondly, Japan’s candidacy for permanent membership is being mocked for its vague ideas in

regards to the future of the UN. Critiques argue that Japan as a permanent member will be no different to

that of a Japan that does not have a permanent seat.138

US endorsement is not enough to sustain Japan as a

lead candidate. The majority of the SC is in favour of backing India’s candidature because India is more

representative for developing countries. China expressed support for India, comparing India’s consistent

priorities to Japan’s dispersed actions.139

When compared to Britain and France, Japan’s inconsistency

illustrates their lack of international experience and political leadership which could inhibit future decisions

in the UN if Japan became a permanent member. India also seems to be more accepted as a future

permanent member due to their nuclear arms status. British, French and Russian diplomats made their

views clear in stating that being a nuclear power had “something to do with the qualification for a

permanent Security Council seat”.140

Therefore Japan’s opposition to obtaining nuclear arms in the future

affects its chance of gaining more than just US support for the bid.

Identity Crisis

In order to galvanise enough international support, it is important for Japan to target countries in

the AA bloc because Japan being recognised as a Western power offends Asian countries. Such reaction

derives from Japan’s lack of independence from the US, placing the needs of America before its own

country. The demands under Japan’s bilateral relationship with the US pressurises Japan in complying and

emulating American practices, thus leading Japan to psychologically leave Asia.141

According to Pan, Japan

was always forced into either co-operating with Western nations or pursuing a special interest as an Asian

power.142

Japan’s dilemma is not its relationship with the West specifically but its desire in wanting to

please two blocs that have contrasting identities. From an Asian angle, Japan is only ‘Asian’ in a

geographical sense. Being associated too closely to the West is having a negative effect since Japan cannot

rationalise that they will represent Asia as affectively as India.

6. JAPAN’S OPTIONS TO BECOME A PERMANENT MEMBER

OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Strategies which are open to Japan in approaching the candidacy very much depend upon either

the reformation of the Japanese Constitution or the UN Charter. Alternate options for Japan to become a

permanent member are based on hypothetical situations. With the exclusion of the ‘enemy clause’ or

Article 9, it is possible for Japan to become a permanent member by adopting strategies which are

examined in this chapter.

138 Drifte, Permanent SC seat, p.106 139 Nikkan Sports. “Chukoku ga indo no jouninri iri shiji”. (2008) 140 Drifte, Permanent SC seat, p.141 141 Thompson, China, Taiwan, Japan, p.97 142 Pan, U� in Japan’s policymaking, p.45

25

Reform

As discussed in Chapter 4, Article 9 of the Constitution restricts the JSDF from being involved in high

risk PKO. Article 9 bears no flexibility in expanding JSDF involvement in fuller PKO. For a nation that seeks

permanent membership, observations show that Japan cannot continue to play a passive role in

peacekeeping. Out of 118 countries, Japan ranks 83 for contributing its military to PKO,143

placing it at a

disappointing low level. Apart from its financial contributions, Japan’s participation in PKO compared with

that of other countries is unsatisfactory. The Constitution has to be flexible in allowing JSDF to adhere to

UN collective security actions. Using the JSDF for the purpose of international peace and security should be

allowed within Japan’s Constitution as Japan’s military will be used “to prevent war”144

not wage or

contribute to war. Complying with the UN Charter, Japan should therefore be permitted to expand the

military simply for UN functions and overcome its timid approach to amending Article 9.

Besides amending Article 9, Luck and other like-minded authors criticised that “no reform of the

United Nations would be complete without the reform of the Security Council”.145

Sixty years on, the SC no

longer reflect today’s world. As the fight against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction threaten the

world today, the UN must change and adapt to meet these challenges, which current SC cannot fulfil

without disarming its nuclear arms.146

Therefore, as of March 1995, recommendations to expanding the SC

with five additional permanent members and four non-permanent members, having only one extra

permanent member, or the choice to elect five new permanent members is being consulted.147

While the

expansion of the SC is at the forefront of UN reform, former SC members are reluctant to forfeiting their

permanent seat.148

Current permanent members agree that the creation of even one permanent seat will

make the UN ineffective as consensus for a vote will be made more difficult.149

Russia prefers the right of

veto to strictly belong to the “original P5”150

as the UN Charter still recognises Germany and Japan as

“enemy states”.151

Although Japan and Germany are perceived as “natural beneficiaries”152

of a permanent

seat, the UN Charter’s ‘enemy clause’ is a psychological weight153

to these candidates. Without deleting the

enemy clause, countries who oppose Japan’s candidature will be less reluctant to forgive past aggression

and accept enemies as permanent peacekeepers.154

Deleting the enemy clause will be a powerful symbol to

represent international forgiveness of Japan’s past misgivings.

Entry as a Quasi Member

The role of a quasi-member is one that Japan has filled many times. The term ‘quasi’ in relation to

the bid refers to preliminary permanent membership without the rights to veto. In short, quasi

143 Global Policy. (February 28, 2008) “Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN

Operations”.http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2008/feb08_2.pdf 144 Kokusaiho Gakkai, Japan and the U� report, p.215 145 Edward C. Luck, U� SC: Practice and Promise. (2006), p.118 146 PM Junichiro Koizumi “Kokuren Shinjidai” Speech 147 Ibid. p.116 148 Drifte, Permanent SC seat, p.174 149 Ibid. p.143 150 Ibid. 151 References to the ‘enemy states’ appear in Article 53, 77, 107 of the UN Charter. 152 Drifte, Permanent SC seat, p.141 153 Hook, et al. Japan's International Relations, p.374 154 Yoshikawa, “Kokuren Jouninnriji”, pp.40-41

26

membership encapsulates the role of a non-permanent member of the SC.155

The difference between the

two is the non-requirement of being voted into the SC as a non-permanent member. Japan’s nine time

record of being voted as a non-permanent156

proves that Japan’s contribution in the UN is acknowledged by

international society. Although quasi membership removes the right to veto, SC members cannot veto the

admission of a non-permanent member.157

By switching objectives from permanent membership to

entering the SC as a non-permanent quasi member, Japan will not only become more involved in talks with

permanent members, but will be able to gain a more detailed insight to the works of the SC. Strong support

from the AA will guarantee Japan’s entry as a quasi member because the AA considers Japan as their UN

representative. In this way, Japan will maintain a close relationship with member states whilst exercising

authority as a semi-permanent member.

Entry as a Full Member

Characteristics of a full member reflect qualities of current SC members. Each SC member is a

nuclear state who is considered great military powers. Adopting such characteristics is a highly unlikely

option for Japan but hypothetically, the lack of constitutional restraint could tempt Japan to pursue the

path to normalisation. Japan strongly upholding a non-nuclear policy does not draw away from the fact that

the idea of developing nuclear arms has not been considered.158

In view of Japan’s technological and

economical strength, observers have commented that Japan could easily become a nuclear power in “a full

afternoon”.159

Moreover, British and French diplomats stating that Japan “deserves to have nuclear

weapons”160

could further entice Japan to believing nuclear status automatically gives one the right to

become a permanent member. Owning nuclear arms will allow Japan to eject from US’ defence security

and enable Japan to fully participate in PKO like other members. Through adapting similar qualities as

current permanent members, Japan would have attained the means to influence other nations, 161

and in

turn demand permanent membership.

Entry as a Special Member

There is a fair amount of evidence to suggest that entry as a special member is Japan’s strongest option

in pursuing permanent membership. Rather than copying qualities of current SC members, it is better for

Japan to strengthen its special qualities. Special membership status signifies an invite for permanent

membership with Japan’s current restrains. As a special member, the right to veto “should be given as a

matter of principle”.162

Dispossession of nuclear arms and military power puts Japan in an ideal position to

control other permanent members from “taking too radical actions” 163

using the veto to mediate extreme

155 Kokusaiho Gakkai, Japan and the U� report, p.139 156 Japan was voted in as a non-permanent member of the SC in the years 1958-9, 1966-7, 1971-2, 1975-6, 1981-2, 1992-3, 1997-8.

This information was found in Hook, et al. Japan's International Relations, p.371 157 Luck, U� SC, p.69 158 Speech by Ambassador Kobayashi, “Mission of Japan to the European Communities”, Brussels, 11 May 1993, in �ews & Views

from Japan (1993), p.3 159 Johnson, China, Taiwan, Japan, p.111 160 Drifte, Foreign Policy, pp.80-1 161 Hughes, ‘�ormal’ Military Power, p.93 162 Anon, ‘Anpori kakudai gutaika no ugoki’, Sankei Shimbun, (1997) 163 Liang, U� in Japan’s policymaking, p.41

27

opinions. Relying strongly on its non-militaristic principles, Japan will be acting as an “ideas-man”164

for

international security and development in the SC. Unlike previous options, as a special member Japan will

not be pressured into participating in PKO through a militaristic means. Rather, by expanding its soft power

qualities, Japan can maintain a concentrated effort on the financial management of the UN and ODA.

Special member status in the SC would best suit today’s international world and help maximise Japan’s

projection of its soft power asset without threatening its relationship with other nations and its situation at

home.

7. CONCLUSION: Breaking out of the Struggle

Japan is faced with paradoxical circumstances. In wanting world-class responsibility, Japan’s

eagerness to impress everyone has interfered with Japan’s approach to its candidature. Its ultimate

objective to become a permanent member of the SC is stalled as a result of conflicting opinions from

domestic and international forces. Government desire to normalise Japan into a military nation is

conflicting with domestic interest in preventing constitutional reform. Strong domestic pressure in

maintaining Article 9 is obstructing Japan to participate in a wider range of peacekeeping activities, in turn

receiving criticisms from SC members for not actively contributing to international security. Strengthening

relationship with Latin American and African countries puts Japan at a great advantage in securing

international co-operation for its bid. Nevertheless its bilateral relationship with the US is affecting Japan’s

connection with Asia. Without sustaining strong Asian support, Japan will be perceived as a weak

contender and an ineffective leader when representing Asia in UN meetings. Furthermore, with so much

Asian unrest towards Japan’s war crimes, illustrating it as the enemy is obliterating the ‘peace-loving image’

Japan tried so hard to regain over the last five decades. Japan’s persistence in wanting to satisfy its own

national interest and the interest of others is confusing its bid altogether. These obstructions are hardly

trivial matters but the Japanese government continues to ignore and clumsily evade these issues.

The answer to Japan’s struggle is to achieve unity. The Japanese government may insist that the

most direct way in resolving its stalemate for permanent membership is to remove the enemy clause and

re-elect members for the SC; however its failure to manage historical problems embraced by its neighbours

is stalling Japan’s progress for permanent membership. Japan needs to prioritise which issue to deal with

first rather than managing all problems simultaneously. Instead of focusing so heavily on nuclear-related

issues, Japan must first tackle problems presented by Korea, China and Russia to avoid attacks which make

it vulnerable. Problems regarding Japan’s war crime and Kurile Island will not disappear as pressure from its

neighbours and its people will persist. The Japanese government need to construct a strategy that will

diminish anti-Japanese sentiment by assuring its position as a pacifist country and honouring Article 9. Once

the issues faced by problem countries have been tackled, only then can Japan focus on non-proliferation,

disarmament and worldwide development without being bombarded by criticisms from other nations

which essentially weakens Japan’s permanent bid.

164 Hook, et al. Japan's International Relations, p.387

28

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