Jaafar - An Islamic Revolution in Egypt?
Transcript of Jaafar - An Islamic Revolution in Egypt?
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The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization Spring 2004, Article 3
AnIslamicRevolutioninEgypt?ByRudyJaafar
Middle Eastern countriesparticularly
in thesecondhalfof the twentiethcentury
have witnessed the rise of sociopolitical
movementsthat
pressure
governments
to
adopt the Sharia, or holy law of Islam, as
ultimate arbiter of social and public affairs.
The failures of socialism and panArabism
have,morethanever,strengthenedthebelief
inpolitical Islam aspanacea topolitical and
economic woes. These Islamic movements,
coupledwith other popular grievances, can
often threaten established regimes and state
structures,resulting inviolentarmedconflict
andchaos.ThehistoryofthemodernMiddle
East is repletewith such events: the Syrian
regimesassaulton thecityofHama in1982,
thenullificationof the1992electionsand the
subsequent civil war in Algeria, and the
recurrent flareups between militants and
security forces inEgypt, toname a few.The
mostsignificantofthemall,however,wasthe
Iranianrevolution, for itwas thesoleIslamic
strugglethatculminated intheestablishment
ofanIslamicstate.UsingtheIranianmodelas
a basis of comparison, I will examine the
possibility, or lack thereof, of the emergence
of a revolutionary Islamic government inEgypt, and by extension, evaluate the
apparentuniquenessoftheIranianrevolution
in thehistoryofpolitical Islam.As theArab
worldsmostpopulousnation,Egypt isalso,
quotingFouadAjami, the statewhereArab
historycomesintofocus.1Inotherwords,an
analysis of revolutionary political Islam in
Egypt would shed some light on the
developmentsof Islamicmovements inother
Arab countries. Iwill startmy analysiswith
theobvious:
Iran
is
aShia
country,
whereas
EgyptspopulationispredominantlySunni.Is
therean intrinsiccharacteristic inShia Islam
thatallowsitsadherentstomobilizeandfight
fora religious authority?Wewillattempt to
answerthisquestionbyconsidering,first,the
ideologicalanddoctrinalfoundations,aswell
as thehistoricalpositionsofShiaandSunni
spiritualleadersvisvistemporalauthority.
Temporal and Spiritual inter-relations inShia Islam
The Shia, to this day,believe that the
leadership of the community ofMuslims is
the divine right of the descendants of the
ProphetthroughthefirstImam Ali.Thisline
of descendants constitutes the line of Shia
Imams,whohave,historically,challengedthe
prevailing authority of their time. Their
rebelliousactivity resulted in themartyrdom
of the first three Imams and the subsequent
persecution of theirdescendants.The Imami
challenge to temporal authority continued
until theghaiba,oroccultation,of the twelfthand lastImam,MuhammadalMahdi,in874.
Here, it is believed the twelfth Imam
miraculouslydisappeared; however, he is to
return to the temporalplane in the future in
ordertoinstitutejusticeonearthandheralda
goldenageforMuslimsandhumanity.
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Shia EthosThe origins of Shia ethos are therefore
found in rebellion and martyrdom. The
rebelliousanddisappearingImamsofShiism
have enabled the development of a dual
ideologythatcouldbeeitherrevolutionaryor
quietist. Indeed, the paradigm of the
messianicMahdicancarry,ontheonehand,a
revolutionary significance, similar to the
rebellionsagainst the temporalauthoritiesof
the early founding Imams. In contrast, the
ideology can alsobe quietist in nature, and
here the concept of the ghaiba is of utmost
importance, for, in theabsenceof theMahdi,
theShiaare tomind theirownbusinessand
paylipservicetotheauthorities.
Another major aspect of Shia ethos
stems from the martyrdom of the earlyImams. Alis, and particularly Husseins,
deaths at the hands of their enemies have
createdanabhorrenceoftyrannyandinjustice
in themindsof the followersofShiism.The
early Imams have been remembered as
championsof theoppressed in theirstruggle
against the impious rulers. The dialectic
between theconceptsofjusticeandrebellion
in opposition to those of tyranny and
oppressionhasthereforebeencentraltoShia
thought.We
will
now
examine
the
influence
it
has had on the development of the Shia
clergy.
Iranian Shia ClericsThe particular historical and ideological
development of Shia identity has led to
unique results in the evolution of the Shia
clericalestablishment.Beginning in sixteenth
century Iran, the Safavids bestowed upon
these clerics, or ulama (singular: alim)
religious scholars considered guardians of
Islamictraditions economicbenefitssuchas
property and the right to collect religious
taxes from the populous.2The Iranian Shia
ulamaenjoyed, therefore, from the startand
as a result of their relative financial
independence, strong positions visvis the
state. Moreover, the decline of temporal
powerinPersia,fromtheseventeenthcentury
onwards,furtherstrengthenedthe ulamaand
enabledthemtoquestionthelegitimacyofthe
rulers. Another factor that proved to be a
sourceofindependenceandincreasingpower
for the ulamawas the locationof important
Shia centers of learning and leadership
outside Iran, in theOttoman cities ofNajaf
andKarbala.Temporal and spiritualpowers
were thereforegeographicallyseparated,and
the clergy couldbetter resist thepressure of
theIranianstate.3
The Usuli School
The independence of the ulama in
eighteenth century Persia led to the
emergenceof a school of thought specific to
Persian Shia Islam.TheUsuli,orMujtahidi,
doctrine,asitcametobeknown,centeredon
theconceptof themujtahid,aclericwhohas
undergoneextensivetrainingintheologyand
hasbecome a recognized interpreter of law
anddoctrine.Thisideologyboundsbelievers,
rulers included, to follow the teaching of an
accomplished mujtahid, sometimes referred
toasmarjaetaqlid, inthepoliticalsphereas
inotherareasofhumanactivity.HamidAlgar
argues that, under Usuli doctrine, the
monarch was theoretically bound, no lessthanhissubjects,tosubmittotheguidanceof
a mujtahid, in effect making the state the
executivebranchof ulamaauthority.4Usuli
doctrinethereforeprovidesthemujtahidwith
tremendous power, his rulings carrying far
morelegitimacythananyissuedbythestate.
The emergence of these particular
doctrines and powers of the Shia clergy in
Persia is, therefore, a direct result of the
historicalconditionsarisingsince thebirthof
Islamthroughtheearlytwentiethcentury.Wewill now turn to the role of the Egyptian
ulama, who have had a diametrically
opposedhistoricalpath ina landsubscribing
toSunniIslam.
Temporal and Spiritual inter-relations inSunni Islam
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Early Sunni doctrinal developments, andcontrasts with Shi'ism
The history of orthodox Islam has
produced differing results for the Sunni,
compared to the Shia, ulama. The Sunni
clerical establishment has historically
supported the rulers and they therefore
enjoyed the protection of the state. Unlike
their Shia counterparts, the Sunni ulama
thereforehadtodeveloptheirdoctrinesunder
the aegis of a government claiming political
legitimacy. The Shia ulama possessed no
politicalprotectors,andwere,asaresult,not
forcedtoreconciletheirdoctrineswithofficial
temporal creed. Sunni clerics, on the other
hand, in return for state protection, had to
sacrificetheirdoctrinalindependence.5There
have been interesting parallel historical
processes, albeit with different endresults,
between Sunni and Shia doctrinal
developments.TheSunniAbbasiddynastyin
Baghdadaswellas theShiaSafavidsofIran
hadbothsupported,intheircomingtopower,
ulama with a Mutazili outlook. Mutazili
thoughtemphasizestheapplicationofreason
and educatedjudgment to questions of law
and doctrine. This rationalist approach was
challenged, however, in both cases, by
traditionalists refusing to waiver from theliteralmeaning of religious texts. In Safavid
Iran,aswehaveseen, the ulamamaintained
individual judgment and interpretation in
legal theory; ijtihadwas indeed encouraged
following rigorous training. In the Abbasid
case though, thevictory, for reasonsbeyond
the scopeof this study,wasachievedby the
literalists. Individual interpretation of law
and doctrine was prohibited. This event is
referred to as the closure of the doors of
ijtihadin
Sunni
Islam.
Evidently,
this
development further curtails the power of
Sunni ulama.6
The 'ulama of Egypt
TheEgyptian ulamasfinancialsituation
was radically different than that of their
Iranian Shia counterparts; they were
financially dependent on the state. The
Egyptian ulama receivedno cashmoney for
their teaching but were paid in rations of
bread,donations,giftsofclothing,orfinancial
endowments.7
On several occasions, the
Egyptian ulamawere cowed
through
finances by the rulers due to their
dependenceonthestate.8UnliketheSafavids
or the Qajars, the Ottoman and Mameluk
rulers ofEgyptwere thereforevery effective
in curtailing the power of the ulama.
Moreover, the Egyptian states successful
formationofamodernizedarmyandacentral
bureaucracy in the early nineteenth century
further reduced the power of the ulama.9
Thiscasecontrastssharply,aswehaveseen,
with developments in Iran. The financial
dependenceofthe ulamaonthestateandthe
centralization of Egypt do not explain,
however, the absence of political leadership
on the part of the Sunni clerics. Therewere
many occasions when the state effectively
collapsed and the ulama were left with
tremendous power on their hands, yet they
failed toshow leadershipand takecontrolof
the situation. Throughout Egyptian history,
the ulama have temporarily filled a power
vacuum, when one occurred, only torelinquish political authority when it was
firmly in their hands.10
The most notable
example, occurred following the French
invasion in 1798. Napoleon courted the
ulama and lavished them with gifts and
wealth forhesaw themasnatural leadersof
the native society. He tried to establish a
nativegovernmentbyofferingthe ulamathe
highestpoliticaloffices,butthe ulamawould
notaccept.Theyinformedhimthattheywere
accustomed tohavingTurkishofficialsat thehead of allbureaus of the government, and
Turkswerefinallyretainedattheheadofthe
governorship, the army and the police.11
DanielCreceliusarguesthatthisdevelopment
isa reflex from theSunni ulamascenturies
oldsubmissiontopoliticaltyranny,aswellas
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anadmissionoftheir inabilitytoperformthe
vitalfunctionsofgovernment.12
TheSunni ulamacouldnotconceiveofa
government inwhich they exercised power.
Their role, as it has always been, was to
advisethe
government
of
others;
to
govern
the governors. They did not aspire to lead
politically.Theywerepreserversof tradition,
politicalbrokersatmost,and they couldnot
shatter this image of themselves.13
They
correspond to the classical Sunni role of the
Muslim thinker, best expounded by Al
Ghazali,described asdirectorof conscience
for political authority in administering and
discipliningmen that order andjusticemay
reigninthisworld.14
The doctrinal differences we have
exploredbetween theShiaandSunni ulama
are numerous and consequential. Alone,
however, they do not explain the
phenomenonof the Islamic revolution.After
all, the Iranian ulama had coexisted for
hundreds of years with rulers more
authoritarian and despotic thanMohammad
RezaShah.Moreover, the clericsof Iranhad
not, preceding the revolution, advocated the
seizure of political power; on the contrary,
theyhadremainedonthemarginsofpolitics.Based on this analysis, it is safe to conclude
thattherehappenedaspecificdevelopmentin
twentieth century Iranwhich permitted the
establishment of an Islamic republic. A
development,asweshallsee,notmirroredin
Egypt.
The rise of the Islamist movement in Egypt
The government, al-Azhar, and the militants
Asdiscussedearlier,the ulamainEgypt
hadalwaysbeenaninstrumentofthestateto
legitimizetherulingelite.Followingthe1952
revolution, however, the abuse of this
instrument reached absurd proportions, as
the following example illustrates. Under
Nasser, the servicesof the ulamawereused
to legitimizeArabnationalismandsocialism.
Sadat then solicited alAzhar todelegitimize
the socialists and the nasserites. He then
pushed for support of his policies and used
alAzharasa counterweight to themilitants,
asdidhissuccessorMubarak.15TheEgyptian
governments takeover of religious
institutions,and
their
subsequent
crisis
of
legitimacy,were themost important factors
contributing to the emergence of radical
Islamic groups, such as Jihad, Gamaa
Islamiya, and Takfir wa alHijra, whose
purpose was the violent overthrow of the
regime.16Anotherelement strengthening the
recruitmentbaseof these radicalgroupswas
theexplosionoftheurbanpopulationduetoa
decrease in themortality rates coupledwith
massiveruralmigration.Indeed,theslumsof
Cairoconstituteperfectenvironments for theeffervescence of radical Islamic ideologies,
feeding on the alienation and destitution of
large collectives of people. The Egyptian
Islamic militants believed the clerics had
surrendered their right as interpretersof the
faithbecause they colludedwith the unjust
temporalauthorities.
Violentactionsagainsttherulers,carried
under the banner of Islam, were therefore
legitimate.Theseextremistgroupsengagedin
assassinations
and
brutal
attacks
in
order
to
destabilize the ruling authorities. The most
notable event was President Sadats
assassination in 1981 by Egyptian army
membersofalJihad.Anotherimportantevent
istheNovember1997LuxorattackbyGamaa
extremistswhichkilled58foreigntouristsand
4Egyptians,andwhichresultedinamassive
reduction inthenumberof tourists, followed
by a serious downturn in the countrys
economy. Following these operations,
however, there occurred a shift in support
away from the militants. The Egyptian
populationsbackingforthemilitantIslamists
witheredasimagesofthedisplaysofviolence
were broadcast on the news. These actions
appalledalargesectionofthepeople,andas
a result, themilitants lost thepublic support
theyhadenjoyed.Moreover, thegovernment
seized the opportunity and respondedwith
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an allout war on these extremists before
completely neutralizing their operational
capacity. Many militants died or fled the
country during these ruthless campaigns
waged by the state security forces. The
conclusion was an unconditional ceasefire
announcedbyGamaaIslamiyainMarch1999,
followed thereafterbyAlJihadsdeclaration
of the end of military operations in June
2000.17Nowadays,therefore,theviolentand
direct threat to the integrity of theEgyptian
state has significantly subsided. This
development has not spelled the end of the
Islamicmovement inEgypthowever.A1994
alAhram poll declared that 86 percent of
EgyptiansbelievedviolentIslamicgroupsdid
not
work
to
the
benefit
of
society.
The
same
poll alsomentioned that 73 percent thought
nonviolent Islamic groupsbenefited Egypt.
Therewasthereforebroadsupportamongthe
peopletogiveIslamagreaterroleinstateand
society;thedisagreementwasoverthemeans
employedtoachievethatresult.
The path of non-violent polit ical Islam in EgyptThe pillar ofMuslim activism in Egypt
and in most Arab countries is the Muslim
Brotherhood.18Establishedin1928byHassan
AlBanna, the Brotherhoods ideology is
basedontheestablishmentofanIslamicstate
and the application of Sharia as the only
solution toall societal ills. Itscommitment is
to socialjustice and it perceives its foreign
enemiesasCapitalismandZionism.19In the
eighties, following fruitless bloody conflicts
withthegovernment,theBrethrenrenounced
violence as a means of achieving their
politicalaims.Thosememberswhodisagreed
and believed in the continuation of violent
struggle splintered and formed the violent
groupsGamaa andJihadmentioned earlier.
With this new nonviolent strategy, the
Brethren were allowed by Sadat to run for
parliamentary elections.20
The Muslim
Brothers new focus shifted towards
penetratingtheorgansofcivilsocietyinorder
toenlarge theirpowerbaseand spread their
message.Their targetswere the professional
associations of doctors, engineers,
pharmacists and university teachers.21
Throughout the Arab world, these
associationsare
the
most
active
civil
organizations because of the high level of
education and political conscience of their
members, as well as their independent
financial resources. This new nonviolent
strategyprovedvery successful andpolitical
Islamic activism developed a substantial
socioeconomic base. For example, the
movement creatednew Islamicbankswhich
amassed deposits surpassing those of state
ownedorconventionalbanks.Themovement
was
also
capable
of
providing
better
health
andsocialservicesthanthoseofthestate.22
PublicsupportforIslamicgroupingsalso
increased, when in times of crisis, these
organizations outperformed the government
inassistingthevictims,aswasthecaseinthe
October 1992 earthquake. The Brotherhood
emergedfromthe2000electionswith17seats,
thelargestgroupintheopposition.
Aswehave seen, the statesdominance
of AlAzhars completely discredited the
institution.
This
in
turn
has
provided
support
to the Islamic militants from a population
disenchantedby the dearth of a viable and
constructivepolitical ideology, aswell asby
increasing economic and social woes. The
extremeviolenceperpetratedbythemilitants
alienated the people, however, and the
Egyptiangovernmentmanagedtosubduethe
militant Islamic threat to its integrity. The
growthof thenonviolent Islamicmovement
seekingtoturnEgyptintoanIslamicstatehas
notbeenaffectedthough.Indicationsactually
pointtowardsanincreaseinitspopularbase.
Iranian developments in po litical Islam
On the other side of the Middle East,
Iranianhistory followedadistinctlydifferent
path.SimilarlytotheEgyptiancase,therewas
massive ruralmigration, a destabilization of
the traditional social groups due to rapid
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modernization, and state repression.23
The
regime,however,wasunable toweather the
assaultson itsauthority.ThePahlavissimply
couldnotholdontopoweramidthemassive
nationwidecampaignofcivildisobedience.24
A question arises: how was popular
discontent transformed into largescale
rebellion,before ending in the establishment
of an Islamic regime? We will start our
analysis with the leader of the revolution,
AyatollahKhomeini.
Khomeini's leadershipWith thepublicationofVelayateFaqih,
hisseminalwork,andinaradicalbreakwith
traditional Shia positions of political
passivity,Khomeini
advocated
the
acquisition
oftemporalpowerbytheclergy.25Heargued
that it was the duty of the Faqih to seize
powerand implement thepreceptsofSharia
asbest as he could.A societybased on the
holy law of Islam, and guidedby aMuslim
religiousjurisconsult,wasthebest thatcould
beachievedbefore thecomingof theMahdi.
Though many in the Shia clerical
establishment opposed his views, Khomeini
was able,nonetheless, toprovide the ulama
withatheoretical
and
doctrinal
justification
forpolitical engagement. In order to expand
his message further and unite, under his
leadership,thevariousgroupsopposedtothe
Shah, Khomeini incorporated into his work
ideasfromanotherIraniantheoreticalthinker,
Dr. Ali Shariati. Khomeini substituted the
concept of the faqih for Shariatis
rawshanfekran, or enlightened intellectual,
as the leader of the Islamic revolution.
Moreover,inhisdiscoursepost1970,heused
Marxist terms of class struggle, plentiful in
Shariatis analysis, to proclaim himself
representative of the disinherited.26
S.E.
Ibrahim states that Islamic and leftist
ideologies provide a persuasive intellectual
responsetothe issuesofnationalcrises,class
malaise, and individual alienation.27
Khomeini succeeded in magnifying their
impacts.Hisgroundbreakingwork fused the
two ideologies together, the Islamic and the
leftist,andtheircombinedeffectprovedtobe
far superior than the sumof their individual
parts. Khomeinis ideas spread to large
segments of the Iranian population; poor
young militants interpreted this new Shia
doctrine in a revolutionary context, and the
educated urban middle class joined the
chorus.This intelligentsiadeluded itself into
believing that in the end, following the
removal of the Shah, it would unseat
Khomeini, this charismaticbut impotentold
man.28Their predictions, obviously, failed
miserably. In addition to the poor and the
secularmiddleclass,anotherimportantsocial
group,
the
bazaar,
joined
Khomeinis
revolutionary forces. These merchants
representedthetraditionalalliesoftheclerical
establishmentinIranandthetwoclasseshad,
inthepast,joinedforcesintheirhostilitytoa
strong state. The bazaar always resented a
centralized government that could have
burdened it with heavy taxation. It had
therefore supported the ulama in their
opposition to the state since the late 19th
century.Thealliancebetweenthemosqueand
thebazaarwasoldandwellestablished.With
the first violent incidents in 1978, the
revolutionary wheel was set in motion. In
addition to Khomeinis leadership, the
popular uprising benefited from the
confluenceofseveralotherfactors:the ulama
provided logistical and organizational
support using their network of 80,000
mosques,thebazaarissuppliedthefunds,and
the rural migration of the previous years
provided the human potential for mass
mobilization ineverymajorcity in Iran.29In
summary, we can state that though the
opposition to the Shahwaswidespread and
the popular movement benefited from
favorable causes, most importantly, it was
unitedundertheleadershipoftheAyatollah,
asheaccomplishedtwomajordevelopments.
He first transcended, theoretically, the
limitations of the marjae taqlid and
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established the concept of Velayate Faqih,
increasing further the power of the clergy.
Secondly, he created an umbrella for all the
different political and social movements
opposingtheShah.
Comparative Analysis
The Egyptian ulama lost their
legitimacy, and the popular religious
leadership of the opposition passed to
reactionary organizations created by men
whowerenotclericswithtraditionalreligious
educations. The ensuing rift between these
twopolesof the Islamicmovement inEgypt
severely constrained its powers and
effectiveness in challenging the state. The
Iranian religious movement was capable of
facing the Shah with one united front,
whereas the Egyptian Islamic opposition is
handicapped by its internal conflict, which
has prevented the emergence of a unifying
figure in the image of the Ayatollah
Khomeini,anindispensableleaderinthecase
oftheIranianrevolution.
Another important factor is thescopeof
the ideology underpinning the revolt. The
Iranian revolution contained elements of a
class struggle superimposed on the religious
natureof
the
event.
Khomeini
sradical
ideology was the cornerstone of this
revolution, for it united the multifarious
forces opposing the Shahunder onebanner,
that of political Islam. Though Egyptian
Islamists attracted people from diverse
backgrounds,theirideaswereopposedbythe
clerical establishment, and were therefore
deniedtheirsupportinbecomingasignificant
force for change. The organizational role
played by the mosque in the Iranian
revolution
is
a
case
in
point.
The
legitimacy
of
the governments the radical Islamists are
fighting is also of importance to this study.
The Shah, for example, was alien to his
people.His forcedmodernizationpolicies,as
wellashisKemalistattacksonthetraditional
moresofhissociety,decreasedhislegitimacy.
Hisstrongalliancewith theUSandIsrael,as
well as his capitulation to the American
demandoflegalimmunitytoUSpersonnelin
Iran, also damaged his credibility. On the
otherhand,theradicalEgyptiangroupsfacea
government possessing stronger credentials
from thepopulous.Nasser, forexample,was
the champion of nationalism and pan
Arabism, a largerthanlife figure who was
extremely popular in Egypt. Nasser was
therefore able to fight the Islamists more
effectively than the Shah. Even Sadats
position was better than the Shahs, for,
though he signed a peace treatywith Israel,
he had fought a successful war with the
IsraelisandmanagedtoregaintheSinaiwith
theCampDavidaccords.
Conclusion
Ihavetraced, throughoutthisstudy, the
historical, doctrinal, ideological and political
dimensionsoftheIslamicmovementsinboth
IranandEgypt.Bothactorssought to initiate
a popular Islamic revolution and topple the
government,thoughonlyonewassuccessful.
Today,itseemsunlikelythatthesecondevent
will occur; in other words, Egypt will not
experience an Islamic revolution. However,
this conclusion does not exclude the
possibilityofEgyptbecominganIslamicstate.
Indeed,as
it
is
mentioned
in
this
research,
the
Egyptian Islamists are gaining ground.They
are slowly, but surely, penetrating all
instrumentsofcivilsociety;theyhaveshifted
theirstrategyfromatopdowntoabottomup
approach. Nonetheless, their ultimate goal
hasremained theestablishmentofanIslamic
government.ValiNasrdistinguishes the two
movements as Red andGreen Islam.30Red
Islam corresponds to the Iranian case; a
revolutionaryideologyimbuedwithelements
ofMarxistclassstruggle.GreenIslam,on theotherhand, isnot revolutionarybut consists
ofaslowandgradualevolution towards the
establishment of an Islamic state. Geneive
Abdoswork31is insightful inthisrespect,as
itelucidatessomeof the tacticsandprogress
achieved by the new Islamists of Egypt in
furtheringtheiragenda.
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The views and opinions expressed in articles arestrictly the authors own, and donotnecessarilyrepresent those ofAl Nakhlah, itsAdvisory andEditorial Boards, or the Program on Southwest
Asia and Islamic Civilization (SWAIC) at TheFletcherSchool.
1
FouadAjami,TheArabpredicament:Arabpoliticalthoughtandpracticesince1967(NewYork:
CambridgeUniversityPress),13.2NikkiKeddie,TherootsoftheUlamaspowerinmodernIran,inScholars,Saints,andSufis:
MuslimreligiousinstitutionsintheMiddleEastsince1500,ed.NikkiR.Keddie(Los
Angeles:UniversityofCaliforniaPress),221222.3Ibid,226.
4HamidAlgar,TheoppositionalroleoftheUlamainTwentiethcenturyIran,inScholars,
Saints,andSufis:MuslimreligiousinstitutionsintheMiddleEastsince1500,ed.NikkiR.
Keddie(LosAngeles:UniversityofCaliforniaPress),235.5NikkiKeddie,TherootsoftheUlamaspowerinmodernIran,inScholars,Saints,andSufis:
MuslimreligiousinstitutionsintheMiddleEastsince1500,ed.NikkiR.Keddie(LosAngeles:UniversityofCaliforniaPress),216.
6Ibid,223224.
7AfafLutfialSayyidMarsot,TheUlamaofCairointheEighteenthandNineteenthcenturies,
inScholars,Saints,andSufis:MuslimreligiousinstitutionsintheMiddleEastsince1500,
ed.NikkiR.Keddie(LosAngeles:UniversityofCaliforniaPress),154155.8Ibid.
9NikkiKeddie,TherootsoftheUlamaspowerinmodernIran,inScholars,Saints,andSufis:
MuslimreligiousinstitutionsintheMiddleEastsince1500,ed.NikkiR.Keddie(Los
Angeles:UniversityofCaliforniaPress),213.
10
AfafLutfialSayyidMarsot,TheUlamaofCairointheEighteenthandNineteenthcenturies,
inScholars,Saints,andSufis:MuslimreligiousinstitutionsintheMiddleEastsince1500,
ed.NikkiR.Keddie(LosAngeles:UniversityofCaliforniaPress),159163.11DanielCrecelius,NonideologicalresponsesoftheEgyptianUlamatomodernization,in
Scholars,Saints,andSufis:MuslimreligiousinstitutionsintheMiddleEastsince1500,
ed.NikkiR.Keddie(LosAngeles:UniversityofCaliforniaPress),173174.12Ibid.
13AfafLutfialSayyidMarsot,TheUlamaofCairointheEighteenthandNineteenthcenturies,
inScholars,Saints,andSufis:MuslimreligiousinstitutionsintheMiddleEastsince1500,
ed.NikkiR.Keddie(LosAngeles:UniversityofCaliforniaPress),164165.
14
GillesKepel,MuslimExtremisminEgypt(LosAngeles:UniversityofCaliforniaPress),229230.
15MuhammadQasimZaman,TheUlamaincontemporaryIslam:custodiansofchange(New
Jersey:PrincetonUniversityPress),146.16TamirMoustafa,ConflictandCooperationBetweentheStateandReligiousInstitutionsin
ContemporaryEgypt,InternationalJournalofMiddleEasternStudies32(2000):10.
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7/27/2019 Jaafar - An Islamic Revolution in Egypt?
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17TheEconomistIntelligenceUnit,Countryprofile2002:Egypt,TheEconomistIntelligence
UnitLimited(2002):9.18SaadEddinIbrahim,Egypt,Islam,andDemocracy(Cairo:TheAmericanUniversityinCairo
Press),56.19Ibid,24.
20TamirMoustafa,ConflictandCooperationBetweentheStateandReligiousInstitutionsin
contemporaryEgypt,InternationalJournalofMiddleEasternStudies32(2000):1718.21SaadEddinIbrahim,Egypt,Islam,andDemocracy(Cairo:TheAmericanUniversityinCairo
Press),58.22Ibid,6061.
23GillesKepel,JihadTheTrailofPoliticalIslam(Massachusetts:TheBelknapPressofHarvard
UniversityPress),108;HosseinBashiriyeh,TheStateandRevolutioninIran,19621982
(NewYork:StMartinsPress),34.24SaidAmirArjomand,TheTurbanfortheCrownTheIslamicRevolutioninIran(NewYork:
Oxford
University
Press),
191.
25GillesKepel,JihadTheTrailofPoliticalIslam(Massachusetts:TheBelknapPressofHarvard
UniversityPress),40.26Ibid,41.
27SaadEddinIbrahim,Egypt,Islam,andDemocracy(Cairo:TheAmericanUniversityinCairo
Press),26.28GillesKepel,JihadTheTrailofPoliticalIslam(Massachusetts:TheBelknapPressofHarvard
UniversityPress),7.29HosseinBashiriyeh,TheStateandRevolutioninIran,19621982(NewYork:StMartinsPress),
121122.30
SeyyedRezaValiNasr,lectureonLatesttrendsinpoliticalIslam,TheFletcherSchoolofLawandDiplomacy,TuftsUniversity,Medford,MA.,5November2003.
31SeeGeneiveAbdo,NoGodbutGod:EgyptandthetriumphofIslam(NewYork:Oxford
UniversityPress).
Al Nakhlah The Fletcher School Tufts University