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Greek Oath Breakers?The Arrest of the Generals in Xenophons Anabasis Reexamined

Readers of Xenophons Anabasis have long considered the arrest of the Greek generals after the Battle of Cunaxa to be an egregious example of Persian treachery and perjury (An. 2.5.1-35).1 And with good reason: Xenophon asserts repeatedly and emphatically that Tissaphernes and the Persians had broken their oaths (3.1.20-2; 3.2.4-5; 3.2.8; 3.2.10; 3.5.5), which stipulated that as long as the Persians provided a market from which the Greeks could buy provisions, they were to refrain from plundering Persian territory (2.3.26-7; cf. 3.1.20). Bassett, who offers the most critical analysis of the incident, lends credence to this view, contending that Tissaphernes had no intention of honoring the oath he had sworn and plotted against the Greeks from the beginning.2 She presents the novel argument that Tissaphernes inclusion of the purchasing () clause in the oath shows malicious intent because the Greeks were cash-starved after the death of their paymaster, Cyrus.3 It was only a matter of time, then, until dire necessity would force the Greeks to provision them-selves in ways contrary to the stipulations of the treaty, an inescapable situ-ation which Tissaphernes craftily engineered. Accordinglyand here is the twistBassett maintains that the Greeks did, in fact, break their oaths by for-aging on the march, the evidence for which is subtly embedded in Xenophons narrative.4 The interpretation of the Greeks as hapless perjurers has proven to be attractive, gaining some notable adherents of late.5 In this paper, I wish to scrutinize this particular claim and make the case that the Greeks, in spite of Tissaphernes connivance, did not break their oaths. I thus affirm that Xenophons portrayal of the Persians as treacherous oath breakers is both con-sistent and sound.

1 Isoc. Paneg. 147 and Philip 91; D.S. 14.26.5-7; Arr. An. 1.12.3; Aristid. Rh. 2.13.1, 3; Suid. s.v. , 48.19-21. Among modern commentators, see, e.g., Grote 1869, 376-8; Bury 1902, 82-3; Higgins 1977, 87-8; Anderson 1974, 116; Lewis 1977, 151-2; Strauss 1983, 108; Hirsch 1985, 24-8; Dillery 1995, 69. For a different view, see Cawkwell 1972, 24-6 and 2005, 198-9.

2 Bassett 2002, 447-61. 3 Ibid., 451-2.4 Ibid., 459-61. 5 Rood 2005, 206, n. 49 and Waterfield 2006, 120; cf. Hyland 2005, 170-1.

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Let us take a closer look at Bassetts argument by examining the specific terms of the treaty that Tissaphernes proposed to the Greeks:

, . , , . (2.3.26-7)

[We] will lead you through our territory to Greece without treachery, pro-viding you with a market; wherever it is impossible for you to purchase provisions, we will allow you to take them from our territory. But it will be necessary for you in truth to swear us an oath to march as if through friendly country taking food and drink without doing harm whenever we do not provide a market, but if we do provide a market, you will have your provisions by purchasing them.

What ostensibly gave Tissaphernes the justification for arresting the Greeks was a direct contravention of the treaty, a charge, it should be stressed, no one in the Anabasis ever imputes to the Greeks themselves.6 However, Ctesias quip (FGrH 688 F 27, 3-4) that Clearchus and the other Greek generals were defeated by deceit and oaths ( ) suggests to Bassett that we look more closely at Xenophons account for inconsistencies and evidence of an artful cover-up.7 One piece of information Xenophon alleg-edly let slip was mentioning that the Spartan general Chirisophus had been away at that time in a village with others who were foraging ( ) when the Greek generals were arrested, implying that they were not buying their food but taking it by force (2.5.37). Again, such behavior was permitted only if the Persians failed to

6 Ariaeus accuses Clearchus specifically of breaking the truce but he is frustratingly vague as to nature of his plotting (2.5.38).

7 Bassett 2002, 459. A recent trend in Xenophontine scholarship, although the approach has been around for over a quarter century, is to expose the historian as an artful reporter, that is, someone who conveniently omits or spins evidence that may contradict his interpretation of an event or call into question his larger historiographic aims (see, e.g., Hunter 1973). Fox 2004, 5 advises the following way of reading Xenophons Anabasis: How do we best expose the artfulness of an artful reporter? One way is to try to expose him from the evidence of his own text, as if he has not consistently covered his own tracks...Another way is to set other evidence against his own (cf. Cawkwell 1972, 26). Bassetts article evidences well this approach.

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provide a market, which in this case the Persians undoubtedly did. For when Clearchus and the other generals went to Tissaphernes tent, Xenophon says about two hundred other soldiers followed with the intention of going to mar-ket ( ) (2.5.30).8 Consequently, when news of the generals arrest reached the Greek camp, the Orchomenian general Cleanor could give only a feeble, blustering reply to the Persians, because the Greeks knew they had broken the terms of the treaty and technically were in the wrong.9

I see three main problems with this argument. First, though it is hardly debatable that the Persians had provided the Greeks with a market, it is not certain that Chirisophus and other Greeks were actually foraging for food. The word Bassett translates as foraging, , literally means to pro-vision oneself with food and is intrinsically neutral as to the nature of the food sources.10 It may indicate food obtained by looting or by purchase. A few examples will illustrate the semantic range of this verb. While in Byzantium, the Ten Thousand grumbled because the Spartan harmost Anaxibius refused to pay them, which, they claimed, made it impossible to get provisions () for their journey back to Asia (7.1.7). Thucydides likewise uses for armies engaging in peaceful commercial exchange: during naval operations around Euboea, the Athenian fleet was slow () to meet the enemy, as the sailors happened to be providing themselves with their midday meal not from the market (for the Eretrians purposely put nothing on sale there) but from the houses on the outskirts of the city ( ) (8.95.4). In two clear-cut cases, however, Xenophon does employ to connote provisioning not by means of purchase but rather by plunder or theft (3.4.18; 7.7.1).11 The

8 Bassett 2002, 460, n. 44 and Stylianou (2004, 95) dismiss rightly the suggestion of Cawkwell 1972, 25 that should be construed to mean as though to buy provisions, which would otherwise indicate hostile intent on the part of the Greeks as they went to Tissaphernes tent.

9 Ibid., 460.10 LSJ9 s.v. and Tuplin 2004, 171 contra Descat 1995, 104-5, who argues that the verb specifi-

cally refers to drawing supplies from official Persian imperial storehouses. Foraging is among the various meanings of the substantive , which occurs in the Anabasis twice (1.5.9; 7.1.9). However, in both passages Xenophon gives no indication that looting was going on.

11 Cf. 2.4.5 and 6.2.4, which may refer to looting (the latter cited by Tuplin 2004, 171, n. 56). In the four remaining examples of in the Anabasis (1.5.1, 5, 9; 4.7.18), Xenophons narrative is so curt that it is altogether unclear what kind of provisioning was going on.

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word by itself, therefore, does not indicate the precise manner in which provisions are obtained; context must play a determining role in ascer-taining its precise meaning.

Bassetts discussion of the Greeks financial plight is well-taken and provides much needed background with which to assess their behavior on the march. Indeed, shortly after the arrest, Xenophon himself expresses consternation over the fact that few soldiers had the wherewithal to buy provisions when the truce was in effect (3.1.20; 3.2.21). But must we conclude from this admission that the Greeks were in such dire straights that they were compelled to break the treaty, especially in light of Xenophons insistence that they nonetheless firmly held off from taking food by force (3.1.22)? I think not. For only one week before the arrest, Tissaphernes, in a move that seems strangely counter-productive to his strategy to bankrupt the Greeks, allowed the army to plunder some villages belonging to Cyrus mother Parysatis and to take whatever they wanted except the slaves. Xenophon explicitly states, much grain, sheep, and other goods were inside (2.4.27). Furthermore, soldiers often bartered with each other and shared their provisions in exceptionally grave circumstances (e.g. 4.5.5). While the common soldiers undoubtedly had very little money on hand, the generals and other leaders probably had enough to distribute to the soldiers to stave off a crisis.12 Xenophon at one point even mentions a com-mon fund out of which the Greeks could draw funds to pay sailors for their wages and transport of the army back to Greece (5.1.12; cf. 6.6.2).13 Lastly, if the

12 For example, at Heraclea Lycon, an Achaean soldier, was amazed that the generals were not doing enough to secure money allowances () for the soldiers, which sug-gests that they, at least in principle, had the wherewithal to supply such grants (6.2.4-5). That the generals had a ready supply of cash is confirmed by Xenophons suggestion to form a new contingent of slingers by buying Rhodian slings from those who had them and paying for more slings to be made (4.3.18). Generals, it must be remembered, usually received four times the daily wage of the common soldier (7.2.36; 7.6.1) and a lions share of the booty (see Pritchett 1991, 398-401; for the other profits of generals, Pritchett 1974, 126-32). Xenophon does not give us any specific amounts, but the ten-mnai fine imposed on Sophaenetus and the twenty-mnai fines on Philesius and Xanthicles suggest that they possessed no nominal sums (5.8.1). Clearchus undoubtedly still had some of the 10,000 darics, which Cyrus paid him to wage war on the Thracians (1.1.9; 2.6.4), and the diviner Silanus is said to have had 3,000 darics (5.6.1).

13 The size of this public purse is difficult to determine, but the claim of Dalby (1992, 16-30, 26) that the amount of public property was small is predicated upon a misunderstanding of 6.6.2-6. There the army decrees that all booty () captured by individuals when the whole army went out of the camp to plunder be public property (), which sug-gests to Dalby that the normal procedure on the march was that individual soldiers kept their booty, and thus the generals themselves never played a role in distributing plundered

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terms of the treaty were so detrimental to the Greeks, it is puzzling to see them still adhere to its tenets as they passed through the lands of both Greeks and non-Greeks during the remainder of the retreat. The policy of the army was simply this: if the local inhabitants offered the Greeks a market, they would buy their victuals accordingly; but if they were refused, the Greeks interpreted this as a sign of hostility and took provisions by force.14 Interestingly, when the Greeks were passing through the Greek polis of Cotyora, the citizens refused to provide a market. The army forced their way into the city, took some provi-sions, and billeted sick troops in local homes (5.5.6-23). Yet, Xenophon claims that these troops nonetheless paid for their upkeep (5.5.20), an indication that the financial situation of the soldiers was not always quite so perilous and that they tried to adhere to the principles of the treaty, even when circumstances permitted otherwise. In short, the evidence suggests that as long as the Greeks could occasionally plunder hostile territory and replenish their supplies and sell some of their booty (6.6.38; 7.7.56), enough money would have been on hand, both publicly and privately held, to conduct a consistent policy of provi-sioning by purchase in local markets when provided.

The question, however, still remains: why were Chirisophus and the other Greeks getting provisions in a village when the Persians had already provided a market? The simple answer is that the Persian markets were often deficient, perhaps intentionally so, and high prices were commonplace (3.2.21; 5.1.6; cf. 7.6.24). In these circumstances, it is easy to imagine Chirisophus seeking to purchase additional necessities elsewhere, which were either not on sale and/or too expensive in the Persian market proper. That the terms of the treaty

goods to the army at large. Xenophon, however, is very clear that this new rule was in effect only when the army was at rest ( ). In other words, all booty seized by the army on the move was public property and subject to distri-bution to the soldiers by the generals (see Pritchett 1991, 386, 388). For a complete list of booty raids in the Anabasis, see Pritchett 1991, 516-18.

14 The policy is announced by Chirisophus himself, the putative oath breaker: We have decided that if people allow us to return home we will pass through their territory as harmlessly as possible ( , , ) (3.3.3); compare with the phrase in the treaty cited above. Cf. 2.3.27 and 5.5.5-21 for Xenophons restatement of the policy. It is also significant that when the army adopts Lycon the Achaeans proposal to extort money from the Heracleans (see previous note), both Xenophon and Chirisophus fought vehemently against it, for they both agreed that it was good not to compel a friendly Greek city to give something when they were unwill-ing ( ) (6.2.6).

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allowed such supplemental purchases from other sources is unclear; but the provisions, as Xenophon relates them, do not explicitly forbid such provision-ing. The tenor of the oath is based on the idea that victuals be procured by pur-chase (rather than by purchase in the market specifically) and not by plunder: wherever it is impossible for you to purchase provisions, we will allow you to take them from our territory (2.3.26). Indeed, the evidence recommends the view that the Greeks themselves understood the treaty in this way. Xenophons own take on the situation is crucial: no one could share in all these good things [sc. victuals, cattle, clothes, etc.] unless he bought them...and that our oaths held us from procuring supplies in an other way than by purchasing them ( , ) (3.1.20; cf. 5.5.14; 7.3.5, 13). Earlier, Clearchus, in response to the wish of the majority to leave before Tissaphernes return from the king, urges caution out of fear of breaking the treaty: Furthermore, for the first of our worries, no one will provide us with a market nor any place from which we can procure provisions ( ) (2.4.5). The Ten Thousand, it would then seem, at least during this stage of the march, could purchase necessities from places other than the market. We are not told about any of these locations, but in light of the example from Thucydides cited above, goods could be purchased directly from households in cities and villagesa custom we see the Greeks practicing later in the campaign (5.5.20). At one point they also buy goods from vendors who come down from mountain strongholds in the territory of Cerasus (5.7.13). Given that necessities could be purchased outside the Persian market, we do not need to charge Chirisophus and his cohort with illicit foraging.

The second reason that calls into question the interpretation that the Greeks broke their oaths is that the chronology of events does not allow for a sufficient amount of time to have elapsed between Chirisophus supposed foraging and the arrest of the generals. Xenophon mentions Chirisophus actions as hap-pening at the same time that Ariaeus arrived into the Greek camp to announce Clearchus alleged breaking of the truce (2.5.35-8).15 Xenophons narrative, however, leaves little doubt that Tissaphernes seizure of the generals and the other soldiers was premeditated (2.5.32), perhaps planned to take place when

15 . As Smyth 1956, 466-7 (2096c) notes well when is used with a supplementary participle, it often loses the idea of chance, and denotes mere coincidence in time (I am just now, I was just then) or simply I am (was). Xenophon uses this construction numerous times in the Anabasis; see, e.g., 1.1.10, 1.9.31. 2.1.7, 2.2.14, 2.2.20.

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it did at least three days before, when tensions between the two camps reached fever pitch (2.5.1). Even if we admit, arguendo, that Chirisophus was foraging contrary to the terms of the treaty, his actions could not therefore have pre-cipitated the arrest of the generals. To overcome this inconsistency, one must accuse the Greeks of having foraged in violation of the treaty before the arrest, an argument from silence which I do not find convincing.16

Lastly, as mentioned above, Xenophon is quite emphatic that the Persians had broken their oaths. Xenophon even reiterates this allegation in the Cyropaedia, placing oath breaking at the beginning of his notorious prcis of the decline of Persian morals (8.8.1-4).17 His confidence is also inspired by subsequent developments in Greco-Persian relations. In the Hellenica, Tissaphernes is again shown to be duplicitous: Xenophon was probably pres-ent when he swore a false oath to Agesilaus in order to buy time for the Persian King to collect a large enough army to resist the Spartan advance into Persian held territory (3.4.5-6, 11; cf. Ages. 1.17-18). Admittedly, Xenophons theological Weltanschauung also probably shaped his negative attitude of the Persians. In his theological universe, the success of the army in resisting the Persians and their allies on the march to the sea is testament to the Greeks having divine favor; the gods simply do not reward impious individuals, especially those who break their oaths (cf. 3.2.10 with 4.8.25).18 However, this only confirmed what he already knew from personal experience: much of the Persian leadership of his day, as witnessed by the behavior of Tissaphernes and others after the battle of Cunaxa, was a treacherous, deceitful, and perjurous lot.19 This is not

16 So Bassett 2002, 460: Cheirisophus is unlikely to have been the only Greek engaged in foraging, and this is unlikely to have been the only occasion on which it occurred (emphasis mine). If such was the case, surely Tissaphernes would have mentioned it to Clearchus during their confab right before the arrest (2.5.3-26). It is also noteworthy that those in the Persian camp who were trying to spread false charges against Clearchus and the Greeks (2.5.24-5) never impute foraging to the Greeks.

17 A majority of scholars now accept the authenticity of the Cyropaedias epilogue (8.8). See Delebecque 1957, 405-10; Tatum 1989, 220-5; Gera 1993, 16-22; Nadon 2001, 139-46.

18 For Xenophons views, see Dillery 1995, 179-94; Pownall 1998, 251-77; and Hyland 2005, 164-71.

19 See Cawkwell 2005, 198-9, who questions Xenophons thesis of Persian moral decline in the fourth century. The view of Hirsch 1985, 26 and 159, n. 44 that besides Tissaphernes and Artaxerxes II (cf. 3.2.4), Xenophon does not express disdain for other Persians in the Anabasis cannot be maintained upon closer scrutiny. Xenophon, for instance, imputes the crime of perjury not to Tissaphernes specifically but to the Persians generally, saying, they broke the treaty ( ) (3.1.21; cf. 3.2.10 and 3.5.5). The Persian Ariaeus, one of the the most faithful () to Cyrus, along with Mithradates and

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to say that Xenophon should be uncritically trusted as a historian of Persian affairs or that he cannot be an artful reporter with chauvinistic biases. Rather, in this particular case the evidence suggests strongly to the contrary.20

Joseph JansenRhodes College, Dept. of Greek and Roman Studies2000 N. ParkwayMemphis, TN 38112-1690, USA

jansenj@rhodes.edu

Received: February 2012; accepted: March 2012

Bibliography

Anderson, J.K. 1974. Xenophon (London)Bassett, S. 2002. Innocent Victims or Perjurers Betrayed? The Arrest of the Generals in

Xenophons Anabasis, CQ 52.2, 447-61Bury, J.G. 1902. A History of Greece, vol. II (London)Cawkwell, G. 1972. Introduction, in: Warner, R. XenophonThe Persian Expedition

(London), 9-48 2005. The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia (Oxford)Dalby, A. 1992. Greeks Abroad: Social Organization and Food Among the Ten Thousand,

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Artaozus (2.5.35), was the only one of his philoi and table mates who abandoned him and did not fight and die over his corpse (1.9.31). The integrity and faithfulness of the Persian noble Orontas is also thoroughly questioned by Xenophon, who discusses at length his past treachery to Cyrus and his deceitful, treasonous actions on the march (1.6; 1.9.29). The recent attempt of Danzig (2007) to rehabilitate the character of Tissaphernes by cit-ing the command of Cyrus father to be designing and cunning, wily and deceitful, a thief and a robber, overreaching the enemy at every point (Cyr.1.6.27-8) is thought provoking but not completely convincing. Even if we grant that Xenophon shared the view of Cyrus father (a problematic proposition to say the least), these words are not an endorsement of perjury, a fact to which Danzig rightly admits but distorts when he argues that perjury is condemnable in Xenophons moral universe only if it becomes public knowledge: Tissaphernes greatest mistake may have been getting caught (43). Such a view is simply not supported by the evidence in the Anabasis.

20 I would like to thank my colleagues Geoff Bakewell, Kenny Morrell, Susan Satterfield, and David Sick for their help and encouragement with publishing this piece. I am also grateful to Michelle Currie for her assistance in the preparation of the manuscript.

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