7/23/2019 James Jeffrey - When Multilateralism Met Realism

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/james-jeffrey-when-multilateralism-met-realism 1/4

 When Multilateralism Met Realism — and Tried to

Make an Iran Deal1

The current debate offers a bonanza of lessons for IR students on how their theories are

applied outside the classroom and why sometimes even the most rigorous theorist needs tocompromise.

BY JA!" J!##R!Y $ A%&%"T ''( )*'+

,resident Barac- bama/s Aug. 0 speech on Iran( notable for its 1my way or war2 polemics( signals a

hardening of the debate over the Iran nuclear agreement( -nown as the Joint 3omprehensive ,lan

of Action( or J3,A( 4ust as 3ongress begins reviewing the deal. This political calcification reflects

 various factors( from presidential election polling( to tensions between the bama administration

and 3ongress( to the e5istential issues involved for iddle !astern states. But it draws much of its

fire from the unreconciled differences in competing world views of the many fors and contras 6 a

multilateral idealism for the former( a unilateral realism for the latter.

Both perspectives are valid( but neither is complete. 7ithout understanding the differences in

perspectives and attempting to bridge them( arriving at a rational decision will be hampered. !ven

more seriously( the ultimate up or down results 6 J3,A survives congressional review or doesn/t8

the J3,A( or whatever would replace it( strengthens iddle !ast stability or doesn/t 6 will be

crippled if the deal does not better reflect and reconcile these conflicting world views9 Thus bama/s

multilateral idealism needs a shot of unilateral realism( and the realist opposition needs to better

appreciate what multilateral idealism can and can/t do.

1 Jefrey, James “When Multilateralism Met Realism — and Tried to Make an Iran Deal”, disponibleen  https!!"orei#npoli$y%$om!&'1(!')!11!*hen+multilateralism+met+realism+iran+deal+obama+administration+$on#ress!    James Jefrey is $urrently hilip -olond. /isitin# 0ello* at theWashin#ton institute% e ser2ed as ambassador to Ira3, Turkey, and 4lbania, and as deputynational se$urity ad2isor%

1

7/23/2019 James Jeffrey - When Multilateralism Met Realism

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/james-jeffrey-when-multilateralism-met-realism 2/4

These two perspectives have a long history of conflict and cohabitation. The ,+:' effort with Iran on

the nuclear issue is a case of classic multilateral idealism9 global relationships as moral( ordered(

rational( and based on the rule of law. The operating elements of this system are nation states(

e;ually sovereign( and committed to the %.<. preamble/s values for which they signed up. The coin

of this realm is diplomatic politesse even among bitter enemies( with system member states treated

as inherently redeemable 6 if they promise to mend their ways.

This approach presents problems when dealing with a revolutionary anti=status ;uo state li-e Iran(

problems e5acerbated by the bama administration/s multilateral idealism on steroids. ,ro4ecting

their own views onto a very different culture( administration leaders have touted the opportunities

the deal offers Iran( as the president noted in his July '> statement( for 1integration into the global

economy( more engagement with the international community( and the ability of the Iranian people

to prosper and thrive2 will do far more than any J3,A details to -eep Iran nuclear weapons=free.

Iran/s past behavior is thus not particularly important. 7hat is( is 1going forward(2 as "ecretary of 

"tate John ?erry put it at the "tate @epartment press briefing on June '0. The administration thus

seemingly believes that Iran will adhere to the agreement because adherence is beneficial to Iran/s

inevitable 1vocation2 6 a normal system state.

%sually presidents operating in a multilateral idealism conte5t season it with a bit of realism see9

#ormer ,resident Richard <i5on/s 'C) Dietnam escalation while negotiating with 3hina and the

%""RE 6 especially with nuclear aspirant states where the negotiating record is not promising. But

the bama administration is hampered here from two directions9 #irst( by its dismissive attitude

towards military force the ultimate realist seasoningE in circumstances other than

counterterrorism. And second( by administration leaders/ 1grander ambitions for a deal they hope

could open up relations with FIranG and be part of a transformation in the iddle !ast(2 as &ardiner

Harris put it in the  New York Times. This supposedly( per ?erry/s words to the  Atlantic/s Jeffrey 

&oldberg in an interview  on Aug. +( could even produce %.".=Iranian 4oint action on regional

problems. In line with this( the administration seems to see any tough love towards Iran as

deleterious to the prize 6 which is a different Iran. But given the discouraging record of 

&

7/23/2019 James Jeffrey - When Multilateralism Met Realism

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/james-jeffrey-when-multilateralism-met-realism 3/4

transforming states Ira;( Afghanistan( 3hina( RussiaE( putting all of one/s eggs in this bas-et of 

idealist transformation seriously harms chances for managing an unpredictable Iran.

But those sharing the star- unilateral realism perspective of many J3,A opponents have their own

difficulties.

In dealing with security threats li-e Iran( realism has much to offer9 nly power and force( not laws

or trust or glitzy conferences in Alpine venues( can protect oneself and one/s friends from the

1other.2 But driven by moral repugnance at Iran/s undoubtedly aggressive policies( many opponents

see- not effective deterrence but something stronger 6 a permanent state of hostility toward Iran

that mirrors Tehran/s approach toward much of the world. 7hile critics of the agreement fre;uently 

cite the many flaws in the J3,A( for many the deal/s main problem is its failure to force Iran to

surrender virtually its entire nuclear program and remain permanently and internationally 

ostracized as the aggressor state they argue it is. The problem with this approach is not the end( per

se( but the means available to achieve it.

%nilateral realism( of course( has in its repertoire the means to this end 6 military force. %nilateral

%.". sanctions 4ust don/t cut it.E But this is not now an option. ,ublic opinion following the long

 wars in Ira; and Afghanistan is strongly against an attac- on Iran in almost all circumstances( and

as &en. Joseph @unford recently noted( America has more dangerous threats than Iran. Thus( the

%nited "tates 6 starting with the Bush administration 6 eschewed a unilateral military approach

 with Iran for an international mi5 of negotiation and sanctions bac-ed by threat of force( essentially 

applying multilateral idealism with unilateral realism threads( and that/s where we are today.

 7ith no unilateral realism means 6 military force or unilateral sanctions 6 at hand to achieve their

desired end( realist opponents must deploy multilateral idealism/s means9 thus( their calls for new 

international negotiations and sanctions to rectify the J3,A error. But these means( whether in

the ,+:' tal-s or in any successor negotiation with Tehran were the J3,A to be re4ectedE( cannot

produce the end which these opponents see-8 permanent ostracism is alien to the entire

5

7/23/2019 James Jeffrey - When Multilateralism Met Realism

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/james-jeffrey-when-multilateralism-met-realism 4/4

international law=based system. <ot even "addam Hussein/s idiotic defiance at a time of much

greater %.". dominance could generate perpetual outcast status.

Thus the problem with the unilateral realism approach. @espite bama/s accusations( opponents

 wisely avoid advocating the one means 6 military force 6 that would produce the victory over Iran

they want. The irony is that the uncertain ma5imum end which they could obtain with the

multilateral idealism means left to them 6 replacing the J3,A with a new multilateral negotiation

 bac-ed by new international sanctions 6 is simply limited improvements to the J3,A. And this

approach has ma4or ris-s9 'E no guarantee of a new( let alone better( agreement8 )E diplomatic

confusion8 E a refusal by the bama administration to reengage8 >E the li-ely erosion of sanctions8

+E the collapse( at least temporarily( of verification of Iran/s nuclear program8 and 0E the possible

e5ploitation of America/s credibility gap by Russia and 3hina.

If realist opponents have no choice to enlist these tools of multilateral idealism as a means to deal

 with Iran after -illing the J3,A( they need to analyze the practical pros and cons of the outcome in

advance. 7hat is the benefit of a new( still=less=than satisfactory( multilateral agreement in

comparison to the profound ris-s of -illing the e5isting agreement A magic victory over Iran

 without using force is 4ust not possible. And if the opponents of the deal still insist the J3,A must

go( they should present their alternative multilateral diplomatic( sanctions( and military plans in

detail 6 including hard evidence that the rest of the ,+:' would accommodate them.

Ki-ewise( if the bama administration wants to secure the agreement from congressional defeat and

ensure that it meets minimum American and partner security needs and thus not be re4ected by the

ne5t administrationE( it must introduce a more credible element of unilateral realism 6 namely( the

threat of military pressure so abhorred by this president 6 into its Iran policy( and distance itself 

credibly from the dream of a future Iran transformed by bama/s and ?erry/s diplomatic s-ill.

6