January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

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January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD [email protected] www.holmeshummel.net/ClimatePolicyDesign Complementary Policies for Climate Change: Basis, Design, Strategy 1

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January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD [email protected] www.holmeshummel.net/ClimatePolicyDesign. Complementary Policies for Climate Change: Basis, Design, Strategy. Seeking a Price Response in Failed Markets Making the Case for Complementary Policies - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Transcript of January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

Page 1: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

January 23, 2009

Holmes Hummel, PhD

[email protected]

www.holmeshummel.net/ClimatePolicyDesign

Complementary Policies

for Climate Change:

Basis, Design, Strategy

1

Page 2: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

• Seeking a Price Response in Failed Markets

• Making the Case for Complementary Policies

• Considering a Federal Climate Action Plan

• Annex: Smart Grid (EISA Title XIII)

Complementary Policies

2

Page 3: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

U.S. Approach: Cap-and-TradeDeclining Cap

Covered Entities 3

Page 4: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

Polluters Compete for Scarce Permits

4

Page 5: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

Carbon Price Established by Market Activity

So, is it more profitable to:

buy a permit, OR reduce my own

emissions?

Profit opportunities are a main driver for innovation and investment,

and the climate challenge needs both.

5

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Carbon Price Established by Market Activity

Would anyone accept $40 for your permit?

$40

6

Page 8: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

2000 21002050

Achieving Reduction TargetsTo stabilize global warming, most uses of coal, oil, and gas will have to move to a different game: the clean energy economy.

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

6000

7000

$100

$80

$60

$40

$20

$120

$150

An

nu

al U

.S.

Em

issi

on

s (M

tCO

2)C

arbo

n P

rice ($/MtC

O2)

$??

$??

$??

$??

$250

$200

$150

$100

$50

$300

$350

8

What price trajectorywould be sufficient to drive

people away from fossil fuels?

Modeling results are highly uncertain

Page 9: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

Moving to Clean Energy

Players seek better options as costs rise.

Cap-and-trade lets players choose at what price they leave the game

– and how they want to make that change.

$30$150$20

$100

$200$50

2050204020302020

Wind power

Rail Transport

Green buildings

Nuclear power

2010

Solar power

Hybrid vehicle

9

Page 10: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

Achieving Reduction Targets

Who will be the last greenhouse gas polluters

left in the game?

2050

Unlike the familiar game of Musical Chairs, the last players still vying for pollution permits are not exactly winners…

10

Page 11: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

Achieving Reduction Targets

The last ones remaining in the game are those who:

A) can afford to pay the most, or

B) have the least flexibility to change games.

The underlying assumption is that the most valuable uses of fossil fuels must be the ones for which people are willing to pay the most.

To stabilize global warming, most uses of coal, oil, and gas will have to move to a different game: the clean energy economy.

2050

11

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12

Page 13: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

Market Conditions

• Many small buyers and sellers

• Perfect freedom of entry and exit from the industry.

• Homogeneous products are supplied to the markets that are perfect substitutes.

• Perfect knowledge

• Low transaction costs

• No externalities arising from production and/or consumption which lie outside the market

Perfect Competition

SELLERS

BUYERS

Page 14: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

Market Conditions

• Many small buyers and sellers

• Homogeneous products are supplied to the markets that are perfect substitutes.

• Perfect freedom of entry and exit from the industry.

• Perfect knowledge

• Low transaction costs

• No externalities arising from production and/or consumption which lie outside the market

Perfect Competition

Page 15: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

Market Conditions

• Many small buyers and sellers

• Homogeneous products are supplied to the markets that are perfect substitutes.

• Perfect freedom of entry and exit from the industry.

• Perfect knowledge

• Low transaction costs

• No externalities arising from production and/or consumption which lie outside the market

Perfect Competition

Page 16: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

Market Conditions

Perfect Competition

• Many small buyers and sellers

• Homogeneous products are supplied to the markets that are perfect substitutes.

• Perfect freedom of entry and exit from the industry.

• Perfect knowledge

• Low transaction costs

• No externalities arising from production and/or consumption which lie outside the market

$3.99

$3.99

$3.20

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Market Conditions

Perfect Competition

• Many small buyers and sellers

• Homogeneous products are supplied to the markets that are perfect substitutes.

• Perfect freedom of entry and exit from the industry.

• Perfect knowledge

• Low transaction costs

• No externalities arising from production and/or consumption which lie outside the market

$3.99

$3.99

$3.20

Page 18: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

Market Conditions

Perfect Competition

• Many small buyers and sellers

• Homogeneous products are supplied to the markets that are perfect substitutes.

• Perfect freedom of entry and exit from the industry.

• Perfect knowledge

• Low transaction costs

• No externalities arising from production and/or consumption which lie outside the market

$3.99

$3.99

$3.20

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Market Conditions

Energy Sector

• Few sellers, many buyers

• Homogeneous products are supplied to the markets that are perfect substitutes.

• Perfect freedom of entry and exit from the industry.

• Perfect knowledge

• Low transaction costs

• No externalities arising from production and/or consumption which lie outside the market

$3.99

$3.99

$3.20

Page 20: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

Market Conditions

Energy Sector

• Few sellers, many buyers

• Homogeneous products are supplied to the markets that are perfect substitutes.

• High capital requirements and regulatory barriers to entry

• Perfect knowledge

• Low transaction costs

• No externalities arising from production and/or consumption which lie outside the market

$3.99

$3.99

$3.20

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Market Conditions

Energy Sector

• Few sellers, many buyers

• Homogeneous products are supplied to the markets that are perfect substitutes.

• High capital requirements and regulatory barriers to entry

• Lack of transparency

• Low transaction costs

• No externalities arising from production and/or consumption which lie outside the market

$?? $/Btu?

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Market Conditions

Energy Sector

• Few sellers, many buyers

• Homogeneous products are supplied to the markets that are perfect substitutes.

• High capital requirements and regulatory barriers to entry

• Lack of transparency

• Persistent transaction costs

• No externalities arising from production and/or consumption which lie outside the market

$??

$/Btu?

Page 23: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

Market Conditions

Energy Sector

• Few sellers, many buyers

• Homogeneous products are supplied to the markets that are perfect substitutes.

• High capital requirements and regulatory barriers to entry

• Lack of transparency

• Persistent transaction costs

• Many, Very Large Externalities – climate change is just one…

$??

$/Btu?

Page 24: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

• Seeking a Price Response in Failed Markets

• Making the Case for Complementary Policies

• Considering a Federal Climate Action Plan

• Annex: Smart Grid (EISA Title XIII)

Complementary Policies

24

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#1 Complementary Policies Reduce the Cost of Price-Based Policies

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#1 Complementary Policies Reduce the Cost of Price-Based Policies

-110

1.01.0 1.21.2

-50

0.20.2 0.40.4 0.80.80

-40

0.60.6-20-10

10

4050

7080

100

20

-100

-70-80

30

60

90

-120

-30

-60

-90

-230

1.41.4 1.81.8 2.02.0 2.22.2 2.42.4 2.62.6 2.82.8 3.03.0 3.23.21.61.6

Mid-range case, McKinsey 2007

Abatement costs <$50/ton

PotentialGigatons/yearIN 2030

COST($/tonCO2)

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#1 Complementary Policies Reduce the Cost of Price-Based Policies

-110

1.01.0 1.21.2

-50

0.20.2 0.40.4 0.80.80

-40

0.60.6-20-10

10

4050

7080

100

20

-100

-70-80

30

60

90

-120

-30

-60

-90

-230

Residential electronics

Residential buildings - Lighting

Fuel economy packages – Cars

Cellulosic

biofuels

Industry – Combined heat and power

Conservation tillage

Fuel economy packages – Light trucks

Coal mining – Methane mgmt

Industrial process improve-ments

Commercial buildings – New shell improvements

Abatement costs <$50/ton

Commercial electronics

Mid-range case, McKinsey 2007

PotentialGigatons/yearIN 2030

A price on carbon will not address all the non-price barriers to reducing GHGs –

or the price insensitive reasons people consume fossil fuels.

1.81.8 2.02.0 2.22.2 2.42.4 2.62.6 2.82.8 3.03.0 3.23.21.61.61.21.2 1.41.4

COST($/tonCO2)

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#1 Complementary Policies Reduce the Cost of Price-Based Policies

Natural gas and petroleum systems mgmt

Afforestation of pastureland

Reforestation

Winter cover crops

New coal

power plants

with CCS

for EOR

Biomass power – Cofiring

Industry – CCS new builds on carbon-intensive processes

Shift dispatch of existing plants from coal to natural gas

Car hybridi-zation

Commercial electronics

Residential electronics

Residential buildings - Lighting

Fuel economy packages – Cars

Cellulosic

biofuels

Industry – Combined heat and power

Conservation tillage

Fuel economy packages – Light trucks

Coal mining – Methane mgmt

Industrial process improve-ments

Commercial buildings – New shell improvements

-110

1.01.0 1.21.2

-50

0.20.2 0.40.4 0.80.80

-40

0.60.6-20-10

10

4050

7080

100

20

-100

-70-80

30

60

90

-120

-30

-60

-90

-230

Abatement costs <$50/ton

Mid-range case, McKinsey 2007

PotentialPotential

Gigatons/yearGigatons/year

IN 2030IN 2030

1.41.4 1.81.8 2.02.0 2.22.2 2.42.4 2.62.6 2.82.8 3.03.0 3.23.21.61.6

COST($/tonCO2)

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#1 Complementary Policies Reduce the Cost of Price-Based Policies

-110

1.01.0 1.21.2

-50

0.20.2 0.40.4 0.80.80

-40

0.60.6-20-10

10

4050

7080

100

20

-100

-70-80

30

60

90

-120

-30

-60

-90

-230

Abatement costs <$50/ton

1.41.4 1.81.8 2.02.0 2.22.2 2.42.4 2.62.6 2.82.8 3.03.0 3.23.21.61.6

Natural gas and petroleum systems mgmt

Afforestation of pastureland

Reforestation

Winter cover crops

New coal

power plants

with CCS

for EOR

Biomass power – Cofiring

Industry – CCS new builds on carbon-intensive processes

Shift dispatch of existing plants from coal to natural gas

Car hybridi-zation

Potential

Gigatons/year

IN 2030

Mid-range case, McKinsey 2007

$40$40 / tonCO2

Reduction Reduction Target: Target:

1 GtCO2e1 GtCO2e

Reduction Reduction Target: Target:

1 GtCO2e1 GtCO2e

COST($/tonCO2)

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30

#1 Complementary Policies Reduce the Cost of Price-Based Policies

$10 Billion

-110

1.01.0 1.21.2

-50

0.20.2 0.40.4 0.80.80

-40

0.60.6-20-10

10

4050

7080

100

20

-100

-70-80

30

60

90

-120

-30

-60

-90

-230

Abatement costs <$50/ton

1.41.4 1.81.8 2.02.0 2.22.2 2.42.4 2.62.6 2.82.8 3.03.0 3.23.21.61.6

Potential

Gigatons/year

IN 2030

Mid-range case, McKinsey 2007

Reduction Target:

1 GtCO2e

$40$40 / tonCO2

Residential

buildings -Lighting

Fuel economy

packages – Cars

Fuel economy

packages –

Light trucks

COST($/tonCO2)

New coal

power plants

with CCS

for EOR

Shift dispatch of existing plants from coal to natural gas

New coal

power plants

with CCS

for EOR

Shift dispatch of existing plants from coal to natural gas

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-110

1.01.0 1.21.2

-50

0.20.2 0.40.4 0.80.80

-40

0.60.6-20-10

10

4050

7080

100

20

-100

-70-80

30

60

90

-120

-30

-60

-90

-230

Abatement costs <$50/ton

1.41.4 1.81.8 2.02.0 2.22.2 2.42.4 2.62.6 2.82.8 3.03.0 3.23.21.61.6

Potential

Gigatons/year

IN 2030

Mid-range case, McKinsey 2007Residential

buildings -Lighting

Fuel economy

packages – Cars

Fuel economy

packages –

Light trucks

New coal

power plants

with CCS

for EOR

COST($/tonCO2)

Shift dispatch of existing plants from coal to natural gas

#2 People May Reject a Carbon Price Signal Before They Reject Fossil Fuels

Page 32: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

#2 People May Reject a Carbon Price Signal Before They Reject Fossil Fuels

Page 33: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

#2 People May Reject a Carbon Price Signal Before They Reject Fossil Fuels

Nuclear NuclearCoalPower

CoalPower

Natural GasPower

Natural GasPower

Carbon Price: $0/tCO2 $20/tCO2

Market Price

Market PriceSets Price

Sets Price

Pro

fit Pro

fit

Pro

fit

Pro

fit

Dis

pat

ch P

rice

per

MW

h

Dis

pat

ch P

rice

per

MW

h

Pro

fit Pro

fit

Page 34: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

Nuclear NuclearCoalPower

CoalPower

Natural GasPower

Natural GasPower

Carbon Price: $0/tCO2 $20/tCO2

Market Price

Market PriceSets Price

Sets Price

Pro

fit Pro

fit

Pro

fit

Pro

fit

Dis

pat

ch P

rice

per

MW

h

Dis

pat

ch P

rice

per

MW

h

#2 People May Reject a Carbon Price Signal Before They Reject Fossil Fuels

Pro

fit

Pro

fit

Page 35: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

Gasoline Consumption

Price of Gasoline

#2 People May Reject a Carbon Price Signal Before They Reject Fossil Fuels

~$150/tCO2

Page 36: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

World Resources Institute; 2003 data

#3 Stabilization Requires Reducing Emissions Outside a Managed Cap of Measurable Sources

OFFSETS

CAP

Page 37: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

• Seeking a Price Response in Failed Markets

• Making the Case for Complementary Policies

• Considering a Federal Climate Action Plan

• Annex: Smart Grid (EISA Annex XIII)

Complementary Policies

38

Page 38: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

Market Conditions

Perfect Competition

• Many small buyers and sellers

• Homogeneous products are supplied to the markets that are perfect substitutes.

• Perfect freedom of entry and exit from the industry.

• Perfect knowledge

• Low transaction costs

• No externalities arising from production and/or consumption which lie outside the market

Energy Sector

• Few sellers, many buyers

• Homogeneous products are supplied to the markets that are perfect substitutes.

• High capital requirements and regulatory barriers to entry

• Lack of transparency

• Persistent transaction costs

• Many, Very Large Externalities – climate change is just one…

39

Page 39: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

Market Conditions

Energy Sector

• Few sellers, many buyers

• Homogeneous products are supplied to the markets that are perfect substitutes.

• High capital requirements and regulatory barriers to entry

• Lack of transparency

• Persistent transaction costs

• Many, Very Large Externalities – climate change is just one…

Complementary Policies

Price-Based Policies

40

Page 40: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

Market Conditions

Energy Sector

• Few sellers, many buyers

• Homogeneous products are supplied to the markets that are perfect substitutes.

• High capital requirements and regulatory barriers to entry

• Lack of transparency

• Persistent transaction costs

• Many, Very Large Externalities – climate change is just one… Price-Based Policies

41

1. Curing market failures

2. Coping with market failures

3. Covering emissions by sector

Page 41: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

World Resources Institute; 2003 data

OFFSETS INSIDE U.S.

CAPCAP

Designing Complementary PoliciesU

.S. G

HG

Em

issionsU

.S.

Sou

rces

End-Use

42

An “economy-wide” cap-and-trade policy does not distinguish between sectors

Page 42: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

World Resources Institute; 2003 data

TransportationTransportation

U.S

. GH

G E

missions

U.S

. S

ourc

es

End-Use

43

Designing Complementary Policies

DistanceMode

Fuel SourceFuel Economy

Page 43: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

California’s Strategy to Reduce Emissions to 1990 by 2020 = 174 MMTCO2E below baseline = 10% below 2002-2004

Vehicle GHGStandards

Page 44: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

California’s Strategy to Reduce Emissions to 1990 by 2020 = 174 MMTCO2E below baseline = 10% below 2002-2004

Vehicle GHGStandards

Low Carbon Fuel Standard

Page 45: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

California’s Strategy to Reduce Emissions to 1990 by 2020 = 174 MMTCO2E below baseline = 10% below 2002-2004

Vehicle GHGStandards

Low Carbon Fuel Standard Transportation

& Other Vehicle Measures

Page 46: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

World Resources Institute; 2003 data

Electric Power SectorElectric Power Sector

U.S

. GH

G E

missions

U.S

. S

ourc

es

End-Use

47

Designing Complementary Policies

TransportationTransportation

Page 47: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

California’s Strategy to Reduce Emissions to 1990 by 2020 = 174 MMTCO2E below baseline = 10% below 2002-2004

Vehicle GHGStandards

Low Carbon Fuel Standard Transportation

& Other Vehicle Measures

Efficiency Standards& Incentive Programs

Page 48: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

California’s Strategy to Reduce Emissions to 1990 by 2020 = 174 MMTCO2E below baseline = 10% below 2002-2004

Vehicle GHGStandards

Low Carbon Fuel Standard Transportation

& Other Vehicle Measures

Efficiency Standards& Incentive Programs

Renewable PortfolioStandard:33% by 2020

Page 49: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

California’s Strategy to Reduce Emissions to 1990 by 2020 = 174 MMTCO2E below baseline = 10% below 2002-2004

Million Solar Roofs

Vehicle GHGStandards

Low Carbon Fuel Standard Transportation

& Other Vehicle Measures

Efficiency Standards& Incentive Programs

Renewable PortfolioStandard:33% by 2020

Page 50: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

World Resources Institute; 2003 data

U.S

. GH

G E

missions

U.S

. S

ourc

es

End-Use

51

Designing Complementary Policies

Industrial Industrial GasesGases

Page 51: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

uCalifornia’s Strategy to Reduce Emissions

to 1990 by 2020 = 174 MMTCO2E below baseline = 10% below 2002-2004

Million Solar Roofs

F-Gases &Refrigerants

Vehicle GHGStandards

Low Carbon Fuel Standard Transportation

& Other Vehicle Measures

Efficiency Standards& Incentive Programs

Renewable PortfolioStandard:33% by 2020

Page 52: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

uCalifornia’s Strategy to Reduce Emissions

to 1990 by 2020 = 174 MMTCO2E below baseline = 10% below 2002-2004

Million Solar Roofs

Vehicle GHGStandards

Low Carbon Fuel Standard Transportation

& Other Vehicle Measures

Efficiency Standards& Incentive Programs

Renewable PortfolioStandard:33% by 2020

F-Gases &Refrigerants

SustainableForests

Page 53: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

uCalifornia’s Strategy to Reduce Emissions

to 1990 by 2020 = 174 MMTCO2E below baseline = 10% below 2002-2004

Million Solar Roofs

Vehicle GHGStandards

Low Carbon Fuel Standard Transportation

& Other Vehicle Measures

Efficiency Standards& Incentive Programs

Renewable PortfolioStandard:33% by 2020

F-Gases &Refrigerants

SustainableForests

Other

Page 54: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

uCalifornia’s Strategy to Reduce Emissions

to 1990 by 2020 = 174 MMTCO2E below baseline = 10% below 2002-2004

Million Solar Roofs

Vehicle GHGStandards

Low Carbon Fuel Standard Transportation

& Other Vehicle Measures

Efficiency Standards& Incentive Programs

Renewable PortfolioStandard:33% by 2020

F-Gases &Refrigerants

SustainableForests

Cap-And-TradeMarket Response

Page 55: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

World Resources Institute; 2003 data

OFFSETS INSIDE U.S.

U.S

. GH

G E

missions

U.S

. S

ourc

es

End-Use

56

CAPCAP

Designing Complementary Policies

Page 56: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

Most of the Industrial GHG Emissions Covered by a Cap-and-Trade Policy are in 5 Sub-Sectors

Energy Intensive Industries

Capped

Page 57: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

Most of the Industrial GHG Emissions Covered by a Cap-and-Trade Policy are in 5 Sub-Sectors

ISO 50001: Int’l Energy Management Std.

Capped

Page 58: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

Complementary Policies for EE & RE

• National Action Plan for Energy Efficiency recommendations

• Renewable Portfolio Standard; Renewable Fuel Standard

• Generation performance standards; Low Carbon Fuel Standard

• Requiring efficiency to be an alternative in power plant EIS studies

• Remove barriers to grid access (“Free the Grid” report)

• Green power purchases and marketing

• Combined heat and power (CHP) standards, incentives, and/or barrier removal

• Public Benefits Charge – and all that it could fund59

Page 59: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

Policy Horizon

On the Books:

1. EPAct 2005

2. EISA 2007

3. Existing executive authorities across all departments

Looking ahead:

1. New Energy for America

2. SAFETEA-LU (Transportation Reauthorization)

3. Cap-and-Trade legislation

4. Mass vs. EPA regulations60

Page 60: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

• Seeking a Price Response in Failed Markets

• Making the Case for Complementary Policies

• Considering a Federal Climate Action Plan

• Annex: Smart Grid (EISA Title XIII)

Complementary Policies

61

Page 61: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

Supplemental questions on Smart Grid

1. What does Smart Grid do?

2. What characterizes a Smart Grid?

3. What does Smart Grid deliver?

… as specified in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007

62

Page 62: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

What does a Smart Grid do?(EISA Title XIII)

1. Dynamic optimization of grid operations and resources, with full cyber-security.

2. Development and incorporation of demand response, demand-side resources, and energy-efficiency resources.

3. Provision to consumers of timely information and control options.

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Page 63: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

What characterizes a Smart Grid?(EISA TitleXIII)

1. Increased use of digital information and controls technology to improve reliability, security, and efficiency of the electric grid.

2. Deployment and integration of distributed generation (e.g. renewable resources)

3. Deployment and integration of advanced electricity storage and peak-shaving technologies, including plug-in electric and hybrid electric vehicles, and thermal-storage air conditioning.

4. Deployment of `smart' technologies (real-time, automated, interactive technologies that optimize the physical operation of appliances and consumer devices) for metering, communications concerning grid operations and status, and distribution automation.

5. Integration of `smart' appliances and consumer devices.

6. Development of standards for communication and interoperability of appliances and equipment connected to the grid, including grid infrastructure.

7. Identification and lowering of unreasonable or unnecessary barriers to adoption of smart grid technologies, practices, and services.

64

Page 64: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

What does a Smart Grid deliver?(EISA Title XIII)

1. The ability to measure or monitor electricity use as a function of time of day, power quality characteristics such as voltage level, current, cycles per second, or source or type of generation and to store, synthesize or report that information by digital means.

2. The ability to sense and localize disruptions or changes in power flows on the grid and communicate such information instantaneously and automatically for purposes of enabling automatic protective responses to sustain reliability and security of grid operations.

3. The ability to detect, prevent, communicate with regard to, respond to, or recover from system security threats, including cyber-security threats and terrorism, using digital information, media, and devices.

4. The ability of any appliance or machine to respond to such signals, measurements, or communications automatically or in a manner programmed by its owner or operator without independent human intervention.

5. The ability to use digital information to operate functionalities on the electric utility grid that were previously electro-mechanical or manual.

6. The ability to use digital controls to manage and modify electricity demand, enable congestion management, assist in voltage control, provide operating reserves, and provide frequency regulation.

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Page 65: January 23, 2009 Holmes Hummel, PhD hummel@stanfordalumni

January 23, 2009

Holmes Hummel, PhD

[email protected]

www.holmeshummel.net/ClimatePolicyDesign

Complementary Policies

for Climate Change:

Basis, Design, Strategy

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